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Micha‘el Tanchum FOKUS | 4/2019 Turkey‘s String of Pearls: Turkey‘s Overseas Naval Installations Recon- figure the Security Architecture of Mediterranean-Red Sea Corridor Turkey will soon preside over an arc of Turkey’s strategic objective “to operate The Turkish and Qatari initiatives were blue-water power projection extending not only in the littorals but also on the opposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the from Northern Cyprus in the Eastern Medi- high seas,” identifying the Turkish Navy’s regime of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah terranean to Qatar in the Persian Gulf that goals for the coming decade as “enhancing el-Sisi, who ousted the Turkish and Qatari- fundamentally alters the security architec- sea denial, forward presence, and limited backed Muslim Brotherhood government ture of the Middle East. Deftly combining power projection capacity.”2 Although long in July 2013. In 2014, Ankara and Doha soft power initiatives with the construction in the making, Turkey‘s maritime power signed an agreement for the deployment of coastal military installations in Sudan on projection was shaped in response to the of Turkish forces in Qatar. Turkish and the Red Sea and in Somalia on the Arabian Saudi-led coalition to blunt the expansion Qatari intervention in Syria was further set Sea, Turkey has created a ‚string of pearls‘ of Iranian hegemony in Iraq, Syria, and Ye- on its heels by the advances of Iranian- that directly challenges the power of men – most particularly, Qatar‘s breaking backed forces and Russia‘s September Egypt-Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates ranks from that Saudi-led coalition. With 2015 military intervention in support of alliance. With the military entrenchment of the consequent Qatar-blockade, the deep Assad. Less than one month after the No- Turkey in the Horn of Africa, the Turkey- strategic partnership between Ankara and vember 24 downing of a Russian combat Qatar versus Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE Doha became a full-fledged alliance that jet in Syria by the Turkish Airforce, Turkey competition has created an incendiary now constitutes its own power bloc in the announced its plan to establish its first fault-line that now encompasses the entire Middle East and Africa. overseas military base in Qatar. Declaring Eastern Mediterranean-Red Sea maritime during the December 2015 announce- corridor. Turkey‘s naval expansion along the Sea ment that Turkey and Qatar “face common Lines of Communication (SLOCs) between enemies,“ Turkey‘s Ambassador to Qatar Backed by Qatar, Turkey‘s maritime expan- its southern shore and Qatar resembles, Ahmet Demirok explained that Ankara and sion is also a response to Egypt‘s trilateral in miniature, China‘s “String of Pearls.“ Doha “[A]re both very concerned about strategic partnership with Greece and the Before Beijing branded its own maritime developments in the region and uncertain Republic of Cyprus, an alignment suppor- expansion initiative with the innocuous of the policies of other countries.“3 With ted by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In this sounding “21st Century Maritime Silk the onset of the 2017 Qatar blockade and complex web of rival alliances that spans Road“ (the “road“ in China‘s current Belt the warming of Turkish-Russian relations the Aegean and Arabian seas, any one of and Road Initiative), the series of Chinese- as a result of the Astana process, the the previously localized conflicts could built, dual-use port installations spanning Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE bloc and its web ignite a wider regional clash. westward across the Indian Ocean was of alliances has advanced to the forefront dubbed by analysts as China‘s “String of of Turkey and Qatar‘s regional concerns. Turkey‘s String of Pearls Pearls.“ Encompassing China‘s SLOCs from the Malacca Strait to the Red Sea, China‘s Turkey‘s $39 million Tariq bin Ziyad base Turkey‘s blue-water expansion originates String of Pearls includes installations on in Qatar opened in April 2016 and is with the 2002 assumption of power by the coasts of Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Paki- intended to house 3,000 Turkish ground the ruling Justice and Development Party stan, providing a formidable strategic chal- forces plus units from the Turkey‘s naval, (AKP) led by now Turkish President Recep lenge to India, China‘s chief naval rival in air, and special operations forces. The Tayyip Erdoğan. Within the AKP‘s first two Asia. Unlike China, cash-strapped Turkey base‘s establishment has set a general years, Ankara initiated a $3 billion “Natio- does not possess the resources to finance pattern for the Turkey-Qatar strategic nal Warship” program, known by its Turkish its maritime expansion to counter Egypt symbiosis: Turkey provides the boots and acronym MİLGEM, to expand Turkey’s and its Gulf allies. To assemble its String Qatar provides the bank. Although Turkey capability to deploy naval forces far from of Pearls, Turkey has