THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Programme

Armed Non-State Actors Project Briefing Paper No. 1

FEBRUARY 2003 : Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) James Brabazon

This briefing paper is compiled from research carried out as the result of two field trips to Liberian territory under the control or influence of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, known as LURD. The first trip was completed in the period 1 June to 1 August 2002, and the second took place throughout October 2002. Additional information has been collected from visits to (henceforth Guinea) in the same period, and subsequent and prior communication with sources in the West African region. The purpose of these trips was to gather professional audio-visual material for international television broadcast. While much of the material is supported by archive videotape and recorded interviews, the nature of the conflict in Liberia and the personnel involved means that a substantial amount of this information is primarily anecdotal, derived from informal conversations and hitherto unrecorded observations. No attempt has been made to incorporate previous research and opinion about LURD in this paper, relying as it does solely on my own personal reflections and observations. BRIEFING PAPER 2 Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

(with whose population they shared ethnic Mandingo Who are LURD? connections) and . The death under suspicious circumstances of former ULIMO-J Brig. Gen. LURD are an irregular military and political Mana Zeki greatly exacerbated this loss of trust in the organization based primarily in northern Liberia, with Abuja Accords a strong presence in Guinea and representatives in The formation of LURD, however, embodied the Sierra Leone. Their stated objective is the removal from important (at least theoretical) development that no political office of the current Liberian president, former warlord from the previous civil war would be Charles Taylor. allowed membership, and that all the sixteen tribes of According to senior LURD military personnel, the Liberia would actively be encouraged to join, thereby movement was born in July 1999 in Freetown after a ending the dominance of the Mandingos and Krahns series of meetings between groups of Liberian exiles in who are widely distrusted by many of the Southern Sierra Leone and Guinea. The name, Liberians United tribes, and especially by the citizens of . for Reconciliation and Democracy, was reportedly Although Alhaji Kromah has been accused by President coined by LURD’s current Senior Military Adviser (SMA), Taylor of involvement with LURD, there is no direct Gen. Joe Wylie, who is now based mainly in the United evidence that this is the case in the field. However, at States. least one close family member of Kromah is currently LURD was formed by Liberian exiles in response to serving as a colonel in the LURD forces. feelings of frustration and perceived exclusion from Currently, LURD have within their organization a the implementation of the ECOMOG-sponsored 1997 preponderance of former ULIMO fighters and Abuja Peace Accords that ended Liberia’s 1989–97 civil representatives of other civil war-derived factions such war, initiated by Charles Taylor’s bid to overthrow the as the Independent Patriotic Front (IPF) and even then president, . Taylor’s own NPFL. There are also a number of former Initially, LURD consisted of mainly disenchanted soldiers from the (AFL), itself Mandingos and Krahns, ethnic groups from the north effectively a separate faction in the initial civil war. A of Liberia that had long been opposed to Taylor and small number – probably around two to three hundred had fought him during the civil war. The dominance of – of Sierra Leonian troops are also fighting for LURD: a these two tribes persists, though not to the exclusion mixed bag of Kamajors and former Civil Defence Force of all others, owing to the fact that LURD’s military (CDF) irregulars can be found alongside a much smaller hierarchy was, and still is, dominated by ex-combatants contingent of former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Charles Taylor’s old adversaries, the United fighters and even the remnants of the infamous West Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy, or Side Boys (these last I discovered resting in the town of ULIMO (itself comprised almost uniquely of Mandingos Gainkpai, , after their withdrawal from and Krahns). The fact that the Mandingo tribe are Lofa Bridge in July 2002). predominantly Muslim and the Krahns are mainly Three years after the organization was founded, a Christian does not in itself influence or affect delicate balancing act continues: many of LURD’s senior operational cohesion. commanders, such as their deputy Chief of Staff Seeya Splitting into two rival factions in 1993, ULIMO and Sheriff, are former ULIMO-K fighters, while their (now Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia retired) Chief of Staff, Prince Seo, was a senior ULIMO-J (NPFL) dominated the fighting that plagued Liberia in commander. Initially, the Chief of Staff’s position was the mid-1990s. LURD’s creation can be seen in essence effectively reserved only for former J faction as a reunification of the two former ULIMO factions, combatants, formalizing the idea of balance and unity ULIMO-K, formerly led by Alhaji Kromah, and ULIMO-J, in the organization with predetermined field previously commanded by Roosevelt Johnson. ULIMO appointments. formally ceased to exist following the 1997 Funding of LURD is mysterious and opaque. Senior disarmament programme resulting from the Abuja LURD political figures claim that the organization is Accords. entirely financed by exiled Liberians, mainly living in Withdrawing en masse from Liberia’s political and the . military structures, ULIMO’s fighters and political cadres claimed harassment, betrayal and assassination at the Political leadership, aims and hands of Charles Taylor’s NPFL forces. Citing evidence objectives of a ‘witch-hunt’ against them, and consequently a breach of the Abuja Peace Accords that were supposed Juggling the plethora of egos and ambitions that to incorporate their faction into the re-formed Liberian constitutes LURD is their National Chairman and military, ULIMO personnel fled to neighbouring Guinea Commander in Chief, Sekou Damate Conneh Junior, a 42-year-old businessman from , Liberia. Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 3

