Avian Influenza Brochure

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As part of the President’s National Strategy How can people become infected Additionally, USDA has increased its monitoring USDA recommends that owners of backyard flocks for Pandemic Influenza, which includes with avian influenza? for illegally smuggled poultry and poultry products follow these six tips to prevent poultry disease: through an anti-smuggling program in coordination ■ keep your distance (restrict access to your property both avian influenza and human pandemic Although the HPAI H5N1 virus does not usually infect with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security - and your birds); preparedness, the U.S. Department of people, more than 200 human cases have been reported Customs and Border Protection. ■ keep it clean (clean and disinfect your clothes, shoes, since 2004. Most people who have become sick or died equipment, and hands); Agriculture (USDA) is working with its from HPAI H5N1 have had extensive, direct contact International assistance: USDA is working closely ■ don’t haul disease home (if you have been near other partners on the international and domestic with infected poultry. Broad concerns about public with international organizations such as the World birds or bird owners, clean and disinfect poultry health relate to the potential for the virus to mutate, or Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the United cages and equipment before going home); fronts to help control the spread of high- change into a form that could easily spread from person Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ■ don’t risk disease from your neighbor (do not pathogenicity H5N1 avian influenza. to person, a characteristic that could result in a human and the World Health Organization to assist HPAI- borrow lawn and garden equipment, tools, or influenza pandemic. There is no evidence that this is affected countries and other countries with disease poultry supplies from other bird owners); occurring. Strains of AI that have been detected in U.S. prevention, management, and eradication activities. ■ know the warning signs (sudden increase in bird poultry, including LPAI and HPAI, have caused no By helping these countries prepare for, manage, and deaths, sneezing, coughing, nasal discharge, watery What is avian influenza? known human illnesses. eradicate HPAI outbreaks, USDA can help to slow the or green diarrhea, lack of energy, poor appetite, spread of the virus. Some efforts include: drop in egg production, swelling around the eyes, vian influenza (AI)--the bird flu--is a virus USDA has experience responding ■ Training sessions for veterinarians and poultry neck, and head, and purple discoloration of wattles, that infects wild birds (such as ducks, gulls, and to and eradicating HPAI. disease experts from H5N1-affected and at-risk combs, and legs); and countries to teach testing protocols. ■ report sick birds (call your local or State veterinarian, shorebirds) and domestic poultry (such as chick- HPAI has been detected three times in U.S. poultry: in ■ Professional expertise and funding to help the FAO or USDA toll-free at 1-866-536-7593). ens, turkeys, ducks, and geese). There is a flu for 1924, 1983, and 2004. No human illness resulted from in Rome develop a new Crisis Management Center, A any of these outbreaks. to respond rapidly and effectively to avian influenza birds just as there is for humans and, as with people, USDA is ready to act. some forms of the flu are worse than others. The 1924 HPAI H7 outbreak was contained and outbreaks in poultry worldwide. eradicated in East Coast live bird markets. ■ Assistance to H5N1-affected countries, including USDA works closely with its Federal, State, and tribal AI viruses are classified by a combination of two The 1983-84 HPAI H5N2 outbreak resulted in hu- laboratory equipment, reagents, and sample partners, as well as industry stakeholders, to coordi- groups of proteins: the hemagglutinin or H proteins, of manely euthanizing approximately 17 million chickens, shipping containers to bolster AI testing and nate emergency response to animal disease outbreaks, which there are 16 (H1-H16), and neuraminidase or N turkeys, and guinea fowl in Pennsylvania and Virginia diagnostic programs. including AI. proteins, of which there are 9 (N1-N9). AI strains also to contain and eradicate the disease. ■ In collaboration with FAO and OIE, USDA USDA provides expertise, funding, and support are divided into two groups based upon the ability of In 2004, USDA confirmed an HPAI H5N2 has deployed expert scientists, veterinarians, and personnel to States when LPAI is detected. Close at- the virus to produce disease in poultry: low-pathogenic- outbreak in chickens in Texas. The disease was quickly animal health emergency managers to H5N1- tention is paid to LPAI H5 and H7 strains, because eradicated thanks to close coordination and cooperation affected countries to test and diagnose AI; advise of their potential to mutate into HPAI. When HPAI ity avian influenza (LPAI) and high-pathogenicity avian between USDA and State, local, and