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Micha‘el Tanchum

FOKUS | 4/2019

Turkey‘s String of Pearls: ‘s Overseas Naval Installations Recon- figure the Security Architecture of Mediterranean- Corridor

Turkey will soon preside over an arc of Turkey’s strategic objective “to operate The Turkish and Qatari initiatives were blue-water power projection extending not only in the littorals but also on the opposed by , the UAE, and the from Northern in the Eastern Medi- high seas,” identifying the Turkish Navy’s regime of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah terranean to in the that goals for the coming decade as “enhancing el-Sisi, who ousted the Turkish and Qatari- fundamentally alters the security architec- sea denial, forward presence, and limited backed government ture of the . Deftly combining power projection capacity.”2 Although long in July 2013. In 2014, and soft power initiatives with the in the making, Turkey‘s maritime power signed an agreement for the deployment of coastal military installations in on projection was shaped in response to the of Turkish forces in Qatar. Turkish and the Red Sea and in on the Arabian Saudi-led coalition to blunt the expansion Qatari intervention in was further set Sea, Turkey has created a ‚string of pearls‘ of Iranian hegemony in , Syria, and Ye- on its heels by the advances of Iranian- that directly challenges the power of men – most particularly, Qatar‘s breaking backed forces and ‘s -Saudi Arabia-United Arab ranks from that Saudi-led coalition. With 2015 military intervention in support of alliance. With the military entrenchment of the consequent Qatar-blockade, the deep Assad. Less than one month after the No- Turkey in the Horn of , the Turkey- strategic partnership between Ankara and vember 24 downing of a Russian combat Qatar versus Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE Doha became a full-fledged alliance that jet in Syria by the Turkish Airforce, Turkey competition has created an incendiary now constitutes its own power bloc in the announced its plan to establish its first fault-line that now encompasses the entire Middle East and Africa. overseas military base in Qatar. Declaring Eastern Mediterranean-Red Sea maritime during the December 2015 announce- corridor. Turkey‘s naval expansion along the Sea ment that Turkey and Qatar “face common Lines of Communication (SLOCs) between enemies,“ Turkey‘s Ambassador to Qatar Backed by Qatar, Turkey‘s maritime expan- its southern shore and Qatar resembles, Ahmet Demirok explained that Ankara and sion is also a response to Egypt‘s trilateral in miniature, ‘s “String of Pearls.“ Doha “[A]re both very concerned about strategic partnership with Greece and the Before branded its own maritime developments in the region and uncertain Republic of Cyprus, an alignment suppor- expansion initiative with the innocuous of the policies of other .“3 With ted by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In this sounding “21st Century Maritime Silk the onset of the 2017 Qatar blockade and complex web of rival alliances that spans Road“ (the “road“ in China‘s current Belt the warming of Turkish-Russian relations the Aegean and Arabian seas, any one of and Road Initiative), the series of Chinese- as a result of the Astana process, the the previously localized conflicts could built, dual-use port installations spanning Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE bloc and its web ignite a wider regional clash. westward across the was of alliances has advanced to the forefront dubbed by analysts as China‘s “String of of Turkey and Qatar‘s regional concerns. Turkey‘s String of Pearls Pearls.