Liberian Studies Journal

VOLUME XXV 2000 Number 1

LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL

Published by THE LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION, INC.

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The Liberian Studies Journal is dedicated to the publication of original research on social, political, economic, scientific, and other issues about Liberia or with implications for Liberia. Opinions of contributors to the Journal do not necessarily reflect the policy of the organizations they represent or the Liberian Studies Association, publishers of the Journal. Manuscript Requirements

Manuscripts intended for consideration should not exceed 25 typewritten, double-spaced pages, with margins of one-and-a-half inches. The page limit includes graphs, references, tables and appendices. Authors must, in addition to their manuscripts, submit a computer disk of their work, preferably in WordPerfect 6.1 for Windows. Notes and references should be placed at the end of the text with headings, e.g., Notes; References. Notes, if any, should precede the references. The Journal is published in June and December. Deadline for the first issue is February, and for the second, August.

Manuscripts should include a title page that provides the title ofthe text, author's name, address, phone number, and affiliation. All works will be reviewed by anonymous referees.

Manuscripts are accepted in English and French.

Manuscripts must conform to the editorial style of either the Chicago Manual of Style (the preferred style), or the American Psychological Association (APA) or Modern Language Association (MLA).

All manuscripts intended for consideration should be mailed to:

Amos J. Beyan, Editor; Liberian Studies Journal; Department of History; West Virginia University; 221E Woodburn Hall; Morgantown, West Virginia 26506-6306.

All items relevant to Book Reviews should be mailed to:

Yar D. G. Bratcher, Book Review Editor; Liberian Studies Journal; Emory University; 859 Petite Lane; Lithonia, Georgia 30058

Cover map: Compiled by William Kory, cartography work by Jodi Molnar; Geography Department, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown.

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LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL Editor, Amos J. Beyan West Virginia University

Associate Editor, Konia T. Kollehlon Book Review Editor, Yar D. G. Bratcher Trinity College, Washington, D.C. Emory University

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD C. William Allen-University of South D. Elwood Dunn-The University Carolina-Spartanburg of the South Bertha B. Azango-University of Liberia M. Alpha Bah-College of Charleston Warren d'Azevedo-University of Nevada Momo K. Rogers-Kpazolu Media Christopher Clapham-Lancaster Enterprises University Yekutiel Gershoni-Tel Aviv University Thomas Hayden-Society of African Lawrence B. Breitborde-Knox College Missions Romeo E. Philips-Kalamazoo College Svend E. Holsoe-University of Delaware Henrique F. Tokpa-Cuttington University Coroann Okorodudu-Rowan College College of N.J.

LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS Joseph Holloway-President Timothy A. Rainey California State University-Northridge Johns Hopkins University Cyril Broderick-Vice President Emmanuel Dolo Delaware State University University of Minnesota Dianne Oyler-Secretary-Treasurer Ciyata Coleman Fayetteville State University Clark Atlanta University Arnold Odio-Parliamentarian Albany State College FORMER EDITORS D. Elwood Dunn Svend E. Holsoe Edward J. Biggane C. William Allen Jo Sullivan Edited at the Department of History, West Virginia University. The editors and Advisory Board gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Eberly College of Arts and Sciences and the Department of History at West Virginia University in the production of the Journal.

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The Tenth County: From Myth to Reality in the Go la Concept of Historic Destiny By Warren L. d'Azevedo. 1 U.S.-Liberian Relations: Challenges in the Twenty-First Century By Tim Dweh Siklo 16 Address to the Liberian Studies Association, March 30, 2000 By Reverend Father E. Bolling Robertson 36 Book Reviews Ayittey, George B. N., Africa in Chaos By D. Elwood Dunn 41 Brown-Sherman, Mary Antoinette, Barclay Women in Liberia- Two Generations: A Biographical Dictionary By C. William Allen 44 Carey, Robert and John Furbay, Freedom Ships By Chandra Dunn. 48 Minutes of the Liberian Studies Association Business Meeting on Saturday, April 1, 2000 Prepared by Dr. Cyril E. Broderick 53 New Publications on or Relevant to Liberia 57 Documents 58

A refereed journal that emphasizes the social sciences, humanities, and the natural sciences, the Liberian Studies Journal is a semiannual publication devoted to studies of Africa's oldest republic. The annual subscription rate is US$40.00, US$15.00 for students, and US$50.00 for institutions, and includes membership in the Liberian Studies Association, Inc. All manuscripts and related matters should be addressed to Dr. Amos J. Beyan, Editor; Liberian Studies Journal; Department of History; West Virginia University; 221E Woodburn Hall; Morgantown, West Virginia 26506- 6306. Subscriptions and other business matters should be directed to Dr. Dianne Oyler, Secretary-Treasurer; Liberian Studies Association, Inc.; Fayetteville State University; P.O. Box 14613; Fayetteville, North Carolina 28301-4297.

Warren L. d'Azevedo*

This study was presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies '..ssociation, October 24, 1984 in Los Angeles. The circumstances as described for e mid-1980s prevailed until 1989 when the unprecedented devastation of the seven -year civil war was instigated and protracted by the marauding bands of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia sweeping down from the eastern interior and eventually overthrowing the regime of Samuel K. Doe. During the interim peace established by ECOMOG, Taylor was put forward by his well armed and relentless party as a major candidate for the presidency. When I returned to Liberia as an election observer in 1997, much of the western coastal region I had known, including the new Bomi County, lay in ruins where thousands of countrymen had been killed or had escaped to foreign lands as refugees while child soldiers looted and ravaged the farms and villages at will. The scattered remnants of Go la families I met in Monrovia had submitted to the bitter irony of casting their votes for Charles Taylor on the meagre hope that, given the power he sought, peace would be maintained and the civil war would not erupt again. A most dismal ordeal was to hear their children, among the many others in the streets, marching like ragged little soldiers, chanting the daring ditty:

He killed my ma, he killed my pa But we will vote for him, eh yah!

Perhaps the deepest sense of lost cause and subjugation came when the victorious candidate proclaimed his title as President Dakpanah Dr. Charles Ghankay Taylor of Liberia. "Dakpanah" is the sacred title of the messenger between Poro and Sande appointed by the Council of Most Sacred Zonya of the Go la. How Taylor managed to acquire it in these disrupted times is a subject of furtive speculation

*Dr. d'Azevedo is a distinguished American Liberianist. He has published significantly, especially on the Go la ethnic group of Liberia. Dr. d'Azevedo is a Professor Emeritus of Anthropology at the University of Nevada, Reno.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXV , 1 (2000)

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among a dispossessed and uprooted people. The "Dr." is his claim to academic achievement from an American university, and the middle-name "Ghankay" is his opportune assertion of an assumed tribal link through a Go la mother! Curiously enough, this seems to be the same strategy employed by his assassinated mortal enemy Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, his predecessor and the assassinator of President William R. Tolbert, Jr. in the coup of 1980. As leader of the despised Krahn-dominated militia, and appointed head of state by the People's redemption Council, he claimed to have been declared head of Poro with the title "Tanu"-or, allegedly, "owner and defender of the town." (cf. Sawyer 1987, pp. 13-14.) The study is based on extensive interviews, direct observation, Liberian government pamphlets and newspaper reports. For additional background information concerning the period and issues under discussion, consult the selected bibliography. In 1983, twenty years after the creation of the new county system throughout the former hinterland of Liberia, a tenth county named Bomi was proclaimed by the Commander and Chief and Head of State Samuel K. Doe, leader of the military coup of 1980 and a determined aspirant to the civilian presidency under the provisions of the new Liberian constitution. This move was cautiously welcomed by the leaders of the predominantly Gola chiefdoms in the northwestern interior of the country for whom the establishment of a county encompassing all of the territories controlled by the Gola in the nineteenth century had been a long- standing preoccupation. Their hopes had been dashed by the death of President Tubman in 1971 a few weeks before his anticipated announcement of the new administrative unit. His successor William R. Tolbert aroused their ire by first supporting the plan and then opposing it in 1978 as potentially a danger to national unity. Following Tolbert's assassination and the emergence of the People's Redemption Council, dominated by members of Krahn ethnic groups considered to be hostile to the cultures north of the St. Paul River, the prospects for the new county seemed more remote than ever. But events soon revived the Gola sense of a manifest destiny by which the ostensible eminence of their culture and political power would be reasserted within the context of the Liberian nation. From the 1820s-when the first black American colonists established a precarious holding on the coast of West Africa-the aggressive Gola chiefdoms constituted the most recalcitrant barrier to the full extension of colonial and, later, Liberian national jurisdiction in the western interior. Through territorial expansion by means of population infiltration, temporary intertribal confederacies, and a strong

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sense of cultural distinctiveness, they succeeded in imposing hegemonic influence over much of the western interior. In consequence, they were in direct and almost continual competition with the colonists on the coast as well as with other neighboring peoples such as the Vai, the Dei, and the Mandingo who sought also an advantageous position with regard to trade between the coast and the hinterland. This situation altered drastically in the early twentieth century when the settler-supported Liberian government developed sufficient military and economic power to subdue the last pockets of strenuous resistance among the indigenous peoples of the interior. The settler government instituted a system of indirect rule linking tribal authorities to an apparatus of hinterland administration. It was not until the Tubman administration of the 1950s and 1960s that this system was transformed by the program of "national unification" which further weakened traditional political structure through direct government intervention or controlled "elections," through the use of patronage to gain the compliance of leaders, and through reorganization of the hinterland tribal territories into "districts" and "counties" whose boundaries often ignored existing ethnic alignments. During this period, the ruling class, consisting of a small population of the descendants of early colonists and their government, contrived to consolidate not only their holdings along the narrow strip of the coast but to extend firm jurisdiction over lands claimed by hundreds of formerly autonomous chiefdoms whose peoples spoke eighteen or more indigenous languages. Many of these groups, like the Gola, had formed strong intra- and intertribal confederacies to resist Liberian expansion and to maintain political and economic control over strategically important sections of the interior. But these entities were not sufficiently cohesive or enduring to withstand the steady pressure of government military and diplomatic actions. Over the years, the successful government campaigns in the interior, the subversion of tribal authority, and the system of patronage by which important families and individuals were diverted from local loyalties by gifts and "pensions," enabled the new nation to validate an image of national authority whose symbols and stated goals elicited a political allegiance transcending that of local cultures. Thus Liberia presented a situation in which few indigenous enclaves sought either autonomy or advancement of interests outside of the national framework after the period of vigorous native resistance in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nor did the polyethnic situation in Liberia involve any major movements that could be considered instruments of "Balkanization" in which traditional ethnic groupings of the interior were potentially

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aligned into opposing territorial or political segments in competitive pursuit of power in the national arena. In this, Liberia's political and social history appears to be relatively unique among other African nations whose legacy of colonialism was quite different and whose national emergence is more recent. The significant and relatively distinctive factor in Liberian national development is that the ruling elite was able to forge a state out of this highly heterogeneous situation without effective rivals for confederate power from the indigenous African sector. It succeeded early in establishing a government and a single party system as a centralizing authority, commanding through its administrative apparatus and emblems a loyalty to the nation often superceding that of local cultural units. There has been little evidence in the recent past of major movements in the traditional sector for complete autonomy or secession, but rather a striving for upward mobility within the national structure and a maneuvering for political favors on the part of special interest groups. This was expressed not so much as a competitive struggle among distinctive ethnic units for unilateral recognition within the national arena, but as a generalized effort of the denigrated classes to enter into the "civilized" community and to share its goods. The concept of "tribes" encompassing larger territories of the interior than were ever occupied by culturally homogeneous or politically cohesive traditional entities was a creation of government polity during the arduous period of national emergence. The early hinterland provincial divisions and designations of tribal territories were an expediency of administration as well as a consequence of European-derived misconceptions of native societies. Eventually, however, these often arbitrary divisions were to be coalesced in the national consciousness as "tribal" areas incorporated into sections of government jurisdiction. The dominant ethnic populations within them, regardless of actual pre-colonial conditions, came to conceive of these imposed territories as representing the bounded areas of traditional cultures. In the mid-twentieth century, as political representation of these interior sections increased, or as they were transformed into "counties" of theoretically equivalent status within the nation, there was an increasing tendency for sectional interests to be expressed in ethnic or "tribal" terms. Aspiring leaders of local traditional groups, as well as of the government, often appealed subtly to these sentiments as a basis for developing constituencies. Recognition of the dangers which this new "tribalism" presented to the policy of "national integrations," as projected by current Liberian administrations, directly motivated President Tolbert's obstruction of the Go la plan for establishment of a "Bomi County" in 1978.

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The Go la represent one of the ethnic clusters in Liberia whose hegemonic expansion in the nineteenth century was impeded by the growing power of the settler society. They were effectively deterred from their insistent encroachments toward the coast where their chiefdoms had sought to control the trading stations, and they were frustrated in their determination to prevent Manding penetration and competition from the east by Liberian aspirations to establish direct commerce and political alliance with these powerful peoples of the far interior. In this early period, the Go la were never united as a centralized "tribe," but comprised a widespread distribution of eighteen or more small chiefdoms which occasionally formed brief and shifting sectional alliances for purposes of defense or aggression. These confederacies frequently included chiefdoms of neighboring cultures such as the Dei, Vai, Mende or Bandi. But such arrangements seldom persisted beyond the course of a specific goal or the lifespan of a particularly charismatic leader. These groups were just as frequently at war among themselves, or united with non-Gola against other Go la chiefdoms. Throughout this early period, the Poro secret association functioned as an instrument of intergroup diplomacy and ritual affinity among the northwestern cultures, helping to produce a network of relations and common values which characterizes this section of the region. The momentum of Gola expansionism and competition with the Manding immigrants and Liberian settlers continued to as late as 1918 when the government was able to quell a major attack from a confederation of northern Gola chiefdoms by forming an alliance with a number of Gola and other chiefdoms adjacent to the coastal settlements. For the next fifty years the potentiality for confederation among the chiefdoms of the northwest was suppressed by Liberian administrative reorganization of the interior, the activation of a frontier militia, the creation of new districts with government-appointed commissioners and Paramount Chiefs, and direct intervention in all local and intergroup politics and economic activity. The decline in traditional systems of authority and competitive commerce was accompanied by a general economic deterioration throughout the interior as the urban settler class drained the resources of the region. Through the monolithic instrument of the True Whig Party, with its networks of official agents armed with access to the rewards of presidential patronage, loyalty was assured and the competitive scramble for favors from the government encouraged factionalism within and a deepening insulation from surrounding groups. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the attempts of the Tubman and Tolbert regimes to integrate the "tribal element" into the national fabric set unforeseen forces

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in motion. The giving of political representation to the former hinterland provinces, and the appointment of native leaders to important government positions, prcvided opportunities for large sections of the interior to operate as constituencies for officials connected by ties of kinship and relatively common cultural background. Moreover, urbanization and new government programs of educational scholarships to persons of tribal origin helped to create a restless class of aspirants seeking limited numbers of posts and the promised improvement of status. Government slogans of "unification" and Africanization" inadvertently awakened recognition of the potentialities of ethnic heritage as a political instrument for the command of larger spheres of influence and official incumbency in those new counties that had been created out of the former hinterland districts. Concepts of ethnicity that had been latent, or retained as merely local expressions of solidarity, began to emerge as significant factors in national political life and were transformed by the expediency of the times. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, appeals to "Golaness" by Go la leaders was more effective than it might have been in the past. The vague notion of a common homeland or the common origin of all Go la-speaking peoples had never been a rallying cry of unity among warring chiefdoms or in the formation of confederacies. but in this new political atmosphere the idea of uniting the forces of the scattered Go la chiefdoms into a viable entity within the structure of the Liberian county system provided incentives for developing a "pantribal" consciousness and the emergence of a dominant Go la constituency in the northwest interior. This emergent "tribalism" is a recent feature in the Liberian national arena, and movements similar to that of the Go la are developing in other sections of the country where ethnic factors have begun to play an increasing part in local and national politics. The Go la instance is an especially intriguing one because of the explicit program of appeal to ethnic coalition. This movement, as well as others like it elsewhere in the country, may be given additional momentum by the recent military insurgency. They are taking place within an African state whose former government had managed to develop a national consciousness and dependence on centralized authority despite the ethnic complexity of its population and its inequitable class structure. The national entity and the system of government was accepted as an essential reality by all sectors for-even as the military coup of 1980 has indicated-the impulse to change was not aimed at total transformation, but rather at the replacement of a corrupt and despotic elite with new personnel. Yet the bureaucratic apparatus remained intact and many of the former officials retained

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their posts. The revolutionary program called for major social and economic reforms, ostensibly involving elevation of the status of the native African peoples who were referred to as "the poor and oppressed masses." This euphemism circumvented any suggestion of ethnic interests, and the new government declared its displeasure with appeals to concepts which might stimulate "disruptive divisions" among the people. Thus, Liberia provides a dramatic illustration of a nation in which long dormant ethnic interests and rivalries have been awakened in new forms by the contradictions inherent in government attempts at amelioration and "notional unification." Rather than the obliteration of ethnic politics in the interests of "modernization" and a non-ethnic federal pluralism, the Liberian nationalization process fostered an unanticipated emergence of tribalism and sectional claims. It is in this context that the Go la case takes on particular significance. With the appearance of the expanded county system in the 1960s, the newly federated divisions of the country had become, in effect, the officially defined pluralistic entities of the national enterprise. The Go la leaders of the Lofa-Gola Paramount Chieftancy-a cluster of Go la, Dei, and mixed Mandingo traditional chiefdoms near the coast-believed that they had been ignored by the Tubman administration and betrayed by their enemies. The four new counties, established in the former hinterland region where the indigenous African population predominated, constituted-in their view-government recognition of historic areas of tribal hegemony. Despite official disclaimers and explicit government polity which aimed at minimizing the ethnic implications of the new county boundaries, the Go la as well as other peoples of the interior spoke of the new Lofa County as an administrative unit providing the Loma people a powerful advantage in national affairs, as did the new Bong County for the Kpelle, Minba County for the Gio, and Grand Gedeh County for the Krahn. Though the old colonies along the coast had been the early centers of Liberian settler jurisdiction, Grand Cape Mount County was nevertheless seen as an area inhabited mainly by the Vai people, Grand Bassa County by the Bassa, Sinoe County by the Kru and Maryland County by the Grebo. The Gola, however, whose distribution extends over a major portion of the northwestern interior, and who had long aspired to government recognition of their territorial (and ostensibly "tribal") integrity, now found their traditional chiefdoms and claimed lands fractionated by the boundaries of four counties-Lofa, Cape Mount, Montserrado, and Bong. For over two decades this matter had constituted one of the major, though cautiously pursued, political concerns of the leading elders of the southern Go la

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chiefdoms and their official representatives in government, including the western educated urban tribal members associated with them. These leaders and constituents have persistently fostered a myth of Go la pan-tribal origin and unity which effectively employed traditional lore in support of a new county in which "Go la" interests would predominate and which would provide administrative equality with other ethnic groups believed to have been tacitly favored by government policy. The fact that the Go la had never in the past constituted a united or centralized ethnic entity was irrelevant (and perhaps forgotten) in the face of the compelling idea that the consolidation of the scattered sections of Go la occupation was a matter of historical destiny which might be at last on the verge of fruition. Among older persons of the conservative interior Go la areas the idea of consolidation rekindled the bitter core of nostalgic retrospection about the unfulfilled hegemonic aspirations of the nineteenth century when Go la expansionism gave promise of creating a confederacy capable of competing successfully with the coastal Liberian settlers. These aspirations were disrupted by effective government military actions and diplomacy in the early twentieth century which created disunity between the interior and coastal Go la chiefdoms, and resulted in final subjugation after the defeat of the Go la rebellion of 1917, a change in fortune which remains an epochal tragedy in Go la historical narrative. To the younger generation of leaders, however, these historical matters are of less importance than the political and economic advantages of consolidation within the national arena of competing groups and interests. Theirs has been an explicit strategy of seeking the development of a viable administrative apparatus for which substantial government funds and new prestigious positions would be allocated. In a nation where opportunities for advancement and positions of power are scarce, creation of new administrative units offers considerable promise. Moreover, competitive ethnic interests provide both an incentive and a justification for a Go la program of seeking a position of equity with other "tribes." The idea of a separate territory dominated by the Go la was originally pressed by Go la political figures in the early 1950s as part of local campaign strategy prior to the elections of 1955. These efforts were confounded by factionalism within the Go la chiefdoms due to the emergence of a strong and vocal anti-True Whig Party and anti-Tubman element which sought alliance with the opposition party of ex-President Edwin Barclay and ex-Minister of the Interior David Coleman, both of whom had Go la connections by marriage and association. With the defeat of Barclay by Tubman in 1955, Go la prospects were in a state of disarray, with the pro-Tubman faction calling for recriminations against the Barclay supporters.