acted in concert with is responsible for covering the base‘s its coastal waters. At the September 2011 its strategic partner Qatar, the world‘s fifth expenses, Qatar has repeatedly intervened commissioning ceremony of MİLGEM’s first largest natural gas producer. to support the Turkish economy. When surface combatant, TCG Heybeliada, then Turkey‘s currency went into free fall during Prime Minister Erdoğan openly declared Turkish Boots, Qatari Bank summer 2018 losing almost 40 percent of his blue-water ambitions, defining Turkey‘s its value against the dollar, Qatar pledged national interests as “residing in the Suez Turkey‘s cooperation with Qatar in regio- $15 billion4 of investments in the Turkish Canal, the adjacent seas, and from there nal interventions evolved during the Arab economy as well as a currency swap of up extending to the Indian Ocean.”1 In March Spring, particularly their efforts to topple to $3 billion.5 At a November 2018 Istanbul 2012, then Commander of the Turkish the regime of Syrian President Bashar al- summit between President Erdoğan and Navy, Admiral Murat Bilgel, outlined Assad through the use of Islamist proxies. the Qatari monarch Sheikh Tamim bin 1 Turkey‘s String of Pearls FOKUS | 4/2019 Hamad al-Thani, the fourth meeting of the to pay for soldiers‘ salaries and rations. Egypt fears Turkey may support Sudan‘s Qatar-Turkey Supreme Strategic Commit- Nonetheless, Somalia‘s current president, claims to the Hala‘ib triangle, the disputed tee, Turkey‘s president thanked Qatar for Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, is widely border territory now under Egypt‘s control. Doha‘s support in the face of what Mr. perceived as aligned with Qatar and Tur- In January 2017, Egypt had already inau- Erdoğan described as “speculative initia- key, having received funds from Doha for gurated its new Southern Fleet Command, tives targeting our economy.“6 To which, his 2017 election campaign.10 In response whose four bases extend down Egypt‘s Sheikh al-Thani replied, “[B]e assured, Mr. to Turkey and Qatar‘s increasing influence Red Sea coast close to the Hala‘ib triangle. President, that if Turkey needs anything in in Mogadishu, the UAE started funding After the announcement of Turkey‘s Suakin the future we will always stand with our Somalia‘s semi-autonomous breakaway acquisition, Egypt sent hundreds of troops friends and brothers.“7 regions of Somaliland and Puntland, inves- to the United Arab Emirates‘ base in Erit- ting $440 million in Somaliland‘s Berbera rea, located on the opposite coastal border Turkey‘s Somali Pearl: Ankara-Doha port11 and $336 million in Puntland‘s with Sudan.14 With a massive naval, air, and Alliance‘s Outpost Near the Gulf of Aden Bosaso port.12 With construction of rival ground force presence at its coastal base maritime installations, the Horn of Africa‘s in Assab, Eritrea,15 the UAE launches air A year and half after Turkey opened its volatile coast has been transformed into and sea operations against Iranian-backed Qatar base, then chief of staff of the a theater of conflict between the Turkey- Houthi rebels in Yemen and transports of Turkish army and current Turkish defense Qatar and Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE blocs, UAE troops and allied ground forces to the minister Hulusi Akar, officially opened rendering the decades‘ effort to ensure conflict zone.16 The presence of Turkish Turkey‘s military facility in Mogadishu, stability and governance in the region troops so close to the Saudi coast may Somalia. Turkey‘s $50 million, 4 square even more elusive. have also prompted Saudi Arabia in km Mogadishu base is its largest training 2018 to establish its first overseas base in facility outside Anatolia, expected to train Tarnished Pearl: Saudi Arabia and UAE Djibouti overlooking the Bab el Mandeb 10,000 Somali troops. Turkey is supplying push back on Turkey‘s Sudanese Port Strait, the strategic chokepoint between weapons to the units of the Somali army the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.17 that it trains, expanding the market for The same year Turkey opened its Moga- Turkish-manufactured arms.8 The Turkish dishu facility, Ankara also sought to Turkey‘s use of Suakin as a naval facility military is able to house assets for its own counter the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE has come under doubt since the April 11, naval, air, and ground forces. Turkey‘s dominance in the Red Sea with President 2019 ousting of President Omar al-Bashir Mogadishu base provides Ankara with a Erdoğan‘s historic December 2017 visit to that ended the Sudanese strongman‘s 30- position reasonably close to the Gulf of Sudan. During this first visit to Sudan by an year rule. On April 21 2019, Saudi Arabia Aden, the strategic eastern entry into the acting Turkish head of state, Sudan agreed and the UAE collectively pledged $3 billion Red Sea critical for the operation of the to lease its Suakin port to Turkey for 99 to the fledgling Transitional Military Coun- Turkey-Qatar maritime partnership.
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