“ Encompassing China‘s SLOCs from the Malacca Strait to the Red Sea, China‘s Turkey‘s $39 million Tariq bin Ziyad base Turkey‘s blue-water expansion originates String of Pearls includes installations on in Qatar opened in April 2016 and is with the 2002 assumption of power by the coasts of , , and Paki- intended to house 3,000 Turkish ground the ruling Justice and Development Party stan, providing a formidable strategic chal- forces plus units from the Turkey‘s naval, (AKP) led by now Turkish President Recep lenge to , China‘s chief naval rival in air, and special operations forces. The Tayyip Erdoğan. Within the AKP‘s first two . Unlike China, cash-strapped Turkey base‘s establishment has set a general years, Ankara initiated a $3 billion “Natio- does not possess the resources to finance pattern for the Turkey-Qatar strategic nal Warship” program, known by its Turkish its maritime expansion to counter Egypt symbiosis: Turkey provides the and acronym MİLGEM, to expand Turkey’s and its Gulf allies. To assemble its String Qatar provides the bank. Although Turkey capability to deploy naval forces far from of Pearls, Turkey has acted in concert with is responsible for covering the base‘s its coastal waters. At the September 2011 its strategic partner Qatar, the ‘s fifth expenses, Qatar has repeatedly intervened commissioning ceremony of MİLGEM’s first largest producer. to support the Turkish economy. When surface combatant, TCG Heybeliada, then Turkey‘s currency went into free fall during Prime Minister Erdoğan openly declared Turkish Boots, Qatari Bank summer 2018 losing almost 40 percent of his blue-water ambitions, defining Turkey‘s its value against the dollar, Qatar pledged national interests as “residing in the Suez Turkey‘s cooperation with Qatar in regio- $15 billion4 of investments in the Turkish Canal, the adjacent seas, and from there nal interventions evolved during the Arab economy as well as a of up extending to the Indian Ocean.”1 In March Spring, particularly their efforts to topple to $3 billion.5 At a November 2018 Istanbul 2012, then Commander of the Turkish the regime of Syrian President Bashar al- summit between President Erdoğan and Navy, Admiral Murat Bilgel, outlined Assad through the use of Islamist proxies. the Qatari Sheikh Tamim bin

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Hamad al-Thani, the fourth meeting of the to pay for soldiers‘ salaries and rations. Egypt fears Turkey may support Sudan‘s Qatar-Turkey Supreme Strategic Commit- Nonetheless, Somalia‘s current president, claims to the Hala‘ib triangle, the disputed tee, Turkey‘s president thanked Qatar for Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, is widely border territory now under Egypt‘s control. Doha‘s support in the face of what Mr. perceived as aligned with Qatar and Tur- In January 2017, Egypt had already inau- Erdoğan described as “speculative initia- key, having received funds from Doha for gurated its new Southern Fleet Command, tives targeting our economy.“6 To which, his 2017 election campaign.10 In response whose four bases extend down Egypt‘s Sheikh al-Thani replied, “[B]e assured, Mr. to Turkey and Qatar‘s increasing influence Red Sea coast close to the Hala‘ib triangle. President, that if Turkey needs anything in in , the UAE started funding After the announcement of Turkey‘s Suakin the future we will always stand with our Somalia‘s semi-autonomous breakaway acquisition, Egypt sent hundreds of troops friends and brothers.“7 regions of and , inves- to the ‘ base in Erit- ting $440 million in Somaliland‘s Berbera rea, located on the opposite coastal border Turkey‘s Somali Pearl: Ankara-Doha port11 and $336 million in Puntland‘s with Sudan.14 With a massive naval, air, and Alliance‘s Outpost Near the Gulf of Aden Bosaso port.12 With construction of rival ground force presence at its coastal base maritime installations, the ‘s in , ,15 the UAE launches air A year and half after Turkey opened its volatile coast has been transformed into and sea operations against Iranian-backed Qatar base, then chief of staff of the a theater of conflict between the Turkey- Houthi rebels in and transports of Turkish army and current Turkish defense Qatar and Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE blocs, UAE troops and allied ground forces to the minister Hulusi Akar, officially opened rendering the decades‘ effort to ensure conflict zone.16 The presence of Turkish Turkey‘s military facility in Mogadishu, stability and governance in the region troops so close to the Saudi coast may Somalia. Turkey‘s $50 million, 4 square even more elusive. have also prompted Saudi Arabia in km Mogadishu base is its largest training 2018 to establish its first overseas base in facility outside Anatolia, expected to train Tarnished Pearl: Saudi Arabia and UAE overlooking the Bab el Mandeb 10,000 Somali troops. Turkey is supplying