Formerly a civil servant in the Liberian Ministry of ideological polemic or grandiose intentions. Conneh’s Finance, Conneh, an ethnic Mandingo, was elected to political position, and that of LURD in general, is his position by LURD’s National Executive Council (see limited and succinct: Charles Taylor must be removed below) in December 2001. Conneh is based in the LURD from power. This is the linchpin of the rebels’ political military headquarters in , northeastern programme: whether by force or of his own volition, Liberia, and during times of instability or diplomatic Taylor must stand down. activity in the Guinean town of Macenta. Until this happened, Conneh stated repeatedly and His predecessor, Mohammed S K Jumandy, was emphatically, there would be no negotiation or elected chairman in 1999, on the strength of promises compromise with Taylor whatsoever. Although he he made pledging to finance LURD with US$1 million. signalled his willingness to negotiate and cooperate Unable to fulfil this commitment, he was removed with church-based non-governmental organizations from office, and no longer plays any significant role in (NGOs) in Liberia and the wider region, as well as the the organization. United Nations, Liberian opposition parties and even Conneh’s appointment was intended to bring members of the Liberian government, the precondition impartiality, dynamism and international recognition for any ceasefire or direct political engagement with to LURD. His lack of direct involvement in the pre-1997 the president remained unwavering: Taylor must first war was thought to augur impartiality, enabling him to leave office. mediate between the ULIMO factions, while his Military gains by LURD in February 2003 appear to Mandingo ethnicity would ensure the respect of the have modified this position to the extent that contact bulk of LURD personnel. Central to Conneh’s election with Liberian government officials is no longer as National Chairman is the role played by his wife, explicitly contingent on President Taylor’s resignation. Ayesha. In practice, however, LURD’s position remains Ayesha Conneh, formerly married to ’s essentially unchanged: many in the organization’s now deceased brother, became his wife according to leadership are now convinced that a rebel victory is west African traditions of marriage. A Guinean citizen, inevitable, and that as such Taylor’s removal is a formerly a displaced person and one-time market foregone conclusion. trader, she has risen to pre-eminence in Guinea as the LURD initially seemed unwilling to contemplate principal spiritual adviser to Lasana Conte, the meaningful negotiations with either ECOWAS or president of Guinea. It was this direct and influential ECOMOG, which they claim are dominated and unduly access that assured, and assures, her husband of his influenced by Nigeria, a country they suspect of position. Based permanently in Conakry, the capital of illegally supplying weapons to Charles Taylor’s regime. Guinea, Ayesha Conneh is at the nucleus of LURD’s However, as their military position strengthens headquarters there, effectively controlling external throughout February 2003, this unwillingness has given access to the organization. way to inevitable realpolitik. Although negotiations Conflict between LURD’s political representatives in with ECOWAS have been largely conducted through Conakry and their military command in Liberia is a church-based intermediaries, LURD for the most part source of considerable mistrust and instability within have seized upon regional talks as a means of helping the organization. All levels of LURD command to schedule fighting to their advantage, as well as personnel actively involved in frontline duties in Liberia making exploratory contacts with Liberian government either openly or discreetly criticize their compatriots in officials. Their disapprobation of ECOMOG apparently Conakry, correctly suspecting them of financial and remains intact. diplomatic intrigue. Many senior military figures LURD’s attitude to the Liberian national presidential openly advocate a full-scale relocation of all LURD elections planned for 2003 is singular and specific: they personnel to Liberia to end such divisions. will not happen. Not only does Conneh refuse to Conneh’s mandate is both political and military in consider participating in such a ballot, LURD claim that nature. Aligned closely to LURD’s military forces on the President Taylor has already rigged the results nine ground, he takes his position of Commander in Chief months in advance. A ballot stage-managed by Charles exceptionally seriously, often to the dismay of émigré Taylor, they claim, could not represent the true politicians based in Conakry. Whether he is espousing opinions of Liberia’s citizens and should consequently the primacy of one strategy over another, or lamenting be ignored. Given the fact that LURD rebels are the logistical problems that beset entire sections of the currently surrounding Monrovia, and now directly front, a conversation with Sekou Conneh is often more control or influence more territory than at any time in military discourse than political polemic. their history, it would be difficult indeed to see how Politically speaking, Sekou Conneh appears to be elections could proceed as planned by the Liberian neither sophisticated nor overly intellectual. LURD are government. not in any sense characterized by political or In the event of Taylor’s removal from power, LURD 4 Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

