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Central Bank of Boone County, Columbia 2,746,579,000 1,372,672,000 900,140,000 2,240,365,000 190,561,000

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Central Bank of Boone County, Columbia 2,746,579,000 1,372,672,000 900,140,000 2,240,365,000 190,561,000 2020 ANNUAL REPORT Table of Contents Year in Review ...................................................................................... 4 Letter to Shareholders ............................................................................ 5 2020 Managing Through Crisis ........................................................... 11 Central Bancompany Welcomes John “JR” Ross ...................................... 15 Financial Review ................................................................................. 17 Five–Year Consolidated Average Balance Sheet ..................................... 20 Five–Year Consolidated Summary of Operations ..................................... 21 Financial Data of Affiliate Banks ........................................................... 22 Independent Auditor's Report ............................................................... 23 History of Central Bancompany ............................................................ 79 Directors and Senior Leadership of Central Bancompany ......................... 81 Affiliates of Central Bancompany .......................................................... 82 2 Financial Highlights TOTAL AVERAGE ASSETS (in billions) TOTAL AVERAGE DEPOSITS (in billions) $16,721 $12,910 17,000 13,000 16,000 12,000 15,000 11,000 $13,635 $10,321 14,000 $12,713 $12,694 10,000 $9,668 $9,660 13,000 $12,245 $9,189 12,000 9,000 0 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 GROWTH EARNINGS PER SHARE BOOK VALUE PER SHARE $526.69 58 $54.41 530 54 500 $480.46 50 $47.38 46 470 $439.97 42 $40.13 440 38 $403.43 34 $32.10 410 $30.97 $380.51 30 380 0 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 NET INCOME (in millions) ANNUAL DIVIDENDS PER SHARE $10.10 $240.8 250.0 10.00 $8.50 230.0 $209.6 8.00 $7.00 210.0 $6.22 190.0 $177.6 6.00 170.0 $4.50 4.00 150.0 $142.0 $137.0 PERFORMANCE 130.0 2.00 0 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 EFFICIENCY RATIO (%) 59.8 % 60 % 59.3 % 59 % 58.0 % 58 % 57 % 56.0 % 55.8 % 56 % 55 % 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 EFFICIENCY 3 Year in Review CENTRAL BANCOMPANY, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES For the Year 2020 2019 Interest Income $534,087,000 538,614,000 Interest Expense 40,732,000 73,595,000 Net Interest Income 493,355,000 465,019,000 Provision for Loan Losses 27,153,000 14,025,000 Non-Interest Income 274,214,000 190,262,000 Non-Interest Expense 429,625,000 368,928,000 Income Taxes 70,015,000 62,685,000 Net Income 240,776,000 209,643,000 Average Daily Assets 16,721,466,000 13,635,347,000 Average Daily Deposits 12,910,023,000 10,321,184,000 Average Daily Loans 10,067,989,000 8,670,796,000 At Year End Total Assets $18,299,657,000 14,960,940,000 Investment Securities 5,413,954,000 3,633,572,000 Loans 10,374,452,000 9,475,093,000 Deposits 14,391,324,000 11,566,917,000 Stockholders’ Equity 2,330,655,000 2,126,063,000 Number of Outstanding Shares 4,425,085 4,425,085 Per Share Net Income $54.41 47.38 Dividends 10.10 8.50 Stockholders’ Equity 526.69 480.46 4 To Our Shareholders Unprecedented. That’s a word we’ve heard over and over in the last twelve months. And yet, despite the pandemic, in a year of one of the most contentious presidential elections in modern history, there is one other important and good thing you can add to the list of unprecedented events we saw last year – your Company added another year of record earnings. How did that occur? For more than a century, this company has handled unprecedented times like the Roaring Twenties, Black Friday, the Great Depression, Stagflation, and the Great Recession in the same way. No matter what the pundits name the crisis, we take the long view and make our decisions based on sound economic principles. S. Bryan Cook, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 5 That is not to say that it was an easy year. It to provide excellent service to our customers. In was not. Applying precedents in a threatening March, we had just welcomed John Ross (JR), our environment requires creativity and discipline. new President and Chief Operating Officer to our Just as occurred in each of our personal lives, the company. With JR’s experience added to the mix, coronavirus disrupted almost every facet of our we turned our attention to two important priorities: operations. As did many of your families, our staying open for business to help our customers and co-workers lost loved ones and dear friends. We took keeping our employees safe. steps to protect our employees and our customers from the virus while innovating to keep our services We kept our drive-up branches open throughout the and