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Understanding Delusions: a Phenomenological Critique of The Running head: CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS UNDERSTANDING DELUSIONS: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DELUSIONS A DISSERTATION PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF APPLIED AND PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY BY GREG BYROM IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PSYCHOLOGY NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY October, 2016 APPROVED: ___________________________ Louis A. Sass, Ph. D. ___________________________ Steven Silverstein, Ph. D. DEAN: ___________________________ Francine Conway, Ph. D. CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS Copyright 2016 by Greg Byrom CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS ii Abstract Theorists of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for schizophrenia claim that understanding aberrant experiences, such as the delusions found in persons with schizophrenia, is possible partly because delusions and non-delusional beliefs are continuous. This assumption of continuity runs contrary to the views of phenomenologically-oriented psychopathologists who emphasize the qualitative differences between delusions and non-delusional beliefs. Importantly, phenomenological and cognitive perspectives both agree that delusions can be understood to some extent. However, the two perspectives differ on how exactly one should approach an understanding of delusions. I propose that, at least in the case of delusions in schizophrenia, CBT offers conceptualizations that fail to appreciate the qualitative differences between delusions and non-delusional beliefs. Qualitative changes associated with the delusional experience, changes which have their source in disturbed experiences of self and world, suggest that certain delusions should not be understood as merely exaggerations of non-psychotic psychological processes. I will first discuss the general CBT model for delusions, including its explanatory terms and its commitment to the claim that delusions are best understood as quantitative variations of normal beliefs. I will then survey the major claims of phenomenological investigators writing about delusion and focus on the views of Jaspers specifically, who is often used as a foil by cognitive theorists in discussing how delusions can be understood. I then discuss the limitations in two lines of evidence that are often taken to support the notion of a continuum between delusions and non-delusional beliefs. One line of evidence comes from the measurement of schizophrenic-like symptoms in the non-clinical population. The second line of CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS iii evidence concerns the link that depression and anxiety have with delusions. After identifying the weaknesses in interpreting this evidence as indications of continuity, I offer revisions, related to the role that anomalous experiences play, for the CBT model for delusions in schizophrenia. I also suggest that the current view of CBT regarding delusions may be well-suited for what phenomenologists have called ‘empirical delusions,’ but it may be necessary to develop somewhat different treatments that are better suited to address the ontological delusions found in schizophrenia. CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank the GSAPP community, whose commitment to diversity, science, and scholarship is reflected in its support for a dissertation using underutilized methods for psychological research. I would like to thank an old friend, to whom eccentricity was no stranger, for making me aware of the necessity of what I would later understand to be ontological interpretation. I would like to thank Ralph Hood, who encouraged me to develop an original voice and who fostered in me breadth of thought. I would like to thank Louis Sass for helping me to wield my own voice with clarity, for fostering depth of thought, and for his inspiring vision of what the psychological study of schizophrenia can be. I would like to thank Steven Silverstein for enriching, sharpening, and diversifying my thinking as both a theorist and a clinician, and for the support and engaging discussions related to this dissertation and psychology more generally. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their unwavering support and encouragement. I would like to thank my wife for her care, tolerance, and continuous affirmation. I would like to thank my children, for providing a light like no other. CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………... iv PREFACE………………………………………………………………………….. 1 BODY Chapter I: CBT for schizophrenia……………………………………………..... 7 Prominent models of CBT for schizophrenia……………………….. 7 Delusions in cognitive theory and therapy: Distress-inducing interpretations applied to intersubjective reality.... 12 The cognitive position as reactionary……………………………….. 17 The importance of cognition in defining delusion………………….... 21 Chapter II: Delusions as extreme variations of non-clinical beliefs: Phenomenological and cognitive-behavioral perspectives…. 26 Phenomenology on the qualitative differences between beliefs and delusions………………………………………………… 26 Jaspers: The basis for the un-understandability of delusion and his place within contemporary phenomenological study of schizophrenia……………………………………………………... 30 The assumption of continuity between non-delusional and delusional beliefs in cognitive models………………………...... 38 Emotions, neurosis, and delusions…………………………………... 41 The relevance of prediction in demonstrating a continuum of states………………………………………………………………... 42 CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS vi Modularity/atomization and contextualization……........................... 44 How should affective life be characterized in delusions and schizophrenia?.................................................................................... 47 Schizotypy: interpretations, measurement, continuity, health, and spirituality…………………………………………………………... 50 History of schizotypy and its influence on continuous views of psychosis…………………………..................................................... 51 What do schizotypy scales actually measure?.................................... 53 Phenomenological insensitivity of measures……….. ……………... 57 Conflation of categories: Psychosis, Normalcy, and Spirituality……………………………………………...................... 59 Chapter III: Suggested revisions for cognitive models of delusions: Theory and therapy……………………………………………................ 62 Scope of revisions for cognitive models and CBT for delusions…... 62 Reconsidering the nature and role of anomalous experiences: increasing specificity and deepening cognitive-experiential dynamics……………………………………………………………. 65 The distinction between experience and interpretation…………...... 72 Enhancing sensitivity to delusional states: delusions as beliefs and the wavering of intersubjective attitudes………………………….... 78 CBT for ontological delusions in schizophrenia: A rationale for modifying experience as a therapeutic goal…………………..... 84 Chapter IV: Conclusion………………………………………………………..... 87 CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS vii REFERENCES………………………………………………………………...…… 92 FOOTNOTES………………………………………………………………………. 114 CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS 1 Preface This paper examines the conceptualization and treatment of delusions in schizophrenia. Cognitive-Behavioral theorists and clinicians have developed cognitive models for explaining delusions and therapies for treating them. Both the models and the therapies have been supported through numerous empirical studies (Garety & Freeman, 1999, 2013; Tarrier & Wykes, 2004; Turner, van der Gaag, Karyotaki, & Cuijpers, 2014; Zimmerman, Favrod, Trieu, & Pomini, 2005). Against this record of empirical support exist two lines of criticism, both aimed at Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and schizophrenia more generally, rather than CBT and delusions specifically. One criticism centers on whether CBT for schizophrenia is more effective than non-specific interventions when methodological quality is taken into account (Lynch, Laws, & McKenna, 2010). The second line of criticism addresses the face validity and theoretical suitability of the cognitive account of delusions and other schizophrenia symptoms, raising concerns about its overall plausibility and philosophical merit (Gipps, 2010; Skodlar, Henriksen, Sass, Nelson, & Parnas, 2012). This paper, inspired largely by phenomenological philosophy applied to the study of psychopathology, represents an effort to understand how cognitive and phenomenological conceptualization of delusion can arrive at substantially different claims, even while both approaches attempt to honor the experiences of persons who have delusions. Part of this difference reflects the purposes of the perspectives: Applied to the study of delusion, one seeks to find an adequate model that has explanatory power while the other focuses on accurate description of the phenomenological features of delusions and, when appropriate, provides a hermeneutic reading of their nature. Even so, CBT AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DELUSIONS 2 there remain unaccounted differences between the two perspectives in what is required for understanding a delusion and in even defining what a delusion is. Juxtaposing these two perspectives on delusions is likely to be mutually enlightening for both approaches, given that perspectives utilizing different epistemologies and methodologies can be jointly corrective (Gallagher, 1997). In addition to highlighting
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