seem confused as to his possible future. Although it is espoused by politicians far from the front line. widely (and probably correctly) assumed that he would LURD’s National Chairman, Sekou Conneh, who flee into exile to Burkina Faso, Libya or Taiwan, the speaks openly about himself and fairly representatively prospect of capturing Taylor alive leaves unanswered for LURD in general, claims that he and his questions. Gen. Joe Wylie, LURD’s SMA, claims that organization will only take executive power if the Taylor would be ‘brought to justice’, and handed over Liberian people choose them to do so. Officially, to the international community for trial. Other LURD Conneh himself has no confessed personal political personnel seem to think a local Liberian trial would be ambition, representing himself as a figurehead, not a more appropriate. Sheriff Abraham, Press Secretary to leader. Sekou Conneh, even suggested that Taylor might be Many senior LURD representatives evidently see allowed to re-enter politics in Liberia after a LURD Conneh very much as a transitional leader to take victory, in the spirit of democracy. However, it seems them to victory in Monrovia, and who should then that, if Taylor were captured, his potential fate is best stand down – with a new leader being selected by the described by Lt. Gen. Prince Seo, (former) LURD Chief National Executive. Several LURD personnel have stated of Staff, who announced that he would do to Taylor repeatedly that Conneh does not have the authority to what Taylor had done to his troops. In this case, make major decisions, and that the National Executive Charles Taylor would not be the first Liberian president Council (NEC) – and especially its representatives in the to experience summary execution at the hands of his United States – are the true power behind the throne. captors. Conneh’s position has shifted subtly in this regard. If Taylor is removed, Conneh and LURD claim they Realizing his own limitations as a stand-alone player in will cease fighting and help the international the Liberian political field, and his vulnerability with community to oversee free and fair elections. Exactly respect to his own armed forces should he become how elections would take place is unclear. The official isolated from them, Conneh has sought to strengthen LURD position is that a non-elected interim his military credentials by taking direct control of the government (comprised of LURD, current opposition LURD army, and positioning himself close to those parties and certain members of Charles Taylor’s commanders who are most likely to facilitate victory. It government) would oversee a transitional phase of seems to be very much the case that with the political authority in conjunction with an international widespread respect of the LURD army, Conneh in fact is stabilization force, preferably provided by the United properly in charge of the organization, and can Nations. LURD would continue fighting in the country, disregard certain elements of internal criticism. it is claimed, only to eliminate pockets of resistance, Significantly, however, not one Liberian citizen to especially RUF mercenaries and renegade army units. whom I spoke in the villages of Bong and Lofa After any such resistance was eradicated, LURD would Counties could name Conneh as the National participate fully in a national disarmament Chairman, or had ever heard of him. programme, incorporating the bulk of their forces into a reconstituted Liberian army. Following this interim phase, LURD claim that they Medical facilities, material would seek fully free and fair democratic elections, circumstances, NGOs and human which would result in their underlying aim of achieving rights a government fully representing Liberia’s diverse ‘indigenous’ tribal heritage. This, it is hoped, would emasculate the Kongo people, or the so-called Liberia is disintegrating rapidly. In LURD-held areas Americo-Liberians, a social and political elite that has there are few viable roads, no electricity, no running dominated Liberian politics since the country was first water, and no proper medical facilities. Over 20% of settled by former slaves from the United States in 1822. the population are displaced or live in refugee camps. Senior LURD military commanders, however, often The hospitals and clinics of Zorzor, Voinjama, Bopolu express opinions widely divergent from this scenario. and Fassama have been rendered completely useless, Deputy Chief of Staff Seeya Sheriff maintained that in or destroyed. In Zorzor, civilians with multiple gunshot the event of a LURD victory a ‘military junta’ would be wounds are treated with paracetamol by sympathetic established, and that there would be no elections, though untrained LURD medics. Antibiotics, drips and democratic or otherwise. Although he later went on to specialized medicines for children and the elderly are say that ultimately elections would have to be held, scarce to non-existent. The LURD’s only functioning short-term military strategy and the mantra that school, in Voinjama, has upwards of 300 pupils, many ‘Taylor must go’ are clearly more important in the of whom show signs of malnutrition and associated minds of the men who are likely to effect such a illnesses. victory, rather than the slick political statements Almost no houses at all have escaped either this war Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 5