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Within weeks of the election, however, the mood turned to general panic when David Coleman was accused of plotting to assassinate President Tubman, and was discovered in hiding among relatives and former supporters near a major Gola village. They were killed on the spot and their bodies placed on display in Monrovia. This event produced a profound schism in the Gola area which has continued to this day. It was more than a year after its occurrence that the pro- Tubman faction dared to approach the president again with the question of a separate territory; for it was said that he had expressed an extreme distrust of all Gola and had made the remark that "these people have been the cause of more trouble and unrest than any other tribe in the history of Liberia." Certain chiefs, therefore, who had been most active in the True Whig Party and who were trusted by Tubman for their vigorous harassment of the opposition were delegated to broach the matter to him. Consequently, a series of delegations were sent to petition the President from 1957 to 1963 at Executive Council and other meetings held in Bopolu, Voinjama, Kolohun, and Sannequelli. In each instance they were given a hearing, but Tubman consistently took the position that the Gola had not proved themselves ready for such a move; they were too disunited; there were anti-administration elements among them; if he were to grant their request, other tribal groups among them such as the Vai, Dei, Mandingo and Kpelle might object, etc. These audiences were taking place while Tubman was formulating his plan to create four new counties in what had been called the Liberian Hinterland Provinces, giving them full and equal representation along with the five original counties along the coast. This plan was enacted into law in 1962 and took effect in 1964. It was at the Third Biennial Unification Council at Kolohun in 1963 that the President proclaimed the new county system as a harbinger of a still more extensive reorganization involving the coalescence of the counties into a number of states

within the Republic "as a measure of decentralization . . . with a certain amount of sovereignty in each." The implications of this agenda were not lost upon the Gola leaders present who saw their own prospects declining while those of other major Liberian ethnic groups were caught up in the momentum of Tubman's grandiose vision. Their insistent appeals had been to no avail. The new county arrangement incorporated a large section of what they believed to be their most ancient territory into the new Lofa County which included the populous Loma tribes of the northeastern interior. The important Lofa-Gola chiefdoms near the coast were incorporated into an expanded Montserrado County containing the main settlements of early Liberian colonial jurisdiction, the national capitol of Monrovia, and the

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remnants of the Dei tribe. A third section of the old Gola area, adjacent to the Vai on the border of Sierra Leone, was to remain within the boundaries of the old Cape Mount County. This administrative separation of major segments of the Gola tribe infuriated many of the Gola leaders who interpreted it as a punitive move on the part of the President who had announced to them that he could not agree to a separate inclusive "territory" or "county" for all the Gola on the basis of their proclaimed tribal interests, for this might encourage "every little tribe in the country" to make similar demands. Other Gola elders and political leaders, however, urged patience and persistence. By 1968 this strategy prevailed, and Tubman signed an act creating an administratively separate "Bomi Territory" of the old Lofa-Gola Paramount Chieftaincy over the strenuous opposition of powerful government officials of Montserrado County whose control over the interior sections of the county were delimited by the act. At the same time, Tubman let it be known that if the new territory showed clear signs of development, he was ready to entertain the idea of establishing a tenth county. The reaction within the southern Gola chiefdoms was one of triumphant enthusiasm. Within two years hundreds of new positions were filled by aspiring Gola candidates from both rural and urban sectors, some even returning from studies abroad to seek placement. The sprawling mining town of Bomi Hills was remained "Tubmanburg" and became the administrative center of the territory. New buildings were rapidly erected and a number of development projects initiated. By 1970 plans were being implemented to invite Tubman to the territory for a birthday celebration in 1971. Increasing pressure had been placed on the President to fulfill his promise of establishing Bomi as a new county. Efforts were made to solicit the support of Gola chiefdoms in Cape Mount and Lofa counties for their inclusion in a county which would reach from the St. Paul River to the Sierra Leone border, uniting all the major Gola-speaking groups and their territories under a centralized administration. In that Tubman had accepted the invitation to a birthday celebration, it was anticipated that he would make the announcement for the tenth county on that occasion. In the midst of the preparations the President died. Though this was a profound setback, the momentum of planning and expectation was undiminished. The issue was put before the new President, William R. Tolbert, almost immediately. He responded with an assurance that the Gola would once again have a unified territory (though, in fact, the traditional chiefdoms had never been permanently united politically, this being a concept emerging with the

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tribalistic revival of the twentieth century). Moreover, President Tolbert appointed a special commission to develop a proposal for the formation of a new "Bomi County" (named after the sacred mountain of the Senje chiefdom), which would include the old Go la sections of Kone in Grand Cape Mount County, the ancient chiefdoms of Godje and Kongba in Lofa County, the more recent Lofa-Gola chiefdoms to the south, and the Dei chiefdom. At the same time, he recognized the Go la as the major custodians of the powerful Sande and Poro societies in western Liberia and made a number of appointments of Go la leaders to national government offices. It is not surprising, therefore, that this move to create a new county reawakened old rivalries and counter political strategies among well-entrenched administrative officials of the previously existing counties and, particularly, among non-Gola leaders in the western interior. The creation of "Bomi County," as proposed, would constitute an unprecedented instance of an aboriginal ethnic group to have consolidated its ancient territories and traditional chiefdoms under a single administrative division of the Liberian nation. There was concern in Vai and Mandingo sectors of a revival of Go la expansion and dominance which had preceded Liberian subjugation of the Go la in the early twentieth century. These groups had benefitted from the suppression of the aggressive Go la chiefdoms and the administrative separation of the widely distributed Go la sections into different interior jurisdictions. Nevertheless, every effort was made to organize the support of Liberian politicians with kinship or other obligations in the Go la area, and young Go la who held government positions were made aware of the advantages which could ensue from the expanded administration of a new county. There is some evidence that the major thrust of the proposal for "Bomi County" came from this group of young government officials in Monrovia who were more interested in the opportunities for personal political advancement than in the ethnic concerns of their interior tribesmen. At the same time, however, there were other government officials pressing the interests of the Vai and Mandingo who were pointing out to the President that approval of the proposal would constitute a dangerous precedent which might awaken "tribalistic" aspirations in other sections of the interior. The President was also warned (as had been many Presidents before him) that the Go la had always sought dominance in the region, that they once had been a major obstacle to government jurisdiction in that sector, and that the present proposal was a stratagem consistent with their historic character. The situation was further complicated by the

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presence, on the President's committee to investigate the proposal, of a number of young Go la officials who had positions in the administrative apparatus of existing counties into which certain of the more remote Gola chiefdoms had been incorporated among dominant populations of Vai, Bandi, Manding, or other peoples. These men sought to arouse their Go la constituencies against the plan, warning that their interests would be overshadowed by more aggressive Go la centers to the south. They were, of course, concerned of the possibility that they would lose their own posts in the administrative reorganization. At the end of 1978, while preparations were being made among the Go la chiefdoms to celebrate the anticipated announcement of the new county, the President's special commission reported to him its inability to recommend a feasible plan, and the President immediately withdrew his support. In explaining his actions, he is reported to have stated that the issue would not be considered by him again during his presidency. The reaction in the central cluster of Go la chiefdoms was one of shocked dismay. The report of the Commission and the President's action were seen as yet another example of betrayal through the political machinations of their enemies, particularly those representing the Mandingo interests. The President was not blamed but rather was seen as a man whose "hands were tied" by his advisors and the dissenting members of the commission. Much criticism was directed to those Go la public officials involved who failed to act decisively because of mixed motives and gerrymandering on the part of opponents of the proposal. The coup of April 12, 1980 brought a violent end to the settler dominated regimes which had controlled the country since the early nineteenth century. The assassination of President Tolbert and the public execution of leading members of his government was a totally unexpected consequence of decades of increasing popular discontent, and the reaction was one of mixed apprehension and exultation in various sectors of the nation. Young rural and urban Go la joined in the revolutionary fervor under the leadership of Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe and the abhorred group of enlisted men from the Krahn tribe who had participated in the coup and now formed the People's Redemption Council of the military government! However, many older people-particularly the tribal and territorial officials of the interior-were in a state of panic. As leading members of the former True Whig Party, they were besieged by angry contingents of local dissidents. Many fled into the forests and were tracked down with the aid of soldiers. Chiefs were publically humiliated and numerous officials were deposed and replaced by appointees of the PRC government.

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Most alarming to the population of the traditional interior sector of the Go la area was the government decision to quarter the Sixth Army Battalion at Tubmanburg, the administrative center of Bomi Territory which had been named in honor of President Tubman (but was soon to be renamed Bomi City). The new superintendent of the territory was a Krahn army officer who immediately suspended all "political" meetings, and issued a warning against Poro activities. Extensive looting and harassment of the population took place, markets were conscripted by the army, and within days the thriving economy of the town and its outlying villages had been devastated. A sense of shock and helplessness pervaded the region. An event of unprecedented punitiveness from the Go la perspective is said to have occurred in 1981 when a leading Dazo of Go la Poro was assaulted in the midst of the most sacred opening rites for the Sande initiation session in the town of Bola near Tubmanburg. A group of soldiers sent by the new superintendent stripped the Dazo of his vestments and paraded him nude before the shocked multitude of villagers. He was charged with partaking in an illegal assembly. Though apologies eventually were made from the office of Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe in Monrovia, rumors of the incident swept a wave of horror throughout the Go la sections. The Dazo refused to carry out the necessary rites, and the commencement of women's initiation sessions was delayed for over a year before he could be persuaded to appear again. Prior to this affair, the old political schisms in Go la society had re-emerged with unusual vigor. The long-suppressed faction of former Barclay and Colemen supporters had seized the opportunity provided by the coup to overturn local incumbents of office who had been loyal to Tubman and Tolbert. But the desecration of a Dazo and the disruption of Poro and Sande rites coalesced most of the population into sullen and frightened disapproval of the new regime. Moreover, the long-standing network of former True Whig Party and Masonic organizations in the interior provided a continuing apparatus of secret communication with effective links to traditional Poro activities throughout the western interior, as well as with Go la leaders holding official posts in Monrovia. It was in this context that a view was widely expressed to the effect that the "Go la tribe had been conquered" by the alien Krahn. Ancient lore concerning the mysterious non-Poro peoples south and east of the St. Paul River was revived and animosity intensified. The predominantly Krahn membership of the top leadership of the military government and the ethnic favoritism shown in official appointments had convinced many that this was the

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basis for the suppression of Poro and the undermining of Go la strength in the northwestern interior. During 1981 and 1982 the Go la area seemed politically quiescent and stunned into passive acceptance of the most drastic subordination experienced since their miliary defeat by Liberian government forces in 1917. Nevertheless, the idea of the tenth county continued to be discussed in the private networks of Go la leadership. Its fruition was seen as impossible until a new civilian government was formed under the revised constitution. However, by 1982 it became apparent to some that Samuel K. Doe (now Commander-in-Chief) was harboring ambitions to become the first president of the new civilian regime. Certain Go la officials in the government indicated that the time might be ripe for approaching Doe about the matter. It was suggested to him that such a move would be a most timely gesture toward improving his image among the people of the northwestern sections and, perhaps, giving him a important constituency for the impending elections. Quite abruptly, and with little advance notice, Head of State Doe announced in October of 1983 the formation of a tenth county to be known as Bomi County. Though there was some disappointment that this new unit would comprise essentially only the southern section which had been known as Bomi Territory, the announcement was met with victorious celebration in the Go la interior. Hundreds of young aspirants to new county administrative positions returned from the urban areas and from abroad to campaign for local election. Krahn appointees were quickly replaced and the Go la area reawakened to a sense of opportunity and self esteem. Meanwhile, vigorous though cautious proselytizing had been initiated in the excluded Go la areas in the Pokpa section of Cape Mount County, the Kongba and Godge sections of Lofa County, and even in the old Deng section of Bong County. The Go la groups of these areas were urged to petition the government for inclusion into an expanded Bomi County. Within the context of Liberian national life the phenomena illustrated above of a vigorous Go la cultural heritage and the development of a pan-tribal consciousness are remarkable, particularly as they were expressed in terms of means and goals derived from an anticipation of changing national polity. In the course of Liberian nationalization, most of the larger ethnic entities have been fractionated and re-oriented to the dominant symbols and the institutions of the national culture. This process was facilitated by the extreme multilingual and polyethnic complexity of the indigenous chiefdoms and confederacies at the time of colonization, constituting a frontier situation of heterogeneity, mobility, and unstable social units. The already

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existing tolerance of ethnic pluralism and shifting centers of political dominance were amenable to the development of a national program by the centralizing agency of a relatively weak Liberian government. The Go la case, however, is something of an anomaly insofar as it represents the development of a distinctive ethnic ideology reinforced by an emergent pan-tribalism. It also reveals the remarkable persistence of a myth of ethnic solidarity which has, over the past twenty to thirty years, been transformed into an instrument of competitive political opportunism within the changing structures of the Liberian national process.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES d'Azevedo, Warren L. "A Tribal Reaction to Nationalism." Parts 1-4. Liberian Studies Journal. Vol. 1(2), Vol. II(1), Vol. III (2), Vol. IV (1), 1969-70. "Tribe and Chiefdom on the Windward Coast," Rural Africana 15:10-29, 1971. Dunn, D. Elwood. The Foreign Policy of Liberia During the Tubman Era, 1844-1971. London: Hutchison Benham, 1979. Holsoe, Svend. "The Condo Federation in Western Liberia." Liberian Historical Review 3(2): 1-28.1966. Johnson, S. Jangaba M. The Traditional History and Folklore of the Gola Tribe in Liberia. 2 vols. Bureau of Folklore Series: Department of Interior, Monrovia, R.L. 1961. Sawyer, Amos. The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia. ICS Press: San Francisco. 1992. Effective Immediately-Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980-1986: A Personal Perspective. Liberia Working Group: Bremen. 1987.

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U.S.-Liberian Relations: Challenges in the Twenty-First Century

Tim Dweh Siklo INTRODUCTION U.S.-Liberian relations uniquely benefit from two historical facts which should enrich and strength them in this century. Liberia is the United States' oldest diplomatic relationship on the African continent and one that originated in the U.S. For a continuous relationship of almost 200 years it is logical to anticipate a third century of mutual benefits, a relationship that stood the challenges of the colonial, cold and civil wars years. U.S.-Liberian relations in the twenty-first century should draw on their experiences of almost two centuries and thereby yield the best fruits thus far. The end of the cold war, which marked the beginning of the Liberian civil war, ushered in a new focus in U.S.-African relations within which U.S.-Liberian relations are viewed. Are both countries prepared and ready to face the challenges presented by the new U.S. foreign policy towards Africa in general and Liberia in particular? Our purpose is to examine U.S.-Liberian relations, by analyzing their basis and objectives, observing how each partner has benefitted or been exploited, and finally suggest how they might each achieve their respective goals in this post-cold war twenty-first century.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The founders of Liberia believed they had a mission to bring civilization, salvation and perhaps create a nation-state modeled after the United States of

Although he is a foreign service officer of the Liberian Government assigned to the Liberian Embassy in Washington, D.C., Mr. Siklo's views here do not in any way represent those of the Liberian Government; rather they are his scholarly perspectives of the topic in question. The article is a revised copy of a paper he presented at the Liberian Studies Association Conference held at Delaware State University, Dover, Delaware, March/April, 2000.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXV , 1 (2000)

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America to Africa.' Nineteenth century Liberian leaders though literate, lettered and having some administrative experience, lacked experience in the practice of statecraft and diplomacy. However, their understanding of the western world in which they lived, and behaved accordingly, is partly to be credited for the survival of the Liberian State. These men and their colleagues were cognizant of the reality that the survival of Liberia as a political entity in a world dominated by Euro-centric values and standards, to a large extent, depended on a close relationship with the United States of America,2 a paternalistic relationship in which the U.S. would become the patron and Liberia the client. This is not to suggest that they then became complacent and left the survival of this new state solely to American guidance and protection. On the contrary, they took matters into their hands with the belief that Liberia had to behave like a sovereign nation under accepted and recognized international norms of behavior.3 The United States recognized Liberia as a sovereign state on October 10, 1862, fifteen years after Liberia's Declaration of Independence and after recognition by Great Britain (November 21, 1848); France (April 17, 1852); Germany (Hanseanic states of Lubeck, Bremen and Hamburg, May 19, 1855); Denmark (May 29,1855), and Belgium (March 29, 1858).4 Seven additional European countries followed after America recognized Liberia. The prevailing ante-bellum politics is largely credited for the delay. However, could it be that the U.S. being the informal guarantor of Liberia's existence needed European reactions before stamping its seal of approval? Or was it that the U.S. had not perceived any economic benefit it could derive from

' Amos J. Beyan , the American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State: A Historical Perspective, 1822-1900 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1991), pp.12-27; J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Quest for Democracy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp.12-27; D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tan, Liberia; A National Polity in Transition (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1988), pp. 21-26; Amos Sawyer, The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge (San Francisco, CA: Instutute for Contemporary Studies, 1992), pp. 105-107.

2 Beyan, p. 98.

3 Ibid., pp. 121-122

4 Nnamdi Azikiwe, Liberia in World Politics (Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press, 1970), pp. 65-70.

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official recognition?' Considering that the formal document establishing diplomatic

recognition was " . . . the first treaty of commerce and navigation,"6 between both countries signed by President Stephen Allen Benson and Charles Francis Adams, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain. The period between the American recognition of Liberia and the arrangement of the 1912 loan backed by the U.S. saw a flurry of economic and financial activities in Liberia that brought Liberia more into the grip of the then international commercial system. Liberian exports grew then declined; her growing maritime merchant fleet fell to competition by European steamships. Economic hard times coupled with official inexperience and corruption led Liberia to arrange for two ill-fated loans in 1871 and 1906.7 The arrangement of the 1912 loan, fifty years after America's recognition of Liberia, marks the beginning of closer and strategic relations with the U.S. This relationship which has benefitted the U.S. more than Liberia was initiated by Liberia. Faced with the possibility of a British takeover and economic collapse due to its inability to meet the conditions of the British loan of 1906 and harsh economic conditions at home, Liberia turned to the U.S. for assistance. Under the leadership of the U.S. an international loan of $1.7 million at five percent interest was arranged from American and European bankers. This loan paid off the loans of 1871 and 1906 leaving Liberia with only $126,482. Under this agreement the President of the United States appointed a Receiver-General of Customs for Liberia who was responsible for collecting and administering all revenues. These revenues were first and foremost to be applied against the loan and maintenance of the Liberian Frontier Force, before application to Liberian government expenses. The receiver-general served as financial adviser to the

Beyan, pp. 122-123; George Klay Kieh, Jr. Dependency and the Foreign Policy of a Small Power: the Liberian Case (San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992), p. 108; Emmanuel Dolo, Democracy Versus Dictatorship: The Quest for Freedom and Justice in Africa's Oldest Republic-Liberia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), pp. 97-99.

Dolo, pp.97-98; D. Elwood Dunn and Svend E. Holsoe, Historical Dictionary of Liberia (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1985), pp. 180-181.

For a detailed discussion of the economic conditions and the loans see: Azikiwe, pp. 111-117; Kieh, pp. 30-39; Sawyer, pp. 165-180; Beyan, pp. 122-126

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Liberian government and had the authority to approve budget estimates before submission to the legislature. He also had the authority to appoint customs officers without recourse to the Liberian Government.' Of course, this plan introduced modern accounting methods which improved the Liberian treasury. It also replaced the British with the Americans as the only providers of military assistance to Liberia in the form of management, training and supplies of the Liberian Frontier Force-the forebear of the AFL-the major instrument for the collection of revenues.