push back on Turkey‘s Sudanese Port Strait, the strategic chokepoint between weapons to the units of the Somali army the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.17 that it trains, expanding the market for The same year Turkey opened its Moga­ Turkish-manufactured arms.8 The Turkish dishu facility, Ankara also sought to Turkey‘s use of Suakin as a naval facility military is able to house assets for its own counter the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE has come under doubt since the April 11, naval, air, and ground forces. Turkey‘s dominance in the Red Sea with President 2019 ousting of President Omar al-Bashir Mogadishu base provides Ankara with a Erdoğan‘s historic December 2017 visit to that ended the Sudanese strongman‘s 30- position reasonably close to the Gulf of Sudan. During this first visit to Sudan by an year rule. On April 21 2019, Saudi Arabia Aden, the strategic eastern entry into the acting Turkish head of state, Sudan agreed and the UAE collectively pledged $3 billion Red Sea critical for the operation of the to lease its Suakin port to Turkey for 99 to the fledgling Transitional Military Coun- Turkey-Qatar maritime partnership. years. Located 483 km (261 nautical miles) cil (TMC) led by Lt. General Abdel Fattah al- from Saudi Arabia‘s port, Erdoğan Burhan, attempting to wean Sudan away Turkey‘s military involvement in Somalia is declared that Turkey‘s reconstruction­ of from Turkey.18 Following the Saudi-Emirati accompanied by wide-ranging soft power the former Ottoman port would service pledge of financial support, al-Burhan initiatives, as demonstrated by the exten- Muslim pilgrims making the and pro- declared that Suakin was “an inseparable sive humanitarian aid Turkey provided mote Sudan‘s tourism industry. However, part of Sudan,“ adding, “We emphasize during Somalia‘s 2011 famine. President then Sudanese foreign minister Ibrahim that we care about the sovereignty of our Erdogan visited Mogadishu twice, with his Ghandour told the press that territories. We will not accept the presence initial 2011 visit being the first arrival by had agreed to Ankara building a dual-use of a foreign military existence in Sudan.“19 non-African leader to war-ravaged Somalia port “to maintain civilian and military in twenty years. Turkey has constructed vessels,“ adding that Turkey and Sudan Subsequently, the TMC government has hospitals, schools, and basic infrastructure had signed an agreement “that could stated that it will uphold all previous in the . result in any kind of military coopera­ agreements, treaties and charters signed tion.“13 Following the pattern of Ankara‘s by the previous Sudanese government.20 While less extensive than Turkey‘s involve- relations with Mogadishu, Turkey‘s Suakin Turkey‘s foreign ministry also issued ment, Qatar is providing Somalia a $200 port acquisition, Turkey‘s development of an official statement declaring that the million infrastructure aid package for military training facilities in Sudan, and its agreement between Ankara and Khartoum the construction of two major highways, deployment of Turkish troops in-country concerning Suakin was still operative. the rehabilitation of government buil- are embedded within in a broader partner- However, the statement simply affirmed dings, and other development projects.9 ship in which Ankara provides $650 million that Turkey‘s Cooperation and Coordina- Officially, Somalia declared its neutrality of development initiatives, including tion Agency (TİKA), Ankara‘s international during the Qatar blockade after receiving a Turkey‘s construction of Khartoum‘s new development agency, was continuing its $50 million aid package from Saudi Arabia . renovation work at the port,21 with no indi-

