Africa's Active Militant Islamist Groups

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AFRICA’S ACTIVE MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS LIBYA TUNISIA • Islamic State in Libya (f.k.a. Wilayat Barqa, Wilayat Fezzan, and Wilayat Tarabulus) • Okba ibn Nafaa Brigade Morocco • Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AST) • Soldiers of the Caliphate (a.k.a. Jund al Khilafah) (targeting both Algeria and Tunisia) EGYPT • Islamic State in Sinai (a.k.a. Wilayat Sinai) (f.k.a. Ansar Beit al Maqdis (ABM)) ALGERIA • Islamic State in Egypt • Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (operating across North Mauritania Africa) Niger Chad Eritrea Sudan MALI/BURKINA FASO/NIGER • Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin SOMALIA (JNIM), ocially comprising the • Al Shabaab following regional AQIM aliates: Côte d’ South Ethiopia • Islamic State in - Ansar Dine Ivoire Ghana Central African Sudan Somalia (ISS) (a.k.a. Republic - Macina Liberation Front (FLM) Cameroon Abnaa ul Calipha) - Al Mourabitoun - Sahara Emirate of AQIM NIGERIA/NIGER/ Uganda • Ansaroul Islam CAMEROON/CHAD • Islamic State in the Greater Sahara • Boko Haram (a.k.a. Jama'atu Ahlis (ISGS) Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad) KENYA/TANZANIA • Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) DEM. REP. OF THE • Al Hijra (f.k.a. Muslim Youth Center) (a.k.a. Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah) CONGO Tanzania • Al Muhajiroun in East Africa • Ansaru (a.k.a. Jama’atu Ansarul • Madina Tawheed wal Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan) Muwahedeen (MTM) ATTACKS TRENDS IN MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUP ACTIVITY IN AFRICA Malawi AQIM and aliates Al Qaeda aliates 5,000 MOZAMBIQUE Al Shabaab and aliates 4,500 • Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama’a 4,000 (ASWJ) (a.k.a. "al Zimbabwe ASWJ and aliates 3,500 Shabaab") Boko Haram and aliates 3,000 ISIS aliates 2,500 Events 2,000 ISWA and aliates 1,500 ISGS and aliates 1,000 ISS and aliates 500 Unidentied/unaliated groups 0 South 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Africa “a.k.a.” = also known as AQIM ISGS BH ISWA Al Shabaab ISS AQ ISIS ASWJ Unaliated “f.k.a.” = formerly known as Updated: February 2021 Note: Compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, this graphic shows violent events involving the listed groups over the 12-month period ending December 31, 2020. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish the perpetrators of the events. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered ocial designations. Due to the uid nature of many groups, the listed aliations may change. Sources: Armed Conict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Daniel Byman; HumAngle; Thomas Joscelyn; SITE Intelligence Group; The Soufan Group; Stanford University’s Mapping Militants Project; Stratfor; Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC); and Aaron Y. Zelin..

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