or the previous one. With the exception of a few through dense and unforgiving forests for over 200km. primitive village dwellings, I saw only perhaps a dozen The porters, exhausted and frightened, were initially buildings that were not either partially or completely paid for their services, in either salt or rice, and destroyed. Owing to the fighting in LURD-controlled volunteered for the task. As civilians became unwilling territory there has been no systematic planting of the to carry more materiél forward, some were pressed staple rice crop in large swathes of Liberia. Many into service that a senior LURD spokesman described to people, such as Tetema Howard, a 48-year-old mother me as ‘’. The threat of a breakdown in civil of ten in the village of Garbi near Fassama, are now relations has reduced the use of enforced porterage. surviving on the remnants of the rice crop from 2000. After the temporary loss of Bopolu in July 2002, many This situation has been compounded by an inability to civilians volunteered to carry ammunition for LURD in a travel freely to areas with more food available, or to (successful) bid to retake the town as reports of market areas, which are often located across front lines systematic human rights abuses by the government or national borders. The shortage of food has now army filtered through to them. reached crisis point in some areas, including Voinjama, Generally, LURD seem to enjoy a high degree of with starvation now possible and in certain areas cooperation and a reasonably strong degree of support probable. Although foodstuffs naturally available in from the civilian population. The much-publicized blind the Liberian forest will prevent famine as such, community in Tubmanburg, for example, were well widespread deprivation is the common denominator treated by LURD, their only casualty resulting from for Liberia’s much put-upon civilian population. indiscriminate government fire. Over 400 civilians All sections of the LURD civil and military command voluntarily followed LURD forces retreating from enthusiastically embrace the idea of international Tubmanburg in July 2002 fearing government reprisals. humanitarian NGOs deploying in their controlled areas, Villagers in Bella Mballona, south of Bopolu, described specifically United Nations agencies and Médecins Sans their readiness to accept LURD soldiers in their village Frontières. Although there is a genuine desire on after government troops entered it in January 2002 LURD’s behalf to ameliorate the condition of the and partially razed it. civilian population under their suzerainty, NGO LURD commanders seem to take human rights deployment would be used to their specific military abuses seriously and act upon their breach. For advantage. A better-fed population with access to example, in July 2002, a young LURD fighter accused of medical supplies would greatly improve LURD’s killing a village elder near Bopolu was arrested and standing in civilian estimations, improving local incarcerated by his commander, and later faced a field support and military conscription. Although LURD tribunal. claims that the security of NGO personnel could be A more disturbing recent development in Voinjama guaranteed by their forces, that is not the case. Even (which, however, does not appear to be widespread) relatively secure areas under LURD control are subject has seen a LURD colonel placed in command of what is, to random and surprise attacks by government forces to all intents and purposes, an execution squad. As of inserted by helicopter or taking advantage of Liberia’s October 2002, one public execution had taken place dense vegetation, which is difficult to patrol. LURD do for certain, though on what grounds was unclear. not seem to appreciate that episodes such as the abduction of five Liberian UNHCR/Merci nurses and their ambulance from Sinje in June 2002 do not create Funding, commercial logging and an environment conducive to greater NGO diamonds involvement. Food shortages account for the greatest amount of Funding of LURD is obscure. The organization claims friction between LURD and the local population in that the majority of its revenue is derived from their controlled areas, as LURD commanders requisition Liberians in exile in the United States; the identities of food for their growing army. Several villagers these donors have not been revealed. complained that what little they had to eat was LURD claim to be opposed to President Taylor’s routinely appropriated by rebel troops. Rebecca Koli, a commercial logging and diamond extraction farmer in the town of Fassama, complained openly programmes, claiming that they are used to finance that she had no food to eat after LURD soldiers had illegal arms transactions. However, LURD claim that occupied the town and commandeered her supplies. they will honour all legally signed contracts with the The worst point of contention between civilians and Liberian government if they take power. They do not LURD is that of porterage. During fighting in Bomi Hills appear to be physically involved in commercial logging, in June and July 2002, for example, every round of and have extensively disrupted or halted government ammunition expended on the front line had to be concerns across their controlled area, specifically in the hand carried by LURD troops and civilian porters southwest. 6 Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

LURD with vital structural investment, and it seems unlikely that they would decline to exploit this whether or not they were installed in Monrovia.

Strategic position and territorial gains

LURD first launched military operations in Liberia in mid-2000 from across the Guinea border. A group of around 70 fighters attacked and finally successfully occupied the northern city of Voinjama, which has remained their headquarters to the present. There have been no major battles over Voinjama since late 2001, with the last minor skirmish there fought in October 2002. The extent of LURD’s territorial acquisitions is in an almost constant state of flux. In December 2002, LURD controlled most of Lofa County and parts of neighbouring districts, in total around 30% of Liberia. LURD forces occupied Liberia from Voinjama and Zorzor and the Guinea border area south to Saint Paul’s Bridge, southwest to the town of Bopolu, and east along the Sierra Leone border to the outskirts of (including the town of Kolahun, recaptured in Lurd Member, 2002 November 2002). Foya, a major strategic objective for LURD, passed in and out of their control for the last LURD do not yet appear to be financing their year. Foya was briefly retaken in November 2002, and organization with illegal diamond sales. Apart from then reoccupied by government troops supported by the apparent sense of moral disapprobation among RUF mercenaries. in December 2002. certain commanders, with the fear that mining will By mid-February 2003, LURD’s military presence had ‘lose them the moral high ground’ vis-à-vis President expanded considerably, with the organization Taylor, LURD forces, importantly, lost control the managing to reoccupy territory lost between May and diamond-rich area of Lofa Bridge in Bomi Hills in July December 2002. LURD military units now appear to be 2002. It has recently been reoccupied by LURD troops, in control of Tubmanburg, Klay Junction, Foya, though in the current climate it seems unlikely that Robertsport and key strategic areas in the immediate any concerted effort will be made to exploit its vicinity of Monrovia. Strategically speaking, LURD’s resources. During LURD’s initial occupation of this area, military position has never been better, although the individual commanders and fighters reportedly sold key issue of logistical supply has only been partially stones on a personal basis, a practice which led to one addressed with the acquisition of motor vehicles in colonel being ambushed by his own troops. Indeed, it recent ambushes and attacks. is this fear that diamond wealth will split the LURD are at a considerable advantage manoeuvring organization with financial jealousy that has so far in northern and southwestern Liberia, especially in prevented any concerted effort to exploit mineral Bomi and Voinjama, as these areas were formerly resources. Significantly, LURD lack the necessary ULIMO operational headquarters. professional equipment to exploit Liberia’s mineral Prior to an assault on Monrovia, LURD military reserves: nearly all heavy industrial excavation objectives were threefold: first, the consolidation of equipment belonging to government and private their hold on Foya and the eradication of its Sierra mining concerns in rebel-controlled areas was Leonian mercenaries fighting on behalf of President destroyed or rendered useless in mid-2002. Taylor; second, the fortification of Tubmanburg and LURD’s eventual systematic exploitation of the southwest Bomi Hills sector; and, third, an assault diamonds, gold and lumber cannot be dismissed, on from the Saint Paul’s Bridge area. Indeed, however. With a stronger command structure to while fighting continues on three fronts, LURD’s prevent internecine fighting and the necessary logistical capabilities remain weakened, and territorial equipment in place, mining and logging would provide gains are hard to consolidate. Without a permanent Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 7

