DOCSLIB.ORG

Perspectives

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Perspectives PERSPECTIVES By Ruth Lea, Economic Adviser to the Arbuthnot Banking Group Ruth Lea The past four UK Economic Adviser Arbuthnot Banking Group [email protected] recessions compared, and 07800 608 674 no recession expected on Brexit 10th September 2018 Introduction As discussed in recent Perspectives, the economy is holding up remarkably well, given the political uncertainties relating to the Brexit negotiations.1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is increasing speculation that the economy may slip into recession if the there is a highly “disruptive” Brexit in March 2019. Suffice to say at this point, we do not know what form of Brexit will take, though, as indicated on previous occasions, there are grounds for some economic confidence, even if it is a so-called “no deal” hard Brexit.2-3 However, it is not unreasonable to anticipate some Brexit related disruption which could impact on GDP growth – even to the extent that GDP may slip back in one or two quarters. But this would probably be temporary, barely deserving of the word “recession”, with relatively little impact on unemployment. (This assumes no major political turmoil or other unforeseen event on Brexit.) Therefore, a recession in the sense of a prolonged hit on GDP, as in the mid-1970s, early-1980s, early-1990s and the Great Recession, remains unlikely. The first three of these recessions were broadly characterised by high interest rates intended to control inflationary pressures and the Great Recession was triggered by the financial crisis of 2007-08. We do not expect any replication of the former, inflation is moderate and there are no signs the Bank wishes to rapidly escalate interest rates. And we do not expect a replay of the latter, assuming the tighter regulation and closer supervision of the banks in recent years should prevent a repeat of the late 2000s financial cataclysm. It is worth noting there are problems with the term “recession”. The term “recession” is conventionally defined as when an economy experiences two or more consecutive quarterly falls in GDP. But this can be criticised for being, on the one hand, too pedantic or, on the hand, too inexact. Too pedantic because if an economy grows below trend (which is broadly 0.5% a quarter), or even stagnates, this can result in significantly higher unemployment. This state of affairs 1 undoubtedly feels like recession for the many adversely affected, even though GDP does not actually fall on a quarter-to-quarter basis. Too inexact because an economy that experiences two consecutive quarters of modestly falling GDP and then recovers quickly would, obviously, be in better shape than one that experiences sharper falls in output and/or falls in output over a more protracted period. Yet both scenarios could be termed “recessions”. The last four recessions: overview The UK’s recessions of the 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s and the Great Recession, were undoubtedly economically damaging. Taking table 1 and chart 1 together, they show the key GDP data for the recessions of the mid-1970s and the early-1980s, where GDP fell by over 5% from pre- recession peak to trough, and the less severe early-1990s recession. They also show the Great Recession where GDP fell over 6% from pre-recession peak (2008Q1) to trough (2009Q2) and it took over 5 years to attain the level of the pre-recession peak. Table 1 The last four recessions Pre- Trough Pre-recession peak attained GDP fall pre- recession recession peak to peak trough Quarter Quarters from start of recession Mid-1970s 1973Q2 1975Q3 1976Q4 (though 14 (3½ years) 193.5/204.4=fall of recession note 1977Q2 5.3% (Q16) “double dip”) Early-1980s 1979Q2 1981Q1 1983Q1 15 (3¾ years) 214.6/226.7=fall of recession 5.3% Early-1990s 1990Q2 1991Q3 1993Q1 11 (2 ¾ years) 287.1/292.9=fall of recession 2.0% Great 2008Q1 2009Q2 2013Q2 21 (5¼ years) 428.1/456.7=fall of Recession 6.3% Source of data: ONS, “First estimate of UK GDP: 2018Q2”, 10 August 2018, database, GDP data in 2016 prices (£bn). 