3 THEOR FUND ENGL.Pdf

THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING N. Filtschev. Theoretische Grundzüge der Strafrechtssetzung. CIELA − Soft and Publishing, Sofia, 2005

Н. Филчев. Теоретические основы уголовного законотворчества. CIELA − Soft and Publishing, София, 2005

Sofia 2005 ISBN 954-649-823-8 NIKOLA FILCHEV

THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Nikola Filchev was born in 1948 in Varna, Bulgaria. He is an alumnus (1972) of Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski; following graduation, he was appointed and served as a judge at Varna District Court. Since 1977 Mr Filchev has been a research fellow at the Institute of Legal Science with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He presented his doctoral thesis in criminal law in 1986 and was made a professor in 1990. In January 1991 Mr Filchev was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bulgaria, Criminal College. Between 1997 and 1999 he served in government as Deputy Minister of Justice. Since 1999 he has been the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria. Professor Nikola Filchev teaches the course in criminal law at the Law Department of the University of National and World Economics in Sofia. He has taken post-graduate courses in criminal law in Russia and in Germany. Mr Filchev has authored over sixty papers (monographs, studies, articles) on inter alia criminal complicity, the method (form) of crime perpetration, the criminalisation of acts, the differentiation of criminal liability, etc. Никола Филчев родился в 1948 г. в городе Варна. Окончил Юридический факультет Софийского университета им. Св. Кли- мента Охридского в 1972 г. После окончания факультета рабо- тает судьей в Варненском районном суде. С 1977 г. он − научный сотрудник в Институте правовых наук при Болгарской академии наук (БАН). В 1986 г. защищает докторскую диссертацию в облас- ти уголовного права. Хабилитирован в 1990 г. С января 1991 г. он − судья в Верховном суде Республики Болгария − уголовная коллегия. В период 1997−1999 гг. занимает должность заместителя минист- ра юстиции. С 1999 г. − Главный прокурор Республики Болгария. Профессор Никола Филчев читает курс лекций по уголовно- му праву на Юридическом факультете Университета националь- ного и мирового хозяйства − София. Он проходил специализации по уголовному праву в России и в Германии. Он является автором свыше шестидесяти публикаций (монографий, студий, статей), посвященных проблемам соучастия в преступлении, способа (формы) совершения преступного деяния, криминализации дея- ний, дифференциации уголовной ответственности и других. CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 13 § 1. Conduct. The structure of conduct ...... 18 § 2. Crime. Method of committing a crime. Substance and form of a crime ...... 23 § 3. Community danger: a key criterion for the criminalization of acts and the differentiation of criminal liability ...... 34 § 4. Criminalization of acts ...... 44 § 5. Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime ...... 58 § 6. Punishment. Grounds, objects, and severity of punishment ...... 70 § 7. Differentiation of criminal liability ...... 81 § 8. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity ...... 120 § 9. Empirical sociological research ...... 190 § 10. Scientific and technical progress and the criminal law ...... 219 § 11. Organized crime and the criminal law and procedural in the context of transition ...... 231 Theoretische Grundzüge der Strafrechtssetzung (Zusammenfassung) ...... 271 Теоретические основы уголовного законотворчества (Резюме) ...... 318 INHALT

Einführung ...... 13 § 1. Verhalten. Verhaltensstruktur ...... 18 § 2. Straftat. Tatmittel. Inhalt und Form der Straftat ...... 23 § 3. Die öffentliche Gefahr – wichtigstes Kriterium für die Kriminalisierung der Taten und Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit ...... 34 § 4. Tatkriminalisierung ...... 44 § 5. Tatbestand. Funktionen des Tatbestands ...... 58 § 6. Strafe. Grund, Ziel und Schwere der Strafe ...... 70 § 7. Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung ...... 81 § 8. Strafrechtliche Institute. Institut der Tatbeteiligung ....120 § 9. Empirische soziologische Untersuchungen ...... 190 § 10. Der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt und das Strafrecht ...... 219 § 11. Die Organisierte Kriminalität und das materielle und prozessuale Strafrecht in der Transformationszeit ...... 231 Theoretische Grundzüge der Strafrechtssetzung (Zusammenfassung) ...... 271 Теоретические основы уголовного законотворчества (Резюме) ...... 318 СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

Введение ...... 13 § 1. Поведение. Структура поведения ...... 18 § 2. Преступление. Способ совершения преступления. Содержание и форма преступления ...... 23 § 3. Общественная опасность − основной критерий для криминализации деяний и дифференциации уголовной ответственности ...... 34 § 4. Криминализация деяний ...... 44 § 5. Состав преступления. Функции состава преступления ...... 58 § 6. Наказание. Основание, цели и тяжесть наказания ....70 § 7. Дифференциация уголовной ответственности ...... 81 § 8. Уголовно-правовые институты. Институт соучастия ...... 120 § 9. Эмпирические социологические исследования ...... 190 § 10. Научно-технический прогресс и уголовный закон ...... 219 § 11. Организованная преступность и уголовный (материальный и процессуальный) закон в условиях перехода ...... 231 Theoretische Grundzüge der Strafrechtssetzung (Zusammenfassung) ...... 271 Теоретические основы уголовного законотворчества (Резюме) ...... 318

To my mother

Introduction

The transition from a centralised state-run economy and authoritarian political rule to a market economy and democracy is essentially a social revolution. It is characterised by a change of production relations based on public ownership of the means of production. In the transition, public (state and co-operative) ownership in Bulgaria has been replaced by private ownership. State assets have been privatized, passing into the hands of a small group of people. Society has split into rich and poor. The change of the economic foundation (material relations) has led to a change in the superstructure (ideological relations). All elements of the superstructure, including political, legal, moral, philosophical and the corresponding ideological relations; the depart- ments and organizations − political (the state, the parties), legal (the judicial authorities), have undergone transformations and are still in a process of mutation. In the transition period the single state property was parceled out among a number of physical and legal persons. This has entailed a redistribution of political power among a number of subjects. By virtue of the principle of separation of powers, state power in this country was divided into legislative, executive and judicial (Art. 8 of the Constitution). Further down the line, the ruling parties continue to redistribute power among the government authorities depending on their temporary interest, by changes in the legislation. The transition in Bulgaria has had a number of positive impacts: more effective management of assets, greater economic initiative, democratization of public and political life and greater personal liberties. Alongside this, there have been some negative 14 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING aspects of the transition: weakening of public and legal control and proliferation of crime. 1. Crime is not a fixed or immutable phenomenon that has been the same in all times and for all peoples. It has been changing in the course of history. The substance and forms of crime ultimately depend on the social and economic context. However, it is partly up to the legislator to decide what acts to make illegal. The legislator makes the criminal statute by responding to the objective public needs, while also taking into account the interests of the ruling class. Historically, criminal law has for a long time been created empirically. Intuition and legal tradition have been instrumental in this process. Today, there is an obvious need for a scientific approach in making criminal laws. The rampant growth of crime, the weakening of public and legal control, the dynamism of social relations in the context of transition call for a theoretical instrument that would allow the legislator to take the right, theoretically substantiated decisions in lawmaking. The quality of a criminal statute is a condition for the effectiveness of criminal justice. There are two main problems facing the legislator in drafting the criminal statute. First: to define the circle of crimes, that is, to draw a line between criminal and non-criminal conduct. A theory of the criminalization of acts is needed for this purpose. However, it is not sufficient. Crimes and responsibility for them need to be differentiated within the framework of criminal conduct. Hence, the criminalization of acts and the differentiation of punishment are the two main problems of penal lawmaking. In resolving them, the following principle should serve as a point of departure. Law is a reflection of facts. A rule of the criminal law mirrors conduct that is typical, widespread and dangerous to society. A criminal statute responds to objective public needs but these are refracted through the conscience of the lawmaker. The role of conscience is not confined to a passive reflection of the objective reality. Conscience Introduction 15 not simply echoes the needs of society (cognitive function) but also has an important part in lawmaking (evaluative and regulatory function). A criminal provision is a specific form of reflection of social realities. It comes out of the lawmaker’s combined cognitive, evaluative, and regulatory activity. 2. Crime is a complex phenomenon that has a social, legal, and mental aspect. This is why it can only be studied by a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach, by using the potential of various sciences. There are two main methods of studying the socio-legal phenomena: the social and the juridical. In the formal, juridical approach one deals with the legal norms, the dogmas (what is due), rather than the actual conduct (what is). Legal analysis is used to identify the elements of different criminal offences set out in the law and establish the relation between the relevant rules of the criminal statute. The juridical approach rests on universally recognised methods of legal interpretation, on the rules of formal logic, on comparative legal analysis, etc. The legal aspect, however, blurs the essential, societal nature of the phenomenon of crime. The formal legal analysis gives no answer to the questions: why has the legislator postulat- ed certain facts (acts) in the law?; what are the social tasks he assigns to the relevant provisions?; what is the mechanism of their operation and the social effect of their application? In order to answer these questions we have to leave the domain of law and seek the social causes that induce the legal provisions and determine their contents. In other words, in order to explore crime as a socio-legal phenomenon we should start with the social facts and identify their abstract expression in the law – the legal rules. We would thus discern the reason why rules of the criminal law are created and pin down their social functions. This approach is designed to study the social esse of legal rules and is referred to as social (sociological). 16 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The social approach to exploring “the offence” means bringing to light a number of factors: first, the social determinants of the rules defining certain acts or omissions as criminal; second, the functions of these rules and how they produce their social effect; third, the results of their enforcement. Today, there is a growing need for a comprehensive approach in studying the phenomena of the criminal law. It is only by combining the legal and social analyses that we can reveal the dialectical union of the legal form and its social substance.1 3. The social determination of the criminal law is unquestion- able. It reflects the objective public needs and the subjective interests of the governing class alike. This tenet is the key to understanding penal lawmaking: the criminalisation of offences and the differentiation of criminal liability. The problem, however, arises when the existing economic needs and political requirements have to be „translated” into the language of law. What is the “mechanism” whereby the public interests are converted into criminal provisions? What are the principles and criteria observed by the lawmaker in criminalising certain acts and differentiating the penalties for them, that is, in creating new rules of the criminal law? In terms of logic, the creation of criminal provisions has several stages: a) studying the objective economic and political imperatives of social development; b) exploring the status and dynamics, the structure and trends of crime; c) setting the specific objectives of the fight against crime, ie the guidelines on crime policy; d) selecting the instruments (including those pertaining to the criminal law) to attain the objectives set; e) analysing the anticipated efficacy of various criminal-law measures and choosing the most appropriate of them; f) translating the will of the lawmaker into specific legal rules;

1 Hertsenzon, A. A., Criminal Law and Sociology. – Moscow, 1970, pp. 5 and 39 (in Russian). Introduction 17 h) harmonising the ensuing provisions with the internal imperatives of the legal system. 4. „Criminalization of acts” and „the differentiation of criminal liability” are comparatively new notions of the science of criminal law. They were born of the efforts to create a theory of penal lawmaking, that is, a theoretical model (a system of principles, criteria, and a set of notions) that will allow the legislator to take scientifi- cally well-founded decisions in lawmaking. The legislature should rely on that theoretical model whenever creating provisions of the criminal law. The scientific approach guarantees the adequate reflection of dangerous conduct in the elements of offences and the fairness of the penalties provided in the sanctions of criminal provisions. Criminalisation consists in declaring an act or omission a criminal offence, whereas decriminalisation means taking an act or omission off the list of criminal offences. Decriminalisation may be seen as criminalisation put into reverse. The differentiation of criminal liability is a tool to implement the principle of fairness in the field of the criminal law. The efficiency of criminal justice actually depends on the lawmaker’s differentiated approach to offences and penalties. The evolution of penal legislation entails an ever deeper differentiation of criminal liability. This work forms part of the effort to design a theory of penal lawmaking. Far from suggesting a complete system, a comprehensive pattern of lawmaking, it only purports to clarify the fundamental concepts, put together the principles and set the criteria, which the lawmaker should take on board in making the criminal statute. It also enquires into how social phenomena, in particular criminality, affect the substance and form of the criminal law. § 1. Conduct. The structure of conduct

Crime is a kind of activity (conduct). Therefore, in order to deepen out knowledge of crime, we should look at general psychology that studies activity. 1. In most general terms, activity may be defined as an interaction between man and his environment in the course of which people change that environment conscientiously and purposefully. The literature in psychology displays divergent opinions on the relation between the concepts of “activity” and “conduct”, the prevailing one being that they are equipollent. According to V. N. Koudriavtsev, conduct “does not mean just any human activity but is subject to two tests: first, the social importance of the activity in question and, second, its outward expression which takes the form of specific physical acts”.1 In this work, “conduct” is used as a generic concept, which covers any and all types of behavioural acts. While human behaviour is at the centre of different branches of science, eg philosophy, sociology, political science, law, ethics, etc., the principles and structure of conduct are dealt with by general psychology. Conduct has different facets (inward and outward; stat- ic and dynamic; physiological, mental, and social; factual and legal, etc.), and can be studied from different angles. The study of conduct covers five key aspects: the subject of conduct; the structure of con-

1 Koudriavtsev, V. N. Law and Behaviour. – Moscow, 1978, p. 8 (in Russian). K. K. Platonov believed that activity is the supreme form of conduct typical only of human beings, so the concept of “activity” is narrower in his view (Concise Dictionary of the System of Concepts of Psychology. – Moscow, 1978, p. 8, in Russian). Conduct. The structure of conduct 19 duct; the motive and functions of conduct; behavioural dynamics; varieties of conduct.2 Hereafter, we shall dwell on the structure of conduct. For this purpose conduct has to be fragmented into its components and the interplay between them should be explored. Human conduct is thus presented as a system. An in-depth analysis of the vertical cross-section of conduct reveals a hierarchy of elements (levels) arranged in a gradually receding complexity. In other words, behavior is represented as a hierarchically organized system. This is logical. Nothing in this world is without components. As materialistic dialectics put it, “the genuine existence of the world, of the objective reality requires by necessity that every single thing be a union of intermission − sustainability, autonomy and inward space – and continuity: an endless sequence of subordinated and co-subordinated levels of organisation of matter, layers of material structures with different degrees of complexity”.3 This precept of philosophy is fully valid for human behaviour. No comprehensive psychological concept of conduct as a system has been developed as yet. However, the works of S. L. Rubinstein, G. V. Souhodolskii, A. N. Leontiev, J. Piaget deserve special mention. Based on systemic analysis, conduct may be fragmented into the following hierarchically organised levels (elements): activity;

2 Suhodolskii, G. V. Fundamentals of the Psychological Theory of Behaviour. – Leningrad, 1988, pp. 20-22 (in Russian). 3 Fundamentals of Philosophy. – Sofia, 1985, pp. 73-74 (in Bulgarian). “The systemic principle is an important aspect of philosophical methodology, an essential facet of the dialectical method... The systemic-structural approach, as a practical implementation of the systemic principle of philosophy, derives from the multi-level structural hierarchy inherent in every object. It helps to identify the specificity of each of those levels while representing all the levels as a single whole, as a multi-quality and multi-dimensional structure.” (Korshounov, A. M., V. V. Mantatov Dialectics of Social Knowledge. – Moscow, 1988, pp. 170-171, in Russian). 20 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING action or inaction; operation; and body movement. Activity is the most superior among them. As A. N. Leontiev noted, it is “a system with its own structure, inner transitions and transformations, its own development”.4 The action (or inaction) is the basic component of any activity. An activity is pursued through a combination of acts. Each action pursues a specific, partial purpose separate from the general purpose (the motive). The motive drives the activity of a subject, while the specific purpose determines the nature of the relevant action. Moreover, any purpose is rooted in a specific material context. The purpose preconditions the nature, the substance of an action, while the context of that purpose dictates how it will be attained, ie the operations through which that action is performed. A body movement is the most rudimentary behavioural act. “The whole infinite diversity of outward manifestations of brain activity,” noted I. M. Sechenov, “comes down to a simple phenomenon: the movement of muscles”.5 The above view on the structure of conduct may be illustrated with the following example. The criminal conduct underlying Art. 226 of the Criminal Code (CC) − unlawful private economic activity − may be decomposed into the following behavioural acts: a) “a master exercises the private activity of dressmaking”: an activity, b) “the master puts together the pieces of the dress”: an act, c) “the master sows the sleeve to the dress”: an operation, and d) “the master sticks

4 Leontiev, A. N. Selected Works in Psychology, vol. 2. – Moscow, 1983, p. 141 (in Russian). 5 Sechenov, I. M. Selected Works in Philosophy and Psychology. – Moscow, 1974, p. 71 (in Russian). It must be underscored that conduct does not always contain all the tiers listed above. In general, the task of setting apart the components, the “units” of conduct cannot be deemed resolved. The analysis of conduct at the mental level must be followed by its “microstructural” analysis at the level of physiology (see for details Leontiev, A. N. op. cit., pp. 159-165). Conduct. The structure of conduct 21 the needle”: a body movement. Each of these acts describes the same point of the actor’s conduct, but at a different level of abstraction. 2. A question arises: what is the correlation between the various elements, the different levels of conduct? First, it is notable that these elements are nothing separate, independent and the behavior is no simple sum total of them. They only emerge in a „vertical cross section” of conduct. The diverse elements (activity, action, operation, and body movement) are not to be found on the same plane but are linked by subordination. Each higher and more complex level includes the simpler ones, which are forms of its manifestation. Thus, an action exists only in the form of different combinations (series) of movements and operations. On the other hand, body movements, operations, actions, and activity are not identical but exist in their own right. The same action may be included in essentially different activities (eg a stone may be thrown to repulse an attacker or play, to damage someone else’s property or engage in hooliganism, to threaten or inflict a bodily harm). The opposite is also possible: a certain activity may be performed by different combinations of actions and operations (thus a bodily harm may be inflicted by stoning as well as by stabbing, using a firearm, car or other items, by giving poison, etc.) Hence, the link between the adjacent levels of conduct can be manifested in many variants where the different elements are interchangeable.6 A behavioural act may be replaced with another one at the same level while the nature of conduct remains essentially the same. The real social significance of an action can be grasped only when considered in relation with the other elements of behavior, that is, after illuminating the type of activity that an action forms part of and the operations used to perform that action.

6 See Koudriavtsev, V. N. Law and Behaviour …, p. 15-16. See also Jordania, I. S. The Structure and Legal Effect of Criminal Modus Operandi. – Tbilisi, 1977, p. 16 (in Russian). 22 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

It should be noted that conduct is a process of perpetual transformations. An action may acquire an autonomous motive so that it becomes an activity or, conversely, lose its autonomous purpose and become the element of another, more complex action. To put it differently, each structural element of conduct may be subdivided further or, vice versa, be pieced together from several behavioural acts.7

7 Leontiev, A. N., op. cit., p. 158. § 2. Crime. Method of committing a crime. Substance and form of a crime

1. The criminal law does not have its own concept of conduct; it only delineates the range of criminal conduct, ie the criminal offences. According to Art. 9 (1) CC, a crime is an act or omission dangerous to the community, committed guiltily and declared punishable by the statute. The lawmaker depicts the specific features of each offence in the respective elements of crime. An act would be criminal if it matches the elements of an offence described in the statute, ie if that act consists in committing a crime. The scope of the concept of “crime” is defined in the statute in respect of each type of offence. Hence, the concepts of “act” and “criminal act” (actus reus) are not necessarily identical. An act is an external demonstration of will power pursuing a specific objective and having an autonomous mental purport.1 By contrast, the actus reus of each individual crime is established on a case-by-case basis. The lawmaker normally crim- inalises an act or omission representing a complete behavioural act (in terms of psychology). Such offences are referred to as single-act (simple) crimes. Sometimes, however, the statute regards a system of two or more crimes as a single offence. These are the so-called complex crimes (two-act crime, composite crime, cumulative crime, crime of systemic commission, etc.). In yet other cases the legislator characterises an offence generally by including in its elements more abstract levels of conduct – complex acts or activities, not any spe-

1 See Mihaylov, D. N. Peculiarities of the Criminal Act in Case of Complex Criminal Activity. – Sofia, 1967, pp. 9-40 (in Bulgarian). See also Stoynov, A. Criminal Law. General Part. – Sofia, 1999 (in Bulgarian); Girginov, A. Criminal Law of the Republic of Bulgaria. General Part. – Sofia, 2002 (in Bulgarian). 24 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING cific action (eg unlawful private economic activity, Art. 226 CC; unauthorised foreign trade activity, Art. 234a CC; living in a vagrant group, Art. 328 CC, etc.). The concept of “criminal act” (actus reus) therefore has a con- ventional content established by the legislator. The actus reus of certain offences involves several acts or even an activity. In such cases there is a multitude of actions (from a psychological standpoint) but one crime, a single criminal offence (from the standpoint of the criminal law). The scope of a criminal act depends on the lawmaker, on how he has chosen to build the elements of the offence in question. 2. In order to determine the “method of committing a crime,” we should subsume it under a broader class of phenomena and single out those specific features that individualise it as a type belonging to a homogenous category. 2.1. In most general terms, the method can be said to belong to the objective aspects of an offence. The objective and the subjective elements in turn are the fundamental components of any crime. The question then is if it is appropriate at all to speak of components, or elements of crime. Any conduct, including the criminal conduct, is a dialectical union of a subjective (inward, mental) and objective (outward, physical) aspect. The outer physical action cannot effectively be sepa- rated from its inner mental substratum. In a scientific analysis, though, it is possible, even necessary, to subdivide the crime mental- ly into its components and to reveal its structure. “Such conditional subdivision,” wrote V. N. Koudriavtsev, “rests on solid ground as each element of an offence characterises it from a specific angle and the separate analysis of those elements helps clarify better the social nature and the legal significance of the crime as a whole”.2 M. G.

2 Koudriavtsev, V. N. The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences. – Moscow, 1960, p. 9 (in Russian). Crime. Method of committing a crime. Substance and form of a crime 25

Ougrehelidze also finds this analysis a helpful method of studying criminal offences. “Such a “fission” of the crime into its elements,” he pointed out, “is methodologically valuable in that it helps to imagine clearly and distinctly the separate structural elements and locate them correctly within the overall consistent structure of criminal conduct”.3 2.2. Criminal conduct has a substantive and a formal side to it. As A. N. Leontiev put it successfully, “in addition to its intent- related aspect (what has to be achieved?), an action also has an operational aspect (how, in what manner can it be achieved?) …”4 This insight is quite constructive as it is an exceptional key to com- prehending the method of crime commission. It is actually a specific expression of the general principle of dialectics that every object is a union of certain substance and a respective form. The method is such a characteristic of a criminal act that shows the way it has been committed: by what elements (movements, operations); how are the elements interlinked; what is the sequence in which they take place, etc. We refer to the mode of linking together the components of a criminal act in one whole as a method of committing the criminal act (in short, method of crime commission).5 According to psychology, the purpose of an actor determines the action as well as the process of its performance. The choice of one method over another depends on the evaluation of its efficiency under the circumstances at hand and, finally, on the objective material context in which the purpose is to be attained.6

3 Ougrehelidze, M. G. Criminalisation of Negligent Offences and the Ontological Structure of Crime. – In: Issues Relative to the Improvement of Penal Legislation (in Russian). 4 Leontiev, A. N., op. cit., p. 156. 5 “The method of crime commission,” wrote V. N. Koudriavtsev, “is understood as a specific order, method, sequence of the movements and means applied by the individual.” (The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences, p. 71). 6 “Let us assume the purpose remains the same but its context has changed; it is namely and exclusively the operational composition of the action 26 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The systemic approach enables the presentation of the criminal act as a system of specific elements (body movements and operations) that link together in a specific way. It is characterised by a certain spatial and temporal structure. “The concept of structure mirrors the existing way in which elements link into tangible objects and the relations among those elements within the framework of one whole”.7 Hence, from the angle of the systemic approach the method of commission is the structure of a crime, the inner organisation of the actus reus. This definition of the method is applicable to all criminal offences, however “simple” they might be in fact. As no object can exist without a structure, as the dialectics of materialism teach. Every object is inexhaustible, infinite “in its depth”. There is no such thing as “ultimate bricks of the universe”.8 In this connection, I. Nenov fairly noted that “… even the least complicated act is indeed a system of “units”: thus, stabbing someone further to an instan- taneous decision requires a series of movements of the doer’s hand and fingers – “taking” the knife, “moving” it out, lifting and direct- that changes then” (Leontiev, A. N., op. cit., p. 156). See also Naoumova, N. F. Sociological and Psychological Aspects of Purposeful Behaviour. – Moscow, 1988, pp. 26-49 (in Russian).

7 Dialectics of Materialism in Five Volumes. Vol. 1. Objective Dialectics. – Moscow, 1981, p. 147 (in Russian). Structure is “the construction and inner organisational form of a system which appears as a union of sustainable relations among its components and of the rules governing those relations. Structure is an inherent attribute of all objects and systems exiting in the real world. Not a single body in this world exists without a structure able to change internally.” (Dictionary of Philosophy. – Sofia, 1985, p. 584, in Bulgarian). See also The Dialectics of Materialism as a General Theory of Development. – Moscow, 1982, pp. 339-340 (in Russian); Sviderskii, V. I. On the Dialectics of Elements and Structures in the Objective World and in the Cognitive World. – Moscow, 1962 (in Russian). 8 See Fundamentals of Philosophy, pp. 74-75. Crime. Method of committing a crime. Substance and form of a crime 27 ing it, as well as the respective movements of arm and body to come closer, take the right position and inflict the injurious blow”.9 2.3. There is no criminal act as such. It is manifested in the real world through one combination (aggregate) or another of movements and operations. Each of these is a way of committing a criminal act. For example, a murder may be committed in many different ways, through different sets of movements: a) grabbing a pistol, bringing it out of the holster, loading it, lifting it, directing the pistol to the victim, taking sight, pulling the trigger; b) bringing the poison out, dissolving it in water, coming closer to the victim, handing over the glass, etc.; c) entering the house of the victim, bringing the explosive out and leaving it, placing a fuse, walking away, setting the fuse on fire; d) bringing the victim to the edge of a precipice, distracting his or her attention, coming closer, pushing the victim, etc. In this case we use the term „method of committing a criminal act” to describe the very combination of certain behavioral acts, whereby a criminal act is perpetrated, that is, the external expression of the act. If we link that to the structure of conduct, the criminal act and the method of its commission obviously represent two adjacent levels, “tiers,” in the structure of conduct. Each level in the hierarchy of conduct is called upon to serve, act as an instrument for the next, higher level, namely to ensure the realisation of that next level. It is through a series of behavioural actions at a given level that the next, more complex act (the criminal act) is carried out. Some commentators therefore regard the criminal act and the way of its commission as a combination of purpose and means.10 As a purpose

9 Nenov, I. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. General Part. – Sofia, 1972, p. 250 (in Bulgarian). 10 According to N. N. Troubnikov, activity may be regarded as a chain of merging goals. Each level of conduct forms the purpose of the preceding simpler actions and a means to realise the subsequent, more complex behavioural acts (On the Categories of “Purpose”, “Instrumentality”, “Result”. – Moscow, 1967, p. 65, in Russian). 28 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING may be accomplished by different means, a criminal act may be committed in various ways, through different combinations of movements. 3. The above definitions of the method of crime commission vary ostensibly. On the one hand, the method is a qualitative characteristic showing how the components of an offence link together, ie the method represents the structure of the criminal act. On the other hand, the term “method” is used to denote the specific combination of body movements and operations whereby a certain criminal act is committed. The latter definition is normally found in criminological literature. Thus, according to G. G. Zouykov and Y. Moussil, “the method of committing the offence is a functional system of those acts of the offender (offenders) that are linked by a common plan and pertain to the preparation, commission, and concealment of the crime …”11 The question then is which of the two definitions of the method is correct and whether they are mutually exclusive. 3.1. To answer that question, we should use a dialectical approach. The dialectical method alone can help us to get an insight into the nature of the object (phenomenon), to reveal its properties, aspects and structure. The dialectical approach, in simplest terms, boils down to the following: the studied object is split into two opposite sides. Each one of them is studied separately in its „pure form,” and then the

11 Criminalistics in the Socialist Countries. – Moscow, 1986, p. 181 (in Russian). It is definitely impossible to agree that the method of crime commission also includes the acts of preparing for and concealing the crime. I. S. Jordania provided a similar definition: “... the method of committing the crime ... is a system of interconnected, purposeful behavioural acts: actions, operations, methods of preparing, committing, and concealing the crime ... “ (op. cit, p. 90). See also Gavlo, V. K. Towards the Issue of Crime Forensic Assessment. − In: Legal Issues of the Fight against Crime. – Tomsk, 1982, p. 159 (in Russian). Crime. Method of committing a crime. Substance and form of a crime 29 interaction (the union and conflict) between the opposite sides is investigated. “… It is only the “rending” of the object into opposites that ensures the amplest and deepest analysis …”12 The opposites into which an object is to be split depends on its nature, not on the researcher’s wish. The choice of the opposite sides is objectively determined, as in nature things have two poles representing a union of opposites. There is no phenomenon in the real world that is only a „criminal act” and another that is only a „method”. There are individual human actions representing a dialectical union of a criminal act and a method of its perpetration. The fact of a criminal act presumes per- force a form in which it manifests itself. When speaking of a criminal act, we presume its specific form of manifestation, the combination of body movements whereby the act is committed. Consequently, the criminal act and the method of its perpetration relate to each other as the substance and form. They are the two opposite sides of one whole. It follows therefrom that all properties in the „substance and form” relation are present in the relation „criminal act − method of its perpetration”.13 Commentators differ in their views on this. While some (Y. M. Braynin, N. P. Ponomariova) agree that the criminal act and the

12 Dialectics of Materialism in Five Volumes. Vol. 1 Objective Dialectics ..., p. 24. 13 “Substance” and “form” are “categories” of philosophy that reflect the relation between the two sides of natural and social reality: the totality of elements and processes arranged in a given order that reflect an object or phenomenon, ie the substance, and the way in which that substance exists and materialises, its various modifications, ie the form. The notion of “form” is also used to denote the internal organisation of substance; in this sense the study of the form develops further in the category of “structure” (Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 593). 30 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING method relate as the substance and form,14 others (I. S. Jordania, N. I. Panov) strongly resist this idea.15 It is very helpful to use the categories of “substance” and “form” to clarify the method of crime. In general, the categories of materialistic dialectics form a powerful methodological tool to get to know the objects. Conflicting opposites that preclude the existence of a third element in an object are especially interesting.16 They enable the application of dialectical analysis, that is, “bifurcating” a single whole into opposites and studying the interaction between them. Substance and form are such opposites. A criminal act and the method of its commission relate as the substance and form. A number of conclusions ensue from this. The method is nothing “separate” that exists independently of the criminal act. It is the form a criminal act takes. The criminal act and the corresponding method of its commission form a dialectical union and cannot exist separately: no substance can exist without a certain form and no form can exist unless it has specific substance. The criminal act (substance) is the decisive factor in this union. It determines the method, that is, the form in which the substance is “cast”. Or, the nature of the criminal act determines the gamut of methods

14 “The criminal act (omission) is an act of human behaviour that is contrary to the legal rule. The method of performing the criminal act – or criminal omission – is a certain form in which that act or omission is cast. The method of crime commission is therefore inseparable from the criminal act (omission) itself, as the form is inseparable from substance. The relation between act and method is the same as between substance and form.” (Braynin, Y. M. Criminal Liability and its Ground in Soviet Criminal Law. – Moscow, 1963, p. 181, in Russian). See also Ponomariova, N. P. The Relevance of the Method of Crime Commission to the Criminal Law, − Avtoref. kand. diss. – Moscow, 1970, p. 7 (in Russian). 15 See Jordania, I. S., op. cit., p. 131; Panov, N. I. The Method of Crime Commission and Criminal Liability. – Harkov, 1982, pp. 29-30 (in Russian). 16 See Dialectics of Materialism in Five Volumes. Vol. 1. Objective Dialectics ..., p. 24. Crime. Method of committing a crime. Substance and form of a crime 31

(ways) by which the offence could be committed. The method in turn impacts on the nature of the criminal act and that impact is very strong at times. The criminal act and its method are the opposite, though dialectically connected, aspects of an individual deed. They are mutually pervasive. That merger, “transformation” of opposites is the core of the dialectical link between a criminal act and the method of its commission. 3.2. The view that the criminal act and its method are connected in one whole as the substance and form helps to clarify the relation between the method and the criminal act as well as the various aspects of the method. The concept of “form” is indeed polyseman- tic. It “is used in the sense of an outer limit of substance, … and in the sense of internal structure of substance, and in the sense of parts or kinds of the same substance …”17 Philosophers normally distinguish between inner and outer form, ie the internal structural organisation of an object and its external manifestation.18 As D. A. Kerimov put it figuratively, “while the outer form is the appearance, the look of the legal edifice (organism), the inner form is its back- bone (skeleton)”.19 Whenever the „method of committing a criminal act” is used in the sense of an internal form, we presume the manner of linking the components of a criminal act in one whole, that is, the structure of the act.

17 Tougarinov, V. P. The Relationship between Various Categories of Dialectical Materialism. – Leningrad, 1956, p. 13 (in Russian). 18 Already G. Hegel referred to a “double form”, ie the inward and the outward form (Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Science, vol. 1. – Sofia, 1975, p. 298, in Bulgarian). 19 Kerimov, D. A., Philosophical Issues of Law. – Moscow, 1972, p. 313 (in Russian). 32 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

“The components are the substance (its most important aspect), while the structure appears as a form (inner aspect). Thus, the dialec- tic relation between components and structure is a specific manifestation of the dialectical interplay between substance and form, a certain aspect of it”.20 According to the dialectics of materialism, the substance changes under the impact of the form. “Moreover, the different structural organisation of the same substance may produce two substances that differ in quality”.21 This precept is of great methodological value for the analysis of the method. It is the point of departure for studying the impact of the method on the social substance (community danger) of the act. As we have mentioned, that impact may differ substantially. At times the method of committing the act predetermines the very existence of any community danger associated with that act. In other cases, the method modifies tangibly the substance of community danger and, hence, the type of the crime. In yet other contexts, the method influences materially the extent of community danger of an offence. Under a fourth group of conditions, the method adds to and expounds the nature and extent of community danger of the crime, etc. The way in which the elements of a criminal act relate, ie the structure of the act, clearly affects greatly the community danger of that act. This explains why the criminal law considers the method exactly as an inner form of the criminal act, as its structural organisation. When used in the sense of an external form, „the method” is assumed to mean the specific manifestation of the act, its outward projection, that is, the combination of body movements, whereby the criminal act is committed. This combination is something material, observable, and has its spatial and temporal dimensions. From this

20 The Dialectics of Materialism as a General Theory of Development. – Moscow, 1982, pp. 340-341 (in Russian). 21 Kerimov, D. A., op. cit., p. 224. Crime. Method of committing a crime. Substance and form of a crime 33 point of view, the method is understood as the individual act that constitutes an offence. The separate varieties of a crime differ by method of commission but have the same substance. It may be concluded that the method of committing a crime displays different aspects and features when examined from different angles. The two definitions of method are not mutually exclusive, they rather reflect different aspects (inner and outer) of the phenomenon. Criminalistics focus on the external aspect as it is here that the method leaves a trail behind. The criminal law emphasises the inner aspect of the method as it is the one of relevance to the community danger of the offence. The inner and outer aspect of the method are dialectically connected and merge into each other but they are not fully identical. This objective reality is mirrored in collective conscience through the different notions of the method of crime commission, which are equally interrelated and mutually pervasive. § 3. Community danger: a key criterion for the criminalization of acts and the differentiation of criminal liability

Social justice is the main principle underpinning our criminal legislation and the practice of its application.1 The principle of social justice has specific implications for the criminal law: punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of the crime and the personality of the offender. The requirement that the penal impact be fair is proclaimed in Art. 35(3) of the Criminal Code: “The penalty shall be commensurate with the offence.” The principle of social justice operates at three levels in the field of the criminal law: a) when the lawmaker selects the acts to be declared crimes (criminalisation), b) when the statutory penalties are established for different offences (differentiation of criminal lia-

1 “Justice in the criminal law partly covers its other most important principles, mostly those of legality, equality of the citizens before the criminal law, individualisation of criminal liability, inevitability of the penalty, humanity.” (Naoumov, A. V. Lawmaking Instruments to Ensure the Social Justice of Soviet Criminal Law. – In: Reinforcing Law and Legal Order. – Moscow, 1987, p. 95, in Russian). On the principles of criminal law, see eg Kelina, S. G., V. N. Koudriavtsev Principles of Soviet Criminal Law. – Moscow, 1988 (in Russian); Fefel ov, P. A. The Principles of Soviet Criminal Law as a Foundation of the Law Enforcement. – Avtoref. dokt. diss. – Sverdlovsk, 1982 (in Russian); Blouvstein, Y. D. Criminal Law and Social Justice. – Minsk, 1987 (in Russian); Yakovlev, A. M. The Principle of Social Justice and the Grounds of Criminal Liability. – Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1982, No. 3, pp. 86-94 (in Russian); Kogan, V. M. Principles of Soviet Criminal Law. − In: Reinforcing Law and Legal Order, pp. 91-95 (in Russian). Community danger: a key criterion for the criminalization of acts... 35 bility), and c) when sentencing the person found guilty (individualisation of criminal liability).2 1. „Weighing” the gravity of a crime is necessary for the consistent application of the principle of justice in both the statute and its implementation. This calls for a study of the objective and subjective elements that make a crime damaging for the public. In the theory of criminal law different views persist on the relation between the community danger of an offence and the offender’s personality, and on their determinants. Gravity is a fundamental social characteristic of an offence which has two components: a) objective – the community danger of the criminal conduct, and b) subjective – the guilt, the blame attaching to the offender’s state of mind and to his perceptions of the dangerous act and its consequences. The community danger of a crime depends on the object and the objective aspect of the conduct. The reproof of the offender’s mens rea in turn depends on subjective factors, such as the type and degree of his fault, his motive, purpose, and emotional state. As Y. A. Demidov observed, the community danger of an offence and fault denote two different relations. While community danger reveals the relation between an act and the set of societal values, fault brings to light the offender’s attitude to those values.3

2 Kelina, S. G., V. N. Koudriavtsev, op. cit., pp. 134-135. 3 Demidov, Y. A. Social Values and Assessment in Criminal Law. – Moscow, 1975, p. 124 (in Russian). As axiological studies of the law evolve, an increasing number of authors tend to accept that fault is not cofined to mental processes but also has a judgmental component. „Besides the actual mental processes,” noted M. G. Ougrehelidze, “the judgmental factor in the form of a moral and political blame is an inherent feature of guilt and the absence of that factor makes criminal liability ill-founded.” (The Criminal Statute. An Attempted Theoretical Modelling. – Moscow, 1987, p. 84, in Russian). See also Makashvili, V. G. Guilt and the Awareness of Unlawfulness. – Metod. 36 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The objective and subjective aspect of a crime represent its two opposites that co-exist in a dialectical union and interaction. The mental processes induce and govern the objective side of a crime,4 which in turn has a reverse impact on the subjective experiences. The substance and degree of fault (which reflect objective processes) largely depend on the seriousness of those detrimental social repercussions, which the offender has foreseen or is bound to foresee. The view that the objective and subjective aspect of an offence are dialectically connected was reasoned by T. V. Tsereteli.5 It is an important methodological contribution to the study of criminal offences as it paves the way to the optimum balance between objective and subjective in developing the definitions of different offences. The objective community danger is decisive for the gravity of a crime, hence, for the type and scope of statutory penalty. Investigating the influence of the various elements of crime on the threat it poses to society is a task of great potential for the theory of criminal law. The solution of this task will provide a deeper insight materiali VIUZI. – Moscow, 1948, vip. 2, p. 92 (in Russian); The Principle of Guilt in Soviet Penal Legislation. – In: Current Issues of Modern Criminal Law, Criminology, and Criminal Procedure. – Tbilisi, 1986, pp. 69-71 (in Rusian). On the axiological problems of law in general see Nenovski, N. Law and Values. – Sofia, 1983 (in Bulgarian).

4 See Koudriavtsev, V. N. The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences..., pp. 12-18. “The criminal intent sets in motion the external forces and appears as a reason that causes the consequence dangerous to society.” (Tsereteli, T. V. The Causal Link in Criminal Law. – Moscow, 1963, p. 306, in Russian). 5 See Tsereteli, T. V., op. cit., pp. 278-317; Grounds of Criminal Liability and the Concept of Crime. – Pravovedenie, 1980, No. 2, pp. 80-86 (in Russian); see also Koudriavtsev, V. N. The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences..., pp. 12-22; Lekshas, Y. Guilt as a Subjective Aspect of Criminal Acts. – Moscow, 1958 (in Russian). Community danger: a key criterion for the criminalization of acts... 37 into the theoretical fundamentals of penal lawmaking. This will make it possible to proceed to the criminalization of acts and the differentiation of criminal liability from a sounder scientific foundation. In its complexity this task is equal to the most sophisticated scientific and technical problems of the natural sciences. The difficulty lies in the need to establish and weigh the qualitative and quantitative changes in community danger brought about by various factors. For this purpose the complex socio-legal phenomena and features (nature and extent of community danger, harmful consequences, and method of committing the act) need to be translated into simple, empirically measurable indicators (symptoms). Then, rules for measuring the symptoms must be devised, namely, a unit and scale of values for every indicator. This process of making legal notions operational and creating formal models of social phenomena is still at a rudimentary stage. 2. In order to divulge the impact of the various elements of crime on community danger, we need more than the general principle that community danger is that feature of an offence, which consists in transgressing or threatening community values. It is necessary to shed light on the rich content of community danger, clarify its different aspects and symptoms, study its determining factors and identify the place of each element of the crime among them. Academic opinion differs on the circumstances that determine community danger. In the view of K. Liutov, the community danger of a criminal offence depends “… on the sum total of its elements, on the specific way in which they combine among themselves and with the context in which the crime is committed”.6 This view is cer-

6 Liutov, K. The Social Danger of Criminal Acts in the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. – Sofia, 1960, p. 170 (in Bulgarian). This view was first upheld in criminal-law literature by A. N. Traynin (A General Theory of the Elements of Crime. – Moscow, 1957, pp. 73-86, in Russian. The first edition of that monograph was published in 1946 under the title A Theory 38 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING tainly correct, though it has to be specified that the objective and subjective circumstances affect community danger in different ways. Being an objective feature, community danger depends immediately on the object and the objective aspect of a crime. The subjective aspect of the crime and its subject (the offender) influence community danger indirectly, only to the extent to which they predetermine the route and development of the causal process. With the same objective aspect of conduct, the different forms of guilt entail a different probability that the criminal result will occur (eg intentional or negligent causation of death). Probability is in turn an objective factor relevant to the extent of community danger. At this point the subjective transforms into objective, the dialectical union of the subjective and objective aspects of a crime comes to light. Community danger is a feature of the entire crime, not of its separate parts. In a scientific analysis, however, a crime may be imagined as fragmented into its components. Then, one may speak provisionally of the „own” public danger of each separate element of the crime. Figuratively speaking, each element of the crime carries a certain „charge” of public danger. As V. N. Koudriavtsev noted, “… within the frame of the general characteristic (of community danger – emphasis added, N.F.) it is also appropriate to consider the objective danger of the very modus operandi whereby the harmful result is caused”.7 The “… danger inherent in the method of crime commission is just one of the factors that combine to produce the communi- of the Elements of Crime). The same view was shared by Dourmanov, N. D. The Concept of Crime. – Moscow, 1948, p. 102 (in Russian); Gertsenzon, A. A. The Concept of Crime in Soviet Criminal Law. – Moscow, 1955, p. 50 (in Russian); Prohorov, V. S. Crime and Liability. – Leningrad, 1984, p. 61 (in Russian). A number of other Russian scholars have elaborated on the social danger of criminal offences, eg M. D. Shargorodski, T. G. Shavgoulidze, V. N. Koudriavtsev, P. A. Fefelov, P. S. Tobolkin, V. K. Glistin, V. M. Kogan, Y. K. Permiakov, etc.

7 Koudriavtsev, V. N. The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences…, p. 98. Community danger: a key criterion for the criminalization of acts... 39 ty danger of the crime as a whole”.8 Referring to the „public danger” of an element of the crime, we mean the extent to which that element contributes to the community danger of the whole crime. The task is to find out in what way the various elements of a crime and the circumstances affect community danger. In order to solve this task we need to have a correct understanding of the structure of criminal offences. From an abstract viewpoint all crimes have the same structure: they represent a union of a subjective (internal) and objective (external) aspect. “The theory of criminal law must be credited,” wrote V. N. Koudriavtsev, “for having revealed the structure common to all offences and having identified on this basis a uniform set of elements in each crime: four major groups of features pertaining accordingly to the object, the subject, the objective and subjective aspect of the crime”.9 This makes it possible to derive some general principles concerning the impact of the different elements of a crime on its community danger. All circumstances (object, subject, objective aspect, and subjective aspect) influence the community danger of a crime, albeit in different ways and different directions. The object of a crime is not dangerous per se. The personal features of the offender become relevant to the criminal law only to the extent to which they are displayed in the context of a specific offence. The same is true for the objective aspect. As long as they have not translated into deeds, materialised in any outward conduct, the offender’s intentions only form a potential danger. The community danger of a crime is manifested primarily in its objective aspect, in the act (or omission). “All other elements of crime,” noted M. I. Kovaliov, “become dangerous

8 Ibid, p. 100. 9 Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Crime. – Moscow, 1972, p. 73 (in Russian). 40 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING to the community only as the offender objectifies his scheme exter- nally and his act (omission) is the form of that objectification”.10 A crime is not a still phenomenon, but a process that deploys across time and space.11 It starts with the act. The objective aspect, however, does not comprise the entire act but only its outward, physical side. Other than the act (committed in a specific manner, in a specific context in terms of venue, time and setting), the objective aspect of a result crime also covers the causal link and the consequences that harm the community (the criminal result). At first sight, community danger boils down to the damage that an act inflicts on the object. Damage is indeed the most important element of crime of relevance to community danger. But damage in itself is insufficient to divulge all the facets of community danger. It fails to reveal the various adverse implications of a crime for social relations.12 Focusing on damage makes it impossible to explain why offences that inflict the same damage are differently dangerous to the community. Thus, sabotage, subversion, mismanagement, arson, theft, robbery, appropriation, embezzlement, fraud, documentary fraud, extortion, the destruction and breakdown of state assets may inflict the same damage in financial terms but each of these crimes has quite a different social purport. The community danger of a crime is also affected directly or indirectly by a number of circumstances other than the nature and extent (depth) of the damage. These are: the method, instrumentalities, time, location, and setting of committing the crime, the frequency of

10 Soviet Criminal Law. General Part. − Moscow, 1977, p. 145 (in Russian). V. N. Koudriavtsev pointed out that it is namely the objective aspect that “finally displays the fundamental social attribute of a crime, viz. its community danger” (The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences..., p. 9). 11 Koudriavtsev, V. N. The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences…, p. 9. 12 See Krivochenko, L. N. On the Content and Structure of Community Danger as an Element of Criminal Offences. – In: Problemi pravovedeniya. – Kiev, 1979, vip. 40, pp. 94-102 (In Russian). Community danger: a key criterion for the criminalization of acts... 41 that type of acts; the subjective elements of conduct: type and degree of the offender’s fault, his motive, purpose, and emotional state; peculiarities of the object and the offender’s personality. All circumstances can be divided into two categories depending on the function they perform when adding up to form the aggregate community danger. Some determine the nature, others − the extent of community danger. The nature and extent are"… separate, autonomous features [of community danger], each of them with its own function in its overall estimate…”.13 The nature is a qualitative feature of community danger showing the path and the manner whereby an act produces its adverse effect. The extent, on the other hand, is a quantitative feature of community danger showing the extent of that impact.14 The nature of the community danger of a crime depends directly on the type of social relation encroached on and on the nature of actual (or potential) damage. The other objective elements of the crime most frequently affect the extent of community danger. Finally, community danger reflects the mens rea and the offender’s personal features only indirectly. The subdivision of all circumstances affecting the community danger of a crime into two categories is certainly conditional. After all, the “nature” (quality) and “extent” (quantity) are only relatively independent facets of community danger. They are dialectically connected into one whole and interact: the nature predetermines the extent which, in turn, affects the nature of community danger. Taken in abstracto, the different elements of crime have different weight and relevance to community danger. Likewise, each crime is characterised by its own specific blend of objective and subjective factors that further conditions its specific community danger. In a given crime the elements combine in a most diverse manner, whereby the ratio of objective-subjective varies. One or other cir-

13 Liutov, K., op. cit., p. 108. 14 Ibid, p. 106. 42 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING cumstances come to the foreground having a crucial effect on the community danger of criminal conduct. 3. We shall describe below the route and the way in which the form (method) of a crime influences its community danger or, in other words, the basic mechanisms whereby the method impacts on the level of community danger of a crime. a. Some methods of crime commission are more damaging than others (all other conditions being equal). And if the crime is one entailing danger, the different methods create different probabilities that the damage will occur. The bigger that probability, the more dangerous the respective form of the crime. b. Some methods of crime commission invariably affect an additional object. This is the reason to set out a corresponding additional definition of the crime that carries a heavier penalty. Thus, if a murder is committed “in a manner or by means dangerous to the lives of many”, the guilty individual is liable to a severer penalty (Art. 116, point 6 CC). Other methods of crime commission affect additional objects only occasionally (depending on the context). Thus, the theft of some parts of a machine may (other than breaking the machine) prevent a business from hitting its manufacturing targets; hooliganism may at times be accompanied by bodily harm or property breakdown. Such forms of a crime affect not only the major but also another, additional object.15 In such cases, the higher level of community danger is taken into account by the court at the sentencing stage. c. Some methods facilitate the commission of a crime more than others. Thus, the use of a motor vehicle and joint perpetration

15 The theory that a criminal offence may have major, additional, and optional objects belongs to E. A. Frolov (Debatable Issues of the General Theory of the Object of Crime. – Sverdlovsk, 1969, in Russian). See also Soviet Criminal Law. General Part. – Moscow, 1977, pp. 118-121 (in Russian). Community danger: a key criterion for the criminalization of acts... 43 substantially facilitate theft (Art. 195(1), points 4 and 5 CC); it is easier for an armed perpetrator or for two or more individuals to break into someone else’s home (Art. 170(2) CC). d. Some methods of crime commission are more efficient, more productive from the offender’s perspective. For example, the conjoint embezzlement of someone else’s property amplifies the enrichment of the wrongdoer. e. A specific manner of crime commission may thwart detection and thus be safer for the perpetrator, for example committing embezzlement while staging a theft allegedly carried out by a third party. f. In determining the impact of a certain method on the extent of community danger, its frequency is also taken into consideration. Some forms of a criminal act are more widespread as they are easier to implement or more productive for the offender, or as they are harder to detect, etc. The frequency of a method depends inter alia on its acces- sibility and cost-benefit potential (the necessary time, energy, etc.). g. Some methods of crime commission are “more dangerous” as their adverse impact on collective consciousness is stronger. Thus, a robbery, embezzlement or rape committed by two or more persons acting in concert affect more powerfully the mentality of the population than similar crimes perpetrated by a sole individual. h. In some cases a crime committed in a given manner not only affects an additional object but also satisfies the definition of a different offence. This is referred to as “an act constituting two or more offences”. That modus operandi is obviously more dangerous than any other. Thus, incitement to an offence may take the form of ask- ing someone to commit it or bribing. The second form of incitement is certainly more dangerous to society. The method of crime commission may affect the extent of community danger also through other mechanisms. We have attempted to outline above only the most frequently encountered, typical ways whereby the method contributes to community danger, moreover we have done this in the abstract, on the plane of the general concept of crime and its elements. § 4. Criminalisation of acts

Criminalization (declaring an act a criminal offence) and decriminalization (taking an act off the range of crimes) are relatively new notions in the criminal law.1 They emerged from the effort to build up a theory of penal lawmaking (endowed with its own set of concepts). Such a theory would facilitate the lawmaker to make correct, theoretically justified decisions in crafting penal legislation. 1. When defining the list of criminal offences, the lawmaker evaluates the acts in the light of his own interests and ideology, that is, by reference to a specific set of values.2 The system of prevailing political, legal, moral, esthetical, and philosophical ideals and goals, and the corresponding norms and standards of behaviour serve as criteria for the criminalisation of certain human deeds. Today, it is fairly emphasised that universal human values must prevail over group or class interests (which is a virtual revival of the tenets of nat-

1 The exact definition of criminalisation reads: defining an act, in the criminal statute, as dangerous to the community, committed guiltily and punishable. Decriminalisation is normally perceived as criminalisation put into reverse. Unless expressly stated otherwise, the concept of ”criminalisation” in this work is used in its broader sense which covers criminalisation and decriminalisation alike. 2 “The community danger of an offence is an objective feature of any criminal offence as it harms social relations irrespective of whether the lawmaker is aware of this. Nonetheless, placing an act dangerous to the community on the list of criminal offences depends on the will power and conscience of those making the laws ...” (Kovaliov, M. I. The Concept and Features of Criminal Offence and Their Relevance to Classification. – Sverdlovsk, 1977, p. 29, in Russian). As fairly noted by V. S. Prohorov, “there is no crime without assessment” (op. cit., p. 26). Criminalisation of acts 45 ural law). The estimate thet an act is dangerous to the community largely depends on collective consciousness.3 That estimate determines the response of the state, ie the emergence and nature of socio- legal control. The will power (discretion) of the lawmaker is restricted by the objective properties of the act. The decision to incriminate an act is always the result of the interaction of two factors: a) objective − the factual features of the act (lying outside and independently of the relation “knowing subject − object”) and mostly its property to harm or endanger social relations, that is, the community danger of the act, and b) subjective − the state of the public conscience and more specifically − the legislator's negative qualification of the act as undesirable.4 Therefore the cognitive and evaluative elements intertwine in the criminal provision. The notion of crime is a union of objective elements (actual characteristic of the act) and subjective ones (judging the social implications of the act). The link between an act dangerous to the community (fact) and its reflection in the statute (criminal provision) is not rigid or invariable but flexible and relative. That link is refracted through the conscience of the lawmaker. The lawmaker enjoys some (relative) free-

3 On the role of legal conscience in penal lawmaking see Kovaliov, M. I. The Role of Legal Conscience and Legal Technique in the Development of Penal Legislation. – Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1985, No. 8, pp, 73-75 (in Russian). Public opinion has a special role in penal legislation as it reflects the public perception of justice, see on this Efremova, G. H., G. S. Lezhava, A. R. Ratinov, T. G. Shavgoulidze Public Opinion and Criminal Offences. – Tbilisi, 1984 (in Russian); Noskova, N. A. Public Opinion and the Efficiency of Impact Measures under the Penal Legislation. – Aktualnie prolemi ougolovnogo prava. – Moscow, 1988, pp. 121-131 (in Russian). 4 “The nature of the penal-law decision,” wrote A. M. Yakovlev, “depends on the objective features of the acts that threaten the prevalent social relations ..., and on how the community, the class whose will is embodied in penal legislation evaluates the social situation” (The Grounds of Criminal Proscription, pp. 145-146). See also Demidov, Y. A. op. cit., pp. 14-15 and 134; Blouvstein, Y. D., op. cit., pp. 30-44. 46 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING dom in making criminal-law decisions, in particular when defining the list of criminal offences. It is up to his will to refer or not to refer some acts of a lower extent of community danger to the category of crimes. This accounts for the dynamic and flexible border between criminal and non-criminal conduct. This border shifts depending on changes in the objective conditions but also through the will of the lawmaker. The history of the criminal law in the countries of Europe shows that all acts that have been criminalised broadly fall within two categories: a) “natural” offences: acts considered criminal at all times and by all nations (murder, rape, fraud, espionage, theft, robbery), and b) acts deemed criminal only within a specific socio-economic system, moreover at a specific stage of that system's historic development (duel, fornication, contamination with a venereal disease, homosexual acts, fraudulent bankruptcy, failure to procure mandatory supplies to the state, asserting rights in another's property).6 The lawmaker has no particular discretion when criminalising the first category of acts (“natural offences”).7 Legislative discretion, however, is of the essence when it comes to the criminalisation of acts in the second category. Those deeds are in the grey area

5 See Demidov, Y. A. op. cit., pp. 134 and 137; Kogan, V. M. The Social Mechanism of Penal Impact (in Russian). The general theoretical aspects of transition from what is factual (existing) to legal-normative (required) and the role of assessment as an agent in this process have been studied by N. Nenovski (op. cit., pp. 46-79). 6 Already the ancient Romans had divided criminal offences in two categories: wrongs in themselves (mala in se) and prohibited wrongs (mala pro- hibita). 7 In this case the discretion of the lawmaker materialises in constructing the definitions of offences, creating definitions that carry lighter or heavier penalties, determining the effects of wrongs (type and degree of penalty, individual circumstances that excuse the offender's punishment or criminal liability, etc.); in one word, it materialises in differentiating the penalty carried by the crime in question. Criminalisation of acts 47 between criminal and non-criminal conduct and may be placed in either category depending on the will of the lawmaker.8 2. The reasons for criminalisation are those social phenomena that dictate the use of the criminal law as a shield to protect social

8 This stance is corroborated by the development of Bulgarian penal legislation. Let us look at the period between the enactment of the new Criminal Code (1968) and 1990. An important proviso should be made first. We are not interested in legislative amendments resulting from objective societal changes, such as: a) the introduction in the Criminal Code of new proscriptions to protect infant social relations or respond to the substantial increase in the community danger of some offences in the new context (thus, to protect the new relations covered by the Citizens' Property Act (1973), the lawmaker added to the Criminal Code Art. 221а, Art. 225а (subsequently repealed), Art. 234(2), (3) and (4) (subsequently repealed), Art. 270а (subsequently repealed), Art. 323а; likewise, scientific and technological progress entailed the criminalisation in 1975 of different forms of environmental pollution (Art. 352а, Art. 353); 1982 saw the criminalisation of negligent threats to workers' life and health resulting from breaches of safety at work (Art. 136(2); or b) the decriminalisation prompted by a substantial lowering of the community danger of an offence or its complete disappearance (thus, in 1968 a number of criminal provisions were abolished concerning various encroachments on the peace and public order, government-ordered supplies, etc.). We are only interested in amendments to the Criminal Code (criminalisation and decriminalisation) that manifest the discretion of the lawmaker and where the subjective factor (legislative assessment) was crucial to the decision to insert or abrogate a criminal rule. The following amendments may be cited as examples: а) in 1968 a number of encroachments were criminalised against the labour rights of citizens (Art. 172), against family and youth (Art. 178, Art. 190), against peace and humanity (Articles 407-415); b) in 1975 the petty incidents of overpricing goods sold (Art. 225(6), subsequently repealed) and defrauding buyers in measuring or weighing the goods bought (Art. 232(4)) were decriminalised; also decriminalised were various forms of dominance and oppression of one racial group over another (Articles 417 and 418); c) in 1982 the legislator criminalised the disclosure of the secret of adoption (Art. 145(2)); increased the number of punishable homosexual acts (Art. 157(1) and (2)); extended the scope of Art. 172 CC on offences against labour rights; concurrently, the petty offences against socialist property were decriminalised (petty theft, embezzle- 48 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING relations. The principles of criminalisation represent a reflection in public conscience of the different reasons to criminalise.9 The principles of criminalisation have been extensively explored in recent years by myriad Russian researchers, eg V. N. Koudriavtsev, G. A. Zlobin, M. I. Kovaliov, P. S. Dagel, S. G. Kelina, A. M. Yakovlev, V. M. Kogan, N. F. Kouznetsova, V. I. Kourliandskii, I. M. Galperin, P. A. Fefelov, A. V. Naoumov. The difficulty today is no longer to formulate the principles of criminalisation. Most of them have been defined already. The problem is to develop a system of principles (general norms and criteria) that would enable the lawmaker to make theoretically substantiated decisions on whether or not to criminalise a particular act. According to V. N. Kudryavtsev the legislator should use four criteria10 when deciding to criminalise a certain act. These include: the need to prohibit the act, that is, to enact a new rule of the criminal law; admissibility; applicability; and expediency of the new provision.11 Each of these criteria relates to a number of factors to be dealt with below. 2.1. The need to enact a new prohibition (proscription) of the criminal law. The main factor that necessitates the criminalisation of an act is its danger to the community, ie the property of the act to harm or threaten social relations. However, not any act (omission) dangerous to society deserves to be criminalised but only those that pose a community danger of a sufficiently high extent. The reason to ment, appropriation and concealment of items) − Art. 218b, as were a larger number of foreign exchange offences under Art. 250(3) (subsequently repealed) and some other offences listed in Art. 424 CC.

