Repositorium für die Medienwissenschaft

Sumandro Chattapadhyay Greatfire.org 2015 https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/1485

Veröffentlichungsversion / published version Sammelbandbeitrag / collection article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Chattapadhyay, Sumandro: Greatfire.org. In: Nishant Shah, Puthiya Purayil Sneha, Sumandro Chattapadhyay (Hg.): Digital Activism in Asia Reader. Lüneburg: meson press 2015, S. 79–86. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/1485.

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Sumandro Chattapadhyay1

[Image­1]­https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2015/mar/we-are-under-attack­

Greatfire­was­‘under­attack’­in­March­2015.­Now­how­do­you­attack­a­website?­ As they explain above, you attack it by sending a large number of visitors to the website. It is like occupying a park or a building. With that many users visiting the website, it stops working. Of course, these visitors are non-human visitors: they are automated scripts/bots asking the website for information.

1­ Text­written­and­screenshots­from­Greatfire.org­compiled­by­Sumandro­Chattapadhyay. 80 Digital Activism in Asia Reader

But­what­information­does­the­Greatfire­website­possess­for­which­it­got­ attacked?

[Image­2]­https://en.greatfire.org/faq/what-greatfireorg­

[Image­3]­https://en.greatfire.org/faq/where-does-our-data-come­

[Image­4]­https://en.greatfire.org/faq/what-are-you-trying-accomplish

[Image­5]­https://en.greatfire.org/faq/where-does-our-data-come­

So how can the blocked sites and webpages in China be explored through Greatfire?­

Go­to­the­homepage­first.

The Latest Stats section shows the various counts of online censorship in China­maintained­by­the­website.­It­monitors­the­global­top­1000­most-visited­ domains according to Alexa to check if those are blocked in China or not. Similarly­it­monitors­specific­domains,­sites­and­search­result­pages­within­ Google­domains,­HTTPS­addresses­(as­separate­from­HTTP­addresses),­direct­ IP­addresses­of­webpages,­URLs­of­webpages­(even­if­the­domain­itself­is­not­ blocked,­specific­pages­within­it­might­be),­search­result­pages­on­Weibo­(the­ Greatfire.org 81 major­Chinese­social­microblogging­platform),­and­pages­across­Wikipedia­ domains.

[Image­6]­https://en.greatfire.org/

Greatfire­maintains­a­list­of­all­these­domains,­webpages,­IPs,­search­result­ pages, etc. that it tests periodically to see if they are blocked within China or not.­You­can­go­to­the­Recently­Added­section­to­check­what­all­domains­and­ pages and IPs have they started to monitor in recent times: https://en.great- fire.org/recently-added.

The­Search­bar­on­top­also­allows­you­to­directly­search­for­specific­keywords­ and URLs and check if they are blocked or not.

For­example,­we­can­search­for­‘Tibbet’­in­the­search­bar­on­the­top,­and­ Greatfire­will­show­us­a­result­page­like­the­following­one:

[Image­7]­https://en.greatfire.org/keyword/tibbet­ 82 Digital Activism in Asia Reader

Now how should we interpret this censorship score? The 33% value indicates that­out­of­the­three­search­engines­that­Greatfire­tracks—Baidu,­Google,­and­ Sina Weibo—the search results for the term ‘Tibbet’ is only blocked for one search engine, that is Google.

The­thing­to­remember­here­is­that­Baidu­and­Sina­Weibo­being­Chinese­ companies,­content­that­is­available­via­them­might­be­already­subject­to­ other forms of censorship. The critical value of this 33% score hence is in dem- onstrating how Chinese censorship targets digital content being produced elsewhere in the world and prevents it from being accessible to Chinese users of the Internet.

A­look­at­the­list­of­‘­Censorship­of­Alexa­Top­1000­Domains­in­China’­reveals­ how global digital content is comprehensively stopped from being accessed by Chinese Internet users.

[Image­8]­https://en.greatfire.org/search/alexa-top-1000-domains.