2 Chart 1 The last four recessions; pre-recession quarterly peak GDP (Q0) =100 104 1979Q2-1983Q2 1973Q2-1977Q4 102 1990Q2-1993Q2 100 98 2008Q1-2013Q3 96 94 92 90 Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 1973Q2-1977Q4 1979Q2-1983Q2 1990Q2-1993Q2 2008Q1-2013Q3 Source of data: ONS, “First estimate of UK GDP: 2018Q2”, 10 August 2018, database, indices calculated by the author. Chart 2 shows the impact on unemployment (annual data). Suffice to say, the unemployment rate rose significantly in all recessions, albeit with the customary lag. It plateaued at 5.6% in 1977-78 (LFS measure), peaked at 11.9% in 1984, peaked at 10.5% in 1993 and reached 8.3% in 2011. The increase in the Great Recession was less-than-expected, given the severity of the recession, which has been attributed to the flexibility of the labour market compared with earlier recessions. Chart 2 UK unemployment rates (%): Labour Force Survey (LFS) and claimant count 14 12 10 LFS 8 6 4 2 Claimant count 0 % rate (LFS) % rate (claimant count) Source: ONS, “UK labour market, August 2018”, 14 August 2018, database. There were definitional changes to the claimant count during the 1980s, which reduced the numbers on the count Associated with the first three recessions was a rapid build-up of inflationary pressures in the economy, as already noted (chart 3). RPI inflation in 1974, the first year of falling output in the 1970s, was 16%. Despite an economy in recession, with rapidly rising unemployment, RPI inflation was over 24% in 1975. Even though the term “stagflation” was much used at the time, it was more 3 a period of recession and inflation. Moving on to the early-1980s recession, RPI inflation of 18% was recorded for 1980, when GDP was already falling quite steeply. RPI inflation was around 9½% in 1990, the second half of which saw the start of the early-1990s recession. The economic disruption caused by high inflation and the costs involved in rectifying entrenched inflationary pressures were substantial in all cases and serve as a timely reminder of the economic costs of losing control of inflation. And after the UK’s withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1992, the Treasury introduced inflation targeting in October 1992. The Government’s commitment to controlling inflation was reinforced when the Bank of England was given responsibility for monetary policy in May 1997. Targeting CPI inflation at 2% was adopted in 2003, when the CPI replaced the RPI as the targeted measure. Since the mid-1990s, inflationary pressures have been kept relatively contained – though CPI inflation did pick up to 4.5% in 2011, reflecting sharply higher oil prices, as the economy was recovering from the worst of the Great Recession. But the pick-up was temporary, not entrenched, and did not lead to any overall increase in long-term inflationary pressures. The Great Recession was not triggered by worrying inflationary pressures. It was, therefore, quite different in origin from its three predecessors. As already noted, the trigger was the financial crisis. Chart 3 CPI and RPI annual inflation (%), 1970-2017 30 25 20 RPI annual inflation 15 10 CPI annual inflation 5 0 -5 Sources: (i) ONS, “UK consumer price inflation: July 2018”, 15 August 2018, database; (ii) www.swanlowpark.co.uk for the RPI. CPI data began in 1989. The mid-1970s recession The 1970s was an economically turbulent decade. Britain was known as the “sick man of Europe” and sought salvation in membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), joining on 1 January 1973. Wildcat strikes, “working to rule” and other manifestations of quasi-anarchic industrial relations were known as the “English disease”. Chancellor Anthony Barber’s tax-cutting 1972 Budget added to macroeconomic instability by triggering the inflationary “Barber Boom” (1972-73) and inflationary wage demands from public sector employees. The pound was “temporarily” floated in June 1972, and has floated since. 4 Britain’s economic problems intensified when the Heath Government sought to control rising inflationary pressures by capping pay rises (in 1972-73). Powerful unions reacted with industrial action, culminating in the NUM’s “work to rule”. Coal stocks dwindled and at the beginning of 1974 the “three-day week” was introduced to conserve electricity. GDP fell over 2½% (QOQ) in 1974Q1. But it was not just powerful unions and problematic industrial relations that troubled the British economy at this time. The 1973 oil crisis, triggered off by OPEC’s oil embargo (starting October 1973) on shipments to Israel’s allies in the Yom Kippur War, led to a quadrupling of oil prices (see chart 4).4 This gave a significant kick on UK prices inflation (chart 3, above) which provided further impetus to higher wage settlements. The “wage-price spiral” intensified through 1974 and 1975, but began easing in 1976 as higher unemployment curbed inflationary pressures. Monetary policy was tightened significantly in 1973-74 despite the onset of recession in 1973H2, in order to curb demand. The official interest rate (then the minimum lending rate) was hiked dramatically in 1973H2 (from 7.5% mid-year to 13% in November), remaining high (around 12%) throughout 1974. The economy picked up in the second half of the 1970s and unemployment fell. But industrial relations deteriorated towards the end of the 1970s when the Government sought to contain inflationary pay awards, culminating in the “winter of discontent” of 1978-79. One consequence of the 1980s retrenchment of organised labour and the trade union reforms of the Thatcher Government is that trade unions are very unlikely to hold the British economy “to ransom” as they did in the 1970s.