9 The Grounds of Criminal Proscription…, pp. 202-215. 10 Instead of “principle of criminalisation” we would use onwards the term “test of criminalisation” as it is narrower and more specific. 11 Koudriavtsev, V. N. Legaly Relevant Conduct: Norm and Pathology. – Moscow, 1982, pp. 267-273 (in Russian). Criminalisation of acts 49 criminalise is not the mere existence of community danger but its elevated degree. It is only the high extent of community danger that confronts a state with the need to use the ultimate form of coercion − criminal liability − to resist the respective prejudicial conduct. The criminal law regulates mass behavior rather than individual outrage. A criminal provision is designed to address typical, widespread behavior that projects certain social and natural patterns. The need to introduce a new criminal proscription is determined by the community danger of the totality of such deeds rather than by the harmfulness of a single act. In other words, an act should be sufficiently widespread in order to be criminalised. The legislator may criminalize acts that are rarely committed in practice only when seeking to protect most precious relations. “The harmfulness and frequency of the act,” pointed out V. N. Koudriavtsev, “are closely connected. It is justified to prohibit an act if it is quite widespread, though not particularly harmful, and vice versa, if, albeit rare, it displays a very high extent of community danger”.12 It should be noted, however, that the extensive frequency of an act forms an obstacle to its criminalisation. Prohibiting such acts amounts to creating inefficient legal rules that would not be enforced or would be enforced only selectively, ie in some instances and vis- Ў-vis some individuals. The fundamental principles of the criminal law (inevitability of the penalty, equality of the citizens before the law) would thus be infringed. The enactment of such rules would undermine the prevailing perceptions of justice and disturb the collective consciousness and the citizens' respect for the law. Criminalisation is only necessary where a society avails of no other, less oppressive, means to crack down on certain destructive acts. Before enacting a new criminal proscription, the lawmaker

12 Koudriavtsev, V. N. Scientific Prerequisites of Criminalisation. – In: Criminology and Crime Policy. – Moscow, 1985, p. 106 (in Russian). 50 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING must evaluate “the potential” of the other available social responses (community measures; civil, disciplinary, or administrative liability) and employ criminal liability as a means of last resort when there is no other way to attain the desirable social result. 2.2. Admissibility of the criminal prohibition (proscription). The need to criminalise an act does not entail in itself a prohibition on that act in the criminal code. It is equally necessary to determine if the respective proscription is admissible in terms of the prevailing policies, morals, and laws. The criminal law of the Republic of Bulgaria is the expression of a specific crime policy. Any new criminal prohibition must be consistent with the crime policy of the state. Hence, the rule should be consistent with the fundamental principles of contemporary criminal law (fairness, legality, equality of the citizens, personal liability based on guilt, inevitability of punishment, humanity, democracy) as well as with the current trends in crime policy (lessening criminal repression; achieving maximum correctional and deterrent effects with minimum coercion; deepening the differentiation of criminal liability). A new criminal proscription must also conform to morality, to the public perceptions of good and bad, justice, etc. In terms of morality, a crime is always something immoral. Finally, it should be seen whether the new rule is consonant with established legal principles; whether it fits in the structure of the existing legal system; whether it contradicts any provisions of other branches of law that might authorise the conduct in question. 2.3. Applicability of the criminal prohibition (proscription). After a prohibition is found to be necessary and admissible, there comes the next question: is it possible to carry it out in practical terms? In order to know this, a number of circumstances need to be clarified. Is the respective behaviour susceptible of social control (for example, does it affect rather intimate aspects of citizens' pri- Criminalisation of acts 51 vacy?), can it be regulated by rules of the criminal law? It is only after these questions have received an affirmative answer that the specific legal requirements should be assessed: a) available legal techniques to create a corresponding criminal provision (are we opening “legislative gaps” or producing “redundant” criminal rules?; can the community danger and blame of the conduct be adequately reflected in the elements of crime, ie can the definition of the offence be comprehensive and specific?; is it possible to provide for a penalty commensurate with the seriousness of the offence?); b) possibility to detect and prove the fact of the crime at the different stages of criminal procedure while relying on the available lawful instruments; c) possibility to correct and rehabilitate the offenders through the execution of the penalty or to discourage repeat offending. 2.4. Expediency of the criminal prohibition (proscription). The advantage of criminalisation is well-known: the rules of the criminal law shelter the social relations from the most dangerous encroachments. However, even if it is necessary and admissible, criminalisation has downsides as well as advantages. It unavoidably has a negative aspect.13 The lawmaker must always judge the expediency of introducing another criminal prohibition, that is, juxtapose the positive and negative effects of criminalisation. The social “price” of criminalisation depends on a number of factors: a) the harmful side implications of criminalisation (removing a convict away from production, from his family, etc.); b) the resources required to enact and enforce the new rule (expenses for lawmaking, raising public awareness, crime investigation, trials and execution of penalties); c) the socio-psychological response of the citizenry and law-enforcement to the new enactment; d) the negative

13 “However dangerous a certain conduct,” wrote G. A. Zlobin, “its criminalisation can never be seen as an absolute good: rather, it always means sacrificing one public interest for the benefit of another, more important one.” (The Grounds of Criminal Proscription..., p. 220). 52 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING impact of criminalisation on the conscience of the sentenced person concerned (suppressed self-esteem as a result of stigmatisation, lessening importance of legal and moral norms, etc.); e) the social and legal outlooks for the fight against the destructive acts at hand (term of validity of the new rule, need to amend other pieces of legislation, etc.).14 The enactment of a new criminal prohibition is only expedient if its expected advantages outweigh substantially the negative implications of criminalisation.15 3. The criminalisation of different acts is governed by various considerations relating to the peculiarities of the act or the social context. Changes in the penal legislation, the enactment or abroga- tion of criminal proscriptions may be prompted by: a) a change in the community danger of a specific type of acts (thus, in 1982 the lawmaker criminalised the failure to abide by court orders vesting the exercise of parental rights: Art. 182(2) CC; bribery in the economic sphere: Art. 225b CC; the assertion of false information in a written deposition before a court: Art. 290a, CC), or b) the identifi- cation of more efficient (less oppressive or “less costly” for the public) responses to the respective category of harmful deeds. For example, in 1982 first-time offences of theft, embezzlement, appropriation or concealment of public assets worth less than 50 Levs were decriminalised and declared administrative offences. The reasons underlying that step were that most small-scale encroachments usually went unpunished; it was unwarranted to conduct “expen-

14 See Koudriavtsev, V. N. Legaly Relevant Conduct: Norm and Pathology …, p. 272. While reiterating the need for stable criminal provisions, M. I. Kovaliov added: “When establishing criminal liability, the lawmaker must declare criminal only those wrongs that would remain dangerous in terms of crime policy and legal conscience over a long period of time. Recurrent legislative amendments, although allegedly made to improve the framework, instil instabili- ty and inflict more harm than they bring benefits” (The Role of Legal Conscience and Legal Technique in the Development of Penal Legislation..., p. 77). 15 See The Grounds of Criminal Proscription…, p. 220. Criminalisation of acts 53 sive” criminal proceedings for acts that were less dangerous albeit widespread; the combat against those encroachments would be more efficient if they were administrative offences as administrative proceedings were a simpler, quicker and more effective means to punish a larger number of wrongs. In order to rest on a solid theoretical ground, a decision to criminalise must satisfy all the tests for and all principles of criminalisation. None of the reasons to criminalise (high extent of community danger, frequency of the act, etc.) is sufficient in itself to justify the enactment of a new criminal prohibition. The consistent application of all criteria and principles alone enables the legislator to take the most appropriate decision and craft an efficient rule of the criminal law. 4. The method (form) of committing the act and criminalisation. In some instances, the method (form) of committing the act determines the social significance of that act, in particular the existence of its community danger. The method then calls for criminalisation of the act. 4.1. Some acts are dangerous to the community only if performed in a specific manner. Depending on the method, some forms of an act are dangerous to society while other forms of the same act may contribute to social evolution. The variable social purport of the forms of acts triggers matching responses by the lawmaker. Thus, the state normally encourages the cross-border transfer of goods in accordance with the applicable procedures as a form of commercial exchange. However, where such a transfer occurs without customs authorisation, it is an administrative offence that entails administrative liability and an administrative penalty. And if a document belonging to a third party or one forged or containing misrepresentations is used to effect the transfer, the administrative offence grows into a criminal offence against customs regulations (Art. 242(1)(b) CC). In this case the method has such a compelling impact on the social implications of the act that the latter transforms from some- 54 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING thing beneficial (or at least neutral) to society into an act dangerous to society. Here, it is the modus that “adds” community danger to the act. The lawmaker has therefore criminalised not the act as such but only those of its forms that are sufficiently dangerous to the community. Hence, in such cases the method is a sine qua non for the criminalisation of the act. This is mirrored in the statute as the respective method is defined as a constitutive feature of the basic definition of the crime. The method of committing the act thus serves to distinguish between criminal and non-criminal conduct (administrative, disciplinary, or civil breach). 4.2. Under the legislation in force, the method (form) conditions the criminalisation of a number of acts. The following offences may be cited as examples: acts aimed at exciting or satisfying sexual appeal without intercourse in respect of an individual above the age of 14, if performed by use of force or threat or by bringing the victim into a state of helplessness (Art. 150 CC); sexual intercourse with a woman by use of coercion by force or threat or by bringing her into a state of helplessness (Art. 152(1), points 2 and 3 CC) or by forcing her by use of financial or official dependency (Art. 153 CC); sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex by use of force or threat (Art. 157(1) CC, first sentence); homosexual acts carried out in an open or scandalous manner or in a way to push another into perversion (formerly Art. 157(4) CC, subsequently repealed); obstructing the citizens, by use of force or threat, to manifest their faith or carry out religious ceremonies and services that do not vio- late the laws of the land (Art. 165(1) CC); entry into another's home by use of force, threat, slyness, dexterity, abuse of power or special technical devices (Art. 170(1) CC); enticing someone else into mar- riage in a violent way (Art. 177(1) CC); killing or catching small game by prohibited means (Art. 237(2) CC, last sentence); fishing by use of explosive, poisonous or stupefacient substances (Art. 238(1)(b) CC, first sentence); cross-border transfer of goods without Criminalisation of acts 55 customs authorisation by use of another's document or a forged document or a document containing misrepresentations (Art. 242(1)(b) CC); deflection from military service for less than 24 hours if the act was committed as a group (Art. 380(2) CC, second sentence), etc. In all these cases the criminalisation of the act is conditioned by the same factor: the method (form) of commission. The question arises: what are those methods, could they be included in a classification based on some criteria? The analysis of the legislation reveals that two thirds of the respective acts have been criminalised as they are committed by use of coercion. The most frequent form of coercion is “committing the act by force or threat” (nearly half of the examples). “Bringing someone into a state of helplessness”, “forcing the victim by using his or her dependency”, “abuse of power” are other sui generis forms of coercion. The other acts are criminalised as they are performed in a way unacceptable to society, eg entering another's home “by use of slyness, dexterity, or special technical devices,” hunting game or fishing by “prohibited means”, etc. Earlier Russian writings in criminal law have attempted to divide all methods into criminal and non-criminal ones (A. Chebishev-Dmitriev, I. Foynitski). However, an abstract division regardless of the type of the criminal act is unfeasible. “Such a distinction,” commented V. N. Koudriavtsev, “is only possible and expedient with respect to each specific group of social relations”.16 The issue here concerns the methods of impacting on a given object, ie the acts themselves, rather than the methods to commit a certain crime. The actual social purport of an act only comes to the fore if it is linked with the object affected by that act and the ensuing changes in social relations. Every object predefines (relatively) the spectrum of acts that can encroach upon it. “The object protected by the criminal law,” wrote B. S. Nikiforov, “may not be damaged by any but

16 Koudriavtsev, V. N. The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences ..., p. 74. 56 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING only by certain acts whose nature depends on the features of the object itself ”.17 Figuratively speaking, ownership relations cannot be affected by an insult nor can health be affected by appropriation. The method (act) must be appropriate for the object (social relation) it influences. 4.3. The question arises: how strongly should the method (form) affect the social implications of an act and, specifically, what extent of community danger needs to be there to criminalise an act performed in a specific way? It is impossible to set a priori and in the abstract a minimum community danger or a threshold for purpose of criminalisation. The legislator therefore judges the specific impact of an act on social relations case by case. In addition, the community danger of a certain category of acts is not invariable but changes as time goes by, along with the changing socio-political context. The process of criminalisation is a tool to adjust the criminal law to the needs of life. It is the response of the state to certain public necessities. The line between criminal and non-criminal conduct is therefore dynamic, movable. It changes depending on social development and on the capacity of the state to suppress the respective category of destructive deeds. So the question what extent of community danger should be there for an act to be criminalised is answered by the legislator in concreto, on a case- by-case basis. Another major question arises as well: is it possible to pinpoint and “measure” in practice the impact of the method (form) on the community danger of the act and, hence, identify its function in the process of criminalisation? It should be recognised that the problem is quite complex while the possibilities to resolve it are limited. Nonetheless, the “purport of the principle of community danger,” noted G. A. Zlobin, “does not consist in establishing a priori the

17 Nikiforov, S. The Object of Crime Under Soviet Criminal Law. – Moscow, 1960, p. 137 (in Russian). Criminalisation of acts 57 signs demonstrating the sufficiently elevated community danger of each act (which is impossible) but in reminding the need to discuss and resolve, times and again, all issues that help to estimate the specific community danger of a certain type of acts: does community danger exist at all?; what does it consist in specifically?; what social relations are damaged and how?; what are the dynamics of that danger?; why did the community not have this problem yesterday but it exists there today?; is the degree of community danger so high as to make us place that act on an equal footing with those already covered by the criminal code and exclude it from the class of homogenous acts that are not criminalised?”18

18 The Grounds of Criminal Proscription…, p. 217. § 5. Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime

1. The elements of crime form a set of features used by the lawmaker to characterise a certain type of offence in the criminal code.1 The crime and its elements relate to each other like the actual phenomenon and the notion of it. The elements of crime represent the statutory pattern of a certain type of crime.2 The elements are not simply a sum total of symptoms but rather a system of properties having a certain structure.3 The substance and structure of the elements of crime depend on two factors: the material phenomenon itself, reflected in the elements, and the functions of those elements. The elements of crime reflect primarily a concrete social fact − the criminal conduct. Each element included in the definition of an offence has its material prime source (element, a property or peculiarity of conduct). The substance and structure of criminal conduct determine the substance and structure of the elements of crime.4 Not

1 Traynin, A. N. A General Theory of the Elements of Crime ..., pp. 59- 60. See also Nenov, I. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. General Part ..., p. 229. 2 Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Crimes ..., p. 73. See also A Course in Soviet Criminal Law. Vol. 5. – Leningrad, 1981, p. 525 (in Russian); Zherebkin, V. E. Logical Analysis of Legal Concepts. – Kiev, 1976, p. 65 (in Russian). 3 Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Crimes ..., p. 73. 4 As V. N. Koudriavtsev put it, “[t]he elements of crime represent the objectively existing structure of a certain type of offence that we frame as an abstract concept and describe more or less accurately and comprehensively in the disposition of the criminal rules” (The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences ..., p. 43). Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime 59 in absolute terms, though, we should add. The elements of crime are not a “mirror image” of the conduct dangerous to the community. The substance and structure of any system, including the elements of crime, depend inter alia on its functions. When constructing those elements and determining the features to be included therein, the lawmaker starts with the functions of the particular set of elements in the process of penal regulation. There exist two such functions: to establish (criminalise) and distinguish (differentiate). By using the statutory elements, the lawmaker declares the act described by those elements a criminal offence, that is, establishes the crime, the legal ground for criminal liability. Any conduct that matches the statutory elements of a crime entails criminal liability. This, however, is not sufficient for penal regulation. It is further necessary to set the measure, the extent of that liability. The elements of crime therefore have a second, differentiating function to perform. While characterising a certain type of criminal offence, the elements of crime distinguish between that offence and all other offences and make it possible to provide for matching liability. The lawmaker differentiates between the criminal liability for various offences by defining various crimes in the criminal code.5 Of the whole spectrum of factual properties (elements, peculiarities) of the conduct prejudicial to society, the lawmaker chooses only the most essential ones to depict them as elements of crime. The question then is: which features are of material importance to the

5 “The differentiating function of the elements of crime,” wrote V. N. Koudriavtsev, “is of essential practical relevance as it enables the differentiation of liability depending on the extent of community danger of different wrongs...” (A General Theory of the Classification of Crimes ..., p. 75). On the elements of crime see also Tkesheliadze, G. T. Court Case Law and Penal Legislation …, pp. 45-88; Prohorov, V. S. Crime, the Elements of Crime, and the Grounds of Criminal Liability. − In: A Course of Criminal Law. Vol. 5 …, pp. 523-536; Bourchak, F. G. The Elements of Crime. − In: Criminal Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at the Present Stage. General Part …, pp. 55-80. 60 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING elements of crime?; what criteria does the lawmaker rely on to prefer some features to others and include them in the definition of the offence? The elements should clearly be structured so as to successfully perform both their functions − to establish and differentiate. Hence, the elements must reflect adequately the social nature of the crime, viz. its community danger. This is a precondition for adjudi- cating and imposing a fair penalty. “The general conclusion may thus be drawn,” asserted K. Liutov, “that of all features of the act that are relevant to community danger the lawmaker only selects and adds to the definition those that are necessary and sufficient to establish the community danger required for criminal liability and to outline approximately its extent. The features that are irrelevant to establishing the nature of community danger or play a minor part in specifying its extent remain outside the definition”.6 In fact, this conclusion had been drawn already by the Russian scholar A. N. Traynin in his study A General Theory of the Elements of Crime. “The first and fundamental requirement to be met by the features the legislator defines as elements of crime is that, in their entirety, they must constitute an act dangerous to the community and the state. An act that is not dangerous to the community may not generate a definition of an offence … the law proclaims elements of crime the features that establish not just the existence of community danger but also its extent”.7 This view of A. N. Traynin has been quite fruitful for subsequent research conducted by many other scholars. However, it needs an important addendum. The role of the elements of an offence is not confined to reflecting the community danger alone. There are among them some that concern the guilt, ie characterise the blame attaching to the offender's mental attitude to his dangerous act and to

6 Liutov, K. The Community Danger of Criminal Acts in the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria..., p. 186. 7 Traynin, A. N. A General Theory of the Elements of Crime ..., p. 77. Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime 61 its prejudicial consequences.8 Finally, a qualified definition may contain, inter alia, features concerning the community danger of the offender's personality. By and large, the elements of crime include those features of an offence that are indispensable to provide for a fair and expedient penalty. 2. The next question to be answered concerns the specific place of the method (form) of the act within the set of elements of crime. An examination of the special provisions of the Criminal Code shows that the method is included in the elements of only certain types of crime. The major test used by the lawmaker here is the effect of the method on the community danger of the offence. The method may therefore play quite a different role in the set of statutory elements. a. In certain cases the method of committing the act determines its social implications, or the fact of its community danger. Some acts are socially dangerous and criminal only when committed in a specific manner. Thus, entry into another's home is a criminal offence only if “force, threat, slyness, dexterity, abuse of power or special technical devices” have been used (Art. 170(1) CC). Here, figuratively speaking, the method carries the “main charge” of community danger. It is a precondition for the criminalisation of the act and the legislator has therefore made it a constituent feature of the basic definition of the respective offence. In this case the method is the test used to differentiate between criminal and non-criminal conduct. b. The various methods of infringing upon a certain category of social relations, ie the different offences, may differ perceptibly in the nature of community danger. In such cases the lawmaker sets

8 See to this effect Braynin, Y. M. Criminal Liability and Its Ground in Soviet Criminal Law …, pp. 94-95; Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Crimes ..., pp. 71-72. 62 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING them apart and defines new crimes. Thus, theft, robbery, fraud, and extortion are different ways to encroach on property. These are different methods of criminal interference with an object, not different methods of committing the same crime. It may be asserted that the modus operandi here modifies the nature of the community danger of the criminal conduct. The modus is therefore a criterion to distinguish between kindred criminal offences, ie to differentiate between various grounds for criminal liability. c. The method of committing a criminal act often affects significantly the extent of its community danger. Where a certain method intensifies the community danger so that it goes beyond that underlying the basic definition of the offence, the lawmaker embeds the respective more dangerous variety of the crime in a separate definition that prescribes a heavier penalty. The method, then, is a qualifying circumstance. It forms part of a qualified definition and serves to distinguish between the different varieties of an offence. Here the method is a criterion to differentiate criminal liability, though within the frames of a specific type of crime. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Bulgaria provides for definitions qualified on account of the method in respect of almost all crimes of wider practical purport (offences against the person, offences against property, etc.). d. The legislator specifies, refines the community danger of some crimes by including the method of crime commission in the basic definition of an offence (eg endangering the safety of an aircraft by communicating false information or giving a false signal: Art. 341a(2(b) CC). The combination of criminal act and method depicts more accurately the community danger of the conduct. In this case, too, the method is an element of the basic definition of the offence, though it is not a key element (decisive for criminalisation) but an additional, expounding one. The concretisation of the definitions of offences entails a deeper differentiation of the statutory grounds for criminal liability. Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime 63

e. In the rest of cases, where the method does not affect substantially the typical community danger, the legislator does not reflect it in the respective definitions. The impact of the method on community danger is considered by the court at the sentencing stage. Here the method of crime commission is either an aggravating or attenuating circumstance relevant to the individualisation of criminal liability. Hence, in different scenarios the method of crime commission can bear quite differently on criminal liability. While in some cases it conditions the criminalisation of the act, ie the very emergence of criminal liability, in others it is a criterion to differentiate criminal liability at different levels, and in yet others it is a circumstance addressed when individualising the penalty. There also exist border- line situations where the method of crime commission must be clearly distinguished from the method of criminal encroachment on the object (which is the offence itself). All these intricacies call for theoretical research on the methods (forms) of committing criminal offences. 2.1. In order to locate the method (form) of the act within the structure of statutory elements, we shall rely on the following fundamentals. First, conduct is a system of hierarchical elements (levels) with different degrees of complexity. It is a hierarchical structure. The criminal act (the substance) and the method (form) of committing it are two adjacent levels in the structure of conduct. The method is a combination of behavioural acts whereby the next, higher level of conduct, viz. the criminal act, materialises. Second, the elements of crime form a reflection, a normative image of criminal conduct. Hence, the elements also have a hierarchical structure. Any definition of an offence consists of various categories of elements characterising different levels of conduct and therefore having a different level of abstraction. Each element may 64 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING in turn be “decomposed” without limitation into other, more specific elements.9 Of all elements forming the objective aspect of an offence, the most abstract is the one that characterises the type of criminal act, ie the substance of the offence. The elements concerning the method of crime commission, ie the form of the offence, belong to a lower level. The relation between these two categories of elements depends on the relation between the phenomena they reflect − the criminal act and its method (form). Any criminal act is performed through a combination of body movements that we refer to as a “method of commission.” The substance of the element labelled “criminal act” is therefore fully disclosed by the totality of elements concerning the “method (form) of the act” which have a lower level of abstraction and are to be found one level down in the hierarchy of elements of crime (provided no alternative elements exist at that lower level).10 The hierarchical structure of the elements of crime may be illustrated with the following example. Let us take the definition of aggravated encroachment upon the inviolability of one's home (Art. 170(3) in conjunction with (2) CC). The most abstract element is the one depicting the type of the criminal act: “entering another's home” (level I). Such entry, however, is a criminal offence only if commit-

9 See Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Crimes ..., pp. 115-121. 10 On the alternative elements in the definitions of offences (which give rise to complex theoretical problems) see Koudriavtsev, V. N. ibid, p. 119. Our legislator has described a number of methods in the Criminal Code by reference to alternative elements, for example: a) the method is a condition for criminalisation (Art. 127(3); Art. 150; Art. 152(1), point 2; Art. 153; Art. 157(1); Art. 170(1) CC; b) the method is a qualifying circumstance (Art. 149(2); Art. 185(2); Art. 195(1), points 3 and 4 CC); c) the method is an expounding circumstance in the basic description of an offence (Art. 107; Art. 143; Art. 167; Art. 341a(2)(a) and (b) CC). Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime 65 ted in a specific manner. A number of alternative elements describing the manner of entry − by use of “force, threat, slyness, dexterity, abuse of power or special technical devices” − are located one level down (level II). Each of these specifies how the “other's home” is entered. Or, they specify the substance of the former, more general element of “entry”. This is where the characteristics of the basic variety of the offence (the basic definition under Art. 170(1) CC) end. Art. 170(2) CC then provides for heavier penalties if the offence is committed “at night or by an armed person, or by two or more persons”. The first aggravating circumstance concerns the time of committing the offence, while the others display some peculiarities of the offender. All elements listed in Art. 170(2) CC in fact elaborate on the crime defined in Art. 170(1) CC and therefore occupy the third level down in the hierarchy of elements of crime (level III). Art. 170(3) CC then provides for even heavier responsibility if the aggravated assault under paragraph 2 “is targeted at the home of a person enjoying international protection”. These elements specify the subject-matter of the aggravated encroachment on the inviolability of one's home referred to in paragraph 2 and are therefore further down (level IV) in the structure of elements of crime. Of course, it is not that the definitions of all offences are “layered” at so many categories of elements with different degrees of abstraction. Most offences defined in the Criminal Code cover two adjacent levels of elements. 2.2. As mentioned earlier, the elements of crime represent a statutory pattern of behaviour that is dangerous to society. The question then is: which levels of conduct (body movement, operation, action, activity) does the lawmaker reflect most frequently in the definitions of offences. An analysis of the Criminal Code shows that acts (omissions) feature most prominently among the elements of crime. The level of activity is too high to be reflected in a concrete provision of the criminal law (that level is normally subject to moral 66 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING norms), whereas the level of the body movement is too low (body movements are regulated by technical standards).11 By way of exception, the Criminal Code may contain norms that prohibit entire activities, eg unlawful private economic activity (s. 226 CC), unauthorised commercial agency by way of occupation (s. 234(1) CC, subsequently repealed), unlawful organisation and carrying out of house construction as an entrepreneur (s. 234(2) CC, subsequently repealed). An action may form part of activities of a different nature and be performed by different body movements. In order to reflect adequately the social implications (community danger) of criminal conduct, the lawmaker normally includes in the definition of an offence: a) the harmful consequences caused by that act or, b) the method used to perform the act. In the latter case, the legislator shapes within the definition two adjacent levels of conduct, viz. the criminal act and the method (form) of its commission. The combination of behavioural acts that belong to adjacent structural levels helps characterise more precisely the community danger of the conduct.12 The role of objective factors, in particular the structure of conduct, in shaping the definitions of offences should not be overstated. The elements of crime form a vivid and creative (as opposed to passive and “mirror-image”) echo of reality. The lawmaker decides to include the method in the definition of a certain offence depending

11 Koudriavtsev, V. N. Law and Behaviour ..., pp. 27-28. 12 It is important to underscore the merit of the Russian scholar V. N. Koudriavtsev for having applied the structural approach to the analysis of legally relevant conduct and the elements of crime (eg Law and Behaviour; A General Theory of the Classification of Crimes). “It is only the combination of elements attributable to two adjacent levels of conduct,” wrote V. N. Koudriavtsev, “that provides the law with an acceptable pattern of socially beneficial or socially harmful behaviour and such combinations are frequently found in legal rules (Law and Behaviour ..., p. 28). On the link between the structure of conduct and the legal rule see also Nourpeisov, E. K. The Psychology of Law-abiding Behaviour …, pp. 13-24. Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime 67 on his estimate as to whether the definition, so constructed, would be successful in performing its functions. The structure of a definition is also tailored to the functions it is called upon to perform by statute. The two functions of the definition (establish and distinguish) play an important part in lawmaking. The legislator selects and reflects in the elements of crime those crucial elements of conduct that, in the aggregate, outline most accurately the social implications of the conduct, ie its community danger and reproof. Hence, the definition is a functional system of the elements of an offence. 2.3. The question arises: what are the outlooks − would the definitions of offences that include the method (form) of the crime proliferate as penal legislation evolves? If we think of the trend towards a deeper differentiation of criminal liability, this question should be answered in the affirmative. First, the lawmaker may limit the scope of application of some criminal rules by adding to the respective basic definitions a new element concerning the method of committing the offence. The punishability of an act would thus be confined to some of its varieties (for example, after 1968 homosexual acts were only punishable if committed by force, in a scandalous manner or in a way to push someone else into perversion (provisions repealed, State Gazette, issue 92 of 2002) and in some other cases − Art. 157 CC. Second, the ever deeper differentiation goes hand in hand with the emergence of new definitions qualified on account of the method of crime commission (thus, in 1982 thefts committed by use of a motor vehicle were defined as qualified offences carrying heavier penalties: Art. 195(1), point 4 CC, first sentence). The new ways of committing criminal offences should be studied and, should the lawmaker become confident that a certain method affects materially the community danger of the crime and is sufficiently widespread, it should be added to the respective definitions of offences. 68 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

2.4. The efficiency of a criminal statute depends not only on its substance but also on its form, on the technique used to set forth the legislative text. Depending on the legal technique used by the lawmaker to characterise the criminal conduct, the elements of crime divide into four categories: descriptive (formally defined), simple, blanket, and judgmental.13 An analysis of the definitions in the existing Criminal Code that include, inter alia, the method (form) of crime commission shows that such methods are depicted primarily by formally defined features, eg theft committed “by destructing, damaging or undermining barriers inserted firmly for the protection of persons or estates” (Art. 195(1), point 3 CC); robbery committed “by two or more persons who have conspired in advance to commit thefts or robberies” (Art. 199(1), point 2 CC); catching fish in fishing waters “with explosive, poisonous or stupefacient substances” (Art. 238(1)(a) CC, first sentence); endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight by “destroying or damaging an air navigation installation or facility” (Art. 341a(2)(a) CC), etc. In only one fifth of all cases has the lawmaker used judgmental features to characterise the method of the offence,

13 The techniques of penal legislation have also been analysed by N. N. Polianski and M. D. Shargorodski. The in-depth studies of M. I. Kovaliov are noteworthy as well, eg Kovaliov, M. I. On the Technique of Penal Legislation. − Pravovedenie, 1962, No. 3, pp. 142-146 (in Russian); The Sound Construction of Criminal Rules as a Must for Their Efficiency. − Sb. uchen. tr. sv. YuI., 1974, vip. 29, pp. 5-12 (in Russian); The Optimum Relation between Formal and Judgmental in the Criminal Statute. − Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1973, No. 11, pp. 68-74 (in Russian); The Role of Legal Conscience and Legal Technique in the Development of Penal Legislation. − Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1985, No. 8, pp. 73-79 (in Russian). See also Kouznetsova, N. F. The Efficiency of Criminal Rules and Statutory Language. − Sotsialist. zakonnost, 1973, No. 9, pp. 29-33, (in Russian); Naoumov, A. V. The Form of the Law and Its Social Determination. − In: Issues Relating to the Improvement of Penal Legislation. − Moscow, 1984, pp. 18-27 (in Russian). Elements of crime. Functions of the elements of crime 69 eg murder “in a manner particularly painful for the murdered person” (Art. 116, point 6 CC, second sentence); causing a dependent person to commit a suicide “by cruel treatment” (Art. 127(3) CC); theft committed “in a special manner” (Art. 195(1), point 4 CC, third sentence), etc. The legislator clearly aspires to provide in the criminal code a more concrete description of the different methods and therefore relies mostly on descriptive elements with a well-defined and invari- ant meaning. This approach if fully justified. It would be illogical to specify a criminal offence by reference to the method of its commission if the latter is characterised in a rather abstract way, by judgmental or blanket features (thus undermining the principle that all offences must be provided by statute and inviting judicial errors in the day-to-day classification of offences). § 6. Punishment. Grounds, objects, and severity of punishment

Any problem in the realm of the criminal law finally comes down to determining the ground for and the severity of punishment. These issues have been lively debated ever since the emergence of this branch of law. Already Cesare Beccaria addressed them in his famous treatise, On Crimes and Punishments (1764). Beccaria's ideas were quick to conquer Europe and inspire penal legislation reforms in a number of countries. “Punishment” and “criminal liability” are similar notions but they are not identical. Imposing the same penalty for different offences does not mean the offender faces the same liability. Criminal liability normally goes along with a penalty. Exceptionally, however, criminal liability may be engaged although no penalty is imposed. In this case criminal responsibility consists in the very fact of convicting the guilty person, ie recognising him as being at fault for the crime and repri- manding him.1 In this work the concepts of “penalty” and “criminal liability” are used as equipollent.

1 As I. N. Danshin put it: “... liability may take exactly the form of such a reprimand and conviction of the guilty person and his act by the state, even though no penalty is applied. Therefore, the very fact of returning a verdict of guilty, whether or not a sentence is imposed, shows that the burden of criminal liability is placed on the person's shoulders” (Criminal Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at the Present Stage. General Part …, p. 46). The opposite view was taken by S. Pavlov: “A finding of guilt is not equivalent to a conviction. He who is not sentenced cannot be regarded as convicted. Conviction unavoidably and necessarily entails a specific sentence” (Public Warranty for the Correction and Rehabilitation of Guilty Offenders. − Sofia, 1969, p. 144, in Bulgarian). Punishment. Grounds, objects, and severity of punishment 71

Essentially, criminal liability consists in bearing, enduring statutory constraint on the part of the person who has committed an offence. In terms of its social role, criminal liability is the response of the state to a committed criminal offence. It aims at restoring the state of justice undermined by the crime. Imposing criminal sanctions is therefore an activity beneficial to the community. Criminal liability is an instrument of social control that safeguards the positive development of social relations. In terms of law, criminal liability is the legal effect that a crime entails. The ground for criminal liability is the offence itself − the guilty commission of an act dangerous to society and defined in the criminal code. The crime is the juridical fact that gives rise to the penal relation, ie to the entitlement of the state to try and punish the guilty individual and to the obligation of the latter to endure criminal liability. That obligation is a possibility that materialises when the verdict and sentence take effect. In other words, criminal liability is the result of enforcing the rules of the criminal law.2

2 A slightly different view was upheld by V. Karakashev who defined “criminal liability as a legal possibility, triggered by the commission of an offence, to impose a penalty on the offender and make him sustain the execution of that penalty. Criminal liability materialises in the sentencing and in the execution of the penalty. This, however, does not always occur. Liability is therefore just a possibility failing which no other option exists.” (Punishability, Criminal Liability, and Personal Grounds for Exceptions from Criminal Liability. − Sofia, 1966, p. 72, in Bulgarian). According to S. N. Bratous, "liability is not the obligation to sustain the consequences of the wrong but the very endurance of those consequences as a result of coercion" (Legal Liability and Legality. − Moscow, 1976, p. 103, in Russian). On the concept of “criminal liability” see eg Strouchkov, N. A. Criminal Liability and Its Implementation in the Fight against Crime. − Saratov, 1978 (in Russian); Karakashev, V. On the Issue of Criminal Liability. − Pravna misal, 1981, No. 1, pp. 40-49 (in Bulgarian); Santalov, A. I. Theoretical Problems of 72 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

1. Ground for punishment. The different systems of criminal law vary primarily in their grounds for criminal liability (for the penalty). Depending on whether the criminal act or the perpetrator is the ground for the penalty, we have the system of the “deed-driven criminal law” and the system of the “doer-driven criminal law”. The classical school (founded by C. Beccaria and having K. Binding as its eminent representative) has it that the criminal act is the sole ground for punishment. The act induces the punishment and at the same time determines its severity. In other words, the offence is not only the ground for punishment, but also its measure. The deed-driven approach, which requires the penalty to be commensurate with the offence, was invented by C. Beccaria. In studying the relation between the offence and the penalty, he noted that penalties, that is, “the barriers that deter people from committing crimes must increase the larger the damage an offence inflicts on society … punishments must be in direct proportion to the crimes”.3 Today, Bechharia's theory (revived by the neo-classical school) prevails not just in mainland Europe but also in the United States and in the Nordic countries.4 If Beccaria were

Criminal Liability. − Leningrad, 1982 (in Russian); Prohorov V. S., op. cit., pp. 126-135; Hinova, T. Methods, Instruments, and Organisation of the Combat against Juvenile Offending. − Sofia, 1984, pp. 18-21 (in Bulgarian); Criminal Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at the Present Stage. General Part …, pp. 41-48; Shavgoulidze, T. G. Philosophical and Psychological Reasoning of Criminal Liability. − In: Current Issues of Modern Criminal Law, Criminology, and Criminal Procedure. − Tbilisi, 1986, pp. 8-18 (in Russian); Kozachenko, I. Y. Sanctions for Criminal Offences against Life and Health, pp. 31-87; Soviet Criminal Law. General Part. − Moscow, 1988, pp. 22-26 (in Russian); Prohorov, V. S., N. M. Kropachev, A. N. Tarbagaev The Mechanism of Penal Regulation. − Krasnoyarsk, 1989, pp. 144-187 (in Russian).

3 Beccharia, C. On Crimes and Punishments. – Varna, 1993, pp. 91-92 (in Bulgarian). 4 See Christie, N. The Limits of Penalty. – Moscow, 1985 (in Russian; translated from English). Punishment. Grounds, objects, and severity of punishment 73 to make an inspection tour of Europe now, he would be completely contended with the implementation of his ideas. One century after Bechharia the anthropological-sociological, or positive, theory emerged in C. Lombroso's work ‘The Criminal Man’ 1871 (F. List in known as its most renowned representative). That school shifted the emphasis from the offence onto the offender. According to it the reasons for crime are rooted in the psychophysical peculiarities of the offender and his social milieu. Retribution for a perpetrated offence is thus pointless as it fails to eliminate the reasons for the crime which lie in the offender himself. Hence, the offender's criminal inclination has to be punished, not the act. The anthropological-sociological theory rejected the deed-driven approach and made the offender's personality the basis of punishment. A person with criminal inclination must be diverted to various protective, non- oppressive (medical, psychiatric, etc.) measures to ensure his social reintegration. As this theory is essentially subjective, it ends up in dis- torting the equality of the citizens before the law and even in judicial arbitrariness. It is not by coincidence that even the fathers of the school have renounced its extreme conclusions. 2. Objects of punishment. Punishment is not just a fair (proportionate) retribution for an offence committed but also a means of achieving certain ends. A clamp down on crime is the ultimate purpose of any penalty. The immediate aim, however, is to: a) influence the offender (individual deterrence), and b) influence the other members of society (general deterrence). Preference for one of the two goals depends on the crime policy of a state and its concept of fighting crime. The objectives the lawmaker pursues with punishment largely determine the type and limits of the penalties for different offences. In order to measure the efficacy of the penal impact, the objects of punishment must be set out in the law. Hence, it is necessary to define the relation between individual and general deterrence. 74 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

At the outset of the nineteenth century, two schools of thought emerged in Germany with respect to the objects of punishment. The German scholar A. Feuerbach, a follower of Beccaria's classical theory, viewed general deterrence as the goal of any penalty. K. Grollman, considered to be an early representative of the anthropological-sociological theory, took the opposite stance. In his view, individual deterrence was the essential goal of a penalty. This debate is still ongoing and vividly fuelled today, both in the theory and practice of the criminal law. The penalty to be selected for an offence depends on the goal to be emphasised. If the penalty aims at individual deterrence, ie influencing the offender, the statute must set down a set of measures, including non-penal ones, that help take maximum consideration of the individual features of an offender's personality. If a penalty is targeted on general deterrence, that is, deterring the other members of society, it must be a fair retribution for the offence. The type and severity of the penalty, then, depend on the typical level of gravity (danger to society and reproof) of the criminal act in question. Individual and general deterrence should not be perceived as mutually opposite. They are not two opposite poles. “Individual and general deterrence,” observed V. Karakashev, “are not different levels in the sophisticated hierarchy of goals pursued by criminal-law measures.” Individual deterrence is “a major tool to attain more comprehensively the goal of general deterrence…”.5 This view is quite helpful as it avoids the artificial clash between individual and general deterrence and paves the way to the optimum balance between them. 3. Severity of punishment. According to the Criminal Code of Bulgaria, a penalty may only be imposed on a person who has committed a crime established by statute” (Art. 35(2) CC). On the other hand, Art. 35(3) CC reads: “The penalty shall be commensurate with the offence,” that is, with its community danger and blame. Our penal

5 Karakashev, V. Measuring the Efficiency of the Sentence of Imprisonment. − Sofia, 1982, pp. 52-87 (in Bulgarian). Punishment. Grounds, objects, and severity of punishment 75 legislation therefore rests on the deed-driven approach. The criminal act is a single, general measure for the punishment of different individuals that ensures the equality of the citizens before the law.6 The penalty must be proportionate to the offence. It must be a fair retribution for the offence committed. And vice versa, a fair penalty matches the criminal offence. The fairness of the penalty contributes to the object of general deterrence − to prevent other citizens from offending. Besides being commensurate with the offence, a penalty must be expedient, so as to attain the objectives prescribed by statute. The Criminal Code has formulated two objects of punishment, viz. general and individual deterrence (Art. 36 CC). General deterrence is attained by fair punishment (corresponding to the criminal act). Individual deterrence, however, requires that the penalty be tailored to the individual peculiarities of the offender's personality. Hence, a penalty must satisfy two requirements that are hardly consistent. It must match the offence and be tailored to the offender. Our legislator has confined himself to formulating the requirements for a penalty without specifying which of them is decisive. However, we need a clear and theoretically substantiated explanation of the relation between the two factors (offence and offender) that determine the severity of the penalty. The analysis of Bulgarian penal legislation invites the conclusion that the inconsistency is resolved by attaching major importance to the offence. The criminal act is the ground for and the measure of punishment. Therefore, the penalty has mainly a general deterring effect. The offender's personality is just another factor bearing on the severity of the penalty. Hence, Bulgarian law defines general deterrence as the major goal of punishment while individual deterrence is of secondary importance.

6 Already Aristotle noted that justice has many facets and wrote: “If someone ... brings harm and another sustains it, the law sees a difference only in the damage caused while treating all people as equal.” (Works. Vol. 4. − Moscow, 1981, p. 4, in Russian). 76 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Contemporary European literature in criminal law is also per- vaded by the understanding that general deterrence (the offence) should prevail over individual deterrence (the offender).7 The report of the Committee on Criminal Law Affairs (produced in 1977 to support the reform of penal legislation in Sweden) is a perfect illustration of this. It made inter alia the following conclusion: “We recommend a system of penalties that would enhance general deterrence … The seriousness of the offence and the need to strike a balance between the offence and the penalty must be decisive for the choice of penalty.” Some authors have even attempted to substantiate quantitatively the relation between the two factors − offence and offender − in determining the severity of punishment. “If a penalty is a function of two independent factors (offender and personality),” observed P. P. Ossipov, “the relative weight of the offence should be twice as big as that of the offender when the penalty is set.”8 3.1. The relation between offence and penalty may be viewed at two different levels, viz. legislative and judicial. At the outset, the lawmaker estimates, or “gauges,” the gravity (community danger and blame) of the crime and reflects it in the statute (elements of crime). The penalty enshrined in the sanction is a compressed image of the offence, its qualitative estimate. “Any general, model definition of a crime provided in the disposition of the statute, each description of an offence,” noted A. N. Traynin, “is matched by a general, model penal-

7 See Karpets, I. I. Social, Legal, and Criminological Problems. − Moscow, 1973 (in Russian); Andenes, I. Penalty and the Prevention of Crime. − Moscow, 1979 (in Russian, translated from English); Christie, N., op. cit.; Jescheck, H. Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil. B., 1988; Roxin, C. Strafrecht. M., 1991; Streng, F. Strafrechtliche Sanktionen. B., 1991; Individualprvention und Strafzzumessung. W.,1992. As regards the reform of penal legislation in Finland, I. Anttila underlined: “The penalty must result first and foremost in general deterrence,”; see Anttila, I. Et forslag til straf- flagsreform i Finland. − NTK, 1977, pp. 65 and 102-106. 8 Ossipov, P. P. A Comprehensive Study of the System of Impacting on Crime. − St. Petersburg, 1978, pp. 106-107 (in Russian). Punishment. Grounds, objects, and severity of punishment 77 ty defined in the sanction…”9 The problem of lawmaking is how to arrive at that consistency, ie embed in the sanction a penalty that matches the offence depicted in the disposition. In one word, the problem lies in creating a fair statute. In order to find out the proportion between crime and punishment, the two have to be weighed in advance. The task to set in the legislation penalties proportionate to the offence has three stages: a) estimating, in qualitative and quantitative terms, the gravity (community danger and blame) of the different categories of offences; b) setting a uniform scale and weighing the severity of the different types of penalties; and c) establishing and expressing in quantitative terms the dependence between the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the penalty, inter alia by identifying the ratio of consistency between them (how much of the penalty matches one unit of the gravity of crime). Finally, it is a matter of measuring socio-legal phenomena. The court weighs virtually every day the gravity of specific criminal offences and the severity of specific penalties. Judicial assessment, however, develops within the frames preset by the lawmaker's estimate (Art. 54 CC). In other words, the legislative assessment of the gravity of an offence and a penalty prevails over the evaluation of the judge. Overall, the criminal law is deeply permeated by qualitative eval- uations. It is the task of criminal-law theory to devise sound criteria and methods to gauge the community danger and blame of criminal offences and build up the sanctions of the rules in the special part of the criminal code. That would curtail the role of intuition and subjective judgment and foster the theoretical substantiation and fairness of the solutions embedded in the criminal law. 3.2. A review of Bulgarian penal legislation shows that a number of definitions of offences contain elements concerning the offender

9 Traynin, A. N. A General Theory of the Elements of Crime ..., p. 313. 78 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING along with features of the act. Thus Art. 116(1), point 2 CC (murder); Art. 131, point 2 CC (bodily harm); Art. 148(1), point 4 CC (insult); Art. 148(2) in conjunction with paragraph 1, point 4 (defamation) all specify that the offender must be an official; the offender under Art. 126(2) CC (criminal abortion) must be an individual who “has no university degree in medicine”; bribery under Art. 302, point 1 CC may only be committed “by a person occupying a senior official position”, etc. Moreover, the criminal liability for a number of offences (murder; rape; bodily harm; hooliganism; theft; robbery; embezzlement; fraud, etc.) intensifies in the event of “repeat offending” or “dangerous repeat offending”, ie if the crime in question is committed by an individual with a particularly dangerous personality (anti-social mindset). The legislator is obviously unable to disregard completely the offender's personality in lawmaking and adds some personal traits to the definitions of specific offences.10 The question then is how this reconciles with the principle that the act should be the sole ground for the penalty. In order to give the right answer, we should distinguish between the factors that condition the emergence of criminal liability (ie form the ground for liability) and those that only affect the extent of that liability. The former are relevant to criminalisation whereas the latter bear on the differentiation of criminal liability. Or, the elements of the basic definition of an offence should be distinguished from the elements of any qualified (aggravated or attenuated) such definition. In the basic definition of an offence the lawmaker sets out the ground for criminal liability. The basic definition must therefore

10 See on this Yakovlev, A. M. The Principle of Social Justice and the Grounds of Criminal Liability… pp. 87-90; Leykina, N. S. The Offender's Personality and Criminal Liability. − Leningrad, 1968, pp. 39-68 (in Russian); Koudriavtsev, V. N. Criminalisation: The Optimum Models. − In: Criminal Law in the Fight against Crime. − Moscow, 1981, p. 4 (in Russian). Punishment. Grounds, objects, and severity of punishment 79 describe only the act. This is a vehicle to implement the principle of equality of all citizens before the law. On the other hand, a qualified definition of an offence is a tool to differentiate criminal liability. Besides the features of the basic definition, qualified definitions also cover the circumstances that alter materially the basic variety of the offence and call for a modified (differentiated) penalty. Such qualifying (aggravating or attenuating) circumstances may characterise the offender's conduct or personality. When a feature of the offender's personality affects substantially the extent of community danger, the lawmaker reflects that feature in a special definition of the offence that carries a lighter or heavier penalty. Hence, the special rule (the qualified definition) alone, which provides for a lighter or heavier penalty, may characterise the offender's personality.11 This is logical. The peculiarities of an offender's personality become relevant to the criminal law only once it has been ascertained that the conduct matches the basic definition of the offence in its entirety. It is only if the ground for criminal liability exists that its extent may be discussed, that is, the application of a qualified definition of the offence. In Bulgarian criminal law, the gravity of the offence (the requirement for fairness) is of the essence for the type and scope of punishment. The punishment thus serves general deterrence. In addition, the lawmaker takes account of individual deterrence that is pursued through differentiated penalties. The question is how the requirements for fairness (general deterrence) and expediency (individual deterrence) combine when the penalty is stated in the statute. The follow-

11 Of course, we do not mean here offences that may be perpetrated only by individuals having a specific status, the so-called “genuine special offences”. In such offences the special status of the offender is a sine qua non for the existence of a crime, eg genuine official malfeasance, genuine military crimes, some economic crimes. Here the basic definition of the offence crime clearly contains features of the offender. 80 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING ing general assumption may be made: the ceiling of a penalty is determined by the maximum gravity of the offence (otherwise the principle of matching offences and penalties would be transgressed). However, in setting the threshold of a penalty the lawmaker may go below the minimum dictated by the objective gravity of the crime to enable the court to take maximum account of the offender's traits. As to the court, it certainly reflects the offender's personal features more amply in the sentence. § 7. Differentiation of criminal liability

The concept of differentiation of criminal liability has been lively debated in the theory of criminal law.1 Some authors define that notion quite broadly by including in it inter alia the distinction between criminal and non-criminal conduct, ie criminalisation.2 Others confine the differentiation of criminal liability to the differentiation of penalties.3 We shall examine below the substance of the differentiation of criminal liability and the forms it takes. 1. The notion of “differentiation of criminal liability”. Differentiation of law has deep social roots. It reflects the differentiation occurring within the system of social relations. The progress of science and technology changes the quality of our lives. The production relations tend to become increasingly complex and dynamic. All these phenomena are imaged in law. The increasing complexity of public life has entailed a growing need for differentiated legal regulation. New structural entities − legal rules, institutions, branches − emerge. Some of them govern infant social relations (ie the scope of application of the law is expanding), while other new rules “specialise” in the regulation of individual aspects, elements or peculiarities of existing relations. In other words, the “division of

1 See on this discussion Mihaylov, D. Differentiation of Criminal Liability under the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. − Pravna misal, 1981, No. 2, pp. 24-25 (in Bulgarian). 2 Thus Nezkusil, J. K problematike diferenciace trestni odpovednosti. − In: Diferenciase trestni odpovednosti. Praha, 1983, с. 34-38. 3 I. Nenov used the concepts of “criminal liability” and “penalty” as equivalent terms (Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. General Part, pp. 497-499). See also Refining the Measures to Combat Crime in the Context of Scientific and Technological Advancement. – Moscow, 1980, pp. 126-150 (in Russian). 82 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING labour” among various legal prescriptions is growing.4 The complex, multi-layered nature of regulated social relations and the diverse tasks faced by the law differentiate further the legal system. On the other hand, social developments imply an objective con- vergence of economic trends and relations. The legal projection of this fact is the generalisation (integration) of normative texts. The new social phenomena can only be covered by new, more general forms of the law that are sufficiently abstract. Therefore, the legal rules that regulate close, kindred relations are bundled together and generalised. The legal system thus moves to a new, more sophisticated stage of its development. Hence, differentiation and integration are the opposite and dialectically linked aspects of the evolution of law.5 Penal legislation is a specific tool to protect the social relations against criminal encroachment. The efficacy of penal impact mostly depends on the differentiation of criminal liability and its inevitability. Therefore, the deepening differentiation of criminal liability is a major aspect of the betterment of penal legislation. “Differentiation of criminal liability” means envisaging in the law different criminal liability for the various types of offences (depending on their typical community danger and blame and on those features of the offender's personality that are relevant to society).6 The differentiation of criminal liability is a means of imple- menting the principle of justice in the criminal law. By virtue of that principle “the penalty shall be commensurate with the offence” (Art.

4 Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law, Moscow, 1975, pp. 3-54 (in Russian). See also The Legal System of Socialism. Vol. 1. – Moscow, 1986, pp. 14-65 (in Russian). 5 Idem. 6 According to I. Nenov, differentiation means “establishing specific solutions for different categories of situations relevant to the criminal law”(Nenov I., K. Liutov Differentiation and Individualisation of Criminal Differentiation of criminal liability 83

35(3) CC). The “differentiation of criminal liability” is usually understood as providing heavier penalties for serious offences and dangerous repeat offenders along with alleviated criminal liability or even complete exception for lighter offences and offenders susceptible of correction by less repressive means (known as “incidental offenders”). The concept of “differentiation of criminal liability,” however, is much richer in substance and meaning. To clarify in depth the differentiation of criminal liability, we should start from the link between liability and the offence. An offence is not just the ground for but also the measure of criminal liability.7 In other words, as well as entailing criminal liability the offence determines its weight. Liability is an adequate consequence

Liability. − In: The System of State and Law on the Way towards a Developed Socialist Society in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. − Sofia, 1975, p. 321, in Bulgarian). The differentiation of law “is normally understood as a decomposition, split based on certain features or indicators identifying material and typical dif- ferences which invite specific conclusions and solutions” (Mihaylov, D. Differentiation of Criminal Liability under the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of Bulgaria..., p. 23). On the differentiation of criminal liability see also Kourliandskii, V. I. Crime Policy, Differentiation and Individualisation of Criminal Liability. − In: Major Areas of the Fight against Crime, Moscow, 1975, pp. 77-95 (in Russian); Galperin, I. M. Crime Policy and Penal Legislation. − In: Major Areas of the Fight against Crime. − Moscow, 1975, pp. 47-76 (in Russian); Zlobin, G. A., S. G. Kerina, A. M. Yakovlev Soviet Crime Policy: The Differentiation of Liability. − Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1977, No. 9, pp. 54-62 (in Russian); Filchev, N. The Elements of Crime and Differentiation of Criminal Liability. − In: Diferenciace trestni odpovednosti. Praha, 1983, с. 139-145 (in Russian). 7 “If the concept of “offence” implies a penalty,” wrote Karl Marx, “then the actual offence implies a certain measure of penalty. The actual offence is limited. The penalty must therefore be limited as well... The task is to make the penalty a genuine consequence of the offence...” Marx, K., F. Engels, Collected Works. Vol. 1. − Sofia, 1957, p. 120 (in Bulgarian). 84 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING of the crime. The differentiation of criminal liability thus ensues from the differentiation of its grounds, the criminal offences. The lawmaker therefore faces three problems when differentiating criminal liability. First, the need to distinguish in the criminal code between the different forms of criminal conduct, ie the different types of offence (basic definitions) and those variants of a crime (qualified definitions) that call for specialized criminal liability.8 The fundamental test for this distinction is the seriousness (community danger and blame) of the conduct. Second, the need to categorise the various types of offenders and identify their social characteristics of material importance to the severity (extent) of criminal liability. Third, the need to set down the penalties for different types of offence: each penalty must match the gravity of the crime described in the disposition while remaining proportionate to the penalties for other offences defined in the code. Hence, a system of varied penalties and other measures of impact should be added to the general part of the criminal code; that would enable the lawmaker to differentiate the liability for different offences and allow the court to individualise the penalty depending on the specifics of the case at hand. Besides the gravity of an offence and the offender's personality, the lawmaker uses an additional criterion to differentiate criminal liability, namely the objects of punishment. As mentioned earlier, punishment is not just a fair (proportionate) retribution for the offence committed but also a tool to attain the objects set out in the statute.9 Article 36 of the Criminal Code of Bulgaria defines them in

8 As I. Nenov puts it, “[a]bove all, it is necessary to delineate and describe in the law the typical situations that need a differential treatment and specified criminal sanctions” (Nenov, I., K. Liutov, op. cit., p. 324). 9 “The penalty deserved is not always actually needed (altogether or at the respective level) to attain the goals set out in the statute.” (Liutov, K. Novelties in the Penalties in the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. − Sofia, 1972, p. 11, in Bulgarian). On the objects of punishment see Differentiation of criminal liability 85 most general terms. In envisaging a specific penalty for an offence, the lawmaker adjusts the general principles to the peculiarities of the individual case. Moreover, different crime policy considerations come to the foreground in each case that make the legislator empha- sise a certain immediate, specified purpose. At all times, however, general deterrence (hence, the gravity of the offence, fairness) prevails over individual deterrence (personal peculiarities; expediency) in setting out the penalty in the statute. Again, in setting the threshold of punishment the lawmaker may go below the minimum conditioned by the objective gravity of an offence and mitigate the penalty in order to achieve specific goals (eg encourage the offender's positive post-offence behaviour or enable the court to take on board the negligible extent of community danger of the offender's personality, etc.). The principle of expediency has been instrumental in constructing the sanctions of incentive criminal rules. It is well known that a number of provisions in the Criminal Code of Bulgaria alle- viate or even completely exclude criminal liability if the offender discontinues his criminal activity and prevents, limits or remedies its harmful consequences. These are three classes of cases: volun- tary discontinuance of criminal activity (Art. 18(3) CC; Art. 22 CC); subsequent steps taken by the offender to limit the damage caused (Art. 104(2) CC; Art. 105(2) CC; Art. 183(3) CC; Art. 292(2) CC; Art. 343a CC, etc.); and restitution in the context of offences against property (Art. 197 CC; Art. 205 CC; Art. 206(6) CC; Art. 212b CC, etc.). This is a specific method of triggering the preventative function of the criminal statute where lesser criminal liability is used to encourage the offender to adopt a subsequent

Karakashev, V. Measuring the Efficiency of the Sentence of Imprisonment …, pp. 52-87. Clarifying the objects of punishment is of paramount importance to any analysis of the efficacy of the penal impact. 86 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING constructive conduct and try to prevent, limit or remedy the damage resulting from his crime.10 2. Substantial and functional differentiation. The differentiation of penal legislation develops along two axes: substance and function. 2.1. The deepest reason to differentiate the rules in the special part of the criminal code is the different community danger of the acts under regulation. As is known, community danger has two aspects: qualitative (nature) and quantitative (extent). The nature of the community danger of an offence depends primarily on the object, ie the type of social relation affected. The object determines the factual peculiarities of the encroachment as well as its social implications. The object is therefore a key criterion used to distinguish between criminal offences, hence, between the rules embedded in the special part of the statute. Another factor that bears directly on the substance of community danger is the nature of the ensuing harmful changes in the object. Damage, in turn, depends on the type of encroachment. Thus, the array of offences against property consists of seven categories: theft; robbery; embezzlement; fraud; extortion; concealment of items; destruction; and breakdown.

10 For more details see Nenov, I. Criminal-law Methods to Prevent, Suppress, and Remedy the Damage of Offences. − Pravna misal, 1969, No. 6, pp. 3-21 (in Bulgarian); Karakashev, V. Punishability, Criminal Liability, and Personal Grounds to Exclude Criminal Liability …, pp. 107-184; Palazov, I. The Reduction of Criminal Liability when Embezzled Money, Items or Valuables are Deposited or Replaced: Art. 205 CC. − Buletin na SUB, 1977, Nos. 1-2, pp. 35-45 (in Bulgarian); Mihaylov, D. Classification of Criminal Offences in the Event of Restitution. − Pravna misal, 1979, No. 3, pp. 61-73 (in Bulgarian). See also Eleonskii, V. A. Incentive Norms of the Criminal Law and Their Importance for the Operation of Home Affairs Bodies. − Habarovsk, 1985 (in Russian); Saharov, A. B. The Deterrent Function of Soviet Criminal Statutes. − In: Current Issues of the Criminal Law …, pp. 75-77. Differentiation of criminal liability 87

The other factors (level and probability of damage; method of committing the criminal act; instrumentalities used; time, place and setting of crime commission; frequency of the respective offence; subjective elements of crime − type and degree of fault, motive, purpose, and emotional state of offender; socially relevant features of offender's personality, etc.) affect primarily the extent of community danger. They serve to distinguish between those varieties of a crime that require differentiated, nuanced criminal liability. The substantial differentiation of penal legislation therefore unfolds at several levels. Depending on the nature of community danger the lawmaker distinguishes between different types of crimes and systematises the rules on them in chapters and sections in the special part of the statute. Depending on the extent of community danger he distinguishes between different varieties of the same offence and the respective expounding provisions that set out definitions for the aggravated or attenuated variants of the offence. 2.2. Substantial differentiation is paralleled by a functional differentiation of the criminal law.11 Functional differentiation essentially takes place where a rule (or group of rules) specialises to perform just one task in the process of penal regulation. The function of the rule thus shrinks while its substantial scope expands: it covers all (or most) offences regardless of their type. For example, the institutions of guilt, preparation and attempt, complicity, exception from criminal liability, etc. are functional ones. The provisions on the functional institutions of the criminal law are generalised rules placed “out of the brackets” and applicable to all (or most) offences. The functional institutions form a more sophisticated stage in the evolution of penal legislation and are to be found in the general part of the criminal code.

11 On the functional specialisation of legal rules in general, see Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law …, pp. 44-45; Cherdantsev, A. F. Specialisation and Structure of the Norms of Law. – Pravovedenie, 1970, No. 1, pp. 41-49 (in Russian). 88 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

“Differentiation,” noted D. Mihaylov, “runs through every single concept, category or institution of the criminal law, it affects more or less every offence.”12 3. Differentiation of crimes. Based on these general assumptions, we shall focus on some specific issues in the process of differentiating criminal liability. 3.1. The first of them concerns the classification (categorisa- tion) of offences. Classification means dividing certain phenomena into groups (classes). Different criteria may be used to classify offences. Thus, depending on the construction of the actus reus they are single-act or complex offences; depending on the legal effects prescribed by the rule offences may be conduct crimes or offences entailing danger, or offences causing damage; depending on the state of mind they are intentional or negligent; depending on the number of participants they are offences committed by a sole offender or by a number of offenders; depending on the offender's personality they are offences committed by a person with a clean criminal record or by a repeat offender, by an adult or juvenile; depending on the proceedings employed to prosecute they are indictable offences or offences prosecuted based on a private complaint by the victim, and so forth.13 However, the classification that really matters to the differentiation of criminal liability is the one that reflects the different social substance of offences. Crimes must therefore be classified based on their social properties − community danger and blame. The penalty set in the law may serve as an indicator of the gravity of an offence. It embodies the lawmaker's estimate of the typical community danger and blame of a certain type of crimes. The statutory

12 Mihaylov, D. Differentiation of Criminal Liability under the Penal Code of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria …, p. 33. 13 Ibid, pp. 27-28. Differentiation of criminal liability 89 penalty enables the comparison between different offences (which is a sine qua non for their classification).14 The next question concerns the number of categories into which offences should fall. The legislator decides on this in line with practical necessities and the specific goals pursued with a certain classification. In principle, the classification of offences serves to differ-

14 “The statutory penalty,“ wrote A. A. Piontkovski, “is proportionate to the seriousness, the community danger of a perpetrated offence“ (A Course in Soviet Criminal Law in Six Volumes. The Penalty. Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, p. 28, in Russian). “The level of community danger transpires primarily in the sanction fixed in the legal rule on the offence in question“ (Demidov, Y. A., op. cit., p. 98). See also Tobolkin, P. S. The Social Determination of Criminal Provisions − Sverdlovsk, 1983, pp. 136-137 (in Russian); The Criminal Statute. An Attempted Theoretical Modelling ..., p. 52; Kozachenko, I. Y. Sanctions for Offences against Life and Health …, pp. 213-214. Some commentators believe that the penalty-based classification of offences fails to reflect the real difference between wrongs as the dependence goes the other way around: it is the gravity of the offence that determines the penalty to be envisaged. Thus Y. D. Blouvstein has voiced the hope that "the ideas of using the sanctions prescribed by the rules of the criminal code as measures (“weights“) of the community danger of offences would finally be “shelved“... Theory must seek to identify the proper “weights“ of offences in order to contribute to the improvement of sanctions and court case law“ (Blouvstein, Y. D. Preface. − In: Chubarev, V. L. The Community Danger of Criminal Offences and the Penalty …, pp. 5-6). It is impossible to share this view. The penalty provided in the sanction of a legal rule reflects the legislative estimate of the gravity of an offence. Before defining the type and level of the penalty, the lawmaker explores the social realities, estimates the adverse impact of a certain class of acts on social relations, and considers the priorities of crime policy. Hence, it is unacceptable to merely deny the fairness of the legislative estimate of how serious different offences are. It is another matter that science must equip the lawmaker with a reliable and accurate mechanism to measure the threat to society and the censure for existing destructive phenomena. It might be necessary to review the sanctions for a number of offences and see if the penalty for each of them is still adequate to the gravity of the offence described in the disposition, and if the sanctions for different wrongs are well harmonised. The classification of offences has been dealt with by M. I. Kovaliov, N. I. Zagorodnikov, N. F. Kouznetsova, A. B. Saharov, P. S. Kardaev, L. N. Krivochenko, A. I. Korobeev, and others. 90 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING entiate criminal liability. Classification helps to improve both the penalties for different offences and a number of institutions in the general part of the criminal code. The Criminal Code of Bulgaria has no general provision categorising the offences. Based on the analysis of penal legislation, the following classification may be suggested: 1. light offences: intentional offences punishable under the law with up to one year's imprisonment or another lighter penalty; and negligent offences punishable under the law with up to two years' imprisonment or another lighter penalty; 2. non-serious offences: intentional offences punishable under the law with one to five years' imprisonment or another lighter penalty; and negligent offences punishable under the law with two to five years' imprisonment or another lighter penalty; 3. serious offences: intentional offences punishable under the law with five to ten years' imprisonment; and negligent offences punishable under the law with more than five years' imprisonment; 4. particularly serious offences: intentional offences punishable under the law with over ten years' imprisonment. This classification of offences derives from the statute itself. The Criminal Code addresses many general aspects of liability in relation to entire groups of crimes and those groups match the ones proposed above. Thus, exception from criminal liability coupled with diversion to an administrative penalty (Art. 78a CC) is only possible for light offences; Article 93, point 7 CC defines the concept of “serious offences”; “serious intentional offences” feature in the definition of dangerous repeat offending (Art. 29(1)(a) CC); Article 39(2) CC defines the category of particularly serious offences. The classification of offences is a first step in differentiating criminal liability. It is the original, most general, “rough” differentiation. If inserted in the criminal code, a rule categorising the offences would help attach homogenous legal effects to all homogenous offences and, in particular, to define the scope of the penalty for each class of offences. A number of institutions in the general or special part of the criminal code (preparation; exception from the penalty or Differentiation of criminal liability 91 from criminal liability; statutory limitation; rehabilitation; concealment, etc.) would thus improve; the penalties envisaged for different crimes would be better harmonised among themselves and tailored to the gravity of the relevant offences; the system of prosecuting or absolving some offenders would be generally enhanced. 3.2. The differentiation of criminal conduct is not confined to distinctions between different offences and their classification. It is also necessary to distinguish between those variants of a certain offence that require differentiated liability, ie aggravated or attenuated elements of crime should be devised. The basic definition of an offence depicts the circumstances that must be present for criminal liability to ensue, that is, the factors that form the ground for criminal liability. The basic definition therefore contains the features that make the conduct in question sufficiently dangerous to the community and blameworthy to be criminalised. Those features concern the major elements of behaviour (prejudicial conduct and criminal result) and exist whenever an offence of the respective type is committed. The lawmaker thus reflects in the elements of an offence the typical gravity which is normally inherent in its basic, most general variety. When any other element or peculiarity of the criminal conduct (level of damage, method, place, time of committing the offence, etc.) essentially distorts the typical gravity of an offence (community danger and blame), the lawmaker reflects the respective variant of the offence in a set of elements that carry a lighter or heavier penalty. Such qualified definitions are used to distinguish between the different varieties of the offence, hence, between the penalties for them. The aggravated or attenuated definitions are a means of differentiating criminal liability.15

15 L. L. Krouglikov stated the following on qualifying circumstances: “The lawmaker uses them to construct a more or less dangerous variety of the criminal act and, accordingly, fix in the statute new limits of punishability, a lighter or heavier sanction compared to the one envisaged in the basic definition of the offence. In other words, the special circumstances serve as an instru- 92 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The expounding variant prescriptions in the special part of the criminal code (aggravated or attenuated, ie qualified definitions) represent lex specialis vis-Ў-vis the rule that contains the basic definition of a particular offence. These special rules grow out of the general rule while refining its substance and covering only a segment of its scope. The creation of qualified definitions reflects the trend towards a deeper differentiation of criminal liability. Such special sets of elements are used by the lawmaker to specify the extent of community danger of the criminal conduct and provide for matching differentiated liability. The general rule, to use S. S. Alexeev's expression, becomes “overgrown with a retinue” of expounding rules.16

ment to differentiate the penalties; it is with their assistance that the lawmaker adjusts the remit of responsibility, the frames of punishability.” (Circumstances Attenuating and Aggravating Liability in Criminal Law. − Voronezh, 1985, p. 93, in Russian. See also Mihaylov, D. Peculiarities of the Criminal Act in the Event of Complex Criminal Activity …, p. 188. The qualifying circumstances and, hence, the qualified definitions of offences have received limited attention in the theory of criminal law. Only some qualifying circumstances that feature among the elements of specific offences have been analysed. Moreover, writings in criminal law tends to focus on the doctrine of the basic definitions of offences. A general theory of qualifying circumstances (qualified definitions of offences) should be developed. This implies studying the legal nature of qualifying circumstances; coming up with a general definition for them; categorising their different types; exploring how the rules that set out qualified definitions function in the process of penal regulation; stipulating when such definitions would be created and their underlying principles, etc. The works of L. L. Krouglikov, a Russian scholar, are a serious step in that respect (op. cit., pp. 82-108; see Qualifying Circumstances as Elements of Crime. − In: Substantive and Procedural Problems of the Implementation of Criminal Liability. − Kouybishev, 1986, pp. 48-56, in Russian).

16 On expounding legal rules in general see Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law…, pp. 111-117. See also Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory Differentiation of criminal liability 93

The evolution of penal legislation entails a growing number of expounding norms. In this context, studying the influence of various circumstances (elements of conduct and situation, peculiarities of the offender's personality) on the gravity of the offence is becoming a promising area in the theory of criminal law. Exploring how different circumstances may change the community danger of an offence is the same as studying the relevant expounding rules in the special part of the criminal code. However, the former (social) approach deals with conduct and the relevance of its elements to community danger, whereas the latter (normative) approach deals with the reflection of these phenomena in the law, ie the norms used by the lawmaker to differentiate liability within the frame of a given offence. 4. Differentiation and the elements of crime. Deeper differentiation of penal legislation entails changes in the content of the definitions of offences. The following trends may be identified here: a. The number of result crimes in the Criminal Code increases, contrary to that of conduct crimes. It is well known that criminal offences fall into two categories, viz. conduct and result crimes. The latter in turn may be crimes entailing danger for someone or something (endangering ones) or genuine result crimes (causing damage). The legislator defines different conduct crimes for various reasons: a) where the harmful consequences of the offence occur inevitably (eg perjury, bribery); b) where the object under protection is too valuable for the community (eg espionage); c) where the damage caused by the criminal act cannot be foreseen and characterised accurately enough (eg defamation, concealment, document-related offences, etc.). Two-thirds of the definitions of offences in the existing Criminal Code concern conduct crimes. The trend, however, is towards a growing number of definitions that concern substantial (result) crimes. This is a consistent statutory implementation of the principle that the damage actually caused should serve as an objective measure of responsibility. 94 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

b. Increasingly often the legislator specifies the nature and scope of the criminal result in the definitions of damaging offences. If an offence merely entails danger, the liability should be differentiated depending on how probable it is that the damage would occur. The greater that likelihood, the more dangerous the offence.17 c. Before creating a rule of the criminal law, the legislator explores the objective interrelations between social phenomena and reflects them in the definition of the respective offence. With result crimes, his task is to stipulate not just the actus reus and its consequences but also the causal link between the two. The causal interdependence between two phenomena may differ substantially: it may be direct or indirect, complicated by inputs from the outside. Such external factors may be natural or technical forces, or third party acts. The different nature of the causal link is yet another ground to differentiate criminal liability. When the causal link is indirect, the offender creates a possibility for the occurrence of the criminal result that materialises under the influence of other factors. A direct causal link therefore means that the act is more dangerous to the community. The remoter the result of the deed (depending on the number of external inputs), the

17 The criminalisation of acts (especially negligent ones) that only entail danger for the object is debatable, and even more so in the context of scientific and technological advancement. Some commentators (D. O. Khan- Magomedov) find it rather difficult in practice to establish if a specific breach of safety at work generates an abstract or specific threat to the life or health of workers to constitute a criminal offence as opposed to a mere infringement of safety rules. The respective criminal provisions are therefore not applied, they “do not work”, although such breaches are abundant. This undermines the inevitability of criminal liability. Most authors (M. D. Shargorodski, A. A. Piontkovski, T. V. Tsereteli, P. S. Dagel, M. S. Grinberg) maintain the opposite view, viz. that torts entailing danger must be criminalised. However, in doing so one should be careful and apply a differentiated approach. See on this topic Improving the Measures to Combat Crime in the Context of Scientific and Technological Advancement. − Moscow, 1980, pp. 171-174 (in Russian). Differentiation of criminal liability 95 lesser the liability as the offender's contribution to the occurrence of the dangerous result is limited. It is more difficult for him to foresee the result and command the process of causation. d. The subjective elements of conduct (form and degree of fault; motive, purpose, offender's state of mind, etc.) should be used more extensively in differentiating criminal liability. Scientific and technical progress has brought about the criminalisation of a number of negligent acts relating to the use of technical equipment. These are situational offences where the link between the actus reus and the ensuing harmful consequences is remote and the gravity of the consequences often depends on random factors. The promising approach is therefore to differentiate liability based on the offender's attitude to the safety rule, that is, depending on whether he infringed it knowingly. If that is the case, a heavier penalty should be provided.18 e. The differentiation of criminal liability goes along with deepening the humanity of the criminal law. The principle of humanity requires that minimum repression be employed to attain the objects of punishment. In order to determine the penalty that is necessary and sufficient to correct the offender, the lawmaker should take a closer look at the offender's personal peculiarities. In other words, the elements of crime should reflect the offender's personality more extensively. The question then is how far the lawmaker could get in mirroring the personal features in a rule of the criminal law; how broad should the competence of the court be to individualise criminal liability? This question is just one aspect of a fundamental general problem of the criminal law, viz. finding the optimum bal-

18 This idea belongs to V. I. Kourliandskii (Some Issues of Responsibility Related to Scientific and Technological Advancement. − In: Scientific and Technological Advancement and the Problems of Criminal Law. − Moscow, 1975, p. 18, in Russian). It has been refined by A. S. Dagel (Improving the Measures to Combat Organised Crime in the Context of Scientific and Technological Advancement..., pp. 235-237). 96 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING ance between the will power of the lawmaker and judicial discretion in the process of regulation through the criminal law.19 The offender's personality should be reflected in the elements of crime subject to the following principle: the basic definition of an offence should characterise the conduct as such, whereas the peculiarities of the offender's personality should feature only in the aggravated or attenuated definitions (of course, provided that those peculiarities affect materially the extent of community danger or otherwise dictate the differentiation of criminal liability). Deeper differentiation of criminal liability implies studying and classifying the personal features that the law should translate into qualifying circumstances;20 exploring the grounds and functions of the relevant expounding rules; crafting indicators of the community danger inherent in the personality of an offender and criteria to transform certain personal traits into aggravating or attenuating elements; creating rules to reflect the offender's personality in the elements of crime, etc. 5. Differentiation of penalties. The differentiation of criminal liability stricto sensu means to differentiate in the statute the penal consequences of different offences. The following considerations deserve a mention here: 5.1. The system of penalties21 set out in the general part of the criminal code must allow for a differentiated approach to offences

19 On the relation between the will power of the lawmaker and the discretional powers of the judge see Yakovlev, A. M. The Principle of Social Justice and Grounds for Criminal Responsibility..., pp. 90-92 (in Russian). 20 See Svinkin, A. I. The Features of the Offender's Personality as Qualifying Circumstances. − In: Problems of Soviet Criminal Law and Criminology. − Sverdlovsk, 1973, pp. 48-62 (in Russian). On the socially relevant features of the offender's personality see Todria, G. G. Current Problems of Soviet Law. − Tbilisi, 1988, pp. 334-346 (in Russian). 21 The term traditionally used in works in criminal law is “a system of penalties”. A. N. Strouchkov, however, finds it more accurate to speak of “a system of penal impact measures”. The latter system includes criminal sanc- Differentiation of criminal liability 97 and to guilty individuals. Hence, it is necessary to provide for penalties and other correctional measures that differ in substance and severity. The lawmaker may then select the most appropriate (fair and expedient) penalty when constructing the sanctions for different offences. To deepen the differentiation of criminal liability, it is mandatory to establish the link, the interdependence between different types of penalties. The legislator has ranked the penalties in the General Part of the Criminal Code (Art. 37 CC) according to their severity or level of repressiveness. Thus we get a “ladder of penalties”, where each penalty acts as a separate “stair”.22 Should it be possible to estimate the different severity of various types of penalties, ie the different stairs, then we shall have a single scale to measure and compare all offences (of course, a common measurement unit of the severity of penalties is needed as well). As a result, the sanctions for different offences would be harmonised with precision; the alternative sanctions (that enable a choice between two or more penalties for the same offence, ie provide for interchangeable penalties) would be bettered, etc. tions along with other correctional measures. (On the Penalty, the System of Types of Penalties, and the Other Measures of Penal Impact. − In: Current Problems of Criminal Law..., pp. 91-102).