This focus on the blocking of digital content produced elsewhere from being consumed by Chinese citizens does not give us a full picture of the everyday reality of media censorship in China. Lokman Tsui highlights this point as he questions­the­effectiveness­of­the­prevalent­‘Great­Firewall’­metaphor,­which­ even­the­Greatfire­website­employs.­

Tsui writes:

The metaphor most frequently used in describing and understanding Internet­censorship­in­China­is­that­of­the­Great­Firewall…­I­argue­that­our­ (ab)use­of­the­Great­Firewall­metaphor­leads­to­blind­spots­that­obscure­ and limit our understanding of Internet censorship in the People’s Republic… To illuminate the existence of these blind spots, I use the term Greatfire.org 83

Great­Firewall­myth­(as­opposed­to­metaphor).­By­using­the­word­“myth”,­ however, I am not denying the existence of Internet censorship in China. On­the­contrary.­The­Great­Firewall­myth­is­the­belief­that­China’s­efforts­ to censor the Internet must ultimately fail, and that the Internet will even- tually lead to the country’s democratisation…

[The­myth]­gives­the­impression­that­censorship­is­practised­only­on­infor- mation­that­lies­outside­the­Great­Firewall:­after­all,­that­is­the­purpose­ of the protection the wall provides. Attempts to “break down” the Great Firewall­focus­on­countering­censorship­technology­with­more­and­better­ technology, resulting in a cat-and-mouse game between activists and censors…­The­image­of­the­Great­Firewall­protecting­China­from­the­West­ thus obscures the fact that “undesirable” information often comes not from the West but from within China itself...

…­[Further,]­the­Great­Firewall­metaphor­hints­at­the­difficulty­only­of­ receiving information, not sending it. Censorship prevents the barbarians from coming in, but does it also prevent the Chinese from going out? The concept of free speech has two aspects: the right to receive information, but­also­the­right­to­impart­it.­(Tsui­2007)

Greatfire,­however,­effectively­creates­entry­points­to­understand­various­ kinds of censorship activities of the Chinese government. The pattern of blocking­of­Wikipedia­pages­in­China,­for­example,­offers­interesting­insights.

[Image­9]­https://en.greatfire.org/search/wikipedia-pages.­ 84 Digital Activism in Asia Reader

When interpreting the censorship of Wikipedia pages, there are two things that­must­be­given­attention.­Firstly,­the­focus­of­the­censorship­is­clearly­on­ pages­in­the­Chinese­language­Wikipedia­project,­and­not­the­English­language­ Wikipedia­project.­And­secondly,­Wikipedia­is­as­much­a­site­of­information­ consumption,­as­it­is­of­information­production.­Blocking­Chinese­Internet­ users­from­accessing­specific­pages­on­the­Chinese­language­Wikipedia­project­ is hence not only about preventing them from accessing Chinese language content created elsewhere in the world, but also about preventing them from creating and sharing Chinese language content within and outside China.

Production and digital distribution of content by Chinese users is also censored by the Government of China through the ‘Self-Censorship’ mechanism.

[Image­10]­https://en.greatfire.org/faq/self-censorship.­

Let us take a step back now and remember that various forms of censorship are not that uncommon even for the global open Internet.

Google­serves­maps­with­different­political­boundaries­for­different­countries.

Facebook­conducts­psychological­experiments­based­upon­its­ability­to­ algorithmically manipulate what status updates a user sees on her/his Facebook­wall. Greatfire.org 85

The Tempora programme of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)­of­the­Government­of­the­United­Kingdom,­taps­into­the­submarine­ cables­carrying­the­global­Internet­data­traffic,­and­undertakes­mass­inter- ception­of­data­passing­through­Bude,­a­small­coastal­town.­GCHQ­also­runs­ EdgeHill,­a­massive-scale­decryption­exercise­of­digital­communication­flowing­ through­HTTPS­protocol­(targeting­digital­certificates­provided­by­three­main­ authorities).