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cation that Turkey‘s activities at Suakin will With expectations still high for a massive economic zone. The deployment of naval extend beyond its civilian aspects. If Saudi find, attention has turned to ExxonMobil‘s assets in Cypriot waters by any of Turkey‘s Arabia and the UAE succeed in preventing exploration of Cyprus‘ block 10, which NATO allies, such as the United States or Turkey from developing a dual-use port at shares the same reservoir rock bed as Zohr. Greece, to force Turkey to withdraw from Suakin, it would constitute a minor strate- On November 12, ExxonMobil‘s drillship its game of brinkmanship, would provide gic set-back for Turkey‘s naval operations. arrived unmolested by Turkey at the drill Ankara with the pretext to establish a Turkey‘s overall effort to expand its blue- site. While Turkey‘s restraint may be due naval base in North Cyprus. water power projection capabilities would to Qatar ‘s minority stake in not lose its momentum. ExxonMobil‘s venture, Ankara certainly A More Volatile Mediterranean-Red Sea did not want to antagonize Washington Corridor Cyprus: A Powder keg in the East Med-Red by interfering with the U.S.-based energy Corridor giant. The U.S. already maintains a base in Although active U.S. involvement could tip Crete, less than 500 miles from Cyprus. At the scales in the Eastern Mediterranean in Turkey‘s most important ‘pearl‘ is North the end of 2018, Russia made claims that favor of Egypt-Greece-Cyprus alignment Cyprus, the ethnically Turkish-dominated the U.S. is planning to establish a for- at Turkey‘s expense, Ankara is not without part of the divided island where Ankara ward deployment base in Cyprus.24 While recourse. Even at this early stage of backs the unrecognized Turkish Repub­ Washing has not responded to the claims, Turkey‘s maritime base-building initiative, lic of North Cyprus and maintains a the U.S. has increased its security footprint Ankara‘s string of pearls affords a range of military presence of over 30,000 troops. in the region with its December 13, 2018 responses from imposing a strategic cost Turkish newspapers allied with President inauguration of a U.S-Greece Strategic on Egypt in the Hala‘ib triangle to impo- Erdoğan‘s AKP recently have reported on Dialogue. sing a cost on ‘s Saudi and Emirati the possibility that Turkey may build a supporters by interfering in their prose- naval base in North Cyprus,22 a move that On 28, 2019, ExxonMobil cution of the war in Yemen. Turkey can would permanently alter the prospects for announ­ced that it had made a gas disco- also chal­lenge ‘s grand ambition Cyprus reunification. very of in the Glaucus-1 well located in to construct the $500 billion hi-tech city block 10.25 With 142-227 bcm of in-place of Neom, as a cross-border business and Turkey‘s motivation for the base has been reserves, the Glaucus-1 discovery is the tourism zone on the Red Sea that will link prompted, in part, by new natural gas third noteworthy discovery in Cyprus. the Kingdom to Egypt and . finds off the coast of Greek-dominated Combined with the approximately 320 South Cyprus administered by the inter- bcm from its Calypso and Aphrodite fields, Turkey will soon be able to present a more nationally recognized Republic of Cyprus Cyprus now holds a more significant formidable naval challenge when its light government. Turkey claims to be defen- position in its energy partnerships with aircraft carrier the TCG Anadolu becomes ding the rights of Turkish Cypriots who Egypt and , and accordingly greater operational in 2021. The TCG Anadolu is have been excluded from Cyprus‘ offshore geopolitical importance for the EU and the a landing helicopter dock (LHD) capable natural gas exploration efforts despite the United States. sailing non-stop for thirty days with a constitutional status of the island‘s natural range of 1,700 nautical miles (3,148km), gas as being a shared resource of both On May 3, 2019, Turkey formally announ­ almost the distance between the Suez communities. In late February 2018, the ced via NAVTEX, the international ma­ Canal and Mogadishu. As an amphibious Turkish navy blockaded Italian energy gi- ri­time navigational telex system, that assault ship, it will be able to transport a ant ENI‘s drilling ship before it could reach Turkish ships would drill for natural gas off battalion-sized unit of 1,000 troops along its intended drilling site in Cypriot waters, southern coast of the Republic of Cyprus, with 150 vehicles, including battle tanks, forcing the company to withdraw the prompting warnings from Cyprus‘ regional for a marine landing.27 A blue-water power vessel.23 ENI discovered Egypt‘s massive partners as well as the United States projection vessel par excellence, the TCG Zohr natural gas field