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Visibility & Cyber Security The TMB Guide To Cyber Security Cyber Security In Numbers | Tech Jargon Buster | Essential Cyber Security Tips & Advice | Backup & Disaster Recovery: The Ultimate Insurance Policy | How Cyber Secure Are You? | Visibility & Cyber Security TMB: CYBER SECURITY ESSENTIALS vv Welcome t TMB, we believe CONTENTS cyber security isn’t just about A 3 Welcome technology – it’s also about education. Robust security 4 10 Essential Cyber solutions like antivirus Security Tips applications and firewalls About TMB play an important role in 6 The TMB Cyber Security Technology Means Business is a provider of IT services and keeping businesses safe, Jargon Buster products, with more than 30 years of experience working with of course, but to be truly businesses, charities and other organisations. With offices in effective, they have to be backed by a workforce that 8 Backup & Disaster London, Hampshire, Essex and Kent, we cover a large part of knows what it’s doing. Recovery: The Ultimate the South East, and our clients range from small, family owned That’s why we created this ebook. We want to Insurance Policy businesses to large, multinational corporations. show not just our customers but everyone why it’s so important to be on the ball when it comes to cyber 10 Cyber Security Facts & As well as cyber security solutions, such as firewalls, email security. After all, we’re all in this fight together, Figures filtering and disaster recovery, we also specialise in fully and the more we collaborate to tackle this problem, managed IT support, network infrastructure projects, backups, the closer we get to beating it. We’ll probably never 12 Understanding The disaster recovery, technical consultancy and cloud software. get rid of cyber criminals completely, but we can Long-Term Damage definitely make things harder for them. Caused By Cyber Attacks Richard Shuker, technical director, [email protected] 0333 900 9050 www.tmb.co.uk 14 Why Visibility Is Vital To Technology Means Business Cyber Security CYBER ESSENTIALS TMB London TMB Hampshire TMB Essex TMB Kent 318 Worple Road, A1 Endeavour Business Park, 9-10 King’s Court, The Joiners Shop, London, Penner Road, Newcomen Way, The Historic Dockyard, SW20 8QU Havant, Hampshire Severalls Business Park, Chatham, Kent PO9 1QN Colchester, Essex ME4 4TZ CO 4 9RA 2 3 TMB: CYBER SECURITY ESSENTIALS ESSENTIAL CYBER SECURITY TIPS 10Taking a few simple precautions can make a huge amount of difference... According to the government’s Cyber Security ‘Pa$$w0rd’ or ‘12345678’, and don’t reuse your 6) Identify and fix your 9) Review your cyber security Breaches Survey 2018, more than 40% of passwords in different places. weaknesses measures every year businesses in the UK have experienced a All businesses should be aware of their weak Cyber criminals are always looking for new ways cyber breach, and more than 70% say cyber 3) Keep software and points. That could include many things, including to rip people off, so cyber security cannot be security is a high priority for them. Yet less hardware up to date operating systems that are no longer supported, considered as a one-off, static purchase. At least than a third of them have any kind of formal If possible, use automatic updates to keep your people who aren’t trained to spot phishing once a year, you should assess your current cyber security policies in place. IT solutions up to date. Otherwise, ensure that emails, routers that don’t use the latest security security solutions, to see if they’re still up to Clearly more needs to be done, and to give you regularly check for updates, particularly protocols and systems not configured to deliver the task, and if they’re not, then you need to you a head start, we’ve put together 10 cyber those that include security patches. Cyber the maximum security benefits. Arrange a upgrade. This is also a good time to look at your security commandments that every business criminals will be well aware of any weaknesses, security audit to gain clarity and to plan ahead. security budget, to make sure it’s being spent should follow. There are, of course, many more and they’ll waste no time trying to exploit them. effectively. tips and pointers we could include, but hopefully 7) Be careful when clicking this will at least help you to get started. 4) Report any suspicious links or files in emails 10) Make multiple backups, activity Booby-trapped files and websites are a favourite with at least one kept off site 1) Assume you’re a target It’s not necessary to report every single dodgy way for hackers to install malware or to steal Never put all your backup eggs in one basket: First and foremost, never assume that you won’t email you get, as long as they’re automatically data, and email is the most common way of backups can and do go wrong. In the majority be hit by a cyber attack. If you’re lucky, it will getting sent to your spam folder, but if you see getting people to open them. If you receive an of cases, one backup will be enough if your never happen, but absolutely anyone can be a what you think might be a phishing attempt and email from someone you don’t know and it’s main copy of data is damaged by mechanical target, because many attacks use automated it hasn’t been filtered out, tell your IT people. By urging you to download a file or follow a link, failure or human error, but if you’re unlucky, software, which doesn’t necessarily discriminate. getting the word out, you can make sure no one stop and think about it first. your backup could be lost at the same time. Small businesses may also be more likely to fall in your business falls victim to a scam. The chances of your backups being affected victim to security breaches because criminals 8) Don’t leave your computer increase when malware enters the equation. consider them soft targets. 5) Secure all devices including unattended without locking it Viruses, ransomware and so on can spread over phones first a network and take out all your backups, as well 2) Use strong, unique In the modern workplace, it’s not just This is especially important if you’re using a as your main copies. Keep one of them off-site, passwords workstations and servers you need to be laptop or other mobile device and you’re not though, and you should be safe. g Although other forms of authentication exist, concerned with; many workers also carry in the office, because if criminals gain physical such as fingerprint scanners, passwords remain phones and tablets that are connected to the access to your computer, it’s no problem for the most common way of logging into websites corporate network via WiFi. These need to be them to install malware on it. To lock your This article first appeared on the TMB and systems. Don’t make life easy for criminals secured or limited to a guest network, because system, simply press the Windows key and L. blog. Head to www.tmb.co.uk to read more by using weak or easily guessed passwords like they’re all potential entry points for hackers. You’ll need your password or PIN to log back in. of our posts. 4 5 TMB: CYBER SECURITY ESSENTIALS Adware Spear-phishing A form of unwanted software that automatically Like phishing, but tailored specifically to a person. displays adverts, often at particularly intrusive times. Spoofing Bot To fake certain information. In the case of email spoofing, Short for robot, a bot is an automated program that criminals make it look as if they’re contacting you from an works over the internet. email address different to the one they actually are. Botnet Spyware A network of bots. Just like it sounds, spyware covertly sends information from your computer to a third party. DDoS A distributed denial of service is a type of attack that Trojan involves flooding a computer system with requests Also called a trojan horse, this is a computer for information. This essentially overloads that program that seems to be legitimate, but which computer, causing it to crash. contains hidden code that unleashes malware. Encryption Virus By encrypting data, it becomes unreadable to A type of malicious software that attaches itself to anyone who doesn’t have the code to unlock it. files on your computer and which is able to replicate itself. Exploit An attack that takes advantage of a weakness in a Whaling computer system or piece of software. Like spear-phishing, where a particular person is targeted, but aimed specifically at high-profile Firewall employees such as CEOs or CFOs. A security system or program that prevents unauthorised access to a computer or network. Worm Similar to a virus, but a worm can spread across a Hacker network to other computers, and it doesn’t need Confused by tech talk? Let us TMB Someone who gains unauthorised access to data, another file to act as a host. lend you a hand... networks or computers. Malware Understanding cyber security has never been more Software designed to disrupt, damage or gain important for businesses – but it’s not easy. Experts unauthorised access to computer systems. sometimes use so much technical jargon, it’s like they’re talking a completely different language! Phishing But you don’t have to become a tech whiz to learn The practice of sending fraudulent emails, with the about security essentials. As long as you know a few of intention of gaining personal information.
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