229 Plato on Change and Time in the Parmenides DAVID BOSTOCK

and Time in the Parmenides Plato on Change

DAVID BOSTOCK

There are several places in the second part of the Parmenides where Plato makes it clear that his argument is not concerned with any special features that 'the One' must be supposed to possess. Some examples are the thesis that nothing can ever be other than anything else (146 d 8 - e 2); that everything whatever, since it is other than everything else, is like everything else (148 a 4-6); that nothing at all can be small (150 b 5-7); and that whatever is must partake in not-being, and vice versa (162 b, esp. 3-6). Early in his discussion of change and temporal relations Plato explicitly points out that here too his reasoning has nothing specially to do with 'the One'. At 141 a 6 - d 3 it is explicitly whatever is in time (6a« iV -Xp6VWÈOTLV, a 6 and c 8) that is argued to be becoming older than itself, and therefore becoming younger than itself, but also remaining the same age as itself. Similar generality is explicit in the complementary passage at 152 b I - d 4, where it is urged that whatever comes to be «lkv T6 YLYVÓJ1evov,c 7) is always at a 'present moment', and therefore is not after all becoming older than itself but is older. And the generality recurs in subsequent passages treating of our topic, e.g. 156 c 6, 156 e 1-3, &c. Admittedly there are some features of the discussion of temporal relations which do depend on the fact that we have 'the One' for our subject, notably when it is argued (152 e 10-154 a 5) that 'the One' is older than, younger than, and the same age as, 'the Others', but this passage is unusual and I shall ignore it. The passages I wish to discuss are all of a quite general nature, and nothing to do with 'the One'. Indeed we may go further and say that they have no very noticeable relevance to any feature of the theory of forms. This is interesting, because of course the concept of change was very prominent in the middle-period theory of forms. It was supposed to be a crucial contrast between forms and (ordinary, sensible) particulars that particulars do change while forms do not. And this theme is further treated in the later dialogues, most notably in the Sophist 248 a - 249 d. But so far as I can see it does not anywhere obtrude in the discussion of change and temporal existence in the Par- menides, except in one (not very important) aspect. In the Republic, the Cratylus, and much more specifically in the Timaeus (37 e - 38 b) it is emphasised that things subject to change cannot properly be said to be. The same view occurs in the Theaetetus as part of the secret

229 Heraclitean doctrine that is there demolished, and it has often seemed that the view is explicitly denied in the Philebus (y£vsais sls OÙOL<ïv,26b 8; Y£YEVTJJ1ÉVTJouoLa, 27 b 8). In the Parmenides there is no hint of the doctrine that what is subject to change cannot really be, but the argument does sometimes rely on the contrary view that what is subject to change - in fact what is changing - must be. For example at 163 d it is said that to come into being or perish is to acquire or lose being (ouaba), so only things that partake in being can do it; and there is also an explicit contradiction of Timaeus 37 e - 38 b at Parmenides 151 e 7: to be is to partake of being at the present time, just as 'was' and 'will be' signify past or future partaking of being. Of course in the plethora of dialectical paradoxes or à'iTOpL<ï1,which constitute the second part of the Parmenides it is hardly surprising to find these (reasonably plausible, commonsensical) views being put forward and used. What is interesting is that the contrary view of the Timaeus is no- where asserted against them. Three possible explanations that suggest themselves are (i) that at the time of writing the Parmenides Plato does not believe the doctrine that Yevews excludes and that is why he does not there make any use of it; (ii) that the contradictions he wished to present in the Parmenides nowhere required this thesis, so he saw no particular need, and perhaps no opportunity, to bring it in; and (iii) that in the Parmenides the (extra) premises on which Plato relies are supposed to be such that the common man would find them all fairly plausible, but the common man would not find this doctrine plausible, so it would have upset Plato's aim to bring it in as a premise. Of these explanations the third seems to me the most likely. We could reasonably compare the premise that what exists exists in space, which is used at 145 e 1, 151 a 4-5, and 162 c 7 (compare 163 d 5-6), and never contradicted. It seems reasonable to say that the common man would find this premise plausible enough, and would not find its negation plausible at all, though we can also add that Plato must surely have regarded it as false. Similarly the common man will doubtless be quite happy with the premise that what comes-into-being comes into being (Fls ooai«v), and the fact that Plato does not anywhere contradict this premise in the Parmenides shows only that he thought the common man would not be willing to contradict it. Nothing can be inferred either way on whether Plato himself would at this time have been willing to contradict it. However this has been somewhat of an aside from my main theme. So far as that is concerned the points I have wanted to make by way of preliminary are (i) that Plato's discussion of change and temporal relations

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