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Marxist Crisis Theory and the Severity of the Current Economic Crisis
    Marxist Crisis Theory and the Severity of the Current Economic Crisis By David M. Kotz Department of Economics Thompson Hall University of Massachusetts Amherst Amherst, MA 01003, U.S.A. December, 2009 Email Address: [email protected] This paper was presented on a panel on "Heterodox Analyses of the Current Economic Crisis" sponsored by the Union for Radical Political Economics at the Allied Social Science Associations annual convention, Atlanta, January 4, 2010. Research Assistance was provided by Ann Werboff. It is a revised version of a paper "The Final Crisis: What Can Cause a System-Threatening Crisis of Capitalism," Science & Society 74(3), July 2010. Marxist Crisis Theory and the Current Crisis, December, 2009 1 The theory of economic crisis has long occupied an important place in Marxist theory. One reason is the belief that a severe economic crisis can play a key role in the supersession of capitalism and the transition to socialism. Some early Marxist writers sought to develop a breakdown theory of economic crisis, in which an absolute barrier is identified to the reproduction of capitalism.1 However, one need not follow such a mechanistic approach to regard economic crisis as central to the problem of transition to socialism. It seems highly plausible that a severe and long-lasting crisis of accumulation would create conditions that are potentially favorable for a transition, although such a crisis is no guarantee of that outcome.2 Marxist analysts generally agree that capitalism produces two qualitatively different kinds of economic crisis. One is the periodic business cycle recession, which is resolved after a relatively short period by the normal mechanisms of a capitalist economy, although since World War II government monetary and fiscal policy have often been employed to speed the end of the recession.
    [Show full text]
  • Price Spike Of
    United States Department of The "Great" Price Spike of '93: Agriculture Forest Service An Analysis of Lumber and Pacific Northwest Research Station Stum.page Pr=ces =n the Research Paper PNW-RP-476 Pac=f=c Northwest August 1994 Brent L. Sohngen and Richard W. Haynes ....~ ~i!i I 11~.............. pp~L~ ~ S if!i,: ~SS ~$~ ~ ~ S$ $ $_ ss sSSos'S S$ $ S$$ s$$SsSss s ss $ sss~ ~ S sSsS~ Sss S $~ $.~ $ S$ Authors BRENT L. SOHNGEN is a graduate student, Yale University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, New Haven, CT 06510; and RICHARD W. HAYNES is a research forester, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, P.O. Box 3890, Portland, OR 97208-3890. Abstract Sohngen, Brent L.; Haynes, Richard W. 1994. The "great" price spike of '93: an analysis of lumber and stumpage prices in the Pacific Northwest. Res. Pap. PNW-RP-476. Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station. 20 p. Lumber prices for coast Douglas-fir (Psuedotsuga menziesii (Mirb.) Franco var. menziesil) swung rapidly from a low of $306 per thousand board feet (MBF) in September 1992 to a high of $495/MBF in March 1993. This price spike represented a sizable increase in the value of lumber over a short period, but it was not the histor- ical anomaly that many in the media would suggest. Using the theoretical relation between lumber and stumpage prices, we analyzed the interaction between these two markets over the past 82 years. Among our major findings were that there are distinct seasonal variations in monthly lumber and stumpage prices; over the longer term, these markets can be divided into three different periodsm1910 to 1944, 1945 to 1962, and 1963 to 1992; the most recent price spike did not match previous spikes in real terms; and the traditional lumber and stumpage price interaction became more significant with time but it does not seem to be as pronounced when we look at monthly prices.