SELECTED LITERATURE AND OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS A. Literature: The study of foreign policy or foreign relations as a subsection of political science still faces challenges. Dr. George Kieh presents a succinct survey of these problems as they pertain to small states like Liberia, especially in the analysis of their foreign policies or relations with other states. Additionally, in the non-academic policy formulation process world of think tanks, their activities (seminars, panels, briefing etc.) deal mostly with Western, industrialized or large states. However, there is enough information on U.S.-Liberian relations by Liberianists, from the historical and social science points of view. Dr. Kieh in his studies of the foreign policy of the Tolbert Administration examines U.S.-Liberian relations from the inception of Liberia.' He applies the dependency model of analysis to illustrate that since its independence Liberia has been economically and politically dependent on the Western industrialized states for its survival, and it designed its foreign policy to achieve this objective. He mentions that the Tolbert administration, however, attempted to reduce Liberia's dependency on industrialized Western capitalist nations in the areas of economic development, while still maintaining excellent political ties. Dr. Kieh argues that U.S. foreign policies toward Liberia were designed to accomplish its political, economic and geo-strategic objectives. We are told that such policies were clearly evident during the administration of President Tubman and that of President Tolbert; and that U.S. economic relations were exemplified through U.S. foreign aid programs that consisted of economic and military aid. Dr. Kieh claims

Azikiwe, pp. 117-18; Sawyer, pp. 180-182

9 Kieh

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that on the average military aid accounted for 97.9 percent of total aid while economic aid accounted for 2.1 percent. He views U.S. political strategic policies toward Liberia as those which were developed to tie Libera to U.S. national security interests. These interests included the Omega Navigational Station, CIA sub-Saharan headquarters, and the VOA transmitters. Also, U.S. educational aid programs, Dr. Kieh argues, provided training for Liberians with the objective of socializing Liberians into consumers of American ideas. Dr. Kieh concludes that Liberia's political and economic dependence on the advanced capitalist countries affected its foreign policy to the extent that Liberia advocated the foreign policy objectives of these nations. Liberia is said to have depended on the U.S. the most. Drs. Elwood Dunn and Byron Tarr in their book, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition argue that:

While successive Liberian administrations, American missionary organizations operating in Liberia, the interests of black Americans, and those of U.S. businesses have all sought, for their own reasons, to capitalize on the mother country angle of the relationship, this has often been relegated to a perceived U.S.

national interest. 10

They divide U.S.-Liberian relations into six phases, from 1820-1985, and attempt to identify U.S. national interests in its relations with Liberia during each of those phases. The first period, from 1820-1862,is the period from the beginning of the decision to establish Liberia to the recognition of the Republic of Liberia by the U.S. During this period the official relationship was largely marked by an American attitude of neglect except for occasional expression of concerns warning European imperialists to leave Liberia alone. The second period is considered to be from the American recognition of Liberia to the beginning of the forced labor allegation against Liberia. This period includes the beginning of American strategic engagement with Liberia, commencing with the 1909 U.S. Commission of Inquiry into Liberian affairs and the subsequent granting of the 1912 international loan and military assistance to Liberia. An example of this new military relationship was the U.S. military assistance to Liberia

10 Dunn and Tan, p. 170.

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during the Kru Coast Revolt of 1915. This period also witnessed the introduction of the first modern multinational corporation in Liberia, the Firestone Rubber and Tire Company and a subsequent offering of a $5 million loan from the foregoing company to Liberia. The third period begins with Firestone's consolidation of power in Liberia. This period corresponds with the Presidency of Herbert Hoover (1929-1933). The major foreign relations issue between Liberia and the US was the allegation that Liberia was involved in the illegal exportation of labor to Fernando Po. The US was one of the major accusers of Liberia, partly because of Firestone's claim that labor recruitment was becoming increasingly difficult. The fourth period (1933-1971) begins with the New Deal administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) and ends with the Tubman administration (1944-1971). FDR's New Deal was applied to his administration's relationship with Liberia. He accorded recognition to the Barclay administration and Barclay in turn allowed the used of Liberian territory during the Second Worki War. Roosevelt visited Liberia enroute to North Africa during the War. Barclay and President-elect Tubman returned the visit in 1943. This visit, Dunn and Tarr suggest, laid the basis for U.S.-Liberian cold war relationship. During the twenty-seven years of Tubman's presidency (1944-1971) he sought to develop the closest possible friendly relations with the U.S. and the West. During his administration the Liberian maritime registry and Western multinational

concessions such as LMC, NIOC, BMC and LAMCO were established. 1 The fifth period (1971-1980) corresponds with the Tolbert administration, and its attempts to depart from or readjust the unquestionably close relations of the previous government with the U.S. It attempted to be more African and Third World focus and clashed with the multinationals in its effort to renegotiate their concession agreements. The Tolbert administration, sensing that the relationship was not as reassuring as during the previous administration, decided to review it in 1975. Among other things, it questioned the "special" nature of the relationship while raising concerns about certain unfriendly U.S. actions, such as the cancellation of the PL 480 rice program and high performance bond requirement for Liberians contracted by USAID.

11 Ibid p. 172.

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A Liberian government-hired lobbyist in Washington, D.C. described the situation as "complacency on the part of the United States government towards

Liberia with a tinge of concern for an uncertain filture"1 2 and identified the U.S. State Department's views regarding Liberia as: 1. elitist society with masses living in despair; 2. endemic corruption in the government; 3. concept of "special relationship" perpetuated (by Liberia) for aid request purposes; 4. a reliable friend of the U.S. and therefore easy to short-change when it came to military and economic assistance. Concluding the period the authors ask a series of provoking questions such as: whether the State Department's attitude in the 1970s was ever "threatening and punitive?" The last period (1980-1985) marks the introduction of formal military rule in Liberia, that occurred at a period of strained relations between Liberia and the U.S. The U.S. immediately recognized and began to support the military government. A high level U.S. delegation consisting of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose, Democratic Congressman William Gray of Pennsylvania and Jerry Funk of the National Security Council visited Liberia in May of 1980. Several specialized delegations followed, so that before the end of 1980 the U.S. was prepared to strategically engage in a renewed relationship. Secretary Moose identified U.S. strategic interests in Liberia as follows: 1. VOA transmitter for Africa, Middle East and southwestern part of the Soviet Union. 2. Telecommunications relay station for transmitting diplomatic cables between Africa and Washington, D.C. 3. Omega Navigation Station for ships (including submarines) and aircraft to calculate their positions. 4. Approximately 3,500 American citizens residing in Liberia. 5. $350 million worth of U S. private investments. 6. Outstanding American banks loans of about $100 million, AID loans of $76 million, and Export-Import Bank loans of $12 million.

12 Ibid., p. 174.

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In order to sustain U.S. interests in Liberia, and maintain the close relations, U.S. foreign policy towards Liberia included a program of assistance packages, which included economic support, development assistance and military sales. U.S. aid to Liberia rose from $8 million annually to over $50 million. Emmanuel Dolo's book' is an attempt to answer how and why Liberia got into its conflict, i.e., an examination of the causes of the Liberian civil war. In order to present a full and complete picture of the causes that led to the war the author examines the external factors that contributed to the war. He focuses on the role of the U.S., especially its military assistance to the Doe regime. In chapter 8 he scrutinizes the so-called "special relationship" that is purported to exist between Liberia and the U.S. He demonstrates that, from its inception, the U.S.-Liberian relationship was based on the political and commercial interests of the U.S. and that over the life of this relationship American influence and benefit increased to the disadvantage of Liberia. This unbalanced relationship continued into the Reagan administration and Doe regime. The Reagan administration increased military aid to the military government of Doe in terms of training and hardware at a time that there were no external threats against Liberia. These weapons and training were used to suppress the Liberian people's yearning for democracy. This suppression continued under the guise of fighting communism in Liberia. On the existence of a special relationship between Liberia and America he argues that it only exists in the minds of Liberians and that this is driven by what he calls "imperialistic mystique,"14 which is an exaggerated obsession of Liberians with the West, especially the U.S. All five Liberianists suggest that there has been nothing special about the relationship that has existed between Liberia and the U.S.; and that U.S.-Liberian relations have clearly been based on American national interests. The U.S. benefitted both economically and security wise, while Liberia was exploited or not adequately compensated for the services, spaces and materials it provided. Since this study is not based on primary research materials, and since most studies which have been done on relations between powerful and developing or less developed countries are normally conducted by utilizing the dependency model, as

13 Dolo.

14 Ibid., p. 108.

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done by Kieh, I have decided not to employ any model. However, the closest to political theory that this paper comes is the normative studies of politics. B. Official Pronouncements: Attempts at obtaining an official document on U.S. foreign policy towards Liberia from the U.S. State Department were fruitless. Either it is non-existent or it is classified; hence one is obliged to depend on the U.S. national security strategy, foreign policy and its African policy as presented by the three most significant officers of U.S. foreign policy in this regard: the President, Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. In the December 1999 issue of the National Security Council magazine published by the White House, entitled: "A National Security Strategy For A New Century," President Clinton reiterates three core objectives of America's national security strategy: 1. To enhance America's security. 2. To bolster America's economic prosperity. 3. To promote democracy and human rights abroad. According to Secretary of State Madaleine K. Albright, the goals of American foreign policy remain the same as for the past 200 years: ensuring continued security, prosperity, and freedom of the American people. She divides the challenges of U.S. foreign policy into four parts: 1. Strengthening the bonds between and preventing ruptures among the leading nations of the world. 2. Strengthening the international system by helping other states become full participants. 3. Boosting weaker states that are most willing to help themselves. 4. Repelling threats to the system of laws and relationships that affect the security of all nations.' Secretary Albright also presents two tests of U.S. foreign policy. The first is a vision of the world in which the strong are just, the weak are helped and the hungry are fed. This vision requires the U.S. to deal with the world based on what the U.S. anticipates and not on what the U.S. knows, and to succeed the U.S. must continually change the ways and means of its diplomacy.

15 Madeleine Albright, "The Testing of American Foreign Policy," in Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, pp. 50-64

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The second test is pragmatism: whether U.S. foreign policy is producing results. The State Department spends much of its energy on encouraging foreign governments to act for what the U.S. perceives to be the common good. For the Secretary, foreign policy is practical. It requires persuading others to agree to new policies and actions based on new understandings. The true challenge of diplomacy then is how practical is the foreign policy it is carrying out. Hence, diplomacy requires vision and pragmatism, which dictates that the U.S. honors its commitments, backs its words with actions, bears essential costs and takes necessary risks. As if to concretize some of the foregone, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Dr. Susan Rice, in a Worldnerts "Dialogue" interview with Ms. McMillon in Washington, D.C. on February 16, 2000, said:

With respect to the United States' overall policy toward Africa, under President Clinton's leadership we tried to change dramatically the way the United States relates to Africa and the way the United States conceives of its interests in Africa. We are past the Cold War period of competition, of rivalry, of viewing Africa as the superpower playground. We seek and we are building genuine partnerships in Africa based on our mutual interests and mutual respect. And we have made important progress in that regard in changing and deepening and strengthening our economic relationships with Africa, recognizing that we have shared interests in working against common transnational security threat. We are providing increased development assistance over the last several years. We are trying to do more with respect to trade and investment. We continue to be the largest provider of humanitarian assistance of any individual in Africa.

Ambassador Bismarck Myrick, the current U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, in his statement to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearing, seemed to have defined U.S. foreign policy towards Liberia:

. . . Liberia's leaders and its international supporters are working together to build a sustainable democratic environment. It is in the U.S. national interest to promote democratic practices and Liberian citizens welcome United States' leadership in resolving conflicts

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and establishing parameters for peace. As is well known, the United States serves as an example for people of many nations seeking to build democracies, nations which respect human rights and include their citizens in the political process. Historically, Liberia has encouraged foreign trade and investment. While Liberia's infrastructure was severely damaged during the civil war. there is a national recognition that foreign investment will be needed to rebuild the country. Before the war, the Liberian economy was based on the export of iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds, and gold. These sectors, especially rubber and timber, will be key sectors of post-war development. Fishing also offers investment opportunities. As the Liberian business community rebuilds the economy, there will be opportunities for American partners.

In light of the foregoing, U.S. foreign policy towards Liberia should be grounded in the post-cold war realities and partnership. Its goal should be strengthening Liberia's fledgling democracy and helping to reconstruct its economy. This would provide enormous economic opportunities for American businesses and the Liberian people. This means that Liberia's peculiar post-war conditions should be taken into consideration; therefore while private sector initiatives must be emphasized, bilateral assistance programs are necessary foundations for this twentieth century relationship. According to President Charles Taylor:

Liberia's aspirations, beliefs and interests remain the determining factors in the conduct of our foreign relations. Being paramount, these national interests are and will remain the perpetuation and preservation of principles which guided Liberia's international relations, namely: respect for the sovereignty of all States, strict sovereign equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, interdependence of all States, strict compliance with the Charters of the United Nations, the OAU, ECOWAS, Mano River Union, the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as all international conventions to which Liberia is a signatory.'6

'6The State of the Nation Address to the Third Regular Session of the 51' Legislature, delivered on January 25, 1999, p. 7.

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In a February 11, 1998, letter to President Clinton, President Taylor asserts that: "Liberia seeks the best of relationship with the United States." This is one which will benefit Liberia in its efforts to sustain democracy and reconstruct the country.

He sees the African Growth And Opportunity Act as constituting ". . . the

underpinnings of U.S.-Liberian relations as we approach the new millennium." 7

TWENTIETH CENTURY RELATIONS A. Cold War Period: Throughout the twentieth century U.S. national security interests have always been the basis of its relations with Liberia. These interests were economic, political and military in nature. U.S. foreign policies toward Liberia have historically been designed not to give the appearance of exploitation. Beginning with the 1912 $1.7 million loan agreement, America's economic, political and military benefits were guaranteed. American bankers made profits; the U.S. had political influence over Liberian leaders and it maintained control over the means of power by its management of the Liberian Frontier Force. This new-found American power from 1912 to the end of the first quarter of twentieth century set the stage for the beginning of America's exclusive strategic relationship with Liberia by the signing of a $5 million loan from the Finance Company of America, a Firestone subsidiary. The coming of Firestone, which marked the beginning of the modern multinational corporations into Liberian political and economic life, illustrates the importance of Liberia to America's economic prosperity. It is not certain whether Liberian leaders realized it at the time that Liberia was indispensable to Harvey S. Firestone's goal of finding his own independent source of rubber. With the importance of rubber to the automobile industry, Great Britain's indebtedness to the U.S. for the First World War and its control of the source of rubber made Firestone's desire to find his own independent source of rubber the more urgent. Liberia became the ideal place with all the right conditions in place. It is no wonder that one of Firestone's lawyers, who used strong-arm tactics to have the Liberian government sign an agreement with Firestone, became Liberia's longest serving President. In fact the U.S. State Department encouraged Liberia to accept Firestone's offer to establish a rubber plantation in Liberia. Through

17 Presidential Papers, August 2, 1997-December 31, 1998, Vol. I, (Department of Public Affairs, Executive Mansion: Monrovia, Liberia), p. 85.

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Firestone's efforts both the Freeport of Monrovia and Robertsfield were built, with the proviso that they would be accessible to the U.S. military. As we entered the cold war after the Second World War these facilities became part of U.S. national security strategy. Additionally, there were other benefits that accrued to the U.S., which concretized U.S.-Liberian cold war relations. These would include, but are not limited to, hosting of VOA transmitters, headquarters for CIA sub-Saharan operations, Omega Navigation Station, collection of biomedical materials for development of germ warfare agents, etc. Liberia's untapped vast natural resources provided easy and cheap sources of raw materials such as iron ore and lumber for the post-war reconstruction of Europe and America's expanding construction and industrialization. In order to guarantee continuously these benefits, a benevolent dictator who dealt ruthlessly with his political opponents while rewarding his collaborators was provided the necessary foreign aid. During the Tubman years Western economic and political/diplomatic presence increased. Liberia became an integral part of the U.S. defense strategy. The fact that Liberia was said to be stable and the gateway to America and its consumer goods was probably a consequence of the fairly good prices of Liberia's major exports-iron ore and rubber-on the world market. Additionally, the heavy handiness of the Tubman administration on political dissent along with good economic times and the general unenlightened public seemed to have produced a country viewed generally as passive. The administration of President Tubman played the right roles in terms of world and cold war politics, from being anti-Communist, to being conservative in Africa's pan-Africanist struggle, to readily going along with U.S. requests. The Tolbert administration decided to pursue a more independent and African focus policy in world politics. Relations were established with member countries of the Warsaw Pact, an aggressive non-alignment posture was followed in international affairs and more tolerance of political descent was allowed. All of this happened at the height of the cold war, hence it was not surprising when the 1980 coup was successfully staged. With the ushering in of the military government after the 1980 coup, Liberia became well entrenched in the U.S. camp. Because of U.S. interests in Liberia and its worldwide anti-communist campaign, U.S.-Liberian relations were largely defined by increased U.S. military and economic assistance to the Doe regime, both military and civilian. Assistance rose from less than $100 million to $500 million.

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Additionally, all possible opponents to the U.S. anointed leader, Doe, were systematically eliminated. This level of the relationship along with the stationing of the Omega tower on Liberian soil made Liberia a prime target of Soviet missiles during the cold war. However, as the U.S. advanced its strategic nuclear forces communications system from mainly land-based communications to satellite communications it relied less on the tower. The continued civic unrests in Liberia, coupled with the end of the cold war, resulted in a diminished strategic importance of Liberia to the U.S.; at least so U.S. officials want their Liberian audiences to believe. This was the extent of the relations when the Liberian civil war started.

B. Civil War Period: Relations during Liberia's civil war were characterized by American ambivalence towards Liberia. Of the two contenders (IGNU and NPRAG) for the Government of Liberian, the U.S. recognized IGNU, but not with full diplomatic recognition and all attending privileges accorded other governments. For instance, the U.S. would neither name nor accept an ambassador named by IGNU. Additionally, it viewed IGNU as representing the AFL and the NPRAG representing the NPFL; both AFL and NPFL were the major antagonists of the Liberian civil war. Both IGNU and NPRAG were given equal access and consideration by U.S. officials. Many Liberians viewed this supposedly "neutral" stand and statements of American officials that Liberia was no longer of strategic importance to the U.S. as means of avoiding any responsibility for the Liberian conflict. However, U.S. policy focused on finding a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Is IGNU for its part continued to encourage the U.S. to support the peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts of ECOWAS. It undertook efforts to convince the U.S. to give full material and diplomatic support to ECOMOG so that it would not only maintain, but also enforce the peace. The NPFL had a strong public relations effort in the U.S. To complicate matters the U.S. bilateral relations with the military government of Nigeria caused it not to give full support to ECOMOG's efforts in Liberia, since Nigeria controlled ECOMOG. However, had IGNU dedicated

'Statement by Amb. Madeleine Albright on the Situation in Liberia to the UNSC, January 29, 1996; Testimony by George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, September 21, 1995; Testimony by William H. Twaddell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affair;, before the House International Relations Committee, June 26, 1996.

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equal or more efforts to its relations with the U.S. as it did with Nigeria and ECOMOG the outcome of the conflict might have been different. C. Post-Elections Period: Going into the 1997 General Elections in Liberia there was lots of good will in America towards Liberia and the U.S. was publicly optimistic about its future relations with Liberia. This was in part based on the belief that the elections would finally and officially end the civil war so that the rebuilding

and healing process would commence. 19 However, before commencing this anticipated positive future relations, all the old lingering issues from the war years had to be resolved. Among the first unresolved issues were the selective granting of visas to Liberian officials and upgrading the visas of Liberian diplomats in the U.S. After several meetings and exchanges the visa restrictions were lifted and Liberian diplomats were issued the proper visas. The next unresolved issue was the reinstitution of the burned chancery's diplomatic immunity, which was revoked without notification to the Liberian Government. For the most part the relations could be described as crisis management. From the Dokie murders of 1997 to the recent banning of Star Radio and Radio Veritas, the governments of both countries have been solving one crisis after another. Most of these crises could be described as Liberian internal affairs, except for the shooting incident at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia and Liberia's alleged involvement in Sierra Leone. The end of the century seems to produce a consistent articulation of U.S. foreign policy concerns. This was most illustrative when representatives of six opposition political parties visited the U.S. The messages and concerns were basically the same, with slight variations: from U.S. governmental agencies, such as State, Defense, AID, Congress, White House: from non-governmental organizations such as church and human rights groups; and even from Liberian groups such as ULAA and branches of Liberian political parties in the U.S. The concerns raised were: 1. Final resolution of the Dokie murders. 2. Destruction of the arms collected during the disarmament process. 3. Restructuring of AFL.

'9Press Statement by James Foley, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, July 24, 1997.

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4. Investigation of the Camp Johnson Road and U.S. Embassy shooting incident. 5. Human rights abuses and indiscipline of the security forces. 6. Involvement in Sierra Leone. 7. Lack of economic transparency and creation of monopolies. 8. Revocation of Star Radio's shortwave frequency. 9. Interference with the judiciary and legislature branches by the executive branch. For the most part of 1999 the allegation and denial of Liberia's involvement in the Sierra Leonean civil war and issues of human rights abuses dominated U.S. - Liberian relations. The U.S. encouraged Liberia to play a leading role in finding a solution to the conflict, which Liberia did and this did not fall on deaf American ears. Both Secretaries Albright and Rice applauded President Taylor for his efforts. After the signing and implementation of the Lome Accord, democracy, human rights and economic issues began to dominate the relationship. This continues into the twenty-first century. Furthermore, two obstacles to a better relationship are the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's holds on the democracy assistance program to Liberia and the U.S. Senate's denial of the Brooke Amendment waiver for Liberia.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY RELATIONS A. National Interests and Foreign Policy Objectives: The twenty-first century presents the opportunity for strengthening this relationship as never seen before, i.e., a relationship in which each partner's interests will not only be taken into consideration by the other, but could be fully realized. Hence the twenty-first century opportunity is one that guarantees mutual benefits. The major challenge faced by both nations is whether they possess the political will to meet their expressed national interests and foreign policy objectives towards each other in light of the new post-cold war twenty-first century realities. These interests and foreign policy objectives are not mutually exclusive; in fact they are complimentary. For the U.S., its national interests fall into three categories:2° 1. Vital interests are those interests of broad and overriding importance to the physical safety, survival and vitality of America.

20 A National Security Strategy For A New Century, October, 1998; pp. 5-6.

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These include the physical security of the territory of the U.S., its allies, and citizens, and its economic well being and protection of its critical infrastructures. The U.S. Embassy and the Omega Navigation Station would fall under this category. 2. Important national interests are those interests that do not affect America's national survival, but affect its national well being and the character of the world, e.g., its participation in NATO and UN operations, and support of ECOMOG. 3. Humanitarian and other interests are those beyond the above, but which are demanded by its values, e.g., responding to natural or manmade disasters or human rights violations, and supporting democratization. Criticism of human rights abuses, call for press freedom and good governance in Liberia are consistennt with this category. American officials from both the executive and legislative branches continue to stress that the objective of U.S. foreign policy towards Liberia is tc help reconcile and reconstruct the country by supporting press freedom, democratic reforms, rule of law, good governance, financial discipline and transparency, rights and liberties of all Liberians and Liberia's full reintegration into the international system.21 As for Liberia its national interests are upholding those international principles that guarantee its security, existence, peaceful co-existence with other nations, interdependency of all states, sovereignty and equality of all states and abiding by the rules and laws of all international organizations it belongs to. The objectives of its foreign policy are not only to reclaim its rightful place in the region and international community after its civil war, but also to gain donors' support for its National Reconstruction Program presented to the Paris Club in April 1998. Liberia needs an infusion of bilateral U.S. assistance programs primarily in the areas of rule of law and security, education and professional journalism, healthcare and

'Congressmen Donald Payne(D-NJ) and Tom Campbell(R-Cal) visited Liberia on December 3, 1998 and held talks with Liberian Governments and held a subsequent press conference. Ambassador Howard Jeter, Special Presidential Envoy For Liberia met with Liberian Government officials during celebrations marking Liberia's 151 Independence Anniversary. Also press statement by State Department spokesmen expressed similar policy objectives.