22 “If the difference in the levels of coercion is too big,” wrote A. S. Mihlin, “a sui generis vacuum appears that inhibits the individualisation of responsibility, and if it is too slim, there will be a competition between the different types of punishment” (Problems of Refining the System of Penalties in Soviet Criminal Law. − In: Current Problems of Criminal Law…, p. 104). V. Karakashev also referred to the risk of such a “vacuum”: “... the increase in the minimum of the custodial sentence would bring about a vacuum within the system of penalties, in particular between correctional labour and imprisonment, and such vacuum somehow exists even now. That vacuum should be replen- ished” (Measuring the Efficiency of the Sentence of Imprisonment..., p. 123). See also Karakashev, V. On the Issue of Short-term Deprivation of Liberty. − Pravna Misal, 1977, No. 3, pp. 69-74 (in Bulgarian). 98 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Our lawmaker has already made a step in this direction. However, finding an overall solution of the problem, that is, establishing the quantitative dependence between all types of penalties is a difficult and exacting task that requires extensive theoretical and empirical, social and legal research.23 5.2. The totality of the sanctions provided in the norms of the special part forms a system. The development of the system of sanctions in the criminal code and of each separate sanction is subject to the requirement to differentiate criminal liability.24 The sanction of a criminal provision is closely connected with its disposition. The rules in the special part of the Criminal Code have a specific structure: while the disposition depicts the juridical fact, the sanction prescribes its legal effects. More precisely, the disposition defines the elements of crime, whereas the sanction sets out

23 “It seems possible and indispensable,” wrote I. Y. Kozachenko, “to introduce in penal legislation ratios (quotas) of the adequacy of the heterogeneous penalties used to construct the criminal sanctions...” (Sanctions for Offences against Life and Health..., p. 198). See for a different stance Khan- Magomedov, D. O. Methodology of the Comparative Estimate of the Severity of Criminal Penalties. − In: Voprosi borbi s prestupnostiu. − Moscow, 1972, vip. 15, p. 42-53 (in Russian); Najimov, V. P. The Fairness of Punishment as the Most Important Determinant of its Efficiency. − In: Issues of Court Organisation and the Administration of Justice in the USSR. − Kaliningrad, 1973, pp. 3-11 (in Russian); Kourliandskii, V. I. Crime Policy, Differentiation, and Individualisation of Criminal Liability..., pp. 93-95; Ossipov, P. P. et al. A Comprehensive Study of the System of Impacting on Crime. − Leningrad, 1978, pp. 102-107 (in Russian); Dementiev, S. I. Constructing Custodial Criminal Sanctions. − Rostov na Don, 1986 (in Russian). 24 In order to better the system of sanctions, the different types of sanctions should be classified. An innovative classification has been suggested by Krouglikov, L. L. Circumstances Attenuating and Aggravating Liability in Criminal Law..., pp. 123-135. See also Kozachenko, I. Y. Sanctions for Offences against Life and Health..., pp. 200-227; Grouev, L. The System of Sanctions in Bulgarian Criminal Law. − Sofia, 1997 (in Bulgarian). Differentiation of criminal liability 99 the criminal liability ensuing from the commission of that crime.25 The disposition and sanction of a criminal provision intertwine socially as well as legally, as they mirror actual social phenomena. The disposition contains a pattern of criminal conduct and describes its typical gravity (community danger and blame). The penalty envisaged in the sanction is a sui generis quantitative image of the offence described.26 “Any general, model definition of an offence in the disposition of a statutory rule, any set of elements is invariably matched by a general, model penalty defined in the sanction …”27 This laconic statement of A. N. Traynin is quite meaningful. The task of penal lawmaking is exactly to arrive at such a conformity, to set in the sanction of a rule a penalty commensurate with the offence described in the disposition. In one word, the task is to create a fair statute. In order to establish the dependence, the offence and the penalty must be “weighed,” evaluated in advance. Evaluation is a process where the object weighed is compared to other homogenous phenomena or to a standard.28 The commu-

25 “The elements of crime,” wrote A. N. Traynin, “are organically interrelated, as are their matching components of the rule in the special part of the criminal code, viz. the disposition and sanction” (A General Theory of the Elements of Crime..., p. 311). On the structure of the rules of the special part see Dourmanov, N. D. The Soviet Criminal Statute. − Moscow, 1967, pp. 112- 130 (in Russian); Braynin, Y. M. The Criminal Statute and Its Enforcement. − Moscow, 1967, pp. 40-89 (in Russian). On the relation between the elements of crime and the dispositions of criminal provisions see Kouznetsova, N. F. Criminal Offences, the Elements of Crime, the Disposition of Criminal Provisions. − Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, 1967, No. 4, pp. 35-48 (in Russian); Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Criminal Offences..., pp. 79-87. 26 On the socio-legal roots of the functions and structure of sanctions see Kozachenko, I. Y. Sanctions for Offences against Life and Health..., pp. 88- 109. 27 Traynin, A. N. A General Theory of the Elements of Crime..., p. 313. 28 This is the classical view on the assessment procedure, see Korshounov, A. M., V. V. Mantatov, op. cit., p. 202. 100 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING nity danger of an offence may be weighed only against the extent of danger of other offences. The severity of a sanction is revealed only if it is examined against the system of other sanctions, in relation to them, rather than in isolation. The effort to set statutory penalties commensurate with the respective offences has three steps: evaluating (in qualitative and quantitative terms) the community danger and reproof attaching to the different types of offence; developing a single scale and measuring the severity of the different types of penalty, that is, of criminal repression; identifying and expressing quantitatively the dependence between the gravity of an offence and the severity of the penalty, which implies identifying the “ratio of proportionality” between them (or, figuratively, establishing the quantity of repression that matches one unit of community danger). After all, this boils down to measuring socio-legal phenomena.29 Measuring means providing a quantitative estimate of a phenomenon, so that the latter is depicted (expressed) by numbers. The possibility to measure phenomena derives from the fact that each thing is a dialectical union of certain quality and quantity, each thing is quality defined in quantitative terms. Literature and the case law reveal some scepticism about the possibility to measure and compare offences and penalties. Reliance

29 “The problem of social measurement is a core one in sociological research ... The task to carry out social measurements in law, ie to find the quantitative expression of certain properties of socio-legal and state-legal phenomena and formalise them in view of their full and accurate description in the language of contemporary mathematics, is absolutely crucial“ (Law and Sociology. − Moscow, 1973, pp. 161-162, in Russian). On measuring social phenomena see Vengerov, A. B., V. I. Nikitinskii, I. S. Samoshtenko A General Methodology of Measurement in Law. − Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1970, No. 6, pp. 30-38 (in Russian); Yadov, V. A. Sociological Research. − Moscow, 1972 (in Russian); Souslov, Y. A. Specific Studies and the Development of Sociology of Law. − Leningrad, 1983, pp. 68-69 (in Russian); The Logic of Sociological Research. − Moscow, 1987, pp. 93-151 (in Russian). Differentiation of criminal liability 101 is traditionally placed on rules emerging from experience and human intuition. However, the lawmaker and the courts alike evaluate quantitatively a number of phenomena of the criminal law. Offences are thus arranged in chapters and sections of the criminal code depending on their gravity. That classification rests on the different social weight of protected objects. At the same time the penalties are also arranged by severity and form a “ladder of penalties”. “The very existence of systems of offences arranged by gravity, on the one hand, and a system of penalties, on the other, makes it possible to use the method of simple comparison to identify the offences that deserve the severest penalties from an axiological viewpoint, and vice versa. This initial proviso, however, may and should be refined, tailored specifically to the different types of offence and their definitions”.30 The courts also juxtapose the gravity of specific offences and penalties on a day-to-day basis. The criminal law in general is deeply permeated by quantitative estimates. The penalty provided in the sanction is the lawmaker's quantitative estimate of the gravity of an offence.31 It is up to the theory of criminal law to craft reasonable criteria and methods to gauge the community danger and reproof of offences and contrive the sanctions to be embedded in the special part of the criminal code. The role of intuition and subjective judgment would thus be curtailed and legislative solutions would avail of

30 Ossipov, P. P. Theoretical Foundations of the Construction and Application of Criminal Sanctions..., p. 119 (in Russian). 31 “The sanction,” noted Y. A. Demidov, “contracts community danger to its quantitative aspect, that is, its extent” (op. cit., pp. 25 and 98). However, it is impossible to agree with this author's view that the sanction fails to reflect the substance of community danger. The substance (quality) and extent (quantity) are dialectically connected aspects of community danger; they determine each other. An estimate of the extent therefore enshrines in a covert, hidden form an estimate of the community danger of the offence. 102 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING sounder theoretical substantiation. This task is difficult but certainly not insurmountable.32 Of course, the importance of quantitative methods to criminal research should not be exaggerated as numbers and mathematical formulae cannot provide an adequate description of social processes. Formalisation inevitably ends up in a simplified, “rough” image of reality. A number cannot express the ample substance, all aspects and qualitative properties of socio-political phenomena. Formal methods in social research are therefore reliable only to some extent and only complement the substantial, social analysis of phenomena. The dialectics of materialism form the major methodology to explore all phenomena, including the socio-legal ones. As regards justice, even the most sophisticated computer cannot substitute for the judge's legal conscience and intuition. 6. Limits to differentiation. The deepening of differentiation is a lasting, legitimate trend in the evolution of penal legislation. Differentiation, however, has its limits. These are determined by the optimum level of abstraction (specificity) of a criminal rule. 6.1. There exists an ineradicable conflict between the requirements for abstraction (generality) and specificity (casuistry) of a legal rule. On the one hand, the lawmaker seeks to characterise the offence as accurately as possible in the disposition (specific, clear prescriptions are more efficient as they have stronger deterrent and

32 “Among socio-legal phenomena,” wrote O. N. Grigorev, “some have a certain quantity but it is not manifested in an overt, open form easily lending itself to immediate measurement. In our view, that class of phenomena can be said to comprise the concepts of “responsibility” (“measure,” “degree of responsibility,” “lighter,” “heavier” responsibility), “establishment,” “punishability” (“lighter” or heavier punishability”), “community danger” and a few others (Law and Sociology..., p. 162). This statement is somewhat inaccurate. First, all phenomena, not just a few, have a quantitative as well as qualitative aspect. Second, a phenomenon and the notion of it are two quite different things. Differentiation of criminal liability 103 regulatory effects; citizens and judicial authorities find it easier to understand them, hence, they pave the way to uniform and lawful judicial practice; at the same time, casuistic prescriptions entail the risk of “legislative lacunae”). On the other hand, the legislator must devise a disposition sufficiently general to cover all possible forms of a certain type of offence (abstract dispositions make the statute flexible, that is, enable its application to varied situations in swiftly changing contexts, thus ensuring the longevity of the law; excessive generalisation, however, produces “elastic” dispositions that govern a broad and volatile range of acts, thus inviting subjectivity and arbitrariness in the administration of justice). The difficulty lies in combining the two opposite requirements − for abstraction and specificity, that is, in finding the optimum relation between general (typical) and special (specific) in characterising the different offences in the law. “If the clashing requirements to be met by the criminal provision are seen as two opposite poles,” stated V. N. Koudriavtsev, “between them is the interval where the best solution should be found and the optimum rule worded”.33 The differentiation of penal legislation implies specifying the definitions of offences (isolating special definitions from the general ones; replacing the judgmental and blanket elements with formal ones; clarifying which details of an offence should go into the elements, etc.). The disposition thus becomes less abstract and the scope of judicial discretion shrinks. The question, however, is how far can the legislator go in specifying the elements of crime; how deep should he delve

33 The Grounds of Criminal Proscription..., p. 244. The balance between abstraction and specificity of the legal rule is a major issue of lawmaking. It has been studied both in the general theory of law (S. S. Alexeev, D. A. Kerimov, A. A. Oushakov, A. Nashits, A. S. Pigolkin, S. V. Polenina, Y. A. Denisov, L. I. Spiridonov) and in the specific branches of legal science. As to the field of the criminal law, noteworthy works include those by M. I. Kovaliov, V. N. Koudriavtsev, Y. M. Braynin, V. E. Zherebkin, V. M. Kogan, S. G. Kelina, A. V. Naoumov. 104 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING when taking into account the specifics of an act and distinguishing between the liability for it and the penalty for similar forms of criminal conduct. The main criterion in addressing this question should be the efficacy of the criminal provision, its potential to achieve the desired social effect, the targeted impact on social relations.34 The relation between abstraction and specificity depends not just on the expediency of the rule. It is equally determined by objective social factors, processes, and imperatives. The level of generalisation of a criminal provision finally hinges on the substance and spectrum of regulated phenomena. The wider that spectrum, the more general a rule should be. The disposition should be as general as to cover all homogeneous offences (similar in nature and extent of community danger), while leaving any other types of offence beyond the scope of the rule. A number of social developments produce inconsistent requirements towards the rules of the criminal law. In the context of scientific and technological advancement public life is becoming more complicated, social relations become increasingly dynamic. Hence, it is indispensable to differentiate penal regulation, in particular specify the substance of the corresponding norms. On the other hand, the progress of science and technology calls for more general wordings in the criminal statute. The rampant development of science and technology equips offenders with novel ways and means to attain the criminal result: new varieties of criminal conduct emerge, the methods (forms) of crime commission expand. All this requires generalised dispositions apt to cover all possible forms of an offence. The proliferation of hazardous activities is another development that entails a growing abstraction of the norms. Numerous rules are enacted to regulate the performance of such activities. The more detailed the regulation of a social relation (or activity), the more the

34 On the notion of “efficiency” see Karakashev, V. Measuring the Efficiency of the Sentence of Imprisonment..., pp. 30-41. Differentiation of criminal liability 105 ways to interfere with it. It may be transgressed by breach of any of the relevant safety rules. Hence, the objective aspect of an offence has multiple varieties. It is impossible to depict them all in the elements of crime. The lawmaker therefore characterises the offence generally, by reference to blanket and judgmental features.35 The level of abstraction of dispositions thus increases further to scientific and technological advancement. The following rule may be stated in this respect: the more complex a relation that benefits society and detailed its regulation, the more abstract should be the criminal provision protecting that relation. 6.2. The question arises: how does the differentiation of criminal liability affect the sanctions of criminal provisions? In most general terms, differentiation condenses the scope of the penalties set out in those sanctions. This is quite logical. A more detailed description of the offence, a specification of its features in the statute requires that its legal effects, ie the penalty, be specified accordingly. The frames of a sanction depend on the ambit of the disposition. The smaller the range of the acts covered by the disposition, the narrower the scope of the penalty to be envisaged in the sanction.36

35 Judgmental and blanket elements of crime are quite interesting but their discussion is beyond the purview of this work. Judgmental features in penal legislation have been dealt with by inter alia V. N. Koudriavtsev, M. I. Kovaliov, G. T. Tkesheliadze, Y. M. Braynin, E. A. Frolov, V. V. Pitetski, A. I. Svinkin, whereas blanket dispositions have been analysed by V. V. S o k o l ov, N. I. Pikorov, and others. On the impact of scientific and technological advancement on the form of criminal statutes see Improving the Measures to Combat Crime in the Context of Scientific and Technological Advancement..., pp. 81-92; Filchev, N. Improving Penal Legislation in the Context of Scientific and Technological Revolution. – Socialistichesko pravo, 1981, No. 10, pp. 21- 30 (in Bulgarian). 36 “While the ceiling of the penalty for an offence mainly depends on the social substance of the offence,” noted P. P. Ossipov, “its threshold may be strongly affected by the objects of punishment and the principle of humanity” (Theoretical Fundamentals of the Construction and Application of Criminal Sanctions..., pp. 118). 106 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

It follows that deeper differentiation amounts to reducing the scope of judicial discretion. And the optimum balance between the will of the legislator and the discretion of the court in the context of penal regulation has been recognised as a major problem of crime policy. The analysis of the legislation in force and of the case law emerging from its application prompts the conclusion that judicial discretion should be restricted to some extent so that the lawful and fair disposal of each case is guaranteed. V. N Koudriavtsev and S. G. Kelina have arrived at a similar finding: “… is the scope of discretion the law provides to the court not too extensive, should the statute not encompass some criteria to curtail judicial discretion? In our view,” they noted, “the answer should be in the affirmative. Some formalisation of judicial discretion by the lawmaker himself would result in more solid case law, enhanced legality, better implementation of the principle of fair responsibility”.37

The mutual link between the disposition and sanction of a criminal provision was identified already by M. D. Shargoridskii: “... there is an immediate and dialectical interplay between the form of the disposition and that of the sanction; it boils down to the fact that broad dispositions necessitate broadly, relatively defined sanctions and, vice versa, sanctions defined in absolute terms are only applicable if the disposition is narrowly framed” (The Criminal Statute. – Moscow, 1948, p. 96). See also Tkesheliadze, G. T., op. cit., pp. 114- 129; Kovaliov, M. I. The Role of Legal Conscience and Legal Technique in the Development of Penal Legislation..., pp. 78-79.

37 Kelina, S. G., V. N. Koudriavtsev, op. cit., pp. 145-146. A. M. Yakovlev staunchly supports the idea to restrict the discretional powers of the court (Criminal Law of the Ukrainian SSR at the Present Stage. General Part..., pp. 22-24 and 27-28). This view is shared by many other scholars: Tkesheliadze, G. T., op. cit., pp. 89-147; Some Issues of the Regulation of Judicial Discretion in Criminal Law. – In: Current Issues of Criminal Law, Criminology and Criminal Procedure..., pp. 105-116; Naoumov, A. V. The Form of the Criminal Statute and Its Social Determination. – In: Issues of the Improvement of the Criminal Statute..., pp. 18-27; Lawmaking Tools to Ensure Differentiation of criminal liability 107

The ways to constrict judicial discretion differ depending on the stage of lawmaking. If we look sequentially at the logical stages of that process, the following possibilities come to view: a) defining more types of offences within the frame of criminal conduct in general; b) categorising (classifying) the offences and attaching similar consequences to all offences of a certain type; c) creating definitions that provide for lighter or heavier penalties for an offence in specific circumstances; d) making the definitions of offences more specific by detailing the crime and replacing the blanket and judgmental elements with descriptive ones; e) specifying the grounds for exception from criminal liability and limiting their number; f) stipulating expressly the aggravating and attenuating circumstances in the general part of the criminal code and making it obligatory to reduce or increase the penalty whenever such circumstances exist; g) limiting the number of alternative sanctions in the criminal code; h) bridging the gap between the ceiling and the threshold of the penalty envisaged in the sanction, etc. The sanctions in some rules of our Criminal Code seem to leave a huge gap between the ceiling and the threshold of the penalty. Thus, the penalty for particularly serious thefts (Art. 196a CC), embezzlement (Art. 203 CC), and bribery (Art. 302a CC) is in the the Social Justice of Soviet Criminal Law. – In: Reinforcing Law and Legal Order..., pp. 95-97; Krouglikov, L. L. Circumstances Attenuating and Aggravating Liability in Criminal Law..., p. 96; Dementiev, S. I., op. cit., p. 49; Kozachenko, I. Y. Sanctions for Offences against Life and Health..., pp. 209- 210; Blouvstein, Y. D., op. cit., p. 54, etc. In fact already A. N. Traynin noted the need to place some limits on judicial competences, of course having in view the legislation at that time: “... the more comprehensive the description of the crime, the more specific the presentation of its elements in the disposition, the smaller the difference should be between the threshold and the ceiling of the penalty envisaged in the statute. The process of specification of the elements of crime typical of Soviet legislation should gradually entail some constraints on the judicial competence to define the type and level of the penalty” (A General Theory of the Elements of Crime..., p. 317). 108 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING range of ten to thirty years' imprisonment. In other words, the com- pass of a possible court decision is twenty years. At the same time the statute confines the maximum duration of the sentence of imprisonment to twenty years in general (Art. 39(1) CC). In such cases it is certainly compelling to restrict judicial discretion to some extent.38 If we assume that statutory penalties reflect adequately the gravity of offences, a penalty should change only where the elements of the offence have changed. The community danger and reproof of conduct, however, are dynamic properties. They change along with social developments. The lawmaker's estimate of the gravity of the respective acts should therefore change accordingly. Any further improvement of the set of sanctions embedded in the Criminal Code implies revisiting the gravity of some offences and redefining the limits to penalties. The sanctions would thus be brought into line with the new social context.39

38 “The vast gap between maximum and minimum time limits,” wrote G. L. Kriger, “effaces the border between crimes that have materially different degrees of community danger...” (Constructing Sanctions in the New Penal Legislation. – In: Current Problems of Criminal Law..., p. 114). I. I. Carpetz also favours narrowly framed penalties, see: The Penalty: Socio-Legal and Criminological Issues..., pp. 239-240. It is a different question if a penalty of thirty years’ imprisonment for offences against property is consistent with the principles of justice, humanity, and economy of criminal repression and apt to attain the objects of punishment. “Practice has definitely shown,” pointed out I. Nenov, “that the excessive duration of imprisonment essentially distorts its efficiency” (Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. General Part..., p. 455). 39 It is hardly fair for the Criminal Code to provide today a penalty of up to thirty years’ imprisonment for particularly serious instances of theft, embezzlement and bribery while setting out far lighter sanctions for the gravest assaults against the person (though just for their non-aggravated forms). A non-aggravated intentional murder thus carries up to twenty years’ imprisonment, a grievous bodily harm carries up to ten years’ imprisonment, and rape carries up to eight years’ imprisonment. The life and health of people ranks higher than property within the set of social values. The issue should therefore be revisited in order to rectify any existing disproportion among the penalties for the above offences. Differentiation of criminal liability 109

7. The method (form) of offence and differentiation of criminal liability. The method (form) of the offence is relevant to the substantial differentiation of penal legislation which serves to distinguish between various legal grounds for criminal liability. Substantial differentiation comprises several logical stages: a) dividing, “fragmenting” the criminal conduct into separate types of offence; b) devising definitions that carry heavier or lighter penalties for a specific offence; c) expounding the statutory definitions by clarifying the details of each offence. At each of those stages, the modus operandi has a specific role to be discussed below. 7.1. The different ways to interfere with an object, ie the kindred forms of criminal conduct, may vary greatly in the nature of their community danger. The lawmaker then sets them apart as different crimes. Thus, the offences of theft, robbery, fraud, and extortion are different ways to prejudice property. The difference between kindred offences may vary substantially in its depth (extent). The higher the extent, the easier to distinguish between the respective types of offences. It should be remem- bered, though, that these are encroachments on the same collective object. And the object is of the essence for the nature of community danger. The difference therefore appears within a certain group of offences, ie between different types of homogeneous offences. Where the difference between the various forms of criminal conduct is minor, it is hard to determine if these are different, though similar offences or varieties of the same offence. I. Nenov accepted that “participation in an attempted coup d' État” and “participation in a rebellion or armed uprising” are two different offences,40 rather than alternative forms of treason defined in Art. 95 CC. This view is by far not indisputable, especially after the new wording of the definition enacted in 1968.

40 Nenov, I. Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 1. – Sofia, 1956, pp. 74-76 (in Bulgarian). 110 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The same problem may be approached the other way around, by taking as a point of departure the features common to kindred offences (not the difference between them). Theft, robbery, fraud, and extortion are identical in terms of object, offenders and degrees of fault… The acts constituting those offences are also similar in their core. All of them finally consist in removing an item from the patrimonium of its owner. But the way in which this is done, ie the mechanism of inflicting the damage, is different: in the event of theft the removal is lasting; in the event of robbery it is achieved by means of force or threat; in the event of fraud or extortion, the offender applies deception or duress to motivate the victim to dispose of the item. The law therefore regards these forms of prejudicing property as separate offences. It may be claimed that a class of homogeneous offences is “fragmented” into separate types of offences depending on the method (form) of the act, in particular the method of interfering with the object.41 In this case the modus operandi is just a factor that changes the nature (quality) of conduct. The use of a particular method distorts the balance and the offence transforms into another, similar offence. The problem is to identify where, at which point the balance breaks; where is the divide between two offences that form two different ways of prejudicing an object. This question has serious practical implications both for the lawmaker, when he builds up the system of the special part of the criminal code and differentiates the grounds for criminal liability, and for the courts and law enforcement when they classify the criminal acts. The task is further complicated as the

41 “Theft,” wrote V. N. Koudriavtsev, “is distinct from robbery only in terms of its modus operandi” (A General Theory of the Classification of Criminal Offences..., p. 148). Throughout paragraph 7.1., “modus operandi” (or the “method of action“) is understood as the method of impacting on the object, ie the encroachment itself, not the method of committing a certain offence. Differentiation of criminal liability 111 transformation of one social phenomenon into another does not occur at a predefined point: the transition is gradual and may be grasped only approximately on the basis of statistical analysis.42 According to V. N. Koudriavtsev, where two forms of criminal conduct differ in their objective aspects alone, we may only speak of two different definitions (and different offences) if the criminological discrepancies between these forms of conduct are substantial. However, he went on to add: “Our conclusions cannot be definite as this issue remains insufficiently explored: no criteria exist yet to formalise better these discrepancies”.43 We tend to think that the criterion suggested (“criminological discrepancy”) is rather general and, hence, of limited helpfulness. The ultimate, most solid criterion to distinguish between various types of offences is their gravity (ie community danger and blame). Where two encroachments have the same object, subject, and subjective aspect, but differ in the manner of interfering with the object, the question if these are two different offences should be resolved based on the nature of their harmful consequences. If the two encroachments inflict damage of the same kind, they constitute different varieties of the same offence. However, if the encroachments entail different adverse changes in the object (affect different aspects of that object or affect it in a different way or to a different extent, ie threaten or damage or destroy the object, or affect additional objects, etc.), their community danger is so essentially different that they constitute two separate (albeit similar) offences. Besides, not all changes in the nature of community danger are equally material to involve the transformation of an offence into one

42 See Fundamentals of Philosophy..., pp. 182-183. 43 Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Criminal Offences..., p. 97. See also Braynin, Y. M. Criminal Laws and Their Enforcement..., pp. 57-59. 112 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING of a different type.44 The various forms of impacting on the object may produce quite a similar community danger and the difference may remain within a certain type of offence. Where the varieties of a crime display approximately the same extent of community danger and have the same implications in terms of criminal liability, the lawmaker states them as alternative varieties of the same offence. Thus, disclosing defamatory facts about another person and imputing a crime to someone else are forms of defamation (Art. 147(1) CC); asserting false information before a court is a form of perjury as is withholding truth (Art. 290(1) CC); drawing up a false official document and forging the content of an official document are forms of document forgery (Art. 308(1) CC). 7.2. The method (form) of committing the criminal act often acts as a qualifying circumstance. Where the method of commission intensifies community danger so that it goes beyond its typical level (highlighted in the basic definition of the offence), the lawmaker designs a corresponding set of elements that carry a heavier penalty and defines the more dangerous variant of the offence there. Setting apart such a special rule is needed to reflect the higher extent of community danger when the offence is committed in a specific way and to envisage a corresponding severer penalty than the one envisaged in the main rule setting out the basic definition of that offence.45 In this case, the method (form) is a qualifying circumstance that serves as a test to distinguish between varieties of the same offence. Or, it is a criterion to differentiate criminal liability, but within the same offence.

44 “In its dialectical union with the quantity of things, quality remains identical with itself but may sustain some changes or go through various stages of development or sophistication, while remaining the same, a component of a certain measure, or could transform into a different quality where the existing measure of well-settled union of quantity and quality has been modified” (Fundamentals of Philosophy..., p. 183). 45 See Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Criminal Offences..., pp. 248-249. Differentiation of criminal liability 113

The expounding variant prescriptions in the special part of the criminal code enhance the specialisation of legal regulation. They convey the aspiration of the lawmaker to reflect more accurately the gravity of the different variants of an offence and provide for matching differentiated, varied liability. Although the evolution of penal legislation implies an ever deeper differentiation of criminal liability, in particular a growing number of expounding rules, “the existence of expounding statutory prescriptions has failed to catch the attention of legal commentators”,46 noted S. Alexeev. The Criminal Code of Bulgaria states the method (form) of crime commission as an aggravating circumstance in respect of nearly thirty offences. The most significant of them are: murder (Art. 116, point 6 CC); bodily harm (Art. 131, point 5 CC); insult (Art. 148(1), point 2 CC); defamation (Art. 148(2) in conjunction with (1), point 2 CC); gross indecency (Art. 149(2) CC); rape (Art. 152(3), point 1 CC); illicit entry into another's home (Art. 170(2) CC, last-but-one sentence); theft (Art. 195(1), points 3, 4, and 5 CC); robbery (Art. 199(1), point 2 CC); embezzlement (Art. 202(1), point 2, C); fraud (Art. 210(1), points 1 and 2 CC); passive bribery (Art. 302, point 2 CC); hooliganism (Art. 325(2) CC, first sentence); unlawful seizure of an aircraft (Art. 341b(2) CC); unauthorised preparation, acquisition, holding, transportation, transfer, sale or other form of alienation of narcotic drugs (Art. 354a(2)(b) CC); failure to fulfil the order of a military commander (Art. 372(2) CC, first and third sentence), etc. For some offences (murder, theft, fraud, etc.) two or more aggravated definitions exist depending on the method of commission. Thus, four offences against property are matched by a total of ten qualified definitions that reflect different forms of the modus operandi. In all these cases the qualifying circumstance is the same − the method (form) of crime commission. However, for different crimes

46 Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law..., p. 113. 114 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING different types of methods are defined as qualifiers. Two questions arise: what are these methods, and why has the lawmaker chosen to create definitions qualified by the modus operandi exactly as respects the above offences? An analysis of the respective rules of the Criminal Code that carry heavier penalties shows that the method most frequently used as a qualifying circumstance is complicity or, more precisely, joint perpetration (as the law puts it, “perpetration of the offence by two or more (a group of) persons”). Joint perpetration is a qualifying circumstance for thirteen offences, primarily against property, against the person, and some military offences. Another method that often operates as a qualifying factor (for nine offences) is the coercive commission of the criminal act. Coercion may take different forms: a) use of force or threat, as in the case of gross indecency (Art. 149(2) CC); unwarranted sheltering of another's child (Art. 185(2) CC); unlawful seizure of an aircraft (Art. 341b(2) CC); b) offering resistance to a public authority in the event of hooliganism (Art. 325(2) CC, first sentence); offering armed resistance to a military commander (Art. 376(3) CC, first sentence); c) committing a murder (Art. 116, point 6 CC), bodily harm (Art. 131, point 5 CC), and illicit deprivation of liberty (Art. 142a(4) CC, first sentence) in a way painful or dangerous for the victim. The reason to devise definitions that carry heavier penalties is the same in all cases: the tangible increase in the extent of community danger brought about by certain methods. However, the mechanism whereby community danger increases differs depending on the type of method used. Some methods (forms) of crime commission cause larger damage, others affect additional objects, yet others make the offence widespread, etc. As to the type of offences where the method is used as a qualifying factor, even a cursory glimpse at the system of the special part of the Criminal Code may substantiate the following conclusion: the law- Differentiation of criminal liability 115 maker has designed definitions qualified on account of the method used for all offences of significant practical implications. These offences fall into two categories depending on their criminological specifics: violent crimes (murder, bodily harm, rape, hooliganism) and offences against property (theft, robbery, embezzlement, fraud). The approach of the lawmaker is reasoned by social considerations. Qualified definitions of offences are generally created when a factor affects materially the extent of community danger and is relatively widespread. In addition, however, the legislator considers the implications of the offence itself for social development, ie the adverse impact of the respective class of offences on social relations. It is unworthy to design many qualified definitions for offences of limited practical interest. And vice versa, widespread and dangerous offences call for a broad range of definitions that carry lighter or heavier penalties. The effectiveness of penal measures depends primarily on the differentiation of criminal liability and its inevitability. These are the key requirements considered by the legislator in selecting the offences to be qualified on account of the modus used. The lawmaker actually considers not simply how a specific method alters community danger but also the criminological reality, ie the rate, structure, and dynamics of crime. Therefore, the method has become a qualifying factor for almost all significant offences. It is not by coincidence that the same offences (murder, bodily harm, rape, theft, robbery, embezzlement, fraud, hooliganism, etc.) are punished more severely also in the event of dangerous repeat offending. 7.3. The process of specifying the legal grounds for criminal liability implies more than just constructing sets of elements that carry lighter or heavier penalties, ie setting out special (variant) prescriptions other than the general rule on the offence in question. Specification may also consist in elaborating on the elements included in the basic definition of an offence, detailing the description of the criminal conduct within a certain definition. 116 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

a. The method (form) of crime commission is an element frequently added by the lawmaker to the definition of an offence. In this case the statute characterises not just the criminal act but also the operations (body movements) whereby it is performed − not just the substance but also the form that substance takes. Relevant examples include: disorganising or undermining the branches of economy by use of government institutions or enterprises or by frustrating their operation or by failure to perform important economic tasks assigned (Art. 107 CC); causing a dependent individual to commit a suicide by cruel treatment or systematic debasement (Art. 127(3) CC); unlawfully taking knowledge, by use of special technical devices, of a message not addressed to the offender and transmitted by telecommunications means (Art. 171(3) CC); performing unlawful private economic activities by use of a governmental, cooperative or other community organisation (Art. 226(1) CC); endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight by destructing or damaging an air navigation installation or facility (Art. 341a(2)(a) CC) or by emitting a false signal (Art. 341(2)(b) CC); avoiding draft duties by simulating illness or by forging a document or by use of another fraudulent scheme (Art. 383(1) CC), etc. In these cases the lawmaker outlines the criminal conduct and its method (form) among the elements of crime. The combination of two adjacent levels of conduct better matches the target and inten- sity of encroachment. The method specifies the gravity of the offence. The more detailed the description of the crime in the disposition of a rule, the narrower the limits to be envisaged for the penalty in the sanction. Specified definitions of offences serve to deepen the differentiation between the legal grounds for criminal liability. On the other hand, clear and specific prescriptions are a must for the accurate and uniform application of the statute. b. Where an act is criminalised because of the method, the legislator adds it to the basic definition of the respective offence. Differentiation of criminal liability 117

However, the two scenarios should be clearly distinguished. In the first case the method (form) determines the community danger of the act. Figuratively speaking, it “attributes” danger to the act. The method there is of the essence for the criminalisation of the act in question and a constituent element of the basic definition of the offence. The role of the method in the second scenario, where the legislator uses a specific modus to expound the gravity of the offence, is quite different. Here, the act is per se dangerous to society and calls for criminalisation. By adding a specific method to the definition of the offence, the legislator expounds its community danger. In this case, the method is an additional, expounding (not constituent) element of the definition of that offence. From a formal viewpoint, there seems to be no difference between the two scenarios: either way, the method (form) is an element included in the basic definition of a crime. From a substantial point of view, though, when the point of departure is the relevance of the method to the community danger of the offence, the difference is self-evident. In the former case the method conditions the danger associated with the act, while in the latter it only specifies, clarifies the existing community danger. c. The basic definitions of most offences in the Criminal Code of Bulgaria are silent on the method (form) of crime commission. The following offences may be cited as examples: provoking a foreign state to wage war against the Republic; espionage; murder; perjury; bribery, etc. These offences are criminal regardless of how they are committed. In other instances the statute specifies that an offence is criminal if committed “in any manner whatsoever”. Illustrations include: assisting a foreign state in the conduct of hostilities against the Republic of Bulgaria (Art. 100(2) CC); aiding or enticing another person to commit a suicide (Art. 127(1) CC); falsifying election 118 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING results (Art. 169(2) CC); preventing the execution of a judgment concerning the exercise of parental rights or the right to have con- tacts with a child (Art. 182(2) CC, second sentence); acquisition of explosives or firearms without due authorisation (Art. 339(1) CC); propaganda of war (Art. 407 CC). In yet other rules the lawmaker refers to some more or less typical ways of action and summarises that the offence shall be criminal even if committed “in another manner.” Examples include propaganda of racial hatred (Art. 164 CC); using religion for propaganda against the people's authorities (Art. 166 CC, second sentence); obstructing another person to exercise his voting right (Art. 167 CC); deliberately making oneself unable to provide alimony or maintenance (Art. 183(2) CC); preventing criminal prosecution (Art. 288 CC); open incitement to an offence (Art. 320 CC); trans- mitting misleading signals for help or alert (Art. 326 CC); putting into circulation foodstuffs dangerous to health (Art. 350(1) CC, second sentence); provocation to war (Art. 408 CC). Although the legal technique used in the three groups of cases differs, the outcome is the same: the act is prohibited irrespective of how it is committed. The primary reason for that decision of the lawmaker is the substance of the act itself. It “emits” its social properties so clearly and entails such a specific adverse impact on social relations that, however committed, the offence is sufficiently dangerous to society to be criminalised. The legislator is therefore indif- ferent to its specific outward forms and refrains from including any particular method in the statutory definition. This approach is used quite often in describing offences against objects that are most precious for the community (the person; the rights of the citizens; the government regime and social organisation in the Republic of Bulgaria; the public safety of citizens; the operation of government institutions, etc.). This is logical. The more valuable the object, the more abstract should be the criminal provision designed to protect it. Differentiation of criminal liability 119

It should cover all possible manners of prejudicing the object. Any further differentiation of criminal liability implies revising the legislation in force and adding the method (form) of crime commission to the basic definitions of some offences. § 8. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity

1. Institutions of the criminal law. An institution of the criminal law is a system of criminal provisions regulating a group of kindred penal relations or a variety, aspect, element, etc. of such a relation. The notion of “institutions of law” has been explored in depth by S. S. Alexeev, a Russian scholar whose views (The Structure of Soviet Law, Moscow, 1975) have largely influenced this exposé. The objective prerequisite to form an institution of the criminal law is the existence of a group of penal relations that need autonomous regulation by a distinct set of provisions.1 Seen from the outside, in conjunction with the other components of the branch of criminal law, the institution forms an integral whole. It therefore regulates autonomously a certain area of social relations. Seen from the inside, however, the institution of law embraces many criminal provisions with different degrees of abstraction and dissimilar functions. Hence, the institution of law has a certain internal organisation, a structure of its own. The latter reflects the differentiation of the rules based on their function on the one hand and the integration of the normative text into a coherent whole on the other. Because of this essential autonomy an institution of the criminal law is normally located in a separate section or chapter of the criminal code. The emergence and development of institutions of the criminal law usually goes through several stages. At the outset, a group of rules regulating kindred relations are set apart. The separate rules later become “overgrown” with a number of expounding elements (varieties and details). A clear-cut “division of labour” takes place

1 Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law..., p. 129. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 121 among the new prescriptions. The group of rules thus gradually evolve into an institution that regulates a specific segment of penal relations.2 The fundamental attribute of any institution of the criminal law is its function in the process of penal regulation. Each institution specialises in the fulfilment of an autonomous function. Hence, there is a “division of labour” among the different institutions of the criminal law. The criminal law regulates destructive human conduct. It is therefore negative (not positive) law. The institutions of the criminal law contain prohibitions. They are protective (not regulatory) institutions. A prohibition often shows in the combination of several expounding, variant prescriptions. The expounding rules envision differentiated liability depending on the peculiarities of the criminal conduct or the context in which it occurs. The institutions of the criminal law may also divide into substantial and functional. Substantial institutions are those in the special part of the criminal code that set down the liability for a certain class of offences, ie the institution of murder, the institution of theft, the institution of robbery, etc. The specialisation of criminal provisions entails the emergence of functional institutions of the criminal law. These are general rules taken “out of the brackets” and applicable to all offences. They are therefore found in the general part of the criminal code. Such institutions regulate immediately a certain specificity, aspect common to all heterogeneous penal relations. Thus, the institutions of self- defence, fault, attempt, complicity, etc. are functional ones. The prime source of functional institutions are the expounding variant prescriptions. Functional institutions emerge from these prescriptions by means of generalisation and integration. They form a higher level of sophistication, codification of penal legislation.

2 Ibid, p. 130. 122 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

2. The institution of complicity. Complicity means the conjoint participation of two or more persons able to stand criminal liability in the commission of an intentional offence. The institution of complicity outlines the objective and subjective features of different forms of concerted criminal conduct, delineates the circle of individuals competent to stand trial, and sets out the conditions for and the limits to their liability. The issues of complicity are relevant to all central categories and institutions of the criminal law: offence; grounds for criminal liability; elements of crime; act and causal link; fault; offender (subject of offence); differentiation and individualisation of criminal liability; classification of the criminal conduct, etc.3 For a number of offences the law provides for heavier penalties if the act is perpetrated by “two or more persons”. Examples include: rape (Art. 152(3), point 1 CC); illicit entry into another’s home (Art. 170(2) CC); theft (Art. 195(1), point 5 CC); robbery (Art. 199(1), point 2 CC); embezzlement (Art. 202(1), point 2 CC); fraud (Art. 210(1), point 2 CC); unauthorised production, acquisition, distribution, holding, transportation or transfer of narcotic drugs (Art. 354a(2), point 2 CC). The provisions on other offences are worded slightly differently. Unauthorised industrial fishing by foreign nationals in Bulgarian waters (Art. 240(2) CC), failure to fulfil the order of a commander (Art. 372(2) CC), and offering resistance to a commander or mili-

3 “The theory of complicity,” explained Russian scholar G. E. Kolokolov, “has crowned the general theory of crime and is fairly regarded as the most difficult part of the criminal law” (Criminal Law. Lecture Notes, − Moscow, 1896, p. 112, in Russian). N. K. Nikov referred to complicity as “the thorniest and most complicated institution of the criminal law” (Handbook for the General Part of the Bulgarian Criminal Law. – Sofia, 1921, p. 10, in Bulgarian). According to F. G. Bourchak, “the criminal liability of accomplices in an offence is amongst the most complex problems of the theory of criminal law” (A Theory of Complicity under Soviet Criminal Law. – Kiev, 1969, p. 5, in Russian). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 123 tary official (Art. 376(3) CC) carry a heavier penalty if committed by “a group of persons.” Finally, evading military service for a period of one to three days (Art. 381 CC) is punished more severely if committed “as a group”. The legislator clearly makes no distinction between “a group of persons” and “two or more persons.” Any multitude “of two or more persons” is a “group”.4 In this case the law uses different expressions to depict the same fact, namely that more than one individual participates in the commission of an offence. That linguistic inconsistency should be eliminated by future amendments to the Criminal Code. The above expounding provisions5 relate to different offences but share a recurring feature, viz. the conjoint commission of the offence (“by two or more persons”, “in concert”). In terms of the form of action, all these provisions refer to the same form of concerted criminal conduct. It is therefore possible to craft a single generic concept of the concerted conduct under Art. 159(3), point 1; Art. 170(2); Art. 195(1), point 5 CC, etc., namely the concept of “offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons”.6

4 “Two or more persons,” “a few” and “concert,” wrote D. Vaptsarov, “are all collective concepts so it is natural and fair for anyone, even a non- lawyer, to subsume them under the notion of “group” (Crime Organisation and Criminal Group. – Pravna Misal, 1962, No. 3, p. 57, in Bulgarian). See also Mihaylov, D. Crimes Committed by “a Few” under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Bulgaria. – Pravna Misal, 1965, No. 1, p. 43 et seq. (in Bulgarian); Hinova, T. On Groups and the Concerted Criminal Activity of Juveniles. – Pravna misal, 1973, No. 1, pp. 57-58 (in Bulgarian). On the concept of “group” see also Shtepanskii, Y. The Elementary Concepts of Sociology. – Moscow, 1969, p. 119 (in Russian). 5 These are Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5; 199(1), point 2; 202(1), point 2; 210(1), point 2; 354а(2), point 2; 240(2); 372(2); 376(3); and 381 of the Criminal Code. For brevity, the relevant provisions are cited hereafter as “Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc.”, while the corresponding offences are referred to as “rape, illicit entry into another’s home, theft, etc.”. 6 For brevity, the term “group offence” is also used in this work as a syn- onym of ”offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons”. Though 124 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The escape of prisoners by concerted efforts (Art. 298(2) CC) falls into the same category of conjoint criminal conduct.7 The fact that an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” is a form of complicity is beyond doubt in the theory and practice of the criminal law. Such offences display all generic features of complicity – a number of offenders, an objective union of criminal activities (causal link), and a common intent shared by the offenders. In the event of “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”, however, the general issues of complicity intertwine with specific problems concerning the type of individual offence. The properties of complicity have different external forms depending on the nature of the criminal act. Complicity changes unevenly the community danger of different offences. The lawmaker reflects these phenomena in the criminal code and provides for matching liability. The “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” is a specific form of concerted criminal activity, a form of complicity that evokes a number of questions: lacking in precision, the expression “group offence” is widespread in Russian legal literature. I. H. Hakimov thus noted: “[i]t is accepted to call simple complicity (joint perpetration) “a group criminal offence” (Legal Issues of Complicity in Encroachments on Socialist Property. – Tashkent, 1975, p. 83, in Russian). See also Galiakbarov, R. R. Group Offences: Invariable and Variable Features. – Sverdlovsk, 1973 (in Russian); Oushakov, A. V. Group Offences and Related Forms of Criminal Activity. – Kalinin, 1978 (in Russian); Combating Juvenile Group Offences. – Kiev, 1982 (in Russian); Bourchak, F. G. Complicity: Social, Criminological and Legal Issues. Kiev, 1986 (in Russian). The concept of “joint perpetration” is not used at all in the Criminal Code of Bulgaria but the expression “group offence” features in Articles 380(2) and 381 CC.

7 This is readily visible if we compare the offences under Articles 297 and 298 CC. Article 297(1) CC envisions criminal liability for a prison escapee, ie for an act committed by a sole person. Where the escape is perpetrated by “prisoners who have conspired to escape by concerted efforts”, the liability is heavier, in line with Art. 298(2) CC. Article 298(2) CC thus sets out a qualified (aggravated) form of the offence under Art. 297(1) CC. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 125

− What are the circumstances that trigger the application of those rules of the special part that carry heavier liability for offences perpetrated “by two or more persons,” ie what is the scope of these rules? − Why, notwithstanding the general rules on complicity (Articles 20-22 CC), has the lawmaker inserted provisions in the special part concerning “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” (Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc.) that also cover forms of complicity? The result is that homogeneous phenomena are regulated by two types of norms found accordingly in the general part and in the special part of the Criminal Code. In other words, what are the reasons to place such expounding prescriptions in the special part of the code and what is their function in the process of penal regulation? − What is the relation (common features and discrepancies) between “an offence perpetrated by two or more persons” and the other forms of concerted criminal activity covered by the special part of the criminal code? − What problems would practising magistrates face in classifying “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” and other forms of complicity? The questions raised shall be addressed in turn to highlight complicity from a specific angle. The practical relevance of the problems with “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” derives from several factors. Perpetration of an offence” by two or more persons” is a qualifying circumstance for a number of offences (against property or others) that exhibit a high level of community danger and are relatively widespread (eg theft, robbery, embezzlement, fraud, rape). Statistical research suggests that offences against property and those against the person amount to nearly two thirds of all punished 126 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING offences in this country.8 The largest share of the overall array of crimes belongs to encroachments on property (ca 40 per cent). The most widespread of them are thefts (two thirds of all offences against property) and embezzlement. These offences inflict substantial damage on the national economy. Offences against the person come second in the structure of crime. Rapes form a relatively tiny portion but their implications ensue from the elevated danger they pose to the community. On the other hand, offences where complicity is a qualifying factor are often committed by “two or more persons” in concert. Nearly one fifth of all offences in the country are committed in complicity. In the case of some offences against property or against the person that share is much larger. Concerted juvenile offences are particularly widespread. Almost one third of all juvenile offences involve accomplices. Complicity is therefore quite widespread, especially in the context of serious and repeat offending. 2.1. Scope of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. The expounding rules in the special part of the Criminal Code – Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc. – certainly concern acts of complicity. Then, however, a cleavage of opinions occurs. According to the first view these rules cover all forms of complicity (both joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu). The second view is that the rules in question only cover joint perpetration. Hence, we need to delineate the scope of the specific rules of the special part. At an earlier stage, this issue had led to heated debates in court case law that were settled with the 1982 amendments to the Criminal Code.

8 All statistics on crime in Bulgaria cited in Paragraph 8 derive from a series of periodic publications, Offences and Sentenced Persons. More detailed information is available from Karakashev, V. Problems of Crime and Its Structure. – Sofia, 1977 (in Bulgarian); Tsankov, P. Combating Crime against Socialist Property. – Sofia, 1983 (in Bulgarian); Fundamentals of Criminology in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. – Sofia, 1983 (in Bulgarian). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 127

2.1.1. Throughout the period from the enactment of the new Criminal Code (1968) until its amendment (1982) the case law was dominated by an understanding that the above qualified definitions cover both forms of complicity (joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu). That view was virtually imposed by Regulation 3- 1970-Pl. on embezzlement and Regulation 6-1971-Pl. on the thefts of public and personal property.9 Under Regulation 3-1970-Pl., an aggravated embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC “can be carried out if at least one participant involved in the offence as a perpetrator has the official status required by Art. 201 CC vis-Ў-vis the property that forms the subject-matter of offence” (Reports, p. 14). In other words, in order for the qualified definition under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC to be satisfied, one perpetrator is sufficient while the other participants could be inciters and/or aiders. Later, in its Regulation 6-1071-Pl. the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court extended that interpretation to cover thefts committed “by two or more persons” under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC (Reports, p. 13). The two Regulations pushed the courts to construe and apply extensively the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. We should add immediately that the Criminal Code itself opened the door to such interpretations. Before 1982 the rules on embezzlement (Art. 202(1) and (2) CC), fraud (Art. 210(1), point 2 CC), and unauthorised production,

9 Throughout this work, judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bulgaria are cited as follows: number; year of issue; and issuing division of the Supreme Court. Judgments of the General Assembly of Criminal Colleges at the Supreme Court are identified by the abbreviation OSNK, while the regulations issued by the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court are indicated as Pl. VS. These indications are followed by the relevant volume of court reports, Case Law of the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. Criminal College (referred to as “Reports”) and the page where the respective judgment is found. The publication year of the Reports is normally skipped as it is the same as the year when the judgment was returned, for example: 567-1970-II (Reports, p. 85). 128 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING acquisition, distribution, holding, etc. of narcotic drugs (Art. 354a(2), point 2 CC) envisaged heavier penalties if the crime were “carried out by two or more persons”. The expression “carry out a crime” is broader in meaning than “perpetrate a crime”. The activity of carrying out a crime includes the perpetration of the actus reus as well as the activity qualifying as incitement or aiding. Hence, sufficed it for more than one person to have participated in the “carrying out” of the offence in general (not in the actus reus only) for the above qualified definitions to apply. It appears that the former (pre-1982) wording of Art. 202(1), point 2 CC covered the acts of joint perpetration and the concerted acts of complicity stricto sensu alike and that the interpretation provided in Regulation 3-1970-Pl. was consistent with the then wording of the law. As K. Liutov and I. Palazov noted, “the interpretation given in paragraph 3 of section II of Regulation No. 3/1970 of the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court … derived from the wording of the law before the insertion of Art. 93, point 12 CC”.10 It may be concluded that the law at that time invited a broader stance on the scope of the rules on embezzlement, fraud, unauthorised preparation, acquisition, holding, etc. of narcotic drugs. The situation with Regulation 6-1971-Pl. on the thefts of public and personal property was slightly different. Even before the 1982 amendment, Article 195(1), point 5 CC required the theft to be “perpetrated by two or more persons”. Already the grammatical interpretation of the text made it clear that it only concerned acts of joint perpetration. By stating in its Regulation 6-1971-Pl. (Reports, p. 13) that the qualified definition of theft (Art. 195(1), point 5 CC) applied to both forms of complicity, the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court instructed the courts to interpret extensively also the other similar norms of the code.11

10 Liutov, K, I. Palazov The Sentencing Practice in respect of Offences against Socialist Property. – Sofia, 1983, p. 13. 11 As mentioned earlier, the substance of Article 195(1), point 5 CC is unveiled by grammatical interpretation alone. Grammatical interpretation, Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 129

Consequently, the wider application of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” was due to two different reasons. As regards embezzlement, fraud, and the unauthorised production, acquisition, distribution, holding, etc. of narcotic drugs, it ensued from the law itself. Conversely, in the case of theft (and the other offences) it followed up on the extensive interpretation made in Regulation 6-1971-Pl. of the Supreme Court. The view that the qualified definitions relate to both forms of complicity is also endorsed in the literature. According to its supporters the factor that materially steps up the community danger of an offence is the cohesion (prior conspiracy) of the accomplices, not the substance of their acts (method or instrumentalities of concerted interference with the object). Thus, the Russian author G. A. Kriger noted: “The level of coordination of steps among the accomplices … is decisive in determining the community danger of the act performed”.12 According to P. F. Telnov “the mutual coordination of functions among the participants in a contemplated encroachment endows the criminal act with a new quality, enhances its community danger, transforms the offence in progress into the act of a “group”. The existence of such mutual coordination of functions is however, is just a first step to clarifying the substance of legal rules. In this case it clearly proved insufficient to convince the courts that the respective qualified definitions only covered joint perpetration. Logical interpretation was needed as well. The tools available to the science of criminal law should be used to endorse theoretically the conclusion from the lexical analysis. “Grammatical interpretation,” explained V. Ta dje r, “is the first step of interpretation. It is an indispensable stage … of the functional (ie logical – emphasis added, N. F.) interpretation which reveals the spirit and the reason of the law. The actual meaning of the law may only be established if both methods are employed concurrently... In any case, functional interpretation must follow up on grammatical interpretation” (Civil Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. General Part. Vol. 1. – Sofia, 1972, pp. 127-128, in Bulgarian).

12 Grishaev, P. I., G. A. Kriger Complicity under Soviet Criminal Law. – Moscow, 1959, p. 51 (in Russian). 130 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING increasingly used in court practice to distinguish group acts from other forms of the same offence”.13 The second opinion is that the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” only apply to joint perpetration. In some of its judgments the Supreme Court has upheld this view as well.14 It is particularly obvious in judgment 53-1975-OSNK: “… in order for the offence under Art. 152(3), point 1 CC to exist, two or more persons must participate directly in coercion and sexual intercourse or in either component of the offence (coercion or sexual intercourse), in other words, at least two joint perpetrators should participate … The aiders and inciters of an individual who is involved himself in both coercion and intercourse are not to be held liable under Art. 152(3) … They will only be held liable for ordinary rape under Art. 152(1), point 2 CC …” (Reports, p. 52). D. Mihaylov also pointed out that “an offence is committed by “a few [people]” (an expression used in the repealed Criminal Code – emphasis added, N. F.) if several persons acting as joint perpetrators satisfy the elements of that offence”.15 Some Russian commentators share a similar view.16

13 Telniov, P. F. Liability for Complicity in Criminal Offences. – Moscow, 1974, p. 119. 14 See eg Judgment 617-1973-I (Reports, p. 72) and Judgment 231-1976- I (Reports, p. 56) in relation to Art. 152, para. 3, point 1 CC; Judgment 103- 1973-I (Reports 1975, p. 79) and Judgment 75-1977-I (Reports, p. 123) in relation to Art. 298, para. 2 CC. 15 Mihaylov, D. Criminal Offences Committed by “a Few” under the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria..., p. 30. See also Nenov, I. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. General Part..., pp. 398- 399; Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 1, pp. 453-454 and 473 (in Bulgarian); Krastev, K., op. cit., pp. 45-54; Palazov, I. Embezzlement. – Sofia, 1984, pp. 34-36 (in Bulgarian). 16 See Andreeva, L. The Classification of Offences Committed in Complicity. – Sovetskaya iustitsiya, 1969, No. 20, pp. 20-21 (in Russian); Boushouev, G. The Group of Persons as a Qualifying Element of Crime. – Sovetskaya iustitsiya, 1970, No. 3, p. 17 (in Russian); Pogrebniak, I. G. The Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 131

2.1.2. The features of an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” (ie the scope of the respective specific rules) need a straightforward and theoretically justified explanation. We shall rely on the following basic assumptions in trying to provide one: a. Criminal liability matches the seriousness of the offence. The lawmaker reflects in the basic definition the typical community danger and reproof of the offence. Where a particular factor materially intensifies the community danger or reproof (beyond the limits set in the basic definition), that factor is included in a corresponding set of elements that carry a heavier penalty. The expounding prescriptions of Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc. provide for heavier liability if the offence is perpetrated “by two or more (a group of) persons”. The reason is that these prescriptions cover more dangerous varieties of the offence in question. b. The material increase in the community danger of the above offences is due to complicity.17 The question is if all the forms of com-

Classification of Embezzlement Committed by a Group of Persons Who Conspired in Advance. – In: Combating Embezzlement of State-owned and Public Property. – Moscow, 1971, pp. 185-200 (in Russian); Zelinskii, A. F. Complicity in Crime. – Volgograd, 1971, pp. 25-26 (in Russian); A Course in Soviet Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 3. – Leningrad, 1973, pp. 392-394 (in Russian); Galiakbarov, R. R. op. cit. pp. 52-89; Hakimov, I. H., op. cit., pp. 82-84; Gorelik, I. I., I. S. Tishkevich Issues of the Criminal Law (special part). – Minsk, 1976, p. 135 (in Russian); Soviet Criminal Law. Special Part. – Moscow, 1979, p. 115 (in Russian); Tsaregordtsev, A. M. Issues of the Classification of Criminal Offences Perpetrated by a Group of Persons. – In: Issues of Combating Crime. – Omsk, 1978, pp. 17-26 (in Russian); Orehov, V. V., V. A. Alexeev Improving the Legislation on Liability for Group Offences. – Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta, 1988, vip. 2, pp. 47-48 (in Russian).

17 In principle complicity intensifies the gravity (community danger and reproof) of a crime and aggravates the liability of the individuals at fault. This principle, however, should not be seen as absolute. Albeit seldom, one may come across examples of complicity as an attenuating circumstance, eg where a juvenile is involved in concerted criminal activity by an “experienced” repeat offender. 132 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING plicity entail a material increase in the extent of community danger or joint perpetration alone has that effect. Depending on the answer, the qualified definitions would cover either all forms of complicity or just occurrences of joint perpetration. We should therefore look at how different forms of complicity affect the gravity of the offence. As a modus operandi, complicity stricto sensu is certainly “more dangerous” than sole perpetration, while joint perpetration is “more dangerous” than complicity stricto sensu. The problem is to identify where the essential difference lies, where the “leap” in the level of community danger occurs – between sole perpetration and complicity stricto sensu or between the latter and joint perpetration. This is necessary as the qualified definition covers only a variety of the offence that is substantially more dangerous than its basic pattern (covered by the main definition). c. Complicity is a feature, a characteristic of the commission of the offence. It shows how the concerted efforts of several individuals combine for the offence to occur. Complicity is therefore a method, a form of committing the offence. 2.1.3. The task is to scan the impact of complicity on the gravity of the offence and in particular to compare the community danger inherent in each of the tree variants of crime commission, viz. sole perpetration, complicity stricto sensu, and joint perpetration. Before that, we shall address some general issues, viz. the approaches to such a study and the mechanism whereby the social relation is distorted. 2.1.3.1. To establish the impact of complicity on the seriousness of an offence, we should use both the theoretical and the empirical approach. The theoretical approach implies starting with the general assumptions about the structure of a crime and its community danger so that a particular conclusion is drawn on the specific impact of complicity on community danger (deductive method). The logical Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 133 proof, however, is not sufficient in itself. The veracity of a theoretical conclusion should be tested in practice. Practice is the test of truth. Hence, an empirical survey should be conducted in order to analyse the same interrelation (between complicity and the community danger of offences) against the backdrop of specific empirical data.18 With the empirical approach, the process develops the other way around – from particular to general. The empirical data on a specific offence serves to draw a generalised conclusion about the impact of complicity on community danger (inductive method). The empirical survey is used to test and refine the theoretical conclusion. The empirical test casts the bridge between theory and practice. The theoretical and empirical approaches, deduction and induction, are intrinsically connected aspects of the dialectical method of exploring reality. This twofold approach has been used in the present work as well. The survey of “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” consists of two stages: a) theoretical, where the interdependence between the form of complicity and the gravity of the offence is deduced logically, and b) an empirical test of the logical conclusion where the latter is juxtaposed with actual data. A theoretical finding that matches the facts is truthful, authentic.19 2.1.3.2. The extent of community danger is mainly determined by the extent of its adverse impact on the object, ie the level (depth)

18 “The process of research in social science starts by advancing (formulating) a theory which is then tested empirically” (Tam, H. Crime and Standard of Living. – Moscow, 1982, p. 22, in Russian). 19 “The most powerful explanation of the object,” wrote Y. A. Souslov, “is the deductive scheme where the explanation boils down to deducing the reasoning about the object from the explanatory theory. As the theoretical explanatory prerequisites are truthful statements, the logical results derived from them form a truthful and trustworthy explanation, provided that they match the description of the facts” (Specific Research and the Development of Sociology of Law. − Leningrad, 1983, p. 111, in Russian). 134 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING of damage caused. Therefore, the three variants of the offence (sole perpetration, complicity stricto sensu, and joint perpetration) must be compared in their extent of damage caused. Such comparison implies a good grip on the structure of the underlying social relation and the mechanism of its distortion. a. It is well known that any social relation is a connection between people apropos of a material or spiritual value. Depending on their subject-matter, social relations divide into material and ideological ones. The criminal law does not protect just any social relation but those that are most appreciated by society and therefore regulated by law. A legal relationship has three structural components: a) parties to it (natural or legal persons), which have specific interests, b) a natural or social phenomenon (value) apt to satisfy specific needs thus causing the subjects to interact, and c) interaction itself, that is, the mutually agreed conduct of the parties.20 That conduct forms the core substance of the social relation. It normally develops in conformity with the rights and obligations conferred on the parties by statute. A legal relationship stricto sensu has two components: a purely legal link between the parties, ie a set of reciprocal legal rights and obligations, and the factual steps undertaken by the parties, their practical activity in realising the rights and obligations in question. In the event of criminal encroachment the offender affects the material (or spiritual) value underlying a legal relationship or the parties thereto or their conduct. The element of the social relation that is affected by the offender is referred to as the subject-matter of an offence. No offence exists without a subject-matter.

20 See Soviet Criminal Law. General Part. − Moscow, 1977, p. 110 (in Russian). Here, we adhere to the understanding of the object of crime prevailing in the literature of criminal law and ensuing from the research of B. S. Nikiforov, E. A. Frolov, E. Kairzhanov, N. I. Korzhanskii, V. K. Glistin and a number of other Russian scholars. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 135

In the case of sole perpetration the social relation is distorted as the offender interferes with certain powers of the parties by impacting on one of the elements of the relation. The power is only the legal “envelope” of the parties’ factual possibility to act in a certain way. In the end, the socially beneficial conduct of the parties is twisted by the criminal encroachment. b. The above assumptions make it possible to compare the mechanisms of interference with the social relation in cases of complicity stricto sensu and joint perpetration. In the event of complicity stricto sensu (like with sole perpetration), just one individual – the perpetrator – impacts on the subject- matter of the offence. He is assisted by accessories (inciters or aiders). The inciter employs different techniques (soliciting, bribery, talking over, threat, fraud, etc.) to influence the principal’s state of mind. The inciter actually “produces” the principal’s decision to act. The aider, on the other hand, assists in the perpetration either by creating objective conditions extraneous to the principal (physical aiding) or by reinforcing the perpetrator’s resolution to act (intellectual aiding). None of the accessories (inciter or aider) targets his efforts directly at the subject matter of the offence. They harm it only indirectly, through the agency of the principal’s conduct. The offence is finally perpetrated by one person. In this, complicity stricto sensu resembles sole perpetration. On the other hand, though, in situations of complicity stricto sensu a perpetrator never acts completely on his own. He is incited and/or aided by other persons. The commission of the offence as a whole involves several individuals. In this, complicity stricto sensu resembles joint perpetration. Joint perpetration interferes with the object of an offence under a different scheme: all participants impact directly on the subject- matter of crime. Each participant impacts on the subject-matter per- sonally, not through the agency of any other actor. To put it figuratively, the offence seems to be committed by an offender endowed 136 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING with the combined capacities of all participants (having several hands which inflict blows in the event of bodily harm or deprive someone else of his property in the event of theft).21 Hence, while on the face of it (number of offenders involved) it resembles joint perpetration, in reality (mechanism of inflecting the prejudice) complicity stricto sensu is much closer to sole perpetration. For that reason, all other conditions being equal, an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” (joint perpetration) is liable to cause larger damage than an “offence perpetrated by a sole person assisted by inciters and aiders” (complicity stricto sensu). 2.1.3.3. We have found that joint perpetration is liable to cause far greater damage to the object than complicity stricto sensu. Damage, however, is not the only factor that contributes to the essential difference in the gravity of these two criminal schemes. A number of other details relevant to the mechanism of inflicting the damage tend to deepen that difference. a. As a modus operandi, joint perpetration entails a much greater likelihood than complicity stricto sensu that the criminal result would to occur.22 This is perfectly understandable: the occurrence of the damage is likelier if several persons, as opposed to a single individual, impact immediately on the object. Acts of joint perpetration end up far more frequently in causing the criminal result

21 As appropriately defined by R. R. Galiakbarov, the accomplices in a group offence are a sui generis “collective perpetrator” (op. cit., p. 55). 22 “The probability that the harmful effects occur is an important indicator of the danger posed by the act in question. The danger inherent of the act consists in that it may produce certain harmful consequences. Those consequences, however, do not necessarily materialise. Naturally, the likelier the occurrence of the harmful consequences, the more dangerous the act in comparative terms.” (Koudriavtsev, V. N. The Objective Aspect of Criminal Offences..., p. 102). See also Filimonov, V. D. Criminological Foundations of Criminal Law..., pp. 107-108. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 137 than offences committed in complicity stricto sensu (the latter rather end at the stage of attempt).23 b. Joint perpetration facilitates the commission of the actus reus to a much larger extent than incitement or aiding. At times the context in which the offence occurs is such that the act may only be performed by the concerted efforts of a number of individuals. In terms of actus reus, joint perpetration makes it easier to interfere with the object under protection (thus in the case of theft it is easier for several individuals to take the property in question). In terms of mens rea, joint perpetration enhances substantially the deci- siveness of the participants to commit the offence.24 c. Joint perpetration is a much more reliable method of committing the offence than complicity stricto sensu. Joint perpetration places all participants on an equal footing, frustrates detection and helps the culprits feel safer. From an offender’s standpoint, joint perpetration is a “more productive,” more effective method to hit the target. d. For all these reasons joint perpetration is also far more widespread than complicity stricto sensu. Criminological surveys suggest that nearly 80 per cent of all concerted offences in this country take the form of joint perpetration,25 whereas the other 20 per cent are

23 According to R. R. Galiakbarov, “as a rule, group rapes are brought to an end, whereas the dangerous conduct of a sole perpetrator twice more often breaks at the stage of attempt” (Commission of Criminal Offences by a Group of Persons. − Omsk, 1980, p. 40, in Russian). The assertion that joint perpetration makes it more probable that the criminal result would occur applies to the totality of criminal offences of a certain class, not to any specific perpetrated offence as in the latter case we cannot speak of a “possibility”. 24 See The Mechanism of Criminal Conduct. − Moscow, 1981, pp. 101 and 225 (in Russian); Djekebaev, U. S., L. M. Veissberg, R. N. Soudakova Complicity in Crime. − Alma-Ata, 1981, p. 107 (in Russian); A Course in Soviet Criminology. − Moscow, 1985, pp. 359-377 (in Russian). 25 Joint perpetration is accompanied by incitement or aiding in only 9 per cent of those cases. 138 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING acts of complicity stricto sensu.26 Joint perpetration is four times more frequent than complicity stricto sensu. It is well known that the frequent, large-scale occurrence of a certain type of criminal conduct is a major determinant of its community danger. e. The criminal act is prejudicial not just to the social esse but also to the collective mind.27 An offence perpetrated by two or more persons affects public conscience much more adversely than a similar act perpetrated by a sole individual. f. The decisive censure for the mindset (guilt) of joint perpetrators is due to the following factors: first, premeditation, which often involves contemplating the future criminal activity; second, the intellectual component of a joint perpetrator’s intent covers those circumstances that make the offence more dangerous (larger damage, a higher probability that it occurs, etc.); third, the volitional component of a joint perpetrator’s intent reveals the willingness to have the object prejudiced by two or more individuals, to cause larger damage by employing a more secure and efficient method, etc. We may thus summarise: joint perpetration makes it likelier than complicity stricto sensu that the object (social relation) would sustain a much more intensive damage; moreover, joint perpetration facilitates to a larger extent the commission of the offence, obstructs its detection, instils a feeling of security in the perpetrators’ minds, and it is much more widespread; an offence perpetrated by two or

26 According to A. V. Oushakov, 65 per cent of all concerted offences in Russia represent sequential joint perpetration, 15-17 per cent are instances of simultaneous joint perpetration, and 18-20 per cent represent complicity stric- to sensu (Group Offences and Related Forms of Criminal Activity..., pp. 9, 11, and 25). V. V. Sergeev pointed out: “... as is shown by criminological research, more than 90 per cent of all different offences committed in complicity are acts of joint perpetration" (Joint Perpetration of Offences in Soviet Criminal Law. − Avtoref. kand. diss. − Moscow, 1972, p. 3, in Russian). 27 See A Comprehensive Study of the System of Impacting on Crime ..., p. 96. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 139 more persons injures public consciousness far more extensively; the state of mind of the joint perpetrators deserves a far stronger reproof. Hence, an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” (joint perpetration) is generally much more serious than an “offence perpetrated by a single person assisted by inciters and/or aiders” (complicity stricto sensu). Therefore, the comparison between the three criminal schemes – sole perpetration, complicity stricto sensu, and joint perpetration – shows that, all other conditions being equal, the essential difference, the “leap” in the level (extent) of community danger and reproof occurs between an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” and an “offence perpetrated by a sole individual assisted by inciters and/or aiders,” rather than between the latter form and “an offence committed by a sole individual”. 2.1.4. The above findings pave the way to defining the notion of “offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” used in Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc. As we have seen, an offence perpetrated by two or more persons is considerably more dangerous than the other two varieties of the same offence (sole perpetration and complicity stricto sensu). Joint perpetration alone intensifies the community danger of an offence so that it exceeds the framework of the basic definition and dictates a harsher legislative response, ie the creation of a relevant qualified definition with a heavier penalty. Consequently, the rules that provide for heavier penalties (Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc.) only cover acts of joint perpetration, whereas acts in complicity stricto sensu (whose level of community danger is similar to that of sole perpetration) should be classified under the basic definition of the respective offence in conjunction with Articles 20-22 CC. 2.1.4.1. The viewpoint that the definitions setting down heavier penalties cover all forms of complicity (ie joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu) is based on the assumption that community danger is essentially determined by the cohesion (prior conspir- 140 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING acy) of participants, not by the nature of their acts (way of committing the criminal act). The logical sequel to this view is that the forms of complicity differ in their extent of cohesion between the accomplices. Its supporters believe that a concerted act should be classified under the basic or aggravated definition of an offence depending on whether prior conspiracy exists. This understanding has to be declined. The criterion to divide complicity into forms that differ in their “danger” is objective. This is the manner of committing the offence, ie the nature of the accomplices’ conduct (not the extent of their cohesion). Based on that criterion, complicity can take one of two forms: joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu (incitement and aiding). The essential difference in the extent of community danger shows between these two forms (not between spontaneous complicity and premeditated complicity). The above considerations do not imply that the subjective aspect (prior conspiracy) has nothing to do with the gravity of the offence. On the contrary, a more sophisticated joint organisation among the participants intensifies the community danger of their offence. But however substantial, that increase remains within the confines of the community danger typical of the respective form of the offence – joint perpetration or complicity stricto sensu. In other words, although the different extent of joint organisation may add some shades to community danger, it is not a reason to distinguish an autonomous form of concerted criminal conduct. After all, it is the objective manner of committing the offence, ie the nature of the acts performed by the participants, that is decisive for the threat to society. The view that “prior conspiracy” is a major modifier of the danger of an offence may be defeated with yet another argument. Some offences (rape, illicit entry into another’s home, unauthorised industrial fishing by foreign nationals in Bulgarian waters, failure to execute the order of a superior, offering resistance to a superior or military Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 141 official, evading military service for a period of one to three days) carry a heavier penalty just because the offence is committed “by two or more (a group of) persons”. No “prior conspiracy” is required to cover these qualified definitions. Suffice it for two or more individuals to have participated in perpetration itself. The lawmaker apparently thinks that the community danger of such offences increases tangibly even without prior conspiracy (just on account of joint perpetration). The view that “prior conspiracy” materially intensifies community danger fails to explain the reason for the change (ie what causes the creation of qualified definitions).28 2.1.4.2. Finally, the following conclusion may be drawn: in terms of forms of complicity, all “offences perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” boil down to joint perpetration. Joint perpetration forms a major element, the core of the concept of “offence committed by two or more persons”. Consequently, an “offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” may be defined as one the very perpetration of which involves at least two individuals acting in concert. This is consistent with the legal definition of perpetration in Art. 20(2) CC.29

28 The question is why for other offences (theft, robbery, embezzlement, fraud, unauthorised manufacturing, acquisition, distribution, possession, etc. of narcotic drugs) the law requires “prior conspiracy” along with joint perpetration for a heavier responsibility to emerge. That different legislative approach may be explained by the fact that the definitions of offences are based on the community danger inherent in an offence as well as on the extent to which that offence is widespread or typical. In the above cases joint perpetration often goes hand in hand with prior conspiracy. The lawmaker has reflected this in the Criminal Code by adding “prior conspiracy” to the relevant aggravated definitions. It is another question if all legislative decisions to create such aggravated definitions are justified. 29 According to Art. 20(2) CC “perpetrator is the one who participates in the very commission of the offence”. 142 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Besides joint perpetrators, an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” may certainly involve others – inciters, aiders or persons incompetent to stand trial (under the age of 14 or of unsound mind). It is also possible that the accomplices are organised to a different extent – spontaneous complicity, complicity with prior conspiracy, conspiracy to commit numerous offences (ie to engage in long-term criminal activities), highly organised crime syndicates, etc. Where a certain factor is typical of a larger number of acts within a certain class, ie it is widespread and affects materially the community danger, the legislator reflects that factor in an aggravated definition of the offence in question. “Prior conspiracy” is one such factor. Hence, the general notion of “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” has fundamental (mandatory) and additional (optional) features. Other than the above two types of features, a concerted act may display peculiarities that are not included in the statutory definition. These are stand-alone, occasional features that are irrelevant to the classification of the conduct and only matter when individualising the penalty, eg number of joint perpetrators, involvement of inciters and aiders along with the joint perpetrators, extent of cohesion among the participants, etc. In order to clarify the features of the “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” as a form of concerted criminal conduct, joint perpetration should be defined first.30 It is only then that the

30 For more details on joint perpetration see Kovaliov, M. I. Complicity in Criminal Offences. Part 2. Types of Accomplices and Forms of Criminal Complicity. − Sverdlovsk, 1962 (in Russian); Sergeev, V. V., op. cit.; Gamkrelidze, O. K. Joint Perpetration and Perpetration through an Agent in Soviet Criminal Law. − Avtoref. kand. diss. − Tbilisi, 1973 (in Russian); Wasek, A. Wsposprawstwo v polskim prawie karnym. Warszawa, 1977; Jescheck, H. H. Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Berlin, 1978, pp. 522-577; Filchev, N. General Characteristics of Complicity under the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. − God. SU. Iurid. fak., 77, 1987, No. 1, pp. 219- 255 (in Bulgarian). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 143 specifics of the different classes of offences perpetrated by two or more persons can be identified. The specifics of a phenomenon may only be singled out against the backdrop of the features common to all other homogeneous phenomena. Therefore, the general theoretical assumptions concerning complicity (joint perpetration) are the starting point to disclose the specificity of different group offences. As D. Mihaylov fairly pointed out, “an offence is committed by “a few” (expression used in the ex-Criminal Code (repealed) – emphasis added, N. F.) where several persons cover its elements in the context of joint perpetration. A major inference can be made from this: as the lawmaker has made joint perpetration a qualifying element of the offences in question, their specific features must be analysed exactly in the light of the theory of that form of complicity”.31 2.1.4.3. The scientific substantiation of “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” and of the scope of the relevant expounding rules had to be implemented consistently in the statutes and in case law. Therefore, the Act to Amend and Supplement the Criminal Code of 31 March 1982 (in effect as from 1 July 1982) amended the Criminal Code as follows: a) the rule of Art. 93, point 12 CC was inserted to provide that “an offence is perpetrated by two or more persons” where at least two persons have participated in perpetration itself ”; b) the expression “carrying out of the offence” in the relevant expounding prescriptions on embezzlement (Art. 202(1), point 2 CC), fraud (Art. 210(1), point 2 CC), unauthorised production, acquisition, distribution, holding, etc. of narcotic drugs (Art. 354a(2), point 2 CC), etc., was replaced with the narrower and stricter criminal-law term “perpetration of the offence”.32 The theo-

31 Mihaylov, D. Criminal Offences Committed by “a Few” under the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria..., p. 30. 32 For those proposed amendments, see Filchev, N. Group Offences. − Sotsialistichesko pravo, 1981, No. 5, pp. 25-35 (in Bulgarian). In fact, the pro- posals had been tabled already in 1979 before the task force at the Ministry of Justice in charge of drafting the amendments to the Criminal Code. 144 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING retical proposition that the expounding prescriptions of Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc. cover the acts of joint perpetration alone thus became legislation in force. 2.2. Background, nature, and functions of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. Criminal complicity is regulated by two types of rules found accordingly in the general and the special part of the Criminal Code. The question then is: why has the lawmaker devised the expounding rules of the special part on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” although general norms on complicity exist (Articles 20-22 CC)? In other words, we should clarify the background, the nature and functions of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. 2.2.1. Emergence of the institution of complicity from rules of the general and special parts of the Criminal Code. In order to elucidate the reason to insert the norms of Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc., we should start with the general imperative underlying the evolution of the legal system and identify on its basis the specific factors that have prompted the respective prescriptions. 2.2.1.1. The development of penal legislation, including the institution of complicity is governed by a general imperative inherent in law – the specialisation of legal regulation. “Specialisation,” observed S. S. Alexeev, “is a peculiar legitimate process of the law’s “self-development” (calling for particular attention on behalf of academia) that displays the operation of the whole set of system-gen- erating factors. The core of that process is the “division of labour” which occurs and evolves in law thus causing the separate rules and sets of rules to differentiate increasingly in performing a certain operation so that their substance is refined while legal regulation becomes integrated”.33 That general imperative also underlies the genesis of the institution of complicity.