    [Show full text]
  • Breaking Down the Walls: the West's Challenge Operating in Euro-Asia" (2015)
    University of Central Florida STARS HIM 1990-2015 2015 Breaking Down the Walls: The West's Challenge Operating in Euro- Asia Ekaterina Marchenko University of Central Florida Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015 University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIM 1990-2015 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Marchenko, Ekaterina, "Breaking Down the Walls: The West's Challenge Operating in Euro-Asia" (2015). HIM 1990-2015. 602. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/602 BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS: THE WEST’S CHALLENGES OPERATING IN EURO-ASIA by EKATERINA V. MARCHENKO A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Business Administration in the College of Business Administration and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Summer Term 2015 Thesis Chair: Dr. Dean Cleavenger ABSTRACT Russia today presents potentially lucrative business opportunities and markets for any company interested in expanding internationally. Together with the opportunities and potential profits, however, Russia also presents formidable challenges and risks to any Western or American company considering doing business there. The purposes of this thesis are: to explain how Russia’s unique and tortured history has impacted the business culture of modern Russia; to describe the primary business risks that any Western company entering Russia will face; and to offer recommendations to any Western company considering doing business there.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Decline of Catching up Development an Experience of Russia and Latin America with Implications for Asian ‘Tigers’
    Victor Krasilshchikov The Rise and Decline of Catching up Development An Experience of Russia and Latin America with Implications for Asian ‘Tigers’ ENTELEQUIA REVISTA INTERDISCIPLINAR The Rise and Decline of Catching up Development An Experience of Russia and Latin America with Implications for Asian `Tigers' by Victor Krasilshchikov Second edition, July 2008 ISBN: Pending Biblioteca Nacional de España Reg. No.: Pending Published by Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar (grupo Eumed´net) available at http://www.eumed.net/entelequia/en.lib.php?a=b008 Copyright belongs to its own author, acording to Creative Commons license: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5 made up using OpenOffice.org THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CATCHING UP DEVELOPMENT (The Experience of Russia and Latin America with Implications for the Asian ‘Tigers’) 2nd edition By Victor Krasilshchikov About the Author: Victor Krasilshchikov (Krassilchtchikov) was born in Moscow on November 25, 1952. He graduated from the economic faculty of Moscow State University. He obtained the degrees of Ph.D. (1982) and Dr. of Sciences (2002) in economics. He works at the Centre for Development Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. He is convener of the working group “Transformations in the World System – Comparative Studies in Development” of European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI – www.eadi.org) and author of three books (in Russian) and many articles (in Russian, English, and Spanish). 2008 THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CATCHING UP DEVELOPMENT Entelequia.Revista Interdisciplinar Victor Krasilshchikov / 2 THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CATCHING UP DEVELOPMENT C O N T E N T S Abbreviations 5 Preface and Acknowledgements 7 PART 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Asset and Debt Deflation in the United States: How Far Can Equity Prices Fall?
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Arestis, Philip; Karakitsos, Elias Research Report Asset and debt deflation in the United States: How far can equity prices fall? Public Policy Brief, No. 73 Provided in Cooperation with: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Suggested Citation: Arestis, Philip; Karakitsos, Elias (2003) : Asset and debt deflation in the United States: How far can equity prices fall?, Public Policy Brief, No. 73, ISBN 1931493219, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54323 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu ® The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Public Policy Brief ASSET AND DEBT DEFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES How Far Can Equity Prices Fall? PHILIP ARESTIS AND ELIAS KARAKITSOS INSTITUTE VY No.
    [Show full text]
  • Structural Change for Equality an Integrated Approach to Development
    2012 structural change for equality An Integrated Approach to Development Thirty-fourth San Salvador, session 27 - 31 August of eclac 2012 structural change for equality An Integrated Approach to Development Thirty-fourth San Salvador, session 27 - 31 August of eclac Alicia Bárcena Executive Secretary Antonio Prado Deputy Executive Secretary The preparation of this document was coordinated by Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary of ECLAC, in collaboration with Antonio Prado, Deputy Executive Secretary, Mario Cimoli, Chief of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management, Juan Alberto Fuentes, Chief of the Economic Development Division, Martin Hopenhayn, Chief of the Social Development Division and Daniel Titelman, Chief of the Financing for Development Division. The drafting committee also comprised Wilson Perés and Gabriel Porcile, in collaboration with Martín Abeles, Verónica Amarante, Filipa Correia, Felipe Jiménez, Sandra Manuelito, Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Esteban Pérez-Caldentey and Romain Zivy. The following chiefs of substantive divisions, subregional headquarters and national offices of ECLAC participated in the preparation of the document: Hugo Altomonte, Hugo Beteta, Luis Beccaria, Inés Bustillo, Pascual Gerstenfeld, Dirk Jaspers_Faijer, Juan Pablo Jiménez, Jorge Mattar, Carlos Mussi, Sonia Montaño, Diane Quarless, Juan Carlos Ramírez, Osvaldo Rosales and Joseluis Samaniego. Contributions and comments regarding the various chapters were provided by the following ECLAC staff members: Olga Lucía Acosta, Jean Acquatella,