victory in Foya, it is unlikely that LURD would consider other troops to deploy. an outright assault on Monrovia, as President Taylor Although LURD occasionally use child soldiers in a would be able to seriously degrade LURD’s western combat capacity, the tendency to do so is not without front by the insertion of troops by helicopter from internal criticism. In addition, the majority of children Monrovia. However, the reoccupation of Tubmanburg, exposed to warfare by LURD are not soldiers, but and especially Klay Junction, in significant numbers will weapons porters for commanders known as ‘pekins’. now almost certainly result in at least a limited These children act as de facto servants in return for engagement of government forces based in the capital food and security, and are not deployed as fighting irrespective of the government’s continued possession troops. of Gbarnga. The seizure of Robertsport, if it proves to Despite dressing partly in military uniforms and be sustainable, would allow LURD the option of a sea- partly like rap singers, LURD show higher than borne logistical supply route into Monrovia itself. expected degrees of morale, discipline and training. Despite being unpaid and suffering perhaps 1,000 fatalities over the last three years, they display LURD military capability generally high morale, if occasionally boosted by copious amounts of marijuana. The singular cause of ousting Taylor from power is easy to grasp, and highly One of the defining characteristics of the current appealing to former ULIMO fighters who felt they Liberian conflagration is the very limited number of were denied the benefits of the 1997 peace troops actually prosecuting the war. Judging by their agreement. If nothing else, fighting with LURD offers own estimates of battalion strengths, LURD can have prestige, excitement, food, and the possibility of no more than three thousand men under arms. employment in the event of a LURD victory. Recruiting (Interestingly, the number of ex-ULIMO fighters who heavily in refugee camps in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, fled to Guinea and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s is LURD rely extensively upon the regional Liberian estimated at around 2,800.) Crucially, the same diaspora to swell their ranks. It seems that the current limitation also seems to be true of the Liberian instability in Côte d’Ivoire prompted LURD to consider government army. Radio intercepts and captured opening an additional front, a possibility that was classified documents clearly show that at the zenith of apparently rejected owing to uncertainty surrounding the struggle over Tubmanburg in July 2002, no more the sympathies of local civilians. than five hundred government troops were or could be Discipline in the LURD army is heavily dependent deployed in the field; at one point the government’s upon the quality and moral calibre of any given total strength in the Bomi sector, staggeringly, commander in charge, and supplemented by those numbered only 34 men, with a desertion rate of over fighters who have had regular training in the AFL, 10%. Government troops only managed to retake including some instruction by American military Bomi after RUF mercenaries and government troops personnel. Troops under the command of Brig. Gen. from Gen. Roland Duo’s Navy Division were flown in by Sekou Kamarra (AKA ‘Dragon Master’) and also the helicopter as reinforcements from Foya. Had LURD not late Brig. Gen. Musa Donso (AKA ‘Deku’) in June and accidentally destroyed over 40,000 rounds of their own July 2002 showed a remarkable degree of military ammunition in a vehicle fire, it is unlikely that they discipline, including regular salutes, the honorific would have been dislodged at all. reference to rank, and a willingness to carry out life- Incredible though this may seem, these figures make threatening orders without question. Field discipline is surprising sense when viewed in the context of enforced by a rigorous system of corporal punishment, Liberia’s faction-riven society: according to numerous and the very real threat of execution for mutiny. independent testimonies by former government troops Around 90% of the LURD command structure is former and prisoners of war, the Armed Forces of Liberia have ULIMO, and by their own estimates at least 60% of been largely disarmed and have remained unpaid and their fighters are also from a ULIMO background; unused for over two years. Even Taylor’s infamous Anti- commanders and troops often share common histories Terrorist Unit (ATU), commanded by his son ‘Chucky’ and operational experience. Taylor, reportedly worked without pay for a six-month In areas where senior commanders are not present, period up to August 2002. On both sides the such as in Salayie in late July 2002, discipline proliferation of child soldiers and the forcible disintegrates rapidly and almost completely. Firing recruitment of civilians indicates many things, though becomes random and indiscriminate, the civilian primarily a lack of men and women particularly eager population is harassed, and territory is quickly lost as to die for either side. The RUF fighters that Taylor pays government troops capitalize on their opponents’ to defend Foya close to the Sierra Leone border are disorganization. employed for the simple reason that there are no Training is administered chiefly in Voinjama, with 8 Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