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environmental protection, democratic empowerment and business development. According to President Taylor:

The primary concern of the Government in the immediate post-war period is to ensure national security and peace as a basic conduit for the repatriation, resettlement and engagement of our people in productive activities and the rebuilding of their lives. The existence of a peaceful environment will also afford us the opportunity to begin the difficult task of restoring our economy which is in a state of disrepair, due to a prolonged period of economic contraction and the impact of the civil war itself?'

B. Challenges: As we have entered the twenty-first century both countries must change their perception and behave in accordance with the new realities. Liberia must disabuse itself of the existence of a special relationship. First, Liberian leaders and public figures must desist from referring to or speaking of this so-called special relationship. Substantive or meaningful relationship with the U.S. must be based on mutual interests and not on romanticism about a relationship that does not exist. This is the first step towards reclaiming Liberia's rightful place in the international community. Secondly, Liberia has to implement those decisions it made and which impact its relations with the U.S. Those aspects of its National Reconstruction Program and National Conference which illustrates that it is committed to genuine reconciliation and the foundation for a national reconstruction program must be implemented. This would be an indication to the U.S. and international community that Liberia is taking the lead and hence must be assisted. Thirdly, Liberia must fully staff, fund and support its Foreign Service, especially its missions to the U.S. and UN. Since Liberia seeks a much-improved relationship with the U.S. it must demonstrate that it is ready and capable to continuously engage the U.S. at all necessary levels by first and foremost taking care of its presence in the U.S. Adequate funding and information must be provided to the Liberian Embassy, Mission and Consulate in New York. Since the maintenance and management of these institutions indicate to the U.S. government, and to public and

22National Reconstruction Program Main Report (Paris: April 6, 1998); p. i

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investors the degree of seriousness and preparedness of Liberia, it is incumbent upon Liberia to put its best foot forward. Fourth, Liberia must seriously engage Liberians in the U.S. on a continuous basis. This engagement must be done in a positive atmosphere, where divergent and dissenting views will be tolerated. Suggestions must be solicited from Liberians in the diaspora and government policies and actions explained on a continuous basis. Channels for the expression of grievances must be established. The government must presume that Liberians in the U.S. have Liberia's interest at heart and view them as its unofficial ambassadors to the American people and government. Lastly, the Liberian government must now begin planning how to engage the

U.S. under its landmark African Trade Bill. For President Taylor has said ". . . the

African Growth and Opportunity Act . . . now constitutes the underpinning of U.S. - Liberian relations as we approach the new millenium."23 Similar sentiments have been expressed by American officials with reference to U.S.-African relations. Other African countries have already begun planning. Three things are basic to luring investors to Liberia under the African Trade Bill: reliable electricity, availability of pipe-bored water and general security. The U.S. must realize cold war tactics are obsolete and therefore fully implement its new African policy towards Liberia without reservation. It must also recognize Liberia's current challenging conditions and pay heed to the confirmation statement of its current ambassador in Monrovia. The U.S. should be the calmer and more stable partner in this relationship. This means that its perception must be changed from dealing with a country with warlords to a fledgling democracy that needs all the necessary meaningful nurturing it can get. America must practice what its officials have expressed. Three of the four challenges identified by Secretary of State Albright, and mentioned earlier here, can and should be applied to Liberia:' 2. Strengthening the international system by helping other states become full participants. 3. Boosting weaker states that are willing to help themselves.

23Presidential papers, August 2, 1997-December 31, 1998, Vol. 19 (Department of Public Affairs, Executive Mansion: Monrovia, Liberia), p. 85.

24Madeleine Albright, "The Testing of American Foreign Policy," in Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, pp. 52-53.

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4. Repelling threats to the system of laws and relationships that affect the security of all nations. Even though Secretary Albright has said the State Department spent much of its resources on adapting to meet the challenges of the post-cold war world, the U.S. needs to still do more in its relationship with Liberia. For instance the Senate Foreign Relations Committee must release the hold it has on programs that help sustain democracy in Liberia. These programs among others help civil society in a variety of democracy implementation activities, and train judicial and legislative professionals. The Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee of its Foreign Relations Committee must grant the Brooke Amendment waiver to Liberia until Liberia is able to resume paying its debts to the U.S., especially in light of the U.S. and international calls for debts relief.

CONCLUSION U.S.-Liberian relations have gone through a lot over the past two hundred years and both countries should be able to examine the relationship and chart a new course that will benefit both mutually. In this regard a joint commission should be establisheb by both countries to review the relationship and make recommendations to both governments for their review and actions.

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Address to the Liberian Studies Association, March 30, 2000

Reverend Father E. Bolling Robertson*

Dr. Cyril E. Broderick, Sr., Conference Coordinator, officers and members of the Liberian Studies Association, distinguished guests and friends; greetings! What a great honor to be with you for your Millennium Conference. The millennium is here. What is foremost in your thoughts when you hear sung: "All hail, Liberia, hail! All hail, Liberia, hail! This glorious land of liberty by God's command."?' Are they as expressed on June 4, 1978 in Petersburg, Virginia, by the Honorable Francis A. Dennis when he said:

It is interesting to note . . . that from Roberts to Tolbert have come the same message of brotherly love, social justice and reconciliation for the people of Liberia. Today we are proud to say that, that tiny settlement which was established on the West Coast of Africa in 1822 as a beacon light and symbol of hope and freedom to the peoples of that continent, has not only grown in size and international stature, but the mediatory voice of its leaders has been sought and appreciated throughout the world, especially Africa!'

*Dr. Robertson served for many years as a Reverend Father of the Episcopal Church and a principal and teacher of a high school that is owned and operated by that Church in Cape Mount, Liberia. Dr. Robertson also served as an Interim President of Cuttington College and Divinity School in Liberia in 1972. He is retired, and he and his wife currently reside in the United States.

'Quoted from the Liberian National Anthem.

'Joseph Jenkins Roberts Memorial Booklet, (Petersburg, Virginia, 1980), p. 27.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXV , 1 (2000)

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He was speaking on the occasion of the unveiling of the J.J. Roberts monument erected by the citizens of Petersburg, Virginia, the city in which J.J. Roberts had lived before emigrating to Liberia. Or does the following haunt you? Memories and images fonned by the press, radio, TV; civil disobediences and rebel uprisings; the massacre at St. Peter's Lutheran Church, Sinkor; thousands dead and wounded; thousands fleeing from their homes. Is it not the second that fills your memories? My heart aches as I compare the present to those early years of my ministry in Grand Cape Mount County. In my journeys through the forest I enjoyed the hospitality and found eagerness for education. The temptation now is to turn our back and look in the opposite direction. NO! Is there no good? I remember another photo in the newspaper. A woman is being transported in a wheelbarrow. A man without shirt or shoes is pushing the wheelbarrow. The expression on her face could not be ignored. I could not forget this scene. A verse of Scripture came to me:

Blessed be the Lord! for he has shown me the wonders of his love in a besieged city. (Psalm 31:21)3

These words recited for almost three thousand years can and must speak to us today. In a besieged city, Monrovia, a crippled woman, a man and a wheelbarrow reveal Divine LOVE, TRUST and HOPE. The love of the man rolling the wheelbarrow, the trust of the crippled woman, stirred hope in those who have eyes to see. An interpretive word of an event of three millennia before, recorded in the Psalms of David, gives a tool for the educators and scholars of the Liberian Studies Association of this millennium. The carer needs the cared-for as does the cared-for have need of the carer. Their needs are fulfilled by one another. If we move back one hundred and seventy-one years, we find a setting in which LOVE, TRUST and HOPE were lived out as the widow Mrs. Amelia Roberts spoke to a congregation in Petersburg, Virginia, just before emigrating to West Africa with her family, her oldest son being J.J. Roberts. Those who heard her parting words quoted her as saying:

3 Book of Common Prayer, New York, (1979), p. 624.

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I thank God for hearing my prayer. Pray for us friends. I am carrying my sons where they can be truly free.4

In Liberia Joseph Jenkins became a great statesman. He served twice as President of Liberia and displayed a burning zeal for education. Between his two periods as President, in 1856, he founded Robertsport, which later would become a major center for the Episcopal Church's education and medical missionary endeavors. In Monrovia he established Liberia College, (now the University of Liberia), showing a dedicated interest in the growth and development of Liberia's people. His will of 1875 gave proof of personal sacrifice to the education he so willingly championed. His will specified that his coffee farm "shall never be sold, but leased or rented" and its revenue, together with that of the ten thousand in United States bonds, shall remain a "perpetual foundation" whose object is to increase the country's educational facilities.5 This will has been faithfully executed. Even today students in Liberia are receiving grants from the J.J. Roberts Perpetual Foundation. In the next scene the main character is neither crippled nor widowed. No mention is made of his biological family. We see a man with a shepherd's staff in one hand and in the other an Executive Order from Anthony Gardner, the President of Liberia. Charles Clifton Penick, the shepherd, was consecrated Bishop in 1877 for the Church in Cape Palmas and Parts Adjacent.6 The President's order to the Honorable Mr. Diggs granted the Bishop authority to select thirty acres to found a mission at Robertsport. Decades before Bishop Penick was elected questions of policy and structure troubled the Episcopal Church in the United States from which church matters in Liberia were controlled. In the 1860s, mindful that their Bishop John Payne might soon retire, the clergy of Monrovia sought independence from the Mother Church. Bishop Payne himself recommended the election of a native for the Office of Bishop. Instead of listening to this wisdom, the U.S. Mission Board elected J.G. Auer who served but a few months.

4Joseph Jenkins Roberts Memorial Booklet, p. 27.

5 Liberian Studies Journal, "News and Notes," vol. 14, no. 1 (1989), pp. 126-7.

'Julia C. Emery, A Century of Endeavor, 1821-1921, (New York, 1921), Chpt. 8.

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For almost ten years the Liberian Church had no residential Episcopal supervision. In the United States the reduction in church giving limited the staff and curtailed replacement of missionaries. Thus in 1877 Bishop Penick was elected to head a divided, leaderless church embroiled in controversy. It is amazing to see how his LOVE, TRUST and HOPE drew him beyond the debates and questions of support. First, he opened the mission in Cape Mount, which had been unevangelized up to that point. Second, he welcomed a host of married and unmarried women who, recently liberated, wished to share in the ministry of the church. These women were both foreign and native. Our millennium need not be characterized by hatred, suspicion and e..epair. We can witness to the truth of the words of the Psalmist: "God has shown me the wonders of his love in a besieged city-in a besieged country-Liberia." LOVE, TRUST and HOPE were found to be in the picture of a crippled woman in a wheelbarrow. LOVE, TRUST and HOPE were also the supporting bedrock of the Roberts family. Recall Mrs. Amelia Roberts' departing words to her church family.

"I thank God for hearing my prayer. . .I am carrying my sons where they can be truly free." Renewed, envisioned and directed, the Episcopal Church with Bishop Penick courageously marched to Cape Mount to embark on a Mission which blossomed into works of evangelism, education and health. May our millennium become the millennium wherein LOVE overcomes hatred, TRUST replaces suspicion and HOPE displaces despair. You may think this impossible. Let me share three experiences which show how God makes the impossible possible. The Episcopal Chapel at Dia housed Mommie Kenney's Government School classroom. When I visited this school, the only visual aid was a calendar with a verse of Scripture for each day. This day it was Ecclesiastes 9:18, "Wisdom is better than weapons of war."' I can still hear the children being drilled over and over until they learned this sentence. When it was publicly announced at the end of the recent civil war that the Honorable Ruth Perry was elected Chairperson of the Council of State, Republic of Liberia, and the further note that she was the first woman to be elected Head of State in Africa, I remembered my day with Mommie Kinney's school. "Wisdom is better than weapons of war." Liberia's Head of State is Mommie Kinney's granddaughter. War is ended and Liberia chose wisdom.

'The Holy Bible, Revised English Version, (London, 1989), p. 580.

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In 1972 my position was Interim President of Cuttington College and Divinity School. I purviewed the enrollment and observed that no student had enrolled in the Divinity School. The school, founded in Cape Palmas in the 1880s, enrolled theological students from the beginning. So it was until its closing in 1928. Bishop Bravid Harris reopened the school at its present location in Suacoco in 1949. Theological students enrolled. But now, none had registered since 1965. The year 1972 saw a program begun and theological students enrolled. This developed into a four-year course with the awarding of a Bachelor's Degree in Theology. Graduates now serve the church in Liberia, U.S.A., England, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Guinea and The Cameroon. That which had died, God brought back to new life. The Cape Mount Mission was without an emblem until 1950. Dr. Henri Loskant, the Christian missionary doctor at St. Timothy's, a German citizen born of Jewish parents, crafted the emblem. At first glance all I saw were lines, lines, lines and leaning structures that in reality did not lean. I studied it. The emblem took on new meaning. I saw objects that were seen every day. A coconut palm bearing fruit, a church building, a storied tower were the symbols used. Loskant's message was profound. The coconut with fruit is fruitful creation. The tower used for calling the mission to prayer as well as to mark the time of day is skilled mankind. Both the palm tree and the tower bend towards the church, yet they are higher, their roots are in the church. Below the coconut palm and the tower, the cross proclaims the servanthood of the Divine who is the provider, sustained and fulfiller of all. The meaningless strokes became God's message. The twenty -first century has the potential to be the time in which what has seemed impossible becomes possible by God's command.

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Book Reviews

Africa in Chaos

George B. N. Ayittey. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

Ayittey, a Ghanian academic, apparently in self-imposed exile, offers here a sequel to his highly acclaimed Africa Betrayed, a study of autocratic rule in Africa, how that has engendered the ruin of "an entire continent" and necessitated a "second liberation struggle." Africa In Chaos seeks to lay out the imperatives for the new struggle. This is no "doom and gloom" account of Africa's ills but rather an attempt systematically to diagnose the contemporary crisis and then to offer a prognosis for remedying the situation. In ten cogently analysed and information-packed chapters, he seeks to uncover why the states of Africa have been imploding and otherwise remain "intractably mired in poverty" (p. 24). "The Lost Continent" (chapter 1) updates the human and material resources of the African continent much as the late Ghanian President Kwame Nkrumah did in his Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965). Against this background Ayittey goes on to point out the roots of the continent's malaise, emphasizing the need to distinguish between Africa's leaders and its people (leadership failure not synonymous with failure of people), and between traditional Africa and modern Africa (one denigrated because non-western, yet has worked to sustain people over the centuries; the other the abode of the autocratic state, the "lost Africa"). Root causes are acknowledged as well as being both external and internal, though the author opts to dwell on the internal dimension, generally viewing the external as exacerbating, not initiating factors. In all of this Ayittey strikes themes touched upon by others, notably Basil Davidson in his The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (1992). He laments the spurning of the African indigenous heritage and the opting by the African elite for a modernization that advocates westernization. "Africa's Crises and Underdevelopment" (chapter 2) highlights the issue of investment environment, pointing out distinction between "environmental defects" (people-made artificial circumstances that legislative and political actions can

Liberian Studies Journal, XXV ,1 (2000)

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remedy) and the "structural obstacles" (low savings, low literacy, lack of capital, etc). Chapter 3 compares Africa's indigenous political and economic systems with its modern ones, contrasting indigenous accountability (democracy) with modern "personal rule." In chapter 4 the author addresses the spurning by African leaders and elites of their indigenous institutional and philosophical heritages. Where indigenous Africa's economies were largely capitalist in conception and operation, modern elites have erected the command economy to accompany a command polity, the latter complete with single party states and presidents-for life. Where nationalist leaders might have drawn upon their indigenous heritage as they faced the challenge of state construction in the aftermath of colonial authoritarianism, they opted instead to strengthen and expand the scope of authoritarianism. Clientelism was installed. It is power monopoly by an individual or a group where patronage (spoils) is dispensed to loyalist clients or cronies. Development was consequently perverted. Chapter 5 examines the predatory state and its survival tactics, yet it is precisely those survival tactics that "eventually suck[ed] the country into a vortex of violence and implosion" (p. 28). Under the circumstances reform is required, and it ought to take the form of the contemporary global emphasis on democracy and the market economy. But how have the elite leaders approached reform? They have created an "acrobatics of reform"-one step forward and three steps back, or the absence of commitment to changing the situation for the better. And the governments of the western countries are partly to be blamed, for it is they who maintain a business-as-usual relationship with autocrats (more than $400 billion in aid and credit to Africa since the 1960s with precious little to show for it). Chapter 9 offers alternative solutions, including radical ones such as returning to Africa's roots, the modernization of its indigenous institutions and processes. But the leadership in place remains the primary obstacle to any genuine reform. The challenge then becomes one of finding creative ways to bypass or circumvent the autocrats. As Africa's genuine intellectuals step forward to take the lead in this endeavor, the author contends, the Western world should be prepared to assist with the reform agenda by among other things getting tough with African despots, distinguishing between Africa's leaders and its people, identifying internal (African) and Diaspora agents of genuine reform and assisting or empowering them, and establishing a "Radio Free Africa" to assist the effort. The book speaks well to the burning issues on Africa's current agenda, and it does so in a structured and passionate manner. First the roots are examined, then

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remedies are offered in light of the efforts so far deployed. The roots are summed up in the poor quality of self-serving leadership and its intrinsic inability to effect reform. For Ayittey the remedy is genuine reform, one focused on democracy and the market economy but rooted in Africa's traditional heritage. The genuine reformers are identified as Africa intellectuals (defined as those subclasses of elites comprising the professional and the subelites focused on the masses). The author even provides guidelines ("the ten commandments for African intellectuals") for the reformers: never forget your roots; seek ye first the economic kingdom in the private sector; privatize the universities; demand and defend freedom of expression/media; practice intellectual solidarity; demand national conferences; disband the military or cut it in half; practice pan-africanism; set up a rival OAU; and selectively repudiate foreign debt. These are superb ideas worthy of serious consideration, though they need to be tempered by at least two considerations. The first has to do with the nature of the political universe in which the reform process is to proceed, and the second is the African peoples (the trouble with us may be ourselves rather than our leaders) who are the objects of the reform effort. Both are suggestive of complications that reformers would be foolhardy to ignore. Church-related colleges and universities, especially those functioning on the African continent should find much food for thought in Ayittey's study, for in the environment of crisis in which they are called to minister, there is need for a clearly articulated agenda or mission statement, one that rests on the essential arguments of this book. Their responsibilities, under the circumstances, are manifold: train a leadership that appreciates its heritage as it embraces the modern (not necessarily the western) world; guard against complicity with acrobatic reformism in much the same way that Western governments should do; consider seriously the advisability of incorporating into school curriculums philosophies of democratic accountability and fundamental human rights; and consider the challenge of collaborating in the identification of the reformist leadership of which the author speaks.

D. Elwood Dunn University of the South

The reviewer is a distinguished Liberian Liberianist. He has published substantially on the political history and the foreign policy of Liberia. He served as editor of the Liberian Studies Journal from 1985 to 1995.

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Barclay Women in Liberia-Two Generations: A Biographical Dictionary

Mary Antoinette Brown-Sherman. Middletown, New Jersey: Jellemoh Publication, 2000.