33 Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law..., pp. 52-53. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 145

Initially, at a very early stage in the development of the criminal law, specific rules are set empirically to account for the higher extent of community danger of some concerted offences. Where many cases become regulated in the same way, the lawmaker brings the common features “out of the brackets,” ie to the general part of the criminal code. A prescription that has emerged in a purely casuistic form thus transforms into a general norm. The provisions on complicity in the general part (Articles 20-22 CC) have ensued from the generalisation of the casuistic prescriptions contained in the special part. The evolution of the institution of complicity, however, does not halt there. The legal framework must enable the court to reflect as accurately as possible the gravity of different concerted acts and impose a fair sentence. The lawmaker therefore creates specific provisions in the special part of the code which provide for heavier penalties if some offences are committed “by two or more (a group of) persons.” These expounding prescriptions are set on the basis of the existing general rules on complicity (Articles 20-22 CC). Overall, the institution of complicity is finally shaped by setting apart two groups of rules that cover concerted criminal behaviour – in the general part and in the special part of the criminal code. The process of specialisation, however, goes on. Changes in the social context may elevate the extent of community danger of some concerted acts or bring about a new variety of concerted criminal conduct. The legislator responds by inserting a matching new specific prescription in the special part of the code. The rules on complicity in the general part of the criminal code get refined as well. Because of specialisation, they regulate ever narrower segments (aspects, elements, peculiarities, etc.) of concerted criminal activities, ie their function narrows down. At the same time new provisions emerge to regulate the vacant “white areas”. Consequently, the formation of the institution of complicity has three logical stages: a) substantial differentiation of the special part 146 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING of the criminal statute where casuistic prescriptions are crafted to cover specific concerted acts; b) integration of the normative text that engenders general rules on complicity (in the general part of the criminal code); c) functional specialisation of the general rules on complicity.34 The distinction between these stages is only conditional. In reality, they dialectically intertwine, permeate, and condition each other as different points of the single process of forming the institution of complicity. 2.2.1.2. The proposed logical explanation of how the institution of complicity emerges is corroborated by the historic development of Bulgarian penal legislation. The first known Bulgarian legislative instrument, the Law for the Judging of the People (9th century A.D.), contained specific provisions on some concerted criminal acts. After the Liberation, the Ottoman Penalties Act (1859), which had been based on the French Code Pénal (1810), was still applied for some time in the new Bulgarian state. That Act did not have any general rules on complicity but its special part contained the germ of abstraction. Art. 45 was reading: “Partakers in a guilt shall be liable as the actual principals of that guilt, unless otherwise provided in the law”. In 1880, the Second National Assembly passed the Statute on Penalties to be Imposed by Justices of the Peace which laid the foundations of modern Bulgarian penal legislation. It was an almost lit- eral translation of a Russian statute of the same title. The Statute on Penalties had a general and a special part. Under the general rule of Art. 13, “where two or more persons were involved in the commission of the offence, those of the guilty persons who perpetrated the offence themselves or incited others thereto shall be punished more severely than their accessories”. That provision mirrored the aspira-

34 On the evolution of penal legislation in general, see Koudriavtsev, V. N. A General Theory of the Classification of Criminal Offences..., p. 247; Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law..., p. 64. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 147 tion of the lawmaker to differentiate the responsibility of different categories of participants in crime. The Military Penal Act (1888) was the first to introduce a fully- fledged system of criminal rules on, inter alia, complicity. Its Articles 10 and 11 had been borrowed from the Russian Military Statute on Penalties (1867) and distinguished between principals and accessories. The Criminal Act (1896) contained relatively sophisticated provisions on complicity. The general norms of its Articles 50-56a had been copied from the German Criminal Act and the Russian draft criminal act (influenced by the classical school of the criminal law considered to be quite avant-garde at the time). The Criminal Act (1951) laid the beginning of contemporary penal legislation in Bulgaria which evolved under the prevalent influence of Russian criminal law. This historic overview provides some insights into the processes of differentiation and integration underlying the development of the institution of complicity. 2.2.2. Background of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. The existence of different categories of rules on complicity is conditioned by objective factors. It derives from the need to reflect adequately the gravity of different types and forms of concerted criminal conduct in the statute and provide for matching differentiated responsibility. Complicity generally intensifies the community danger of an offence. The increase, however, differs from offence to offence and from one form of complicity to another. On the one hand, joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu entail a different growth of the danger posed by an offence. On the other, the growth of community danger in the case of complicity differs depending on the nature of the specific offence. Further to the interplay between the two factors (nature of the criminal act and form of complicity), the separate concerted offences have a specific 148 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING community danger. In order to translate adequately the extent of their danger into criminal provisions, the lawmaker puts in place a broad range of general and specific rules on complicity. The varie- gated picture of concerted criminal deeds in real life must be echoed by a mature system of statutory criminal provisions, viz. the institution of complicity. 2.2.2.1. Complicity normally increases community danger within the limits typical of the basic variant of an offence (described in the basic definition). The lawmaker has taken account of this fact in the Criminal Code by setting out the general rule that “all accomplices shall be liable to the penalty set down for the perpetrated offence” (Art. 21(1) CC). In other words, all accomplices are responsible within the frames of the penalty envisaged for a sole offender. Within these confines, the court considers how complicity has stepped up community danger, while analysing “the nature and extent of participation” of each accomplice in the offence (Art. 21(1) CC). Consequently, complicity is an aggravating circumstance as a matter of principle. With some offences, though (rape, illicit entry into another’s home, theft, etc.), concerted (joint) perpetration increases the community danger of the offence to an extent that it should no longer be subsumed under the basic definition of the elements. The lawmaker is then “compelled” to insert a corresponding definition carrying a heavier penalty. This expounding norm (the qualified definition) reverberates the fact that community danger increases more than usual because of joint perpetration and sets out a severer punishment than the basic rule on the offence (the basic definition of its elements). In other words, the expounding prescriptions of the special part (Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc.) introduce an exception to the general rule of Art. 21(1) CC. For the offences of rape, illicit entry into another’s home, theft, etc., joint perpetration is a qualifying rather than merely an aggravating circumstance. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 149

Hence, the reason to create rules that set forth a heavier penalty if “the offence is perpetrated by two or more persons” is the substantial growth of community danger on account of joint perpetration. It requires a severer legislative response, viz. the introduction of additional definitions carrying heavier penalties. 2.2.2.2. According to R. R. Galiakbarov, a Russian scholar, “the existing approach where the statute reflects the enhanced danger of only some concerted offences has a minimal criminological justification … A promising area in the development of our penal legislation would be the uniform (unified) reflection in the institution of complicity of the enhanced community danger of all group offences against relations protected by the criminal law”.35 He went on to suggest the insertion in the criminal code of a general rule that increases by one third the penalty for any offence where it is committed by a group (“by two or more persons”).36 This proposal cannot be endorsed as long as community danger increases unevenly in the context of different offences. Community danger in the event of joint perpetration increases significantly with some offences and negligibly with others. The reason for this lies in the very nature of criminal acts. The question then is whether any general dependency could be identified between the nature of an act and the modification of community danger. The problem is to pinpoint those factual properties of acts that fuel the substantial increase of community danger in the context of joint perpetration. The analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of the present work. Practice has shown, however, that joint perpetration steps up materially the community danger of encroachments that imply a physical impact on tan-

35 Galiakbarov, R. R. Group Offences: Invariable and Variable Features..., p. 19. 36 Galiakbarov, R. R. It Is Expedient to Reflect in the Law the Intensified Danger of Group Offences. – In: Problems of the Efficiency of the Criminal Statute. − Sverdlovsk, 1975, pp. 46-47 (in Russian). 150 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING gible phenomena – items and people (eg offences against property and offences against the person) – and of some military offences. Accepting the above proposal amounts to estimating in the same way offences that pose a different threat to society. This is at odds with the differentiation of criminal liability as a fundamental principle of crime policy. It is a different matter that comprehensive (sociological, legal, and psychological) surveys need to be conducted to check if the legislation is an adequate image of the reality of crime. It might prove necessary to envisage heavier penalties also for other offences when perpetrated “by two or more persons” (eg acts of terrorism under Articles 96 and 97 CC, murder, bodily harm, concealment of items, speculation, official malfeasance under s. 282 CC, hooliganism, unlawful taking of another’s motor vehicle). 2.2.3. Substance of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. The norms on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” (Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc.) belong to the special part of the Criminal Code. They pertain to the corresponding substantial institutions of rape, illicit entry into another’s home, theft, etc. 2.2.3.1. The question arises: what is the relation between an expounding rule that sets out a heavier penalty for an offence committed “by two or more persons” (qualified definition) and the rule depicting the basic variant of that offence (basic definition). As mentioned earlier, besides all elements of the basic definition an aggravated definition contains other, additional features; the respective expounding norm is lex specialis vis-Ў-vis the rule outlining the basic elements of an offence. In the case at hand the expounding provision specifies how the offence is committed (“by two or more persons”) and covers only a segment of the scope of the general rule, ie regulates only the concerted form of the corresponding offence. 2.2.3.2. It is equally indispensable to illuminate the relation between the specific norms of the special part dealing with concert- Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 151 ed encroachments and the general norms on criminal complicity (Articles 20-22 CC). The rules of Articles 20-22 CC are general and apply to any offence irrespective of its nature. This is why they are located in the general part of the Criminal Code. From a different angle, these rules are specialised as they regulate only a specific feature (the concerted commission) of offences. Hence, they build up the functional institution of complicity. The general provisions on complicity have emerged from the integration of the normative texts in the special part of the code. The general rules (Articles 20-22 CC) cannot serve as an autonomous legal basis for legal relationships but only operate in conjunction with the specific rules in the special part.37 The relation between general and specific rules on complicity is determined by the fact that the former (Articles 20-22 CC) belong to the general part, whereas the latter (Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc.) feature in the special part of the code. The rules of the general part dictate the content of the relevant expounding provisions of the special part. The latter in turn restate the general rules in concreto to match specific contexts. The two categories of rules on complicity share a common function: they regulate the responsibility for the concerted commission of offences. They therefore rest on the same legal principles. The legal union of the two groups is conspicuous regardless of whether we perceive the rules of the general part as a generalisation of the normative texts contained in the special part or, vice versa, view the variant prescriptions of the special part as a sequel to, a specific expression of, the general norms. The provisions of Articles 20-22 CC cover the general aspects: main forms of complicity, categories of accomplices, regime of their

37 See Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law..., pp. 107-109, and the bibliography cited there. 152 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING criminal liability and, above all, the general rule that all accomplices shall be liable to the penalty envisaged for the sole perpetrator (Art. 21(1) CC). The provisions in the special part in turn account for the larger (than usual) growth of the community danger of some jointly perpetrated offences and lay down heavier penalties. They establish an exception to the principle proclaimed in Art. 21(1) CC. The provisions of the general part represent rules on complicity “having crystallised in their pure form” and are independent of the nature of the criminal offence. Conversely, the prescriptions of the special part are intrinsically linked to the respective offences. They reflect not just the concerted manner of committing the offence but also the nature, the peculiarities of the criminal act itself. It follows that the rules on complicity in the general part and those in the special part of the Criminal Code relate as general to particular.38 The general features (numerous offenders, objective union of criminal activities, common criminal intent) are present in all concerted acts. The particular features form a dialectical union of general and specific. Any particular concerted act displays the specific features of the offence in question along with the general features of complicity. The prescriptions of the special part therefore reflect both the general (generic) features of complicity and the par- ticularity of the crime at hand. 2.2.3.3. Do the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” pertain to the institution of complicity? Before addressing this question, we must delineate clearly the “scope” of that institution. In the literature, the “institution of complicity” is normally seen as the set of rules in the general part of the code (Articles 20-22 CC).

38 “The relation between the general and the special part,” noted N. D. Dourmanov, “when defining the offence may be represented as a relation between general and single in the union of substance” (Soviet Criminal Laws. − Moscow, 1967, p. 74, in Russian). N. D. Dourmanov however failed to distinguish between “single” and “particular”. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 153

This understanding is substantiated as follows. The institution of complicity is functional rather than substantial. It covers only those general rules on complicity that are located in a separate section III of Chapter II of the general part of the code. By contrast, the expounding prescriptions of the special part are substantial norms and do not belong to the functional institution of complicity. It is impossible to acquiesce with this. In order to identify the rules belonging to the institution of complicity, we should rather take as a point of departure the function of that institution in the process of penal regulation. The most general, generic function of the institution of complicity is to set down the criminal liability attaching to the concerted commission of offences. (We mean offences that can be committed in principle by a sole perpetrator). Consequently, all norms vested with this function, in one way or another, pertain to the institution of complicity. It is irrelevant whether they are located in the general or special part of the code. The test is the function of the rule in the process of penal regulation. The expounding prescriptions of the special part set out the liability for the concerted (group) commission of specific offences. Each of those prescriptions performs (within its own remit) the same generic function that is attributed to the norms of the general part (Art. 20-22 CC). Hence, the prescriptions of the special part may be regarded as components of the institution of complicity. Another argument that may be invoked to support this view is the genetic link between the two categories of rules. The casuistic prescriptions of the special part form the logical and historic background of the general rules. The sources of the functional institutions of law, as S. S. Alexeev pointed out, are normally the expounding variant prescriptions.39 Hence, the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” may attach to different institutions of the law depending on the

39 Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law..., pp. 142-143. 154 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING criterion applied. Where we take as a criterion the subject-matter of legal regulation, each rule of the special part belongs to the respective functional institution of eg rape, illicit entry into another’s home, theft, etc. If the criterion, however, is the function performed by these rules within the system of the criminal law, they have obviously specialised in regulating only the concerted varieties of the respective offences. Therefore, they also belong to the institution of complicity. The fact that a rule may belong to different institutions of the criminal law is readily understandable. Depending on the criterion used, different structures may be identified within the legal system, different elements (rules or groups of rules) come to the foreground. The institution of complicity consists of two main groups of rules – of the general and the special part of the criminal code. The institutions of law generally embrace different types of rules. In order to cover the whole range of concerted criminal acts, the institution of complicity must contain different categories of norms, combine general and specific rules. 2.2.4. Functions of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons.” The nature of legal rules transpires in their functions. Overall, the institution of complicity has a generic function in the system of the criminal law (it regulates concerted criminal behaviour). Inside that institution, a certain division of labour occurs as well and each rule (group of rules) specialises in fulfilling a particular, narrower function.40 Each rule then regulates just one facet, element, peculiarity, variety, etc. of complicity. The complex phenomenon of “criminal complicity” is covered by the aggregate (combination) of all rules organised in the institution of complicity.41

40 See Galiakbarov, R. R. Group Offences: Invariable and Variable Features..., p. 25. 41 On the link between the functions and the structure of the legal system see Alexeev, S. S. The Structure of Soviet Law..., pp. 50-51. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 155

Further to that specialisation, particular elements (rules, groups of rules) are set apart inside the institution, ie a specific structure is shaped. It enshrines the functions performed by the different elements (rules) of the institution of complicity. The functions and the mechanism of operation of the rules are intimately connected with their rationale. 2.2.4.1. The functions of the rules on “offences committed by two or more persons” become visible when compared to the functions of the remaining rules within the institution of complicity. a. Depending on the level of abstraction, hence, on their scope, the rules on complicity in the general part divide into two categories: rules applicable to all concerted criminal acts and rules that regulate exclusively complicity stricto sensu (incitement and aiding). The first category of general rules (Art. 20(1); Art. 20(2); Art. 21(1); Art. 21(4) CC, etc.) have the highest level of abstraction and normally regulate all forms of complicity. Among these rules, a certain “division of labour” exists as well. Thus, Article 20(1) CC proclaims the principle that complicity is only possible in the context of intentional offences and goes on to define the categories of accomplices; Article 21(1) CC lays down the general rule on the limits to the criminal liability of accomplices, etc. The second group of rules in the general part (Art. 20(2); Art. 20(4); Art. 21(2); Art. 21(3); Art. 22 CC) are less abstract and therefore narrower in scope. They cover only complicity stricto sensu. The legislator has used these norms to define as criminal the conduct of inciters and aiders although it fails to match the elements of any particular offence. The legal basis of criminal liability thus extends to factors beyond the definition of a particular crime and the rules in question actually have a constituent function in the institution of complicity. b. The rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” mirror the substantial increase in the community danger of some 156 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING offences as a result of joint perpetration and provide for heavier penalties. Therefore, their function is to differentiate criminal liability. The lawmaker uses the expounding, variant prescriptions of the special part to differentiate the responsibility for the concerted perpetration of the respective offences. The specialisation of criminal provisions thus finally entails differentiated criminal liability. 2.2.4.2. The nature of the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” also defines their mechanism of operation. These are norms of the special part of the Criminal Code, so they apply directly to the fact of the concerted act. At the same time, these prescriptions specify the general rules and adjust them to specific contexts. Therefore, whenever a provision of the special part is applied, the general, primary rules of Articles 20-22 CC must be taken into account as well.42 The latter serve as a guideline on the interpretation and enforcement of the specific rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. Albeit the general rules are not explicitly cited when group encroachments are classified under the code, they affect materially the application of the relevant provisions in the special part of the Criminal Code. 2.3. Relation between the rules on “offences perpetrated by two or more persons” and the rules on other forms of concerted criminal activity. 2.3.1. Characteristics of the special forms of concerted criminal activity. The special part of the Criminal Code of Bulgaria covers different forms of concerted criminal activity which are usually referred to as “special”. The whole array of special forms of concerted criminal activity may be reduced to four categories: a)

42 “Unless we consider the general provisions on complicity,” wrote R. R. Galiakbarov, “the application of the rules of the special part to the fact of an offence committed by several individuals in concert could substantially twist the meaning of those rules” (Group Offences: Invariable and Variable Features..., p. 22). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 157 offences perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons; b) offences committed by a crowd; c) setting up or membership of a group (organisation) that aims at committing offences, ie associating for criminal purposes; d) compulsory complicity in a criminal offence. The concept of “concerted criminal activity” is the broadest one and covers all acts done by several individuals. It includes both the main forms of complicity (joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu) and the forms of concerted criminal activity envisaged in the special part of the Criminal Code (offences perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons; offences committed by a crowd; associating for criminal purposes; compulsory complicity). We shall cite the opinion of I. Nenov in support of this interpretation: “Criminal complicity is covered by a special section of Chapter II of the general part of the Criminal Code (Articles 20-22) complemented by the rule of Art. 58(b) of the code. Here, however, the statute only refers to the most typical main forms of complicity (“perpetration”, “incitement”, “aiding”) that may be defined for any offence, while failing to exhaust the possible forms of concerted criminal activity or make any reference to organised crime. None the less, sui generis scenarios of organised crime are depicted in the Criminal Code – but in its Special Part – in the context of particular offences where these com- plexities are typical and need to be addressed”.43 The question is: what is the relation between an “offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” and the other forms of concerted criminal activity? In order to clarify this, we should first characterise the other, special forms of concerted criminal activity envisaged in the Criminal Code.

43 Nenov, I. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. General Part..., pp. 391-392. See also Solnar, V. Complicity under the Criminal law of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. − Moscow, 1960, p. 44 (in Russian). 158 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

2.3.1.1. Offences committed by a crowd. The Criminal Code of Bulgaria prescribes heavier penalties for some offences if they are committed “by a crowd”. Under Art. 269(1) and (2) CC, the use of coercion against an authority or a community representative carries up to three years’ imprisonment or correctional labour. If the same offence is committed by “participants in a crowd”, the inciters and the leaders of the crowd are liable to a heavier penalty, viz. imprisonment of one to eight years (Art. 269(3) CC). Article 162(2) CC reads that the use of violence against citizens on account of their nationality or race shall be punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and community reprimand. If that assault is carried out by a crowd and results in grievous bodily harm or death, the inciters and the leaders of the crowd are liable to imprisonment of three to fifteen years, while the other participants in the crowd face up to five years’ imprisonment unless liable to a heavier penalty (Art. 163(3) CC).44 The same form of concerted criminal activity may cover (with some provisos) an attempted coup d’État, rebellion or armed uprising under Art. 95 CC, as well as living in a vagrant group (Art. 328 CC). “The crowd,” wrote I. Nenov, “is a) a multitude of individuals, b) brought together in a public place so that an unlimited number of other individuals can join, c) united by a certain purpose which d) determines their immediate concerted activity”.45 The activity of a crowd depends on the purpose it pursues. If the crowd acts “with the aim to overthrow, undermine or weaken state authority”, that would be an armed uprising under Art. 95 CC.46 Where the activity of a

44 There exist two qualifiers in Art. 163(3) CC: the attack is carried out by a crowd, and the attack has caused grievous bodily harm or death. 45 Nenov, I. Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 2. − Sofia, 1959, pp. 15-16 (in Bulgarian). 46 According to I. Nenov, the concept of “mutiny” in Art. 70 of the ex Criminal Code (repealed) is identical with “armed uprising” (Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 1..., pp. 59-60). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 159 crowd is inspired by national or racial hostility, that would be an offence against the national or racial equality of the citizens (Art. 163 CC). Finally, where the crowd influences an authority or a community representative to impel them to do or fail to do anything related to their duties, that would be an offence against the governance (Art. 269 CC). A “crowd” must be clearly distinguished from two other concepts used in the Criminal Code – “organisation” and “group”. “We refer to an organisation or group where two or more persons have agreed to set up an organised entity whose members are defined exactly or approximately and have agreed specifically on its aim, methods and instrumentalities, and possibly on its organisational structure”.47 By contrast, the crowd is a multitude of people who generally come together spontaneously, with no prior arrangements. Anyone may freely join a crowd and its activity is always overt. Two categories of participants may be identified within a crowd: active and passive ones. The active participants cause the criminal result directly (as perpetrators) or indirectly (as inciters or aiders) – thus, they are the ones to apply coercion against an authority (Art. 269(3) CC) or inflict the bodily harm under Art. 163(3) CC. In other words, both forms of complicity (joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu) may be present within a crowd. However, the characteristics of an “offence committed by a crowd” are not confined to the features of complicity. The deeds of the active participants necessarily imply the presence of other people as passive members of the crowd. The multitude of people is the indispensable background against which the conduct of the active members deploys. The definitions of Articles 163(2), 269(3), 95, and 328 CC may be matched only by the concerted efforts of many individuals.

47 Liutov, K. Offences against the Rights of Citizens, Matrimony, Family, and Youth. Document-related Offences. – Sofia, 1976, p. 9 (in Bulgarian). 160 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

In this, “an offence committed by a crowd” resembles compulsory criminal complicity. The lawmaker has differentiated the criminal liability of the various categories of participants in a crowd. In some cases heavier penalties are applicable to inciters and leaders alone (Art. 269(3) CC), while elsewhere all members of a crowd face heavier responsibility. Thus, the severer penalty under Art. 163(3) CC is imposed on all participants in a crowd. It is not necessary that the guilty individual has inflicted himself bodily harm or death: suffice it for him to have simply participated in a crowd some members of which have caused that criminal result. 2.3.1.2. Setting up or membership of a group or organisation that aims at committing offences. Another special form of concerted criminal activity is the setting up or membership of a group (organisation) that aims at committing criminal offences, ie associating for criminal purposes, known as “plot” in the past. “Despite the change of terminology,” noted I. Nenov, “the concepts “plot” in Art. 93 (of the repealed ex Criminal Code – emphasis added, N. F.) and “organisation” (“group”) in Art. 70 (of the repealed ex Criminal Code – emphasis added, N. F.) must be construed as identical as regards the form of concerted activity carried out by the accomplices”.48 The Criminal Code of Bulgaria regards the following as autonomous finalised offences: setting up, management or membership of an organisation or group that aims at committing offences against the Republic (Art. 109 before the amendment in the State Gazette, issue 92 of 2002); setting up, management or membership of an organisation or group that aims at committing an offence against national or racial equality (Art. 162(3) and (4) CC); setting up a political organisation based on a religious premise (Art. 166 CC, first sentence); associating with the aim to produce or distribute forged currency or other notes (Art. 246(1) CC, second sentence);

48 Nenov, I. Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 1..., p. 64. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 161 conspiracy by prisoners to escape by concerted efforts (Art. 298(1) CC); setting up, management of or involvement in a group composed with the aim to commit offences within or without the country (Art. 321 CC before the amendment in the State Gazette, issue 92 of 2002); setting up an organisation or group that prepares to commit abroad an offence under Art. 242(2) and (3) CC or specific offences dangerous to the public at large (Art. 356b(2) CC), etc. The same form of concerted criminal activity covers participation in a crowd gathered to attack groups of the population or individual citizens or their possessions because of their nationality or race (Art. 163(1) CC). A “group” is an association of two or more individuals competent to stand trial and brought together by the same criminal purpose. An “organisation” is in turn a structured and sustainable (normally larger) group. An organisation is characterised by a certain structure and leadership that channels the concerted effort.49 In the above examples the very fact of associating with the aim to commit a crime (before any other step has been undertaken) is criminalised as an offence in its own right. Here, the legislator regards an activity that is essentially preparatory as a completed crime.50

49 On the organisation and the group under Art. 109, CC prior to the 2002 amendment see Interpretative Decision 23-1977-OSNK (Reports, p. 59). 50 Of all different groups pursuing criminal purposes, the one under Art. 109 CC was most interesting in practice. It was debatable in the case law how the conduct of a person should be classified if he participated in a group under Art. 109 CC and then indeed committed the contemplated offence against the Republic. According to Judgment 120-1974-1 (Reports, pp. 43-44), “if the organisation or group proceeds, after being set up, to the direct commission of acts matching the elements of some offences against the People's Republic, the participants in the offence shall be liable for their offence in accordance with Articles 95-108, not Art. 109 CC”. That view was later abandoned, and rightly so. Based on a proper understanding of the relation between setting up a group under Art. 109 CC and the preparation to commit an offence against the 162 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

In 2002 an attempt was made to bring the Bulgarian Criminal Code into line with the international instruments against organised crime. A new provision – Art. 93, point 20 CC – was inserted providing that “an organised criminal group means a structured lasting association of three or more persons having the aim to commit in concert, in the country or abroad, criminal offences punishable by more than three years’ imprisonment and pursuing a material benefit. An association is structured even without the existence of any formal distribution of roles among the participants, any continuity of membership or a developed structure” (State Gazette, issue 92 of 2002). Likewise, the concept of “group” in Articles 109 and 321 of the Criminal Code was replaced with the new notion of “organised criminal group”. This legislative amendment is extremely counterproductive. It has confined the scope of Articles 109 and 321 CC to “organised groups” consisting of at least three persons and to premeditated offences punishable by more than three years’ imprisonment and pursuing a material benefit. These changes, brought in incompetent- ly, have produced effects contrary to those desired – they have actually curtailed the efficacy of the rules of the code against organised crime. 2.3.1.3. Compulsory criminal complicity. Compulsory complicity is another form of concerted criminal activity covered in the special part of the Criminal Code. Some offences may only be committed by the combined efforts of two or more individuals competent to

Republic of Bulgaria under Art. 110 CC (subsequently amended), the Supreme Court issued Interpretative Decision 23-1977-OSNK (Reports, pp. 59-60) and ruled that where a participant in a group under Art. 109 CC also commits another offence against the People's Republic under Articles 95-108 CC, he should be liable for the both these offences. On this issue see also Mihaylov, D. Classification of Cumulative Offences. − In: Lectures for Post-graduate Training of Lawyers. Vol. 14. − Sofia, 1977, p. 106 (in Bulgarian). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 163 stand trial. Compulsory complicity may take place in extremely varied contexts. Its classical forms are considered to be sexual intercourse between relatives (“incest”, Art. 154 CC); homosexual acts done in order to obtain a benefit (Art. 157(5) CC) and some other offences.51 Compulsory complicity, however, may also cover rebellion and armed uprising (Art. 95 CC) or living in a vagrant group (Art. 328 CC). Broadly speaking, any association pursuing a criminal purpose is a form of compulsory complicity (see Art. 109 CC; Art. 162(3) and (4) CC; Art. 166 CC, first sentence, etc.). In the event of genuine (possible) complicity there always exists a theoretical potential for a sole individual to commit the offence. This is even the normal, typical scenario. With compulsory complicity, however, the very construction of the elements of crime requires that several persons be involved in crime commission. While compulsory complicity is a peculiarity of the definition of the offence, genuine (possible) complicity is a factual peculiarity of crime commission. Some authors find that “doing the criminal act in concert (in the event of compulsory complicity – emphasis added, N. F.) is either an element of the basic definition or a circumstance increasing the level of community danger so that the basic definition transforms into a qualified one”.52 In their view the latter form of compulsory complicity covers the commission of an offence “by two or more persons”.

51 H. Simeonov wrongly asserted that Art. 180 CC (subsequently repealed) covered an offence committed in the context of compulsory complicity (Complicity under the Criminal Code of Bulgaria. − Dissertatsia, p. 209, in Bulgarian). In fact these were two different offences. While Art. 180(1) CC was providing for a two-act offence (abandoning one's family and engag- ing in cohabitation with a third party), the offence under Art. 180(3) CC con- sisted in a single act (cohabitation with a person having left his family).Two different offences, not a single offence in compulsory complicity, also feature in Art. 179(1) and (2) CC. 52 Ibid, pp. 210-211. 164 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The stance that compulsory complicity may serve as a qualifying circumstance is fundamentally erroneous. In order to cover the respective qualified definition of theft (for instance under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC), commission must involve two or more persons indeed. However, this is not yet compulsory complicity. The latter would exist only if the basic variant of the offence (depicted in the basic definition of constituent elements) can never be perpetrated by a single individual. Quite the contrary, a theft is normally perpetrated by a sole person. Its commission in concert (joint perpetration) merely increases the community danger of the offence to an extent which has prompted the lawmaker to create a definition carrying a heavier penalty – Article 195(1), point 5 CC. In the event of compulsory complicity the conduct of all participants is punishable. No “compulsory complicity” therefore exists when the commission of an offence requires inputs from a number of persons but the conduct of some of them is not punishable. Thus, in cases of pimping (Art. 155(1) CC, second sentence) the conduct of the women targeted by the pimp is not punishable; where premises are provided to different persons for purpose of debauchery (Art. 155(2) CC), the conduct of the individuals having used the premises is not punishable; nor is the buyer of pornographic material punished for pornography (Art. 159 CC). Naturally, “compulsory complicity” is not at stake either if two individuals are necessary to commit the offence but one of them is the perpetrator while the other is a victim (eg murder, criminal abortion, bodily harm, gross indecency, rape, etc.) 2.3.2. Relation between “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” and the other forms of concerted criminal activity. The basic assumption here is that an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” is a form of genuine complicity (joint perpetration or a combination of joint perpetration and incitement or joint perpetration and aiding). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 165

2.3.2.1. All special forms of concerted criminal activity have, to one extent or another, the general, generic features of complicity (many offenders; objective union of criminal activity; common criminal intent). In addition to these generic features, each form of concerted criminal activity envisaged in the special part of the Criminal Code has its peculiarities. Any form of concerted activity is therefore characterised by the generic features of complicity and the specific features of the criminal conduct in question. The specific features may affect the concerted criminal conduct in two ways. In the first case, they are “layered” over the generic features of complicity and produce a form of concerted activity that remains essentially genuine complicity (“offence perpetrated by two or more persons”). The characteristic of that form is dominated by the generic features of complicity. Any changes here occur within the same qualitative definiteness: complicity in an offence. In other situations the “particular” features prevail over the general ones and determine the sum and substance of the concerted criminal act. Here the “specific” features53 are decisive. They affect the nature of the conduct so strongly that the respective forms of concerted activity are perceptibly remote from genuine criminal complicity. These are the forms of “participation in a crowd”, associating for criminal purposes, and compulsory complicity. Each of them has the features of complicity but displays in parallel its “specific” features that transform the concerted act into a specific offence in its own right. Consequently, the special forms of concerted criminal activity fall into two categories depending on their relation to complicity. The first category comprises “offences perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons”. The second category of concerted acts

53 These features are not special in the strict sense of the term: they affect the substance of the concerted criminal conduct so powerfully that they transform it from complicity into something of a completely different nature. 166 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

(“offences committed by a crowd”, associating for criminal purposes, and compulsory complicity) have such compelling peculiarities that they form something different in quality from complicity under Articles 20-22 CC.54 The common feature of that class of concerted offences is that they may only be committed by the cooperative efforts of several individuals, so they are forms of compulsory complicity. Hence, an “offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” is a form of genuine (possible) complicity while the other special forms of concerted criminal activity are varieties of compulsory complicity (in the broader sense of the term). 2.3.2.2. What are the reasons to insert provisions on concerted criminal activity in the special part of the Criminal Code and what are their functions in the process of penal regulation? These two questions intertwine and mirror different facets of the esse of legal norms. On the one hand, these provisions reflect well-defined, factually existing variants of concerted conduct that is dangerous to society. On the other hand, they are not a perfunctory snapshot of reality. The lawmaker has not only and simply reflected the dangerous conduct in these norms but has tasked them with specific social functions. He has built up the provisions on concerted criminal activity so as to attain the social effects pursued while taking into account the existing possibilities to suppress that destructive conduct. Hence, the system of rules on concerted criminal activities set out in the special part of the Criminal Code depends on two factors: a) the subject-matter of legal regulation, ie the actually existing forms of concerted conduct prejudicial to the community, and b) the functions of the different rules. The interaction between these two factors triggers a “division of labour” between the rules and they

54 Cf. Solnar, V. op. cit., pp. 64-65. The opposite view was taken by Schneider, M. A. Complicity in Criminal Offences. − Moscow, 1962, pp. 27- 28 (in Russian). See also Soviet Criminal Law. General Part. − Moscow, 1981, pp. 259-261 (in Russian). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 167 specialise in performing different functions in the process of regulating concerted criminal activity. Therefore, the reasons to create the rules on concerted criminal activity may not be analysed in isolation from the functions these rules are called upon to perform within the system of penal regulation. The fundamental, uttermost reason to create rules on concerted criminal activity is the community danger of the acts that these rules proscribe. All forms of concerted criminal behaviour fall into two groups depending on their relation to the community danger of the conduct concerned. a. Where concerted commission reinforces the community danger of an offence so that the latter may no longer be subsumed under its basic definition, the lawmaker puts in place a corresponding definition carrying a heavier penalty. This is the reason to create the expounding provisions on “offences committed by two or more (a group of) individuals” and “offences committed by a crowd”. They serve to differentiate the criminal liability within the confines of the penalty prescribed for a given offence. b. The setting up, membership and management of a group (organisation) with the aim to commit criminal offences is so dangerous in itself that the lawmaker has defined that conduct as a separate offence (Art. 321 CC). Besides the general description in Art. 321 CC, the code covers several specific instances of criminal asso- ciations depending on the object they target (Art. 109 CC; Art. 162(3) and (4) CC; Art. 246(1) CC, second sentence, etc.). Associating with the aim to commit offences is a peculiar form of preparation. However, because of its elevated community danger the statute regards it as a completed offence. Consequently, the function of the relevant rules of the Criminal Code is to criminalise certain concerted activities. An offence committed in compulsory complicity is only possible if it involves a number of offenders, it combines the steps 168 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING undertaken by several individuals. This act is very complex in factual terms and poses a peculiar threat to society. That threat may be adequately addressed by the law only if the whole act is criminalised rather than its segments (the act of each offender). This is the reason to create the rules on offences committed by compulsory accomplices. The function of those rules is to criminalise conduct. Consequently, the rules of the special part on “offences perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” and “offences committed by a crowd” serve the differentiation of criminal liability, whereas the rules on crime syndicates and compulsory complicity have as their function the criminalisation of the respective concerted acts. 2.3.2.3. Finally, it is appropriate to highlight the prospects for the development of penal legislation as regards concerted criminal activity. “Associating for criminal purposes” and “offences committed by a crowd” are rare in practice. Therefore, the rules that set down the liability for them would hardly change substantially in future. These rules are important primarily in the context of deterrence. The situation is slightly different with the rules that penalise more heavily the offences committed “by two or more (a group of) persons”. This qualifying circumstance features in the definitions of a number of offences that are very dangerous to society and quite widespread (rape, theft, robbery, embezzlement, fraud, etc.). A reasonable question here is how the evolving social context would affect the substance of the relevant rules. It is well known that the object of criminal encroachment determines the manner in which that encroachment occurs, thus impacting on the substance of the criminal provisions designed to protect the object. Let us focus on Article 202(1), point 2 CC, viz. embezzlement committed by two or more officials. This provision was created in Bulgaria after 1944 to protect the then infant relations of collective ownership against concerted criminal offences. The organisational forms of managing collective possessions influence the Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 169 manner of embezzlement. The storage, circulation, and reporting on assets and cash are entrusted to many officials and other persons. Because of the division of labour, all those individuals engage in relations of official and production interdependence. It is utterly difficult for a sole individual to embezzle property. Officials therefore combine to embezzle in concert. They normally rely on existing organisational links and channels but employ them to criminal ends. Economic and criminal operations thus intertwine and the criminal group grows like a poisonous mushroom over the production structure of the business; that groups is characterised by a high level of organisation (structure and leadership), distribution of roles among the accomplices, sustainability (continued criminal activity), etc. Criminological research has shown that at times the very context in which collective possessions are managed “is conducive to” concerted embezzlement, to the formation of large, long-lasting, organised groups of embezzlers.55 Such crime syndicates are essentially different from the simple conspiracy of two or more persons to embezzle. Therefore, the old legal formula of an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” can no longer respond to the new public needs. It fails to mirror adequately the social threat posed by the novel social phenomena, viz. the organised groups of criminals. This entails a mismatch between the reality of crime and the legal framework (the institution of complicity). The modern forms of concerted criminal encroachment fail to fit into the classical frames of complicity. Hence, the thrust of the efforts must be on studying recent social phenomena (organised criminal groups) and shaping corresponding statutory models in the Criminal Code.

55 On the mechanism of setting up organised criminal groups, see Rinkiavichus, Y. I. Preventing Group Encroachment on Socialist Property. − Vilnius, 1976 (in Russian); Chernova, K. T. Organised Groups of Offenders against Socialist Property. − Dissertatsia. − Moscow, 1974 (in Russian); Weda, K. Crime and Criminology in Japan Today. − Moscow, 1989, pp. 123-129 (in Russian). 170 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

2.4. Classification of offences committed in complicity 2.4.1. Perpetration and joint perpetration. A number of debatable issues emerge in the case law when enforcing the rules of the Criminal Code on complicity, in particular in classifying concerted offences. The legal classification of criminal acts is important both from a legal and social viewpoint. It guarantees the lawfulness of criminal justice as it ensures the equality of citizens before the law, fair punishment, etc. We shall address below some of the difficulties encountered in the case law in applying the rules on complicity. The distinction between perpetration on the one hand and aiding on the other is a major problem. The prevailing view in earlier case law was that an offender present on the crime scene further to a preliminary distribution of roles was a joint perpetrator (not an aider). Thus, it was accepted that anyone who, by virtue of prior conspiracy: a) stood as a guard in front of the house while someone else is stealing inside (98-1970-II, Reports, 106-107);56 b) detracted the attention of guards thus enabling another to enter the factory and steal the goods produced; c) decoyed a herd into the forest in order to facilitate someone else to steal the sheep, was a joint perpetrator of the offence of theft. This view must be rejected. Accepting it means to agree with the subjective theory that a perpetrator (joint perpetrator) might not participate in the actus reus. The Bulgarian lawmaker, however, has embraced the objective theory of perpetration. Under Art. 20(2) CC, “perpetrator is the one who participates in the very commission of the offence”. An aider only assists in the commission of the offence

56 The judgments of the Supreme Court (SC) are referred to by indicat- ing the number of judgment, the year of issue and the issuing body (division, General Assembly of Criminal Colleges (OSNK), Plenary Meeting of the SC). The reports of judgments delivered by the criminal colleges of the SC during a given year are referred to in brief as Reports. The Arabic numerals at the end identify the page in the Reports where the quoted paragraph of the judgment is found. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 171 without being involved in the actus reus. In other words, the criterion to distinguish between perpetration and aiding is objective and defined by statute. This is the “commission” of the offence. A joint perpetrator is the person who, jointly with another, does the act in whole or in part, ie covers at least partially the elements of the offence in question. By virtue of Interpretative Decision 54-1989-OSNK (Reports, pp. 40-45), that impermissible case law of the courts was brought to an end. The Supreme Court clearly took the stance that no factor (prior conspiracy or distribution of roles, or presence on the crime scene) can transform an offender into a joint perpetrator if he has not participated in the actus reus. The preliminary organisation of the criminal group and the distribution of roles do not make the accomplices joint perpetrators. As correctly stated in Judgment 121-1971- II, “whether the individual has been more or less active in his aiding is a fact that cannot alter his status as an aider if it is established that all he did intentionally was, in terms of actus reus and mens rea, to facilitate the perpetration of the offence and he was not involved in the actus reus” (Reports, p. 29). Common criminal intent does not transform the accomplices into joint perpetrators either as it is inherent in any form of complicity, not in joint perpetration alone. From this general standpoint the Supreme Court gave a clear answer to the above question in its Interpretative Decision 54-1989- OSNK (Reports, p. 43). Whenever accomplices in theft distribute their roles in advance so that one of them removes the item while the other only acts as a guard, the former is a perpetrator while the latter is an aider. The conduct of the “guard” should be defined as aiding as he is not objectively involved in the actus reus of theft. 2.4.1.1. The formal objective criterion (“commission of the offence”) sometimes blurs the distinction between perpetration and aiding. The more abstract the description of the actus reus in the def- 172 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING inition of an offence (by judgmental, blanket features or by reference to the harmful consequences of the act), the more difficult for the courts and law enforcement to delineate the divide between perpetration and aiding. The problem becomes dire if the statutory definition of the offence gives no indication as to the method of committing the criminal act, ie the form of the act. Thus, the actus reus of all thefts is described by using the same word – “taking”. That act, however, has different forms depending on the nature of the specific object and subject-matter of encroachment, the spatial and temporal specifics, the instrumentality used to commit the crime, etc. The specific commission of different thefts differs and comprises different combinations of movements. Therefore, the question of whether an act (omission) forms part of commission should be answered on a case- by-case basis. When it is difficult to distinguish joint perpetration from aiding in the context of a specific offence, the material test should be used as well. It should be clarified if the act in question was directly targeted on the object, if it created any specific danger to the underlying social relation. While an aider only facilitates commission, a perpetrator (joint perpetrator) impacts on the subject-matter of the offence by causing directly the result that is prejudicial to society. The material test helps to discern the actual social implications of the act. It should therefore be used when we have to verify the distinction between aiding and perpetration drawn according to the formal criterion. It has been accurately established in the case law that a rape starts with the abduction of the victim,57 a burglary starts with forcing the door (or window) open or resting the step-ladder against the

57 See Nenov, I. Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 1. – Sofia, 1956, pp. 451-452 (in Bulgarian), and the case law cited there. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 173 window or entering the courtyard (premises), etc. As stated in Interpretative Decision 36-1961-OSNK, “when the thief targets his activity at premises or places such as warehouses, shops, residential or other premises, iron safe boxes, pockets, etc. which normally contain chattels that may be the subject-matter of theft, an attempt exists if he has begun to commit the offence, that is, if he for example entered the premises or broke down the iron safe box or slipped his hand into the pocket, although in the case at hand no chattels of the sort were found there and the theft could not be completed for that reason”.58 A person who commits the above acts or participates somehow in their commission is fairly regarded as a joint perpetrator. 2.4.1.2. The conduct of a person who is present on the crime scene when the offence is committed may have quite different legal effects. This issue pertains to the area of criminal omission. It is well known that there exist two types of criminal omission. In the first scenario, criminal omission has a causative effect. It is a sine qua non for the occurrence of the criminal result (eg murder through the omission of the mother who is under an obligation to nourish her newborn child; or through the omission of a switchman obliged to change the track of a train). These are known as result crimes committed by omission. The second scenario is one of “pure” omission – the offender fails to do a specific act prescribed by a rule of the criminal law. He is liable not because he contributed to the occurrence of the criminal result but as he failed to prevent another person from causing that result (eg failure to render assistance under Art. 139 CC, or conniving in the commission of a criminal offence under Art.

58 Regulations and Interpretative Decisions of the Supreme Court of Bulgaria in Criminal Cases, 1953-1979. − Sofia, 1982, p. 136 (in Bulgarian). Later, in Regulation 6-1971-Pl.VS the Supreme Court reconfirmed its view on the starting point of the commission of theft, see its section II, paragraph 4 (Reports, p. 9). 174 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

285 CC). Such offences by omission are always conduct crimes (unrelated to a specific result). Where the “presence” of the offender only serves to encourage the perpetrators of the offence, he is an intellectual aider. However, if with his “presence” the offender exerts on the victim mental pressure that forms part of the actus reus (robbery, rape), he is a joint perpetrator (of course subject to the existence of common criminal intent). In any other situation the omission of a person present on the crime scene qualifies as conniving in the commission of an offence and is not punishable in general (unless otherwise provided by law, see eg Articles 322, 285, etc. CC). Various chambers of the Supreme Court have repeatedly observed that “the very knowledge that a crime is being committed does not make the person an accomplice in an the intentional offence (embezzlement in the case at hand)”: Judgment 220-1990-I, Reports, p. 17. The situation is different where that person is involved in the spending of embezzled money knowing or assuming its criminal acquisition by a third party. That would be concealment of items under Art. 215 CC. Judgment 182-1989-III (Reports, p. 56) also stated correctly that a spouse who knew, when crossing the border, that the other spouse was perpetrating a foreign exchange offence under Art. 250 CC (provision repealed) should not be held liable for his own failure to act. 2.4.2. Incitement. In its case law the Supreme Court has invariably adhered to the accurate view that incitement exists where the individual in question has motivated, through his own acts, another party to commit the offence. An inciter is the initiator of the offence. The mental pressure which an inciter exerts on the perpetrator is a decisive condition for the commission of the offence (Interpretative Decision 39-1988-OSNK, Reports, p. 117). There would be no incitement where the mental influence is exert- ed on a person already resolved to commit the offence. As reiterated by Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 175 the Supreme Court, “the defendant cannot be an inciter where the perpetrator made himself the decision to commit the offence” (Judgement 220-1990-I, Reports, p. 17). We thus stumble on the absorbing issue about the difference between a) incitement, and b) intellectual aiding. Both these phenomena imply the exertion of mental pressure on the perpetrator. An inciter, however, shapes the intent of the perpetrator, whereas in the case of intellectual aider the criminal intent already exists on the perpetrator’s mind. An intellectual aider only fosters, reinforces the perpetrator’s resoluteness to commit the offence. 2.4.3. Aiding. Aiding means the intentional facilitation of another person to commit an intentional offence (Judgment 39-1988- OSNK, Reports, p. 117). The conduct of an aider therefore has a causal link to the criminal result. That link, however, is indirect, it materialises through the agency of the perpetrator’s actus reus. It may be inferred from the objective characteristic of aiding that “the activity of an aider must precede or parallel the actus reus of the principal. This is so,” stated Judgment 101-1977-I (Reports, p. 31), “because the aider’s activity must facilitate the commission of the offence by the perpetrator by use of the means listed in Art. 20(4) of the Criminal Code … Likewise, an aider must act intentionally and his intent must be to facilitate the offence.” Aiding can exist in two forms: physical or intellectual. The most widespread forms of aiding are covered by the legislation. While physical aiding consists in creating objective conditions for the commission of the offence that are extraneous to the perpetrator, intellectual aiding boils down to influencing the perpetrator’s state of mind. As noted in Judgment 220-1990-I (Reports, p. 17), “intellectual aiding may take the form of counselling, a promise to harbour or compound or any other form of mental impact on a perpetrator who has already decided to commit the crime.” In their case law the courts and law enforcement occasionally fail to distinguish between intellectual aiding in the form of a 176 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING promise to provide assistance after the fact, on the one hand, and the concealment or receipt of items obtained through that offence. Deeds that represent intellectual aiding are often classified as concealment of items.59 Concealment (in addition to the failure to report on or conniving in the occurrence of an offence) is a form of complicity after the fact. It is a secondary criminal activity by an individual who has not participated in the preliminary offence and consists in concealing, receiving or realising the subject-matter of the offence. “Concealment of items,” stipulated Judgment 780-1991-I (Reports, p. 346), “is a different crime, an offence other than theft, embezzlement, appropriation. The offender here is different from the perpetrator of the preliminary offence.” On the contrary, a promise to provide assistance after the offence has been committed (inter alia by realising its subject-matter) is a form of intellectual aiding. The question is, how to classify the conduct of a person who conceals the subject-matter of an offence – as concealment of items under Art. 215 CC or intellectual assistance in the respective preliminary offence? The Supreme Court has provided a general answer to that question in Judgment 51-1977-OSNK (Reports, pp. 30-31). “In order to distinguish between a) intellectual aiding in the form of promising assistance after the fact, and b) concealment in the form of realising the subject-matter of the offence, the time when the promise was given is of the essence. He who commits the offence of concealment is not directly involved in the embezzlement of public possessions and only steps in after the latter has been completed in order to hide away the subject-matter of that offence. However, when the offender has promised assistance in the realisation of the subject- matter before the commission of embezzlement, he is guilty of aid-

59 On concealment see Panayotov, P. Concealment and Harbouring under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Bulgaria. − Sofia, 1997 (in Bulgarian). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 177 ing within the meaning of Art. 20(4) CC, as his conduct has encour- aged the perpetrator to translate into reality his decision to offend.” A number of other judgments of the Supreme Court reconfirmed this stand, viz.: 54-1972-I (Reports, pp. 25-26); 322-1975-I (Reports, pp. 29-30); 37-1977-I (Reports, p. 31; 585-1980-I), (Reports, pp. 31- 32); 482-1983-I (Reports, p. 74); 26-1991-III (Reports, p. 15); 780- 1991-I (Reports, pp. 45-46). I. Nenov accepts that if an offender has promised assistance beforehand and conceals, once the offence has been committed by someone else, the items as promised, he commits the cumulative offence of intellectual aiding of (or incitement to) coupled with concealment.60 This view cannot be upheld. An intellectual aider is a kind of accomplice, a “co-author” of the offence. And an accomplice (whether a perpetrator, inciter or aider) is not liable for concealing his own offence. Participation in an offence, in any form whatsoever, excludes complicity after the fact of that offence. It is therefore impossible to have a combination of complicity in and complicity after the same offence. Complicity after the fact is subsumed under complicity in the offence. In this case, the intellectual assistance in an offence assimilates all subsequent factual steps aimed to conceal the subject-matter of that offence. 2.4.4. The subsidiary nature of liability for incitement and aiding. Under the fundamental principle of Art. 35(2) CC, only an act that the statute has declared an offence may trigger criminal liability. In other words, the sole ground for criminal liability is the act that covers the elements of a specific offence defined in the law. The conduct of an inciter or aider fails to cover the elements of any particular crime. They only assist the perpetrator in the commission of the offence. None the less, inciters and aiders “shall be liable to the penalty set down for the perpetrated offence” (Art. 21(1) CC). Two

60 Nenov, I. Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 1..., p. 232. 178 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING conclusions follow. First, the provisions of the Criminal Code on complicity stricto sensu (incitement and aiding) extend the ground for criminal liability beyond the specific elements of any offence as they envisage criminal liability for behaviour that fails to match any particular set of elements in the criminal statute. Second, the liability of an inciter and of an aider is subsidiary. It depends on the conduct of the perpetrator who must have completed, or at least started, the commission of the offence (ie there must exist at least an attempted offence). The subsidiary nature of liability does not mean that an instigator or aider is responsible for someone else’s conduct. Quite the contrary, they are responsible for their own conduct, for having contributed objectively and guiltily to the commission of the offence. Their liability, however, only materialises subject to one condition – the commission of the offence. In its Interpretative Decision 48-1976-OSNK (Reports, pp. 93-94), the Supreme Court clearly identified the subsidiary nature of the liability borne by an inciter or aider.: “Our Criminal Code rests on the fundamental principle that accomplices in an offence shall be punished where the offence in which they participated has been committed: Art. 21(1) CC. Consequently, if the offence is not committed, an inciter or aider is not to be punished.” Finally, according to Judgment 35-1990 of the Military College (Reports, pp. 17-18), the liability of an individual as an aider may only be engaged if the offence is perpetrated indeed. The person “cannot face autonomous liability under Art. 20(4) CC for an offence that has not been committed.” Judgment 35a-1974-II (Reports, p. 27) was in the same vein. Although it fails to match the elements of any offence, the conduct of an inciter or aider must have the basic properties of criminal conduct as defined in Art. 9(1) CC. In other words, the act of an accessory must be dangerous to the community, contribute objectively to the commission of an offence and be at fault. No complicity therefore exists where: a) an act that objectively facilitates the Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 179 offence is not dangerous to the community, eg as it was done in self- defence; or b) the act was not done guiltily because of a mistake or incidental occurrence. The intent of an inciter or aider must be aimed at completing the offence. It is a different issue that the offence may for some reason freeze at the stage of attempt. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, a failed incitement or aiding (where the offence is not even attempted) does not carry criminal liability. There exists no incitement or aiding unless an offence is committed. The Bulgarian Criminal Code, however, knows some exceptions to the subsidiary nature of complicity. Thus, it penalises the abortive incitement (enticement) to some serious offences, such as murder (Art. 117(2) CC), perjury (Art. 293 CC), etc. In a number of judgments, the Supreme Court has singled out the difference between incitement to and enticement into perjury. As judgment 635-1991-I put it (Reports, p. 14), “the criminal liability of an inciter within the meaning of Art. 20(3) CC may only be engaged if the offence to which he incited took place indeed. This view derives from the very wording of the statute which reads that an inciter shall be liable for the offence committed by the person he incited. Another argument along these lines is Art. 293 CC which defines the very enticement into perjury as an autonomous offence. Hence, where an individual is enticed into perjury but fails to provide false testimony for reasons beyond the control or willingness of the enticer, the latter must be held liable under Art. 293 CC, not under Art. 290(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(3) CC.” Two other judgments of the Supreme Court reconfirmed this stand, viz. 48- 1976-OSNK (Reports, p. 94) and 31-1973-I (Reports, pp. 117-118). 2.4.5. Excess. In terms of mens rea, complicity necessitates a common intent. Hence, an accomplice must be aware not only of the elements of the crime in question but also of the fact that he operates in concert with the others to have the offence committed. The principle that no liability accrues without fault is embodied in the provi- 180 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING sion of Art. 21(2) CC: an inciter or aider shall be liable only for what they have intentionally incited to or assisted in. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that in the event of excess – where the conduct of some accomplices goes beyond the common intent, the other accomplices shall not be liable for the acts done in excess (see Judgments 236-1973-II, Reports, pp. 35-36; 88-1975-I, Reports, pp. 30-31; 97-1988-OSNK, Reports, p. 24). As scrupulously noted in judgment 236-1973-II (Reports, p. 36), “[e]ach accomplice is responsible within the limits of what is covered by his own intent.” 2.4.6. Personal circumstances bearing on the criminal liability of accomplices. The criminal liability that the lawmaker attaches to any offence is predetermined by its community danger and the censure for it (the guilt): Art. 35(3) CC. Where a certain personal circumstance (a feature or attitude of the offender’s personality) affects materially the community danger of the offence or otherwise prompts the differentiation of liability, the lawmaker transforms that circumstance into a qualifier by creating another definition of the offence carrying a heavier or lighter penalty. In such a case the liability of accomplices is subject to Article 21(4) CC: the special circumstances on account of which the law relieves or aggravates the liability of an accomplice are irrelevant in respect to the other accomplices. According to Judgment 2-1974-II (Reports, pp. 30-31) “an offence may be privileged or aggravated only in respect of the accomplice affected by the respective circumstances, whereas the acts of the other accomplices for whom no such circumstances exist must be classified under the basic definition of the offence in question. The fact that the other accomplices knew in advance the special circumstances applicable to an associate is irrelevant in law and may not result in the same classification of the acts of all accomplices, unlike what had been stated in ex Article 19(2) CC (subsequently repealed).” Interpretative Decision 54-1989-OSNK (Reports, p. 44) and Judgment 315-1972-II (Reports, p. 27) were in the same spirit. Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 181

The situation is similar when a personal reason exists to exclude the criminal liability of a perpetrator. That reason does not concern the other accomplices who must face their responsibility for the offence in conformity with the general rules. As regards accessories, the law requires that the conduct of the principal should constitute a crime, not that the principal be necessarily punished. However, if the liability of the principal is justified by a personal circumstance (eg his official or military status), that is, this circumstance is the reason for the offence to be criminalised, an inciter and an aider are liable for that offence although they might not enjoy the same status (Art. 21(3) CC). As fairly pointed out in Judgment 183-1989-II (Reports, p. 72), “… individuals who are not officials may also act as aiders in or inciters to the offence under Art. 311 CC. It is important to establish the common intent during the period when the actus reus was taking place – ie when drawing up the document– and the persons must have contributed objectively and guiltily to the false documenting by the official.” 2.4.7. Complicity in composite or cumulative offences 2.4.7.1. Complicity, in particular the joint perpetration of composite offences (robbery, embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC) has some peculiarities. These stem from the complex nature of the actus reus of a composite offence. As is known, a composite offence combines two acts each of which is a criminal offence in itself, and these acts – when linked by specific objective and subjective factors – form a single complex offence. The first act has a subordinated, contributory role – it facilitates the second offence which is the main one. It is universally accepted in the literature that participation in either component of a composite offence amounts to participation in the whole and should therefore be classified as joint perpetration of the composite offence. This view needs to be substantially refined. For joint perpetration to exist, the guilty person must have assisted 182 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING in the commission of one of the offences through his participation in the other offence. The perpetrator of the first (facilitating) act in a composite offence contributes to the commission of the second act. Hence, he need not do anything else for his conduct to qualify as joint perpetration. However, an offender participating only in the second (main) act “will be liable for the whole composite offence only if he has, by some of his acts, incited or assisted his accomplice to perpetrate the “other” crime or agreed with him in advance on a corresponding distribution of roles”.61 In fact, prior agreement is a form of aiding, or inciting to, the first act included in the composite offence. The situation is similar when it comes to aiding or inciting to just one of the two offences forming part of a composite offence. The individual shall be liable for the whole, ie the composite offence, only if his liability may be engaged for the other offence as well. As noted in Regulation 3-1970-Pl.VS (Reports, p. 15) on embezzlement, “an inciter or aider is liable for embezzlement under Art. 202(1) CC, only if the former also incited to the commission of the facilitating offence and the latter also aided the commission of that offence.” In a number of its judgments, the Supreme Court rightly accepted that “in the event of a composite offence joint perpetration exists even where participants in the commission distribute their roles so that some of them participate in only one of the offences that build up the overall composite offence. In such cases it is not required that each participant be necessarily involved in each crime” (Judgment 363-1982-I, Reports, p. 20, in relation to Art. 199 CC). Besides, Judgment 505-1977-I (Reports, pp. 27-28) on robbery reads: “Robbery is a composite offence; therefore, where two or more persons, having decided to commit robbery, distribute their

61 Liutov, K. On Complicity in Composite Offences. − Pravna misal, 1964, No. 1, p. 35 (in Bulgarian). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 183 roles so that some of them inflict battery to break the resistance of the victim while others take the victim’s property without his con- sent, this is joint perpetration within the meaning of Art. 20(2) CC; hence, all individuals are to be held liable under Art. 256(1) (subsequently repealed), irrespective of whether they also participated directly in taking the victim’s property”.62 The above citations give the impression that the classification of composite offences committed in complicity is a problem-free area. Problems, however, do occur in practice, especially with offences whose commission requires a special status (committed by the so- called “special offenders”). We mean the composite offence under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC – embezzlement – where embezzlement is facilitated through the commission of another offence that is not punished more severely by statute. Thus, in Judgment 750-1974-I (Reports, pp. 28-29) the Supreme Court took the opposite stance: “non-officials participating in document-related offences that facilitate embezzlement cannot be the perpetrators of aggravated embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC; they can only be inciters or aiders although they directly participated in the elements of the document-related offence.” Judgment 367-1982-I (Reports, pp. 74-75) was similar: when a non-official commits the facilitating offence under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC after prior conspiracy and the official commits embezzlement, ie the second part of the composite offence

62 The Supreme Court took the same correct stance on the classification of complicity in rape. “In order for complicity to exist in the form of joint perpetration of the offence defined in Art. 152(III) CC,“ reads Judgment 617- 1973-I (Reports, p. 72), “viz. rape by two or more persons, it is not required that all accomplices have sexual intercourse with the raped woman. Even a person who did not have sexual intercourse with the raped woman shall be held liable as a joint perpetrator if he was present at the intercourse of the others and participated in the violence applied to the victim....” Judgments 53-1975- OSNK (Reports, p. 52) and 231-1976-II (Reports, p. 56) were along the same lines. 184 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC, the overall activity no longer qualifies as an offence perpetrated by two or more persons under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC. This is due to the fact that “prior conspiracy within the meaning of Art. 202(1), point 2 exists only if at least two perpetrators entrusted with the safekeeping and management of public property participate in its embezzlement.” This view fails to reflect the nature of the offence defined in Art. 202(1), point 1 CC. It is a composite offence. The specificity of a composite embezzlement lies in the fact that the actus reus consists of two components, or parts (by contrast to single-act embezzlement under Art. 201 CC). Therefore, in the event of complicity the first component (the facilitating offence), which necessitates no special official status, may be perpetrated even by a non-official. That person is a sequential joint perpetrator of the composite embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC. And the combined acts of all joint perpetrators produce an offence perpetrated by two or more persons under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC. It is exactly this scenario that prevails in practice – sequential joint perpetration of the composite embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC. On the contrary, the “pure” joint perpetration of ordinary embezzlement (under Art. 201 CC), where a specific property is entrusted to two officials simultaneous- ly, is rather rare in practice. Regulation 7-1987-OSNK (Reports, pp. 18-19(12) brought to an end the inconsistent judicial classification of complicity in composite offences and the Supreme Court took a correct and theoretically justified stance. “Embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 1 CC,” reads Regulation 7-1987, “is a composite offence. The other offence that facilitates embezzlement may be committed even by someone who is not an official within the meaning of Art. 93, point 1 CC. Where such a person acts based on prior conspiracy with the official, there is joint perpetration of the composite embezzlement and it should be classified under point 2 as well as point 1.” Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 185

2.4.7.2. Some widespread offences (theft, robbery, embezzlement, fraud) are often committed in complicity and in the form of cumulative criminal activity. The problems in this case may be illustrated with the following hypothetical scenario. A. embezzles 4500 Levs in the context of a cumulative offence. The chain of his cumulative criminal activity includes inter alia an act of embezzling 300 Levs (other than the first embezzlement) perpetrated jointly with B. How should that sole concerted act be classified and how relevant is it to the classification of the overall criminal activity? In order to trigger the heavier liability under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC, embezzlement must be “committed by two or more persons who have conspired in advance”. Conspiracy takes place “in advance” where the agreement to engage in a concerted activity is reached before embezzlement itself has started. At first glance, there is no prior conspiracy in the above hypothetical as the agreement is made after A. has started embezzling. In fact, however, the time of conspiracy must be determined in respect of the concerted act alone. As the former precedes the latter, the concerted act actually covers the elements of Art. 202(1), point 2 CC. “In the event of cumulative embezzlement,” reads Regulation 3-1970-Pl.VS (section II, para 3, Reports, p. 14), the agreement may even be reached at the time of committing the separate acts.” The same general view was expressed in the Supreme Court’s Judgment 169-1977-II (Reports, p. 120) on robbery, as respects Art. 199(1), point 2 CC: “In the cumulative offence of robbery perpetrated by two or more persons, prior conspiracy as an element of the qualified definition may even be reached at the time of doing the separate acts that form part of the cumulative offence. The important thing here is how the qualifying circumstance has affected the overall criminal activity.” The second question is, how to classify the overall criminal activity of A. – under the basic definition (Art. 201 CC) or the qualified definition (Art. 202(1), point 2 CC)? It should be noted first that “the 186 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING coherence of a cumulative offence is not undermined by the fact that the offender has committed some of the offences on his own and others in complicity with third parties”.63 The situation where different definitions of embezzlement (basic and qualified) are satisfied is envisaged in the statute itself. According to Art. 26(3) CC if the separate acts of a cumulative offence come under different definitions, the entire cumulative offence is punished according to the aggravated definition. By way of exception, only if the qualified acts have not affected materially the gravity of the overall cumulative criminal activity, the latter should be subsumed under the lighter definition and the qualifying circumstances are to be considered at the sentencing stage (Art. 26(4) CC). Hence, the problem is one of fact, not law. The difficulty is to determine in each case whether the qualified acts affected (or, to be more precise, did not affect) “materially” the gravity of the overall criminal activity. This ad hoc determination is made by the court in the light of all circumstances of the case. As stated in Interpretative Decision 3-1971-OSNK (Reports, p. 34), “the question when the qualifying circumstances did or did not affect “materially” the overall criminal activity must be answered by the court after it has considered the aggregate criminal result that occurred, the result of each separate act, the offender’s reasons, motives, status, and any other relevant facts.” In the above hypothetical, if we assume that the only concerted act (300 Levs worth of damage) does not affect materially the seriousness of the overall cumulative embezzlement (4500 Levs worth of damage), the overall activity should be classified under the basic definition (Art. 201 CC), while the isolated qualified act (Art. 202(1), point 2 CC) should be considered as an aggravating circumstance in individualising A.’s sentence.