smaller towns conducting more limited programmes. Former AFL personnel are charged with training which covers basic rifle maintenance and weapons operation, ambush tactics and attempts to instil a sense of identity with songs, physical training and drilling. While this only barely prepares recruits for the front line, LURD fighters seem an able match for their Liberian government counterparts, in many cases outclassing them in the field. While LURD do not bear any comparison with a trained African army, their apparent respect for (and dependency on) the civilian population, combined with a Lurd Members, 2002 strong esprit de corps and a from Sierra Leonian RUF prisoners of war captured degree of basic military training, certainly elevates near Foya indicate that the Liberian army’s Chief of them above the level of other regional insurgents, Staff, Benjamin Yetin, has personally paid RUF specifically the RUF. mercenaries in the town, who number several hundred. Estimates of the total number of RUF mercenaries in the region, who by their own account Mercenaries and prisoners of war travel freely between Liberia and Sierra Leone, vary wildly, though they too possibly number several hundred. LURD contains a small contingent of former CDF troops When asked about the nature of their future and Kamajors from Sierra Leone, numbering perhaps intentions, senior RUF commanders have claimed to be 300, along with a smaller number of ex-RUF fighters planning fresh attacks inside Sierra Leone in order to and around 20 former members of the West Side Boys. further destabilize the border area. LURD have These troops are apparently unpaid, and most have repeatedly and plausibly claimed that their forces were some form of Liberian parentage or family connection attacked near Kolahun by armed RUF units crossing the linking them to the conflict. These troops are Sierra Leone border in mid-2002. integrated into LURD command structures and do not The Liberian army is known to rely on South African operate separately from them. Sierra Leonian troops and Libyan military advisers, as well as employing two fighting with LURD are in general more ruthless than Ukrainian helicopter crews, and apparently retains two their Liberian counterparts, occasionally torturing platoons of Burkinabe troops employed as President prisoners of war and even at times practising ritual Taylor’s personal security detail. cannibalism. It seems to be the case that LURD do not currently employ other paid foreign mercenaries, or military advisers, and do not have the financial Military hardware and United capability or desire to do so. Nations sanctions Captured government soldiers who show remorse and compliance are frequently debriefed and incorporated into the LURD army after a period of LURD forces do not seem to have a shortage of retraining and political reorientation. Even experienced weapons or ammunition, although their lines of RUF mercenaries captured near Foya have been logistical supply are at times fatally stretched. LURD integrated into LURD ranks. Other prisoners, who are defeats at Kolahun and in Bomi were almost uniquely captured unwillingly in battle or who are not trusted due to failures of immediate supply, not to a lack of by the LURD or are burdensome to them, are executed. material or inferior fighting capacity per se. Interviews in the field indicate that the Liberian LURD fighters are equipped with AKM assault rifles, government seems to rely extensively on the forced RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers (firing recruitment of civil militias (including children and mainly anti-armour grenades, with a limited supply of university students) and paid mercenaries. Testimonies anti-personnel rounds), PKM light machine guns, and a Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 9

random and limited assortment of self-loading pistols. Weapons definitely captured by LURD from In addition, LURD have a very small number of RPK and government forces also include over 100 probably RPD machine guns and up to 10 mounted Chinese Yugoslav-made AKM assault rifles. These weapons are M60-type 7.62mm medium machine guns. New recruits consistently stamped with the dates 2000, 2001 and are often initially issued with ageing Czech-made SKS 2002, and provide evidence of the Liberian rifles. government’s contravention of the United Nations Perhaps a dozen LURD fighters use captured arms embargo currently enforced against them. government FN FAL rifles. A lack of 7.62mm x 51mm ammunition makes them undesirable issues. Although the PKM is widely prevalent and greatly favoured, PKM Tactics and warfare 7.62mm x 54mm ammunition is scarcer than the seemingly inexhaustible supply of 7.62mm x 39mm AK Maintaining communications with HF radios and ammunition. Motorola field radios, which are often used to LURD possess approximately eight DSHK 12.7mm communicate with government forces, LURD fighters calibre heavy machine guns and at least two BZT enjoy a high degree of mobility and inter-unit 14.5mm anti-aircraft artillery pieces, with which they communication in theatre. Contrary to certain media successfully destroyed a government helicopter outside reports, LURD are not comprised of isolated groups of Voinjama in 2001. loosely affiliated rebels, but are a coherent and LURD forces also possess at least nine SAM-7 surface- integrated mobile irregular army. to-air missiles, which they claim were captured from Warfare takes four primary forms, namely attacking Liberian-backed dissidents invading Guinea in 2000. predetermined defended positions, defending urban or One missile has been fired to no effect in the field. semi-urban possessions, ambushing government LURD have at least two operators trained in the use of convoys and troops, and repelling ambushes set by these missiles by the AFL. Though posing a threat to government troops. the Liberian government’s air operations, these Contacts are always initiated with RPG-7 grenades, weapons do not yet appear to be a significant risk to fired with limited collateral effect but inflicting civil aviation. substantial psychological damage, and followed by With respect to artillery, LURD are currently PKM and then AKM fire. Neither government forces operating two British-made 81mm mortars, with a nor LURD fighters will initiate major contacts without a significant supply of bombs. Grenades and propellant substantial number of RPG grenades. Major fire-fights for RPG-7s are available by the thousand. LURD also directed against defended positions usually last for a possess two or three RPO-type, probably Ukrainian- maximum of four hours before one side either made grenade launchers, firing grenades by succeeds or has to withdraw to replenish ammunition. thermobaric means, which were captured from Aimed shots are rare to non-existent in all contact government troops in July 2002. situations, with casualties consequently very low. Major On the basis of personal observation, LURD do not battles fought at close quarters will typically yield no appear to use any form of mines, set booby-traps, or more than a dozen casualties in total. Despite the engage in any form of suicide attacks, human bombing enmity felt between the opposing sides, there is a keen or urban terrorism. They have a limited number of all- appreciation that it is undesirable for Liberians to be terrain vehicles inside Liberia, most of which have been killing each other under such circumstances. Sierra captured from government troops and converted to Leonian mercenaries are not treated with the same carry 12.7mm heavy machine guns. Gasoline and diesel sympathy. are in short supply, and are also used to feed generators that help maintain radio communications. LURD claim to use only weapons and ammunition captured from government forces. While a large LURD military command structure number of the organization’s weapons are procured this way, there are large weapons caches near the LURD’s military structure operates along protocols Guinea border containing several hundred newly established in the AFL, which in turn are loosely based packaged Chinese-made type 56 AKM assault rifles, on the US military model. There is a coherent system of hundreds of pallets of various 7.62mm calibre ranks and titles, which are respected by the majority of ammunition stamped 2001 and 2002, and possibly fighters. Promotion and the award of rank are based thousands of RPG shells. Although the provenance of upon longevity of service, ability in the field, and more these weapons is unclear, it seems unlikely that they especially previous military experience or affiliation. were obtained from Liberian government stores, which Former AFL and ULIMO fighters entered LURD with are equipped with different supplies and material. their existing ranks, and were quickly promoted to 10 Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