The rush for surveillance, monitoring, and censorship of global Internet trans- actions is a rather global phenomenon - neither being done only by govern- ment agencies, nor taking place only in Asian countries.

A­key­question,­hence,­is­if­the­Chinese­government­is­one­of­the­first­movers­ in the space of Internet censorship. Did it initiate the competition, and thus shape a global situation of acts and counter-acts of surveillance and censorship?

Evgeny­Morozov­disagrees.

…[T]he­US­government­insists­that­it­should­have­access­to­data­ regardless of where it is stored as long as it is handled by US companies. Just imagine the outcry if the Chinese government were to demand access to any data that passes through devices manufactured by Chinese companies – Xiaomi, say, or Lenovo – regardless of whether their users are­in­London­or­New­York­or­Tokyo.­Note­the­crucial­difference:­Russia­ and China want to be able to access data generated by their citizens on their own soil, whereas the US wants to access data generated by anybody anywhere as long as American companies handle it...

...Whatever motivates the desire of Russia and China to exert more con- trol over their digital properties – and only the naive would believe that they are not motivated by concerns over domestic unrest – their actions are­proportional­to­the­aggressive­efforts­of­Washington­to­exploit­the­ fact that so much of the world’s communications infrastructure is run by Silicon Valley. One’s man internet freedom is another man’s internet imperialism­(Morozov­2015).

References and Further Readings

2015.­“Denial­of­Service­Attack.”­Wikipedia.­June­11.­Accessed­June­15,­2015.­https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack. 2015.­“Great­Firewall.”­Wikipedia.­May­20.­Accessed­June­15,­2015.­https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Great_Firewall.­ 2015.­“Internet­Censorship­in­China.”­Wikipedia.­June­13.­Accessed­June­15,­2015.­https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_China. 2015.­“Internet­Censorship­in­the­United­States.”­Wikipedia.­April­12.­Accessed­June­15,­2015.­ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_the_United_States. 86 Digital Activism in Asia Reader

2015.­“Sina­Weibo.”­Wikipedia.­June­14.­Accessed­June­15,­2015.­https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Sina_Weibo.­­ Cox,­Joseph.­2014.­“The­History­of­DDoS­Attacks­as­a­Tool­of­Protest.”­Motherboard.­October­1.­ Accessed­June­15,­2015.­http://motherboard.vice.com/read/history-of-the-ddos-attack. Dempsey­Morais,­Caitlin.­2012.­“The­Politics­of­Google’s­Mapping.”­GIS­Lounge.­May­18.­Accessed­ June­15,­2015.­http://www.gislounge.com/the-politics-of-googles-mapping/.­ Morozov,­Evgeny.­2009.­“The­Internet:­A­Room­of­Our­Own?”­Dissent.­Summer.­Pp.­80-85.­ Accessed­June­15,­2015.­http://www.evgenymorozov.com/files/09Summer-MorozovInternet. pdf. Morozov,­Evgeny.­2015.­“Who’s­the­True­Enemy­of­Internet­Freedom—China,­Russia,­ or­the­US?”­The­Guardian.­January­04.­Accessed­June­15,­2015.­http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2015/jan/04/internet-freedom-china-russia-us-google-microsoft-digital-sov- ereignty. Reporters­without­Borders.­2014.­“United­Kingdom:­World­Champion­of­Surveillance.”­In­ Enemies of the Internet 2014: Entities at the Heart of Censorship and Surveillance.­March­10.­ Accessed­June­15,­2015.­http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/2014/03/10/united-kingdom-world- champion-of-surveillance/ Tsui,­Lokman.­2007.­“An­Inadequate­Metaphor:­The­Great­Firewall­and­Chinese­Internet­Censor- ship.” Global Dialogue.­Volume­9,­Number­1–2.­Winter/Spring.­Accessed­June­15,­2015.­http:// www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=400.­ Tufekci,­Zeynep.­2014.­“Facebook­and­Engineering­the­Public.”­Medium.­June­29.­Accessed­June­ 15,­2015.­https://medium.com/message/engineering-the-public-289c91390225.­