63 Interpretative Decision 3-1971-OSNK on cumulative offences (Reports, p. 33). See in the same vein Judgment 409-1970-I (Reports, p. 38). Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 187

2.4.8. Perpetration of offence “by two or more persons”. After the provision of Art. 93, point 12 was inserted in the Criminal Code in 1982, the courts should have no difficulty in classifying the “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. The interpretative instruments previously issued by the Supreme Court were adjusted accordingly. Thus Regulation 3-1970-Pl.VS on embezzlement (section II, paragraph 3) was amended by Regulation 7-1987-Pl.VS (paragraph 12) and now reads: “… in order for the offence under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC to exist, the participation of at least two joint perpetrators is required to whom the public property has been entrusted or handed over for safekeeping and management” (Reports, p. 19). Interpretative Decision 54-1989-OSNK provided expressly that “the theft is perpetrated by two or more persons who have conspired in advance only if at least two perpetrators have participated in the very commission of the offence” (Reports, p. 43). Judgments 208-1991-I (Reports, p. 34) and 780-1991-I (Reports, pp. 45-46) on qualified thefts under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC, aired the same view. The problem in each case is to distinguish between the commission of the offence on the one hand and aiding on the other, and establish how many (one or more) individuals were involved in “commission itself,” that is, the number of perpetrators. Depending on that, the respective concerted act should be classified under the basic or qualified definition of the offence. We shall focus below on two specific issues relating to “offences perpetrated by two or more persons”. 2.4.8.1. The specific rules of the Special Part CC (Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc.) apply only to acts of joint perpetration. This is not to say that all participants in a concerted act must be joint perpetrators. Besides joint perpetrators, the realisation of an offence may also involve other persons – inciters and aiders. They should also face the heavier penalty envisaged in 188 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING the qualified definitions. As pointed out in section II, paragraph 3 of Regulation 3-1970-Pl.VS (as amended), in addition to the two perpetrators of the qualified embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC, “the remaining accomplices … may be inciters or aiders.” When the conduct of the inciters or aiders is classified under the aggravated set of elements, the role of each of them is normally not specified – it is not specified if para 3 or 4 of Art. 20 CC is at stake. Under Art. 21(1) CC, however, in individualising the sentence the court must duly consider the nature and extent of involvement in the offence. The judicial authorities must therefore clarify the role (nature and extent of participation) of each accomplice and reflect it in the legal classification of the offence while relying not just on the applicable rule of the special part but also on the general provision on incitement (Art. 20(3) CC) or aiding (Art. 20(4) CC). Such precise classification is not an end in itself. It fulfils a specific social and legal task, viz. to reflect most accurately the community danger and reproof of an actual offence and to pave the way to a fair sentence. 2.4.8.2. An offence is “perpetrated by two or more persons” where these persons are competent to stand trial. In other words, the offenders must be adult and of sound mind (Art. 31(1) CC). This is the reason why they can face criminal liability for what they have done. This understanding is deemed indisputable in the case law of Bulgarian courts. Already Interpretative Decision 24-1967-OSNK underlined that the respective rules on rape, illicit entry into another’s home, theft, etc., “require the intentional participation in the actus reus of several individuals fit to commit an offence. A minor (under the age of 14) who participates in the commission of any of these offences together with an adult competent to stand trial cannot be an offender for the purpose of the criminal law… Therefore, his involvement in the perpetration of any of those offences along with another person competent to stand trial does not entail joint perpetration, so the offence committed by the person who is criminally Institutions of the criminal law. The institution of complicity 189 liable should not be classified as one committed by “a few” (Reports of Regulations and Interpretative Decisions of the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria 1953-1973, Sofia, 1974, p. 440). It should be reminded that the concept of “a few” in the ex Criminal Code (subsequently repealed) is identical with the notion of “two or more persons” in the existing Criminal Code (1968). A similar stance was reflected in Regulation 3-1970-Pl.VS, section II, paragraph 3: “No qualified embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC exists where the official has conspired in advance only with persons under the age of 14 or of unsound mind, as such individuals are not competent to stand trial for their deeds. In such cases the offence should be classified as an ordinary embezzlement, unless other qualifying circumstances exist” (Reports, p. 14). The clarification that associating with people under the age of 14 or of unsound mind does not amount to complicity was perhaps relevant in the context of earlier (pre-1982) case law where the elements of Art. 202(1), point 2 CC could be covered even by a sole perpetrator (with the other participants acting as inciters or aiders). Today, when the statute expressly requires that embezzlement be perpetrated by at least two officials (and no people of unsound mind or minors are appointed officials), the cited paragraph of Regulation 3-1970-Pl.VS should be deleted. § 9. Empirical sociological research

Empirical sociological research plays a major part in the legislative process and in particular in penal lawmaking. Empirical sociological surveys are used to cross-check the veracity of a theoretical conclusion about the relation between two social phenomena. A certain interdependence deduced logically is tested in practice against the background of specific empirical data. In lawmaking, empirical research serves to test the correctness of various legislative solutions. We shall display below the potential of empirical sociological research to resolve specific problems. In particular, we shall test empirically the veracity of the theoretical finding about the concept of “offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons”, that is, about the remit of the special rules on offences perpetrated by two or more persons. The survey was conducted long ago but exemplifies the ample capacity of empirical sociological research to try out the theoretical conclusions about social imperatives. The concept of “offence perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” rests on the understanding that joint perpetration as a modus operandi is far “more dangerous” than complicity stricto sensu and the material difference in the extent of community danger appears between “an offence perpetrated by two or more persons” and an “offence perpetrated by a sole person assisted by inciters and aiders (not between the latter and an “offence perpetrated by a sole person”). We have drawn this conclusion by means of deduction − starting with the general assumptions about the structure and community danger of offences, we have arrived at a particular conclusion about the impact of complicity on the extent of community danger of a crime. Empirical sociological research 191

None the less, the logical conclusion that joint perpetration is considerably “more dangerous” than complicity stricto sensu is no more than a hypothesis. This hypothesis operates as a point of departure in defining the concept of “offence perpetrated by two or more persons”. The theoretical conclusion must therefore be tested in practice, in real life.1 For this purpose, we shall study now the same interdependence (between complicity and the community danger of offences) empirically, based on specific factual data on a certain type of offence. Empirical research should determine whether the theoretical finding matches the facts of life. 1. The plan of any empirical survey embraces the following headings: a) purpose and conceptual framework of survey; b) major tasks of survey; c) object and scope of survey; d) statistical research methods; e) empirical interpretation of the key concepts (making them operational); f) major hypotheses; g) methods and rules of collecting and stating empirical data; h) statistical processing of data and substantial analysis of the results obtained. 1.1. Purpose and object of survey. The purpose of the empirical survey at hand was to elucidate the dependence between complicity and the community danger of offences and in particular to establish how the two forms of complicity (joint perpetration and complicity stricto sensu) affect the extent of community danger.

1 According to Y. A. Souslov, the process of scientific research has the following stages. At the outset, the problem is formulated. “Resolving the problem implies a union of theoretical and empirical research. In the course of research, a hypothesis is advanced. The essential thing is that the hypothesis may not be deduced from the theory by way of logical necessity ... Consequences are deduced from the hypothesis. Then, it is tested experimen- tally. If the hypothesis is confirmed, it becomes an element of the theory and relates logically to its other components.” (Kozlov, V. A., Y. A. Souslov Specific Sociological Research in the Field of Law. − Leningrad, 1981, p. 44, in Russian). On empirical sociological research see also Lapaeva, V. V. Specific Sociological Research in Law. − Moscow, 1987 (in Russian); The Logic of Sociological Research. − Moscow, 1987 (in Russian). 192 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The object of the survey was the relation between complicity as a modus operandi and the community danger of an offence. There exists a causal interdependence (relations of determination) between these two phenomena2 as any change in the form of complicity entails a change in the extent of community danger.3 The method of committing the act (form of complicity) is a causative phenomenon, ie an independent variable. The community danger of the offence (in particular its quantitative aspect − the extent of community danger) is a resultant phenomenon, ie a dependent variable. The empirical survey had to address the following questions: a) is there a causal relation (determination) between the two phenomena?; b) what is the nature of that relation or, more precisely, how does community danger depend on the form of complicity (is it possible to deduce any dependence in that respect)?; c) is the impact of complicity on community danger substantial and what is its relative weight among the factors that determine the community danger of the offence? Making empirical inquiries into the causal interdependence of two social phenomena is a difficult task in general. In the course of our analysis we had to set aside the influence of all other factors. In real life, however, social relations intertwine and interplay. A certain result follows invariably from the interaction of numerous reasons.

2 N. F. Kouznetsova speaks of several types of determination relations (and determinants, accordingly): a) causation (cause); b) relation of conditionality (condition); c) correlative dependency; d) systemic-structural determination (Issues of Criminological Determination. − Moscow, 1984, pp. 7-16, in Russian). Based on this classification, it should be assumed that complicity and the extent of community danger have a relation of conditionality. 3 “Two social phenomena relate as a cause and result,” observed O. A. Gavrilov, “if changing (variating) one of them entails a change in (variation of) the other” (Personality and the Respect for Law. − Moscow, 1979, pp. 63-64, in Russian). Empirical sociological research 193

1.2. Scope of survey. The survey covered the cases of theft of public property tried by Sofia District Court and disposed of sentences which took effect in 1979, 1980 or 1981. We divided those thefts in three groups: a) thefts perpetrated by a sole person in situations other than petty offending (Art. 194(1) CC); b) thefts committed by a sole person assisted by inciters and aiders in situations other than petty offending (up until 1982 these had been wrongly classified by the court under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC); and c) thefts perpetrated by two or more persons in situations other than petty offending (Art. 195(1), point 5 CC). a. The data of the Central Statistical Department for the three-year period between 1979 and 1981 showed that nearly 700 cases at Sofia District Court had been disposed of by convictions for thefts by sole perpetrators and over 200 cases had been disposed of by convictions for thefts committed by several individuals. In the course of the survey we looked at all cases of theft committed by several persons (both in complicity stric- to sensu and in joint perpetration). The survey, however, focused exclusively on thefts under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC. Thus, the following cases were excluded from the aggregate of over 200 proceedings: − concerted acts without prior conspiracy which had been classified under Art. 194(1) in conjunction with Art. 20 CC; − petty thefts committed by two or more persons and classified under Art. 194(3) in conjunction with Art. 20 CC; − thefts of possessions of particularly significant value committed by two or more persons (Art. 195(2) CC); − thefts representing dangerous repeat offending (Art. 196(1), point 2 CC). For minors, the law envisioned lighter penalties (Art. 63 CC) incomparable to the those imposable on adult offenders. Therefore, the survey was confined to thefts committed by adults. 194 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

For similar reasons 23 other cases of thefts under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC were left out as the court had applied Art. 55 CC there. Based on its finding of numerous attenuating circumstances that would have made even the lightest statutory penalty disproportion- ately severe, the court had imposed sentences below the existing threshold, ie below one year's imprisonment. Such penalties cannot serve as an indicator of the community danger of the underlying offences and, more importantly, cannot compare to the penalties imposed in “normal” cases of theft under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC. For the same reasons the survey covered only those thefts under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC where no restitution had been made. As a result 141 cases qualified for the survey out of all cases for theft committed in complicity. Of those, 112 concerned thefts in joint perpetration and 29 were for thefts in complicity stricto sensu.4 Besides, in order to delineate the group of thefts committed by a sole person we dispensed with 20 cases under Art. 194(1) CC for each of the three years in question (1979, 1980, 1981) which totalled 59 cases less. Those cases were selected at random (not deliberately, stochastically), irrespective of their representative character or typical features within the aggregate. Finally, an array of 200 cases was formed and these were divided in three groups (comprising accordingly 59, 29, and 112 cases). The data derived from these 200 cases were processed at the Institute of Mathematics at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. b. Any representative empirical survey faces the question about the veracity of the results obtained: to what extent do the conclusions

4 Several files were not found as they did not have an archive number in the register for the relevant year or, although they had one, it proved impossible to identify them in the records office of the court (as they had been enclosed to other files or simply missing). Empirical sociological research 195 drawn match reality? This question may only be answered in a sat- isfactory manner if we rely on mathematical statistics and on the theory of probabilities. The veracity of the results depends on two factors: the correctness of the methods (or theory) used and the reliability of input information, ie the quality of empirical data. The reliability of information is determined based on different indicators, the most important being the representativeness of the sample.5 “In the practice of sociological research,” stated some Russian commentators, “a sample is deemed representative if the general mean is included in the confidence interval X known ± 2∆ with 95 per cent of probability”.6 Generally speaking, a sample is deemed sufficiently large if the likelihood of the veracity (acceptance probability) of the respective conclusion exceeds 95 per cent.

5 Representativeness is the capacity of the sample to represent (with a certain accuracy) the general aggregate. Representativeness is estimated by identifying the error of representativeness. That error characterises the degree to which the structure of the sample deviates from the genuine, “real” structure of the general aggregate. The error of representativeness is in direct proportion to the heterogeneity (variegation) of the sample and in inverse proportion to the scope of the sample, ie the number of units surveyed. 6 Dictionary of Applied Sociology. – Minsk, 1984, p. 116 (in Russian). The typical level (x) is the generalised value of a feature and the units of the phenomenon surveyed are apportioned evenly above and below that level. The typical level is calculated through the arithmetic mean.

n Σ xi i=1 X = n where: n is the number of units in the group.

хi is the value of the feature for unit i. 196 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

In the course of the survey we calculated the probability for the results obtained to be veracious. It proved quite high and largely in excess of 95 per cent. Consequently, all three samples (of 59, 29, and

The standard deviation (s) measures the dispersion of the separate units within the group through the typical amplitude whereby they float above or below the typical level. We judge from the standard deviation if the typical level is a correct description of the group. The standard deviation is calculated based on the formula: n Σ 2 (xi - X) i=1 s2 = n The standard deviation displays the typical dispersion in absolute (named) terms.

The error of representativeness is calculated based on the formula:

σ 2 ∆=t n

where: ∆ is the error of representativeness σ is the dispersion of the variable n is the number of units in the sample, and t is the confidence coefficient that reveals the rate frequency of the standard deviation. In sociological research the confidence coefficient (t) is normally assumed to be 2, see Gavrilov, O. A. Mathematical Methods and Models in Socio-legal Research. − Moscow, 1980, p. 50 (in Russian). The theory of probabilities helps calculate the probability that the deviation between the average sample value and the genuine one (the one of the general aggregate) remains below a certain ceiling called “utmost error of representativeness”. “The probability (p) whereby it is guaranteed that the utmost error of representativeness would not exceed the one/two/three fold standard deviation is called “acceptance probability”, whereas the indicator of the rate frequency of the standard deviation is called “confidence coefficient”. Empirical sociological research 197

112 cases respectively) were large enough to serve as the basis for correct (reliable) conclusions. The risk of mistake was negligible.7 c. We chose the offence of theft for a number of reasons. First, the qualifying circumstance “if the offence was perpetrated by two or more (a group of) persons” is stated in relation to 12 offences. Among those, however, embezzlement and theft (of public property) are of major interest in practical terms. Embezzlement accounts for nearly one third of all offences against public property, with 2577 Levs worth of damage on average.8 Thefts account for over half of all offences against public property. The average damage caused by an individual theft is much lower, viz. 235 Levs.9 None the less, we selected the thefts of public property as a subject-

(Dictionary of Applied Sociology, pp. 115-116, in Russian). In other words, the acceptance probability indicates the veracity of the conclusion made. In the event of normal allocation there is 68 per cent probability that the utmost error of representativeness is smaller than the standard deviation, 95.5 per cent probability that it is smaller than the doubled standard deviation, and 99.7 per cent probability that it is smaller than the tripled standard deviation (for more details see Dictionary of Applied Sociology, pp. с. 18-21, 35, 88-90, 99-102, 114-117, 143-145, and 291-292, in Russian).

7 The probability to arrive at a wrong conclusion is known as a degree of implication and is expressed by “α”. “In sociological research α=0.05 is accepted as a sufficient degree of implication; it means that the conclusion which corroborates or disallows of the hypothesis scrutinised may prove incorrect in 5 per cent of the instances of repeated samples.” (Dictionary of Applied Sociology, pp. 291-292, in Russian). The acceptance probability of most conclusions deriving from this survey was extremely high. The last table of Appendix 1 (row 1, last column) thus shows that the probability for one of the major conclusions to be wrong, ie the degree of implication, was 0,0003. Hence, if we considered 10 000 cases, the conclusion might prove wrong, unre- liable in only three of them. In other words, the acceptance probability was extremely high − 0, 9997 (or 99.97 in percentage terms). 8 See Tsankov, P. op. cit., pp. 12 and 17. 9 Idem. 198 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING matter of our empirical survey. The reason was that the mechanism of interference with the object in the case of embezzlement is rather specific − the encroachment actually comes “from inside”. The offender here (the official) is also involved (as a party) in the social relation transgressed. By contrast, the typical mechanism of infringing a social relation is to affect it “from outside” (as in the case of theft). Therefore, when studying how the modus affects the community danger of offences, the crime of theft is to be preferred. It helps to better grasp the dependence of the method of crime commission and the community danger of the offence. Second, in order for joint perpetration to exist in the context of embezzlement, the property targeted by the offence must have been entrusted concurrently to two or more officials. This is rare in practice. Embezzlement is normally classified as perpetrated “by two or more persons” where “another offence has been perpetrated to facilitate it” and that other offence has been committed by someone else. That situation displays both qualifying factors − under Art. 202(1), point 1 and Art. 202(1), point 2 CC accordingly. It was impossible during the survey to isolate and measure the individual impact of one of these circumstances (complicity) on the extent of community danger. Embezzlement was therefore unsuitable for this particular empirical survey. Third, embezzlement committed “by two or more persons” may be classified under three different provisions: Art. 202(1), point 2 CC in ordinary cases; Art. 202(2), point 1 CC when the embezzled amounts are large; or Art. 203 CC where the embezzled amounts are particularly large and the offence is especially serious. The cases of embezzlement under Art. 202(1), point 2 CC fall within the jurisdiction of district (first- tier) courts, while those under Art. 202(2), point 1 CC, and under Art. 203 CC are tried by regional (second-tier) courts. All these details would have frustrated additionally the analysis of court case law. d. The following considerations dictated our focus on the case law of Sofia District Court during the period 1979 − 1981. Empirical sociological research 199

First, Article 93, point 12 CC, which changed the approach of the courts to Articles 152(3), point 1; 170(2); 195(1), point 5 CC, etc., was enacted by the Bulgarian Parliament on 31 March 1992 and took effect on 1 July 1982. Consequently, the last year representative of the former, erroneous case law, was 1981. In order to compile a sufficiently large aggregate (sample) we had to analyse also the cases from the previous two years (1979 and 1980). Second, the election of judges took place in 1976. We assumed that during the second half of their terms of office (1979-1981) most judges had gained sufficient experience in the courtroom to apply correctly the statutory criteria for sentencing. We therefore expected immaterial deviations from the principle of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the severity of punishment at the material time. 1.3. Statistical research methods. The dependences of social phenomena are statistical, not functional (dynamic). Thus, statistical dependence is the one that shows as a trend, ie it only surfaces in the massive occurrences of a phenomenon rather than in each individual case.10 Hence, the use of statistical methods in social research ensues objectively from the nature of social imperatives themselves. The object of knowledge − as the dialectics of materialism teach − determines the methods employed to study that object. Statistical methods are used to verify the existence of a relation between two social phenomena and the nature of that relation (degree of relatedness between the two). Statistical analysis has an important role in crime research.11 The application of statistical

10 On statistical and functional (dynamic) imperatives see Biliarski, A. Statistical Studies in Criminological Research. − Pravna misal, 1968, No. 2, pp. 52- 55 (in Bulgarian); Legal Statistics. − Moscow, 1980, p. 117 (in Russian); Law and Sociology. − Moscow, p. 159 (in Russian); Souslov, Y. A. op. cit., pp. 131 et seq. 11 “The role of statistical analysis in identifying and estimating relations between crime and criminal record,” wrote G. A. Zlobin, “is of the uttermost importance. As long as we deal here with large-scale phenomena, it may be asserted that no conclusion about such relations should be deemed veracious and reliable unless corroborated by statistics” (Legal Statistics..., p. 114). See also Biliarski, A. op. cit., p. 51. 200 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING methods requires that the socio-legal phenomena surveyed (in our case, “complicity” and “community danger of offences”) be for- malised, measured, and described in quantitative terms. 1.4. Empirical interpretation of key concepts. The empirical interpretation of a concept means to restate it by simple empirically measurable indicators, ie the concept is “translated” into the language of facts. In this process, the concept is somehow “dissem- bled.” It is decomposed into elementary empirical components.12 In our case, “complicity” and the “community danger of offences” had to be described by factual indicators susceptible of experimental testing. It was also necessary to devise rules on the measurement of those indicators, that is, a measurement unit and a scale.13 a. Complicity (the method of crime commission) operated as a cause. Complicity was characterised by the following empirical indicators: a) form of complicity (measured by a nominal scale of two values: complicity stricto sensu and joint perpetration); b) degree of co-organisation of the accomplices (a range scale of two degrees: prior conspiracy and highly organised group; c) number of accomplices − overall and by type of accomplice (joint perpetrators, inciters, aiders); d) type of offence depending on its duration (a nominal scale of two values: single-act offence and cumulative offence); e) duration of cumulative offence (in months). The extent of community danger of the offence was affected by a number of other factors besides complicity: a) possibly existing other qualifying circumstances (a nominal scale of two values: no additional qualifying factors or existence of other qualifying circumstances); b) stage of criminal activity (a nominal scale of two

12 See Kozlov, V. A., Y.A. Souslov, op. cit., p. 50; Personality and the Respect for Law..., p. 52. 13 The feature is a qualitative characteristic of the phenomenon. In the process of measuring, we attribute to that feature specific numerical values, ie describe the phenomenon in quantitative terms. Empirical sociological research 201 values: attempted and completed offence); c) subject-matter of theft (a nominal scale: chattels, money). The extent of community danger of offences was equally influenced by some traits of the offender's personality, in particular his criminal record (measurable by a nominal scale of two values: not sentenced, sentenced). b. The extent of community danger operated as a consequence. The following were used as empirical indicators of the extent of community danger of perpetrated crimes: a) damage caused (material damage measurable in Levs), and b) sentence (sentence returned by court measurable in months). Under Art. 195(1), point 5 CC the theft of public property perpetrated by two or more persons carried one to ten years' imprisonment, ie 12 to 120 months. For a more comprehensive description of the offender's liability it was also important to know if service of the sentence had been deferred on grounds of Art. 66 CC (the scale to measure this feature was nominal and had two values: “yes” and “no”). 1.5. Fundamental hypotheses of survey. The hypotheses are theoretically substantiated assumptions about the properties of the phenomena surveyed or the existence of a causal link between those phenomena.14 Hypotheses are closely related to the conceptual frame of a survey. They are derived logically (deductively) from the fundamental premise of the survey and their veracity is then tested empirically (in practice). Our survey relied on the understanding that the method of crime commission (complicity) and the extent of community danger of the offence had a causal relation, in particular one of conditionality. The purpose was to study that relation empirically, to establish by means of experiment how the different forms of complicity affected the extent of community danger. Hence, the hypotheses proposed were explanatory (not descriptive). There were two main hypotheses.

14 See Kozlov, V. A., Y. A. Souslov, op. cit., p. 56. 202 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

a. If the three variants of the offence (sole perpetration, complicity stricto sensu, and joint perpetration) were compared, the tangible difference, the “leap” in the extent of community danger occurs between an “offence perpetrated by two or more persons” and an “offence committed by a sole person assisted by inciters and aiders (rather than between the latter and an “offence committed by a sole person”). b. Of all circumstances that characterise complicity, the form of complicity, ie the type of concerted method, is (most) essential to the extent of community danger of an offence committed in concert. The other peculiarities of complicity (cohesion of accomplices, number of accomplices, overall and by type − joint perpetrators, inciters, aiders, etc.) do not affect materially the level of community danger and may be ignored without substantial repercussions on the accuracy of the survey. 1.6. Methods and rules of collecting and stating empirical data. The data of interest to us were not available in the periodic publication Offences and Sentenced Persons, nor could they be extracted from court reports. We therefore used as a source of original information those criminal cases at Sofia District Court relative to thefts of public property where the sentences had become effective in 1979, 1980, and 1981.15 We extracted the data mostly from the convictions and sentences (operational part plus reasons) but it was often necessary to consult also the materials from the court inquiry and the pre-trial stage. These data were entered on special blank forms, then moved to perforated cards and machine-processed. All data for an offence were recorded on the form in one row divided in 27 columns. These

15 “The survey of documents is among the oldest methods of retrieving information in social research ... The materials from the administration of justice also serve as documents for specific sociological surveys of law” (Ibid, pp. 75-76). Empirical sociological research 203 were data on: 1) form of complicity; 2) degree of organisation of accomplices; 3) overall number of accomplices; 4) number of joint perpetrators; 5) number of inciters; 6) number of aiders; 7) type of offence based on its duration; 8) duration of cumulative offence (in months); 9) existence of other qualifying circumstances; 10) stage of offence; 11) subject-matter of theft; 12) amount of damage caused (Lev equivalent); 13) level of penalty imposed on perpetrator (in months) (in the event of joint perpetration the arithmetical mean was inserted of the penalties of all joint perpetrators of the theft). Further, separate data were inserted on each joint perpetrator: penalty imposed on the respective joint perpetrator; criminal record; applicability of deferred sentencing under Art. 66 CC. Finally, the archive number of the file and the year during which it had been archived were entered.16 2. Statistical processing of data and content analysis of the results obtained. The collected empirical data were computer- processed at the Computing Centre at the Institute of Mathematics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, with the assistance of P. Petrov, Research Fellow at the Computer Stochastic Laboratory. We used the universal BMPD programme package designed by W. J. Dixon at the University of California (version 1981). In the view of experts, the BMD package “has been used to date on both sides of the Atlantic and may be of interest to historians of science as the first serious example of a stochastic programme package that has proven valuable to many experimenters”.17 2.1. Analysis of damage-related data. The key empirical indicator of the extent of community danger of thefts was the value of property stolen, ie the extent of material damage caused.

16 We do not indicate here the symbols we have adopted to record (fix) the values of every feature on the form as this is a purely technical matter. 17 Sprent, P. Handling Numbers and Statistics in Action. − Minsk, 1983, p. 229 (in Russian). 204 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The three groups of theft differed in their method of crime commission (sole perpetration, complicity stricto sensu, joint perpetration). The question was if the three types of theft also differed in their damage: did damage-related data reveal any difference and how essential was it? Hence, the analysis had two stages: first, establishing the difference, if any, between the average damage caused by each of the three criminal schemes (was it possible to identify three groups of thefts also by reference to the “damage” factor?); second, establishing where the substantial variance, the “leap” occurred in the level of damage (was it between sole perpetration and complicity stricto sensu or between the latter and joint perpetration?) 2.1.1. To resolve this task, we used the P7D programme which makes it possible to study the structure of the array of data by means of dispersion analysis based on a description and graphic presentation of the different groups. Dispersion analysis is a statistical method to explore how different, autonomous, and concurrent factors (causes) affect the modification of a phenomenon (result). Dispersion analysis is employed in sociological surveys to discern and determine the influence of a factor on the change of a consequence. Dispersion analysis helps to define if the factor affects the result in any material way.18 a. The chart in Appendix 1 visualises the values and the allocation of damage among the various groups. The graphic presentation of the three groups revealed that they differed substantially in their average values, ie the typical level of damage caused. Appendix 1 also contains data on the average values: thefts were causing average damage worth 296.19 Levs if committed by a sole perpetrator, 473.46 Levs if committed in complicity stricto

18 See Dictionary of Applied Statistics, pp. 31-33; Totev, A. Y. Statistical Characterisation of Causal Dependencies. – Sofia, 1969, p. 19 (in Bulgarian). Empirical sociological research 205 sensu, and 835.69 Levs if committed by joint perpetrators.19 Already at this initial stage of the survey it was obvious that joint perpetration was “causing” much larger damage than complicity stricto sensu or sole perpetration. The typical level of damage could not fully depict the variance among the three groups of thefts. It was therefore necessary to establish the dispersion of the separate units in each group, ie their deviation from the typical level. Dispersion was measured through the standard deviation. The latter showed the dispersion, the extent to which thefts could vary in their damage and, hence, characterised the heterogeneity (variegation) of the group.20 It was the standard deviation that helped determine if the typical level adequately represented a group. The standard deviation for the three groups of thefts was 424.55 Levs for thefts committed by a sole perpetrator, 491.96 Levs for thefts committed in complicity stricto sensu, and 1051.14 Levs for jointly perpetrated thefts. b. Further, the three groups of thefts were compared using a mono-factor dispersion analysis. The first stage was to check if they differed at all in terms of “damage”. The standard calculations for dispersion analysis were made. The dispersion relation obtained (F- value) was 8.41.21 It was much bigger than the critical F-value in

19 Besides the average values, the standard deviations for the three groups were calculated as well, as were some auxiliary values defining the accuracy of the mean estimate, see Appendix 1. 20 See note 6 above on the standard deviation (s). 21 The dispersion ratio is also labelled “F-test” in honour of R. A. Fisher, the architect of dispersion analysis. It is the ratio of intergroup dispersion to within-group dispersion. Where the dispersion ratio is equal or close to one, the causative factor does not influence materially the resultant factor. Where the dispersion ratio exceeds one, the causative factor (which underlies the division) affects the result materially, see Tottev, A. Y., op. cit., pp. 25-28; Sprent, P. op. cit., pp. 116-118. In order to answer the question if the dispersion ratio found (F-empirical) was sufficiently large, ie important, tables were compiled to depict the minimum implication of F (F-critical) in the relevant context. 206 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Empirical Survey Results (computer-processed data, Empirical sociological research 207

Appendix 1 BMPD statistical programme package used). 208 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING such circumstances. Consequently, the three categories of thefts (divided by modus operandi) also differed materially in terms of the damage caused. In other words, the “causative” phenomenon (modus operandi) used to categorise the three groups affected materially the “resultant” factor (damage). The probability for this conclusion to be wrong (ie that the form of complicity affected immaterially the extent of damage caused) was 0.0003 (or 0.03 per cent). Hence, if 10 000 cases were analysed, the conclusion might prove erroneous in no more than three of them. In other words, the acceptance probability was extremely high: 0.9997 (or 99.97 per cent). The test of Levene was used to verify the coincidence among the dispersions of the three groups. Two additional tests were also applied to see if the groups differed materially: the statistical test of Welch and the statistical test of Brown- Forsythe. The values obtained were accordingly 2.84 and 2.167, whereas the F-values were 11.21 and 14.58. These results confirmed that substantial variance existed among the three groups of thefts as far as the “damage” factor was concerned (the acceptance probability was very high, close to 100 per cent). 2.1.2. The second, more important stage of dispersion analysis was to identify the variance among the three groups of theft and see where exactly the “leap” occurred in the extent of community danger. We could thus realise which two categories of theft were similar in terms of community danger and should therefore be subsumed under the same statutory definition. a. One could have a general idea about the variance among the three categories of theft if these were compared by the average damage inflicted. As mentioned earlier, the average damage stood at 296.19 Levs in the event of sole perpetration, 473.46 Levs in the event of sole perpetrators assisted by inciters and aiders, and 835.69 Levs in the event of thefts perpetrated jointly by two or more individuals. The variance between the third group (joint perpetration) Empirical sociological research 209 and the second group (complicity stricto sensu) was twice larger than that between the second and the first group (sole perpetration). This dependence between the method of crime commission and community danger (damage) in the event of theft could be expressed as follows in mathematical terms: the three average values of damage represented elements of the numerical line

a1, a2, a3 where a1 = 296 a2 + 296 + 177 = 473 a3 = 296 + 3.177 + 9 = 836 Denoting the increase of 177 Levs as b, we identified the following relation among the three values:

a1 a2 = a1 + b a3 = a1 + 3.b = a2 + 2.b (with some approximation) Then same line could be stated as follows:

a1, a1 + b, a1 + 3.b b. The typical level (arithmetic mean) alone was insufficient to characterise comprehensively the variance among the three groups of theft. Therefore two more sophisticated calculations were made as well − the Buferoni test and the statistical test of Student. The T-criterion of Student was especially illustrative.22

22 While the test of Fisher (F-test) exhibits the variance among all groups within a given general aggregate, the test of Student (Т-test) provides an estimate of the variance between the groups two by two. The test of Student shows how big the variance is between two groups in terms of a specific feature.

Where the standard deviations in the two groups are unequal (s1/ s2), the Т-test is taken down as follows:

where: x is the arithmetic mean 210 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The T-test values obtained confirmed the variance between the three groups of theft in terms of the “damage” factor and displayed the following quantitative estimate of the variance between the groups two by two: a) the variance between the group of thefts committed by a sole perpetrator and that of thefts perpetrated by two or more persons was Temp. = 4.73 (statement with an acceptance probability of ca 100 per cent); b) the variance between the group of thefts committed by a sole perpetrator and that of thefts perpetrated by one person assisted by inciters and aiders was Temp. = 1.64 (acceptance probability of 89.21 per cent); c) the variance between the group of thefts perpetrated by a sole person assisted by inciters and aiders and that of thefts perpetrated by two or more persons was Temp. = 2.66 (acceptance probability of 99.07 per cent). These values of the T-test clearly revealed that the essential variance, the “leap” in the extent of damage occurred between the thefts in complicity stricto sensu and those committed by joint perpetrators. The P7D programme enabled inter alia a graphic presentation of the variance among the three groups of theft (charts based on the standard deviation and its logarithm), and the depiction of the straight and reverse regression lines, see Appendix 2. 2.2. Analysis of sentence-related data. The sentence was the second (next to damage) empirical indicator of the gravity of the offence committed. Under Art. 35(3) CC, “the penalty shall be commensurate with the offence”. The manifest unfairness of the penalty imposed is a statutory ground to seek the modification of the sen-

s − s is the standard deviation − is the standard assessment error N N is the number of degrees of freedom The absolute value of T provides information on the level of variance between the groups compared. The bigger the T-value, the bigger the variance between two groups. This, however, is only true if the T-values are substantial. Empirical sociological research 211 tence.23 Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the penalty reflects not just the gravity (community danger and blame) of a perpetrated offence but also the peculiarities of the offender's personality (the risk that an offender poses to the community and any other circumstances relevant to the individualisation of the penalty).24 The data on the sentences for perpetrators in each of the three groups (sole perpetration, complicity stricto sensu, joint perpetration) were also studied by dispersion analysis. The average duration of the sentence was 6 months for thefts committed by sole perpetrators; 15 months for thefts committed by a sole perpetrator assisted by inciters and aiders; and 19 months for thefts committed by two or more persons. The standard deviation for each of the three groups was accordingly 3.5 months, 3.7 months, and 8.3 months, whereas the calculated empirical F-value was 72.55. Consequently, the “causative” factor (method of crime commission) according to which the three groups had been divided affected materially the “resultant” factor (in this case, the sentence). The probability for this conclusion to be trustworthy was close to 100 per cent.

23 In order to use the sentence imposed as an empirical indicator of the gravity of a perpetrated offence we should know if the sentencing practice of the court is legitimate, ie to what extent the court diverts from the statutory model of the ratio between “gravity of the offence” and “penalty”. Hence, it is necessary to compare empirically the established (factual) dependence between the gravity of the offence and the sentence, on the one hand, and the statutory (theoretical) dependence between these two factors, on the other hand, ie to establish the variance between “existing” and “due”. For a similar study of sentencing practices for thefts of public property (where regressive and correlative analysis is used) see Filchev, N. Criminal Offences Committed by Two or More Persons. − Dissertatsia. − Sofia, 1985, pp. 113-127 (in Bulgarian). 24 According to P. P. Ossipov, the relative weight of the act in the process of sentencing must be twice bigger than the relative weight of the offender's factor (A Comprehensive Study of the System of Impacting on Crime..., pp. 106-107). 212 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Empirical Survey Results (computer-processed data, Empirical sociological research 213

Appendix 2 BMPD statistical programme package used). 214 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

The analysis showed that the situation with sentences was exactly the opposite to that with damage. The variance in the average duration of the penalty for sole perpetration and for complicity stricto sensu was 9 months, whereas the variance between the average penalties for complicity stricto sensu and joint perpetration was 4 months. In other words, the substantial variance (in terms of the “penalty” indicator) occurred between the offences committed by a sole perpetrator and those committed by a sole perpetrator assisted by inciters and aiders. This conclusion was corroborated by the calculated values of the T-test of Student. According to Student's criterion, the variance between the first group (sole perpetration) and the third group of thefts (joint perpetration) was 14.6; the variance between the first and the second group (complicity stricto sensu) was 10.59; and that between the second and the third group was 3.81 (T-values). The acceptance probability of the conclusions drawn was quite high. 2.3. Results of the empirical survey. The analysis of the empirical research results (see Appendix 3) paved the way to the final conclusion that the hypotheses advanced at the outset were confirmed in practice. Where the three categories of theft were compared in terms of damage inflicted (as an objective indicator of their community danger), the material variance occurred between the thefts in complicity stricto sensu and those committed by joint perpetrators. The material damage caused by thefts in the latter group was nearly twice larger. a. The penalties imposed by the courts before 1982 for thefts in complicity stricto sensu failed to match the community danger of those offences. Although such thefts were much closer to sole perpetration in terms of damage caused, the penalties they carried were almost three times harsher that those imposed for sole perpetration. In terms of length of the sentence, the thefts committed in complicity stricto sensu were quite close to those committed by joint per- Empirical sociological research 215

Duration of sentence to match damage in 10 months 30 months

line with Criminal 6.7 months ;

Appendix 3 Code Classification of offence after 1 July 1982 Art 194(1) Art 194(1) in conjunc- with tion Art. 20 Art 195(1), p. 5 Degree between two

ajacent groups based 3.81 10.59 on T-test Variance between arithmetical means of

two ajacent 9 months 4 months groups Arithmetic mean of 6 penalties imposed 15 19 months months months

Classification of offence prior to 1982 Art 194(1) Art 195(1), p. 5 Art 195(1), p. 5 Variance between two ajacent groups 1.64 2.66 based on T-test

Variance between

(damage and penalty) in the event of theft of event penalty) in the and (damage two arithmetical

Damage Penalty and classification and Penalty Damage means of two ajacent 177.28 BGN 362.23 BGN groups Arithmetical mean of damage X 296.19 BGN 473.46 BGN 835.69 BGN Relation between method of crime commission and extent of community danger danger community of extent and commission crime of method between Relation Indicators Type of offence of Type on depending commission of method person sole by Thefts in complicity Thefts sensu stricto joint by Thefts perpetrators 216 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING petrators. That was at odds with the statutory requirement that the penalty should match the gravity of the offence (Art. 35(3 CC). The reason was the incorrect, aggravated classification by the court (before 1982) of offences committed in complicity stricto sensu. This was the major vice of earlier court case law and it had to be eradicated. b. According to the data of the Central Statistical Department, ca 30 per cent of the thefts of public property in the country are committed in concert, ie in complicity. Of them, 20 per cent are thefts in complicity stricto sensu and 80 per cent are thefts by joint perpetrators. The chart in Appendix 4 shows the relation between the frequency of the three types of theft and the average damage they inflict. The graphical image of that interdependence is yet another argument in support of the view that acts of complicity stricto sensu must be classified under the basic definition of the offence (in this case Article 194(1) CC), like the offences committed by a sole person. Thefts committed in complicity stricto sensu are relatively rare (barely 20 per cent of the thefts committed in complicity or 6 per cent of all thefts). Their limited occurrence is an additional factor (besides the limited damage they inflict) that determines their relatively lower extent of community danger compared to jointly perpetrated thefts (which account for 80 per cent of the thefts committed in complicity and 24 per cent of all thefts). Before the 1982 amendments to the Criminal Code acts of complicity stricto sensu were normally classified under the aggravated definition (Art. 195(1), point 5). That practice was allegedly intended to enhance the efficacy of the fight against concerted criminal activity. However, the actual results were contrary to those looked for: after classifying acts of complicity stricto sensu as aggravated offences, the courts were intuitively considering their low extent of community danger at the sentencing stage and were normally imposing insignificant penalties for them (the average sentence for thefts in complicity stricto sensu Empirical sociological research 217

Appendix 4

Relation between the frequency of the three types of theft and average damage caused

Average damage within group

(BGN)

835.69

473.46

296.19

thefts by sole perpetrator perpetrators joint by thefts stricto sensu stricto thefts in complicity in complicity thefts

70% 76% 100%

Relative share of the three types of theft (in terms of frequency) 218 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING was 15 months, very close to the absolute minimum of 12 months imprisonment set out in Art. 195(1), point 5). That wrong approach entailed a more liberal attitude of the courts to joint perpetration which also meant lenient sentences (19 months on average) mis- matching its genuine danger to the community. As a result, 20 per cent of the concerted offences were penalised relatively severely (because of their wrong classification under the aggravated rule of Art. 195(1), point 5 CC) while the other 80 per cent, viz. the acts of joint perpetration, were penalised far less stringently than their level of community danger required. That was the second vice of the former case law of the courts which called for the legislative changes of 1982. That situation confirmed the view that harsher repression does not necessarily imply a more efficient penal impact. The efficacy of the criminal law is conditioned by the differentiated approach to offences and penalties, the inevitability of criminal responsibility, and the swiftness of punishment. § 10. Scientific and technical progress and the criminal law

1. The progress of science and technology, and the substance of the criminal statute. Scientific and technical advancement bears on all spheres of public life: production, style of living, culture, etc. The vigorous development of science and technology is primarily visible in the automation and computerisation of industries and services, as well as in transport, telecommunications, and IT. Scientific and technical advancement steps up business performance, fosters economic development, entails a comprehensive approach to management and governance, and overall improves the quality of people's life. None the less, along with the benefits it brings to society scientific and technical progress has a number of harmful side effects: strong environmental pollution, proliferating sources of various hazards, mental stress affecting the working population, to mention a few. As any social phenomenon, criminality is affected by the progress of science and technology. On the one hand, scientific and technical advancement entails personal progress and the deployment of novel equipment to combat crime. On the other hand, it has negative, criminogenic effects. The system “man - technology” has seen a considerable pressure: work is becoming more complex while the mental and physical burden on workers intensifies. Modern technology's higher claims on people clash with their mental and physical limitations. Hence, the growing danger of operating it. Failure to observe safety instructions may be detrimental to people's life, health and property. This is particularly valid for working with auto- mated systems of management where the minutest mistake may 220 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING have a high social “price”.1 Consequently, scientific and technological advancement sharply increases the number of hazardous activities. This generates the need to regulate the new activities and penalise the breaches of the new rules. The elevated community danger of the negligent operation of equipment mandates that it be criminalised, ie resisted with the tools of the criminal law. The impact of scientific and technical advancement on the penal legislation is not confined to criminalising some negligent offences. That impact is much ampler and diverse. This essentially new stage in the development of science and technology is characterised by the discovery of new substances and sources of energy, the emergence of new areas and methods of work (the discovery of radioactive substances, the use of nuclear energy, the creation of calculating machines, the conquest of space, genetic dis- coveries, etc.). All these new processes are mirrored in the statutes. Moreover, the remit of law is expanding. Legal provisions, including those of the criminal law, regulate activities hitherto rare or unknown. Thus, the amendments to the Criminal Code of December 1975 were made to criminalise the destruction or damaging of aircraft (Art. 340(2) CC); the placing in an aircraft of a device likely to destroy or damage it (Art. 341(1) CC); the pollution of territorial or inland sea waters with oil products (Art. 325a CC); the breach of rules on the manufacture, acquisition, etc. of stupefacient or toxic substances (Art. 354(4) CC) or narcotic drugs (Art. 354a(5) CC); the preparation, acquisition, etc. of narcotic drugs (Art. 354a(1)-(4) CC). The legislation has two functions vis-Ў-vis the progress of science and technology − to “stimulate” and “deter”. The first means to enhance advancement and the implementation of the new attainments, whereas the second consists in curbing the downsides of scientific and

1 See Kvashis, V. E. Scientific and Technical Advancement and Liability for Negligence. − In: Major Areas of the Fight against Crime. − Moscow, 1975, pp. 114-115 (in Russian). Scientific and technical progress and the criminal law 221 technological development. More specifically, scientific and technological advancement bears on the following aspects of penal legislation: 1.1. A number of negligent acts in using technical equipment are criminalised. The objective aspect of those offences boils down to a breach of statutory safety rules that entails the operator's loss of control of the equipment and causes damage to (or threatens to damage) the life, health or property of an undefined number of citizens. The subjective aspect of such “technical” offences involves the knowing infringement of a safety rule and negligent causation of the prejudicial result. The following provisions of the Criminal Code refer to such acts (or cover some of their aspects): Art. 331 (negligent arson); Art. 335 (negligent flooding); Art. 341 (negligent damaging of a transport vehicle that has resulted in substantial damage); Art. 341a(5) (negligent placing in an aircraft of a device likely to destroy or cause damage to that aircraft where the consequences under Art. 341 have materialised); Art. 343 (violating the rules on road traffic or transport operation, etc., where this has negligently produced substantial damage); Art. 347(2) (negligent damaging of telegraph, telephone, etc. equipment); Art. 351 in conjunction with Art. 349 (negligent placing of an item dangerous to life or health in a water-conduit); Art. 351 in conjunction with Art. 350 (preparing foodstuffs or drinks so as to negligently create therein substances dangerous to health); Art. 352(3) (dangerous negligent pollution of water, soil, and air); Art. 352a(2) (negligent pollution of sea waters with oil products); Art. 356(2) (breach of established construction or other rules in performing construction works where it has negligently exposed to danger another's life). In addition to the above special rules, the Criminal Code also has the general provisions of Articles 123 and 134 which provide for heavier penalties for the negligent causation of death or bodily harm in the fulfilment of a hazardous activity (irrespective of the nature of that activity). 222 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

1.2. Environmental pollution (water, air, and soil) is another destructive effect of scientific and technological advancement. Nuclear radiation is especially dangerous to people. Industrial and domestic waste snowballs. Motor vehicles absorb a substantial amount of oxygen from the atmosphere. As a result, the autochthonous balance of nature is disrupted, human life and health are at risk. This urges the criminalisation of various encroachments on the environment. The Bulgarian Criminal Code, as it stands, sets out the following rules that penalise the damaging or threatening of natural sites: Art. 230(4) (breach of the Ordinance on combating plant diseases); Art. 235 (unauthorised felling of timber in the state forestry fund); Art. 236 (destruction or damaging of forest trees); Art. 237 (unauthorised killing or catching of game); Art. 238 (fishing with explosives); Art. 239 (breach of the rules on preserving fish resources); Art. 240 (industrial fishing by foreign nationals in Bulgarian waters); Art. 278c (destructing or damaging a protected area); Art. 323a (constructing an edifice on arable land or on a pasture); Art. 352 (dangerous pollution of water, soil, and air); Art. 352a(1) (pol- luting territorial or inland sea waters with oil products); Art. 353 (putting a manufacturing enterprise into operation without waste treatment facilities), etc. The lack of a structured system is notable when it comes to the criminal-law protection of natural environment. The Criminal Code has no general norm criminalising the conduct that materially dam- ages the environment. It only protects certain natural sites from offences. This engenders legal lacunae. A number of acts that are dangerous to society thus remain beyond the remit of the Criminal Code. The reason for this unsatisfactory state of the legal framework is the lack of a lucid and theoretically substantiated stance on the environment as a subject-matter of protection. Future refinement of penal legislation in this area necessitates that all offences against the environment be set apart in an Scientific and technical progress and the criminal law 223 autonomous chapter of the code; that the limits of criminal-law protection be defined and criteria developed for the criminalisation of relevant dangerous acts; that a well-structured system of rules with different levels of abstraction be drafted while striking the optimum balance between abstraction and specificity in the wording of the provisions. Finally, it is noteworthy that the insertion of new rules in the Criminal Code is not in conflict with the general trend towards limiting criminal repression. It only reflects the recent phenomena in public life ensuing from the development of science and technology. Moreover, the introduction of a new rule does not necessarily imply the criminalisation of a whole new category of acts. Some newly enacted provisions are specialised rules that follow up on a general provision and serve to differentiate criminal liability. 2. Criminalisation of negligent acts dangerous to society. The criminalisation of negligent acts is among the most debatable issues in contemporary criminal law. The prominent community danger of negligent acts derives from the following factors: a) The development of technology places in the hands of man powerful sources of energy. Their careless use may entail enormous damage similar to that caused by intentional offences. b) On the whole, negligent (criminal or other) offences cause larger material damage to society (in terms of human life and health or property) than intentional offences. c) The relative share of negligent offences in the total number of crimes is on the increase (this is especially valid for negligent transport-related offences).2 2.1. All these reasons mandate the criminalisation of a number of negligent acts in using equipment. Of course, the realm of pun-

2 See Dagel, P. S. Establishing Criminal Liability while Taking into Consideration the Subjective Aspect of Acts Dangerous to the Community. – In: Major Areas of the Fight against Crime, pp. 134-135. 224 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING ishable negligence cannot expand endlessly. Otherwise the newly coined rules would have a limited effect thus undermining the overall efficiency of the criminal law. Negligent acts should be criminalised subject to the principle of lessening criminal repression and in view of the chances to influence the respective behaviour with the tools of the criminal law. This implies a differentiated approach to the various types of negligent activity. P. S. Dagel identified the following criteria for the criminalisation of negligent acts dangerous to society: a) nature and extent of potential harmful effects; b) probability of their occurrence further to a breach of safety rules; c) availability of statutory safety rules applicable to the activity in question; d) frequency of the respective offence in a specific sphere of public life, etc.3 A certain category of acts may be criminalised by enacting one general rule or a number of specific prescriptions. The specific rules have a stronger deterrent and regulatory effect but tend to leave gaps in the legal framework. The problem faced by the lawmaker is not to choose either of these approaches but to identify the right blend of general and special provisions that penalise negligent conduct. As indicated earlier, the enactment of new definitions of offences does not necessarily extend the scope of punishable negligence. Often times the new rules emerge from a general rule and regulate only a segment of the scope of that general rule. The drafting of expounding, special rules evinces the process of differentiation of penal legislation. Negligent criminal offences are situational and the nature of the damage they might cause is normally unforeseeable. Therefore, it would be appropriate to differentiate the liability based on the offender's attitude to the breach of the safety rule, ie on whether the breach was committed knowingly or inattentively.4

3 Improving the Measures to Combat Crime..., pp. 174-175. 4 Improving the Measures to Combat Crime..., p. 236. Scientific and technical progress and the criminal law 225

2.2. The span of criminalisation also depends on the drafting technique used by the lawmaker. It is well known that, based on their structure, criminal offences divide into conduct and result crimes. The latter in turn may be endangering or damaging offences. The typical feature of endangering offences is that no damage occurs in reality but damage is latently possible. Objectively, endangering someone or something is the same as a criminal attempt. The difference lies in the mens rea: while an attempt is only possible if the offender has a direct criminal intent, endangering offences are associated with indirect intent or negligence. The Bulgarian lawmaker has chosen to structure negligent crimes primarily in the form of damaging offences and, occasionally, as conduct crimes. Besides, he has also defined some negligent endangering offences: examples include: Art. 351(1) in conjunction with para. 350(1) CC, first sentence (preparing foodstuffs or drinks so as to negligently create therein substances dangerous to health); Art. 352(3) in conjunction with paragraph (1), first sentence (negligent pollution of water basins, soil or air so as to make them dangerous to people, animals, and plants); Art. 356(2) (breach of established construction or other rules in the design and implementation of constructions that entails exposing another's life to danger). A number of authors today endorse the criminalisation of endangering negligent offences. They believe that this would rein- force the deterrent effect of the criminal law. As a matter of principle, though, criminal liability should be borne for damage actually caused. Objective damage is the measure of liability. It would be appropriate to criminalise endangering negligent offences only where most cherished values are at stake (eg state independence or human life); moreover, this should be done when such values are threatened by the negligent performance of a hazardous activity.5

5 Dagel, P. S., op. cit., in the compilation Major Areas of the Fight against Crime..., p. 137; see also Improving the Measures to Combat Crime..., pp. 168-172. 226 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

2.3. The criminalisation of negligent acts also brings to the fore two general issues: introducing specific insanity and fine-tuning the notion of negligence. a. As is known, people's mental and physical capacity is limited and they sometimes fail to keep abreast of the rampant growth of technology. A person who is sane in ordinary circumstances may lose his ability to “understand the substance or the consequences of his deeds or command them” in operating a sophisticated technical system, owing to mental stress. In such cases he cannot be held liable for the damage caused. Eventually, a “model of the expert” should be created, consisting of a full description of the mental and physical features that the operator of a technical system ought to posses.6 Defining criteria of professional fitness for some more complex activities would facilitate the court in its determination of whether a specific individual has acted in a state of insanity. b. The existing definition of negligence in Art. 11(3) CC is not adjusted to the reality of crime and need to be refined. One drawback of that definition is its failure to characterise the offender's state of mind. It is therefore inapplicable to the negligent conduct offences depicted in the special part of the Criminal Code. In addition, there exist forms of negligent attitude which, strictly speaking, do not fit the concepts of recklessness or negligence. Thus, a situation beyond the scope of Art. 11(3) CC is the one where the offender fails to foresee the socially dangerous consequences of his conduct while under an obligation to do so and could not have foreseen them because of his ignorance of the activity performed. Moreover, that ignorance is owing to slipshod behaviour, neglect by the offender of his instruction, ie a reason that cannot be

6 See Grinberg, M. S. Psychophysiological Limitations of Man and Criminal Liability. − Sov. gos. i pravo, No. 12/1974, pp. 70-75 (in Russian); also Improving the Measures to Combat Crime ..., pp. 112-114. Scientific and technical progress and the criminal law 227 excused.7 In this case guilt exists because the offender is able to become aware of his incompetence to engage in the relevant activity. Although this variety of negligent fault does not match the definition of Art. 11(3) CC, the lawmaker has reflected it in the special part of the Criminal Code in describing professional negligence (see Articles 123 and 134 CC). 3. Scientific and technological advancement and the form of the criminal statute. The social developments associated with scientific and technological progress affect the form of penal legislation as well as its substance. Further to technological improvements, the conflict between stability and flexibility of the law intensifies.8 The legislator is increasingly hard-pressed to define the optimum degree of abstraction (specificity) of criminal provisions. Two opposite trends clash in constructing the definitions in the Criminal Code: a) the aspiration to provide a specific description and detail to the extent possible the elements, hence, the community danger of the offence, that is, to differentiate liability, and b) the aspiration to create a sufficiently general rule that might cover all dangerous acts of the respective class. Abstract wordings endow the law with flexibility thus making it applicable to diverse situations in the rapidly evolving context of modern life. Contemporary legislation gravitates towards expounding the definitions of offences. This helps to specify the extent of community danger and measure the penalty. The crux of the matter, however, is how far the lawmaker should get in expounding the definitions in the Criminal Code. In order to answer this question, we should turn to the nature of modern social relations, to their dynamic and multifaceted evolution

7 For more details on this idea, see Liutov, K. Professional Negligence in the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. − Sofia, 1958, pp. 106- 110 (in Bulgarian). 8 See Improving the Measures to Combat Crime ..., pp. 81 et seq. 228 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING driven by scientific and technological advancement. The vigorous advance of science and technology today makes available to criminals a rich arsenal of instrumentalities and variants of criminal conduct. Hence the need to design rules that are sufficiently abstract to cover all possible varieties of a certain offence.9 Strict formalism in the criminal law is a thing of the past. Using blanket dispositions and judgmental elements in lawmaking is one way to transform the casuistic wordings into generalised rules. The growing number of blanket rules and judgmental elements in modern criminal law is yet another product of scientific and technological advancement. 3.1. The peculiarity of blanket wordings is that the disposition of the rule describes the conduct in question as a whole, by reference to generalised features, instead of depicting its separate components. A blanket rule can function only if additional information is sup- plied. The latter is contained in legislative instruments beyond the domain of the criminal law, and the blanket rule refers to those instruments.10 To put it differently, the description of criminal conduct has its follow-up in other legislative instruments. These specify the content of the blanket rule and enable its application. The Bulgarian Criminal Code contains a considerable number of blanket dispositions and it is fair to expect them to proliferate in future. The following are blanket rules: Art. 136; Art. 230; Art. 239(1; Art. 251; Art. 282; Art. 338; Articles 342 and 343; Art. 354(4); Art. 354a(5); Art. 354c; Art. 355; Art. 356, to mention a few. The growing number of blanket rules in the code is due to scientific and technical progress. It is well known that the method of

9 Cf. Kovaliov, M. I. On the Efficacy of Penal Legislation. – In: Issues of the Efficacy of the Criminal Statute. – Sv., 1975, p. 15 (in Russian). 10 See Sok ol ov, V. V. The principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege and the blanket dispositions of the criminal statute. – Sov. gos. i pravo, No. 12/1980, pp. 96-99 (in Russian); Grouev, L. Blanket Criminal Provisions. – Sofia, 1997 (in Bulgarian). Scientific and technical progress and the criminal law 229 legal regulation (in particular, the drafting technique) depends on the subject-matter of regulation, that is, on the properties of the relations to be covered. Social relations in the context of scientific and technological development have some peculiarities that fuel the preference for blanket criminal provisions: a. Dynamics of social relations. The raging expansion of science and technology changes swiftly the quality of social relations. The criminal provisions called upon to protect those relations must be sufficiently flexible to fit many and diverse situations in real life. Therefore, the rules should be more abstract. This is accomplished through blanket provisions. b. Intense regulation of social relations. In the context of scientific and technological progress, a growing number of activities become hazardous. Numerous rules are devised to regulate any such activity. The more detailed the regulation of a social relation (activity), the larger the number of ways and means to interfere with it as it may be transgressed by breaching any safety rule. An encroachment may be carried out in different ways or by impacting on different items or using different tools. Each element of the objective aspect of an offence is characterised by myriad homogenous variants. It is impossible to describe them all in the definition of constituent elements. On the other hand, homogenous elements affect the community danger of an offence in similar ways. The lawmaker therefore uses blanket, generalised features that characterise the offence as a whole, not its individual elements. To conclude, social relations in the era of scientific and technological advancement are subject to detailed regulation. They may be impinged on by breaching any relevant rule. Hence, in creating criminal provisions to protect those relations, the lawmaker describes the offence in relatively general terms, by reference to abstract features. 3.2. The increasing share of judgmental elements is another ramification of scientific and technological progress relevant to the 230 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING form of the criminal statute.11 It is known that the general properties of conduct are described by abstract judgmental features. The details of conduct are defined in turn by specific, unambiguous features. The uniformity of enforcement necessitates clear-cut and concise wordings. On the other hand, though, judgmental concepts are more suitable for the criminal law in the dynamic and sophisticated context of modern life. They instil flexibility in the legislation while ensuring its sustainability over a longer period of time.12 Strict, casuistic prescriptions cover a limited number of cases and therefore risk gaps in the law. Such prescriptions are appropriate for sunset statutes. The relation between descriptive (formal) and judgmental features in characterising criminal offences is one aspect of the tension between the stability and flexibility of the law. The ample reliance on judgmental concepts today calls for criteria for their usage in lawmaking. According to M. I. Kovaliov, the more abstract the statutory description of a criminal act or omission, the more specific the definition should be of the criminal result, and vice versa.13

11 The following are examples of judgmental features: “material” damage, damage that is “not immaterial”, “improper” acts, “gross” violation, “obvious” contempt, “substantial” breakdown, etc. 12 See Improving the Measures to Combat Crime ..., pp. 88-90. 13 Kovaliov, M. I., op. cit., pp. 15-16. § 11. Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of transition

1. The development of substantive penal legislation in the context of transition.* As a result of the turbulent economic, political, and social changes at the time of transition the legal system of Bulgaria has lagged considerably behind the development of society. The old legislation could no longer serve the new public needs. The inadequate legal framework affected adversely both economic development and the fight against crime. The legislative vacuum in finance and banking, taxation and privatisation control has facilitated fraud, misuse, embezzlement of public funds and their flight abroad. Penal legislation provided no tools apt to suppress crime. Transition to a market economy and democracy has seen new forms of dangerous behaviour beyond those addressed by the Criminal Code. 1.1. In July 1991, the new Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria was enacted and provided a basis for comprehensive legislative reformation of, inter alia, the criminal law. The new Constitution established parliamentary governance in the Republic of Bulgaria, along with political pluralism and the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial (Art. 8). It also envisaged the existence of a Constitutional Court as a specialised body vested with overseeing the constitutionality of legislation. The provisions of the Constitution have direct effect (Art. 5(2)). The Constitution also laid down a mechanism to approximate Bulgarian legislation with international law. By virtue of its Art. 5(4)

*§ 11.1 is based on criminal substantive legislation as it stood before 1997. See for more details Filchev, N. Strafrechtsentwicklung in Europa. 5.2. Freiburg, 1999. 232 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING the international treaties that are ratified in conformity with the Constitution, promulgated and in force for the Bulgaria form part of the country’s domestic law. The norms of such international treaties have direct effect. The state need not enact explicit legislation to endow such treaties with legal effect within the domestic legal system. Those treaties, however, do not always become part and parcel of Bulgaria’s internal legislation. Some treaty provisions are not “self-executing”, that is, they cannot be applied directly in the domestic legal order of the ratifying country. The lawmaker should then pass legislation to implement the respective international norms into national law and specify their effects. This is especially true of international treaty provisions in the field of criminal law. In its Judgment No. 7 of 1992 (State Gazette, issue 56 of 1992), the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria stated that the principle of direct effect of international treaties is considerably limited when it comes to the criminal law. In order for an international treaty provision criminalising a certain offence to apply, the lawmaker must expressly establish the elements of crime, as well as the type and level of the penalty it carries, in the special part of the Criminal Code by adopt- ing a domestic statute to that effect. That judgment of the Constitutional Court, however, is relevant only to substantive, not procedural, criminal provisions. Most international procedural norms encompass safeguards for a fair and impartial trial, for the freedom and integrity of the individual involved in criminal proceedings, for the right of defence, etc. Hence, international procedural rules become part of Bulgarian domestic legislation subject to the criteria in Art. 5(4) of the Constitution and should be applied directly in any criminal proceeding in this country. 1.2. The frequently changing governments after 1989 failed to adhere to any clear-cut policy designed to suppress crime. As a matter of fact, it is generally difficult to shape and pursue a consistent Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 233 crime policy at a time where statehood is disintegrating. Crime policy mirrors the intrinsic conflicts of society and the clash between political forces. Most generally, two trends may be discerned in the development of penal legislation in Bulgaria. The first is the approximation of Bulgarian legislation with European laws and standards (guaranteeing the right of defence, ensuring fair and impartial trials, etc.). The second trend has emerged from the violent growth of organised crime. That trend materialises primarily in criminalising new acts dangerous to the community, reinforcing the penalties for serious offences, and introducing measures especially devised to combat organised crime and corruption. Post-1989 penal legislation in Bulgaria has developed at a dra- matic pace. The Criminal Code underwent dozens of changes. These, however, invariably failed to convey a well-defined crime policy. Most of them were inspired by short-sighted considerations and lacked in substantiation. Some rules of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code were abolished so hastily that they had to be reinstated after some time. For example, in 1993 the legislator repealed Article 250 CC which penalised breaches of rules on the transactions in foreign exchange valuables, on the import and export of such valuables, and on the obligation to declare them (State Gazette, issue 10 of 1993), thus liberalising the foreign exchange regime. Soon thereafter, the economic situation in the country urged the re-criminalisation of those offences, so the current Article 251 CC was enacted (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995). The realm of criminal procedure offers another good example. In 1990, seeking to provide wider guarantees for the right of defence, the legislature abolished police investigation as a simplified form of pre-trial proceedings. Very soon, though, investigative magistrates became overloaded with criminal cases virtually to the point of paralysis. The wild growth of crime simply dictated the existence of different criminal procedures. Police investigation was thus rein- 234 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING stated as a form of pre-trial proceedings (State Gazette, issue 110 of 1993). 1.3. The following significant amendments were made to the general part of the Criminal Code: 1.3.1. In the event of a cumulative offence (Art. 26 CC), the offender is punished in view of the acts that form part of the cumulative offence taken in their entirety and for the overall criminal result caused thereby. The procedural rationale of the concept of “cumulative offence” lies in the fact that the res judicata of the verdict extends to all acts forming part of the cumulative offence even though some of then may have remained undetected or unknown to the trial court. If such an act is detected after the verdict has taken effect, the guilty individual can easily go unpunished for it because of the ne bis in idem principle (Art. 21(1), point 6, Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)). The only exit from this situation prior to the amendment was for the Supreme Court to reverse the verdict after an extraordinary reopening of the case (Art. 362(1), point 3 CPC) and remit the case for retrial from scratch, so that all acts done could be included in the overall cumulative offence. However, that legal solution had a disappointing social price. It meant new resources for the judicial system, time and expenses for witnesses, and a sluggish (hence, far less efficient) state response to the criminal offence. In order to limit the possibility of quashing verdicts on account of newly detected acts, the lawmaker made Article 26 CC on cumulative offences inapplicable to acts done after the service of indictment on the defendant (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995). In other words, the indictment isolates the cumulative offence from any post-indictment acts, and those new acts are not deemed components of the cumulative offence. The offender must face a separate penalty for them. 1.3.2. The concept of “official” in Bulgarian criminal law is rather vast and covers three categories of individuals: a) persons per- Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 235 forming official duties at a government institution, b) persons in managerial positions, and c) persons whose job implies safekeeping state-owned or municipal property (Art. 93, point 1 CC). The amendment to Art. 93, point 1(b) CC extended the third category of officials to include persons whose job implies safekeeping property belonging to any third party and inter alia to sole traders (State Gazette, issue 10 of 1993).That amendment resulted from an effort to make private and public property equally protected under the criminal law. What emerged in practice, however, was a very broad, almost absurd notion of “official”. That notion should be eventually revised and confined to the concept of “official” as delineated in the administrative law. 1.4. The important novelties in the special part of the Criminal Code can be summarised as follows: 1.4.1. Political crimes. In the aftermath of 10 November 1989, the lawmaker yielded to the public pressure and repealed Art. 273 CC (State Gazette, issue 91 of 1989) penalising the dissemination of false statements or any other act apt to instil mistrust in the public authorities or their endeavours or to generate public dismay. That provision had been used to persecute the political opponents of the former regime. Besides, a number of offences in Chapter One of the special part, Offences against the Republic were decriminalised: harbouring a person who has perpetrated an offence against the Republic (Art. 11 CC, repealed, State Gazette, issue 99 of 1989); failure to inform the authorities about a perpetrated offence against the Republic (Art. 112 CC, repealed, State Gazette, issue 99 of 1989); perpetrating offences as defined in Chapter One against another socialist state (Art. 113 CC, repealed, State Gazette, issue 99 of 1989). Some forms of the actus reus of anti-state agitation and propaganda under Art. 108 CC were decriminalised as well – now “the propaganda of fascist or other anti-democratic ideologies or the forcible change of the social and state organisation established by the 236 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Constitution” alone qualify as offences under the code (State Gazette, issue 99 of 1989). The preparation to an offence is generally not prosecuted under Bulgarian penal legislation (Art. 17(2) CC). This principle enshrines the view that criminal liability should accrue only where damage is caused. By way of derogation, ex Article 110 CC penalised the preparation to commit offences against the Republic. The 1989 amendments confined the prosecution of preparation only to the most dangerous offences against the state (State Gazette, issue 99 of 1989). 1.4.2. Before 1993, the Criminal Code listed the offences against property in two different chapters depending on the type of property: socialist (state-owned, cooperative, community) or personal. Criminal responsibility was differentiated accordingly: the penalties for offences against socialist property were heavier than for similar offences against personal property. The Constitution of 1991 defined property in Bulgaria as public or private and proclaimed that both forms shall enjoy equal protection. Thus, in 1993 the lawmaker was compelled to relocate all offences against property in one chapter of the special part (covering theft, robbery, embezzlement, appropriation, fraud, extortion, concealment, destruction or breakdown of items, abuse of confidence) and to envisage the same penalties for those offences irrespective of the type of property involved, ie public or private (State Gazette, issue 10 of 1993). 1.4.3. The amendments to the rule on embezzlement (Art. 201 CC) illustrate the profound political clash at the stage of transition and the aspiration to employ justice to political ends. 1.4.3.1. The background of the issue. Article 201 CC had been created to criminalise a certain category of offences against socialist property (state-owned, cooperative or belonging to community organisations). There were two forms of property at that time, viz. public and personal. The rule on embezzlement prohibited the Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 237 unlawful transformation of public property into personal one (of course, strictly speaking, property cannot be lawfully “acquired” from an offence). The transformation of one type of public property into another, however, was not deemed an offence against socialist property, so it did not qualify as embezzlement. The Supreme Court had reiterated this principle in its interpretative instruments. Thus, Interpretative Decision 50-1980-OSNK provided: “In the event of embezzlement the offender or a third party actually receives public property completely unfoundedly, moreover with the purpose to appropriate it for his personal benefit… In some situations, however, the earmarking, authorisation or disbursement of public funds fail to match the objective and subjective elements of any of the offences under Articles 201-205, as the expenses in question were necessary and incurred in the public interest.” (Reports of Regulations and Interpretative Decisions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bulgaria in Criminal Cases, 1953-1990, Sofia, 1990, p. 230). The view that socialist property was only encroached upon when disposal thereof had served the personal interest of an individual was articulated even better in Regulation 8-1978-Pl.VS on documentary fraud. The acts covered by Chapter Five of the Criminal Code “constitute appropriation and are perpetrated with the aim to provide a natural person – the offender or a third party – with a material benefit. As a result of the act, damage is inflicted on socialist property, the possessions in question can no longer serve their intended public purpose, the powers of the owner are exercised by the individual in his personal interest …Where public property is transferred from one socialist organisation to another, it on the one hand remains socialist property, while on the other such transfer is not designed to benefit a natural person… The statute protects socialist property, not operational management; therefore, as long as the property remains public, the collective object protected by this 238 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING chapter of the Criminal Code is not affected” (Reports of Regulations and Interpretative Decisions of the Supreme Court …, p. 249-250). These considerations were equally valid for embezzlement. The major principle highlighted by the Supreme Court was that embezzlement only existed where the offender disposed of public property in the name of an individual’s personal interest. This was logical as the Constitution in force distinguished between public and personal property. 1.4.3.2. The new Constitution of 1991 provided that property in Bulgaria shall be private and public (Art. 17(2)). Private property, in turn, may be personal (belonging to a natural person) or corporate (belonging to a legal entity). The judicial enforcement of Art. 201 CC on embezzlement thus had to be made consistent with the new Constitutional provisions. Hence, any illicit transfer of property from the patrimonium of one owner into the patrimonium of another owner should be regarded as an offence. The then existing general definition of embezzlement under Art. 201 CC could be given a fresh substance in the light of the Constitution. 1.4.3.3. Up until 1995 the legal definition of embezzlement was reading: “an official who appropriates another’s money or items whose possession has been entrusted to him for safekeeping or management shall be punished for embezzlement …” (Art. 201 CC). In 1995, that definition was supplemented by adding the words “by disposing thereof in his own or another’s personal interest” after the phrase “whose possession has been entrusted to him for safekeeping or management” (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995). As a result, one specific form of disposing with someone else’s property – disposal to the benefit of an extraneous corporate interest – no longer qualified as embezzlement. The underlying idea of that legislative change was to bring to a close a specific category of lingering criminal proceedings. The presenter of the amendments reasoned that Article 201 CC would be allegedly brought into line with the case law of the Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 239