senior ranks such as colonel and general to cement the Initially, LURD battalions were known by colloquial former ULIMO’s hegemony in the organization. While names appertaining to geographical location. The there is an abundance of very young generals and following classifications are still represented by ad hoc colonels, as well as private soldiers, there is a marked uniforms, but are now largely redundant. lack of a strong non-commissioned officer corps, which affects operational effectiveness. Bopolu Cobra Movement Gbarnga Voltage Movement Foya University of Bullet

Commander in Chief Sekou Damate Conneh In September 2002, Inspector General Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Prince Seo Musa Donso, AKA ‘Deku’ (former UMLIMO-K Deputy (Retired) Chief of Staff), was reportedly killed by government Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. A. Seeya Sheriff, troops near Kolahun, near the Liberian border with AKA ‘Cobra’ Sierra Leone. Director of Staff Brig. Gen. Fexon Jackity LURD’s Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Prince Seo, has been (Acting CoS as of 10.02) retired, and is no longer active in frontline duties. His Inspector General Vacant wife, Masa Seo, accompanied him into retirement. His Defence Operations Chief Musa Kamarra, acting replacement, Brig. Gen. Fexon Jackity, was the AKA ‘Black Marine’ rising star of LURD’s command structure. Formerly G3 Training Commander Lt. Col. Prince Wylie Inspector General of ULIMO-K, Jackity has been Women’s Artillery Command Masa Seo (Retd) responsible for the recapture of Kolahun and the Deputy Women’s Artillery Mawata Tranaray, subsequent assault on Foya. Articulate and politically Command AKA ‘Black Diamond’ aware, Jackity, based in Voinjama, seemed cautious Senior Military Adviser Brig. Gen. Joe Wylie and well respected by his troops, over whom he Executive Mansion Security Force Brig. Gen. Sekou Kamarra, exerted considerable personal influence. In the period Unit (EMSFU) Commander AKA ‘Dragon Master’ October to December 2002, he and Sekou Conneh, the Military Adviser to National Brig. Gen. Abbas Kenneh National Chairman, were the driving force behind Chair LURD’s military campaign. By mid-February 2003, Provost Marshal Col. Lussene Musseneh however, Jackity’s whereabouts had become unclear, with plausible information suggesting that former 2nd 2nd Brig. Field Commander Col. Ofere Diah Brig. Field Commander Col. Ofere Diah had temporarily 2nd Brig. Battle Front Commander Lt. Col. Mohammed taken over as Acting Chief of Staff. Dukely, AKA ‘Nasty Duke’ Former LURD Chief of Staff Charles Dent was killed on 2 November 2001. Suggestions that he was assassinated by his own troops appear unfounded. The LURD army, in the period May–August 2002, was Over the period July 2002 to November 2002 several comprised of two brigades, the 1st Brigade and the significant changes in the command structure were 2nd Brigade. under way, a process that is still in progress. The The 1st Brigade is divided into two battalions, each following is a reasonably accurate though necessarily of which contains three to four companies, each dated characterization of LURD’s military hierarchy comprising around 50 men. battalion structure. The 2nd Brigade follows the same structure, though it is considerably larger, and is divided into eight battalions. National Chairman Sekou Damate Conneh Two battalions of Special Forces, each containing Deputy National Chairman Ayesha Conneh two companies of around 50 men, exist outside this Secretary General Joe Gbalah structure: the Executive Mansions Security Force Unit Special Assistant to Sec. Gen . Jaguar Sheriff and the Strike Force Commandos. Deputy Chair, Cttee for Security Morris Dolley In June 2002, the official number of LURD Deputy Sec. Gen. for Civil Admin Alhaji Sekou Fofanah combatants given by the organization was 14,000. By October 2002, this had fallen to 5,000. Taking into US Rep. of National Chairman Mohamed Kamara consideration battalion reorganizations subsequent to National Spokesman Hanson Williams the above structure, new recruits and combat Military Spokesman Charles Bennie casualties, it seems reasonable to assume that LURD’s Press Secretary to the National Sheriff Abraham total number of men under arms numbers around Chair 2,500 to 3,000, with an additional 500 or so unarmed Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 11