In this 15-page, self-published pamphlet, Mary Antoinette Brown- Sherman has compiled brief biographical sketches of twenty-six women who are connected to the Barclay family either through marriage or consanguinity. Fourteen of the women were direct descendants of what the author calls "this eminent family," and twelve joined the family through marriage. The author also provides an extensive appendix on Sarah Ann Bourne Barclay, wife of Anthony Barclay, the patriarch of the family who led a group of 346 immigrants to Liberia from Barbados in May 1865. Among the immigrants were Mr. and Mrs. (Anthony) Barclay's eleven children-eight girls and three sons. From this original group of Barclays, a family tree sprouted. It is from this family tree-the second and third generations- that the author has chosen the subjects of her biographical dictionary. The work draws its credibility from the impeccable credentials of the author and the fact that she, too, is a descendant of the Barclays through her mother, Victoria Elizabeth Jellemoh Grimes, and her paternal grandmother, Ella Mai Gilbert Barclay Grimes. The author is a well-known Liberian educator, scholar, former president of the University of Liberia, and the first woman to head a university in Africa. The work also draws on primary sources like African Repository and several secondary sources such as the 1985 Historical Dictionary of Liberia by D. Elwood Dunn and Svend E. Holsoe. In the introduction, the author quotes from African Repository which, according to her, in 1873 described the immigrants from Barbados as the "most intelligent and best educated of emigrants that ever came to Liberia and equally industrious." She backs this claim out with the notation that from the ranks of the Barclay family have come "two Presidents of Liberia, a Chief Justice, four Secretaries of State, two Associate Justices, and other officials of the Liberian Government." She does not provide details of the names of these persons in the introduction; such details are threaded throughout the work under specific biosketches of the women based on their relationship to the men. This technique works well because it makes the work truly a work about Barclay women with the

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men only mentioned based on their relationships to the women. However, this reviewer assumes that among the presidents, the author is referring to Arthur Barclay and Edwin Barclay, Liberia's 15' and 17th presidents respectively. The author's own father, Louis Arthur Grimes and her brother, J. Rudolph Grimes, served as Chief Justice and Secretary of State, respectively. To the unsophisticated reader of Liberian social history, the names read like an alphabet soup of settler crust matrons-Ella Mai Gilbert Barclay [Mrs. Henry

Waldron Grimes], . . . Sarah Helena Barclay [Mrs. Joseph J. Blyden], . . . Sarah

Elizabeth Braxton Cooper, [Mrs. Arthur Barclay] . . . Jane Euphemia Seton Davis

Lomax [Mrs. Arthur Barclay (number 2)] . . . just to mention a few. However, woven between the biographical data are information about the social, political and cultural realities of life in Liberia during the period covered in the work. For example, contrary to popular belief, the work shows that women in nineteenth century Liberia were not simply marginalized as housewives and mothers, but many of them made history through their contributions to education, church, state and society in general. Some of the entries are brief, others are extensive. An example of a brief entry:

Barclay, Sarah Elizabeth (Mrs. Reginald A. Sherman) Daughter of Arthur Barclay and Mary Marshall Barclay, both of West Indian descent. Born in Monrovia, Liberia. Grew up in Monrovia. Educated in Monrovia; taught by her aunt, Antoinette Hope Barclay. Married Reginald A. Sherman and moved with him to Robertsport, Cape Mount, Liberia. Children, 4 (2 boys, Arthur and Reginald and 2 girls, Florence and Ann Lucretia). Died in March 1927.

Though brief, an entry like the one above is useful because it informs the reader, for example, of how the Shermans of Cape Mount are related to the Barclay clan, and that some young women of the day were taught at home by relatives rather than attend public schools. Perhaps the most extensive entry is that of the author's mother. This review assumes that this excerpt is from the unpublished biography of her mother titled, Jellemoh: A Story of the Life and Times of Victoria Elizabeth Jellemoh Grimes, A Liberian Wife and Mother. Perhaps what is most significant about this entry is that it documents the intermarriage of a prominent settler (Louis Arthur Grimes) to a

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woman of vai heritage. It also reveals a controversial practice that was common in nineteenth century Liberia (and still exists to some extent today) where children from the rural areas were taken in as wards in urban homes and, if the system worked like it was designed to, they got an education and an opportunity for upward mobility in society. The intermarriage of Louis Arthur and Jellemoh was clearly a successful one as far as unification and integration is concerned because Jellemoh rose to a level on the social ladder in Liberian society that a woman of pure vai heritage would have only dreamed of in her days. Another point of view could be that she was dislocated from her ethnic roots and immersed into a social and political order alien to her. However, it is difficult to discount the fact that the marital union, among other things, provided Africa with its first female president of a university and gave Liberia a Secretary of State (J. Rudolph Grimes) who played a leading role in writing the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Cheeseman, Victoria Elizabeth Jellemoh (Mrs. Louis Arthur Grimes)-Daughter of Ambollai Fahnbulleh and Jarsie Fahnbulleh of the vai ethnic group. Foster daughter of Joseph James Cheeseman and Mary Ann Crusoe Cheeseman, both of Americo- Liberian descent. Born in Jondu, Cape Mount, Liberia, February 1889. Spent first six years of her life in Jondu; seventh year in Monrovia in the Executive Mansion with her foster parents, President and Mrs. Cheeseman. Grew up from eight years old in Edina, Grand Bassa, Liberia with her foster mother, Mrs. Cheeseman, in the wake of the death of President Cheeseman on November 12, 1896. Attended Brierly Memorial in Harper, Cape Palmas, Liberia. Married Louis Arthur Grimes in Edina, Grand Bassa, December 11, 1911 and moved with him to Monrovia. The marriage lasted until he predeceased her December 14, 1948. Children-5 (4 boys, Louis Arthur, Henry Waldron, Joseph

Rudolph, and Ernest Marbue, and 1 girl, Mary Antoinette Hope) Reared first grandchild, James Rudolph Grimes, and fostered 20 children, 11 boys and 9 girls. Her Christian faith was strong and she was active in the Episcopal Church (Trinity) from the time of her marriage until the final years of her life. She was also active in the Eastern Star, a sister organization of the Ancient Free and Accepted Masons, and in community service organizations such as

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the Antoinette Tubman Children Welfare Foundation and the YWCA. Died in Monrovia, Liberia, April 19, 1970.

As the author correctly points out, "the importance of biography to understanding and appreciating the Liberian nation and its people has been overlooked for the most part. One result has been very little biographical material on Liberians. On women, especially, there is a dearth of such information." This work, brief as it is, should help Liberian studies in two ways: (1) To breach a knowledge gap that exists when it comes to information about the role of settler women in early Liberian society; and, (2) to encourage other aspiring writers to use the genre of biography as a tool for disseminating information about Liberians in general-male and female, contemporary and pioneers, settler and ethnic-so that through the experiences of our foremothers and forefathers we may strive to understand our past, learn to appreciate the present, and be better prepared to face the future. This reviewer hopes that soon, a bound edition of the work would proliferate, perhaps with photographs and a graphically produced family tree that shows the linkages beyond the two generations of Barclays that the author has chosen to include in this first edition.

C. William Allen University of South Carolina Spartanburg

The reviewer is an associate professor of journalism and mass communications at the University of South Carolina Spartanburg. He is the immediate past editor of the Liberian Studies Journal.

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Freedom Ships

Robert Carey and John Furbay. Topeka, Kansas: AF-AM Links Press, 1999. 361 pp.

Freedom Ships, a historical novel written by Robert Carey and John Furbay, combines a stimulating story line with a wealth of research on the early history of the Liberian state. Carey and Furbay, two distinguished white American educators with half a century of service in Liberia between them, collaborated to bring to life the history of the creation of Africa's first black republic. Carey and Furbay narrate an engaging and entertaining story that delineates the difficulties, conflicts, and triumphs endured by the early black emigrants, their white supporters, and indigenous African peoples during the founding of the Republic of Liberia. Carey and Furbay demonstrate their profound respect for "those brave black pioneers" and "their white friends in the Society who raised funds and supported the pioneers" as well as the "indigenous Africans who joined the pioneers in their fight against the slave trade and in the building of a nation" by dedicating Freedom Ships to them. Furthermore, the authors illustrate their continued commitment and interest in Liberia by donating part of the profits of the book to the reconciliation and rebuilding efforts in war-torn Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the prologue, the authors set the stage for this epic odyssey to establish a homeland on the coast of West Africa for freed black slaves and expatriates in the United States. In the early nineteenth century, after most slaves had been freed or acquired their freedom by fighting in the War of 1812, many blacks in the United States found themselves in a precarious and unpalatable situation. Although they were free, they were still rejected from society and refused jobs because they were black. Without jobs, many black women, men and children were near starvation and forced to endure harsh winters with little or no shelter. In order to abate the suffering of the freed blacks, the American Colonization Society, "a society for the colonization of free Negroes in Africa," was founded. The formation of the society, as the novel describes, served two purposes. Firstly, "freed slaves could be free, and reap the rewards of their own labor and eventually function as full citizens of their own country." Secondly, the society aimed to ameliorate the political scene in the United States; "giving freed slaves a place to go would provide an incentive to slaveholders to free their slaves

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voluntarily. This would ease the threatening conflict between northern abolitionists and southern slaveholders." However, the founding of the American Colonization Society did not go without controversy over the Society's intent to "deport freedman" deeming them as a "dangerous and useless element" in American society. Although there were blacks in the United States that opposed the resettling of freed blacks in West Africa, many were hopeful that their lives would be improved in a country that was created by them and for them. Freedom Ships narrates a historically informed fictional account of the lives of those who chose the latter. Freedom Ships is astute in its representation of the complexities of social institutions and mores during the early to mid-nineteenth century in both the United States and the colony. The authors masterfully use characters in the novel, some historically constructed-all social and political constructions of their time and circumstance-to demonstrate prevalent and divergent viewpoints on important social issues, such as the slave trade and the role of women in the nation-building process. Carey and Furbay's punctilious research of emigrant letters, dairies, newspaper articles, U.S. Navy and Congressional archives and various other archives and their personal experience of Liberian culture, acquired over their years living and working in Liberia, coalesce in the novel Freedom Ships. The product is a fictional account of the efforts to establish the colony, the controversy over the eradication of the slave trade on both sides of the Atlantic, and the creation of the Republic of Liberia that is historically and culturally informed. However, it is the engaging story line and intriguing characters that keeps the reader turning pages, eager to find out the outcome of the next palaver or the fate of perfect love in the midst of imperfect cross-cultural clashes. The novel begins in 1820 with the first Freedom Ship, Elizabeth, leaving from New York destined for the West Coast of Africa. Among the first black pioneers on the Elizabeth are Elijah Johnson, our protagonist, and his family. Elijah Johnson is a black freedman who won his freedom through service in the War of 1812. Elijah's passion for establishing a country where freed blacks are truly free participating members of society, where they own the product of their own labor and govern themselves manifests itself in Elijah's commitment to civic duties of the nation-building process. Elijah becomes particularly involved in the diplomatic negotiations, palavers, between the various Kings, chiefs, princes and headmen of the region and the colonists in order to purchase land for the colony.

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From the beginning of the novel, it is not only clear that Elijah is a dedicated citizen but also a natural leader. Elijah is joined by his wife Mary and their three children. Although Mary is one of the many colonists on the Elizabeth to die during the first bout of fever, Elijah perseveres and is extremely instrumental in building the colony into a nation. The authors' poignantly illustrate the personal sacrifices made for the creation of Liberia throughout the novel. In addition to his three children, Elijah is granted guardianship of a young girl by her mother because her father, a runaway slave, is refused admission aboard the Elizabeth. Consequently, the mother and father stay in the United States and the young girl travels on the Elizabeth to the West Coast of Africa. The young girl's name is Carrie Reeves. Carrie is a pivotal and powerful character in the novel. Carrie personifies the hybridity that is a quintessential characteristic of Liberian culture and Liberia's national identity. The complexity and ingenuity of this hybrid existence is delineated in the development of Carrie's character. Carrie spends most of the first part of the novel simultaneously missing her mother desperately and being angry with her mother for sending her to Africa. Her connection is in the United States; she has no connection to Africa. Moreover, although Carrie is barely a teenager, she finds herself in the position of being the main caretaker for the Johnsons' three children after Mary Johnson dies. It is only during a conversation with a suitor named John Bannon one night after putting the children to bed that Carrie realizes that it is precisely because her mother loved her so much that she wanted her to go to Africa

and be free, really free. Carrie ruminates, "Ma's gift to me . . . her love gift . . . to

come to Africa . . . to find my own freedom." Carries then vows, "I'll make my own freedom." Carrie first exercises her freedom by articulating her opposition to engaging in war against the Africans for land in the region. Although Elijah and the other men of the colony do not agree with Carrie and proceed with the war, her opinion was heard and noted. Carrie remains resolute in her conviction and decides to leave the colony and runs away into the forest. While in the forest, Carrie runs into a freed captured slave returning to his home village. His name is Togba of the Kpelle people. As they traveled through the forest, Togba's description of his village is so peaceful and harmonious and in sync with Carrie's conception of how African life should be that she joins follows him to his village where she is welcomed and cared for as a long lost daughter.

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As a Kpelle girl child, Carrie is required to go through the girls' bush school and the Sande initiation rites. Upon discovering that the initiation rites for the girl children of the Sande involve genital mutilation, Carrie executes her escape plan, calling Togba to rescue her. The two must flee the village because they offended and angered the Sande. They seek refuge with Chief Bob Gray, a Bassa chief that had befriended Elijah and the colonists. While Togba and Carrie wait for Elijah to retrieve Carrie from Chief Bob Gray's empty slave pen where they were both in hiding, the two consummate their love. Consequently, Carrie's first child represents the hybridity that is inherent to the creation and existence of the Republic of Liberia and furthermore, the necessity to nurture it for the future success of Liberia. Chief Bob Gray is helpful to Elijah on more than one occasion. Chief Bob Gray serves as a secret informer at the African chiefs' war council when the chiefs decide to wage war on the colonists because the colonists are threatening their lucrative slave trade along the West Coast of Africa. Carey and Furbay intelligently outline the range of varying viewpoints and activities surrounding the slave trade amongst whites in the United States, black colonists and Africans during the nineteenth century. For instance, General James Harte, a white plantation owner in Virginia and his beautiful new wife, Laura, are strong supporters of the creation of Liberia and the colonization effort. This shared passion becomes a part of the fabric of their profoundly loving marriage. General Harte feels strongly that he must prepare his slaves for freedom and travel to colony Africa. Harte and his wife are tormented by the latent threats of those that oppose Harte's plan to teach the slaves to read and write and to set them free. Eventually, Harte falls victim to an ambush framed by whites who are in steep opposition to black slaves being freed. Ironically, in the novel, most of Harte's children become slave owners and advocates for the perpetuation of slavery in the United States. Elijah views the eradication of the slave trade on the West Coast of Africa as an integral part of the process of establishing a colony and subsequently a black republic. In an enlightening piece of dialogue between Elijah, Jehudi Ashmun, a white agent of the American Colonization Society, and Chief Bob Gray, the authors illuminate the differences between the African slave trade and the Trans Atlantic slave trade, as well as the reasons for the perpetuation in the Trans Atlantic slave trade. The colonists question Chief Bob Gray about his participation in the slave trade. Full of remorse, Chief Bob Gray replies that the rum that he and the other chiefs trade for the slaves helps to anesthetize them from any bad feelings they might

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have about participating in such trade. Chief Bob Gray explains that the slave trade is a quick way to get the goods that his people enjoy. Bob Gray goes on to explicate a brief history of the slave trade in Africa. "In olden times we fight plenty wars-it be our way. We win war and take captives. That be our right-they be our slaves, to

do work, live in our compounds, be part of our village life. It be our way . . . it be good!" Chief Bob Gray continues, describing the evolution of the slave trade. "White man called Portagees come to get workers so our grandfathers giv'em captives or bad people who must be sent away or killed. Trade goods and rum begin to satisfy our fathers. Other white men come-English, Frenchy, `Merican, Spanish-and they give us guns to fight more tribes for captives." Ashmun probes further by asking Chief Bob Gray if he approves of this slave trade. Chief Bob Gray replies, "I want good trade like before white slavers come-for salt, palm oil and

food, and pots, leather, cattle-no more killing for slave trade . . . black `Mericans come back home to be free, so no slavery be allowed in colony. I want to help colony do this. Someday it help me be free, too!" It is this conviction that leads Chief Bob Gray to play an extremely instrumental role in the colonists' defeat of the warriors of the chiefs' war council. Carey and Furbay succeed in animating this particular chapter in the history of Liberia and the United States so skillfully and meticulously that both lay readers and educators alike can appreciate the creative thought and diligent scholarship that characterize this novel. The multiple storylines and conflicting ideologies that constitute the plot of this historical novel provides a complimentary perspective to any historical study of Liberia and the United States. However, the broad ranging significance of the themes explored in Freedom Ships begs for a larger audience. The next step for this historical novel is to be made into a film.

Chandra Dunn The reviewer is a 1997 graduate of Mount Holyoke College (B.A., International Relations). She has worked for Andersen Consulting as an analyst in governmental practice, and is now headed for graduate school and the pursuit of development studies. Chandra is the elder daughter of D. Elwood Dunn (former editor of the Liberian Studies Journal).

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Minutes of the Liberian Studies Association Business Meeting on Saturday, April 1, 2000

Prepared by Dr. Cyril E. Broderick.

Dr. Joseph Holloway, President of LSA, called the meeting to order at approximately 2:25 P.M. Printed copies of the agenda for the business meeting were then passed out. The Secretary/Treasurer of LSA, Dr. Dianne Oyler, reminded the body that only paid members were eligible to vote during the meeting. Some people who had not had the opportunity to pay prior to the meeting indicated that they would pay their annual dues immediately. Dr. Holloway then made remarks about the nature and purpose of the Association. He reflected on the objectives that have historically been pursued by the Association, and he indicated that there are additional challenges to the Association as it grows. At the end of his remarks, the President opened the floor for nominations for potential hosts of the LSA 2001 Conference. Dr. Y. Gershoni reported the readiness of his University to host the 2001 Conference. He noted that he is resident at the University of Tel Aviv in Israel and pointed out his many years of membership in LSA and his unfailing presence since 1968 at the Liberian Studies Association annual conferences. There were no other requests to host the Conference, although several people indicated that it might be logistically difficult to get the membership to Israel due to probable difficulties in affording the potentially high airfares and hotel accommodation rates. A motion was made to accept Dr. Gershoni's request, and a friendly amendment to the motion was made to indicate that Dr. Gershoni should communicate the progress of the planning and indicate if significant difficulties exist in the planning process as soon as possible. The motion was voted upon, and it passed unanimously. Dr. Gershoni was congratulated for his successful bid to host the Conference in Israel in 2001. The next item on the agenda was the Secretary/Treasurer's report. The Secretary/Treasurer, Dr. Dianne Oyler, informed the body that the Association now has Tax Exempt Status. She indicated that because of this, we can now make contributions beyond our dues to the Association. These contributions can then be used as tax-deductible gifts in individual's tax returns. She then referred to the

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Minutes of the Association, as reported in Volume 4, Number 1, of the Liberian Studies Journal. A motion was made by Dr. Elwood Dunn to adopt the minutes. Dr. Nathaniel Appleton seconded it. The motion was carried, and the minutes were adopted. She then distributed a Cash Flow Statement to correspond with the publication of Volume XXIV (1 and 2) in 1999. In summary, the statement noted that there were 118 paid professional members, 88 institutional members, and four (4) student members. The year started with a balance of $2,782.05, with Journal subscriptions adding $6,169.45, Journal direct sales contributing $773.55, and a bank interest of $10.27. She reported that no revenues were obtained from the Los Angeles conference in 1999. The total income for 1999 was $6,953.27, but expenditures totaled some $7,499.00. Major expenditures of the Association were in the printing and mailing of the LSA Journals. Other expenses were small item expenses, including the cost for storage of the Journals and Journal negatives, as well as minor operational expenses. The Association spent $545.73 more than we earned in 1999, but the ending balance on hand is $2,236.32, because we ended 1998 with an income balance of $2,782.05. In discussions that ensued, it was also pointed out that we should solicit more universities to subscribe to the Journal. The suggestion was also made that people could buy the Journal for libraries and buy other subscriptions as gifts. It was noted that 491 Journals were printed, but that some 91 were given out to Board Members and others who do not pay for them. It was agreed that bills should be sent to the recipients of the journals and efforts made to get them to pay for their subscriptions. Dr. Alpha Bah made this into a motion, and Mr. Tim Siklo seconded it. The motion was carried with 23 votes for and no votes against. The Secretary/Treasurer informed the body that "We did not make any money from the LA Conference." With the completion of the Secretary/Treasurer's report, Dr. Bah moved to accept the report, and Dr. Konia Kollelon seconded the motion. The motion was carried with 23 votes for, no votes against, and no abstentions. The Editor's Report was the next item on the agenda. Dr. Amos Beyan gave his report noting that West Virginia University supports the LSA Journal by allocating about $2,000 to $3,000 annually. He noted that his term of service as Editor ends next year, and that he was looking forward to passing on the responsibilities to a new Editor.

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A discussion of old business followed, beginning with a focus on membership. It was stated that there is a need to retain the current membership, and to look for new members. Some stated that in looking for new members, the search should not be limited to Ph.D.'s. The indication was also that people with scientific training (scientists) should also be pursued. It was also pointed out that graduate students should also be encouraged to secure membership in the Association. It was also stated that the Association should take its membership drive to the Internet. In pursuit of new members, one member indicated that current members should pledge to bring at least one new member to the Association by next year. Other suggestions were to bring more institutional members aboard. Dr. Mary Antoinette Brown- Sherman then suggested that members give Journals as gifts to lure potential members to the Association. Last, Dr. Holloway indicated that with the Tax Exempt Status of the Association, members should give $100 gifts to the Association in support of the Association's objectives. Dr. Elwood Dunn was then asked to give a report about the directive to pursue an Annual Conference in Liberia. After noting that this year's Conference, LSA 2000, had initially been slated to be held in Liberia, it was concluded that because Liberia was yet shedding the scales of war, the Liberian climate is not yet suitable to hold the forum of the Liberian Studies Association Conference. The post- war circumstance is not yet conducive to expressions that challenge the limits of academic freedom of expression. Dr. Mary Antoinette Brown-Sherman then inquired about the progress of work with Dr. Liberty's book. The response was that the book will be completed and published very soon. In New Business, elections were first. Dr. William Allen nominated Dr. Dianne Oyler to succeed herself as Secretary/Treasurer. The nomination was closed on the one name, and Dr. Oyler was reelected. There was also an opening for one at- large board member to replace an out-going board member. Dr. Alpha Bah and Dr. James Guseh were nominated. Each nominee made brief campaign statements. Dr. Bah won the election with 17 votes to Dr. Guseh's 5 votes. There were three abstentions. In the final items from the floor, Mr. Tim Siklo mentioned the need to seek out some corporate sponsors. Dr. Gershoni noted that LSA can gain greater exposure by publishing the LSA Journal's Table of Contents on Internet resources. He mentioned a popular link that can benefit the Journal and the Association. Another

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suggestion was made to publicize conference presentations, and one of the last suggestions was to have the Journal present an award for the best paper of the year. The next item on the agenda was the Installation of the President. Dr. Cyril E. Broderick, the president-elect of the Association was called to the front of the assembly at the center of the stage. Other officers of the Association joined him there. Next, the Officers placed their hands on the head and shoulders of Dr. Broderick as the outgoing President, Dr. Joseph Holloway said the words of Investiture, thereby installing Dr. Broderick as the new President of the Liberian Studies Association. Dr. Broderick then made a brief statement that he solicits the assistance of the membership in the carrying out the objectives of the Association. He promised to work diligently and cooperatively with the officers and the members to assure sustained growth and development of LSA. Thereafter, a few announcements were made, and the business meeting of the 32nd Annual Conference ended.