Supreme Court. That justification displayed an extreme confusion over both the legislation in force and the case law of the Supreme Court. In reality, the legal result ensuing from the amendment was to limit the scope of Article 201 CC in two respects: a. As is well known, embezzlement may take place in two ways: through the illicit disposal of an item entrusted to the offender as if it were his own, for his personal benefit or for the benefit of another, or through the illicit refusal to return the entrusted item to the person entitled to claim it.1 All criminal statutes of the Republic of Bulgaria to date have expressly specified that the actus reus of embezzlement may materialise in two forms: disposing of the item as if it were the offender’s property or refusing to return the item (cf. Art. 319(2) of the Criminal Act (1896); Art. 189 (3) of the Criminal Act (1951); Art. 189(3) of the Criminal Code (1956)). Thus, Article 189(3) of the Criminal Code (1956) stipulated: “Embezzlement shall be deemed perpetrated once the possessor or guardian disposes of the item as if it were his own or once he denies that it belongs to the person entitled to claim it”. After the latest amendment to the current Criminal Code, the second form of embezzlement was no longer considered a crime. b. The second constraint on the scope of Art. 201 CC stemmed from the fact that after the amendment embezzlement only existed if the official disposed of the item for the benefit of another individual. By contrast, there was no embezzlement if the official disposed of the property in the interest of a corporation. Thus, a number of acts dangerous to society and consisting in the illicit transfer of state assets to the patrimonium of various private formations were left outside the ambit of Article 201 CC. Of course, the illicit disposal of state assets to the benefit of a private legal entity remained an offence even after the amendment to

1 See along these lines Nenov, I. Criminal Law. Special Part. Vol. 1. – Sofia, 1956, pp. 183 and 195 (in Bulgarian). 240 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Art. 201 CC and should be classified as intentional mismanagement under Art. 219(3) CC or appropriation under Art. 206 CC. The political drive for this legislative solution was self-evident, as was its social and legal ill-foundedness. 1.4.3.4. Developments, however, did not halt there. At the request of the Prosecutor General, the Constitutional Court declared the amendment to Art. 201 unconstitutional so the rule was reinstated in its previous form (Judgment No. 19 of the Constitutional Court of 12 October 1995, State Gazette, issue 97 of 1995). The major consideration of the Constitutional Court was that the amendment had allegedly infringed the Constitutional principle of equal statutory protection of different types of property (public and private). This judgment of the Constitutional Court may rouse disagree- ment as well. Article 201 CC protects all types of property. Any property belonging to someone else may be the subject-matter of the offence under Art. 201 CC. In other words, the criminal law extends its protection to public and private property alike. The amendment to Art. 201 CC indeed distinguished to some extent between the two. However, this was not a difference in the object of protection but in the possible encroachments on property and their classification under the criminal law. In the event of embezzlement, a “disposal” could benefit the offender or any third party. The third party’s interest could be individual or corporate. By amending the rule, the lawmaker singled out, within the entire category of disposals covered by Art. 201 CC, disposals in someone else’s corporate interest and provided a slightly different regime of criminal responsibility for them. After the amendment, that offence had to be classified under Art. 219(3) or Art. 206 CC (and no longer under Art. 201 CC). It is therefore clear that public and private property alike could be encroached upon by disposals in someone else’s corporate interest. The amendment to Article 201 CC differentiated the liability Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 241 depending on the interest – public or private – in which the official disposed of the property. Where the disposal served the offender’s personal interest or the interest of another individual, the act had be classified as embezzlement under Art. 201 CC. Conversely, where the disposal benefited someone else’s corporate interest, the act had to be classified as intentional mismanagement or appropriation (provided that all other elements of the respective offence were present). In other words, the lawmaker differentiated the criminal liability for offences targeted at the same object depending on whether the acquirer of the item was a natural or legal person. It is arguable whether such differentiation is advisable when it comes to similar offences against another’s possessions but at least there was no differential treatment of public and private property. Hence, the amendment to Article 201 CC was not inconsistent with the Constitutional proviso on the equal protection of different types of property. The legislative solution was inexpedient indeed but the expediency of statutes falls within the exclusive discretion of Parliament. The Constitutional Court, on its part, may only determine if a piece of legislation is constitutional.2 1.4.4. At the time of transition to a market economy, the community danger of some economic crimes associated with centralised government production and distribution faded out, and new dangerous phenomena emerged (or existing ones have expanded). These social changes prompted legislative response. A number of provisions in the chapter on Offences against the Economy were repealed as inconsistent with the principles of market economy: non-ear- marked use of public funds (Art. 221 CC); drawing up statements of account for a construction site substantially different from the actual numbers (Art. 221b CC); stating false source data in drawing up an economic plan (Art. 222 CC); receipt by lessor of rentals higher

2 On this issue see also Mihaylov, D. The Actus Reus in the Event of Embezzlement. – Savremenno pravo, 1996, No. 1, pp. 7-15 (in Bulgarian). 242 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING than the statutory ones (Art. 225a CC); unauthorised purchase of goods for resale, or selling such goods (Art. 233 CC); commercial agency without authorisation (Art. 234(1 CC); entrepreneurial construction of residential homes or summer houses (Art. 234(2 CC); breach of the statutory monopoly on foreign trade (Art. 241 CC), etc. Concurrently, quite dangerous offences surfaced in the area of finance and banking. Thus, in 1995 (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995) the following were criminalised: bank transfers of money abroad using an inauthentic or forged or false document (Art. 250 CC, new provision); taking up the business of banking without the relevant authorisation (Art. 252(1) CC, new provision); transacting the business of banking with funds obtained in breach of the existing provisions (Art. 252(2) CC, new provision). The latter rule was copied from U.S. legislation in an effort to tackle money laundering. 1.4.5. Other amendments. In 1991 the number of punishable offences against citizens’ political rights was extended by criminalising the following acts: unlawful hindrance of another individual to exercise his political rights under the Constitution (Art. 169b CC, new provision); forcing another individual to become a member of or leave a political party or an organisation or movement pursuing political goals (Art. 169a CC, new provision, State Gazette, issue 1 of 1991). Preventing others from taking up employment and forcing someone to leave his job because of his nationality, race, religion, social background, political affiliation or political opinion were criminalised as well (Art. 172 CC, State Gazette, issue 10 of 1993). The new provision of Art. 172a CC penalised “audio-video piracy” (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995). The rules protecting intellectual property rights were enacted to align Bulgarian legislation with the international standards in this area. The abolition of Articles 280 and 281 CC (State Gazette, issue 37 of 1989) decriminalised the failure of Bulgarian nationals having gone abroad to return to the country. The new proviso of Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 243

Art. 343b CC (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995) evoked heated debates as it introduced criminal liability for a conduct offence, viz. driving a motor vehicle with blood concentration of alcohol in excess of 1.2 per mille. Heavier penalties were also prescribed for the aggravated forms of some offences, eg filing a false return where offender aims to avoid taxes due (Art. 313(2) CC, State Gazette, issue 10 of 1993); unlawful transfer, production and trade in weaponry where the offence is committed by an official availing of his official capacity or if the offence is repeated or if the subject-matter of offence is of high value (Art. 337(2), (3) and (4) CC, State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995). 1.5. The system of penalties under the Criminal Code of Bulgaria. 1.5.1. The system of penalties3 set out in Article 37 CC was characterised by two essential peculiarities. It covered a relatively large number of different penalties – thirteen in total. In the case law, though, imprisonment sentences were and still are prevalent. These are too often imposed by the courts. To restrict the scope of imprisonment, the principle of ultima ratio should be embraced, ie a rule should be added to the general part of the Criminal Code to the effect that short-term prison sentences are imposed only in exceptional circumstances.4 1.5.2. The Criminal Code of Bulgaria used to envisage capital punishment for the most serious offences (Art. 37(2) CC, subsequently amended). It could be imposed if the specific offence was extraordinarily grave and the objects of punishment defined in Art. 36 CC could not be attained through any lighter penalty (Art. 38(1) CC, subsequently amended). The public in Bulgaria engaged in vig-

3 See Grouev, L. Indispensable Changes in the System of Sanctions under the Criminal Code. − Savremenno pravo, 1995, No. 3, pp. 19-30 and No. 4, pp. 26-34 (in Bulgarian). 4 Grouev, L., op. cit. − Savremenno pravo, 1995, No. 3, p. 23. 244 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING orous debates over the death penalty.5 The Parliament took two steps to abolish it. First, a moratorium was introduced on the execution of death sentences. Second, life imprisonment was added to the system of criminal sanctions (Art. 37 CC) and replaced the capital punishment. 1.5.3. In analysing the development of the criminal law after 1989, it is worth mentioning the amendment to Art. 80(1), point 1 CC on statutory limitation. The rule of Art. 80(1), point 1 CC was reading that criminal prosecution shall extinguish on account of statutory limitation if no such prosecution has been initiated over the span of twenty years. That wording was supplemented in the sense that, by way of exception, murder of two or more persons would be subject to a statutory limitation of thirty-five years (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990). The aim of that extended period was to enable the prosecution of the individuals responsible for the massacres in the camps at the time of the totalitarian regime. However, it is hardly possible to extend the period of statutory limitation retroactively. The Criminal Code expressly provides that newly passed rules of the criminal law shall not retroact, unless they are more favourable to the offenders. In particular, Article 2(2) CC stipulates that if different laws follow before a sentence has taken effect, the law that is most favourable to the offender shall apply. A norm extending the period of statutory limitation is certainly less favourable to offenders, so it cannot apply to existing relationships. It is obvious that the problem should be resolved in a different way.6 1.6. The European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (1990) was ratified by an Act of Parliament (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1993) and entered

5 See Grouev, L. The Death Penalty. – Sofia, 1998 (in Bulgarian). 6 See on statutory limitation Girginov, A. Statutory Limitation in Criminal Law. – Sofia, 1992 (in Bulgarian). Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 245 into force for Bulgaria on 1 October 1993 (Convention published in the State Gazette, issue 43 of 1994). The Convention places each Party thereto under an obligation to: a) establish as offences under its domestic law the concealment, acquisition, use and transfer of the proceeds from a predicate offence, as well as the assistance of a person having committed an offence in evading criminal prosecution; b) adopt measures to establish the confiscation of the concealed proceeds from the predicate offence, ie of “dirty money”; c) provide for a court proceeding for the confiscation of the proceeds from the predicate offence and a possibility to appeal before a court; d) provide for measures to identify and trace the proceeds from crime and, above all, regulate the controls to be applied by financial institutions to avoid the circulation of dirty money; e) implement in its domestic law the specific Convention provisions on international cooperation in the investigation and confiscation of proceeds from crime. In implementation of the Convention, Bulgaria enacted its first Measures against Money Laundering Act (State Gazette, issue 48 of 1996) which had a number of deficiencies. Therefore, in 1998 that Act was repealed and a new Measures against Money Laundering Act was adopted in its stead (State Gazette, issue 85 of 1998).7 1.7. The crime policy of the contemporary Bulgarian state must meet the specific needs of public life, it must be consistent with the social context. The problem is how to “translate” the economic needs and political requirements into the language of the law, that is, to set up a “machinery” to transform the public interest into rules of the criminal law. The development of Bulgarian penal legislation in recent years and the amendments to it have not emanated from any

7 See on this Panayotov, P. Money Laundering in Penal Legislation. – Sofia, 1998 (in Bulgarian). 246 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING specific crime policy. A number of amendments are there because of short-term pressures and, hence, lack in consistency. The lawmaker now faces the following strategic goals in the field of the criminal law: a) Shaping fair and humane penal legislation driven by public interests. The statutes must accord the individual fair protection against criminal offences, efficient and fair criminal proceedings where the right balance has been struck between the interests of the defendant, the victim, and the community. They must also ensure the access of all citizens to criminal justice irrespective of their property or standing in society. b) Second, Bulgarian penal legislation should be aligned with international rules and standards. This means, inter alia, to put in place a modern system of penalties while extending the range of non-custodial sanctions; undertake legislative and organisational measures to prevent any potential occurrence of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of defendants and sentenced persons; envisage government compensation for the vic- tims of crime where the offender has remained unknown; bring the legislation in full compliance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice; provide for efficient measures to protect children from abuse; criminalise a number of dangerous acts in the fields of economy, finance, environmental protection, IT, and tighten the penalties for corruption, misuse of power, production of and trafficking in narcotics, and for all forms of organised crime and terrorism. c) A number of other issues need to be addressed in the process of reforming Bulgarian penal legislation. It is necessary to reassess the gravity of criminal offences in the light of the new societal context and categorise the crimes while attaching homogenous legal effects to all offences within a given category; refine the rules on insanity, guilt, and repeat offending; resolve the problem with cor- Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 247 porate liability (liability faced by legal entities and crime syndicates), etc.8 1.8. Hence, penal legislation should develop and improve in two major respects: humanising its substantive and procedural rules in concordance with European standards, and stepping up the suppression of organised crime and terrorism through the tools of the criminal law. To be efficient, penal legislation must match the reality of crime, mirror the status quo while keeping abreast of developments in the criminal world. The drafting of efficient criminal provisions necessitates a series of sociological surveys and, above all, an inquiry into the typical forms of behaviour dangerous to the community. a. Violent conduct should be studied – aggression in the economy and politics, in the family and in the street, in interethnic relations, the circulation of weapons among the population, the formation of large armed groups – and matching criminal provisions should be added to the special part of the Criminal Code. In this connection, the institution of self-defence must be improved to provide citizens with ampler opportunities to oppose criminal assaults.9 b. The economy appears to be among the most crime-prone areas. At the time of transition to a market economy, economic behaviour needs to be redefined so as to identify those dangerous acts that deserve criminalisation. The different forms of illicit “acquisition” of others’ property should be targeted in particular. c. Modern organised crime has gone beyond the traditional frames of complicity. Therefore, new legal rules should be coined to reflect adequately the community danger inherent in organised con-

8 See on this Girginov, A. Individuals Competent to Stand Trial. – Sofia, 1995 (in Bulgarian). 9 See Stoynov, A. The Victim of a Criminal Offence. – Sofia, 1993 (in Bulgarian); Girginov, A. Self-defence and Necessity. – Sofia, 1995 (in Bulgarian). 248 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING certed criminal activities. Such rules must provide for differentiated criminal liability for all participants in a criminal association, though without going to the extreme of strict liability. d. As to corruption, the problem there is not in the lack of legal definition. The existing Criminal Code has a number of provisions proscribing the major forms of corruption. These are the rules on bribery (Articles 301-307a CC); breach of official duty in order to obtain a benefit (Art. 282 CC); using one’s official capacity to receive an illicit benefit (Art. 283 CC), etc. The current provisions need to be “adjusted” to the modern disguises of corruption: new qualified definitions should be designed for the above-listed offences and expounding rules be enacted to address the specific forms of corruption typical of some spheres of public life. 2. The development of criminal procedure in the context of transition.* 2.1. Suppression of crime goes hand in hand with restrictions on citizens’ human rights and freedoms. When making decisions in the field of criminal procedure, the lawmaker inevitably comes across the dilemma which of these values is to be privileged – the public interest in the fight against crime or individual human rights.10 The problem lies in striking a fair balance between the individual’s per-

* § 11.2 is based on the criminal procedure legislation as it stood before 1997. See for more details Filchev, N. Strafrechtsentwicklung in Europa. 5.2. Freiburg, 1999. 10 According to I. Petroukhin, a Russian expert in criminal procedure, “throughout the world, two theories have been in conflict for centuries; the first proclaims suppression of crime as a value of the utmost importance while pushing human rights to the backstage, while the second stands by the preva- lence of human rights that should not be sacrificed to step up the fight against crime” (Petroukhin, I. Suppression of Crime in a Democratic Society. – Gosudarstvo i pravo, 1993, No. 10, p. 88). The same has been reiterated by a number of German experts in criminal procedure, eg E. Schluechter, J. Benfer, H. H. Kuehne, and others. Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 249 sonal freedom and the public need to rein in crime through efficient criminal justice. The progress of Bulgarian criminal procedure reflects the incessant search for that equipoise of individual and general interests. 2.2. Right of defence. 2.2.1. The right of defence is complex in substance. It encom- passes a number of rights, including the right to counsel. According to the Constitution of 1991, “everyone has the right to defence by an attorney as from his arrest or involvement as an accused person” (Art. 30(4)). In that respect, the Criminal Procedure Code actually evolved ahead of the Constitution. Before 1990, counsel was entitled to participate in criminal proceedings as from the service of pre-trial investigation materials. That rule was conducive to a prosecutorial bias in evidence gathering and to violations of defendants’ rights. In 1990 (one year before the enactment of the new Constitution) Art. 73(1) CPC was amended to provide counsel with the right to participate in criminal proceedings as from the client’s arrest or involvement in the procedure as an accused (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990). In parallel, a number of procedural safeguards were put in place for the defendant’s right to counsel. Article 73(2) CPC thus requires the pre- trial authority to provide the accused with a possibility to contact counsel; pre-trial bodies are prohibited from making any investigative steps unless the above obligation has been fulfilled. Counsel is entitled to be present at all procedural steps in the context of investigation (Art. 75(1) CPC). The accused may choose to testify only in the presence of counsel; any such request is placed on the record and counsel must be summoned for the interview (Art. 87(1) CPC). The above amendments to the CPC (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990) are indisputable attainments in the evolution of the right of defence. None the less, the case law on the novel provisions has shown that some of them are worded inappropriately. Thus, counsel may abuse their right to be present at any and all procedural steps in 250 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING the course of investigation (Art. 75(1) CC). Where investigation deploys against several defendants and all of them have counsel, the requirement that each attorney be present at all investigative steps obstructs pre-trial investigation. Therefore, the right of counsel to be present should be confined de lege ferenda to the investigative steps of direct concern to his own client. 2.2.2. In 1990, Art. 277 CPC was amended to eliminate the possibility for a defendant’s pre-trial testimony to be attached to the evidence on the file where: a) there is considerable discrepancy between that testimony and the testimony given in the courtroom, or b) the defendant refuses to testify before the court (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990). The amendment was allegedly made to prevent the extortion of a defendant’s confession at the pre-trial stage by use of threat or force. The pendulum, however, swung to the other extreme – the work of investigators became largely pointless. Therefore, in 1995 the possibility to read out in court defendants’ pre-trial testimony was reinstated (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995) in parallel to the already existing right of counsel to participate actively in pre-trial investigation. 2.2.3. Before 1990, only the Prosecutor General and the President of the Supreme Court were able to initiate the extraordinary review of effective verdicts and sentences. In refining the right of defence, the lawmaker enabled all parties to a criminal proceeding (sentenced person, private complainant, civil plaintiff, civil defendant) as well as the Prosecutor General to trigger the appellate review of effective verdicts and sentences – Art. 350 CPC (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990). The downside of that move is that the extraordinary review proceeding now, sort of, replicates the regular proceeding at second instance. 2.3. Pre-trial investigation. 2.3.1. In making the laws, the legislature faces the pros and cons of the differentiation of criminal proceedings. Should criminal Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 251 justice diversify to reflect the gravity and complexity (in fact or in law) of the offences tried or a single, unified procedure should exist for all offences? A perfect criminal procedure must enshrine all guarantees that the real facts will be ascertained and all safeguards for the right of defence. This, however, makes the process of criminal justice exceedingly formal, complicated, and lengthy. The explosive growth of crime today urges the state to respond quickly and efficiently to protect the community from criminal offences. Hence, criminal proceedings need to be differentiated by category of offence (in line with the community danger and reproof of different criminal acts, the factual and legal complexity of criminal investigation, the evidentiary problems, etc.). The forms of criminal procedure should match public needs. The differentiation of criminal procedure is therefore a must. The hardship lies in striking the right balance between the two imperatives: ensuring a fair procedure where the facts are firmly established while providing a rapid and efficient response to crime. In other words, the problem is to set up a simplified fast-track procedure for lighter offences, while preserving sufficient procedural safeguards for the ascertainment of facts and for the right of defence. 2.3.2. The Criminal Procedure Code passed in 1974 (State Gazette, issue 89 of 1974) envisaged three forms of criminal proceedings: a) criminal proceeding with preliminary investigation; b) criminal proceeding with summary police investigation; and c) fast- track proceeding. 1990 saw the abolition of police investigation and fast-track proceedings that had served as simplified forms of criminal justice (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990). All criminal offences (even the pettiest ones) were thus channelled into the complex and cumbersome procedure with pre-trial investigation. The case law quickly brought to light the irrationality of that move – investigators became lost in pending cases, many pre-trial investigations were delayed or suffered in quality. The overall efficiency of criminal jus- 252 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING tice was greatly undermined and the lawmaker was compelled to reinstate police investigation as a summary, simplified form of preliminary investigation (State Gazette, issue 110 of 1993). The problem with police inspection bodies emerged then. Before 1990, police investigation was vested in officers in charge at the Ministry of Interior. The separation of powers under the new Constitution, however, required that pre-trial criminal proceedings be entrusted exclusively to investigative magistrates who were members of the Judiciary in Bulgaria (Art. 128 of the Constitution). It was therefore accepted (in line with the Constitution) that only assistant investigative magistrates might operate as police investigation bodies (Art. 229 CPC, subsequently repealed). 2.3.3. In 1993 (State Gazette, issue 39) the legislature introduced the summary trials of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of district courts at first instance where: a) the person was caught while perpetrating the offence or immediately thereafter; b) manifest traces of the crime were found on the person’s body or clothes; c) the person appeared himself before the relevant bodies of the Ministry of Interior or the prosecutor and confessed to the offence committed (Art. 171(2) CPC, subsequently amended). Besides, summary trials are possible only if the case is not complex in fact or in law. Summary proceedings are criminal proceedings where no pre- trial investigation takes place (Articles 409-414 CPC, subsequently amended). The procedure is as follows. The summary proceeding is launched by the police who provide the prosecutor with the materials collected (records of crime-scene inspection, search and seizure, interview of the incriminated person, interviews of eye-witnesses, reference information, and any other documents). The prosecutor may issue immediately a reasoned warrant whereby he press- es charges and submits the case to court. The prosecutor may detain the suspect up until the first working day thereafter. Where the judge Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 253 is satisfied that the conditions to proceed with the case have been met, he commits the suspect to trial and schedules a hearing that should take place in no more than three days. The court returns the verdict and sentence with reasons. As long as no special rules exist, the general rules of criminal procedure apply. This summary procedure contributes to promptness and procedural economy while providing sufficient guarantees for the ascertainment of facts and for the right of defence. Summary proceedings give rise to a number of theoretical and practical issues. The nature of the data collected by the police appears to be a major one. Although related to the evidence on the file, this data is not evidence within the meaning of Art. 84 CPC. Police data has no evidentiary strength as it is not collected under the procedure set down in the CPC, that is, police gather it outside any formal criminal procedure. For that reason the court may interview as a witness even the police officer who was an eyewitness to the crime (although the same policeman may have taken the initial investigation steps under Art. 409 CPC, subsequently amended). 2.4. Detention on remand and judicial review (Habeas corpus). 2.4.1. The measure to prevent absconding known as “detention on remand” curtails substantially the freedom of a defendant. The institution of detention on remand is a clear projection of the procedural task to find the optimum balance between the citizen’s individual rights and the public interest in efficient criminal justice. A number of amendments to Art. 152 et seq. CPC on pre-trial detention were made in search of that balance. The most important ones are listed below: a) the range of offences that may trigger detention as a measure to prevent absconding was extended: the minimum penalty required to apply detention was reduced from ten to five years’ imprisonment (Art. 152(1) CPC, subsequently amended, State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995); 254 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

b) the absolute proviso of Art. 152(3) CPC (subsequently repealed) was created which made detention an inevitable and mandatory measure of coercion in some specific circumstances (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995); c) the generally worded ground for detention “important state interests” was abolished as it had often been abused in the past (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990). 2.4.2. To determine the importance of these changes, we should consider the objects, grounds, and criteria for imposing detention on remand in Bulgarian criminal procedure. Under Art. 147(1) CPC (subsequently amended) any measure to prevent absconding, including detention on remand, was to be imposed to prevent a defendant from fleeing or committing another offence or obstructing justice or the execution of a final sentence.11 These objects also served as legal bases to order detention and were therefore subject to proof. The key criterion in selecting a measure of procedural coercion is the proportionality between the severity of the measure sought and the goal it pursues. The freedom of the accused may be restricted only to the extent necessary to hit the targets of criminal justice. Therefore, in deciding on the measure to prevent absconding the competent authority must estimate on a case-by-case basis the gravity of the offence and the potential conduct of the accused person (Article 147(2) CPC lists the following elements to be considered: extent of community danger of the offence; evidence against the accused;

11 A coercive measure to prevent absconding is not a sentence for the perpetrated offence. Such measures aim at preventing possible endeavours by a accused person to interfere with the objects of criminal justice – detecting the offence and punishing the culprits as required by statute. It is only where a coercive measure is imposed “to prevent the accused from committing another offence” that it has a deterrent effect, viz. to protect the community from other offences. Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 255 health status, family status, profession, age, and any other relevant personal circumstances of the accused).12 2.4.3. The first ground to order detention under the CPC was the commission of a serious intentional offence (Art. 152(1) CPC, subsequently amended). In 1995 Article 152(3) CPC was enacted (State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995, subsequently amended) providing that “paragraph 2 shall not apply where the accused is also a party to a pending proceeding for another indictable offence or in the case of repeat offending”. After that change, the rules on detention for serious intentional offences looked as follows: Art. 152(1) CPC set out the principle that detention shall be ordered for a serious intentional offence. Art. 152(2) CPC (subsequently amended) introduced an exception to the principle if no risk existed of the defendant’s fleeing or obstructing justice or committing other offences, that is, if the objects set in Art. 147(1) CPC could be achieved by applying a lighter measure of coercion. Art. 152(3) CPC (subsequently amended) made the exception in paragraph 2 inapplicable where the defendant was also involved in a pending proceeding for another indictable crime and in respect of repeat offenders. In other words, paragraph 3 of Article 152 CPC (subsequently amended) precluded the application of paragraph 2 and referred back to the principle defined in paragraph 1. Article 152(3) CPC, as it stood in 1995, provoked numerous problems. The major one concerned its consistency with the international treaties to which Bulgaria was a party and which, by virtue of

12 This principle is known in German law as the “fundamental principle of consistency” (Verhaeltnismaessigkeitgrundsaetz). According to the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany, the principle of consistency enables the competent authorities to order detention only if it is the sole possible measure to ensure the normal progress of the proceedings, ie if there is no other means to ensure investigation into the offence and the execution of the sentence. 256 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

Art. 5(4) of the Constitution, prevailed over conflicting domestic legislation. Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified, promulgated and in force for the Republic of Bulgaria as from 23 March 1976) reads: “… It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.” Before the adoption of Article 152(3) CPC in 1995, our Criminal Procedure Code did not provide for a situation where detention would be compulsory and unconditional, ie absolute. In no case did the law oblige the competent authorities to seek or order detention irrespective of the facts of the case at hand. The new proviso of Article 152(3), however, envisaged exactly that: whenever there existed a pending proceeding against the accused person for another indictable offence, and in the event of repeat offending, the competent authority was duty-bound to order detention as a measure to prevent absconding. The defendant’s arrest in the circumstances depicted in Article 152(3) CPC (subsequently amended) was a rule without exceptions. Hence, in its 1995 version Article 152(3) CPC bluntly con- travened the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.13 2.4.4. Habeas corpus.14 Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9(4)) and the European

13 By virtue of Ruling No. 1 of 21 March 1997 in criminal case No. 1 of 199, the General Assembly of Criminal Colleges at the Supreme Court of Cassation referred to the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria the question if the provision of Art. 152(3) CPC was consistent with the international treaties to which Bulgaria was a party (Buletin na VKS i VAS, 1997, Nos. 3-4, pp. 1-3). Later (1997) paragraph 3 of Article 152 CPC was amended by Parliament (State Gazette, issue 64 of 1997). 14 The institute of habeas corpus originated in Britain where back in 1679 the famous Habeas Corpus Асt provided for judicial review of detention. This fundamental human right had been referred to already in the Magna Carta Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 257

Convention on Human Rights (Article 5(4)) proclaim the right of every arrested person to seek a judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention. Though slightly more general, Article 30(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria is similar in substance: it requires the judicial body to pronounce within 24 hours on the lawfulness of detention. The right of arrested persons to challenge their arrest before a court (habeas corpus) was first recognised by the Bulgarian lawmaker in 1990 in Article 152(5) CPC (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990, subsequently amended). Even a cursory comparison of the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 5(4)) and the Bulgarian CPC at that time (Art. 152(5), subsequently amended) reveals that the legal rules on habeas corpus in Bulgaria were scanty and inadequate when weighed against the detailed and strict requirements of the European Convention. Moreover, Article 152(3) CPC (1995 version) made the judicial review of detention completely pointless. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the procedure of habeas corpus (Article 5(4)) ECHR) must be adversary and evidentiary; in it, the court must determine not just the formal validity of a decision to detain but also its essential lawfulness, that is, whether the arrest has the legal basis invoked and whether the data on the defendant’s personality and the evidence against him have been duly considered. This was impossible in the situation described in Article 152(3) CPC (version 1995). The insertion of an absolute statutory requirement (for the competent body to order detention unconditionally in certain circumstances) deprived the judiciary from any chance to review the merits of the arrest. Thus, detainees were virtually deprived of the right to have their detention

(1215). The essential features of habeas corpus are defined in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 5(4)) and in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in implementation of that Convention. 258 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING reviewed by a court. As the European Convention on Human Rights formed part of Bulgarian domestic legislation (Art. 5(4) of the Constitution) and prevailed over the conflicting domestic legal rule of Article 152(3) CPC (version 1995), that conflict of rules had to be resolved by applying directly the Convention provisions. 2.5. Other amendments. Pre-trial investigation must be finalised within no more than two months (Art. 222(1) CPC, subsequently amended). In 1995 regional prosecutors were empowered to extend this time limit to six months, while the Prosecutor General could extend it to nine months in exceptional cases (Art. 222(3) CPC, State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995, subsequently amended). In order to strengthen the adversarial system of criminal justice, the lawmaker provided that the bill of indictment should be read out in the courtroom by the prosecutor, not by the president of the trial court, which had been the case before (State Gazette, issue 31 of 1990). By amendments to the CPC enacted in 1990 and 1995 the victim stepping in the proceeding as a private prosecutor was entitled to appeal against the verdict or sentence (Art. 316(3) CPC, subsequently amended) and to seek an extraordinary judicial review of final verdicts or sentences (Art. 350 CPC, subsequently amended) where the victim’s rights or legitimate interests were affected by the verdict or the penalty imposed. The court of second instance was accordingly empowered to worsen the position of the defendant further to an appeal from the private prosecutor, that is, to derogate from the prohibition on reformatio in pejus (Art. 334(2) CPC, State Gazette, issue 50 of 1995, subsequently amended). These amendments to the CPC, which essentially limited the role of the prosecutor as an officer of the state in criminal cases for indictable offences, invite major objections. 2.6. International legal assistance in criminal matters. By an Act of Parliament of 27 April 1994 (State Gazette, issue 39 of 1994), Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 259 the Republic of Bulgaria ratified the European Convention on Extradition (in force for Bulgaria as from 1 October 1994),15 the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (in force for Bulgaria as from 10 October 1994), and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (in force for Bulgaria as from 15 September 1994). The three conventions were published in the State Gazette (issue 8 of 1995). 2.7. Adversarialism and the ex officio principle. Today, it is suggested that the evidence be gathered ex officio by the pre-trial authorities while the court should only collect evidence upon the motion of a party. This suggestion is at odds with a fundamental principle of Bulgarian criminal procedure, viz. the ex officio principle. Art. 12 CPC requires the pre-trial authorities and the trial court alike to take any measures needed to ascertain the facts. In other words, the court must be active and make of its own motion any step (including evidence gathering) that would secure the correct disposal of the case. Making the court unable to gather evidence but at the parties’ request amounts to absolving the court of its duty to clarify objectively, comprehensively, and in detail the circumstances of the case before it. That would virtually destroy the requirement for the court to ascertain the facts. However, any verdict that falls short of the ascertainment of all relevant facts would fail to serve its purpose – to ensure a fair disposal of the criminal dispute at stake. Both approaches – the ex officio principle and adversarialism – now feature in Bulgarian criminal procedure. There is a strictly defined co-relation between them (the ex officio principle being the prevalent one). Indeed, the new Constitution requires the court to provide the parties with equality of arms and enable them to avail of an adversary trial (Art. 121(1) of the Constitution). This can be attained if the ex officio principle is confined solely to the pre-trial

15 See Girginov, A. Extradition under Bulgarian Law. – Sofia, 1998 (in Bulgarian). 260 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING stage and the adversary nature of the trial is reinforced. However, such a change in the basic principles of our criminal procedure, such a drift away from the usual pattern in civil law countries and reliance on the common law model should be made with care while fully considering its anticipated benefits and possible drawbacks. The facts of a case cannot be sacrificed to deepen the adversarialism of court proceedings. Quite the contrary, Article 121(2) of the Constitution reads that “proceedings in cases shall ensure the ascertainment of truth”. Hence, the overall organisation of proceedings, including their trial stage, must serve the requirement to ascertain the facts. As to adversarialism, it means primarily providing the parties with equality of arms as far as the evidence gathering goes. The defence must benefit from the same procedural rights as the prosecution in collecting evidence. 3. Organised crime in the context of transition.* 3.1. Notion of organised crime. Organised crime has grown into a most dangerous factor in Bulgarian society. It inflicts enormous damage on the state and on its citizens. The organised criminal world affects all domains of public life, including political decision-making. 3.1.1. Organised crime is a system of criminal offences perpetrated mainly in the areas of business and economy. The main objective of organised offenders is to obtain material benefits. Organised offences are committed by sustainable crime syndicates built to engage in continued economic operations with the aim of illicit

* Bibliography: Koudriavtsev, V. N., V. V. Louneev, A. V. Naoumov Organised Crime and Corruption in Russia. – Moscow, 2000 (in Russian); Louneev, V. V. Crime in the Twentieth Century. Global, Regional, and Russian Trends. – Moscow, 1997 (in Russian); Criminal Justice: Issues of International Co-operation. – Moscow, 1995 (in Russian); Möglichkeiten der Gewinnabschopfung zur Bekampfung der Organiesierten Kriminalität. Kilchling, M., G. Kaiser. Fr., 1997; Korruptionsbekampfung durch Strafrecht. Eser, A., Uberhofen, B. Huber. Fr., 1997. Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 261 enrichment and typified by a hierarchy and role distribution among their members. In crime, as well as in the economy, the concerted efforts of a group of individuals are much more productive than isolated endeavours. 3.1.2. Terrorism may be defined as a violent criminal activity pursuing specific political results. The essential difference between organised crime and terrorism lies in the purpose of criminal activities. While organised crime aims at deriving profits, terrorism has political ends that involve changes in government. Terrorism normally develops within the territory of a single country. The seizure of state power, however, may be a step towards the formation of a new state. Terrorism then acquires an international dimension. Acts of terrorism also become international when perpetrated against foreign nationals or in the territory of another country. In such cases terrorism is an international crime punishable in line with international law. After the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, international criminal justice in this domain has developed intensely. 3.2. Forms of manifestation of organised crime. Organised crime may be divided conditionally into economic (“white-collar”) crime and violent (“street”) crime. On the one hand, organised crime may involve grievous offences against the person, such as murder, racketeering, robberies, bodily harm. On the other hand, it tends to develop primarily in the economy. Criminological data for the period of transition in Bulgaria suggest that the organised criminal world has been involved in the following major occupations: smuggling (illicit cross-border trafficking in narcotic drugs, arms, oil, ciga- rettes, etc.); channels for cross-border transfers of persons; illegal privatisation of state assets (tourist sites, banks, weaponry factories, telecommunications or energy supply facilities, etc.); large-scale financial fraud; prostitution; gambling; theft and robbery of motor vehicles and high-way robberies; extortion in the form of “agree- 262 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING ments” for security services or insurance (or forcing lower purchase prices for agricultural produce); money laundering, etc. As a result: a) powerful economic groups emerge that make a fortune in criminal ways, while the “dirty cash” is infiltrated in the financial system, corrupting public officials and begetting new crimes; b) these criminal groups oust the state from legal production and trade by creating an “informal economy”; c) organised crime control centres are formed that regulate relations among different groups and seek to take them to the international arena by legalising their operation. At the same time, the syndicates engage in fierce competition to apportion the criminal business among themselves. 3.3. The reasons for organised crime. Organized crime, like banditry in the past, is the offspring of the modern civilized world of urbanization, technical progress and globalization. However, the main reason for the rampant growth of organized crime in Bulgaria is the change of the system of government or, rather, the weakening of public and legal controls during the transition from centralised state economy and authoritarian political rule to a free market based on private ownership and democracy. Essentially, the transition towards a market economy is not criminal. Conversely, it is useful and necessary for the public. None the less, the transition in Bulgaria was ill-conceived and was mis- carried: no prior strategy existed for its forms and substance or its negative corollaries and the measures to resist them. The state abdi- cated abruptly and definitely from the management of production (industry and agriculture), without having created conditions for promoting free enterprise, for the small and medium private busi- nesses. There was no control (production or financial, banking or tax, customs, border or privatisation) adequate to the new realities. The command administrative control exercised by the state was dying out, and no new system of checks and balances consistent with the requirements of the market was there to replace it. Moreover, in Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 263 a number of areas there was no legal framework for the economic activity in transition. As a result of transition unemployment soared, the population sank into poverty and the gap between rich and poor deepened. Criminal and other offences (primarily illicit profit-making) became widespread. 3.3.1. Stages of economic crime in the context of transition. Transition in Bulgaria was accompanied by several waves of economic crime. a. By violating the UN imposed embargo on Yugoslavia, or, rather, by illicit cross-border sales of oil (1993-1994) newly hatched criminal groups (assisted by Interior Ministry personnel) made huge profits. In addition to that, some government steps prior to 1996, notably scores of bank authorisations (the so called „bank boom”), enabled a close circle of people to embezzle vast state funds by fraud and abuse of office in the banking sphere. This led to a concentration of money masses in the hands of a small number of people. A few dozens of individuals embezzled nearly seven billion DM. As if all those in power sought, or at least connived in, the emergence of a group of intimately connected superaffluent personages. The drain- ing of finances from the state amounted to an under-the-counter privatisation of Bulgaria's financial capital. This was a precondition for the next step − the privatisation of material assets, of state property. The state appeared to have laid itself the financial foundations of organised crime right at the outset of economic reforms. b. The second wave of economic crime concurred with the privatisation of state assets that started in 1997. Unfettered privatisation created fertile soil for the organized criminal world. The transfer of public property into private hands took place in the context of a severe depreciation of the state assets that were up for privatisation. Between 1997 and 2001 state assets worth USD 20 billion were privatised while the state only obtained two billion dollars in 264 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING revenue. Public enterprises fell into the hands of self-styled nou- veaux riches unable to manage them properly. The initial privatisation thus failed to bring about the longed-for efficient asset management. The reason for all this was the lack of adequate control on privatisation. Even worse, privatisation rules were occasionally transgressed by design to derive illicit profits. In 2002 alone, 1577 criminal cases were instituted for privatisation-related official malfeasance. c. It is still early to speak of a third wave of economic crime. The experience of other states in transition, however, points to serious crimes in servicing the external debt (about USD 11 billion for Bulgaria), in operating with the state reserve and in contracting consulting services out to foreign companies. 3.3.2. The economic reasons for the growth of organised crime coexist with other – political and legal – factors. The multiparty political system, plurality, and the separation of powers (into a legislative, executive, and judicial branch) undermined government authority. The various mechanisms and systems of government control became inoperative. Cooperation among government institutions actors degenerated. The set of social values fell apart. The decline of morality is a fact today. 3.3.3. Corruption is an essential attribute of organised crime. It has acquired large proportions. Latent (unregistered) corruption has seen a particular boost. Organised crime, that is, the coalescence of government bodies and the criminal world, emerges when criminals realise that the state machinery needs resources to operate (and repays with impunity). Corruption is the language whereby the organised criminal world talks to the government authorities. Today, corruption, like a cancerous growth, is eating away the fabric of the state. Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 265

The system of law enforcement is infused with corruption and lacks the required efficiency. Society, on the other hand, is short of efficient supervisory instruments to police its watchdogs – the executive bodies and law enforcement. 3.3.4. In the context of transition, the law has lagged much behind the abundant social developments. The criminal law fails to address the new forms of detrimental behaviour called to life by the transition to a market economy. Criminal procedure fails to identify vehicles enabling the effective suppression of organised crime. 3.4. Control on organised crime. Organised crime is a complex social phenomenon engendered by the interplay of a number of factors: economic, socio-political, criminological, and legal. Its suppression therefore has different aspects: a) a socio-economic aspect where organised crime is seen as an element of the state socio-economic system; b) a criminological aspect where organised crime is seen as social pathology and its roots are explored; c) the aspect of the criminal law dealing with the statutory properties of criminal offences, their proof in criminal proceedings, and the punishment of offenders. Crime (its level, structure, and dynamics) is not directly and solely dependent on legislation. The law is merely one of the tools available to curb crime, and certainly not the crucial one. Crime must be tackled comprehensively, by employing a vast range of economic, socio-political, criminological, and legal methods and means. Moreover, law is conservative and follows on social developments. These factors account for the constraints of the criminal law (criminal sanctions) in fighting organised crime. In order to become an efficient instrument to suppress crime, penal legislation must adequately reflect the new social realities. The legal framework should match the status and trends of organised crime. 266 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

3.5. International cooperation in fighting organised crime and terrorism.16 Organised crime often goes beyond state borders. In recent years, however, the organised criminal world has taken a course of an all-out confrontation with the international community. Illicit drugs trafficking is the main criminal “business”. It brings the underworld billions-of-dollars-worth of dirty money. Today, domestic criminal groups combine into powerful international syndicates. They make enormous profit on drugs trafficking and perpetually refuel organised crime and terrorism. The criminal world thus devastates people’s lives. The international community is therefore pressed to give a concerted response to organised crime and terrorism. 3.5.1. The national legislation on organised crime and terrorism. Most of the forms of organised criminal activity and terrorism are covered by the Criminal Code of Bulgaria. Internationally, however, the criminalisation of these acts is still to take place. It would bring in new international tribunals and generally give an impetus to the development of international criminal justice. Organised criminal activity and terrorism are usually pursued by a group of individuals covertly, in a conspiracy. Their investigation should therefore be covert in order to match the substance and forms of the relevant criminal acts. Hence, the investigation of organised crime and terrorism entails the employment of technical devices for personal control (wiretapping, surveillance, etc.); under- cover agents should be infiltrated in criminal groups; bank secrecy should be lifted more easily; incentive rules should be created on informants; the law enforcement community should step up its inter- agency information exchange, etc. Consequently, the legal measures to combat organised crime and terrorism belong primarily to the realm of criminal procedure

16 See Mihaylov, D. International Criminal Law. – Sofia, 2003 (in Bulgarian). Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 267 and involve inter alia the employment of special investigative techniques (known as “electronic surveillance”) to ensure evidence gathering in the process of criminal justice; the use of agents-provocateurs who are not held liable for their involvement in crime; the protection of witnesses at threat; tighter control on the circulation of “dirty money”; the freezing and upfront forfeiture of criminal assets; the introduction of special, fast-track investigation procedures for organised crime and terrorism, etc. Organised crime and terrorism pose an ever growing threat to society. They are paralleled by increasing efforts to craft special legislation setting out emergency measures to combat this utterly dangerous criminality. However, any stronger control over crime entails some restrictions on individual human rights. The lawmaker thus faces two discordant requirements: to develop efficient means to suppress organised crime and terrorism while avoiding encroachments upon human rights. The legislative temptation to enact stringent measures taints the operation of other government bodies down the line – those called upon to enforce the laws. In the combat against organised crime and terrorism, they are tempted in turn to abuse their power in the name of public interests. Almost any of the above measures against organised crime and terrorism is open to misuse. Human rights may be unduly transgressed by surveillance, wiretapping and recording; by arrest and protracted detention to extort a confession; by disclosing the sources of personal income or forfeiting private assets without sufficient evidence of involvement in crime; or by opening secret personal files without any control, etc. The efforts to crack down on organised crime and corruption therefore always threaten the creation of uncontrolled bodies that wield unlimited power. Internationally, this danger is becoming even greater. The reason lies in the fact that international cooperation in this area is relatively recent and international treaties (bilat- 268 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING eral or multilateral) usually provide no guarantees against the misuse of power. 3.5.2. International treaties on organised crime and terrorism. International cooperation in the fight against organised crime and terrorism is governed by various international treaties that envisage inter alia mutual legal assistance in the investigation of criminal offences; the transfer of defendants to stand trial; the recognition of foreign criminal judgments; the exchange of judicial papers in criminal matter; and the transfer of sentenced persons. The rapidly evolving international environment, the complex historic, economic, and political links among states have inhibited the codification of all international treaties into a universal global code to combat organised crime and terrorism. The efforts of experts and scholars to develop such a code stumble in the reluctance of official government representatives to accept any restriction on state sovereignty. The risk of having state sovereignty curtailed appears to be a stronger argument than the need for international cooperation. Moreover, bureaucratic hurdles in different countries additionally frustrate cooperation. The dangerous acts of organised crime and terrorism nowadays necessitate new international legal instruments apt to suppress them. International organisations, such as the United Nations or the European Union may be instrumental in that respect. They could initiate the development of a universal code to lay down mechanisms apposite to cooperation in combating organised crime and terror (a good example here is the United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, done at Vienna in 1988). There appear some unacceptable trends in the existing international conventions against crime: the scope of the presumption of innocence is under attack, at times even strict liability is envisaged; the burden of proof is occasionally shifted onto the defendant; the Organized crime and the criminal law and procedure in the context of... 269 right of defence is mitigated as well, etc. Overall, the tougher measures against organised crime and terrorism entail expanding legal controls on citizens’ privacy. In a nutshell, international cooperation in the fight against organised crime and terror is not well regulated. No efficient measures exist to prevent and bridle this dangerous criminality. International law should provide clear and precise definitions of the relevant offences and specific mechanisms should be designed to promote intercountry cooperation in this area.

* * *

By way of conclusion: crime has surged in the context of transition. Its nature has changed dramatically. There appeared organised crime (illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons, and persons; large- scale financial fraud; money laundering, corruption) and terrorism. The organised criminal world impacts on all spheres of public life – the economy and political decision-making alike. At the same time socio-legal controls have lagged behind the growth of crime. Criminal justice is in crisis. The procedure to prosecute offenders is slow and cumbersome. Corrupt pressures on law enforcement are growing. The big bosses of the criminal world remain untouchable for justice. It is necessary to tighten public and legal control and improve the effectiveness of criminal justice. Here, the question arises: which of the two values to stake on − the public need for effective control on crime, or individual human rights. For, any control implies certain constraints on human rights. The problem is to strike a balance between the protection of individual rights (freedom of the individual) and the protection of society from crime by reinforcing the control in place (in particular criminal justice). Society seems to be 270 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING faced with the choice of „the state of the Mafia”, where crime runs high owing to the weak public control, or the „state of Mussolini”, where crime is low but there is total control on people's life. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950 laid a new beginning. It purports to protect the individual from constrictions and interference by the state. The Convention brought individual human rights to the fore and proclaimed them uttermost values. Its provisions require that criminal proceedings provide maximum guarantees for the right of defence and against abuse by the state bodies. The organized criminal world, however, also limits the rights of citizens and establishes a dictatorship over society. This type of criminal dictatorship is no less dangerous than the political dictate of the totalitarian state. The contemporary conditions require, therefore, a stronger public control on crime. After all, the European Convention for Human Rights was adopted more than half a century ago and does not reflect the new realities – organized crime and terrorism. Today, most European countries take decisive steps in fighting organized crime, corruption, and terrorism: they allow for the use of special investigative techniques (electronic surveillance) to collect evidence for criminal justice; protect witnesses under threat; let in agents-provocateurs who are not liable for their involvement in crime; tighten controls to prevent money laundering; enable the freezing of criminal assets; introduce simplified, fast-track procedures to handle a number of criminal cases. However, these new steps need not infringe fundamental human rights. As is known, there is no crime in George Orwell's world, where the state exercises total control and penetrates deeply into people's private life by violating their human rights. It watches, follows, wiretaps, records and trespasses on the privacy of their homes; it breaks the secret of communication. The state of Orwell is not our ideal! THEORETISCHE GRUNDZÜGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Nikola Filtschev

(Zusammenfassung)

Der Übergang von der zentralen Planwirtschaft und der autoritären politischen Führung zur Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie stellt an und für sich eine soziale Revolution dar. Diese Transformation zeichnet sich durch den Wechsel der Produktionsbeziehungen aus, die auf das öffentliche Eigentum an den Produktionsmitteln basieren. In der Transformationszeit wurde in Bulgarien das öffentliche (staatliche und genossen- schaftliche) Eigentum durch das private Eigentum ersetzt. Das in staatlicher Hand stehende Eigentum wurde privatisiert und auf einen kleinen Personenkreis übertragen. Die Gesellschaft spaltete sich in Arm und Reich. Der Wechsel der wirtschaftlichen Basis (der materiellen Beziehungen) bewirkte auch eine Änderung in dem Überbau (den ideologischen Beziehungen). Alle Elemente des Über- baus: a) die Ideen – politische, rechtliche, moralische, philosophische usw.; b) die ihnen entsprechenden ideologischen Beziehungen; c) die Behörden und Organisationen – politische (der Staat, die Parteien), rechtliche (die Justizbehörden) usw. erfuhren Änderungen, die noch nicht abgeschlossen sind. In der Transformationszeit wurde das einheitliche staatliche Eigentum auf mehrere juristische und natürliche Personen verteilt. Dies führte auch zu einer Umverteilung der politischen Macht auf mehrere Subjekte. Nach dem Grundsatz der Gewaltenteilung wurde die staatliche Gewalt in unserem Lande in Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative (Art. 8 der Verfassung) geteilt. Nach ihrer konjunkturellen Interessenslage verteilen die 272 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG regierenden Parteien die Gewalt weiter unter den einzelnen staatlichen Organen durch Änderungen in der Gesetzgebung. Der Wandel brachte mehrere Vorteile: eine effizientere Eigentumsverwaltung, Stärkung der freien wirtschaftlichen Initiative, Demokratisierung des öffentlichen und politischen Lebens, Entfaltung der Freiheit des Einzelnen. Die Transformation hatte aber auch Nachteile: Abschwachung der sozialen und gesetzlichen Kontrolle und Zunahme der Kriminalität. 1. Die Kriminalität ist kein erstarrtes Phänomen, das für alle Zeiten und Völker gleich ist. Sie ändert sich im Zuge der historischen Entwicklung. Inhalt und Form der Kriminalität werden letztendlich durch die öffentlichen Wirtschaftsbedin- gungen bestimmt. Es hängt aber gewissermaßen vom Willen des Gesetzgebers ab, welche Taten er als Straftaten qualifiziert. Der Gesetzgeber setzt zwar das Strafrecht unter Berücksichtigung der öffentlichen Bedürfnisse, trägt aber wohl auch den Interessen der Regierenden Rechnung. Historisch gesehen, wurde das Strafrecht über lange Zeit empirisch gesetzt. Dabei haben die Intuition und die juristische Tradition eine immense Rolle gespielt. Heute ist es schon an die Zeit, an die Strafrechtsetzung aus der Sicht der Wissenschaft heranzugehen. Die rasante Zunahme der Kriminalität und die Abschwächung der sozialen und gesetzlichen Kontrolle erfordern ein theoretisches Instrumentarium, das es dem Gesetzgeber ermöglicht, bei der Rechtssetzung richtige und wissenschaftlich begründete Entscheidungen zu treffen. Die Qualität des Strafrechts ist eine Voraussetzung für die Effizienz der Strafgerichtsbarkeit. Zwei sind die Hauptprobleme, mit denen der Gesetzgeber bei der Strafrechtssetzung konfrontiert wird. Erstens soll er den Kreis der Verbrechen klar umreißen d. h. eine Trennlinie zwisschen dem delinquenten und nicht delinquenten Verhalten Zusammenfassung 273 ziehen. Dazu sind theoretische Ansätze für die Kriminalisierung der Taten notwendig. Sie aber reichen an sich nicht aus. Die Verbrechen und die hiermit verbundene Verantwortlichkeit sind im Rahmen des delinquenten Verhaltens selbst zu differenzieren. Die Kriminalisierung der Taten und die Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit sind die beiden wichtigsten Probleme bei der Strafrechtssetzung. 2. Das Delikt ist eine komplizierte Erscheinung, die soziale, juristische und psychische Aspekte besitzt. Deswegen läßt es sich nur komplex erforschen, indem das Potential verschiedener wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen genutzt wird. Zwei sind die wichtigsten methodischen Forschungsansätze zur Erfassung der sozialen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen: ein sozialer und ein juristischer. Beim formlichen, juristischen Vorgehen werden die Rechtsnormen erforscht d. h. die Dogmen (das Soll-Verhalten) und nicht das wirkliche (Ist-) Verhalten. Die juristische Analyse liefert aber keine Antwort auf folgende Fragen: warum hat der Gesetzgeber bestimmte Fakten (Taten) im Gesetz verankert; welche sozialen Aufgaben überträgt er auf die einschlägigen Normen; welchen Wirkungsmechanis- mus haben sie und welcher sozialer Effekt tritt nach ihrer Anwendung ein. Um diese Fragen zu klaren, sollen wir den rechtlichen Rahmen sprengen und den sozialen Gründen auf die Spur kommen, aus denen die gesetzlichen Regelungen erwachsen sind und die ihren Inhalt bestimmen. Heutzutage ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit eines komplexen Vorgehens bei der Erforschung der strafrechtlichen Erschein- ungen. Nur die Verbindung der juristischen mit einer sozialen Analyse erlaubt das Ergründen der dialektischen Einheit zwischen der juristischen Form und ihrem gesellschaftlichen Inhalt. 274 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

3. Es steht außer Zweifel, dass das Strafrecht sozial determiniert ist. Es widerspiegelt die objektiven öffentlichen Bedurfnisse und die subjektiven Interessen der Regierenden. Das Problem entsteht aber bei der „Übersetzung” der wirtschaftlichen Bedürfnisse und politischen Vorgaben in die Sprache der Justiz. Die Aufgabe dabei ist, den „Mechanismus” aufzuklären, durch den sich die öffentlichen Interessen in strafrechtliche Normen verwandeln. 4. Die „Kriminalisierung der Taten” und die „Differen- zierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit” sind relativ neue Begriffe in der Strafrechtswissenschaft. Sie haben sich im Zuge der Aufstellung einer Theorie der Strafrechtssetzung d. h. eines theoretischen Modells (als ein System von Grundsätzen, Kriterien und Begriffen) entwickelt, das dem Gesetzgeber ermöglichen soll, bei der Rechtssetzung wissenschaftlich begründete Entscheidungen zu treffen. Diese Arbeit stellt einen Teil der Bemühungen zur Entwicklung der theoretischen Ansätze der Strafrechtssetzung dar.

§ 1. Verhalten. Verhaltensstruktur 1. Das Delikt ist eine Art Tätigkeit (Verhalten). Das men- schliche Verhalten wird von verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen erforscht: Philosophie, Soziologie, politischer Ökonomie, Rechtswissenschaft, Ethik u. a. Die allgemeinen Grundsätze und die Verhaltensstruktur sind Gegenstand der allgemeinen Psychologie. Bei einer tiefgründigen Erforschung des Verhaltens, d. h. im „vertikalen Schnitt“, ist eine hierarchische Ordnung von Elementen (Ebenen) zu erkennen, deren Kompliziertheit konsequent abnimmt. Mit anderen Worten aus- gedrückt, wird das Verhalten als ein hierarchisches System dargestellt. Zusammenfassung 275

Durch eine systematische Analyse wird das Verhalten in folgende hierarchische Ebenen (Elemente) unterteilt: Handeln, Tat (Untätigkeit), Verrichtung, körperliche Bewegung. Die höchste Ebene bildet das Handeln. Hauptbestandteil des Handelns ist die Tat (Untätigkeit). Das Handeln setzt sich aus einzelnen Taten zusammen. Die einfachste davon ist die kör- perliche Bewegung. 2. Verhältnis zwischen den einzelnen Elementen (Ebenen) des Verhaltens. Diese Elemente sind nicht als etwas Einzelnes aufzufassen. Das Verhalten stellt keine Summe von ihnen dar. Sie treten nur dann in den Vordergrund, wenn ein „vertikaler Schnitt” des Verhaltens vorgenommen wird. Die einzelnen Elemente (Handeln, Tat, Verrichtung und körperliche Bewegung) stehen in einem subordinierten Verhältnis. Jedes höhere Element umfaßt die einfachen Elemente, die eine Form seiner Ausprägung darstellen. Eine bestimmte Handlung kann in verschiedene Tätigkeiten einfließen. Das Gegenteil wäre auch möglich: eine Tätigkeit kann durch verschiedene Kombinationen von Handlungen und Verrichtungen zu Stande kommen. Die soziale Relevanz einer Handlung wäre nur dann zu erkennen, wenn sie in Zusammenhang mit den anderen Verhaltenselementen gebracht wird.

§ 2. Straftat. Tatmittel. Inhalt und Form der Straftat 1. Die Begriffe „Tat” und „verbrecherische (Ausführungs) handlung” decken sich nicht. Die Ausführungshandlung bei den einzelnen Delikten wird vom Gesetzgeber in jedem konkreten Fall bestimmt. Der Begriff „verbrecherische (Ausführungs) handlung” hat einen konventionellen, vom Gesetzgeber festgelegten Inhalt. Die Ausführungshandlung bei bestimmten Delikten umfaßt mehrere einzelne Handlungen oder sogar eine Tätigkeit. 276 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

2. Das Tatmittel gehört zur objektiven Seite der Straftat. Jedes Verhalten, darunter auch das verbrecherische Verhalten, stellt eine dialektische Einheit subjektiver (innerer, psychischer) und objektiver (äußerer, körperlicher) Faktoren dar. In der Realität läßt sich die äußere, körperliche Handlung nicht von ihrem inneren, psychischen Substrat trennen. Bei der wissenschaftlichen Analyse ist es aber möglich und sogar erforderlich, die Straftat gedanklich in ihre Bestandteile zu zerlegen und ihre Struktur zu erforschen. Das verbrecherische Verhalten hat eine inhaltliche und eine förmliche Seite. Das Tatmittel stellt ein Merkmal der Straftat dar, das auf die Art und Weise ihrer Begehung hin- deutet: durch welche Elemente (Bewegungen, Verrichtungen); wie sind diese Elemente untereinander verbunden; in welcher Reihenfolge kommen sie zum Vorschein usw. Die Art und Weise der Verbindung der Straftatbestandteile zu einer Einheit wird als Tatmittel bezeichnet. Aus systematischer Sicht läßt sich das Tatmittel als Struktur und innere Organisation der Straftat darstellen. Eine Straftat im allgemeinen gibt es nicht. Sie kommt in der Realität in Form einer bestimmten Kombination (Einheit) einzelner Bewegungen und Verrichtungen vor. Jede einzelne Kombination stellt ein Tatmittel dar. In diesem Fall bezeichnen wir als „Tatmittel” die Kombination von bestimmten Verhaltensakten, durch die die Straftat realisiert wird d. h. die äußere Erscheinungsform der Tat. Die Straftat und das Tatmittel bilden benachbarte Ebenen oder „Stufen” in der Verhaltensstruktur. Zum einen stellt das Tatmittel ein qualitatives Merkmal dar, das die Art und Weise der Verbindung der Bestandteile einer Straftat aufzeigt d. h. das Tatmittel läßt sich als Tatstruktur definieren. Zum anderen wird als Tatmittel die konkrete Kombination von körperlichen Bewegungen und Zusammenfassung 277

Verrichtungen bezeichnet, durch die eine bestimmte Straftat begangen wird. Die zweite Definition kommt in der kriminalis- tischen Literatur vor. Allein der dialektische Forschungsansatz erlaubt die tief- gründige Erfassung des Objekts (der Erscheinung) und die Aufdeckung seiner Merkmale, Aspekte, Struktur usw. Er läßt sich folgendermaßen vereinfacht darstellen: der Forschungs- gegenstand wird in zwei gegensätzlichen Teile aufgeteilt oder „gespalten”. Jeder Teil wird zuerst „in bereinigter Form” einzeln untersucht. In einem nächsten Schritt wird das Zusammenwirken (die Einheit und der Kampf) der Gegensätze erforscht. Die Auswahl der gegensätzlichen Teile ist objektiv determiniert. Die Dinge sind ihrem Wesen nach polar und stellen eine Einheit von Gegensätzen dar. In der objektiven Realität kommt kaum eine Erscheinung vor, die sich nur als „Straftat” oder als „Tatmittel” bezeichnen ließe. Vielmehr gibt es einzelne Erscheinungsformen menschli- chen Handelns, die eine dialektische Einheit von Straftat und Tatmittel darstellen. Eine Straftat setzt notwendigerweise auch eine entsprechende Erscheinungsform voraus. Wenn eine bestimmte Straftat gemeint wird, versteht man darunter ihre konkrete Erscheinungsform, die Kombination von körper- lichen Bewegungen, durch die diese Straftat begangen wird. Folglich stehen Straftat und Tatmittel im selben Verhältnis wie Inhalt und Form. Sie sind als gegensätzliche Teile eines Ganzen aufzufassen. Daraus folgt, dass alle Merkmale des Beziehung Inhalt – Form auch in der Beziehung Straftat – Strafmittel vorkommen. Wenn der Begriff „Tatmittel” im Sinne einer inneren Form gebraucht wird, versteht man darunter die Art und Weise der Verbindung der Straftatbestandteile zu einem Ganzen d. h. die Tatstruktur. Wenn der Begriff „Tatmittel” im Sinne einer äußeren Form gebraucht wird, meint man die konkrete 278 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Erscheinungsform der Straftat, ihre Wirkung nach außen d. h. die Kombination aus bestimmten körperlichen Bewegungen, durch die die Straftat begangen wird. Diese Kombination ist materieller Natur, sie läßt sich erfassen und hat zeitliche und raumliche Dimensionen. Beide Definitionen für Tatmittel schließen sich gegenseitig nicht aus, sie bringen nur die verschiedenen Seiten (die äußere und innere Seite) der Erscheinung zum Ausdruck.