industry leaders. on surveillance and vaccination programs to protect is detected, USDA and State personnel are primary influenza (HPAI). poultry; and advise on emergency contingency plans. responders because of the rapid spread and high death LPAI, or “low path” avian influenza, naturally oc- USDA efforts to protect the rate among poultry. curs in wild birds and can spread to domestic birds. In United States. Surveillance: USDA works with Federal and State In the event of an HPAI outbreak in the United most cases it causes no signs of infection or only minor partners and industry to monitor U.S. bird popula- States, USDA would work with States and industry to Import restrictions: USDA quarantines and tests live tions. Surveillance is conducted in four key areas: live respond quickly and decisively following these five basic symptoms in birds. These strains of the virus pose little birds imported into the United States to ensure that bird markets, commercial flocks, backyard flocks, and steps: threat to human health. LPAI H5 and H7 strains have they do not have any foreign animal diseases such as the migratory bird populations. ■ Quarantine – restrict movement of poultry and the potential to mutate into HPAI and are therefore HPAI H5N1 virus. Extensive testing occurs in live bird markets and poultry-moving equipment into and out of the closely monitored. All imported live birds (except from Canada) must commercial flocks. Additionally, birds that show signs control area; HPAI, or “high path” avian influenza, is often fatal spend 30 days at a USDA quarantine facility where of illness are tested. ■ Eradicate – humanely euthanize; ■ Monitor region – in chickens and turkeys. HPAI spreads more rapidly they are tested for the AI virus before entering the Through a backyard flock biosecurity program, broad area of testing; country. Returning U.S.-origin pet birds (except from USDA encourages backyard and small poultry pro- ■ Disinfect – kills virus; and than LPAI and has a higher death rate in birds. HPAI Canada) also are tested and are home-quarantined. ducers to strengthen biosecurity practices in order ■ Test – confirm that the poultry farm is AI virus-free. H5N1 is the type rapidly spreading in some parts of USDA maintains trade restrictions on the importa- to prevent the introduction of AI into their flocks. the world. tion of poultry and poultry products originating from Biosecurity refers to practical management practices USDA also maintains a bank of AI vaccine that countries and/or regions where the HPAI H5N1 strain that help to prevent diseases. could be used to protect healthy birds outside a control has been detected in commercial or traditionally raised area, if necessary. poultry. USDA regulations require that import permits accompany properly sanitized poultry products, such as raw feathers. Expanded wild bird testing serves Properly prepared and cooked poultry More information as an early warning system. is safe to eat – you have the power to USDA efforts to protect against and respond to protect yourself. www.usda.gov/birdflu USDA has been testing wild migratory birds for HPAI bird flu: H5N1 since 1998 in both Alaska and the Atlantic fly- Eating properly handled and cooked poultry and eggs way and has worked with Federal, State, and academic is safe. Cooking poultry to an internal temperature of Report Sick Farm Birds: If your farm birds are sick partners to enhance testing and develop a national 165 ˚F kills the AI virus as it does other bacteria and or dying, call USDA’s Veterinary Services toll-free at strategic plan for the early detection of HPAI H5N1. viruses. Cooking eggs until they are firm throughout 1-866-536-7593, or your State Veterinarian or local The wild bird plan targets those bird species in kills the AI virus. extension agent. North America at the highest risk because of their mi- gratory patterns. Key species of interest include ducks, AI is not transmissible by eating properly prepared geese, and shorebirds. USDA and its partners plan poultry. If HPAI were detected in the United States, Report Dead Wild Birds: Dead wild birds can be re- to collect approximately 100,000 samples from wild the chance of infected poultry or eggs entering the food ported to State or Federal wildlife agencies. Information birds as well as 50,000 samples from waterfowl habitats chain would be extremely low because of the rapid on how to make contact with wildlife officials in your across the United States annually. onset of symptoms in poultry as well as the safeguards State is available at www.usda.gov/birdflu The wild bird plan recommends a prioritized sam- pling system, with emphasis first in Alaska, the Pacific in place, which include testing of flocks, and Federal flyway, and on the Pacific islands, followed by the inspection programs. Safe Food Preparation: USDA Meat and Poultry Central, Mississippi, and Atlantic flyways. It also estab- Cooking poultry, eggs, and other poultry products Hotline - 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854), lishes protocols for testing and tracking the data.
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