Respectfully submitted: Cyril E. Broderick, Sr.

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New Publications on or Relevant to Liberia

Alao, MacKinley Olonisakim; MacKinlay, John; Fummi, Olonisakim; and Alao, Abrodren. Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process. New York: United Nations Publications, 2000.

Bah, M. Alpha. Fulbe Presence in Sierra Leone: A Case History of Twentieth Century Migration and Settlement Among the Tishi of Koindra. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1998.

Bayart, Jean-Francois; Ellis, Stephen; and Hibard, Beatrice. The Criminalization of the State in Africa. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Krenn, Michael L., ed. The African American Voice in U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Garland Publications, 1999.

Morris, Samuel; Jackson, Dave; Jackson, Neta; and Jackson, Julian. Quest for the Lost Prince. New York: Bethany Fellowship, 1996.

Sanneh, Lamin. Abolitionists Abroad: American Blacks and the Making of Modern West Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Whalin, Terry and Whalin, W. T. Samuel Morris: The Apostle of Simple Faith. New York: Chelsa House Publications, 1998.

Zartman, I. William, ed. Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1997.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXIV, 2 (1999)

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Documents

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT `OF MAESALuUSLITS

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION ) MAGISTRATE'S DOCKET

) NO. 84-1251-R CHARLES M. TAYLOR

SUBMISSION OF GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION AND ORDER OF EXTRADITABILITY

Now comes the United States of America, by and through its

attorney, William F. Weld, United States Attorney for the District

of Massachusetts, and files its Proposed Certification and Order of

Extradition in the above matter.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM F. WELD United States Attorney

By: RICHARD G. STEARNS Assistant U. S. Attorney

Liberian Studies Journal, XXV , 1 (2000)

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BAITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN-THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION ) MAGISTRATE'S DOCKET

) NO. 84-1251-R CHARLES M. TAYLOR

PROPOSED CERTIFICATION AND ORDER OF EXTRADITABILITY

Having held an extradition hearing on September 5 and 17,

1984, as well as proceedings earlier pursuant to Title 18, United

States Code, Section 3184, and having thoroughly reviewed the

formal extradition request and other exhibits submitted by the

parties as well as the arguments of counsel, the Court makes the

following findings of fact.

Evidence, competent for the purposes of this proceeding, has

been submitted which tennis to estah1ish the following:

1. At all times relevant to the charges, Charles Taylor

served as Director General of the General Services Administration

[GSA) of the Republic of Liberia. The GSA is a Liberian government

agency responsible for the requisition and purchase of equipment

and supplies intended for the use of the Liberian government and

its various ministries, agencies and departments.

2. .10n or about July 21, 1982, Taylor opened a personal

account No. 10817006 at Citibank in New York City. Taylor listed

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one Baldev S. Dhillon, also a Citibank account holder, as a

seferance Taylor. directed_ that all. mail relative to his account

be.zaisixessed- in oars of 14.93,-Sethi-, P.-0. Box 129, Iselin, New

Jersey 08830.

3. On or about September 20, 1982, Taylor received a

quotation from International Earthmoving Equipment, Inc. [IEE]

purporting to list prices and offering to supply parts for tractors

and other heavy equipment maintained by the Liberian Ministry of

Public Works. According to the quotation letter Taylor had agreed

to a $1,000,000 down payment-witha balance of $2,750,000 to be

financed in four equal installments at ten percent interest over

two years. The address listed on IEE's letterhead was P. O. Box

129, Iselin, New Jersey 08830.

4. On or about September 29, 1982, Taylor authorized three

separate disbursements of $310,763.22, $283,428.04 and $305,809.74

in favor of IEE as a purported down payment on the parts. A total

"of $9DI),0.01.00 vas .thus requisitioned by Taylor through the

ilinistTy of Finance.

5. On or about November 18, 1982, IEE opened a business

account No. 27909935 at Citibank in New York City. The account

was maintained at a zero balance until the first deposit on behalf

of the Liberian government was made by wire transfer on January 12,

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1983.1/ In its application to Citibank, IEE claimed to be an

unincorporated Liberian bALsinass, listing B. S_ nhillnn AS its

President and Treasurer. Dhillon and Manmohan Sethi -=were the

authorized signatories on IEE's account.

6. On or about November 25, 1982, Taylor wrote to Liberia's

Acting Minister of Finance requesting that the $900,001.00

disbursement on behalf of IEE be wired directly to IEE's Citibank

account No. 27909935. According to Taylor, IEE had nominated this

account number in a letter of November 3, 1982, an impossibility

given the date on which the account was actually opened.

7. Because of a shortage of foreign exchange, the Ministry

of Finance through the National Bank of Liberia arranged for a

commercial lender, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International

(BCCI), to advance funds to IEE against the Liberian government's

account. On or about January 12, 1983, BCCI wired the sum of

$305,809.74 to IEE's account at Citibank. This figure had been

specified by Taylor in 1022 of the three dishnnsement vouchers

submitted to the Ministry of Finance.

8. On or about January 13, 1983, IEE instructed Citibank to

debit its account in the amount of $100,000. That same day the sum

of $100,000 was credited to Taylor's personal account at Citibank.

1/ Although IEE had represented itself, through Taylor, to the Liberian government as an established dealer in equipment parts, IEE appears to have had no other bank accounts. In the seven month period from November, 1982 to early June, 1983, IEE's account shows only $78,000 in deposits above and beyond tne $922,382.70 transferred to IEE by the Republic of Liberia.

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9. On or about February 1, 1983, Taylor wrote to the

Kizaistry.laf -Finance _urging _:that asper-lial .attention'_ be given to

outstanding amounts owed certain vendors who had provided materials

and supplies to the Liberian government. IEE figured prominently

on the list of seven vendors provided by Taylor.

10. On or about February 24, 1983, at the request of the

National Bank of Liberia, BCCI wired a second installment of

$616,572.96 to IEE's Citibank account. Because of paperwork

confusion, this sum inadvertently duplicated the previously wired

disbursement of $305,809.74 instead of °the $283,428.04 disbursement

which should have been included. The overpayment of $22,381.70 was

not detected by the Ministry of Finance until on or about April 29,

1983.

11. On or about February 28, 1983, at the instruction of

Manmohan Sethi and Colossal Exports Corporation, the bulk of the

second Liberian transfer, $600,000, was transferred to the personal

account No- 10804942 of Baldev Dhillan at Citibank.

12. On or about May-3, 1983, Captain John Bestman, the Deputy

Minister of Finance, wrote to Taylor informing him of the

overpayment and asking him to take steps to recover the money from

IEE. Taylor did not respond to this letter, or a second, more

stiffly worded request forwarded by Captain Bestman on or about

July 13, 1983.

13- On or about July. 25, 1983, -a letter purportedly addressed

to_ Taylor by Hector Rivera, Senior Vice-President of ZEE, was

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placed in GSA's files. The letter claimed that the parts ordered

by Maylopr wnuld shortly be .dispatched to .Liberia by sea. No

evidence of the affiliation of a_liectorRivera as an-officer or

employee of IEE is apparent -from any records of the transaction

between Taylor and IEE.?/

14. Shortly thereafter, Taylor was reassigned from GSA to the

Ministry of Commerce. In September of 1983, without authorization,

Tayldr left Liberia for the United States.

15. None of the parts ordered by Taylor from IEE have been

delivered to Liberia; nor has any reimbursement of the $922,382.70

paid by Liberia to IEE been made. It also appears that IEE has

never responded to inquiries from the Liberian government

concerning the parts or the missing funds.

16. The Liberian government, through its own investigation,

has presented information tending to show a prior relationship

between Taylor and Baldev Dhillon, the President of IEE, involving

a_ company styled as.Green.Coast Impart and Export, .as well as a

company styled as Colossal Export anc import Corporation d/b/a

Inter-Ocean Finance and Trading Co. These companies appear in one

form or another to have been owned or represented by Dhillon.

1/Some similarity between the handwriting..of Manmohan Sethi as it appears on the signature card for IEE's Citibank account and the signature which purports to be Rivera'S in the letter of July 25 can be observed.

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Both Green Coast2 / and Colossal were beneficiaries of orders

placed by Taylor in his capacity AA DIrectoor.,4Winersd at a&A And

both received substantial payments from the Liberian government.

17. The Liberian government has also through its Own

investigation presented information tending to show a prior

relationship between Taylor and Manmohan Sethi, the second

principal in ZEE and a partner of Dhillon in Colossal Export

Corpotation.

18. Other credible evidence has been presented by the United

States government on behalf of the Republic of Liberia tending to

show a relationship among Taylor, Dhillon and Sethi. In summary,

this evidence consists of the following:

a. Dhillon served as the reference for purposes of

establishing Taylor's personal bank account at Citibank.

b. Taylor used IEE's New Jersey address as the mailing

address for statements and other correspondence concerning his

Citibank amount

C. In a search conducted by the U. S. Marshal incident to

Taylor's arrest on a provisional warrant of extradition, Taylor's

wallet was found to contain Dhillon's business card and a personal

check written to Taylor by Dhillon in the amount of $5,000.

3/ - Green Coast is alleged in a statement by Edwin Holder, one of its principals, to have been organized at Taylor's instigation. According to Liberian authorities, Green Coast was a non-functioning company which used Dhillon's Liberian company's mailing address.

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d. Also incident to arrest Taylor's wallet was found to

.con rain a bill for -the leas.ona connominimm owned by Manahan Sethi.

19. I also find that an FBI inquiry has established that

IBE's Iselin, New Jersey, post office box 129 is in fact owned by

Colossal Export Corporation which lists Manmohan Sethi as its

President. Colossal in turn shares an office and secretary with a

travel agency owned by Dhillon. The secretary, in an interview

with FBI agents, stated that Taylor had visited Sethi at the

premises on several occasions. Sethi, also interviewed by the FBI,

claimed that IEE had been incorporated with himself as sole owner

for purposes of transacting business in South America, and had

never in fact done business or maintained a bank account. These

st.tPm,..?nt: to tt' FBI hy T

20. I also attribute significance to the fact that Taylor,

despite his modest salary as a Liberian government official, is

shown by records of .Citibank to have been the beneficiary of in

excess of $800,000 deposited to his personal account during the

nine months between January, 1983 and September, 1983. Included in

these transactions, and confirmed by an advice found in Taylor's

wallet, is a transfer of $60,000 from a Swiss branch of

Manufacturer's Hanover Trust to Taylor's Citibank account.

The Court is satisfied that the above facts, among those

forming the basis of the charges pending. against Charles Taylor in

the Republic of Liberia, as enumerated in the Request for

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Provisional Arrest of May 21, 1984 and as amended by the Writ of

aixest.miasued Mane 1, 1944, haze .been sufficiently established for

purposes of this proceeding.

The Writ of Arrest alleges that Taylor by-virtue of this

employment as Director-General of GSA, by trick and artifice, did

steal, take, appropriate_ and convert to his own use money in the

sum of $922,382.70 belonging to the Republic of Liberia in

violation of Chapter 15, Section 15.51, subsections (a) and (b) of

the New Penal Code of Liberia. The Writ further alleges that

Charles Taylor, contrary to his trust as Director-General of GSA,

with intent to cheat and defraud the Liberian government,

wrongfully caused the transfer of $922,382.70, to International

Earthmoving Equipment in disregard of the risk of loss to the

Liberian government in violation of Chapter 15, Section 15.56 of

the New Penal Code of Liberia.

The applicable sections of Liberian law correspond to

&ea...Minns 641_emod 648 of Title 18 of eke United_States Code.

The offenses are covered by Article II of the Treaty of

Extradition in force between the United States and the Republic of

Liberia (Treaty Series 955; 54 Stat. 1733).

The Court finds the evidence sufficient under the provisions

of the Treaty of Extradition to sustain the extradition charges

against Charles Taylor. The Court hereby certifies the same

together with a copy of all evidence presented to the Court to the

Secretary of State of the United States.

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Specifically, the Court certifies that it has found probable

manse to believe:

(1) that the Charles Taylor who is sought by the, authorities

of the-Republic of Liberia and the Charles Taylor arrested in this

District who appeared before this Court are one and the same

individual;i/

(2) that there are criminal charges pending against Charles

Taylor in the Republic of Liberia;

(3) that there is an outstanding warrant for Charles

Taylor's arrest issued by a competent court in the Republic of

Liberia as a result of these charges;

(4) that there is sufficient evidence before this Court to

establish probable cause to believe that the offenses charged were

committed within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Liberia and

that there is probable cause to believe that Charles Taylor

committed those offenses;

(5) that the Treaty of.Extrarlition entered by the United

States and the Republic of Liberia on November 1, 1937 remains in

full force and effect;

(6) that the offenses of which Charles Taylor is accused are

among the extraditable offenses enumerated by Article II of the

Treaty of Extradition;

1/This fact was not disputed by the parties.

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(7) that there is insufficient evidence before this Court to

find-an examptioa to extradition =Ilex Article III of the Treaty of

.extradition.

Therefore, the Court ORDERS Charles Taylor committed without

bond to the custody of the U. S. Marshal pending the issuance of an

extradition warrant by the Secretary of State of the United

States.

The Court further ORDERS that this Certificate of

Extraditability and Order of Commitment, along with the transcript

of evidence and exhibits presented in this case, as well as the

formal extradition documents, be forwarded to the Secretary of

State by the Clerk of this Court.

ROBERT J. DeGIACOMO United States Magistrate

ENTERED:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Boston, Massachusetts September 13, 1984

I, Richard G. Stearns, Assistant U. S. Attorney, hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Proposed Certification and Order of Extraditability was on this date mailed via Express Mail to Ramsey Clark, Esquire, Clark, Wulf & Levine, 113 University Place, New York, New York 10003, attorney of record herein.

RICHARD G. STEARNS Assistant U. S. Attorney

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ASSOCIATION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA

April 9, 1990

Clarence Simpson, Jr. Exectilive Doard Alexandria, VA

I lair), A. Greaves. fzekeei 0. l'ajibo Dear Mr. b Mrs. Simpson Mom° K. Rogers As you have probably heard, Liberia is in the midst of a Amos Sawyer war----a war of spearheaded by our compatriots, rairick liberation I. N. Seynn the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, against the Vivo lohosoo barbarous, tyrannical regime of M/Sgt. Samuel Doe, f:/N tamaciee self- VVoalliee proclaimed President of Liberia.

The war commenced on December 24, 1989 in Butuo, Nlmba County and has been raging since then at varying levels of intensity. At first, Doe mistakenly took what was essentially a guerrilla action for the normal run-of-the-mill "coup" and despatched a massive force to crush it.i his troops were ambushed and totally routed, with casualties reportedly running into several hundred dead. His reaction? To sand in reinforcements, with orders to shoot at anything that moved: i.e. unarmed men, women and children. The resulting mayhem has caused the disappearance of entire villages and the flight of over 150,000 Liberians into Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire.

As I write you, the NPFL has captured and is holding a large swathe of land stretching from the Ivorian border down as far as Bong County. A few -eekr ago they overran a military barrack at Wadru, In Grand Gedeh County, that was being used to train new recruits for Doe's army, and immobilized the Ganta-harper road. Lately, word has reached us that NPFL forces are descending upon Gbarnga, capital of Bong County and a mere three hours' drive from the nation's capital, Monrovia. All independent reports indicate that the NPFL advance is gaining momentum, and it seems now just a matter of time before the action reaches Monrovia, the seat of Doe's government and the probable site of the final battle---if, that is, Doe chooses to fight rather than run away in his new $20 million Boeing 707.

Over the course of the past few years we have been striving for the replacement of the present military dictatorship with a genuinely democratic government, grounded in the Liberian Constitution end legitimized through -free and fair elections. M/Sgt. Doe's track record convinces us that that theme goals cannot be achieved while he is head of the government. That view appears to be shared by the vast majority of Liberians, including the victims of the current conflict. For. all independent reports we have received from the refugee community emphasize the fact that they too feel that they will not be able to return to their peaceful lives until the t'i-utal reign of terror of M/Sgt. Doe is over.

That is why the current initiative must not be allowed to falter or fail. The memories of the aftermath of November 12, 1985 are still fresh in many of our minds. We remember all too well the terrible price that was paid---by combatants as well as non-combatants---at the hands of Doe's murder machine. That lesson must not be repeated.

P.T.O.

1'.0. 1111, 2911111, Watliingltut. iSc 251)17

Liberian Studies Journal, XXV , 1 (2000)

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So, for all of us who love Liberia---citizens as well as fridnds. of Liberia, active participants in the struggle as well as silent supporters---it is time to redouble our efforts. There is light at the end of the tunnel, and it is beaming brightly. What we need new is to summon up our last reserves in order to hasten the okit ofthb H /Sgt. That is why I am makino this personal appeal to you to mak!! a generous $20, $50, or $100 contribution to the cause. Checks and money orders should be made payable to "ACDL" and mailed to P.0.8ox 3835 Merrifield, VA 22116-3835

Your donation will be treated in the strictest confidence.

If you wish to make a separate contribution to the fund.we have established for providing relief to the refugees, make your check/money order payable to "ACDL/Refugee Fund"

Our attorneys, Messrs. Lichtman, Trister, Singer & Rose, nave applied for tax-exempt status for ACDL under S.301(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which, when approved, will be retroactive to December 1988. Thank you for your support. Yours sincerely,---,

I!. ry A. Greaves, T USURER

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The Conspiracy of Silence and Inaction (Editorial)

Emotionally wounded by the trauma of seven years of factional fighting, and abandoned by a regime incapable of providing adequate programs for rehabilitation, the Liberian populace decided to keep quiet and internalize its pain. Survival instincts and indecision which are hallmarks of our national upbringing, impelled the public to support all sides of the violence. This devious national behavior sent the wrong signal to each wicked warlord that his action was in the national interest. The failure to be courageous in opposing these depraved men proved deadly for the population as manifested by the outcome of the conflict. The factions killed thousands of civilians in their virulent besiege of the country. Yet our people have not learned the lesson that "power concedes nothing without demand" and complacency only enhances the hands of the tyrant. Today in Liberia, the people have resigned themselves to the unfortunate fate of compliant subjects to the overwhelming might and absolute rule of the reprobate Charles Taylor. The voice of the people, which should have been the voice of God, (Vox populi, vox Dei) has been muted. The nation is gripped by fear and intimidation, and the national spirit weakened and demoralized by hopelessness as Mr. Taylor acquires and usurps more power to the detriment of democracy. But while Taylor rapidly escalates this mutilation of democracy, the Liberian public, political parties, and other civic organizations have steadily drifted into a more dangerous conspiracy of silence and inaction. They have failed to speak out against the evils of society and the continued brazen abuse of power by the Taylor government. There is no credible voice of conscience in Liberia today. Instead, the people have become accomplices of the Liberian dictator by their reticence and disengagement, thus contributing to the regime's political overreaching. The Perspective has observed with poignant disappointment the deafening silence in Monrovia in the face of blatant disdain for life, and contemptible disrespect for democratic values. For instance, when former Taylor's loyalist Sam Dokie and family were ambushed, killed and their bodies decapitated by Taylor's security agents, the Liberian people remained conspicuously silent and decidedly detached. There was no vehement outcry from religious institutions or a united condemnation by the political parties.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXV ,1 (2000)