§ 3. Die öffentliche Gefahr wichtigstes Kriterium für die Kriminalisierung der Taten und Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit Der Grundsatz, auf dem unser Strafrecht und die Judikatur aufbauen, ist die soziale Gerechtigkeit. Der Gerechtigkeits- grundsatz weist im Bereich des Strafrechts spezifische Merkmale auf: die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit soll dem Schweregrad der Tat und der Person des Täters angemessen sein. 1. Um den Gerechtigkeitsgrundsatz im rechtlichen und praktischen Bereich konsequent durchsetzen zu können, ist der Schweregrad der Tat festzulegen (zu bemessen). Dies setzt die Untersuchung der objektiven und subjektiven Tatelemente voraus, die die negativen öffentlichen Tatauswirkungen bestimmen. Der Tatschweregrad stellt das wichtigste soziale Tatmerk- mal dar, das aus zwei Komponenten besteht: a) objektiver Komponente: die öffentliche Gefahr, die aus dem delinquenten Verhalten ausgeht und b) subjektiver Komponente: die Schuld, die moralische Verwerflichkeit der psychischen Einstellung des Täters zu der gemeingefährlichen Tat und ihrer Folgen. Die objektive und die subjektive Komponente der Straftat sind zwei Gegensätze, die sich in einer dialektischen Einheit befinden und miteinander zusammenwirken. Die psychischen Zusammenfassung 279

Prozesse lösen die objektive Komponente der Tat aus und lenken sie. Die objektive Komponente wirkt sich zum anderen auf die subjektiven Erlebnisse aus. Eine der Zukunftsaufgaben der Strafrechtswissenschaft besteht in der Erforschung der Auswirkung der verschiedenen Tatelemente auf die öffentliche Gefahr, die von der Tat ausgeht. Die Bewältigung dieser Aufgabe wird zur Stärkung der theoretischen Ansätze bei der Strafrechtssetzung führen und zur Ausarbeitung wissenschaftlich begründeter Empfehlungen für die Kriminalisierung der Tat und die Differenzierung der Strafverantwortlichkeit verhelfen. Diese Aufgabe ist nicht weniger schwer als die schwierigsten technischen und For- schungsaufgaben im naturwissenschaftlichen Bereich. Das Problem besteht in der qualitativen und quantitativen Erfassung der öffentlichen Gefahr unter der Einwirkung verschiedener Faktoren. Zu diesem Zweck sollen die komplizierten sozialen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen und Merkmale (Art und Umfang der öffentlichen Gefahr, negative Folgen, Tatmittel usw.) durch einfache empirisch nachweisbare Größen (Merk- male) dargestellt werden. In einem nächsten Schritt sind die Meßregeln aufzustellen d. h. für jedes Merkmal soll eine Meßeinheit und eine Skala bestimmt werden. Diese Entwick- lung – die Operationalisierung der Rechtsbegriffe und die Auf- stellung gedanklicher Modelle für die öffentlichen Erscheinungen – steckt noch am Anfang. 2. Die öffentliche Gefahr ist in allen ihren Facetten zu erforschen. Dabei sind ihre Aspekte und Merkmale, Bestimmungsfaktoren und der genaue Stellenwert eines jeden Bestandteils der Straftat zu erfassen. Die öffentliche Gefahr ist ein Bestimmungsmerkmal der Straftat als Ganzes und nicht nur ihrer einzelnen Komponenten. Bei der Forschungsanalyse läßt sich jedoch die Straftat in ihre 280 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Bestandteile zerlegen. In diesem Fall könnte man bedingt über eine „eigene” öffentliche Gefahr der einzelnen Straftatkompo- nenten sprechen. Bildhaft ausgedrückt ist jeder Bruchteil der Straftat mit einem bestimmten Bruchteil der offentlichen Gefahr „geladen”. Wenn von der öffentlichen Gefahr eines bestimmten Elements der Straftat die Rede ist, wird in der Tat das Ausmaß gemeint, in dem sich dieses Element auf die öffentliche Gefahr, die von der ganzen Straftat ausgeht, auswirkt. Abzuklären ist in welche Richtung und nach welchem Mechanismus sich die einzelnen Elemente und Umstände der Straftat auf die öffentliche Gefahr auswirken, die von dieser Straftat ausgeht. Um diese Aufgabe zu erfüllen, soll man die Tatstruktur richtig erkennen. Allgemein gesehen, weisen alle Straftaten dieselbe Struktur auf: sie bilden eine Einheit subjektiver (innerer) und objektiver (äußerer) Komponenten. Deswegen ist es möglich, einige Grundsätze im Hinblick auf die Einwirkung der verschiedenen Tatelemente auf die öffentliche Gefahr zu formulieren. Die Umstände werden nach ihrer Funktion bei der Auslösung der öffentlichen Gefahr in zwei Kategorien eingeteilt. Die einen bestimmen die Natur und die anderen das Ausmaß der öffentlichen Gefahr. Die Natur (die Qualität) und das Ausmaß (die Quantität) sind Aspekte der öffentlichen Gefahr, die nur relativ selbständig sind. Die Elemente einer bestimmten Straftat kommen in verschiedenen Kombinationen vor, wobei die objektiven und die subjektiven Elemente in einem unterschiedlichen Verhältnis stehen. In den Vordergrund treten die einen oder die anderen Umstände und beeinflussen entscheidend die öffentliche Gefahr, die von einer Straftat ausgeht. Zusammenfassung 281

§ 4. Tatkriminalisierung Die Kriminalisierung (Bezeichnung einer Tat als Delikt) und Entkriminalisierung (Ausschluß der Tat aus dem Kreis der Delikte) sind relativ neue Begriffe im Bereich des Strafrechts. 1. Die Entscheidung über die Kriminalisierung einer Tat ergibt sich immer aus dem Zusammenwirken zweier Faktoren: a) objektiver Faktor: die tatsächlichen Merkmale der Tat (die außerhalb und unabhängig von der Relation „erkennender Subjekt - Objekt” existieren) und insbesondere ihre bedrohende oder schädigende Einwirkung auf die öffentlichen Beziehun- gen d. h. ihre Gemeingefährlichkeit und b) subjektiver Faktor: das öffentliche Bewußtsein und insbesondere die negative Beurteilung der Tat vom Gesetzgeber. Die strafrechtliche Norm umfaßt also erkennende und wertende Aspekte. Der Straftat- begriff stellt eine Einheit des Objektiven (tatsächliche Merk- male) und des Subjektiven (soziale Relevanz) dar. Es liegt am Willen des Gesetzgebers ob er manche Taten mit geringerer Gemeingefährdung den Straftaten zurechnet oder nicht. Deshalb hat die Trennlinie zwischen dem delinquenten und nichtdelinquenten Verhalten einen dynamischen und flexiblen Verlauf. Er folgt den Änderungen in der objektiven Realität aber auch dem Willen des Gesetzgebers. 2. Nach W. N. Kudrjavtzew soll der Gesetzgeber vier Kriterien heranziehen, wenn er über die Kriminalisierung einer Tat zu entscheiden hat. Es handelt sich dabei um folgende Kriterien: bestehender Bedürfnis nach dem Verbot der Tat d. h. nach der Errichtung einer neuen strafrechtlichen Norm, Zulässigkeit, Anwendbarkeit und Zweckmäßigkeit der neuen Norm. 2.1. Notwendigkeit der Einführung eines neuen strafrechtlichen Verbots. Der wichtigste Faktor, der zur Kriminali- sierung einer Tat führt, ist die öffentliche Gefahr, die von dieser 282 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Tat ausgeht. Nicht jede gemeingefährliche Tat (Untätigkeit) wäre aber zu kriminalisieren, sondern nur diejenige, von der eine hohe öffentliche Gefahr ausgeht. Das Strafrecht regelt nicht die einzelnen Ausschreitungen, sondern vielmehr die massenhaft vorkommenden Taten. Die Strafnorm orientiert sich auf typische weit verbreitete Verhaltensweisen, die bestimmte Gesetzmäßigkeiten in der Natur und Gesellschaft widerspiegeln. Oder anders gesagt, um eine Tat zu kriminalisieren, soll sie hinreichend häufig vorkommen. Nur wenn es gilt, höchste Werte in Schutz zu nehmen, kriminalisiert der Gesetzgeber Taten, die in der Realität selten vorkommen. 2.2. Zulässigkeit des strafrechtlichen Verbots. Zu erwägen wäre auch die Zulässigkeit des Verbots aus politischem, moralischem und rechtlichem Aspekt. 2.3. Anwendbarkeit des strafrechtlichen Verbots. Nachdem der Nachweis vorliegt, dass ein Verbot erforderlich und zuläs- sig ist, soll über seine praktische Anwendbarkeit entschieden werden. Unterliegt die entsprechende Verhaltensweise einer sozialen Kontrolle, läßt sie sich durch strafrechtliche Normen regeln usw. 2.4. Zweckmäßigkeit der strafrechtlichen Norm. Die Kriminalisierung hat nicht nur positive, sondern auch negative Folgen. Deshalb soll der Gesetzgeber immer die Zweckmäßigkeit eines neuen strafrechtlichen Verbots in Erwägung bringen d. h. die Vor- und Nachteile der Kriminalisierung gegenüberstellen. Der soziale „Preis” der Kriminalisierung wird von verschiedenen Faktoren bestimmt. 3. Die Novellierung des Strafrechts d. h. die Verab- schiedung oder Aufhebung eines strafrechtlichen Verbots kann vorausgesetzt werden durch a) die Änderung der öffentlichen Gefahr bei einer bestimmten Art von Taten oder b) die Ent- wicklung effizienterer (weniger repressiver, „billiger” usw.) Zusammenfassung 283

Instrumente zur Bekämpfung des entsprechenden negativen Handelns. Nur die konsequente Anwendung aller Kriterien und Grundsätze erlaubt dem Gesetzgeber eine optimale Entscheidungsfindung und die Errichtung einer effizienten strafrechtlichen Norm. Unter P. 4 wird auf die Bedeutung des Tatmittels (der Form) einer Tat für ihre Kriminalisierung eingegangen. Aufgeworfen wird die Frage wie hoch die öffentliche Gefahr sein soll, um eine bestimmte Tat zu kriminalisieren. Ein Minimum an Gemeingefährdung, ab dem eine Kriminalisierung schon vorzunehmen wäre, läßt sich im voraus und abstrakt nicht bestimmen. In jedem Einzelfall beurteilt der Gesetzgeber die spezifische Auswirkung der Tat auf die öffentlichen Beziehungen.

§ 5. Tatbestand. Funktionen des Tatbestands 1. Die Straftat und der Tatbestand verhalten sich zueinan- der wie die reale Erscheinung und der Begriff hierfür. Der Tatbestand stellt das gesetzliche Modell einer Straftat dar. Der Tatbestand stellt nicht nur eine Gesamtheit von Merkmalen dar, sondern ein ganzes System, das eine bestimmte Struktur aufweist. Inhalt und Struktur des Tatbestands werden von zwei Faktoren bestimmt: von der materiellen Erscheinung selbst, die dem Tatbestand zu Grunde liegt, und von den Funktionen des Tatbestands. Der Tatbestand widerspiegelt eine soziale Tatsache: das delinquente Verhalten. Jedes Merkmal des Tatbestands hat seinen materiellen Ursprung (Element, Merkmal oder Besonderheit des Verhaltens). Wenn der Gesetzgeber den Tatbestand errichtet und die darin einfließenden Merkmale erwägt, geht er auch von den Funktionen des Tatbestands im Rahmen der strafrechtlichen 284 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Regelung aus. Diese Funktionen sind zwei: a) feststellende (kriminalisierende) und abgrenzende (differenzierende) Funktion. Durch das Gesetz verkündet der Gesetzgeber die dort aufgeführte Tat als Straftat d. h. er legt den gesetzlichen Grund für die strafrechtliche Verantwortung (die Straftat) fest. Das Maß d. h. der Grad dieser strafrechtlichen Verantwortung ist noch zu bestimmen. Durch die Errichtung verschiedener Straftatbestände im Strafgesetzbuch differenziert der Gesetzgeber die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit für die verschiedenen Delikte. Um seinen Funktionen gerecht zu werden, soll der Tatbestand die soziale Natur des Delikts d. h. seine Gemeingefahrlichkeit widerspiegeln. Das ist dieVoraussetzung für eine gerechte Strafe. 2. Das Tatmittel (die Form) und der Tatbestand. Aus dem Besonderen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs geht hervor, dass das Tatmittel nur in einige Tatbestände einbezogen wird. Das wichtigste Kriterium für den Gesetzgeber bei der Lösung dieses Problems ist der Einfluß des Tatmittels auf die öffentliche Gefahr, die von der Straftat ausgeht. a. In bestimmten Fällen wird die soziale Relevanz der Tat d. h. das Vorliegen einer öffentlichen Gefahr vom Tatmittel bestimmt. Bestimmte Taten lassen sich als gemeingefährlich und verbrecherisch bezeichnen, nur wenn sie auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise begangen werden. In diesem Fall erscheint das Tatmittel quasi als Hauptträger der „Ladung” öffentlicher Gefahr. Es stellt eine Voraussetzung für die Kriminalisierung der Tat dar und wird deswegen vom Gesetzgeber als ein konstitutives Merkmal im Grundtatbestand verankert. b. Die verschiedenen Mittel zur Beeinträchtigung einer bestimmten Kategorie öffentlicher Beziehungen d. h. die ver- Zusammenfassung 285 schiedenen Eingriffe können je nach ihrer Gemeingefährdung stark voneinander abweichen. In diesem Fall werden sie vom Gesetzgeber als einzelne Delikte ausgewiesen. Hier übernimmt das Tatmittel die Rolle eines Abgrenzungskriteriums für verwandte Delikte d. h. eines Differenzierungskriteriums im Hinblick auf die Begründung der Strafverantwortlichkeit. c. Das Tatmittel beeinflußt häufig den Grad der öffentlichen Gefahr, die von der Straftat ausgeht. Wenn ein Tatmittel eine dermaßen große Zunahme der öffentlichen Gefahr bewirkt, dass dadurch der Rahmen des Grundtatbestands gesprengt wird, verankert der Gesetzgeber die gefährlichere Straftatvariante in einen schwerer zu ahndenden Straftatbestand. In diesem Fall erscheint das Tatmittel als qualifizierender Umstand. Es wird in einen qualifizierenden Straftatbestand aufgenommen und dient zur Abgrenzung der verschiedenen Straftatvarianten. d. Der Gesetzgeber konkretisiert die öffentliche Gefahr bei manchen Delikten, indem er im Grundtatbestand auf das Tatmittel hinweist. Die Verbindung zwischen Straftat und Tatmittel beschreibt besser die öffentliche Gefahr, die von einer bestimmten Verhaltensweise ausgeht. Auch in diesem Fall ist das Tatmittel ein Merkmal des Grundtatbestands, jedoch nicht ein grundlegendes Merkmal (das für die Kriminalisierung der Tat ausschlaggebend ist), sondern ein „zusätzliches“, abklären- des Merkmal. Die Erfassung der einzelnen Straftatbestände vertieft die Differenzierung der gesetzlichen Gründe für die Strafverantwortlichkeit. e. In den übrigen Fällen, in denen das Tatmittel die für eine Straftat typische Gemeingefährdung nicht wesentlich ändert, wird es vom Gesetzgeber nicht in den entsprechenden Straftatbestand aufgenommen. Der Einfluß des Tatmittels auf die öffentliche Gefahr wird vom Gericht bei der Strafzumes- sung berücksichtigt. Hier erscheint das Tatmittel als belasten- 286 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG der oder mildernder Umstand, der für die individuelle Gestaltung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung von Bedeutung ist. Die Straftat (der Inhalt) und das Strafmittel (die Form) liegen auf zwei benachbarten Ebenen in der Verhaltensstruktur. Als Spiegelbild des delinquenten Verhaltens weist der Straftatbestand ebenso eine hierarchische Struktur auf. Er besteht aus mehreren Merkmalen, die verschiedene Verhaltensebenen beschreiben und deshalb einen unterschiedlichen Abstraktionsgrad aufweisen. Die Analyse des Strafgesetzbuchs ergibt, dass der Gesetz- geber in die Straftatbestände häufig einzelne Handlungen (Untätigkeit) verankert. Für die einzelne strafrechtliche Norm ist das Handeln auf einem zu hohen Niveau angesiedelt (es wird in der Regel von den moralischen Normen geregelt), und die körperliche Bewegung liegt wiederum zu niedrig (körperliche Bewegungen werden durch die technischen Normen geregelt).

§ 6. Strafe. Grund, Ziel und Schwere der Strafe Jedes strafrechtliche Problem wird letztendlich auf die Begründung und Bemessung der Strafe zurückgeführt. Die Begriffe „Strafe” und „Strafverantwortlichkeit” sind verwandt, jedoch decken sie sich nicht. Ihrem Inhalt nach beschreibt die Strafverantwortlichkeit das Ertragen eines staatlichen Zwangs durch die Person, die eine Straftat begangen hat. Ihrer sozialen Natur nach ist die Strafverantwortlichkeit eine Reaktion des Staates auf die begangene Straftat. Sie stellt ein Instrument zur sozialen Kontrolle dar. 1. Begrundüng der Strafe. Je nachdem, ob der Grund für die Strafe von der Straftat oder dem Täter ausgeht, wird ein „Strafrecht der Tat” oder ein „Strafrecht des Täters” aufgebaut. Zusammenfassung 287

Nach der klassischen Lehre, deren Begründer C. Beccaria („Über die Straftaten und Strafen, 1764”) ist, bildet die Straftat den einzigen Grund für die Strafe. Die Straftat zieht eine Strafe nach sich und bestimmt parallel dazu ihren Schweregrad. Die anthropologisch-soziologische oder positive Theorie entsteht ca. 100 Jahre später mit der Arbeit von Ch. Lambrozo „Der delinquente Mensch“, 1871. Sie versetzt den Akzent von der Straftat auf den Täter. Nach dieser Theorie wurzeln die Gründe für eine Straftat in den psychischen und körperlichen Merkmalen des Täters und in seinem sozialen Umfeld. Deswegen sei nicht die Tat, sondern die delinquente Neigung des Täters zu ahnden. 2. Ziel der Strafe. Die Strafe stellt nicht nur eine gerechte (verhältnismäßige) Vergeltung für die begangene Straftat dar, sondern auch ein Instrument zum Erreichen bestimmter Ziele. Das Endziel jeder Strafe ist die Einschränkung der Kriminalität. Das unmittelbare Ziel aber besteht in der Ein- wirkung a) auf den Täter (individuelle Prävention) und b) die übrigen Bürger (allgemeine Pravention). Welchem der beiden Zielsetzungen der Vorrang zukommen wird, hängt von der Strafpolitik und dem Konzept des Staates über die Bekämpfung der Kriminalitat ab. 3. Schwere der Strafe. Unser Strafrecht basiert auf den Tatgrundsatz. Die Straftat stellt ein einheitliches, allgemein- gültiges Strafmaß für die Ahndung der verschiedenen Personen dar, die die Gleichheit der Bürger vor dem Gesetz sichert. Die Strafe soll in Verhältnis zu der Straftat stehen. Sie soll eine gerechte Vergeltung für die begangene Straftat sein. Als gerecht läßt sich diejenige Strafe bezeichnen, die der Straftat entspricht. Die Strafe soll nicht nur verhältnismäßig, sondern auch zweckmäßig sein und die gesetzlichen Ziele erfüllen. Die Generalprävention wird durch eine gerechte Strafe realisiert, 288 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG die der Straftat entspricht. Die Spezialprävention erfordert aber eine Strafe, die auf die individuellen Besonderheiten der Person des Täters zugeschnitten ist. Auf diese Weise werden an die Strafe zwei gegensätzliche Anforderungen gestellt: zum einen soll sie der Tat und zum anderen dem Täter entsprechen. 3.1. Das Verhältnis zwischen Straftat und Strafe läßt sich aus zwei verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten – legislativen und judikativen – betrachten. Der Gesetzgeber bewertet oder „bemißt” den Schweregrad der Strafe (die öffentliche Gefahr und die moralische Verwerflichkeit) und verankert diesen Schweregrad im Gesetz (Straftatbestand). Die in der Sanktion vorgesehene Strafe ist ein konzentrierter Ausdruck der Straftat, ihre quantitative Bewertung. Um die Straftat und die Strafe in Verhältnis zu bringen, sind sie vorher zu „bewerten”. Das Problem wird auf die Bemessung sozialer und rechtlicher Erscheinungen zurückge- führt. Das Gericht bemißt praktisch jeden Tag den Schweregrad von konkreten Straftaten und Strafen und setzt sie in einem Verhältnis. Das richterliche Ermessen vollzieht sich aber im Rahmen des gesetzgeberischen Ermessens. Das Strafrecht ist im allgemeinen von quantitativen Wertschätzungen durchdrungen. Aufgabe der Strafrechtswissen- schaft ist es, begrundete Kriterien und Bemessungsmethoden für die öffentliche Gefahr und die moralische Verwerflichkeit der Delikte zu entwickeln. 3.2. Die Analyse unseres Strafrechts ergibt, dass eine Reihe von Straftatbeständen nicht nur Merkmale der Tat, sondern auch Merkmale der Täterpersönlichkeit aufweist. Im Grundtatbestand legt der Gesetzgeber die Begründung für die Strafverantwortlichkeit dar. Deswegen soll der Grundtatbestand lediglich Tatmerkmale umfassen. Der qualifizierte Straftatbestand ist ein Instrument zur Differenzierung Zusammenfassung 289 der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung. Neben den Merkmalen des Grundtatbestands enthält er auch Umstandsmerkmale, die die Hauptvariante der Tat wesentlich verändern und die Notwendigkeit einer differenzierten Bestrafung begründen. Diese qualifizierenden Umstände können das Verhalten oder die Person des Täters beschreiben.

§ 7. Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung 1. Die Differenzierung des Rechts hat tiefe soziale Wurzeln. Sie ist ein Spiegelbild der differenzierten gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen. Im Zuge des immer komplizierter werdenden öffentlichen Lebens wächst die Notwendigkeit einer Differenzierung der gesetzlichen Regelung. Das Rechtssystem wird ebenso komplizierter und reichhaltiger. Neue Strukturgebilde entstehen: Normen, Institute, Bereiche. Mit anderen Worten, die „Arbeitsteilung” zwischen den Rechtsvorschriften nimmt zu. Zum anderen geht die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung mit einer Annäherung der wirtschaftlichen Prozesse und Beziehungen einher. Juristischer Ausdruck dieser Entwicklung ist die Generalisierung (Integration) des Normbestands. Die neuen öffentlichen Erscheinungen lassen sich nur von neuartigen generellen Rechtsformen mit hinreichend hohem Abstraktionsgrad umfassen. Folglich sind die Differenzierung und Integration gegensätzliche Aspekte in der Rechtsentwick- lung, die in einer dialektischen Verbindung stehen. Die strafrechtliche Effizienz hängt in erster Linie von der Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit und ihrer Unumkehrbarkeit ab. Die Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung bedeutet die gesetzliche Verankerung einer verschiedenen strafrechtlichen Verant- wortlichkeit für die verschiedenen Arten von Delikten (in 290 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Abhängigkeit von der typischen Gemeingefährlichkeit und moralischen Verwerflichkeit wie auch von den sozial relevan- ten persönlichen Merkmale des Täters). Die Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit ist ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung des Gerechtigkeitsgrundsatzes im Strafrecht. Das Delikt ist nicht nur ein Grund, sondern auch ein Maß für die Strafe. Es begründet nicht nur die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit, sondern bestimmt auch ihren Schweregrad. Die Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit ist eine Folge der Differenzierung der Gründe hierfür d. h. der Delikte. Neben der Tatschwere und der Täterpersonlichkeit bedient sich der Gesetzgeber auch eines weiteren Kriteriums für die Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortung, nämlich der Strafzielsetzung. Bei der Ermittlung der unteren Straf-grenze kann der Gesetzgeber das von objektiven Schweregrad des Delikts gesetzte Mindestmaß unterschreiten, um die gemilderte Strafe als Instrument für eine bestimmte Zielerreichung zu nutzen. Dem Zweckmäßigkeitsgrundsatz wird bei der Errichtung der Sanktionen für die fordernden strafrechtlichen Normen sehr stark Rechnung getragen. 2. Sachliche und funktionale Differenzierung. Die Differenzierung des Strafrechts verläuft in zwei Richtungen: eine sachliche und eine funktionale Richtung. Die sachliche Differenzierung des Strafrechts verläuft auf mehreren Ebenen. Nach der Art der Gemeingefährlichkeit unterscheidet der Gesetzgeber verschiedene Arten von Delikten und faßt die einschlägigen Normen in Kapiteln und Abschnitten im Besonderen Teil des Gesetzes zusammen. Nach dem Grad der Gemeingefährlichkeit unterscheidet er einzelne Varianten einer Straftat und entsprechende konkretisierende Vorschriften, die qualifizierte Straftatbestände umfassen. Zusammenfassung 291

Die funktionale Differenzierung besteht darin, dass eine Norm (oder Gruppe von Normen) nur auf die Erfüllung einer bestimmten Aufgabe bei der strafrechtlichen Regelung spezialisiert wird. Im Ergebnis wird die Normfunktion eingeschränkt und ihr sachlicher Umfang erweitert: sie umfaßt alle (oder die meisten) Delikte unabhängig von ihrer Art. Als funktional lassen sich z. B. die Institute der Schuld, der Vorbereitung und des Versuchs, der Mittäterschaft, des Freispruchs u. a. bezeichnen. Die Vorschriften der funktionalen Institute stellen „vor Klammern gestellte” allgemeine Regelungen dar, die für alle (oder die meisten) Delikte gültig sind. 3. Differenzierung der Straftaten. Unter P. 3.1 wird die Einstufung (Kategorisierung) der Delikte behandelt. 3.2. Abzugrenzen sind auch die Varianten eines Delikts, die eine differenzierte strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit voraussetzen d. h. die qualifizierten Straftatbestände sind zu formulieren. Im Grundtatbestand setzt der Gesetzgeber die Umstände fest, die die Entstehung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit voraussetzen d. h. sie begründen. Wenn eines der übrigen Elemente und Merkmale des delinquenten Verhaltens (Schadenausmaß, Tatmittel, Tatort, Tatzeit usw.) eine gravierende Abweichung vom typischen Schweregrad auslöst (Gemeingefährlichkeit und moralische Verwerflichkeit), verankert der Gesetzgeber die entsprechende Variante in einem leichter oder schwerer zu ahndenden Straftatbestand. Durch diese qualifizierten Straftatbestände differenziert der Gesetzgeber die verschiedenen Straftatvarianten und dadurch auch die diesbezüglichen Strafen. Die konkretisierenden Variantenvorschriften im Beson- deren Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs (die qualifizierten Straftat- bestände) erscheinen als spezial gegenüber der Norm, die den Grundtatbestand regelt. Diese speziellen Normen ergeben sich 292 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG aus der allgemeinen Norm, indem sie ihren Inhalt konk- retisieren und nur einen Teil ihres Anwendungsbereichs umfassen. Die Errichtung qualifizierter Straftatbestände folgt dem Trend einer tiefgreifenden Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit. So wird die allgemeine Norm nach dem Ausdruck von S. S. Alexejew von einer „Schar konkretisierender Vorschriften überwuchert”. Die Entwicklung des Strafrechts geht mit der Zunahme des Anteils der konkretisierenden Normen einher. Deswegen ist die Erforschung der Einwirkung der verschiedenen Umstände (Elemente des Verhaltens und der Umfelds, Persönlich-keitsmerk- male des Täters) auf die Tatschwere eine zukunftsweisende Richtung in der Entwicklung der Strafrechtswissenschaft. Grundsätzlich handelt es sich bei der Ermittlung des Einflusses der verschiedenen Umstände auf die Gemeingefährlichkeit einer Straftat und der Erforschung der einschlägigen konkretisierenden Normen um ein und dasselbe. Jedoch beschäftigt sich der erste (soziale) Forschungsansatz mit dem Verhalten und der Bedeutung seiner Bestandteile für die Gemeingefährdung und der zweite (normative) Forschungs- ansatz – mit der gesetzlichen Erfassung dieser Erscheinungen d. h. mit den Normen, durch die der Gesetzgeber die Verantwortlichkeit im Rahmen einer Straftat differenziert. 4. Differenzierung und Straftatbestand. Die Vertiefung der Differenzierung im Strafrecht ist mit der inhaltlichen Änderung der Straftatbestände verbunden. Es wird ausführlich auf die verschiedenen Trends eingegangen. 5. Differenzierung der Strafen. 5.1 Das Strafsystem im Allgemeinen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs soll die Voraussetzungen für die Differen-zierung von Straftaten und Beschuldigten schaffen. Zusammenfassung 293

Die Vertiefung der Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit setzt die Bestimmung des Zusammenhangs zwischen den verschiedenen Arten von Strafen voraus. Der Gesetzgeber führt die Strafen im Allgemeinen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs (Art. 37 StGB) nach ihrem Schwere- und Repressionsgrad auf. So entsteht eine „Leiter der Strafen“, auf der jede Strafart eine einzelne „Sprosse” bildet. Sollte der Unterschied im Schweregrad der einzelnen Strafarten d. h. zwischen den einzelnen „Sprossen” ermittelt werden, würde eine einheitliche Skala zur Bemessung und zum Vergleich aller Strafen vorliegen. 5.2. Die Disposition der strafrechtlichen Norm bestimmt den Straftatbestand und die Sanktion beinhaltet die sich aus der Tatbegehung ergebende strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit. Zwischen der Disposition und der Sanktion der strafrechtlichen Norm besteht nicht nur eine juristische, sondern auch eine soziale Verbindung, weil sie beide Erscheinungen aus der sozialen Realität widerspiegeln. Die Disposition enthält das Modell des verbrecherischen Verhaltens und den dazugehören- den Schweregrad (Gemeingefährlichkeit und moralische Verwerflichkeit) und die in der Sanktion vorgesehene Strafe ist ein quantitativer Ausdruck der Straftat. Die Aufgabe bei der Strafrechtssetzung besteht in der Festlegung einer solchen Strafe in der Sanktion, die der in der Disposition aufgewiesenen Straftat entspricht. 6. Grenzen der Differenzierung. Die Vertiefung der Differenzierung ist eine dauerhafte Tendenz in der Entwicklung der Strafrechtsetzung. Jeder Differenzierungsvorgang stößt aber auf gewisse Grenzen. Sie werden durch den optimalen Grad der Abstraktion (Konkretion) der strafrechtlichen Norm determiniert. 6.1. Zwischen dem Gebot der Abstraktion (Verall- gemeinerung) und der Konkretion (Kasuistik) der Norm besteht 294 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG ein kaum auszuräumender Widerspruch. Zum einen ist der Gesetzgeber bestrebt, die Straftat in der Disposition mit maxi- maler Genauigkeit zu beschreiben. Zum anderen soll er eine hinreichend allgemeine Disposition errichten, die alle möglichen Erscheinungsformen der einzelnen Straftat umfaßt. Die Schwierigkeit besteht darin, diese beiden gegenläufi- gen Anforderungen für Abstraktion und Konkretion unter einen Hut zu bringen d. h. das optimale Verhältnis zwischen dem Allgemeinen (Typischen) und Besonderen (Spezifischen) bei der Beschreibung der einzelnen Straftaten im Gesetz zu finden. Die Differenzierung der Strafrechtsetzung geht mit der Konkretisierung der Straftatbestande einher. Im Ergebnis wird die Disposition weniger abstrakt, und die Grenzen des richterlichen Ermessens werden eingeschränkt. Offen bleibt aber die Frage wie weit der Gesetzgeber bei der Konkretisierung des Straftatbestands gehen kann; welcher Tiefgang ist ihm erlaubt bei der Berücksichtigung der Handlungsspezifik und der Differenzierung der Verantwortlichkeit für diese Handlung von der Verantwortlichkeit für verwandte Formen delinquenten Verhaltens. Hauptkriterium bei dieser Aufgabenlösung soll die Effizienz der strafrechtlichen Norm sein, die Möglichkeit, durch sie das gewünschte soziale Ergebnis zu erreichen. Je komplizierter sich eine öffentliche Beziehung darstellt und je ausführlicher sie geregelt ist, desto abstrakter soll die strafrechtliche Norm sein, die diese Beziehung schützt. 6.2. Im Ergebnis der Differenzierung werden die Grenzen der in den Sanktionen vorgesehenen Strafen eingeschränkt. Die Vertiefung der Differenzierung führt folglich zur Ein- schränkung des richterlichen Ermessens. Und eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben der Strafpolitik ist es, ein optimales Verhältnis zwischen dem Willen des Gesetzgebers und dem richterlichen Ermessen bei der strafrechtlichen Regelung herzustellen. Zusammenfassung 295

Unter P. 7 wird auf die Bedeutung des Tatmittels (der Form) für die Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verant- wortlichkeit eingegangen.

§ 8. Strafrechtliche Institute. Institut der Tatbeteiligung 1. Strafrechtliche Institute. Das strafrechtliche Institut stellt ein System von strafrechtlichen Normen dar, die eine Gruppe verwandter Strafrechtsverhältnisse oder eine Variante, einen Aspekt oder ein Element usw. von ihnen regeln. 2. Institut der Tatbeteiligung. Das Institut der Tatbeteiligung umfaßt die objektiven und subjektiven Merkmale der einzelnen Formen gemeinschaftlichen delinquenten Verhaltens, legt den Kreis der strafrechtlich verant- wortlichen Personen fest und bestimmt die Voraussetzungen und den Umfang ihrer Verantwortlichkeit. Für eine Reihe von Straftaten (Vergewaltigung, Diebstahl, Raub, Untreue, Betrug, unerlaubte Herstellung, Verbreitung usw. von Rauschgift) sieht das Gesetz eine strengere Verantwortung vor, wenn die Tat „von zwei oder mehreren Personen” begangen wurde. „Die Straftat, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” ist eine spezifische Form gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns. Sie ist eine Erscheinungsform der Mittäterschaft, die mehrere Fragen aufwirft: – Unter welchen Voraussetzungen finden die Normen im Besonderen Teil Anwendung, die eine strengere Verantwortlichkeit vorsehen, wenn die Straftat „von zwei oder mehreren Personen” begangen wurde d. h. welchen Anwendungsbereich haben diese Normen. – Warum hat der Gesetzgeber bei bestehenden allgemeinen Normen für die Tatbeteiligung (Art. 20-22 StGB) auch die Vorschriften im Besonderen Teil über „Straftaten, die von einer 296 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden” geschaffen, die ebenso Erscheinungsformen der Tatbeteiligung regeln. So werden gleichartige Erscheinungen von zwei Normentypen geregelt: im Allgemeinen und im Besonderen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs. – In welchem Verhältnis (Gemeinsamkeiten und Unter- schiede) stehen „die Straftat, die von einer oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” und die übrigen Formen gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns im Besonderen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs. – Welche Probleme entstehen in der Rechtsprehung bei der Qualifikation der „Verbrechen, die von einer oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden“, und der anderen Formen der Teilnahme? 2.1. Anwendungsbereich der Normen für „Straftaten, die von einer oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden”. Der Umstand, der die öffentliche Gefahr bei den aufgeführten Straftaten in besonderem Maße steigert, ist die Tatbeteiligung. Offen steht die Frage ob alle Formen der Tatbeteiligung eine beträchtliche Zunahme der öffentlichen Gefahr bewirken oder nur die Mittäterschaft. Auf dieser Grundlage werden die qualifizierten Tatbestände alle Erscheinungsformen der Tatbeteiligung oder nur die Fälle von Mittäterschaft umfassen. Zu erforschen wäre der Einfluß der verschiedenen Tatbeteiligungsformen auf die Tatschwere. Das Problem dabei ist einmal festzustellen, wo der wesentliche Unterschied, der „Sprung” im Gemeingefährlichkeitsgrad liegt: zwischen der Einzeltäterschaft und der Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne oder zwischen der Tatbeteiligung und der Mittäterschaft. Weil der qualifizierte Tatbestand nur diese Straftatvariante umfaßt, die bedeutend gefährlicher als die Grundvariante (nach dem Grundtatbestand) ist. Die Untersuchung der „Straftat, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” umfaßt zwei Schritte: Zusammenfassung 297 a) einen theoretischen Schritt, bei dem sinngemäß der Zusammenhang zwischen den Tatbeteiligungsformen und der Tatschwere abgeleitet wird und b) die empirische Überprüfung des logischen Schlusses, wobei letzterer der Realität gegenübergestellt wird. Wenn der theoretische Schluß den Tatsachen entspricht, ist er zuverlässig und wahrheitsgetreu. Der Vergleich zwischen den drei Formen der Straftat – Einzeltäterschaft, Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne und Mittäterschaft (bei sonst gleichen Voraussetzungen) – zeigt, dass der wesentliche Unterschied, der „Sprung” im Gemein- gefährlichkeitsgrad und in der moralischen Verwerflichkeit zwischen der „Straftat, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” und „der Straftat, die von einer Person unter der Mitwirkung von Anstiftern und Helfern begangen wurde” liegt und nicht zwischen der letzten und der „Straftat, die von einer Person begangen wurde”. Folglich umfassen die Vorschriften, die eine höhere Strafe vorsehen (Art. 152 Abs. 3 Z. 1; Art. 170 Abs. 2; Art. 195 Abs. 1 Z. 5 StGB usw.) nur die Erscheinungsformen der Mittäter- schaft, und die Erscheinungsformen der Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne (bei denen die öffentliche Gefahr nahe der bei der Einzeltäterschaft liegt) sollen nach dem jeweiligen Grundtatbestand in Verbindung mit Art. 20-22 StGB qualifiziert werden. 2.2. Begründung, Charakter und Funktionen der Normen für „Straftaten, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden”. 2.2.1. Errichtung des Instituts der Tatbeteiligung aus Normen im Allgemeinen und Besonderen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs. Die Entwicklung des Strafrechts, darunter auch des Instituts der Mittäterschaft, richtet sich nach der allgemeinen dem Recht eigenen Gesetzmäßigkeit: der Spezialisierung der gesetzlichen Regelung. 298 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Die Errichtung des Instituts der Tatbeteiligung vollzieht sich in drei Schritten: a) sachliche Differenzierung des Besonderen Teils des Strafgesetzes, wobei kasuistische Vorschriften über einzelne gemeinschaftliche Handlungen entstehen; b) Integration des normativen Stoffs, die die Entstehung der allgemeinen Vorschriften über die Tatbeteiligung ( im Allgemeinen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs) zur Folge hat; c) funktionale Spezialisierung der allgemeinen Normen für die Tatbeteiligung. 2.2.2. Begründung der Normen für „Straftaten, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden”. Das Vorhandensein verschiedener Normkategorien für die Tatbeteiligung ist der Notwendigkeit der adäquaten Darstellung des Schweregrads der verschiedenen Arten und Formen gemeinschaftlichen delinquenten Verhaltens im Gesetz und der Differenzierung der Verantwortlichkeit erwachsen. Dem bun- ten Bild gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns in der Realität soll ein ausgereiftes System strafrechtlicher Normen im Gesetz entsprechen, nämlich das Institut der Tatbeteiligung. 2.2.3. Charakter der Normen für „Straftaten, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden”. Die Normen für „Straftaten, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden” (Art. 152 Abs. 3 Z. 1; Art. 170 Abs. 2; Art. 195 Abs. 1 Z. 5 StGB usw.) sind Normen, die zum Besonderen Teil des StGB gehören. Sie sind den entsprechenden Instituten der Vergewaltigung, des rechtswidrigen Eindringens in eine fremde Wohnung, des Diebstahl usw. zuzuordnen. Zum anderen regeln die konkretisierenden Vorschriften im Besonderen Teil die Verantwortlichkeit für das gemeinschaftliche Begehen bestimmter Straftaten. Jede dieser Vorschriften erfüllt dieselbe Gattungsfunktion, die auch die Normen für die Tatbeteiligung im Allgemeinen Teil haben (Art. 20-22 StGB). Deswegen lassen sich die genannten Vorschriften Zusammenfassung 299 im Besonderen Teil auch als Bestandteil des Instituts der Tatbeteiligung betrachten. Die Normen für „Straftaten, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden” lassen sich also je nach ange- wandtem Kriterium verschiedenen Rechtsinstituten zuordnen. Wenn der Regelungsgegenstand als Kriterium herangezogen wird, gehört jede Norm im Besonderen Teil dem entsprechenden sachlichen Institut für Vergewaltigung, rechtswidrige Eindringung in eine fremde Wohnung, Diebstahl usw. an. Wenn aber die Funktion dieser Normen im strafrechtlichen System nicht berücksichtigt wird, läßt sich feststellen, dass sie nur auf die Regelung der gemeinschaftlichen Tatvarianten spezialisiert sind d. h. einen Teil des Instituts der Tatbeteiligung darstellen. 2.2.4. Funktionen der Normen für „Straftaten, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden”. Die Normen für „Straftaten, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden” widerspiegeln die beträchtliche Zunahme der öffentlichen Gefährdung durch manche Straftaten wegen Mittäterschaft und setzen eine zunehmende Verantwortlichkeit voraus. Ihre Funktion besteht also in der Differenzierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit. 2.3. Verhältnis zwischen den Normen für eine „Straftat, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” und den Normen für die übrigen Formen gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns. Die ganze Vielfalt von besonderen Formen gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns nach dem StGB läßt sich in vier Kategorien einteilen: a) Straftat, die von einer oder mehreren Personen (Gruppe von Personen) begangen wurde; b) Verbrechen, das von einem Menschen- gemenge begangen wurde; c) Bildung von und Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe (Vereinigung), die sich die Begehung von Straftaten zum Ziel setzt d. h. Vereinigung mit verbrech- erischem Ziel; d) notwendige Tatbeteiligung. 300 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Alle besonderen Formen gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns weisen mehr oder weniger die Gattungsmerkmale der Tatbeteiligung (mehrere Subjekte, objektive Einheit des verbrecherischen Handels, einen gemein- samen Vorsatz) auf. Neben diesen Gattungsmerkmalen besitzt jede Form gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns im Besonderen Teil auch einige spezifischen Merkmale. Die „Straftat, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” ist ein Erscheinungsbild eigentlicher (möglicher) Tatbeteiligung und die übrigen besonderen Formen gemeinschaftlichen verbrecherischen Handelns stellen Varianten der notwendigen Tatbeteiligung in breiteren Sinne dar. Die alte juristische Formel „Begehung einer Straftat von zwei oder mehreren Personen” kann nicht auf die neuen öffentlichen Bedürfnisse angewandt werden. Sie erfaßt nicht präzise die öffentliche Gefahr, die von den neuen sozialen Erscheinungen – den organisierten kriminellen Gruppen – ausgeht. So entspricht die kriminologische Realität der Normregelung (dem Institut der Tatbeteiligung) nicht mehr. Die modernen Formen gemeinschaftlicher Übergriffe lassen sich nicht in den klassischen Rahmen der Tatbeteiligung einordnen. Deswegen sollen die Bemühungen der Erforschung der neuen öffentlichen Phanomene (organisierten verbrecherischen Gruppen) und der Errichtung entsprechender normativer Modelle im Strafgesetzbuch gelten. 2.4. Qualifizierung der Straftaten, die unter Tatbeteiligung begangen wurden. In der einschlägigen Judikatur zur Anwendung der StGB-Vorschriften für die Tatbeteiligung und insbesondere bei der Qualifizierung der mit Beteiligung begangenen Straftaten ergeben sich viele Streitfragen. Behandelt werden die Probleme bei der Qualifizierung von: Tatbeteiligung und Mittäterschaft, Anstiftung, Beihilfe, Akzessorität der Verantwortlichkeit für Anstiftung und Zusammenfassung 301

Beihilfe, Exzessen, personlichen Umständen, die die Verantwortlichkeit der Beteiligten beeinflussen, Beteiligung an mehraktigen und fortgesetzten Straftaten, Straftaten, die „von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurden”.

§ 9. Empirische soziologische Untersuchungen Die empirischen soziologischen Untersuchungen werden in Zukunft eine wichtige Rolle bei der Rechtsetzung und insbesondere bei der Strafrechtssetzung spielen. Durch die empirische soziologische Untersuchung wird die Richtigkeit der theoretischen Schlüsse über den Zusammenhang zwischen zwei sozialen Erscheinungen überprüft. Ein bestimmter logischer Zusammenhang wird in der Praxis anhand konkretem empirischen Material abgeleitet. In der Arbeit wird das Potential der empirischen soziologischen Untersuchung durch Überprüfung der theoretischen Schlußfolgerung über den Begriff der „Straftat, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” aufgezeigt. Der logische Schluß, dass die Mittäterschaft viel „gefährlicher” als die Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne ist, hat dennoch den Charakter einer Hypothese. Sie wird als Ausgangspunkt bei der Definition des Begriffes der „Straftat, die von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” herangezogen. Deswegen ist dieser theoretische Schluß auch in der Praxis, im wahren Leben zu überprüfen. Dazu wurde der- selbe Zusammenhang (zwischen Tatbeteiligung und Gemein- gefährlichkeit der Straftat) erneut, diesmal aber schon empirisch auf Grund konkreter Tatsachen über eine bestimmte Straftat untersucht. Die empirische Untersuchung liefert eine Antwort auf die Frage ob der theoretische Schluß auch den Tatsachen, der Realität entspricht. 302 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

1. Das Programm für jede empirische Untersuchung wird folgendermaßen gegliedert: a) Zielsetzung und Konzept; b) Aufgaben; c) Gegenstand und Umfang; d) statistische Untersuchungsmethoden; e) empirische Interpretation (Operationalisierung) der Grundbegriffe; f) Methoden für die Erfassung und Speicherung der empirischen Daten; g) statistische Auswertung der Daten und Inhaltsanalyse der Ergebnisse. 1.1. Ziel und Gegenstand der Untersuchung. Das Ziel der empirischen Untersuchung war, einmal festzustellen wie sich die beiden Formen der Tatbeteiligung (Mittäterschaft und Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne) auf den Gemeingefahr- dungsgrad auswirken. Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist der Zusammenhang zwischen der Tatbeteiligung als Tatmittel und der Gemeingefährlichkeit der Straftat. Zwischen diesen beiden Phänomenen besteht ein kausaler Zusammenhang (eine Kausalitat). 1.2. Umfang der Untersuchung. Die Untersuchung umfaßt die vom Amtsgericht Sofia verhandelten Verfahren über Diebstahl öffentlichen Vermögens in einem dreijährigen Zeitraum. Die Diebstahldelikte werden in drei Gruppen aufgeteilt: a) Diebstahl, der von einer Person begangen wurde (Art. 194 Abs. 1 StGB); b) Diebstahl, der von einer Person unter der Mitwirkung von Anstiftern und Helfern begangen wurde; c) Diebstahl, der von zwei oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde (Art. 195 Abs. 1 Z. 5 StGB). Bei allen repräsentativen empirischen Untersuchungen wird die Frage nach der Zuverlässigkeit der gewonnenen Ergebnisse d. h. darüber, inwieweit die gezogenen Schlußfol- gerungen der Realität entsprechen, gestellt. Eine zufriedenstel- lende Antwort auf diese Frage kann nur unter Anwendung der Zusammenfassung 303 mathematischen Statistik und der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie geliefert werden. Die Zuverlässigkeit der Ergebnisse ist von zwei Faktoren abhängig: der Richtigkeit der angewandten Methoden (der Theorie) und der Zuverlassigkeit der erhobenen Daten d. h. der Qualität der empirischen Daten. Im Laufe der Untersuchung wurde die wahrscheinliche Zuverlässigkeit der Ergebnisse ermittelt. Es stellte sich heraus, dass diese Wahrscheinlichkeit ziemlich hoch ist und 95% über- schreitet. Daraus wäre zu schließen, dass alle drei Stichproben groß genug sind und sich auf ihrer Grundlage richtige (zuver- lässige) Schlüsse ziehen lassen. 1.3. Statistische Untersuchungsmethoden. Die Zusammen- hänge zwischen den öffentlichen Erscheinungen haben einen statistischen und nicht einen funktionalen (dynamischen) Charakter. Als statistisch läßt sich der Zusammenhang bezeichnen, der als Tendenz d. h. nur bei der massenhaften Erschein- ung der Phänomene und nicht einzeln zum Vorschein kommt. 1.4. Empirische Interpretation der Grundbegriffe. Die empirische Interpretation eines Begriffes bedeutet, ihn durch einfache, empirisch meßbare Größen (Merkmale) darzustellen d. h. ihn in die Sprache der Fakten zu „übersetzen”. Dabei vollzieht sich quasi ein „Abbau” des Begriffes. Er wird in einfache empirische Komponenten zerlegt. Die Tatbeteiligung (das Tatmittel) spielt eine kausale Rolle. Die Tatbeteiligung weist eine Reihe empirischer Merk- male auf, von denen die Tatbeteiligungsform das wichtigste ist. Der Grad der Gemeingefährdung durch die Straftat wird als Folge betrachtet. Als empirische Größen für den Gemeingefährdungsgrad der Straftat werden herangezogen: a) der zugefugte Schaden (der Sachschaden wird in Lewa gemessen) und b) die verhängte Strafe (die gerichtlich ver- hängte Strafe wird in Monaten gemessen). 304 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

1.5. Grundhypothesen der Untersuchung. Die Hypothesen sind wissenschaftlich begründete Vermutungen über die Merkmale der untersuchten Phänomene. Die Grundhypothesen sind zwei: a) Wenn die drei Varianten der Tat verglichen werden (Einzeltäterschaft, Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne und Mittäterschaft), so liegt der bedeutende Unterschied, der „Sprung” im Gemeingefährdungsgrad zwischen „der Tat, die von einem oder mehreren Personen begangen wurde” und „der Tat, die von einer Person unter Mitwirkung von Anstiftern und Helfern” (und nicht zwischen der letzten und „der Tat, die von einer Person begangen wurde”) und b) Aus allen Umständen, die die Tatbeteiligung charakterisieren, hat die Form der Tatbeteiligung d. h. die Art des gemeinschaftlichen Tatmittels eine wesentliche (die größte) Bedeutung für die Gemein- gefährlichkeit der gemeinschaftlichen Tat. 1.6. Methoden zur Erfassung und Speicherung empirischer Daten. Als primäre Informationsquelle wurden die Strafver- fahren am Amtsgericht Sofia genutzt. 2. Statistische Datenauswertung und Inhaltsanalyse der Ergebnisse. Die erhobenen empirischen Daten wurden im EDV-Zentrum beim Mathematischen Institut der Bulgarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften bearbeitet. Angewendet wurde das universelle Softwäre-Paket BMDP, entwickelt in der Kalifornischen Universität. 2.1. Auswertung der Daten über den Schaden. Die drei Gruppen von Diebstahlen unterscheiden sich nach dem Tatmittel (Einzeltäterschaft, Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne, Mittäterschaft). Die Frage ist ob sich die drei Arten von Diebstählen auch nach dem von ihnen verursachten Schaden unterscheiden; weisen die Daten über den Schaden einen Unterschied auf und in welchem Umfang. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage haben wir eine Disper- sionsanalyse durchgeführt, durch die es sich ermitteln läßt, ob sich ein Faktor wesentlich auf die Folgen auswirkt. Zusammenfassung 305

Die drei Gruppen von Diebstählen unterscheiden sich wesentlich untereinander in ihren Durchschittsgrößen d. h. nach dem Ausmaß des aus ihnen erwachsenen Schadens. Aus den von einer Person begangenen Diebstählen ergibt sich ein durchschnit- tlicher Schaden in Höhe von BGN 296,19; bei den unter Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne begangenen Diebstählen liegt diese Größe bei BGN 473,46 und bei den Diebstählen mit Mittäterschaft – bei BGN 835,69. Bereits in diesem Anfangsstadium der Untersuchung läßt sich erkennen, dass sich aus der Mittäterschaft ein wesentlich größerer Schaden ergibt als bei der Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne und der Einzeltäterschaft. Im weiteren werden durch monofaktorielle Dispersions- analyse die drei Gruppen von Diebstählen verglichen. Daraus ergibt sich ein Streuungsverhaltnis (F-Wert) von 8,41. Dieser Wert ist wesentlich höher als der kritische F-Wert für solche Verhaltnisse. Die drei Kategorien von Diebstählen (nach dem Merkmal „Tatmittel”) unterscheiden sich wesentlich voneinander auch nach dem Ausmaß des von ihnen verursachten Schadens. Der Zuverlässigkeitsgrad bei diesem Schluß ist sehr hoch: 0,9997 (oder 99,97%). Der zweite und auch wichtigere Schritt bei der Disper- sionsanalyse ist die Ermittlung des Unterschieds zwischen den drei Gruppen von Diebstählen und insbesondere die genaue Festlegung, wo der „Sprung” im Gemeingefährlichkeitsgrad vollzogen wird. Nur der typische Grad (das aritmetische Mittel) würde nicht ausreichen, um der Unterschied zwischen den drei Gruppen von Diebstählen vollständig erfassen zu können. Aus diesem Grund wurden auch zwei kompliziertere Berechnungen vorgenommen: der Bonferoni-Test und eine statistische Auswertung nach Student. 306 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

2.2. Analyse der Daten über die Strafe. Die zweite empirische Größe für die Ermittlung des Tatschweregrads (nach dem Schaden) ist die verhängte Strafe. Die Angaben über die Strafen bei den drei Gruppen von Diebstählen (Einzeltäterschaft, Tatbeteiligung im eigenen Sinne und Mittäterschaft) wurden auch einer Streuungsanalyse unterzogen. 2.3. Schlüsse aus der empirischen Untersuchung. Die Auswertung der empirischen Untersuchungsergebnisse berechtigt zu der Schlußfolgerung, dass die aufgestellten Hypothesen in der Praxis bestätigt werden.

§ 10. Der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt und das Strafrecht 1. Der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt und der Inhalt des Strafgesetzes. Die rasante Entwicklung von Wissenschaft und Technik läßt sich in erster Linie in der Automatisierung und elektronischen Ausstattung im Produktions- und Leistungssektor wie auch in den Bereichen Transport, Telekommunikation und IT erkennen. Neben der Zunahme des öffentlichen Wohlstands zieht der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt auch negative Nebenfolgen nach sich: starke Umweltverschmutzung, Zunahme der Gefahrenquellen, psychische Überbelastung der Arbeitsnehmer usw. Die gewachsenen Anforderungen, die die neue Technik an den Menschen stellt, geraten in Widerspruch mit seinem begrenzten psychischen und körperlichen Potential. Dadurch wächst die Gefahr bei der Bedienung technischer Geräte. Das Nichteinhalten der Sicherheitsvorschriften könnte schwere Folgen für Leib, Leben und Eigentum der Bürger haben. Insbesondere bei der Bedienung automatischer Steuerungssys- teme könnte der geringste Fehler einen hohen sozialen „Preis” Zusammenfassung 307 haben. Der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt führt also zu einer rapiden Zunahme der Tätigkeiten, bei denen eine erhöhte Gefahr besteht. Dies wird begleitet durch die Regelung der neuen Tätigkeiten und Einführung von Verant- wortlichkeitsvorschriften für die Verletzung der neuen Regelungen. Die hohe öffentliche Gefährdung durch fahrlässi- gen Handeln bei der Nutzung der Technik erfordern die Kriminalisierung solcher Handlungen. Der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt wirkt sich insbesondere auf folgende Strafrechtsbereiche aus: 1.1. Kriminalisiert wird eine Reihe von unachtsamen Handlungen bei der Nutzung der Technik. Die objektive Seite dieser Delikte drückt sich in der Verletzung gesetzlich geregel- ter Sicherheitsvorschriften, infolge dessen die Technik außer Kontrolle gerät und zur Gefährdung von Leib, Leben und Eigentum eines unbestimmten Kreises von Bürgern führt. Subjektiv lassen sich diese „technischen Delikte” durch die wissentliche Verletzung der Sicherheitsvorschriften und das fahrlässige Bewirken gemeingefährlicher Folgen beschreiben. 1.2. Eine weitere negative Folge des wissenschaftlich- technischen Fortschritts ist die Umweltverschmutzung von Boden, Luft und Wasser. Dadurch wird das natürliche Gleichgewicht in der Natur gestört und eine Gefahr für Leib und Leben des Menschen ausgelöst. Dies erfordert die Kriminalisierung einer Reihe von Ubergriffen auf die Umwelt. 2. Kriminalisierung der fahrlässig begangenen gemeinge- fährlichen Taten. Die Kriminalisierung der fahrlässigen Taten soll dem Grundsatz der Ökonomie der strafrechtlichen Repression und den Einwirkungsmöglichkeiten auf das entsprechende Verhalten durch strafrechtliche Instrumente Rechnung tragen. Eine Kategorie von Taten läßt sich auf zwei Weisen kriminalisieren: durch die Einführung einer allgemeinen Norm oder 308 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG durch die Schaffung mehrerer konkreter Vorschriften. Die konkreten Normen haben eine stärkere warnende und regelnde Wirkung, bewirken aber zum anderen Rechtslücken. Das Problem, mit dem der Gesetzgeber dabei konfrontiert wird, besteht in der Herstellung einer richtigen Kombination von allgemeinen und besonderen Vorschriften, die für fahrlässiges Verhalten eine Verantwortlichkeit festlegen. Die Kriminalisierung der fahrlässigen Taten bringt auch zwei Probleme allgemeinerer Art auf die Tagesordnung: die Einführung der besonderen Zurechnungsunfähigkeit und die Präzisierung des Begriffs der Fahrlässigkeit. Das psychische und körperliche Vermögen des Menschen ist begrenzt und kann nicht immer mit der rasanten technischen Entwicklung Schritt halten. Es ist durchaus möglich, dass eine Person, die sonst zurechnungsfähig ist, bei der Bedienung eines komplizierten technischen Systems die Fähigkeit „zum Verständnis der Merkmale und der Bedeutung seines Handelns oder zur Steuerung seiner Handlungen” wegen psychischer Belastung verliert. In diesem Fall wäre die Person schuldunfähig für die entstandenen Schäden. In Zukunft ist die Entwicklung eines „Fachmann-Profils” erforderlich d. h. eine vollständige Beschreibung der psychischen und körperlichen Merkmale, die der Bediener einer technischen Anlage besitzen soll. Die Schaffung von Kriterien für Berufstauglichkeit in bezug auf einige komplizierte Tätigkeiten wird das Gericht in seinem Ermessen über die Zurechnungsfähigkeit einer Person erleichtern. 3. Der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt und die Form des Strafgesetzes. Die gegenwärtigen sozialen Entwicklungen, die mit dem wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritt einhergehen, beeinflussen nicht nur den Inhalt, sondern auch die Form des Strafgesetzes. Dadurch wird der Widerspruch zwischen Stabilität und Flexibilität des Gesetzes verschärft. Für den Gesetzgeber wird es immer schwieriger, Zusammenfassung 309 den optimalen Grand der Abstraktion (Konkretion) der strafrechtlichen Normen zu bestimmen. Die rasante Entwicklung von Wissenschaft und Technik legt heutzutage dem Verbrecher ein vielseitiges Instrumenta- rium von Mitteln und Varianten verbrecherischen Handelns. Dies setzt die Notwendigkeit der Errichtung von Normen mit einem hohen Abstraktionsgrad voraus, die alle möglichen Erscheinungsformen eines Delikts umfassen. Der strenge Formalismus im Strafrecht gehört der Vergangenheit an. Eines der Instrumente für die Umwandlung der kasuistischen Formulierungen in allgemeine Regeln ist das Heranzeihen von Blankettdispositionen und Wertungsmerkmalen bei der Rechtssetzung.

§ 11. Die Organisierte Kriminalität und das materielle und prozessuale Strafrecht in der Transformationszeit 1. Entwicklung des materiellen Strafrechts in der Transformationszeit. Im Ergebnis des rasanten wirtschaftlichen, politischen und sozialen Wandels blieb das Rechtssystem Bulgariens ein großes Stück hinter der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung zurück. Das alte Recht konnte nicht mehr den neuen öffentlichen Bedürfnissen gerecht werden. Das Fehlen einer angemessenen gesetzlichen Regelung wirkte sich negativ sowohl auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung als auch auf die Bekämpfung der Kriminalität aus. Die Gesetzeslücke im Finanz- Bank-und Steuerbereich und in der Privatisierungsaufsicht lieferte einen günstigen Nährboden für Mißbrauch, Betrug, Veruntreuung öffentlicher Mittel und ihrer grenzüberschreiten- den Transfer. Das Strafrecht bietet keine Voraussetzungen für eine effektive Bekämpfung der Kriminalität. 1.1. Die neue Verfassung (1991) schuf einen Mechanismus zur Angleichung des bulgarischen an das internationale Recht. 310 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Gem. Art. 5 Abs. 4 der Verfassung bilden die internationalen Verträge, verfassungsmäßig ratifiziert, bekanntgegeben und für die Republik Bulgarien rechtskräftig geworden, einen Teil des nationalen Rechts. Die Bestimmungen eines derartigen internationalen Vertrags haben eine direkte, unmittelbare Wirkung. Mit Beschluß Nr. 7/1992 (Staatsanzeiger Nr. 56, 1992) hat das Verfassungsgericht der Republik Bulgarien ausgesprochen, dass der Grundsatz der direkten Wirkung der internationalen Verträge auf dem strafrechtlichen Bereich sehr eingeschränkt ist. Diese Entscheidung des Verfassungsgerichts bezieht sich jedoch nur auf die materiellen und nicht auf die prozessualen strafrechtlichen Normen. Unter P. 1.2-1.8 werden die Novellen im Allgemeinen und Besonderen Teil des Strafgesetzbuchs, bei den Strafen, in der Strafpolitik des heutigen bulgarischen Staates wie auch die wichtigsten Trends in der strafrechtlichen Entwicklung behandelt. 2. Entwicklung des prozessualen Strafrechts in der Transformationszeit. 2.1 Die Kontrolle über die Kriminalität geht mit der Einschränkung der bürgerlichen Rechte einher. Wenn der Gesetzgeber im Bereich des Strafverfahrens eine Entscheidung herbeiführen soll, steht er immer vor dem Dilemma welchem von beiden Werten den Vorrang zu geben wäre: dem öffentlichen Interesse an der Kriminalitätsbekampf- ung oder den Rechten des Einzelnen. Hergestellt werden soll dabei ein optimales Verhaltnis zwischen der personlichen Freiheit des Einzelnen und den öffentlichen Bedürfnissen nach Kriminalitäts- kontrolle durch eine effiziente Strafgerichtsbarkeit. Unter P. 2.2 -2.7 werden die Novellen in bezug auf den Schutz des Beschuldigten, die Vorermittlung, die Festnahme des Beschuldigten und die gerichtliche Kontrolle auf ihn (habeas corpus), das Verhältnis zwischen dem Verhandlungs- und Amtsermittlungsgrundsatz behandelt. Zusammenfassung 311

3. Die Organisierte Kriminalität in der Transformations- zeit. Die Organisierte Kriminalität wurde zu einem der gefährlichsten Faktoren für die bulgarische Gesellschaft. Das organisierte Verbrechen wirkt sich auf alle öffentlichen Bereiche, darunter auch auf die politische Entscheidungsfind- ung aus. 3.1. Der Begriff für Organisierte Kriminalität. Die Organisierte Kriminalität stellt ein System organisierter Verbrechen dar, die vor allem in der Wirtschaft begangen werden. Hauptziel dieser Art von Kriminalität ist der Vermögensvorteil. Der Terrorismus ist ein gewalttaterisches Verbrechen, das das Erreichen bestimmter politischer Ergebnisse zum Ziel hat. 3.2. Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalität. Die Organisierte Kriminalität läßt sich bedingt in Wirtschaftskriminalität (Weiße-Kragen-Kriminalität) und Gewaltkriminalitat (Straßenkriminalität) unterteilen. Im Ergebnis der Organisierten Kriminalität: a) entstehen mächtige Wirtschaftsgruppierungen, die auf verbrecherische Weise Kapital anscharren und das „schmutzige Geld” kommt dann in den Umlauf, wird zur Bestechung von Amtsträgern genutzt und löst weitere Delikte aus; b) diese verbrecherischen Gruppen verdrängen den Staat aus dem Produktions- und Handelsbereich, indem sie eine „Schattenwirtschaft” errichten; c) entstehen Machtzentren der Organisierten Kriminalität, die die Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen kriminellen Gruppen regeln und sich darum bemühen, sie auf die internationale Szene zu bringen, indem sie ihre Tätigkeit legalisieren. 3.3. Gründe für die Organisierte Kriminalität. Ähnlich wie das Räubertum in der Antike ist die Organisierte Kriminalität ein Produkt der modernen Zivilisation: der Urbanisierung, des 312 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG technischen Fortschritts und der Globalisierung. Hauptursache für die rasante Entwicklung der Organisierten Kriminalität in unsrem Lande ist aber der Ordnungswechsel und insbesondere die Abschwächung der sozialen und gesetzlichen Kontrolle beim Übergang von einer zentralen Kommandowirtschaft und autoritaren politischen Führung zur freien Marktwirtschaft und demokratischen Ordnung. Der Übergang zur Marktwirtschaft ist an und für sich nicht kriminell. Ganz im Gegenteil: er liegt im öffentlichen Interesse und ist auch notwendig. In Bulgarien aber wurde diese Transformation schlecht vorbereitet und auch schlecht vollzogen: ohne eine strategische Grundlage für Inhalt und Form der Transformation und für die Bewältigung der negativen Begleiterscheinungen. Der Staat ließ abrupt und kategorisch die Hebel für die Produktionslenkung (Industrie und Landwirtschaft) aus seiner Hand los, ohne vorher die erforder- liche Entwicklungsgrundlage für das freie Unternehmertum – die kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen – geschaffen zu haben. Eine an die neuen Realitäten angepaßte Kontrolle (in den Bereichen Produktion, Finanzen, Banken, Steuern, Zoll, Grenze, Privatisierung usw.) fehlte einfach. Die administrativen Kontrollfunktionen des Kommandostaates wären im Absterben begriffen und ein neues Kontrollsystem, auf die Bedürfnisse der Marktwirtschaft zugeschnitten, war einfach noch nicht installiert. In mehreren Bereichen fehlten sogar die gesetzlichen Grundlagen für die Wirtschaftstätigkeit in der Transformationszeit. Diese Transformationszeit wurde in unserem Lande durch mehrere Wellen von Wirtschaftskriminalität begleitet. a. Durch die Verletzung des UNO-Embargos gegen Ex- Jugoslawien und insbesondere durch den illegalen Erdöl- Schmuggel über die Grenze (1993-1994) schlugen neu ent- standene verbrecherische Gruppen (mit der Beihilfe von Zusammenfassung 313

Bediensteten des Innenministeriums) große Gewinne. Zudem ermöglichten einige Handlungen des Staates bis 1996 und insbesondere die Erteilung von Genehmigungen für die Gründung zahlreicher neuer Banken (sgn. Banken-Boom) einem engen Personenkreis öffentliche Mittel in besonders hohem Maße durch Betrug und Verbrechen im Amt im Bankbereich zu verun- treuen. Dies führte zur Konzentration des Geldes in den Händen einer kleinen Zahl von Personen. Dadurch wurde eine inoffizielle Privatisierung des bulgarischen Finanzkapitals vollzogen. Sie bilden den Ausgangspunkt für den nächsten Schritt: die Privatisierung des Aktiva in staatlicher Hand. b. Die zweite Welle der Wirtschaftkriminalität geht mit der Privatisierung der staatlichen Aktiva einher, die 1997 begann. Die Privatisierung, die ohne jegliche Kontrolle verlief, schuf einen guten Nährboden für das organisierte Verbrechen. Die Übertragung öffentlichen Eigentums auf Private wurde bei starker Wertminderung des zur Privatisierung anstehenden staatlichen Eigentums vollzogen. Die öffentlichen Güter gingen in die Hände von Neureichen über, die sie nicht bewirtschaften konnten. Der Grund hierfür war die fehlende Kontrolle über die Privatisierung. c. Von einer dritten Welle der Wirtschaftskriminalität wäre es noch ziemlich früh zu reden. Die Erfahrungen der anderen Transformationsländer weisen aber auf schwere Delikte bei der Bedienung der Staatsschuld (die für Bulgarien bei ca. elf Milliarden USD liegt), der Bewirtschaftung der staatlichen Reserven, der Inanspruchnahme von ausländischen Beratungs- leistungen hin. Ein wesentliches Merkmal der Organisierten Kriminalität ist die Korruption. Sie wurde zu einer Massenerscheinung. Insbesondere nahm dabei die latente (nicht aufgedeckte) Korruption zu. Sie ist die Sprache, durch die das organisierte 314 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Verbrechen mit dem Staat kommuniziert. Wie eine Metastase greift heutzutage die Korruption um sich und zerstort den Korper des Staates. 3.4. Kontrolle über die Organisierte Kriminalität. Die Organisierte Kriminalität ist ein kompliziertes soziales Phänomen, das durch mehrere Faktoren zu Stande kommt: wirtschaftlicher, gesellschaftspolitischer, kriminologischer und rechtlicher Natur. Dadurch wird das Potential des Strafrechts (der Strafe) bei der Bekämpfung der organisierten Kriminalität eingeschränkt. 3.5. Die internationale Zusammenarbeit bei der Bekampfung der Organisierten Kriminalität und des Terrorismus. In jüngster Zeit erleben wir eine totale Konfrontation des organisierten Verbrechens mit der internationalen Öffentlichkeit. „Kerngeschäft” der Organisierten Kriminalität ist der Rauschgiftschmuggel. Dadurch verschafft sich das organisierte Verbrechen Milliarden US-Dollars schmutzigen Geldes. Die meisten Formen Organisierter Kriminalität und Terrorismus werden vom Strafgesetzbuch der Republik Bulgarien erfaßt. Auf internationaler Ebene ist aber die Kriminalisierung solcher Taten noch bevorstehend. Dies wird zur Errichtung neuer internationaler Jurisdiktionen führen und der gesamten Entwicklung der internationalen Strafgerichts- barkeit neue Impulse verleihen. Die Organisierte Kriminalität und der Terrorismus werden in der Regel durch eine Gruppe von Personen konspirativ betrieben. Deswegen sollen auch die Ermittlungen insgeheim laufen und dem Verbrechen nach Inhalt und Form entsprechen. Die gesetzlichen Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Organisierten Kriminalität und des Terrorismus sind folglich vorwiegend prozessualer Natur: Einsatz von speziellen Erkenntnismitteln (der sgn. elektronischen Observation) zum Zusammenfassung 315

Zwecke der Beweiserhebung im Strafverfahren; Einsatz verdeckter Ermittler, die für ihre Tatbeteiligung nicht aus- sagepflichtig sind; Schutz gefährdeter Zeugen; verstärkte Kontrolle über die Bewegung des „schmutzigen Geldes“, Verfall („Einfrieren”) von Erträgen aus Straftaten; Einführung spezialer beschleunigter Ermittlungsverfahren für Organisierte Kriminalität und Terrorismus u. a. Die Bemühungen zur Eindämmung der Organisierten Kriminalität und des Terrorismus sind immer mit der Gefahr der Einrichtung unkontrollierter Organe verbunden, die uneingeschränkte Macht genießen. Im internationalen Aspekt wird diese Gefahr immer größer. Bei den bestehenden internationalen Übereinkommen über die Kriminalitätsbekämpfung machen sich einige inakzeptable Trends bemerkbar: Einschränkung des Anwendungsbereichs der Unschuldsvermutung, Hypothesen für objektive Schuldzuweisung; in bestimmten Fällen wird die Beweislast auf den Beschuldigten übertragen; eingeschränkt wird das Recht des Beschuldigten auf Verteidigung usw. Die verstärkten Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von Organisierten Kriminalität und Terrorismus werden im allgemeinen durch eine verstärkte juristische Kontrolle auf die private Sphäre der Bürger begleitet.