adjacent to Cypriot and the European Union. The European Anadolu will augment Turkey‘s efforts to territorial waters and, two weeks before Union‘s High Representative Frederica draw and into the Turkey- the Turkish blockade, ENI announced Mogherini issued a stern warning to Tur- Qatar alignment, as both nations harbor a significant gas find in Cyprus‘ nearby key, declaring, “we urgently call on Turkey deep concerns about the Saudi Arabi- Calypso field. Cairo and have been to show restrain, respect the sovereign UAE partnership in the wake of the Qatar cooperating to market Eastern Mediterra- rights of Cyprus in its exclusive economic blockade. nean gas to Europe using Egypt‘s Liqui- zone and refrain from any such illegal fied Natural Gas (LNG) plants, bypassing action to which the European Union will Even now, Turkey‘s advances have altered Turkish involvement. Israel, which once respond appropriately and in full solida- the strategic calculus of actors from had been considering an Israel-Turkey rity with Cyprus.“26 At the time of writing, Athens to . The linking of previ- undersea gas pipeline, has likewise agreed Turkey‘s exploration vessels and their sup- ously localized conflicts from the Aegean to a sell Egypt gas for LNG export. port ships are located in Cyprus‘ exclusive and Arabian seas along the Turkey-Qatar

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versus Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE fault-line 14) N.A., “ Why are tensions rising in the Red Sea re- gion?,“, Al-Jazeera, January 16, 2018, https://www. raises the probability that any future aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/tensions-rising-red-sea-regi- clash could develop into a wider regional on-180109064758337.html conflict. Until a new equilibrium develops 15) N.A., “UAE joins an exclusive club,“ Stratfor, December 8, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/uae-joins-exclusive- in the maritime security architecture, the club Eastern Mediterranean-Red Sea corridor 16) Frank Gardner, “ UAE reinforcements in Eritrea ready to join Hudaydah battle,“ BBC , June 15, 2018, https://www.bbc. will be increasingly volatile. com/news/world-middle-east-44500455 17) N.A., “ Djibouti on the Rise as Hub for Foreign Military Bases in Africa,“ Asharq Al-Awsat, September 10, 2018, https://aawsat. Micha’el Tanchum is a Fellow at the Truman com/english/home/article/1390991/djibouti-rise-hub-foreign- Research Institute for the Advancement of military-bases-africa Peace, Hebrew University and non-resident, 18) Khalid Abdelaziz, “Saudi Arabia, UAE to send $3 billion in aid to Sudan,“ Reuters, April 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ affiliated scholar with the Centre for Strate- article/us-sudan-protests/saudi-arabia-uae-to-send-3-billion-in- gic Studies at Başkent University in Ankara, aid-to-sudan-idUSKCN1RX0DG 19) Dorian Jones, “Analysts: Ouster of Sudanese Leader Hurts Turkey (Başkent-SAM). Ankara‘s Regional Goals,“ , April 29. 2019, htt- ps://www.voanews.com/a/analysts-ouster-of-sudanese-leader- Follow @michaeltanchum hurts-turkey-regional-goals/4896412.html 20) Alarabiya.net, AlArabiya, 5 May 2019, www.alarabiya.net/ar/ arab-and-world/sudan/2019/05/05/ 21) Zuhal Demirci and Beyza Binnur Donmez, “Turkey denies Suakin pact ends with Sudan,“ Anadolu Agency, April 26, 2019, Notes https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-denies-suakin-pact- ends-with-sudan/1463560 1) Micha‘el Tanchum, “Sino-Saudi Red Sea Alignment for Turkey- 22) Dorian Jones, “Reports of Planned Turkish Naval Base Stokes China Cooperation,“ Turkish Policy Quarterly, April 7, 2017, Tension Between Greek, Turkish Cypriots“, Voice of America, http://turkishpolicy.com/blog/20/sino-saudi-red-sea-alignment- December 4, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/reports-of- presents-opportunity-for-turkey-china-cooperation planned-turkish-naval-base-stokes-tension-between-greek- 2) Micha‘el Tanchum, “A new Equilibrium: The Republic of turkish-cypriots-/4686670.html Cyprus, Israel, and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean Strategic 23) N.A., “ENI ship blocked off Cyprus leaves,“ Ansa, Febrary 23, Architecture,“ Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) Occasional 