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Benjamin Yeaten, the man who ordered the Dokies arrested never appeared in court to testify. During the trial, he was kept out of sight, practically housebound at Taylor's mansion from where he directed the notorious Special Security Service (SSS). There are reports that link Mr. Yeaten with the death of a leading Nimba county citizen during the war. And today in Monrovia, he is one of fearsome individuals within Taylor's inner circle. And in a stunning display of arrogance and contempt for the sanctity of the constitution, the regime orchestrated a show trial in which the government created phantom perpetrators, and ceded to itself the task of proving the subjects innocent. In this grave travesty in Liberia's jurisprudence and a miscarriage of justice, Taylor realized then the vulnerability of the citizenry and his own wicked ability to manipulate events without any opposition. Emboldened by the impotency of resolve and submissive posture of Liberians, Taylor decided to move against ethnic Krahns on Camp Johnson Road in what is known as the September Massacre of 1998. The Krahns had made the ill-fated decision that by congregating in a section of ravaged Monrovia would give them some sense of security. They were deadly mistaken. In a callous contempt for life, Taylor sent in his death squad, headed by his son, Chucky Taylor, to liquidate the Krahns. His forces, armed with rocket propelled grenades and other weapons of terror, menacingly and deliberately gunned down unarmed civilians, mainly Krahn supporters of former guerrilla leader D. Roosevelt Johnson. Again, the opposition political parties as well as other presumed voices of reason chose silence and inaction over courage. Moreover, as signs of his failure to effectively deal with the country's problems became apparent, the Liberian ruler is becoming more eccentric. God is now directing his actions. He seems more and more like a man in need of psychiatric help than international economic assistance. His rhetoric is now shrouded in bellicose tone, often blaming his perceived enemies for his failure. And as a tactic of diversion in most totalitarian regimes-and Liberia is no exception-the cause of failure often rests elsewhere. Earlier, Mr. Taylor decided to purge one of his former confidants, Sen. Charles W. Brumskine, from the leadership of the Liberian Senate. Taylor, who relishes the imperial presidency, had concluded that the independent-minded Brumskine was no longer a team player, thus a threat to the dictator's autocratic rule. Of course, The Perspective recognizes the right of the National Patriotic Party, like all democratic organizations, to choose its leaders. But soon after the

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controversial purging of Sen. Brumskine, the notorious security forces began stalking his every movement. And amidst all this, President Taylor issued so-called assurances laced with implicit warning to Brumskine not "to put Bassa people

against the rest of Liberia . . ." In addition, The Perspective received information indicating the Brumskine and Associate Law Firm would soon be dissolved. According to credible sources in Monrovia, Brumskine and Associate, which is among the best and prestigious in the country, is being dissolved due to "political pressure" which is being mounted on the clients of the firm, thereby rendering it insolvent. This tyrannical way of forcing people into submission is not only dangerous, but also runs counter to democratic practices. But as Taylor pursues his strategy of eliminating dissenting voices which is intended to stifle competition of ideas, and impede a healthy political environment, the opposition parties surrender their relevance by the collective failure to demonstrate leadership. They have kowtowed to the dictatorship as shown by their obvious silence on such critical national issues. Why do we need opposition political parties when their leaders do not have the guts to condemn cold-bloody killings such as Dokie and family, and the cowardly elimination of Krahn civilians on Camp Johnson Road? And what good is an opposition when most of its leaders cannot muster the courage to speak out publicly against the resurgence of the vile, monolithic, one party state? To remove this absurdity from the sublime to the ridiculous, the opposition has become Taylor's agents. It stands worthless as Mr. Taylor chips at every aspect of democracy, in his desperate effort to restore the old political order of ruthless, undemocratic, minority supremacy. Clearly, the restoration of Liberia's perilous past should alarm all Liberians. It was the diabolical, inhumane, corrupt characteristic of our past that gave impetus to the popular overthrow of the elitist government in 1980. Yet the reactionary Taylor is determined to restore that insidious hegemony. And so far he has succeeded mainly because the citizenry has given in to war-weariness and antipathy to politics, while the sterile and self-serving political cults have lost their raison d' etre. Webster's New World Dictionary defines opposition party as "a political party opposing, and serving as a check on the party in power." In a broader context, the opposition is to make sure that the ruling party abide by the laws and live up to the dictates of the constitution, as well as provide for the general welfare of the

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people. And as a general rule, the opposition should be poised at all times to provide alternative programs and policy which would ameliorate the lot [of] the citizens and advance pluralistic democracy. The idiotic refrain by some slick self-serving politicos of succumbing to every Liberian dictator under the guise of being patriotic and loyal opposition is absurd. Holding the ruling party's feet to the fire to make sure it conduct[s] national polices within democratic framework, providing a set of alternative solutions amenable to the people, and being patriotic and loyal are not mutually exclusive. Our patriotism and loyalty should be to the state, not to some all assuming tyrant. But recently, a group of opposition politicians was dispatched to the United States and Europe to engage donor countries about the economic assistance to Liberia. They claimed they came on this mission on their own, ostensibly, because of their love for Liberia and deep commitment to serve its people. Their real reason, however, was to serve their own interest. Every Liberian knows that most of these politicians depend on Charles Taylor for pocket change and daily meal in Monrovia. How dare they think we are that gullible to their little charade! No doubt, these ingratiating politicians did not realize that no messengers can convince donor countries to help Liberia. The world community had very much outlined what Liberia must do as a condition for economic assistance. Instead of wasting time and money, the opposition ought to call on the regime to meet the requirements of the donor countries. Those requirements are in the best interest of our people, and will help strengthen democracy. Meanwhile, the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA)-an umbrella Liberian organization founded in the United States to advocate democratic changes in Liberia-has fallen in the hands, and run by stooges of the Liberian bandit. Like their counterpart, the so-called opposition parties in Monrovia, these Taylor's ULAA surrogates rationalize the regime's dismal human rights record and brazen abuse of power. These Taylor's apologists usually blame organizations such as the Liberian Democratic Future, publisher of this magazine, and others for the precarious economic inactivity in Liberia. They have turned a model watchdog organization into a bastion for Taylor. And afraid of being thrown out of power, they have refused to hold elections. The much despised Union leadership has used Taylor-like tactics to stay in power. It now serves as one of many links to Mr. Taylor's network in the United States. The Union's abandonment of its core principle and siding with the

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enemy of democracy gives credence to the assertion by Joseph De Maistre in his Letter that "Every nation has the government it deserves." Similarly, most Liberians who took part in demonstrations to bring our plight to the fore in 1970's and 1980's had become disenchanted and disengaged. Some are disillusioned and fed up with the corruption of ULAA, the manipulation of its charter to benefit its leaders and the overall distrust of Liberian politicians. All in all, our people have given in to apathy and cynicism, and chosen complacency and content. They are now part of the conspiracy of silence and inaction. They have lost their sense of commitment. Most importantly, they have waived the future of our children to this pickpocket and fugitive from justice. But while these self-serving Liberian political hustlers try to conceal the regime's ruthless crackdown and polish Taylor's image abroad, the bandit continues to fabricate episodes of coup attempts to overthrow his regime. Recently, state-inspired terrorist groups staged what appeared to be a dissident incursion into Voinjama in which scores of people were killed. Several properties were looted and vehicles belonging to relief agencies stolen and taken to Monrovia. Again Taylor, chief master of chicanery, blamed his former partner-in-war, Alhaji G. V. Kromah for the incident. However, most people believe Taylor and his security apparatchiks concocted the scheme to continue the strategy of holding the country hostage to fear and intimidation. And, many think this might be the prelude of implicating yet another group of people for possible treason or sedition charges or elimination. The modus of operandi is typical Taylor's, a zealot of hyperbole, skillful in magnifying insignificant incidents as a backdrop for a more, sinister political objective. As he ponders and plots strategies for his next victims, gutless Liberian opposition politicians have become [a] conduit of Mr. Taylor and his goveniment. It is difficult to tell the difference, if any, between the killer regime and the nominal opposition. And sadly, the Liberian people, scarred and demoralized by the war, are left in agony without a voice of hope.

Source: Courtesy of The Perspective,Liberian Connection.

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Post-War Liberia Starts Over Again Toward Fitful Peace, Economic Hardship

JeffDrumtra

U.S. Committee for Refugees Africa has experienced many wars during the 1990s, but few armed conflicts wreaked as much destruction in all regions of a single country and against all social classes as did the civil war in the West African country of Liberia. As the decade that ruined Liberia comes to an end, the people of Liberia realize that they stand at a crossroads in their country's history. They nervously wonder which road leads to permanent peace, and which path leads back to war. Virtually all of Liberia's 3 million citizens fled their homes for weeks, months, or years during that country's seven years of bloodshed. An estimated 150,000 Liberians died as up to 11 armed factions battled against each other and terrorized the entire population from late 1989 until late 1996. The years of chaos trashed virtually beyond recognition Liberia's proud national system of education and health care arguably the best in impoverished West Africa before the war. Strong ties between the United States and Liberia convinced many Liberians that American soldiers would eventually wade ashore and restore stability in their ravaged country. (Freed American slaves have historically dominated Liberia's politics and economy.) Direct U.S. military assistance never arrived, however. Three years ago, Liberia's long war officially ended when the country's exhausted armed factions agreed to hold national elections. A fitful peace has replaced the gunfire. Three-quarters of the country's uprooted people have anxiously returned to their homes, although some 200,000 Liberian refugees remain in neighboring asylum countries, wary of their country's future. Nearly 3,000 Liberians have gained individual permanent asylum in the United States during the 1990s, and more than 6,500 have been resettled through the U.S. refugee resettlement program. An additional 10,000 Liberians continue to receive temporary refuge in the United States, their eventual deportation delayed by the Clinton Administration until late

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2000 because of political and economic conditions inside Liberia. (See Refugee Reports, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 11.)

Come Home and Leave Many Liberians express mixed emotions about their return home and their prospects for the future. Philip Jackson, a 30-year-old Liberian, hopes that all Liberian refugees rapidly return home. He adds, however, that he has mixed emotions about Liberia's future. In a devastated country with up to 80 percent underemployment, Philip is one of the fortunate few. He earns the equivalent of $500 per month working for a prominent international aid organization. Philip's salary must stretch to support his wife, four children, and three-dozen friends and relatives. Philip (not his real name) asks that his actual identity remain anonymous to spare him troubles with authorities. He is ethnic Krahn, the group that is widely perceived to have endured the greatest political and economic losses during the war. Philip fled temporarily to Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire during the long conflict. But he has returned home and managed to secure a lucrative job despite his disdain for the current Liberian government. "We don't have 100 percent security, but it is improved. Things have been

picking up economically. . . . I would tell them [Liberian refugees] to go home. I would tell them, 'Your voice and my voice blended together can make a difference. It is up to us to rebuild our country. We made this war. It is our home we spoiled it, and we can fix it."' "If they [current refugees] would come back home, I would feel very proud. The only way for us to regain credibility as a country is to bring back credible people, especially people [with skills in] education, health care, and reconstruction. With them coming back, Liberia could take its rightful place in the world. Without them, there is a cloud hanging over Liberia." He divulges, however, that he recently sent his family back into exile for security reasons. "There is no future in Liberia now," Philip concludes. While the majority of Liberians struggle to rebuild their country, significant numbers of well-educated Liberians acknowledge that they have virtually "given up" on their homeland and might settle permanently in other countries for political or economic reasons.

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"The bulk of the most educated and most experienced Liberians are not in the country" anymore, a Liberian lawyer observed. "There is a permanent removal of these very highly trained people." "What's disappointing to me is the number of Liberians whom I wish were there [in Liberia] but are not there. They are missing in action," an American with long experience in Liberia lamented. "If they [returned to] Liberia, the nature of political discussion inside Liberia would be different. Liberians have to take the risk and commitment to return home. Their presence in the country would contribute to a solution. Their absence contributes to the problems." The country's problems are evident. Liberian voters in 1997 elected as president the most powerful armed faction leader, Charles Taylor, largely to ensure his cooperation in ending the war. Liberians widely complain that President Taylor has reneged on his campaign promises and that his government is "both incompetent and corrupt extremely incompetent and extremely corrupt," as one Liberian put it. (See Refugee Reports, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 12.) The U.S. government and other major donors agree with that assessment. Apparently so does Alexander Kulue, executive director of the Liberian government's Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission and a frequent public critic of his government colleagues. "Honesty and sincerity [are] lacking in our country. We don't have a lot of honest men in this government," Kulue told Refugee Reports. "Our leaders have to realize that the way we're going is not the way to go. They have not realized that yet.

. . . The government does not show good judgment, so how can we convince donors to give us money? I understand the government is not so good yet and [donors] don't want to give it money. I agree." The capital city, Monrovia, remains without electricity and is still cluttered with ugly shells of buildings destroyed by the war. Prices remain higher, and supplies of staple foods and goods remain lower, than pre-war levels. Several key highways are virtually impassable one-third of the year because of rains and years of neglect. Paychecks to government employees are modest as little as $10 per month and reach employees months late. Residents in most rural areas are virtually cut off from regular news and information about their country, unable to hear the capital city's seven radio stations because of the stations' budget problems and government restrictions on broadcasts. Shockingly low student test scores on national scholastic exams in mid-1999

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emphasize the deleterious effects of school overcrowding and the erosion of academic standards compared to the pre war period. "It has been two years [since the national election], and still there are no social services, poor schools, few hospitals, no running water, and no electricity in the whole country," a Monrovia resident complained. Struggling to come to grips with the war's legacy of enormous ruin and a substantially lower standard of living, Liberians are impatient for the benefits they expected peace to bring.

Post-War, But Not Post-Conflict In addition to economic and social hardships, sporadic violence and looting during the past year kept Liberians on edge. In many areas of the country, particularly in Monrovia and the northern county of Lofa, residents believe that three years of relative peace still have not yielded reliable stability. "Liberia is a post-war country, but not a post-conflict country," an international aid worker in Monrovia observed. In September 1998, up to 18,000 ethnic Krahn Liberians fled to neighboring Cote d'Ivoire after government soldiers and Krahn militia clashed in Monrovia, leaving hundreds of civilians dead in the capital, according to some estimates. Twice in the past eight months, in April and August 1999. armed elements attacked villages in remote Lofa county, destroying homes, looting international relief supplies, and temporarily taking aid workers and international diplomats hostage. Up to 8,000 ethnic Mandingo Liberians fled to neighboring Guinea in April. In August, continued looting and violence displaced thousands of Lofa county residents, many of whom remained uprooted in October. Most aid organizations, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), pulled out of upper Lofa county in August. UNHCR said its withdrawal was "permanent" because of recurring insecurity and targeting of relief operations there. Most Liberians and international observers believe that Liberian government security forces were heavily involved in the looting and destruction in Lofa in April and August. Whether President Taylor sanctioned the violence by his troops remains unknown. "Nothing is done to bring these people [undisciplined government soldiers] to book," charged James Verdier, associate director of the Justice and Peace

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Commission, a respected local human rights organization. "There is government complicity in most of these cases." "This has an effect on the return of refugees from neighboring countries. Before August, there was an appreciable number of returns. But since then, many have gone back" to asylum countries, Verdier said. "These events do not encourage people to come home." Liberia's current security problems stem in part from the flawed disarmament process immediately after the war. International donors, including the United States, failed to provide proper funding to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate some 40,000 combatants back into Liberian society. Liberians say they are convinced that many ex-combatants, particularly child soldiers, did not receive the post-war psychological counseling they desperately needed. They assert that many former combatants retain access to weapons that they now use for periodic looting. "There may be a lot of freelancing going on," a Liberian human rights worker said. "People who fought with a faction during the war, and now feel abandoned by their leaders" might dramatize their alienation from the political and economic mainstream by reverting to violence, he said. Although most of Liberia's two-dozen main ethnic groups co-exist peacefully, the war has left scattered tensions, particularly against two groups ethnic Mandingoes and Krahns who formed ethnic-based armies before or during the war. Strong ethnic hostilities exist in parts of Lofa county, where Mandingoes and ethnic Lomas have traditionally competed for economic advantage. Atrocities committed by and against both those groups during the war aggravated animosities that persist today. Between half and three-quarters of the 200,000 Liberian refugees who so far have refused to repatriate are Mandingoes, Krahns, or residents of troubled Lofa county, according to demographic information compiled in asylum countries. Some Mandingo families in Lofa and Nimba counties reportedly have been unable to regain possession of their homes and properties after returning to Liberia. Fear and discrimination are not uniform, however. Thousands of Krahn families returned safely to eastern Liberia's Grand Gedah county. Many told Refugee Reports that they feel secure. Thousands of Mandingoes managed to re-establish their lives in Liberia. And sizable parts of Lofa county remain free of post-war violence. Liberia's people are left with a tenuous peace that is threatened by undisciplined soldiers, disillusioned ex-combatants, pockets of ethnic hostility, and

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economic hardship. It is a peace that, in the hearts of many Liberians, produces more anxiety than comfort. "The majority of Liberians have a fear that things can happen at any time. People keep thinking something [bad] will happen," said Reverend Christian Harding, a Liberian Episcopal priest.

Aid Strategies Limited The international community has responded cautiously to Liberia's considerable needs for reintegration programs, renovation, and long-term development aid. International donors, led by the United States, hesitate to pump aid dollars into a Liberian government widely suspected of corruption. mismanagement, and human rights problems. Liberian returnees receive far less reintegration assistance on a per capita basis than do returnees in many other regions of the world. The World Bank, capable of tapping hundreds of millions of dollars for Liberia, curtailed its activities in Liberia earlier this year in hopes of pressuring Liberian authorities into management reforms and improved accountability for public expenditures. UNHCR and international NGOs struggle to attract timely, adequate tending and are gun-shy after repeatedly suffering attacks, looting of relief equipment, and emergency staff evacuations throughout the 1990s. (Earlier this year, aid agencies lost more than $1 million worth of food, vehicles, radios, and other assets in two major security incidents in Lofa county.) In October, Medecins Sans Frontieres lost thousands of dollars and evacuated a French staff member wounded by armed intruders in southeastern Liberia's Maryland county, previously a quiet area. Despite security concerns and limited funding, international and local aid organizations operate a range of assistance programs. Catholic Relief Services delivers food used in food-for-work programs and supports agricultural projects in selected counties. The American Refugee Committee operates a micro-credit loan program that will provide up to a quarter-million dollars in small loans, $100 to S225 each, to help jump-start new local businesses. Adventist Development and Relief Agency renovates schools buildings, conducts teacher training workshops, and sponsors income generation projects. The International Foundation for Education and Self-Help operates programs in health education, women's literacy, social reconciliation, small loans, and school

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renovation. Search for Common Ground supports local production of radio broadcasts specially geared to facilitate reintegration and social reconciliation. The Carter Center operates a $600,000 "democracy and governance" program aimed at strengthening local human rights organizations and improving the skills and independence of local journalists. Recent cutbacks in U.S. funding have endangered the Carter Center program, however, and forced the National Democratic Institute to suspend similar programs intended to strengthen democratic practices in Liberia. "We found ourselves in a situation where everything is to be done. You go into the bush and see" widespread needs, said Guy Avognon, UNHCR repatriation officer in Liberia. "Even if we had received twice the amount of money we requested, the need is still so large." Before the war, Liberians relied on what they described as a "special relationship" with the United States that steered considerable aid money and other benefits to their country. Now Liberian society is coming to the painful realization that the "special relationship" is finished. Neither international aid donors nor international business investors are standing in line to channel huge sums of money into post-war Liberia. And the Liberian government has, so far, been unable or unwilling to improve conditions for the vast majority of the population. "Liberians have always expected more from Americans than Americans have ever given," said one Liberian exile who says he might never return home. "Liberians have always thought there was a special relationship between the United States and Liberia. But it is more like a relationship of unresponsive love." (On October 12, the U.S. State Department removed Liberia from the "Priority Three" refugee processing priority list. Consequently, Liberian refugees overseas will no longer be eligible to receive consideration for U.S. admission based on petitions from close family members who legally reside in the United States. See story, State Department Scales Back Family-Based Refugee Processing for Africans.)

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A Joint Statement in Opposition to President Taylor's Visit to the U.S.