* * *

In der Transformationszeit nahm die Kriminalität eine rasante Entwicklung. Es kam zur Entstehung von Organisierter Kriminalität (illegaler Rauschgift-, Waffen-und Menschenhan- del, Finanzbetrug im großen Stil, Geldwasche, Korruption u. a.) und Terrorismus. Zugleich blieb die soziale und gesetzliche Kontrolle weit hinter der Kriminalitätsentwicklung zurück. Die 316 THEORETISCHE GRUNDZUGE DER STRAFRECHTSSETZUNG

Strafgerichtsbarkeit steckt in einer Krise. Die Bestrafung der Verbrecher vollzieht sich in einem komplizierten und ver- schleppten Verfahren. Der Korruptionsdruck auf die Rechtsschutzorgane nimmt zu. Die „Big Boss” in der kriminellen Welt bleiben für die Rechtsprechung unerreichbar. Erforderlich ist die Stärkung der sozialen und gesetzlichen Kontrolle durch die Effizienzsteigerung der Strafgerichts- barkeit. An dieser Stelle ergibt sich die Frage welcher von beiden Werten den Vorrang haben sollte: die öffentlichen Bedürfnisse nach einer effizienten Kontrolle über die Kriminalität oder die Rechte des Einzelnen. Weil jede Kontrolle zugleich ein gewisser Eingriff in die Menschenrechte bedeutet. Hergestellt werden soll eine Balance zwischen dem Schutz der Menschenrechte (Freiheit des Einzelnen) und dem Schutz der Allgemeinheit vor der Kriminalität durch eine Verstärkung der Kontrolle und insbesondere der Strafgerichts- barkeit. Die Gesellschaft wird quasi vor die Wahl gestellt: ein „Staat der Mafia” (mit hoher Kriminalität wegen der schwachen sozialen Kontrolle) oder ein „Staat von Mussolini” (mit niedriger Kriminalitätsrate und totaler Kontrolle auf das Leben der Bürger). Die EMRK, die vom Europa-Rat 1950 verabschiedet wurde, hat einen neuen Anfang gesetzt. Sie hat den Schutz des Einzelnen vor den Einschränkungen und Eingriffen des Staates zum Ziel. Die Konvention stellt die Rechte des Einzelnen als höchstes Gut in den Vordergrund. Nach der Konvention soll das Strafverfahren das Recht des Beschuldigten auf Verteidigung und den Schutz vor Mißbrauch durch die Behörden maximal garantieren. Die Organisierte Kriminalität schränkt aber ihrerseits auch die Rechte der Bürger ein und verübt ein Diktat auf sie. che Diktatur des totalitären Staates. Die aktuelle Situation Zusammenfassung 317 erfordert also eine verstärkte soziale Kontrolle auf die Kriminalität. Die EMRK wurde immerhin vor mehr als fünfzig Jahren geschaffen und trägt den neuen Realitäten – der Organisierten Kriminalität und dem Terrorismus – kaum Rechnung. Die meisten europäischen Staaten ergreifen heutzutage entscheidende Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von Organisierter Kriminalität und Terrorismus. Diese neuen Maßnahmen sollen aber in die Rechte des Einzelnen nicht eingreifen. Wie bekannt gibt es in der Welt von George Orwell, wo der Staat eine totale Kontrolle ausübt und tief in den privaten Bereich des Einzelnen eingreift, indem er seine Rechte verletzt (observiert, hört ab, zeichnet auf, dringt in Wohnungen ein, verletzt das Kommunikationsgeheimnis usw.), keine Kriminalität. Unser Ideal ist aber nicht der Staat von Orwell. ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

Никола Филчев

(Резюме)

Переход от централизованной государственной экономи- ки и авторитарного политического управления к рыночному хозяйству и демократии по своей сути является социальной революцией. Этот переход характеризуется сменой производ- ственных отношений, основанных на общественной собствен- ности на средства производства. При переходе в Болгарии на смену общественной (государственная и кооперативная) соб- ственности пришла частная собственность. Государственное имущество было приватизировано и перешло в руки неболь- шой группы людей. Общество разделилось на бедных и бо- гатых. Смена экономического базиса (материальные отношения) привела к изменению надстройки (идеологические отношения). Все элементы надстройки: а) идеи − политические, правовые, нравственные, философские и т.д.; б) соответствующие им иде- ологические отношения; в) учреждения и организации − поли- тические (государство, партии), правовые (судебные органы) и т.д. претерпели изменения и продолжают меняться. В период перехода единая государственная собствен- ность распределилась между рядом физических и юридичес- ких лиц. Это привело также к перераспределению политичес- кой власти между множеством субъектов. В силу принципа разделения властей у нас государственная власть разделилась на законодательную, исполнительную и судебную (ст. 8 Кон- ституции). Далее, правящие партии продолжают перераспре- Резюме 319

делять власть между государственными органами в зависи- мости от своих конъюнктурных интересов посредством изме- нения законодательства. Переход у нас вызвал ряд положительных последствий: более эффективное управление собственностью, рост хозяй- ственной инициативы, демократизация общественно-полити- ческой жизни, увеличение свободы личности. Наряду с этим переход характеризуется рядом отрицательных сторон: ослаб- ление социально-правового контроля и рост преступности. 1. Преступность не вечное и неизменное явление, одина- ковое для всех времен и народов. Она меняется с ходом исто- рии в различные эпохи. Содержание и формы преступности, в конечном счете, обуславливаются общественно-экономичес- кими условиями. Но от воли законодателя зависит, в некото- рой степени, какие деяния будут объявлены преступными. За- конодатель создает уголовный закон, отражая объективные общественные потребности, учитывая также интересы правя- щего класса. Исторически в течение длительного времени уголовный закон создавался эмпирично. При этом значительную роль иг- рали интуиция и правовая традиция. Ныне созрела необходи- мость в научном подходе к уголовному законотворчеству. Бурный рост преступности и ослабление социально-правового контроля требуют теоретического инструмента, который позво- лит законодателю принять правильные, научно обоснованные решения в законотворчестве. Качество уголовного закона явля- ется предпосылкой для эффективности уголовного правосудия. В процессе создания уголовного закона перед законода- телем встают две основные проблемы. Во-первых, определить круг преступлений, т.е. провести границу между преступным и непреступным поведением. Для этой цели необходима тео- рия криминализации деяний. Одной только теории, однако, не- достаточно. Внутри в рамках преступного поведения нужно дифференцировать преступления и ответственность за них. 320 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

Следовательно, криминализация деяний и дифференциация уголовной ответственности являются двумя основными проб- лемами в уголовном законотворчестве. 2. Преступление − сложное явление, которое имеет социаль- ную, юридическую и психическую стороны. Поэтому его можно изучить только с помощью комплексного подхода с привлечением возможностей различных наук. Есть два основных метода исследования социально-пра- вовых явлений: социальный и юридический. Формальный, юридический подход изучает правовые нормы, т.е. догмы (должное), а не реальное поведение (существующее). Юриди- ческий анализ, однако, не дает ответа на вопросы: почему за- конодатель закрепил определенные факты (деяния) в законе; какие социальные задачи возлагает он на соответствующие нормы; каков механизм их действия и социальный эффект в результате применения этих норм. Чтобы выяснить поставленные вопросы, необходимо выйти за рамки права и выявить социальные причины, порож- дающие законные правила и определяющие их содержание. Теперь созрела необходимость в комплексном подходе в исследовании уголовно-правовых явлений. Только сочетание юридического и социального анализов дает возможность выя- вить диалектическое единство юридической формы и ее об- щественного содержания. 3. Бесспорно, уголовный закон является социально обус- ловленным. Он отражает объективные общественные инте- ресы и субъективные интересы правящего класса. Проблема, однако, возникает, когда нужно „перевести” на юридический язык существующие экономические потребности и полити- ческие требования. Задача состоит в выяснении „механизма“, благодаря которому общественные интересы превращаются в уголовно-правовые нормы? 4. „Криминализация деяний” и „дифференциация уголов- ной ответственности” сравнительно новые понятия уголовно- Резюме 321

правовой науки. Их появление связано с усилиями, направ- ленными на создание теории уголовного законотворчества, т.е. теоретической модели (система принципов, критериев и понятийного аппарата), который позволит законодателю при- нимать научно обоснованные решения в процессе законотвор- чества. Настоящий труд является частью усилий, направленных на создание теории уголовного законотворчества.

§ 1. Поведение. Структура поведения 1. Преступление это вид деятельности (поведение). Пове- дение человека является предметом изучения различных наук − философии, социологии, политэкономии, права, этики и др., причем общими закономерностями и структурой поведения за- нимается общая психология. При глубинном анализе поведе- ния, в вертикальном „срезе” выявляется иерархия элементов (уровней), сложность которых последовательно уменьшается. С помощью системного анализа поведение разделяется на следующие иерархично организованные уровни (элементы): деятельность, действие (бездействие), операция, телодвиже- ние. Высшим из них является деятельность. Основной состав- ной частью деятельности является действие (бездействие). Деятельность осуществляется посредством сочетания дейст- вий. Самый элементарный акт поведения − телодвижение. 2. Соотношение между различными элементами (уровни) поведения. Эти элементы не существуют отдельно, самостояте- льно и поведение является не сбором элементов. Они выявля- ются только при „вертикальном срезе” поведения. Различные элементы (деятельность, действие, операция и телодвижение) находятся в отношении соподчиненности. Каждый более сложный элемент охватывает более простые, которые являют- ся формой его осуществления. Определенное действие может войти в довольно различ- ные по характеру виды деятельности. Возможно также обрат- 322 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

ное − данная деятельность осуществляется посредством раз- личных сочетаний действий и операций. Настоящее социальное значение данного действия можно понять только, если рассмат- ривать его в связи с остальными явлениями поведения.

§ 2. Преступление. Способ совершения преступления. Содержание и форма преступления 1. Понятия деяния и преступного (исполнительное) дея- ния не совпадают. Исполнительное деяние отдельных прес- туплений определяется в каждом конкретном случае законода- телем. Понятие преступного (исполнительное) деяния имеет конвенциональное, установленное законодателем содержание. Исполнительное деяние определенных преступлений охваты- вает несколько действий или даже деятельность. 2. Способ является элементом объективной стороны преступления. Любое поведение, в т.ч. преступное, является диалектическим единством субъективной (внутренняя, психи- ческая) и объективной (внешняя, физическая) сторон. В дейс- твительности внешнее, физическое действие не может отор- ваться от своего внутреннего, психического субстрата. В на- учном анализе, однако, возможно и даже необходимо мыслен- но разделить преступление на его составные части и раскрыть его структуру. Преступное поведение имеет содержательную и формаль- ную стороны. Способ − такая характеристика преступного де- яния, которая показывает, как оно совершается − посредством каких элементов (движения, операции); как связаны элементы между собой; в какой последовательности они осуществляют- ся и т.д. Способ соединения составных элементов в единое це- лое называем способом совершения преступного деяния. С точки зрения системного подхода, способ совершения деяния составляет его структуру, внутреннюю организацию деяния. Нет преступного деяния вообще. Оно выражается в объек- тивном мире в виде одного или иного сочетания (совокуп- Резюме 323

ность) движений и операций. Каждое из этих сочетаний пред- ставляет собой способ осуществления преступного деяния. В случае „способом совершения преступного деяния” называем само сочетание определенных поведенческих актов, с помо- щью которых осуществляется преступное деяние, т.е. внеш- нее выражение деяния. Преступное деяние и способ его со- вершения составляют два соседних уровня, „этажи” в струк- туре поведения. С одной стороны, способ является качественной характе- ристикой, показывающей, как связываются элементы прес- тупного деяния, т.е. способ − структура деяния. С другой сто- роны, способом называем конкретное сочетание телодвиже- ний и операций, посредством которых осуществляется опре- деленное преступное деяние. Вторая дефиниция используется в литературе по криминалистике. Только диалектический метод позволяет вникнуть в суть объекта (явление), выявить его свойства, стороны, структуру и т.д. Проще говоря, диалектический метод сводится к следу- ющему: изучаемый объект делится, „расщепляется” на две противоположные стороны и каждая из них исследуется отдель- но „в чистом виде“, а потом исследуется также взаимодейст- вие (единство и борьба) между противоположными сторона- ми. Выбор противоположных сторон объективно обусловлен, поскольку по своей природе вещи полярные, они составляют единство противоположностей. В объективном мире не существует явления, которое яв- ляется только „преступным деянием” и другое, являющееся только „способом”. Существуют отдельные человеческие проявления, составляющие диалектическое единство преступ- ного деяния и способа его совершения. Существование данно- го преступного деяния предполагает по необходимости нали- чие соответствующей формы, в которой выражается это дея- ние. Когда говорим об определенном преступном деянии, мы подразумеваем его конкретную форму проявления, сочетание 324 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

телодвижений, посредством которых реализуется это деяние. Следовательно, преступное деяние и способ его совершения соотносятся между собой как содержание и форма. Они явля- ются противоположностями единого целого. Из этого следует, что все свойства связи „содержание − форма” присутствуют в отношении „преступное деяние − способ его совершения”. Когда понятие „способ совершения преступного деяния” используется в смысле внутренней формы, подразумевается способ соединения составных элементов преступного деяния в единое целое, т.е. это структура деяния. Когда понятие „способ совершения преступного деяния” используется в смысле внешней формы, подразумевается конкретное прояв- ление деяния, его выражение снаружи, т.е. сочетание опреде- ленных телодвижений, посредством которых осуществляется преступное деяние. Это сочетание − нечто материальное, наблюдаемое, оно имеет пространственные и временные из- мерения. Обе дефиниции способа не исключают друг друга, они отражают различные стороны (внутренняя и внешняя) явления.

§ 3. Общественная опасность − основной критерий для криминализации деяний и дифференциации уголовной ответственности Основной принцип, на котором основывается наше уго- ловное законодательство и практика его применения, социаль- ная справедливость. Принцип справедливости имеет специфи- ческое для уголовного права звучание − уголовная ответст- венность должна соответствовать тяжести преступления и личности преступника. 1. Для последовательного проведения принципа справед- ливости в законе и практике необходимо установить („изме- рить”) тяжесть преступления. Для этого следует изучить объек- тивные и субъективные стороны преступления, которые обус- лавливают его отрицательное воздействие на общество. Резюме 325

Тяжесть является основной социальной характеристикой преступления, которая состоит из двух компонентов: а) объек- тивный − общественная опасность преступного поведения и б) субъективный − вина, моральное порицание психического отношения деятеля к общественно опасному деянию и его последствиям. Объективная и субъективная стороны преступления − две его противоположности, которые существуют в диалекти- ческом единстве и взаимодействии. Психические процессы порождают и направляют объективную сторону преступле- ния. А объективная сторона в свою очередь оказывает обрат- ное воздействие на субъективные переживания. Одна из самых перспективных задач, стоящих перед уго- ловно-правовой наукой состоит в исследовании влияния раз- личных элементов преступления на его общественную опас- ность. Решение этой задачи позволит углубить теоретические основы уголовного нормотворчества, сделать ряд научно обос- нованных рекомендаций относительно криминализации деяний и дифференциации уголовной ответственности. По своей труд- ности эта задача не уступает сложнейшим научно-техническим проблемам, стоящим перед естественными науками. Трудность состоит в том, установить и измерить качественные и количес- твенные изменения общественной опасности в результате воз- действия различных факторов. Для этой цели сложные социаль- но-правовые явления и свойства (характер и степень общест- венной опасности, вредные последствия, способ совершения деяния и т.д.) следует выразить посредством простых, эмпири- чески измеримых показателей (признаки). Далее, нужно вырабо- тать правила измерения признаков, т.е. единица меры и шкала стоимостей каждого признака. Этот процесс − операционализи- рование правовых понятий и создание формальных моделей об- щественных явлений все еще находится на начальном этапе. 2. Необходимо раскрыть богатое содержание обществен- ной опасности, выяснить различные ее стороны и признаки, 326 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

изучить факторы, ее обуславливающие и указать место каждо- го элемента преступления среди них. Общественная опасность является свойством, присущим всему преступлению, а не отдельным его частям. Но при на- учном анализе преступление мысленно можно разделить на его составные части. Тогда условно можно говорить о „собс- твенной” общественной опасности отдельных элементов преступления. Образно говоря, каждая частица преступления несет определенный „заряд” общественной опасности. Когда говорим об „общественной опасности” данного элемента преступления, на самом деле мы имеем в виду степень, в ко- торой этот элемент влияет на общественную опасность всего преступления. Задача состоит в том, выяснить в каком направлении и ка- ким путем (механизм) различные элементы преступления и обстоятельства влияют на его общественную опасность. Для решения этой задачи необходимо правильно понять структуру преступления. Если посмотрим более абстрактно, все преступления име- ют одну и ту же структуру − они представляют собой единст- во субъективной (внутренняя) и объективной (внешняя) сто- рон. Поэтому, возможно вывести некоторые общие, принци- пиальные положения относительно влияния различных эле- ментов преступления на его общественную опасность. Все обстоятельства делятся на две категории в зависимости от функции, которую они выполняют в формировании совокуп- ной общественной опасности. Некоторые обстоятельства обус- лавливают характер, иные − степень общественной опасности. „Характер” (качество) и „степень” (количество) только относи- тельно самостоятельные стороны общественной опасности. В отдельном преступлении элементы сочетаются друг с другом самыми разнообразными способами, причем объек- тивное и субъективное находятся в различных соотношениях. На передний план выступают те или иные обстоятельства и Резюме 327

оказывают решающее воздействие на общественную опас- ность преступного поведения. § 4. Криминализация деяний Криминализация (объявление деяния преступлением) и декриминализация (исключение деяния из круга преступле- ний) сравнительно новые понятия в уголовном праве. 1. Решение о криминализации данного деяния является всегда результатом взаимодействия двух факторов: а) объек- тивный фактор − фактические свойства деяния (которые сущес- твуют вне и независимо от отношения „познающий субъект − объект”) и, прежде всего, его свойство причинять вред или уг- рожать общественным отношениям, т.е. общественная опас- ность деяния и б) субъективный фактор − состояние общест- венного сознания, точнее − отрицательная оценка законодателя о соответствующем деянии как нежеланном. Следовательно, познавательное и оценочное переплетаются в уголовно-право- вой норме. Понятие о данном преступлении является единст- вом объективного (фактическая характеристика деяния) и су- бъективного (оценка о социальном значении этого деяния). От воли законодателя зависит, отнесет ли он некоторые деяния с более низкой степенью общественной опасности к преступлениям или нет. Поэтому граница между преступным и непреступным поведением динамична, подвижна. Она меня- ется по причине изменения объективных условий, но также и по воле законодателя. 2. По мнению В. Н. Кудрявцева законодатель должен ис- пользовать четыре критерия, перед тем как объявить данное деяние преступлением. Эти критерии следующие: потреб- ность в запрете деяния, т.е. в создании новой уголовно-право- вой нормы, допустимость, возможность осуществления и це- лесообразность новой нормы. 2.1. Потребность в создании нового уголовно-правового запрета. Основной фактор, который вызывает необходимость в криминализации данного деяния, это его общественная опас- ность. Не всякое общественно опасное действие (бездействие), 328 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

однако, заслуживает быть криминализованным, а только то с достаточно высокой степенью общественной опасности. Уголовное право регулирует не отдельные эксцессы, а массовые проявления. Уголовная норма ориентируется на ти- пичное, распространенное поведение, которое выражает оп- ределенные общественные и природные закономерности. Ины- ми словами, чтобы криминализовать данное деяние, оно дол- жно быть достаточно распространенным. Защищая только самые ценные отношения, законодатель криминализует дейст- вия, которые редко совершаются на практике. 2.2. Допустимость уголовно-правового запрета. Следует оценить также допустимость соответствующего запрета с точ- ки зрения существующих политики, морали и права. 2.3. Возможность реализации уголовно-правового запре- та. После установления того, что данный запрет потребен и допустим, нужно решить следующий вопрос − возможно ли его осуществление на практике. Подлежит ли соответствую- щее поведение социальному контролю, можно ли его регули- ровать уголовно-правовыми нормами и т.д.? 2.4. Целесообразность уголовно-правового запрета. Кри- минализация порождает не только положительные, но и отри- цательные последствия. Поэтому законодатель всегда должен подвергать оценке целесообразность ввода нового уголовно- правового запрета, т.е. сопоставить положительные и отрица- тельные последствия криминализации. Социальная „цена” криминализации зависит от ряда факторов. 3. Изменение уголовного законодательства, т.е. принятие или отмена уголовно-правового запрета может быть продик- товано: а) изменением общественной опасности данного вида деяния или б) нахождением более эффективных (менее реп- рессивных, „менее дешевых” для общества и т.д.) средств для борьбы против соответствующей группы отрицательных про- явлений. Только последовательное применение всех критери- Резюме 329

ев и принципов позволяет законодателю принять оптимальное решение и создать эффективную уголовно-правовую норму. В пункте 4 рассматривается значение способа (форма) деяния для криминализации. Ставится вопрос, насколько высокой должна быть сте- пень общественной опасности, чтобы криминализовать дея- ние, совершенное определенным образом. Предварительно и абстрактно нельзя определить некоторый минимум общест- венной опасности, некоторый нижний порог, необходимый для криминализации. В каждом отдельном случае законода- тель оценивает конкретное специфическое отражение деяния на общественных отношениях.

§ 5. Состав преступления. Функции состава преступления. 1. Преступление и состав преступления соотносятся как реальное явление и понятие о нем. Состав является законной моделью данного вида преступления. Состав преступления не простая совокупность призна- ков, а система признаков, которая обладает определенной структурой. Содержание и структура состава зависят от двух факторов: от самого материального явления, отраженного в составе, и от функций состава. Состав отражает определенный социальный факт − прес- тупное поведение. Каждый признак состава имеет свой мате- риальный первоисточник (элемент, свойство или особенность поведения). В процессе построения состава преступления и оценки какие признаки включить в него, законодатель принимает во внимание также функции состава в уголовно-правовом регу- лировании. А их две: устанавливающая (криминализующая) и разграничительная (дифференцирующая) функция. Посредством законного состава законодатель объявляет ука- занное в нем деяние преступлением, т.е. устанавливает правовое 330 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

основание уголовной ответственности (преступление). Необходи- мо также определить меру, степень этой ответственности. Поэто- му состав исполняет и вторую − разграничительную функцию. Создавая различные составы в УК, законодатель дифференциру- ет уголовную ответственность для различных преступлений. Для того, чтобы выполнить успешно обе свои функции, сос- тав должен адекватно отражать социальную сущность преступ- ления − его общественную опасность. Это является предпосыл- кой для установления и назначения справедливого наказания. 2. Способ (форма) деяния и состав преступления. Прос- мотр особенной части Уголовного кодекса показывает, что способ входит в состав только некоторых преступлений. Ос- новной критерий, которым руководствуется законодатель при решении этого вопроса, это влияние способа на обществен- ную опасность преступления. а. В определенных случаях способ совершения деяния обуславливает социальное значение этого деяния, т.е. наличие его общественной опасности. Данные деяния общественно опасны и преступны, только если будут совершены опреде- ленным способом. Здесь, образно выражаясь, способ являет- ся носителем „основного заряда” общественной опасности. Он является условием для криминализации деяния и поэтому законодатель закрепляет его как конститутивный признак в основном составе соответствующего преступления.. б. Различные способы ущемления определенной катего- рии общественных отношений, т.е. посягательства различного рода, могут различаться существенно по характеру своей об- щественной опасности. В таком случае законодатель обособ- ляет их в отдельных преступлениях. Здесь способ действия является критерием для разграничения сходных преступле- ний, т.е. критерием для дифференциации оснований уголов- ной ответственности. в. Способ совершения преступного деяния часто влияет существенно на степень общественной опасности преступле- Резюме 331

ния. Если данный способ вызывает такой высокий рост об- щественной опасности, что она выходит за рамки основного состава преступления, законодатель закрепляет соответству- ющий более опасный вариант преступления в отдельном бо- лее тяжко караемом составе. Способ в этом случае является квалифицирующим обстоятельством. Он отражается в квали- фицированном составе преступления и служит для разграни- чения различных вариантов данного преступления. г. Законодатель конкретизирует, уточняет общественную опасность некоторых преступлений, указывая в основном сос- таве также способ совершения преступного деяния. Сочетание преступного деяния и способа его совершения характеризует точнее общественную опасность поведения. И в этом случае способ является признаком основного состава преступления, но не основным (который имеет решающее значение для кримина- лизации деяния), а „дополнительным“, уточняющим признаком. Конкретизация преступных составов ведет к углублению диф- ференциации правовых оснований уголовной ответственности. д. В остальных случаях, когда способ совершения деяния не меняет существенно типичную общественную опасность преступления, законодатель не отражает его в соответствую- щем составе. Влияние способа на общественную опасность учитывается судом в процессе определения наказания. Здесь способ совершения преступления является отягчающим или смягчающим обстоятельством, которое имеет значение для индивидуализации уголовной ответственности. Преступное деяние (содержание) и способ его совершения (форма) − два соседних уровня в структуре поведения. Состав, как отражение преступного поведения, имеет тоже иерархичес- кую структуру. В него входят различные категории признаков, которые характеризуют различные уровни поведения и поэто- му они имеют разную степень абстрактности. Анализ Уголовного кодекса показывает, что законодатель закрепляет в составах преступлений чаще всего действия 332 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

(бездействия). Уровень деятельности довольно высокий для отдельной уголовно-правовой нормы (обычно он регулирует- ся моральными нормами), а уровень телодвижения довольно низкий (телодвижения регулируются техническими нормами).

§ 6. Наказание. Основание, цели и тяжесть наказания. Любая уголовно-правовая проблема, в конечном счете, сводится к определению основания и тяжести наказания. Понятия наказания и уголовной ответственности близки, но не совпадают. По содержанию уголовная ответственность означает, что лицо, совершившее преступление, понесло, пре- терпело государственное принуждение. По своей социальной роли уголовная ответственность яв- ляется реакцией государства на совершенное преступление. Она является средством социального контроля. 1. Основание наказания. В зависимости от того, что является основанием наказания − преступное деяние или деятель − офор- мились „уголовное право деяния” или „уголовное право деятеля”. Согласно классической школе, создателем которой явля- ется Ч. Бекария („О преступлениях и наказаниях“, 1764 г.) преступное деяние является единственным основанием нака- зания. Деяние порождает наказание, причем наряду с этим оп- ределяет и его тяжесть. Антропосоциологическая, или позитивная, теория воз- никла чуть позже на один век, и она отражена в книге Ч.Лом- брозо „Преступный человек” 1871 г. Она переносит ударение с преступления на преступника. Согласно этой теории при- чины преступления кроются в психофизических особенностях преступника и его социальной среде. Поэтому следует наказы- вать не деяние, а преступную наклонность деятеля. 2. Цели наказания. Наказание не только справедливое (соответствующее) возмездие за совершенное преступление, но и средство достижения определенных целей. Конечной це- Резюме 333

лью любого наказания является ограничение преступности. Непосредственной целью, однако, наказания является: а) воз- действовать на преступника (индивидуальная превенция) и б) на остальных членов общества (общая превенция). Какая из обеих целей будет выбрана, зависит от уголовной политики, от концепции государства для борьбы с преступностью. 3. Тяжесть наказания. Наше уголовное право построено на принципе деяния. Преступное деяние является единой, об- щей мерой наказания различных лиц, которая обеспечивает равенство граждан перед законом. Наказание должно соответствовать преступлению. Оно должно быть справедливым возмездием за совершенное прес- тупление. А справедливым является то наказание, которое со- ответствует преступному деянию. Помимо того, что оно должно соответствовать преступле- нию, наказание должно быть также целесообразным, достигать указанных законом целей. Общая превенция достигнута, если назначено справедливое наказание (соответствующее преступ- ному деянию). Индивидуальная превенция, однако, требует, чтобы наказание учитывало индивидуальные особенности лич- ности преступника. Таким образом, к наказанию предъявляют- ся два противоречивых требования. С одной стороны, оно дол- жно соответствовать деянию, с другой − деятелю. 3.1. Соотношение между преступлением и наказанием можно рассматривать на двух различных уровнях − законода- тельном и судебном. Первоначально, законодатель оценивает, „измеряет” тяжесть (общественная опасность и моральное по- рицание) преступления и закрепляет эту тяжесть в законе (состав преступления). А наказание, предусмотренное в санк- ции, является концентрированным выражением преступления, его количественной оценкой. Чтобы установить соответствие между преступлением и наказанием, необходимо предварительно „оценить” их. Проб- лема сводится к измерению социально-правовых явлений. 334 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

Суд, на практике, каждый день соизмеряет тяжесть конк- ретных преступлений и наказаний. Судебная оценка, однако, развивается в рамках законодательной. Вообще говоря, уголовное право глубоко проникнуто ко- личественными оценками. Задачей уголовно-правовой науки является создание обоснованных критериев и методов изме- рения общественной опасности и морального порицания преступлений. 3.2. Анализ нашего уголовного законодательство показы- вает, что ряд составов преступлений включают признаки не только о деянии, но и о личности деятеля. В основном составе законодатель определяет основание уголовной ответственности. Именно поэтому основной состав преступления должен включать признаки только относительно деяния. А квалифицированный состав является средством дифференциации уголовной ответственности. Он содержит, помимо признаков основного состава, и признаки об обстоя- тельствах, которые существенно изменяют основной вариант преступления и вызывают потребность в дифференцирован- ном наказании. Эти квалифицирующие обстоятельства могут характеризовать поведение или личность преступника.

§ 7. Дифференциация уголовной ответственности 1. Дифференциация права имеет глубокие социальные корни. Она отражает дифференциацию самих общественных отношений. С осложнением общественной жизни возрастает необхо- димость в дифференциации правового регулирования. Право- вая система тоже осложняется и обогащается. Формируются новые структурные образования − нормы, институты, отрас- ли. Иными словами, углубляется „разделение труда” между правовыми предписаниями. С другой стороны, общественное развитие связано с объек- тивным сближением экономических процессов и отношений. Резюме 335

Юридическое выражение этого факта представляет собой обобщение (интеграция) нормативного материала. Новые об- щественные явления могут быть охвачены только новыми, бо- лее общими правовыми формами с достаточно высокой степе- нью абстрактности. Следовательно, дифференциация и интег- рация противоположные и диалектически связанные стороны в развитии права. Эффективность уголовно-правового воздействия зави- сит, прежде всего, от дифференциации уголовной ответствен- ности и ее неотвратимости. „Дифференциация уголовной от- ветственности” означает установление в законе различной уголовной ответственности за различные виды преступлений (в зависимости от их типичной общественной опасности и мо- рального порицания, а также от социально значимых свойств личности преступника). Дифференциация уголовной ответст- венности является средством для реализации принципа спра- ведливости в уголовном праве. Преступление не только основание, но и мера уголовной ответственности. Иными словами, преступление не только по- рождает уголовную ответственность, но определяет также ее тяжесть. Дифференциация уголовной ответственности является последствием дифференциации ее оснований − преступлений. Кроме тяжести преступления и личности преступника, за- конодатель использует и другой дополнительный критерий для дифференциации уголовной ответственности − цели нака- зания. Когда устанавливает нижнюю границу наказания, зако- нодатель может оказаться ниже минимума, определенного объективной тяжестью преступления, чтобы использовать смягченное наказание как средство добиться одних или дру- гих конкретных целей. Принцип целесообразности присутст- вует в большой степени в процессе построения санкций поощ- рительных уголовных норм. 2. Предметная и функциональная дифференциация. Диф- ференциация уголовного законодательства осуществляется в двух направлениях: предметном и функциональном. 336 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

Предметная дифференциация уголовного законодательст- ва проходит на нескольких уровнях. Учитывая характер об- щественной опасности, законодатель разграничивает различ- ные виды преступлений и систематизирует нормы о них по главам и разделам в особенной части закона. Учитывая сте- пень общественной опасности, он разграничивает варианты данного преступления и соответствующие конкретизирующие распоряжения, которые предусматривают квалифицирован- ные составы преступления. Функциональная дифференциация состоит в том, что дан- ная норма (или группа норм) специализируется в исполнении отдельной только задачи в уголовно-правовом регулировании. В результате этого функция нормы сужается, а ее предметный охват расширяется − она распространяется на все (или боль- шинство) преступлений независимо от их вида. Функциональн- ыми, например, являются институты вины, подготовки и попыт- ки, соучастия, освобождения от уголовной ответственности и др. Распоряжения функциональных институтов представляют собой „вынесенные за скобки” общие положения, которые действительны для всех (или большинства) преступлений. 3. Дифференциация преступлений. Пункт 3.1. посвящен классификации (категоризация) преступлений. 3.2. Необходимо разграничить также варианты данного преступления, которые требуют дифференцированной ответс- твенности, т.е. необходимо сформулировать квалифицирован- ные составы преступления. В основном составе преступления законодатель закрепля- ет обстоятельства, которые необходимы для возникновения уголовной ответственности, т.е. они формируют основание уголовной ответственности. Если какой-нибудь из остальных элементов и особенностей преступного поведения (размер вре- да, способ, место, время совершения деяния и др.) вызывает су- щественное отклонение от его типичной тяжести (обществен- ная опасность и моральное порицание), законодатель закрепля- Резюме 337

ет соответствующий вариант в более легко или более тяжко ка- раемом составе преступления. Посредством этих квалифициро- ванных составов законодатель дифференцирует различные ва- рианты преступления, а наряду с этим и наказания за них. Конкретизирующие вариантные предписания особенной части Уголовного кодекса (квалифицированные составы) яв- ляются специальными по отношению к норме, которая пре- дусматривает основной состав преступления. Эти специаль- ные нормы вырастают из общей, конкретизируя ее содержа- ние и охватывая только часть ее поля применения. Создание квалифицированных составов выражает тенденцию к углубле- нию дифференциации уголовной ответственности. Таким об- разом, общая норма по выражению С.С. Алексеева, „обраста- ет свитой” конкретизирующих положений. Развитие уголовного законодательства связано с ростом удела конкретизирующих норм. Именно поэтому перспек- тивным направлением в уголовно-правовой науке становится исследование влияния различных обстоятельств (элементы поведения и обстановки, особенности личности деятеля), на тяжесть преступления. В сущности, исследовать, как различн- ые обстоятельства влияют на общественную опасность данно- го преступления и изучить соответствующие конкретизирую- щие нормы особенной части по своей сути одно и то же. Толь- ко первый подход (социальный) занимается поведением и зна- чением его элементов для общественной опасности, а второй подход (нормативный) − отражением этих явлений в законе, т.е. нормами, посредством которых законодатель дифферен- цирует ответственность в рамках данного преступления. 4. Дифференциация и состав преступления. Углубление дифференциации уголовного законодательства связано с из- менением в содержании составов преступления. Подробно рассматриваются различные тенденции. 5. Дифференциация наказаний. 5.1. Система наказаний, установленная в общей части Уголовного кодекса, должна созда- 338 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

вать возможность для дифференцированного подхода к преступ- лениям и виновным лицам. Углубление дифференциации уголовной ответственности требует установить связь, зависимость между различными ви- дами наказаний. Законодатель размещает наказания в общей части Уголовного кодекса (ст. 37 УК) согласно их тяжести, репрессивности. Таким образом, получается „лестница нака- заний“, в которой каждое наказание играет роль отдельной „ступени”. Если будет возможно оценить разницу между тя- жестью различных видов наказаний, т.е. между отдельными „ступенями“, тогда мы будем располагать единой шкалой для измерения и сравнения всех наказаний. 5.2. Диспозиция уголовно-правовой нормы определяет состав преступления, а санкция предусматривает уголовную ответственность, которая следует после его совершения. Между диспозицией и санкцией уголовно-правовой нормы су- ществует не только юридическая, но и социальная обуслов- ленность, поскольку они отражают реальные социальные яв- ления. Диспозиция содержит модель преступного поведения и его типичной тяжести (общественная опасность и моральное порицание). А наказание, предусмотренное в санкции, свое- образное количественное выражение этого преступления. Задача уголовного законотворчества состоит в том, чтобы предусмотреть такое наказание в санкции, которое со- ответствовало бы преступлению, указанному в диспозиции. 6. Пределы дифференциации. Углубление дифференциа- ции является длительной, закономерной тенденцией в развитии уголовного законодательства. Но любая дифференциация име- ет некоторую границу. Она определяется оптимальной степе- нью абстрактности (конкретность) уголовно-правовой нормы. 6.1. Между требованием абстрактности (обобщенности) и требованием конкретности (казуистичности) нормы сущест- вует неустранимое противоречие. С одной стороны, законода- тель стремится максимально точно охарактеризовать преступ- Резюме 339

ление в диспозиции. С другой стороны, законодатель должен создать достаточно общую диспозицию, которая смогла охва- тить все возможные проявления преступления данного вида. Проблема в том, что оба встречных требования − об абс- трактности и конкретности − трудно сочетаются, т.е. трудно найти оптимальное соотношение между общим (типичное) и особенным (специфическое) при выявлении характера от- дельных преступлений в законе. Дифференциация уголовного законодательства связана с конкретизацией составов преступлений. В результате этого абстрактность диспозиции снижается, а пределы судебного усмотрения сужаются. Вопрос, однако, можно задать таким образом: как далеко может пойти законодатель в процессе конкретизации состава; как глубоко следует ему заходить, учитывая специфику данного действия и дифференцируя от- ветственность за него от той, характерной для схожих форм преступного поведения. Основным критерием в решении это- го вопроса должна быть эффективность уголовно правовой нормы, возможность посредством нее достичь желанного со- циального результата. Чем сложнее данное общественно полезное отношение и чем подробнее оно регламентировано, тем абстрактнее долж- на быть уголовная норма, защищающая это отношение. 6.2. В результате дифференциации сужаются пределы на- казаний, предусмотренных в санкциях. Следовательно, углуб- ление дифференциации ведет к сужению пределов судебного усмотрения. Одна из основных проблем уголовной политики выражается в том, чтобы найти оптимальное соотношение между волей законодателя и усмотрением суда в уголовно правовом регулировании. В пункте 7 рассматривается значение способа (форма) преступления для дифференциации уголовной ответственности. 340 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

§ 8. Уголовно-правовые институты. Институт соучастия 1. Уголовно-правовые институты. Уголовно-правовой ин- ститут является системой уголовно правовых норм, регулиру- ющих группу сродных уголовных правоотношений или их разновидности, стороны, элемента и т.д. 2. Институт соучастия. Институт соучастия очерчивает объективные и субъективные признаки различных форм сов- местного преступного поведения, определяет круг уголовно ответственных лиц, устанавливает условия и пределы их от- ветственности. За ряд преступлений (изнасилование, кража, грабеж, должностное присвоение, обман, неразрешенное производст- во, распространение и т.д. наркотиков) закон предусматрива- ет более строгую ответственность, если деяние совершено „двумя или более лицами”. „Преступление, совершенное дву- мя или более лицами” является специфической формой сов- местной преступной деятельности. Оно представляет собой проявление соучастия, вызывающее ряд вопросов: − При наличии каких предпосылок применяются нормы особенной части, предусматривающие более строгую ответс- твенность, если преступление совершено „двумя или более лицами” т.е. каков охват этих норм? − Почему, несмотря на наличие общих норм относитель- но соучастия (ст. 20-22 УК), законодатель создал и распоря- жения особенной части относительно „преступлений, совер- шенных двумя или более лицами“, которые регулируют тоже проявления соучастия? Таким образом, однородные явления регулируются двумя видами норм − общей и особенной части Уголовного кодекса. − Каково соотношение (общее и различное) между „прес- туплением, совершенным двумя или более лицами” и осталь- ными формами совместной преступной деятельности, предус- мотренными в особенной части Уголовного кодекса? Резюме 341

− Какие проблемы возникают в судебной практике при квалификации „преступлений, совершенных двумя или более лицами” и других проявлений соучастия? 2.1. Охват норм относительно „преступлений, совер- шенных двумя или более лицами”. Обстоятельство, которое су- щественно повышает общественную опасность указанных прес- туплений, это соучастие. Вопрос в том, все ли формы соучастия вызывают существенный рост общественной опасности, или только соисполнительство? В зависимости от этого квалифици- рованные составы будут распространяться на все проявления соучастия или только на случаи соисполнительства. Необходимо изучить влияние различных форм соучастия на тяжесть преступ- ления. Проблема состоит в том, чтобы установить, где сущест- венная разница, где „прыжок” в уровне общественной опаснос- ти − между единоличным исполнительством и соучастием в соб- ственном смысле или между последним и соисполнительством? Почему квалифицированный состав охватывает только этот ва- риант преступления, который значительно опаснее основного варианта (по основному составу) преступления. Исследование „преступления, совершенного двумя или более лицами” охватывает два этапа: а) теоретический, в ко- тором прослеживается логически зависимость между форма- ми соучастия и тяжестью преступления; б) эмпирическая про- верка логического вывода, в ходе которой он сопоставляется с действительностью. Если теоретический вывод соответствует фактам, он истинен, достоверен. Сравнение трех форм преступления − единоличное ис- полнительство, соучастие в собственном смысле и соисполни- тельство (при равных иных условиях) показывает, что сущес- твенная разница, „прыжок” в уровне (степень) общественной опасности и морального порицания обнаруживается между „преступлением, совершенным двумя или более лицами” и „преступлением, совершенным одним лицом при содействии подстрекателей и пособников“, а не между последним и „прес- туплением, совершенным одним лицом”. 342 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

Следовательно, распоряжения, которые предусматривают повышенную ответственность (ст. 152, пар. 3, п. 1; ст. 170, пар. 2; ст. 195, пар. 1, п. 5 УК и т.д.) охватывают только про- явления соисполнительства, а проявления соучастия в собст- венном смысле (общественная опасность которых близка той единоличного исполнительства) следует квалифицировать по основному составу соответствующего преступления в связи со ст. 20-22 УК. 2.2. Основание, характер и функции норм относительно „преступлений, совершенных двумя или более лицами”. 2.2.1. Формирование института соучастия, исходя из норм общей и особенной части Уголовного кодекса. Развитие уго- ловного законодательства, в т.ч. института соучастия, подчиня- ется общей, внутренне присущей праву закономерности − спе- циализации правового регулирования. Образование института соучастия логически проходит через три этапа: а) предметная дифференциация особенной части уголовного закона, в результате чего создаются казуис- тические предписания относительно отдельных совместных проявлений; б) интеграция нормативного материала, в резуль- тате которой возникают общие положения относительно соу- частия (в общей части Уголовного кодекса); в) функциональ- ная специализация общих норм относительно соучастия. 2.2.2. Основание норм относительно „преступлений, со- вершенных двумя или более лицами”. Наличие различных ка- тегорий норм относительно соучастия вызвано необходимос- тью отразить адекватно тяжесть различных видов и форм сов- местного преступного поведения в законе и предвидеть соот- ветствующую дифференцированную ответственность. Пест- рой картине совместных преступных проявлений в жизни должна соответствовать развитая система уголовно правовых норм в законе − институт соучастия. 2.2.3. Характер норм относительно „преступлений, совер- шенных двумя или более лицами”. Нормы относительно „прес- Резюме 343

туплений, совершенных двумя или более лицами” (ст. 152, пар. 3, п. 1; ст. 170, пар. 2; ст. 195, пар. 1, п. 5 УК и т.д.) явля- ются нормами особенной части Уголовного кодекса. Они от- носятся к соответствующим предметным институтам изнаси- лования, противозаконного вхождения в чужое жилище, кра- жи и т. под. С другой стороны, конкретизирующие предписа- ния особенной части регламентируют ответственность за сов- местное исполнительство определенных преступлений. Каж- дое из этих предписаний выполняет ту же родовую функцию, какую выполняют и нормы общей части относительно соучас- тия (ст. 20-22 УК). По этой причине указанные предписания особенной части можно рассматривать и как составную часть института соучастия. Следовательно, нормы относительно „преступлений, со- вершенных двумя или более лицами” могут быть отнесены к различным правовым институтам в зависимости от применяе- мого критерия. Если в качестве критерия возьмем предмет ре- гулирования, каждая из норм особенной части принадлежит к соответствующему предметному институту изнасилования, противозаконного вхождения в чужое жилище, кражи, и т.д. Ес- ли, однако, рассмотрим функцию, которую эти нормы выполня- ют в уголовно правовой системе, становится видным, что они специализированы регулировать только совместные варианты преступлений, т.е. они составляют часть института соучастия. 2.2.4. Функции норм относительно „преступлений, совер- шенных двумя или более лицами”. Нормы относительно „прес- туплений, совершенных двумя или более лицами” отражают значительный рост общественной опасности некоторых прес- туплений по причине соисполнительства и предусматривают повышенную ответственность. Следовательно, их функция зак- лючается в дифференциации уголовной ответственности. 2.3. Соотношение между нормами относительно „прес- туплений, совершенных двумя или более лицами” и нормами относительно остальных форм совместной преступной деяте- 344 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

льности. Все многообразие особых форм совместной прес- тупной деятельности согласно УК можно свести к четырем ка- тегориям: а) преступление, совершенное двумя или более (группой) лицами”; б) преступление, совершенное толпой; в) формирование или участие в качестве члена в группе (органи- зации), ставящей перед собой цель совершать преступления, т.е. объединение с преступной целью; г) необходимое соучас- тие в преступлении. Все особые формы совместной преступной деятельности в той или иной степени содержат общие, родовые признаки соучастия (множество субъектов, объективное единство прес- тупной деятельности, общность умысла). Помимо этих ро- довых признаков, каждая форма совместной преступной дея- тельности, предусмотренная в особенной части, обладает не- которыми специфическими чертами. „Преступление, совершенное двумя или более (группой) лицами” представляет собой проявление настоящего (возмож- ного) соучастия, а остальные особые формы совместной прес- тупной деятельности являются разновидностями необходимо- го соучастия (в самом широком смысле). Старая юридическая формула „совершение преступления двумя или более лицами” не может успешно обслуживать но- вые общественные потребности. Она не отражает адекватно общественную опасность новых социальных явлений − орга- низованные группы преступников. Таким образом, возникает несоответствие между криминологической реальностью и нормативной системой (институт соучастия). Современные формы совместных посягательств не вмещаются в классичес- кие рамки соучастия. Поэтому следует направить усилия к ис- следованию новых общественных явлений (организованные преступные группы) и созданию соответствующих норма- тивных моделей в Уголовном кодексе. 2.4. Квалификация преступлений, совершенных в соучас- тии. В судебной практике по применению норм УК относитель- Резюме 345

но соучастия и точнее при квалификации преступлений, совер- шенных в соучастии, возникает ряд спорных вопросов. Рас- сматриваются последовательно проблемы, возникающие при квалификации: исполнительства и соисполнительства, подстре- кательства, пособничества, акцессорности ответственности за подстрекательство и пособничество, эксцесса, личных обстоя- тельств, которые влияют на ответственность соучастников, со- участия в составных и продолжаемых преступлениях, преступ- лений, „совершенных двумя или более лицами”.

§ 9. Эмпирические социологические исследования Эмпирические социологические исследования будут иг- рать важную роль в законотворческом процессе и, точнее, − в уголовном нормотворчестве. Путем эмпирического социоло- гического исследования проверяется верность теоретического вывода о связи между двумя социальными явлениями. Данная, логически полученная, зависимость проверяется в практике на основе конкретного эмпирического материала. Возможности эмпирического социологического исследо- вания иллюстрируются в работе путем проверки теоретичес- кого вывода о понятии „преступление, совершенное двумя или более (группой) лицами“ Логическое заключение, что соисполнительство значитель- но „опаснее” соучастия в собственном смысле, имеет все- та- ки характер гипотезы. Эта гипотеза играет роль исходного по- ложения при определении понятия „преступление, совершен- ное двумя или более лицами”. Поэтому теоретический вывод следует проверить в практике, в жизни. Для этой цели та же зависимость (между соучастием и общественной опаснос- тью преступления) стала предметом исследования, но эмпи- рично − на основе конкретных фактических данных об опре- деленном преступлении. Эмпирическое исследование дает от- вет на вопрос, соответствует ли теоретический вывод фактам, действительности. 346 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

1. Программа любого эмпирического исследования со- держит следующие разделы: а) цель и концепция исследова- ния; б) основные задачи исследования; в) объект и охват ис- следования; г) статистические методы исследования; д) эмпи- рическая интерпретация (операционализирование) основных понятий; е) основные гипотезы; ж) методы сбора и правила записи эмпирических данных; з) статистическая обработка данных и содержательный анализ полученных результатов. 1.1. Цель и объект исследования. Целью проводимого эмпирического исследования является установить как обе формы соучастия (соисполнительство и соучастие в собствен- ном смысле) влияют на степень общественной опасности. Объектом исследования стала связь между соучастием, как способ действия и общественной опасностью преступле- ния. Между этими двумя явлениями существует причинная за- висимость (отношения обусловленности). 1.2. Охват исследования. Исследование охватывает рас- смотренные Софийским районным судом дела о кражах об- щественного имущества в трехлетний период. Кражи распре- деляются в трех группах: а) кражи, совершенные одним лицом (ст. 194, пар. 1 УК); б) кражи, совершенные одним лицом при содействии подстрекателей и пособников; в) кражи, совер- шенные двумя или более лицами (ст. 195, пар. 1, п. 5 УК). Во всех репрезентативных эмпирических исследованиях ставится вопрос о достоверности полученных результатов, т.е. о том, насколько сделанные выводы соответствуют действитель- ности. Удовлетворительный ответ на этот вопрос можно полу- чить лишь с помощью математической статистики и теории вероятностей. Достоверность полученных результатов зависит от двух факторов: правильность использованных методов (теории) и надежности собранной информации, т.е. качества эмпиричес- ких данных. В ходе исследования была подсчитана вероятность досто- верности полученных результатов. Оказалось, что она доволь- Резюме 347

но высока и значительно превышает 95%. Следовательно, все три экстраполяции довольно большие и на их основе можно делать правильные (достоверные) выводы. 1.3. Статистические методы исследования. Зависимости между общественными явлениями имеют статистический, а не функциональный (динамический) характер. Статистической является зависимость, которая проявляется как тенденция, т.е. только при массовом проявлении явлений, а не строго в каж- дом отдельном случае. 1.4. Эмпирическая интерпретация основных понятий. Эмпирическая интерпретация понятия означает представить это понятие посредством простых, эмпирически измеримых показателей (признаков), т.е. „перевести” его на язык фактов. При этом осуществляется нечто вроде „разборки” понятия. Оно делится на элементарные эмпирические компоненты. Соучастие (способ совершения преступления) играет роль причины. Соучастие характеризуется рядом эмпирических пока- зателей, важнейшим из которых является форма соучастия. Степень общественной опасности преступления игра- ет роль следствия. В качестве эмпирических показателей о степени общественной опасности совершенного преступ- ления используем: а) причиненный вред (размер имущест- венного вреда исчисляется в левах) и б) назначенное нака- зание (размер назначенного судом наказания измеряется месяцами). 1.5. Основные гипотезы исследования. Гипотезы явля- ются научно обоснованными предположениями о свойствах исследуемых явлений. Основные гипотезы две: а) Если срав- нить все три варианта преступления (единоличное исполни- тельство, соучастие в собственном смысле и соисполнитель- ство), то существенная разница, „прыжок” в степени общес- твенной опасности замечается между „преступлением, со- вершенным двумя или более лицами” и „преступлением, со- вершенным одним лицом при содействии подстрекателей и 348 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

пособников“, а не между последним и „преступлением, со- вершенным одним лицом” и б) Из всех обстоятельств, харак- теризующих соучастие, существенное (самое большое) зна- чение для общественной опасности совместного преступле- ния имеет форма соучастия, т.е. вид совместного способа. 1.6. Методы сбора и правила записи эмпирических данных. В качестве источника первичной информации исполь- зованы уголовные дела Софийского районного суда. 2. Статистическая обработка данных и содержательный анализ полученных результатов. Собранные эмпирические данные обработаны в Вычислительном центре Института ма- тематики БАН. Использован универсальный пакет программ BMDP, созданный в Калифорнийском университете. 2.1. Анализ данных относительно вреда. Все три группы краж отличаются по способу совершения деяния (единолич- ное исполнительство, соучастие в собственном смысле, соис- полнительство). Вопрос состоит в том, различаются ли все три вида краж также по размеру вреда, который они причиняют; показывают ли данные о размере вреда какое-либо различие и насколько велико оно? Для решения этой задачи мы использовали дисперсионный анализ, который позволяет выяснить влияет ли данный фактор существенно на следствие. Все три группы краж отличаются чувствительно по своим средним величинам, т.е. по типичному уровню причиненного вреда. Кражи, совершенные одним лицом, причиняют в сред- нем вред в размере 296, 19 лв.; кражи, совершенные при соу- частии в собственном смысле − 473, 46 лв., а кражи при соис- полнительстве − 835, 69 лв. Даже на этом начальном этапе ис- следования видно, что соисполнительство „причиняет” значи- тельно больший вред, чем соучастие в собственном смысле и единоличное исполнительство. Далее, путем однофакторного дисперсионного анализа сравниваются все три группы краж. Получено дисперсионное Резюме 349

отношение (F − стоимость) 8, 41. Оно значительно выше кри- тической стоимости F для этих условий. Следовательно, эти три категории краж (обособленные по признаку „способ дейс- твия”) различаются существенно и по размеру причиняемого вреда. Доверительная вероятность этого вывода очень высока − 0,9997 (или в процентах 99,97%). Второй и более важный этап дисперсионного анализа состоит в том, выяснить степень различия между этими тремя группами краж, конкретнее − раскрыть, где „прыжок” в уров- не общественной опасности. Одного типичного уровня (арифметическая средняя вели- чина) недостаточно для полной и всесторонней характеристи- ки различия между тремя группами краж. Поэтому были сде- ланы и два более сложных вычисления − тест Бонферони и статистика Стюдента. 2.2. Анализ данных относительно наказания. Второй эмпирический показатель тяжести совершенного преступле- ния (после вреда) − назначенное наказание. Данные относительно наказаний исполнителей в трех ви- дах краж (единоличное исполнительство, соучастие в собст- венном смысле, соисполнительство) подверглись тоже дис- персионному анализу. 2.3. Выводы в результате эмпирического исследования. Анализ результатов эмпирического исследования позволяет сделать окончательный вывод о том, что выдвинутые гипо- тезы были подтверждены на практике.

§ 10. Научно-технический прогресс и уголовный закон 1. Научно-технический прогресс (НТП) и содержание уголовного закона. Бурное развитие науки и техники проявля- ется, прежде всего, в автоматизации и компьютеризации про- изводственных процессов и обслуживания, а также − в облас- ти транспорта, телекоммуникаций и информационных техно- 350 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

логий. Наряду с благами, которые НТП приносит обществу, он вызывает также ряд побочных, неблагоприятных последст- вий: сильное загрязнение окружающей среды, увеличение ис- точников повышенной опасности, психическая перегрузка ра- бочих и др. Повышенные требования, которые новая техника предъ- являет к человеку, входит в противоречие с его ограниченны- ми психофизическими возможностями. В результате этого увеличивается опасность в процессе оперирования техникой. Несоблюдение требований безопасности может привести к тя- желым последствиям для жизни и здоровья людей и их иму- щества. В частности, в работе с автоматическими системами управления малейшая ошибка имеет высокую „социальную” цену. Следовательно, научно-технический прогресс характе- ризуется резким увеличением видов деятельности, являющих- ся источником повышенной опасности. Это сопровождается регламентированием новых видов деятельности и вводом от- ветственности за нарушение новых правил. Высокая общест- венная опасность неосторожных действий в процессе исполь- зования техники требует их криминализации. В частности, научно-технический прогресс оказывает влияние на следующие области уголовного законодательства. 1.1. Криминализуется ряд неосторожных действий в про- цессе использования техники. Объективная сторона этих преступлений выражается в нарушении нормативно закреп- ленных правил безопасности, в результате чего техника выхо- дит из-под контроля управляющего субъекта и это наносит вред (угрожает) жизни, здоровью или имуществу неопреде- ленного круга граждан. С субъективной точки зрения эти „технические” преступления характеризуются сознательным нарушением правила безопасности и неосторожным причине- нием общественно опасного результата. 1.2. Другое отрицательное последствие научно-техничес- кого прогресса это загрязнение окружающей среды − воды, Резюме 351

воздуха и почвы. В результате нарушается естественное рав- новесие в природе, создается опасность для жизни и здоровья человека. Это требует криминализации ряда посягательств против окружающей среды. 2. Криминализация неосторожных общественно опасных деяний. Криминализация неосторожных деяний должна учиты- вать принцип экономии уголовной репрессии, а также воз- можности воздействия на соответствующее поведение уго- ловно-правовыми средствами. Данная категория деяний может быть криминализована двумя способами − путем ввода общей нормы или путем соз- дания ряда конкретных предписаний. Конкретные нормы име- ют более сильное предупредительное и регулирующее воз- действие, но они ведут к пробелам в праве. Проблема, стоя- щая перед законодателем, состоит в правильном сочетании общих и специальных распоряжений, устанавливающих от- ветственность за неосторожное поведение. Криминализация неосторожных деяний выдвигает на пе- редний план две проблемы более общего характера: о вводе специальной невменяемости и об усовершенствовании поня- тия неосторожности. Психофизические способности человека ограничены и не всегда успевают следовать за бурным ростом техники. Возмо- жен случай, когда лицо в обычных условиях вменяемо, но в процессе управления сложной технической системой теряет свою способность „понимать свойство или значение совер- шенного или руководить своими поступками” по причине нервно психической перегрузки. В этом случае к нему нельзя предъявлять требование об уголовной ответственности за причиненный вред. В будущем необходимо выработать „мо- дель специалиста“, т.е. изготовить полное описание психофи- зических качеств, которыми должен обладать оператор дан- ной технической системой. Создание критериев для профес- сиональной пригодности по отношению к некоторым более 352 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

сложным видам деятельности облегчит суд в его оценке, учит- ывая ответ на такой вопрос: насколько конкретное лицо дейс- твовало в состоянии вменяемости. 3. Научно-технический прогресс и форма уголовного за- кона. Современные социальные процессы, связанные с НТП, влияют не только на содержание уголовного закона, но и на его форму. В результате научно-технического прогресса обос- трилось противоречие между стабильностью и гибкостью за- кона. Законодателю становится все труднее определить опти- мальную степень абстрактности (конкретности) уголовных норм. Бурный рост науки и техники дает сегодня в руки прес- тупнику богатый арсенал средств и вариантов преступного поведения. Это обуславливает необходимость в нормах с высокой степенью абстрактности, которые могут распростра- няться на все возможные проявления преступления данного вида. Строгий формализм в уголовном праве принадлежит прошлому. Одним из средств превращения казуистических формулировок в обобщенные правила является использова- ние бланкетных диспозиций и оценочных признаков в нормот- ворчестве.

§ 11. Организованная преступность и уголовный (материальный и процессуальный) закон в условиях перехода 1. Развитие материального уголовного законодательства в условиях перехода. В результате бурных экономических, поли- тических и социальных изменений при переходе, правовая сис- тема Болгарии значительно отстала от общественного разви- тия. Старое законодательство больше не может обслуживать новые общественные потребности. Отсутствие адекватной пра- вовой системы сказалось отрицательно как на развитии эконо- мики, так и на борьбе с преступностью. Нормативный вакуум в области финансовой, банковской, налоговой деятельности и Резюме 353

приватизационного контроля облегчили злоупотребления, об- маны, присвоение государственных средств и их утечку за ру- беж. Уголовное законодательство не дает возможность для эффективного противодействия против преступности. 1.1. Новая Конституция (1991 г.) создала механизм сближе- ния болгарского с международным правом. Согласно ст. 5, пар. 4 Конституции, международные договоры, ратифицированные в конституционном порядке, обнародованные и вступившие в си- лу для Республики Болгария, стали частью внутреннего права страны. Нормы такого международного договора имеют непос- редственное, прямое действие. Решением № 7 от 1992 г. (ДВ, № 56, 1992 г.) Конституционный суд Республики Болгария принял, что принцип прямого действия международных договоров зна- чительно ограничен в области уголовного права. Это решение Конституционного суда относится, однако, толь- ко к материальным, но не к процессуальным уголовным нормам. В пунктах 1.2-1.8 рассматриваются последовательно про- изошедшие изменения в Общей и особенной части Уголовно- го кодекса, в системе наказаний, в уголовной политике совре- менного болгарского государства, основные направления в развитии уголовного законодательства. 2. Развитие процессуального уголовного законодательст- ва в условиях перехода. 2.1. Контроль за преступностью сопровождается ограни- чением прав граждан. При принятии решений в области уго- ловного процесса законодатель всегда встает перед дилеммой − какую из обеих ценностей предпочесть: общественный инте- рес в борьбе с преступностью или индивидуальные права че- ловека. Проблема состоит в том, что нужно найти оптимальное соотношение между личной свободой индивида и обществен- ной потребностью в контроле за преступностью посредством эффективного уголовного правосудия. В пунктах 2.2-2.7 последовательно рассматриваются про- исшедшие изменения в отношении права защиты обвиняемо- 354 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

го, предварительного расследования, „заключения под стражу” обвиняемого и судебного контроля над ним (habeas corpus), соотношения между состязательным и служебным началами и другие. 3. Организованная преступность в условиях перехода. Организованная преступность стала одним из опаснейших факторов для болгарского общества. Организованный прес- тупный мир влияет на все области общественной жизни, в т.ч. на политические решения. 3.1. Понятие организованной преступности. Организован- ная преступность является системой преступлений, которые со- вершаются преимущественно в экономике. Основной целью этой преступности является извлечение имущественной выгоды. Терроризм является насильственной преступной деятельностью, преследующей определенный политический результат. 3.2. Формы проявления организованной преступности. Организованную преступность можно условно разделить на экономическую („беловоротничковая преступность”) и наси- льственную („уличная преступность”). В результате организованной преступности: а) возникают мощные экономические группировки, которые накапливают капитал преступным способом, а „грязные деньги” входят в оборот, коррумпируют государственных служащих и в свою очередь порождают новые преступления; б) эти группировки вытесняют государство из производства и торговли, создавая „серую экономику”; в) возникают управляющие центры орга- низованной преступности, которые регулируют отношения между группировками и стремятся вывести их на международ- ную арену, легализуя их деятельность. 3.3. Причины организованной преступности. Организо- ванная преступность, подобно разбойничеству в древности, яв- ляется детищем современного цивилизованного мира − урбани- зации, технического прогресса и глобализации. Но основной причиной для бурного роста организованной преступности у Резюме 355

нас стала смена общественного строя, в частности − ослабле- ние социально-правового контроля в период перехода от цент- рализованной государственной экономики и авторитарного по- литического управления к свободному рыночному хозяйству, основанному на частной собственности, и демократии. Переход к рыночному хозяйству сам по себе не престу- пен. Наоборот, он общественно полезен и необходим. Но в Болгарии переход был плохо подготовлен и плохо осуществ- лен − без предварительной стратегии относительно содержа- ния и форм перехода, относительно отрицательных явлений, которые сопровождают переход и относительно мер противо- действия против них. Государство резко и категорически отка- залось от управления производством (в области промышлен- ности и сельского хозяйства), не создав условия для развития частного предпринимательства − мелкого и среднего частного бизнеса. Не было контроля, адекватного новым реальностям (производственный, финансовый, банковский, налоговый, та- моженный, пограничный, приватизационный и т.д.) Админис- тративно-командный контроль государства отмирал, а новая система контроля, отвечающая требованиям рыночной эконо- мики, еще не была создана. Отметим факт, что в ряду облас- тей не было правовых основ для экономической деятельности в условиях перехода. Переход у нас сопровождали несколько волн экономичес- кой преступности. а. В нарушении эмбарго, которое ООН наложил Югосла- вии, и, точнее, путем незаконной продажи нефти, провозимой через границу (1993-1994 г.) ново сформированные преступ- ные группы ( с помощью служащих МВД) накопили огром- ную прибыль. Помимо этого, некоторые действия государства до 1996 г., в частности, разрешение о создании множества новых банков (т.наз. „бум банков”) дали возможность узкому кругу людей присвоить огромные государственные средства путем обмана и должностных преступлений, совершенных в 356 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

банковской сфере. Это привело к концентрации денежной массы в руках небольшого круга людей. В результате произош- ла неофициальная приватизация финансового капитала в Бол- гарии. Она стала предпосылкой для следующего шага − прива- тизации материальных ценностей, государственной собствен- ности. б. Вторая волна экономической преступности сопровож- дает приватизацию государственного имущества, которая на- чалась в 1997 г. Бесконтрольная приватизация создала хоро- шую питательную почву для организованного преступного мира. Передача публичной собственности в частные руки произошла путем сильного занижения стоимости государст- венного имущества, подлежащего приватизации. Государственные объекты перешли к нуворишам, кото- рые не умели управлять ими. Причиной всему этому стало отсутствие адекватного кон- троля за приватизацией. в. О третьей волне экономической преступности еще ра- но говорить. Но опыт других государств, находящихся в период перехода, показывает, что были совершены тяжелые преступ- ления в процессе обслуживания иностранного долга (который для Болгарии составляет около одиннадцати миллиардов дол- ларов), при оперировании средствами государственного ре- зерва, а также при использовании консультационных услуг иностранных компаний. Существенным атрибутом организованной преступности является коррупция. Она стала массовым явлением. Отмечает- ся особый рост латентной (незарегистрированная) коррупции. Коррупция язык, на котором организованный преступный мир разговаривает с государством. Сегодня коррупция, подобно ра- ковому образованию, разъедает тело государства. 3.4. Контроль за организованной преступностью. Органи- зованная преступность сложное социальное явление, рождаю- щееся в результате взаимодействия ряда факторов: экономи- Резюме 357

ческих, общественно политических, криминологических и правовых. Это обуславливает ограниченные возможности уголовного права (наказание) в борьбе против организован- ной преступности. 3.5. Международное сотрудничество в борьбе против ор- ганизованной преступности. В последние годы организо- ванный преступный мир пошел на тотальную конфронтацию с международным сообществом. Основным преступным „биз- несом” является оборот наркотиков. Он приносит преступно- му миру миллиарды долларов грязных денег. Большинство форм организованной преступной деятель- ности и терроризма предусмотрены в Уголовном кодексе Рес- публики Болгария. На международном уровне, однако, предс- тоит объявление этих проявлений преступлениями. Это приве- дет к созданию новых международных юрисдикций и даст тол- чок вперед развитию международного уголовного правосудия. Организованная преступная деятельность и терроризм обычно осуществляются тайно, группой лиц, в конспиратив- ной форме. Поэтому расследование тоже должно быть тайным, отвечать характеру и формам расследуемой преступ- ной деятельности. Следовательно, правовые меры в борьбе с организованной преступностью и терроризмом имеют преи- мущественно процессуальный характер: использование спе- циальных разведывательных средств (т.наз. „электронное прослеживание”) для сбора доказательств в уголовном про- цессе; использование „агента-провокатора“, который не отве- чает за свое участие в преступлении; защита угрожаемых сви- детелей; повышенный контроль за движением „грязных де- нег“, предварительное изъятие („замораживание”) имущест- ва, добытого преступным путем; ввод специфических, быстрых процедур для расследования организованной прес- тупности и терроризма и др. Усилия, направленные на ограничение организованной преступности и терроризма, следовательно, чреваты создани- 358 ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ УГОЛОВНОГО ЗАКОНОТВОРЧЕСТВА

ем бесконтрольных органов, располагающих неограниченной властью. На международном уровне эта опасность становится все большей. В существующих международных конвенциях относите- льно преступности обнаруживаются некоторые неприемле- мые тенденции: ограничивается действие презумпции неви- новности и даже предусматриваются гипотезы объективного вменения; в некоторых случаях тяжесть доказательства пада- ет на обвиняемого; ограничивается право защиты и др. Повы- шенные меры в борьбе с организованной преступностью и терроризмом сопровождаются ростом юридического контро- ля над личной жизнью граждан.

* * *

В условиях перехода преступность бурно возросла. Раз- вилась организованная преступность (незаконный провоз наркотиков, оружия и трафик людей, крупные финансовые об- маны, отмывание денег, коррупция и т.д.) и терроризм. В то же время социально правовой контроль отстает от развития преступности. Уголовное правосудие переживает кризис. Процедура по наказанию преступников сложна и медленна. Коррупционное давление на правоохранительные органы уве- личивается. Крупные боссы преступного мира остаются недо- сягаемыми для правосудия. Необходимо усилить социально правовой контроль путем повышения эффективности уголовного правосудия. Здесь воз- никает вопрос, какую из обеих ценностей предпочесть − об- щественную потребность в эффективном контроле за прес- тупностью или индивидуальные права человека. Поскольку любой контроль связан с некоторым ограничением прав чело- века. Проблема состоит в том, чтобы найти баланс между за- Резюме 359

щитой личных прав (свобода индивида) и защитой общества от преступности путем усиления контроля (в частности − уго- ловного правосудия). Общество якобы стоит перед выбором − „государство мафии” ( в котором есть высокая преступность из-за слабого социального контроля) или „государство Мус- солини” (в котором есть низкая преступность, но контроль над жизнью людей тотален). Европейская конвенция о правах человека, принятая Со- ветом Европы в 1950 г., стала новым началом. Ее цель защи- тить личность от ограничений и посягательств государства. Конвенция выдвинула на передний план индивидуальные пра- ва личности как высшая ценность. В силу Конвенции уголов- ная процедура должна предоставлять максимальные гарантии праву защиты обвиняемого против злоупотреблений государ- ственных органов. Но организованный преступный мир тоже ограничивает права граждан, и устанавливают диктатуру над обществом. Эта криминальная диктатура является не менее опасной, чем поли- тическая диктатура тоталитарного государства. Следовательно, обстоятельства сегодня требуют усилить социальный контроль за преступностью. Все-таки Европейская конвенция о правах человека создана почти полвека назад и не учитывает новые ре- альности − организованную преступность и терроризм. Ныне большинство европейских государств принимает решительные меры для борьбы с организованной преступнос- тью и терроризмом. Однако, новые меры в борьбе с организо- ванной преступностью не должны ущемлять основных прав человека. Как известно, в мире Джорджа Оруэлла, в котором государство осуществляет тотальный контроль и проникает глубоко в личную жизнь людей, нарушая человеческие права (наблюдает, следит, прослушивает, записывает, проникает в дома, нарушает тайну сообщений и др.) нет преступности. Наш идеал, однако, не государство Оруэлла. Nikola Filchev THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF PENAL LAWMAKING

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