    [Show full text]
  • Aussie Mine 2016 the Next Act
    Aussie Mine 2016 The next act www.pwc.com.au/aussiemine2016 Foreword Welcome to the 10th edition of Aussie Mine: The next act. We’ve chosen this theme because, despite gruelling market conditions and industry-wide poor performance in 2016, confidence is on the rise. We believe an exciting ‘next act’ is about to begin for our mid-tier miners. Aussie Mine provides industry and financial analysis on the Australian mid-tier mining sector as represented by the Mid-Tier 50 (“MT50”, the 50 largest mining companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange with a market capitalisation of less than $5bn at 30 June 2016). 2 Aussie Mine 2016 Contents Plot summary 04 The three performances of the last 10 years 06 The cast: 2016 MT50 08 Gold steals the show 10 Movers and shakers 12 The next act 16 Deals analysis and outlook 18 Financial analysis 22 a. Income statement b. Cash flow statement c. Balance sheet Where are they now? 32 Key contributors & explanatory notes 36 Contacting PwC 39 Aussie Mine 2016 3 Plot summary The curtain comes up Movers and shakers The mining industry has been in decline over the last While the MT50 overall has shown a steadying level few years and this has continued with another weak of market performance in 2016, the actions and performance in 2016, with the MT50 recording an performances of 11 companies have stood out amongst aggregated net loss after tax of $1bn. the crowd. We put the spotlight on who these movers and shakers are, and how their main critic, their investors, have But as gold continues to develop a strong and dominant rewarded them.
    [Show full text]
  • The UK Recession in Context — What Do Three Centuries of Data Tell Us?
    Research and analysis The UK recession in context 277 The UK recession in context — what do three centuries of data tell us? By Sally Hills and Ryland Thomas of the Bank’s Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division and Nicholas Dimsdale of The Queen’s College, Oxford.(1) The Quarterly Bulletin has a long tradition of using historical data to help analyse the latest developments in the UK economy. To mark the Bulletin’s 50th anniversary, this article places the recent UK recession in a long-run historical context. It draws on the extensive literature on UK economic history and analyses a wide range of macroeconomic and financial data going back to the 18th century. The UK economy has undergone major structural change over this period but such historical comparisons can provide lessons for the current economic situation. Introduction An overview of UK business cycles The UK economy recently suffered its deepest recession since Over the past half century, enormous effort has gone into the 1930s. The recent recession had several defining constructing historical national income data for the characteristics: it took place simultaneously with a global United Kingdom. First, annual GDP estimates were recession; the financial sector was both the source and constructed back to the mid-19th century, based on output, propagator of the crisis; the exchange rate depreciated income and expenditure approaches (Deane and Cole (1962), sharply; and there was a substantial loosening of monetary Deane (1968) and Feinstein (1972)). These were followed by policy alongside a marked increase in the fiscal deficit. But ‘balanced’ estimates of GDP growth that attempted to despite UK output falling by more than 6% between 2008 Q1 reconcile these different approaches from 1870 onwards and 2009 Q3, CPI inflation remains above the Government’s (Solomou and Weale (1991) and Sefton and Weale (1995)).
    [Show full text]
  • The Recent Evolution of the Natural Rate of Unemployment
    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO WORKING PAPER SERIES The Recent Evolution of the Natural Rate of Unemployment Mary Daly Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Bart Hobijn Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Rob Valletta Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco January 2011 Working Paper 2011-05 http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2011/wp11-05bk.pdf The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Recent Evolution of the Natural Rate of Unemployment MARY DALY,* BART HOBIJN, AND ROB VALLETTA Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 101 Market Street San Francisco, CA 94105 January 17, 2011 ABSTRACT The U.S. economy is recovering from the financial crisis and ensuing deep recession, but the unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high. Some have argued that the persistent elevation of unemployment relative to historical norms reflects the fact that the shocks that hit the economy were especially disruptive to labor markets and likely to have long lasting effects. If such structural factors are at work they would result in a higher underlying natural or non- accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, implying that conventional monetary and fiscal policy should not be used in an attempt to return unemployment to its pre-recession levels. We investigate the hypothesis that the natural rate of unemployment has increased since the recession began, and if so, whether the underlying causes are transitory or persistent.