logistical assistants. During the intense fighting that erupted in and around Tubmanburg in July 2002, government troops LURD civilian political structures seemed temporarily unable to halt the LURD advance, and withdrew substantial numbers of troops from frontline positions back to the capital. It should be Although avowedly a military organization, LURD also clearly borne in mind that LURD were not has a parallel political structure to administer its straightforwardly defeated in Bomi during this period. controlled areas and to represent itself diplomatically. Only environmental logistical problems and the Although some of these political cadres, such as former accidental destruction of a major ammunition re-supply ULIMO-J member and current LURD Secretary General facilitated a government victory. Credible sources in Joe Gbalah, are also militarily active, many do not Monrovia state that during this period President Taylor engage in fighting. believed a LURD victory was close at hand, and The following is a selection of LURD’s more prepared for his own emergency evacuation. If the influential political cadres. fighting continues for the following weeks or months LURD’s general membership elects the National as it has done over the last year, a LURD victory is Executive Council. The NEC is the organization’s highly possible. Indeed, as more government troops governing body, and includes all LURD’s senior political desert in desperation, and more civilians are subject to appointees. It is composed of two members human rights abuses by President Taylor’s army, a LURD representing each county in Liberia, though many of victory becomes increasingly likely. these representatives are in exile, either in the region If the United Nations arms embargo is policed to the or in the United States. The NEC in turn elects the extent that the Liberian armed forces are denied a National Chairman. redevelopment of their military air capacity, an There are reportedly seven committees comprising outright victory for government forces appears 35 members to look after diverse matters including virtually impossible. Lacking sophisticated military defence, national security, foreign affairs, finance and equipment and a disciplined, motivated army with investment, public relations and propaganda, logistics which to fight, the government of Liberia could at best and health, social welfare and civil administration. hope to prolong the conflict. So significant to both Opaque and difficult to appraise, LURD’s political sides is the issue of conducting and repelling successful infrastructure operates entirely secretively and without air operations that any development of either party’s the open scrutiny of the military. With the possible offensive air capability or defence would vastly change exception of the NEC, the political framework is the character and outcome of the conflict. entirely subordinate to senior military command. This However, the successful deployment of trained fact has been compounded since the election of Sekou foreign troops with limited air support and the full Conneh as National Chairman. The exact role of his cooperation of the Liberian government would in all wife, Ayesha Conneh, within the political structure of probability effectively end this current phase of the organization is unclear. Liberia’s armed conflict within several weeks. Both financially and politically, however, the prospect of this happening seems remote in the extreme. Conclusions: resolution, Importantly, any form of government military disarmament and factionalism victory, howsoever secured, would only temporarily end the LURD insurgency. Despite the limited political Whether or not LURD will achieve their military and scope of their ambitions, LURD are commanded by political objectives is a matter of conjecture at present. committed and experienced fighters for whom there While LURD forces still have to carry the vast majority are few remaining options but to continue fighting. of their ammunition by hand from secure bases near In the event of an outright LURD victory, their the Guinea border deep into the Liberian interior, it fighters are likely to accept a total disarmament seems unlikely that a prolonged assault on Monrovia is programme, based on the successful integration of credible in the immediate future. However, substantial their core military personnel into a reformed and amelioration of LURD’s logistical capabilities, such as an tribally inclusive Liberian national army. In the event of increase in available vehicles and a greater level of a partial victory, which might theoretically see accessibility to Liberia’s limited road network in areas remaining pockets of resistance from loyalist troops or controlled by LURD, has created conditions conducive RUF mercenaries continuing to harass LURD fighters, to a reoccupation of the territories they lost in July disarmament seems implausible and unworkable. 2002, which in turn has directly and convincingly Politically speaking, LURD remain wedded to a single threatened the security of Monrovia itself. idea, the removal of President Taylor, and it is unclear how their programme would evolve if that came 12 Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

about. There is a distinct possibility that a LURD Without concerted international military occupation of Monrovia without the prospect of participation in the implementation and development immediate international assistance would turn their of post-conflict stability in Liberia, a lasting peace military attentions inwards, reopening historical agreement cemented by fully inclusive elections will be rivalries that are currently only barely suppressed in the impossible to achieve. It is ironic in the extreme that fight against Taylor. The re-emergence of the former deployed in neighbouring Sierra Leone are sufficient ULIMO factions as independent armed groups and the numbers of professional military personnel to end the consequent expansion of the civil war is more than a Liberian conflagration almost literally overnight. But theoretical possibility. This potential infighting could such is the nature of diplomacy and the collective be compounded by disputes over the control of failure of the international community’s imagination. Liberia’s considerable natural resources.

James Brabazon is executive producer of the Nairobi-based television agency Camerapix.

The Africa Programme at Chatham House was launched in July 2002, kindly supported by the FCO, DFID, Shell International, BAE Systems, Lonmin and South African Breweries. The programme is made up of a number of thematic projects, including the Armed Non-State Actors Project. Projects on the Gulf of Guinea, Elections in Africa, and Foreign Policy and Africa are also under way. In addition to commissioning or conducting its own research the Africa Programme holds meetings and seminars. Topics covered to date include conflict diamonds and the Kimberley process, the political economy of São Tomé and Principe, and Kenya's Minister of Foreign Affairs talking about the challenges his country faces following the historic change of government in December 2002.

If you are interested in forthcoming events or research by the Africa Programme contact: [email protected]

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author.

© Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any other means without the prior permission of the copyright holder.

Photographs © James Brabazon 2002

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF Chatham House 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE Charity Registration Tel 020 7957 5700 E-mail [email protected] Number: 208223 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Fax 020 7957 5710 Website www.riia.org