our performance at the highest level. Once again, pandemic and found new ways to provide banking Forbes Magazine recognized our company by naming services electronically and in person. More and us the 4th "Best Bank in America" among the 100 more customers learned about our excellent internet largest banking companies and the top-rated bank in and mobile banking products that were developed four states; Missouri, Kansas, Illinois, and Oklahoma. before the pandemic and used them frequently. As customer's behavior changed, we evolved. Your When we reported to you at this time last year, we knew Company’s historic commitment to technology a new virus was quickly spreading across America. No prepared us well for these times. one really knew how bad it would get. The markets reacted with the fear that uncertainty often brings. A Here are some of the highlights that reveal our decline in publicly traded equities and interest rates character. showed that fear. We knew from our history that the The government introduced a program designed to low-rate environment would squeeze our net interest help our small businesses customers meet payroll and margin and thus earnings. But we have said that to keep them operating through the pandemic. The within our DNA is to prepare for the worst and hope Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) was launched in for the best. So as the economic turbulence increased, March by the Small Business Administration (SBA). we tightened our seatbelts and flew on. We saw our The start-up was difficult and key provisions changed employees work harder, think more creatively, and frequently but it was very successful in helping our plan together. businesses meet payroll. Our dedicated lending staff was in communication daily with the SBA as the program was rolled out at record speed. Because it was believed there was not enough federal funding to "...Forbes Magazine meet the demand, our lenders came to work the first day at 11:00 p.m. just to be ready for the midnight recognized our company by opening of the government's application portal. They naming us the 4th "Best Bank worked throughout the night and the weekend to help as many customers as possible. Within a few days, in America" among the 100 they had completed 9,400 applications for more than $941 million. Our hard work and effort made us the largest banking companies..." top PPP lender in the state of Missouri and in just about every market we serve. This is truly an amazing accomplishment. Difficult times don’t create character, they reveal it. We also had a record year in mortgage banking. Because Your Company benefitted from the value added by the Federal Reserve slashed key interest rates to near the people with whom we are honored to work with. zero, our customers began to refinance their mortgages These employees redesigned work processes on the fly into lower rates. Once again, our employees stepped yet found creative ways to work safely and continue up to the task. Our mortgage leaders redesigned 6 the lending process and enhanced our Mortgage • Total revenue increased by $112.3 million or Fulfillment Center so we could accommodate more 17.1% in 2020 to $767.6 million as net interest customers. Our loan originators and processors got income increased by $28.3 million or 6.1% and busy and worked tirelessly to make sure customers got non-interest income increased from $190.3 million the benefits of lower mortgage payments. As a result, to $274.2 million in 2020 driven by a $78.7 we had a record year in mortgage originations which million increase in mortgage banking income. contributed significantly to a record year of earnings. In total, we originated $3 billion in loans and continued • The Company's efficiency ratio was 55.8% in the expansion of our footprint in Nashville, TN and 2020 and 56.0% in 2019. Colorado. We are now well positioned to improve on • The reserve for loan losses, net of PPP loans, our strategic goal of being the best in class in residential increased from 1.40% in 2019 to 1.57% in 2020. mortgage lending. Net loan charge-offs were $9.6 million in 2020 – These efforts are highlighted because they tell the story 0.10% of loans and $9.1 million in 2019 – 0.11% of who we are, and were large contributors to this of loans. year’s unprecedented results. Big things result from • Total assets on December 31, 2020, were $18.3 countless small acts done exceedingly well, time and billion compared to $15.0 billion the prior time again, by people who know that excellence is a year-end. Total deposits increased from $11.6 way of life. We are so very fortunate that our Central billion at the end of 2019 to $14.4 billion on Bank family, who were with us well before the crisis, are December 31, 2020, while total loans increased committed to excellence. Their character was revealed from $9.5 billion to $10.4 billion on December as 2020 unfolded.
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