    [Show full text]
  • Framing the Global Economic Downturn Crisis Rhetoric and the Politics of Recessions
    Framing the global economic downturn Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions Framing the global economic downturn Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions Edited by Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall Published by ANU E Press The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at: http://epress.anu.edu.au/global_economy_citation. html National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: Framing the global economic downturn : crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions / editor, Paul ‘t Hart, Karen Tindall. ISBN: 9781921666049 (pbk.) 9781921666056 (pdf) Series: Australia New Zealand School of Government monograph Subjects: Financial crises. Globalization--Economic aspects. Bankruptcy--International cooperation. Crisis management--Political aspects. Political leadership. Decision-making in public administration. Other Authors/Contributors: Hart, Paul ‘t Tindall, Karen. Dewey Number: 352.3 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design by John Butcher Cover images sourced from AAP Printed by University Printing Services, ANU Funding for this monograph series has been provided by the Australia and New Zealand School of Government Research Program. This edition © 2009 ANU E Press John Wanna, Series Editor Professor John Wanna is the Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration at the Research School of Social Sciences at The Australian National University and is the director of research for the Australian and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). He is also a joint appointment with the Department of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith University and a principal researcher with two research centres: the Governance and Public Policy Research Centre and the nationally-funded Key Centre in Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance at Griffith University.
    [Show full text]
  • Economic Crisis, Whether They Have a Pattern?
    The 2nd ICVHE The 2nd International Conference on Vocational Higher Education (ICVHE) 2017 “The Importance on Advancing Vocational Education to Meet Contemporary Labor Demands” Volume 2018 Conference Paper Economic Crisis, Whether They Have a Pattern?—A Historical Review Rahmat Yuliawan Study Program of Secretary and Office Management, Faculty of Vocational Studies Airlangga University Abstract Purpose: The global economic recession appeared several times and became a dark history and tragedy for the world economy; the global economic crisis emerged at least 15 times, from the Panic of 1797, which lasted for recent years, to the depression in 1807, Panics of 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, or the most phenomenal economic crisis known as the prolonged depression. This depression sustained for a 23-year period since 1873 to 1896. The collapse of the Vienna Stock Exchange caused the economic depression that spread throughout the world. It is very important to note that this phenomenon is inversely proportional to the incident in the United States, where at this period, the global industrial production is increasing rapidly. In the United States, for Corresponding Author: example, the production growth is over four times. Not to mention the panic in 1893, Rahmat Yuliawan Recession World War I, the Great Depression of 1929, recession in 1953, the Oil Crisis of Received: 8 June 2018 1973, Recession Beginning in 1980, reviewer in the early 1990s, recession, beginning Accepted: 17 July 2018 in 2000, and most recently, namely the Great Depression in 2008 due to several Published: 8 August 2018 factors, including rising oil prices caused rise in the price of food around the world, Publishing services provided by the credit crisis and the bankruptcy of various investor banks, rising unemployment, Knowledge E causing global inflation.
    [Show full text]
  • F I S C a L I M P a C T R E P O
    Fiscal impact reports (FIRs) are prepared by the Legislative Finance Committee (LFC) for standing finance committees of the NM Legislature. The LFC does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of these reports if they are used for other purposes. Current and previously issued FIRs are available on the NM Legislative Website (www.nmlegis.gov) and may also be obtained from the LFC in Suite 101 of the State Capitol Building North. F I S C A L I M P A C T R E P O R T ORIGINAL DATE 02/07/14 SPONSOR Dodge LAST UPDATED HB 234 SHORT TITLE Exclude NOL Carryover For Up To 20 Years SB ANALYST Graeser REVENUE (dollars in thousands) Estimated Revenue Recurring Fund FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 or Nonrecurring Affected General *** Nonrecurring Fund (Parenthesis ( ) Indicate Revenue Decreases) See “FISCAL ISSUES” below for a discussion of impacts in FY18 and beyond. Duplicates SB 156 and conflicts with SB 106. See discussion below in “FISCAL ISSUES.” SOURCES OF INFORMATION LFC Files Responses Received From Economic Development Department (EDD) Taxation and Revenue Department (TRD) SUMMARY Synopsis of Bill House Bill 234 would extend net operating loss carryovers (NOLs) incurred from net income reported for corporate income tax purposes and personal income tax purposes from the current five-year period to 20-years for taxable years (TYs) beginning after January 1, 2013. For TYs beginning before January 1, 2013, NOLs not recovered after five years would be extinguished. Losses incurred in taxable years beginning after January 1, 2013 would be allowed to be excluded from net income until recovered or twenty years from the taxable year of loss, whichever is earlier.
    [Show full text]