2018, http://www.ansa.it/english/news/business/2018/02/23/ Paper Series 1, 2015, p. 10 eni-ship-blocked-off-cyprus-leaves-3_3c4d2077-f068- 3) Tom Finn, “ Turkey to set up Qatar military base to face 4847-b5ed-d77f9ac4fad4.html ‚common enemies,“ Reuters, December 16, 2015, https:// 24) George Psyllides and Elias Hazou, “Russia tweets that US www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-turkey-military- inspected military and strategic sites for base ,“ Cyprus Mail, idUSKBN0TZ17V20151216 December 6, 2018, https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/12/06/cyprus- 4) Orhan Coskun and Sarah Dadouch, “Qatar to invest $15 billion rejects-suggestions-of-military-build-up/ in Turkey; source says banks the focus,“ Reuters, August 15, 2018, 25) N.A. “ ExxonMobil makes natural gas discovery offshore Cyp- https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-currency-qatar- rus,“ ExxonMobil News, February 28, 2019, https://corporate.ex- investments/qatar-to-invest-15-billion-in-turkey-ankara-says- xonmobil.com/en/news/newsroom/news-releases/2019/0228_ idUSKBN1L01P7 exxonmobil-makes-natural-gas-discovery-offshore-cyprus 5) David Dolan, “ Turkey says central bank swap deal with Qatar 26) N.A. “ Statement by High Representative/Vice-President to have $3 billion limit,“ Reuters, August 20, 2018, https://www. Federica Mogherini on Turkey‘s intended drilling activities reuters.com/article/us-turkey-currency-qatar/turkey-says- within the of Cyprus,“ European central-bank-swap-deal-with-qatar-to-have-3-billion-limit- Union External Action, May 4, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/ idUSKCN1L50UK headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/61836/statement- 6) N.A., “Turkey and /Qatar prove to be true friends, says high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-turkeys- Erdo?an,“ Hürriyet Daily News, November 27, 2018, http://www. intended-drilling_en hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-and-qatar-prove-to-be-true- 27) Micha‘el Tanchum, “Turkey’s New Carrier Alters Eastern Me- friends-says-erdogan-139210 diterranean Energy and Security Calculus,“ The Turkey Analyst, 7) N.A. “Qatar, Turkey sign pacts to cement ties,“ Gulf Times, January 29, 2014, https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/ November 26, 2018, https://www.gulf-times.com/story/614290/ turkey-analyst-articles/item/84-turkey%E2%80%99s-new-carri- Qatar-Turkey-sign-pacts-to-cement-ties er-alters-eastern-mediterranean-energy-and-security-calculus. 8) Harun Maruf, “Turkey gives Weapons to Somali Soldiers,“ html Voice of America, January 5, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/ turkey-gives-weapons-to-somali-soldiers-/4193724.html © Austria Institut für Europa- 9) N.A., “Somlia and the Gulf Crisis,“ International Crisis Group und Sicherheitspolitik, 2019 Report - No. 260/Africa, , 2018 https://www.crisisgroup. org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver­ 10) Maggie Fick, “ Harboring ambitions: Gulf states scramble for gleich­bare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des Somalia,“ Reuters, May 1, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik us-somalia-gulf-analysis/harboring-ambitions-gulf-states- (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger scramble-for-somalia-idUSKBN1I23B4 Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus 11) Richard Wachman, “Somaliland backs ‘s DP World over Berbera Port,“ , March 19, 2018, http://www.arabnews. veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die com/node/1269031/business-economy Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren 12) Charlie Mitchell, “ UAE role is crucial, says Somali regional wieder. leader,“ , April 26, 2018, https://www.thenational. ae/world/africa/uae-role-is-crucial-says-somali-regional- Dr. Langweg 3, 2410 Hainburg/Donau leader-1.725207 Tel. +43 (1) 3583080 13) Ali Kucukgocmen and Khalid Abdelaziz, “ Turkey to restore E-Mail: [email protected] Sudanese Red Sea port and build naval dock,“ Reuters, Decem- Website: www.aies.at ber 26, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-sudan- port/turkey-to-restore-sudanese-red-sea-port-and-build-naval- Layout: Medienbüro Meyer dock-idUSKBN1EK0ZC

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