To the astonishment of Liberians and people of conscience who have followed developments which caused more than 250,000 lives in Liberia since Charles Taylor's reign of terror, there is a document from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entitled: Notice of Nolte Prosequi. The notice was dated October 13, 1998, and signed by District Attorney Michael J. Sullivan, and First Assistant District

Attorney Joseph P. Gaughan. According to the document, ". . . the State Department has requested in the interest of harmonious relations between the United States and Liberia, that this charge be dismissed against Charles Taylor." This move has cleared the way for fugitive Taylor's entry into the U.S. Years ago, the U.S. launched a manhunt for Taylor for planning an escape from a Massachusetts federal prison, along with other inmates. This fugitive who has taken Liberia a hundred years back will enter U. S., a country that prides itself as a world policeman, as a hero. Ironically, no one in the U.S. State Department is prepared to claim responsibility for the criminal charges dropped against the fugitive Liberian president. Reporting the decision, the BBC said a U.S. State Department official quoted wished to remain "anonymous." Quoting an unidentified Washington source, Star Radio of Monrovia indicated that an American official said the decision was in the interest of "justice." In quandary, we ponder whether this decision is official. If it is, what has prompted such a bewildering development? To give a man with so much blood on his hands a chance to travel to the United States in the name of "justice" appears bogus at best. Having appointed himself general services agency director in the Doe regime, Taylor robbed Liberia of one million U.S. dollars. He fled but was caught in Boston for extradition to face trial in Liberia. Meanwhile, Taylor broke jail and headed for Africa. With Libya, Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast's backing, he invaded Liberia, setting the basis to destabilize West Africa. ECOMOG helped minimize what would have annihilated the nation in Taylor's desperate bid to be president. This mad man recruited 45,000 children (robbed of their youth) in his rampaging and pillaging army. About 20,000 of them died in battle not knowing

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why. In 1997, an election of sorts was organized by the late Sani Abacha, then Nigerian head of state. But before then, Taylor had thoroughly looted Liberia, stole and sold giant generators, TV transmitters, and industrial equipment to countries like Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast in return for arms. State property became his as he launched illegal logging operations, sold Liberia's iron ore, diamonds, gold and pocketed the proceeds. Although disarmament was the key for the elections, Taylor simply hid his arms and kept the command structure of his marauding private army intact in case he lost the election. The Nigerian commander of the West African force would later admit that disarmament was a farce after a series of disagreements with Taylor that ended a dubious marriage of convenience. The elections have led to more isolation and insecurity. Many towns and villages are empty as Taylor's predatory army-with less to loot-turn on farmers, peasants and small traders. The U.S. State Department has revealed Taylor's policy of dispatching soldiers to rural areas without compensation-a tacit approval of organized looting. Various organizations have reported this year that about one million Liberians in refugee camps have refused to return home and those who did were driven back because of the continuing terror campaign waged by Taylor's security forces. The man who willfully destroyed the bedrock of his nation's economy wants more money from the international community to pocket. Liberia's pre-war export earnings stood at US$702 million annually. There is no interest to resurrect the dead economy. Liberia is run by international aid organizations that exclusively provide social services while Taylor's policies ensure chronic economic paralysis. The unstoppable downward spiral in the economy is not surprising because key economic institutions have become private property of Taylor and his cronies, according to the U.S. State Department 1998 Country Report on Human Rights Practices. Extortion has become "widespread" while a big share of the national budget, which is about US$64 million, goes toward the security of Taylor and his family. A fearsome gang composed of Burkinabes, Guineans, Ghanaians, etc. is commanded by his son, and this force was primarily responsible for the attack on unarmed civilians in September 1998. Many Liberians wished Taylor's presidency would have brought relief from harassment and terror. The opposite is now the case. The man who masterminded the killing of thousands of people and massive destruction of property in the name of change and democracy has embarked on erecting the foundation of a ruthless

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dictatorship unequaled in world history with an ultimate obsession to become a leader in Africa. Evidence abounds that Taylor represents no cause but his own, preoccupied with crude wealth accumulation. With his calculated destruction of Monrovia's power facilities during the war, Taylor and his associates are the only persons who have power and water in the city. Moreover, Taylor rides an array of expensive cars, including a Rolls Royce while over one million Liberians were reported by the World Food Organization to have been dependent on relief food in 1998. Employment opportunities are lacking, with the average wage of the highest paid public servant standing at US$20 per month. Amid such economic malaise, Taylor, his family and trusted friends live in unparalleled luxury while the child soldiers who brought him to power roam the streets without any future or hope for education. This is the man the Clinton administration wants to give a triumphant entry into America. Quite interestingly, the U.S. government pursues other war criminals around the globe. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice recently noted that America would insist on the investigation of war crimes in Sierra I eone. And as an indication of its determination to see real justice in Kosovo, the Clinton administration is using tremendous resources to ensure that those guilty of war crimes receive the required punishment. But in Liberia, a country that lost over 250,000 people and placed on the world map for recruiting children as soldiers, with over 40,000 of them left without a future so that Taylor could ride a Rolls Royce and become wealthy, America's message is different: Washington's welcome of a man who spearheaded the butchering of so many people is a terrible indictment of equal justice and a serious dent for democratization. If justice were without bias in contemporary times, President Charles Taylor would have been tried for war crimes. This psychopath subjects the West African region to a cycle of terror for personal aims. People of conscience, therefore, should prevail upon the Clinton administration to rethink its policy toward Liberia by canceling the planned visit and rescinding its decision to drop charges against a man who has no intention to repent for the terrible suffering he has imposed and continues to inflict on a helpless population. Failure to adopt even-handedness in the Liberian case will be a terrible message with uglier implications. To encourage dictators and corrupt men-as we saw in the case of Samuel Doe during the Reagan administration-leads to a

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groundswell for more chaos and anarchy. A repeat of this policy by an administration that has shown so much goodwill in Africa is a bad beginning latent with disaster. Briefly, let us review Taylor's record for which he should be stoppea from entering the United States this September:

1. Since Taylor became president as an alternative to more killings and wanton destruction, Liberia remains under siege. In September 1998, in defiance to his plea for reconciliation as a cornerstone for reconstruction and democratization, Taylor ordered his ex-fighters to storm a densely populated area of Monrovia with artillery weapons, mortars, machine guns, and bombs. According to the U.S. State Department, about 300 people, mostly ethnic Krahns, were gunned down. Other reports put the number of people killed to over 1,500 in view of the population density of the area attacked. A classic case of ethnic cleansing! Persons wounded during the attack, were pulled out of international medical ambulances and shot. A house-to-house search for Krahns was launched and those arrested were summarily executed. The terror against Krahns was so intense that those ethnic Krahns still living in abandoned homes asked for international assistance to be evacuated out of the city. According to U.S. State Department, 11 officers of the Armed Forces of Liberia, believed to be ethnic Krahns, were arrested, interrogated, tortured and shot. Taylor however claimed the men were killed in an attempt to escape, a lie disputed by the report which cited the place of execution. What followed was an exodus of Krahns out of the country, with reports that as many 18,000 fled back into refugee camps. In Grand Gedeh itself which is the home of the Krahns, a former Taylor general (Cocoo Dennis) rearmed 200 fighters ostensibly as security guards for one of the many logging companies privately run by Taylor. But the men began to intimidate and harass Krahns from their homes.

2. Earlier in December 1997, Taylor's ruthless bodyguards executed his former ally, Samuel Dokie, along with three members of his family. They were mutilated and burnt beyond recognition. No one was convicted of the

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murders and government officials who admitted ordering the arrest remain free.

3. A market woman and known critic of Taylor's reign of terror, Madam Nowai Flomo, was pulled out of her home and killed by Taylor's security men. Similarly, no one was convicted.

4. In April 1999, the campaign of terror intensified. The border town of Voinjama was attacked. The government first claimed that dissidents forces based in Guinea were responsible. Weeks after, facing independent account, the government admitted that the horrors caused in Voinjama were the work of its security forces and promised to investigate. No one has ever been investigated and brought to trial since the incident which left the town well-looted and several persons killed. Taylor then ordered his security forces to turn on another ethnic group; this time the Mandingoes. Several Mandingoes were killed and many more detained.

5. In rural areas, farming has come to a virtual standstill because of continued harassment of farmers by government security forces. Many have returned to refugee camps. According to a Muslim cleric who toured parts of Lofa and Guinea sometime ago, many Mandingoes and Lormas have returned to Guinea-citing continued harassment and insecurity as their reasons.

6. Two years after the election and more than 8 years since the beginning of the terror, Liberia is worst off than anytime in its history. Taylor has shown that he pursues no cause order than his own, and that the promise of democratization was a sham to acquire wealth through theft and terror. He sees opposition everywhere and treats dissent with unsurpassed heavy-handedness. He disrespects the rule of law and lies, deceives and terrorizes. When a member of human rights commission he appointed began to exercise independence, the man was publicly flogged by the late Police Director Joe Tate. Tate participated and directed the 1996 looting of Monrovia. The man later fled, citing threats on his life. The president of the Liberian Senate, who is a member of Taylor's political party, met a similar fate for disagreeing with Taylor on a number of issues, including his

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backing of the RUF rebels. The Liberian lawmaker was forced out of the country and lives in America.

7. Taylor's presidency in Liberia causes more instability with nightmarish repercussions in West Africa, soon to engulf the rest of the African Continent. After politically consolidating himself, Taylor's long-term goal centers on transforming Liberia into a criminal empire for money laundering, drug trafficking, assassinations, among other unwholesome activities.

8. Following Taylor's horrendous destruction of Liberia, the dream of democracy has evaporated because he and his circle of thieves carefully erect pillars of a brutal dictatorship. The entire western border of Liberia serves as the RUF's operational base. Sierra Leone's diamonds are unavoidable attraction for Mr. Taylor. The recent deportation of one of his friends from London for gun-running indicates how slowly entrenched criminal-minded men and women are emerging. With Sierra Leone's rebels in charge of the diamond mines, they are assured of money for Taylor's continued supply of weapons. As this gang strengthens itself, any dream to end the Sierra Leonean war is wishful thinking.

9. Please be reminded that this fugitive from justice did not only target innocent Liberians during the war, but foreign humanitarian workers as well. His rebels tortured and murdered five American Catholic nuns: Sister Kathleen McGuire; Sister Ann Multra; Sister Agnes Mueller; Sister Mary Joel Kolmer; and Sister Shirley Kolmer.

In view of the above, we want to see justice prevail. What is good for Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Bosnia, is equally good for Liberia. The level of impunity shown by Taylor since he was made president is due to the failure of the international community to press for war crimes or a truth and reconciliation commission for Liberia. These steps would have taught a lesson to those who masterminded killing fields in Liberia that crime cannot be rewarded. But the massive benefits enjoyed by Taylor and his janissaries have convinced them of the rightness of their actions and thus, they have no remorse in continuing their campaign of lawlessness.

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For all these reasons, Taylor should not be allowed to visit the United States this September. Without justice, there can be no peace! Therefore, it is in the best interest of a civilized people everywhere to disassociate themselves with like of Charles Taylor. Done In the Supreme Interest of Freedom and Democracy, this 24th day of August, A.D. 1999.

Siahnyonkron Nyanseor, Chairman Liberian Democratic Future (LDF) Atlanta, Georgia

Monica Ballah, Executive Director Liberian Democratic Institute (LDI) Providence, Rhode Island

Bodioh Wisseh Siapoe, National Chairman Coalition of Progressive Liberians in the Americas (COPLA) New York, New York

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An Eyewitness Account of the September 18 Massacre

E. Barchue Lloyd

The event that climaxed the Camp Johnson Road incident started with the usual government accusations of people wanting to destabilize the country and overthrow the government. These accusations lingered until Roosevelt Johnson went to the United States for medical treatment several months ago. When Johnson returned home surreptitiously, Taylor's fear heightened and his comfort level dropped disastrously low. Accusations and counter-accusations were traded between the two former warlords. In late August, ECOMOG prevented a near disaster when Johnson was stopped by his loyalists from attending a consultative meeting at the Executive Mansion. His supporters claimed government forces would have killed Johnson at the Mansion. In the melee, a loyalist of Johnson was shot at close range by a Ghanaian ECOMOG officer on Camp Johnson Road. Eyewitness accounts indicate that security forces attacked Johnson loyalists on Friday, September 18, at about six o'clock local time in the evening. This time, it was a pre-emptive strike by a column of well-armed troops under the command of Chucky Taylor, the president's notorious and drug-addicted son. Chucky had recruited and trained people in Gbatala, Bong County, to form an elite armed group that was not accountable to any security agency, including the Ministry of National Defense. It was this group of bandits with the aid of the ruthless Executive Mansion Special Security Unit (EMSSU) and the marauding Special Operations Division of the National Police, that executed the attack. In a nation-wide radio statement shortly after the attack, Charles Taylor congratulated his men for what he described as a "surgical operation with precision and swiftness." This "surgical operation," however, resulted into a nightmarish national tragedy in which more 1,000 people were killed.

The Massacre Two days after the shooting, the government officially announced that only 15 persons lost their lives. "The swiftness with which the operation was carried out," Taylor said, "resulted in the minimal loss of lives and the destruction of property."

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Following the statement, however, relief workers from the Red Cross and the French NGO, Medicin Sans Frontier, reported that they had buried more than 40 bodies. Local hospitals reported that they had more than 100 bodies in their morgues. At the government-owned John F. Kennedy Hospital, nearly 70 bodies were placed outside the already packed morgue for identification. The regime soon abandoned the identity scheme when the number of bodies began rapidly swelling. The figures even rose faster by the day as the horrors of what really happened on that fateful Friday became self-evident and self-revealing.

The Venue of the Massacre The grisly killing and its associated rapes, torture and vandalism, which brought the tyrannical tendency of the regime to the fore, occurred at four locations, according to eyewitness accounts. A. Camp Johnson Road: The shooting and massive killing of the Krahn people began in this central area of Monrovia which has no connection with the name of Roosevelt Johnson, who by coincidence lived there along with a huge population of displaced fellow ethnic Krahn members. When terrified civilians ran into the St. Thomas Church on the same street, government forces stood at the door and shot into the building. Only three persons are reported to have survived out of sixty who sought refuge there. B. Old Internal Affairs Ministry Building: This building at the end of Camp Johnson Road served as a camp for nearly 1,000 displaced Krahn people, mostly women, children and the elderly. It was shelled by government forces with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and other heavy weapons. The troops completely surrounded the building, shot, and bayoneted hundreds of people who survived the initial blasting. C. Old Public Works Ministry Building: This building is located on Lynch Street near the Barclay Training Center (BTC) military barracks and a few yards away from Camp Johnson Road. It was also occupied by displaced Krahn p2ople. Chucky Taylor and his troops raided the building after dislodging few of Johnson's "dissidents" from BTC. The building was repeatedly attacked with heavy machine guns and RPG, devastating the entire structure and killing all its occupants. D. Matadi Housing Estate: This area, a low-cost government housing community, is predominantly inhabited by the Krahns. Shortly after the Camp Johnson Road incident, a battalion of government troops went into the facility to conduct a house-to-house search for Krahns and arms. Krahn men were taken away

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and women were manhandled and raped. Properties were looted everywhere. Those who were abducted were never seen again. It was later reported that they were killed behind the Executive Mansion at night.

Witch Hunting Though Charles Taylor had said the "surgical operation" on Camp Johnson Road was not an anti-Krahn and anti-political party nor anti-opposition operation, the truth is the security forces did precisely the opposite. Most Krahn people went into hiding for fear of being killed. Their homes were broken into and properties vandalized. Associates of Johnson and those of key opposition members were summarily arrested and brutally flogged. Offices of the Unity Party were ransacked. Despite government denial, eleven Krahn army officers, including Thomas Doeway and Omezee Saydee, were taken from the post-stockade at night and executed two days after the main incident on Camp Johnson, according to well- placed sources. The press was restricted from publishing certain pictures which depicted the true story of the massacre. As a warning to outspoken journalists and newspapers, the managing editor of the Heritage newspaper was arrested and taken to the Executive Mansion and later to the National Security Agency. Reliable sources indicate, the editor was temporarily released after he was "requested" to write a statement while being detained. Three days later, however, President Taylor announced the Heritage editor, a relative of one of the accused coup plotters, would be arrested for treason. This is the state of affairs in Liberia, a nation in search for its moral conscience.

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Trial Verdict Undermines Peace, Stability and Reconciliation Says Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

An Interview by Jackson Kanneh

A leading Liberian opposition leader, Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, has warned Liberian government authorities against carrying out the 10-year jail sentence for 13 ethnic Krahn supporters of former warlord Gen. Roosevelt Johnson. All 13 men, among them former senior government officials in the Samuel Doe administration, were convicted recently by a 12-man jury on charges of plotting to oust the government and overthrow President Charles Taylor. Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf said court arguments were not convincing for the conviction of the 13 so-called coup makers. Below is the full interview with New York-based correspondent Jackson Kanneh.

Kanneh: What is your reaction to reports that Criminal Court A in Monrovia has found 13 men guilty of a plot to oust the Liberian government and subsequently sentenced them to ten years in prison? Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: Well, you know one has to feel pained and saddened by yet another in a series of events that undermine the peace and stability and the reconciliation which we know everyone wants for our country. So I'm quite sad about it. Kanneh: Does this moment take you back to the 1980s when the country was faced with these same problems? Is there a pattern here? Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: Absolutely, this is again part of a continuing pattern of government repressive and intimidating behavior that we have all experienced in the past. We all know that in the past people were unjustly accused of serious crimes like treason and sedition. Many of us were subjected to and victimized by this, intensifying the intimidation of people and then making the government or the Head of State to look good by pardoning them ultimately. Like I said, it's a pattern in the country that has gone on for several years and we had hoped that this new beginning would have led us to much different behaviors and new methods of trying to

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approach the peace, development and stability that we all want. But once again we are looking backwards instead of forward. Kanneh: You visited Liberia several times when the treason trial was going on. Did you ever expect such an outcome in which a guilty verdict would have been rendered? Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: Well, no because I didn't believe, nor was anything I read or saw or listened to in the argument of the case convinced me that these people were guilty. As a matter of fact, I may use my own example: as everyone knows in the indictment I was listed as having participated in a meeting in Freetown with some of those who are now being judged guilty. Well I immediately reacted, pointing out to the government that that was a totally false statement, that all it was meant to do was to intimidate me and frighten me away from the country, that I have never been to Freetown or been to any parts of Sierra Leone since early '97 before I even became a candidate in the 1997 elections. So if what was said about me was false then I must conclude that what was said about others were equally false. So I was never convinced and none of the arguments in the court convinced me. As a matter of fact, I was very impressed by the closing argument of Counselor [Benedict] Sannoh who I thought put the case quite rightly and again I don't know what's going on in the country. It is so disheartening because this was

once again an opportunity to be different [But]. . .democracy, [and] freedom have just been put under the carpet. Here we go again, Deja vu. Kanneh: What message do you have for the Liberian government, especially Mr. Charles Taylor, who is in the position to pardon those convicted? Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: Obviously my message to the government, to Mr. Taylor, to all of those concerned is to please think twice. Please do not do anything that will provoke counter-reaction, that will undermine their own desires and their own efforts for reconciliation and peace. Please don't make innocent people suffer and be victimized for political aims and political objectives. So I hope that Mr. Taylor will act wisely, that he will move swiftly to pardon them and to seek reconciliation among the parties. From what I read and from what I heard from the court arguments, I think it will be in Mr. Taylor's interest to find a way out of this by granting full pardon. Kanneh: You said before that the government lacks the confidence within the international community. Does this court ruling undermines international confidence in the Liberian government?

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Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: Oh, no doubt about it. You see when these happen, people tend not to pay attention to them and subsequently when the government doesn't get the support that it wants, it then blames citizens including myself of lobbying against them. But that's not true. People take note; today the communication revolution means that any action on the part of any government is very quickly noted and known by the outside world, they formulate their judgement and their option on the basis of these. This action will only add to the feeling that the country is not totally stable; that their questionable acts could lead to undermining peace and reconciliation and that is going to [affect] the lack of confidence in the government and its commitment for peace. So we think hard to point out that these are not in the interest of the government, if indeed it wants to achieve its objectives of being able to demonstrate that they have the vision, and the capacity and the capability to not only manage the affairs of state, but to secure the human and economic security that we all seek. Clearly they have not measured up and this is just going to be another added dimension to their failure. Kanneh: Does this development affect your political work in Liberia? Would it deter you? Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: No, I intend to continue my work. My work is peaceful; it is contributory to development and I wish I had more time to spend in the country to be able to do even more. But this will not deter me even if it is meant to intimidate and keep some of us out of the country so that the country is run like a little bush operation. I will continue my work, I will continue to do what I have to remain lawful, remain peaceful and continue to call the government to task when their actions and their policies are not in the best interest of the Liberian people. That's the crux I will bear. I know it! I am on the attack by them all the time for this, but as long as I say what is true, what I do is legal, I will continue to do what I must do in order to be one of the few voices that say to the government if you want peace, if you want stability, if you want reconciliation, if you want development, you got to do things differently. You cannot move us back to the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1980s-that have not served our country right and this is why Liberia is in a rather dreadful situation. Kanneh: Have we reached a situation where people not associated with the government, can now say enough is enough, We are out of it, and bye to

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Liberia. Or those out of Liberia could say they have had enough already and never again in Liberia. Is this the level we've reached already? Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: We are reaching that level. In fact, I may say we have reached that level in the case of so many persons, and persons whose skills and abilities are really needed to help rebuild the country. Many people have just said: can't take it anymore, can't continue to make sacrifices, can't continue to suffer and can't continue to be worried, So let's leave it. Let the people do what they want to do. [We] can't tell you what's happened with [our] own families and close friends who have said, "why you have to keep doing this? Why do you have to keep making sacrifices and putting your life and your safety and your resources at risk?" But we must continue. Not in my interest. My years are far spent, but in the interest of our children and our children's children, we must not let those who have made the great sacrifices of life and liberty; those who have made significant investment in order to see Liberia restructured and re-ordered, we must continue to do what we can to reach the objective of a [new] society. Kanneh: What do you say to other members of the opposition community in light of this development? Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: I must continue to encourage not only opposition leaders and oppositions, but all Liberians, to continue to support the efforts for peace and development in the country. I must continue to encourage people, as much as they can, to go home and join this effort. We are not opposed to the government per se, we are opposed to the wrong policies and practices of the government and we have to bring that to the attention of the government. And so I keep saying that the fact that we're in opposition does not make us enemies. People have said we criticize and we don't make suggestions. That is totally false. If they look at the statements that we make, they are quite balanced. Yes we criticized, but we also make suggestions. The unfortunate thing is that-those who lack vision never see the suggestions for what they are. But I will continue to encourage everybody to go home, to support home, to support the people of Liberia in whatever they do particularly in their development efforts. And I do know that ultimately, good prevails over evil, because it's not the government we're fighting, it is the forces of evil that we continue to resist. Kanneh: Finally Mrs. Sirleaf, if you had the opportunity to right a wrong in Liberia, what would that be?

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Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: In the first instance I think we need to re-emphasize the basic freedoms of people-freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the freedom from fear, [and] more importantly, the freedom of want. All of those fundamental freedoms that bring dignity to the human being. And, then one would also need to work on reconciliation. Reconciliation is not just talk and rhetoric. Reconciliation is recognizing our past and our history; its failures and its successes, finding those things that divide us and being able to identify whereby we can bridge the divide in bringing us together. We need then to concentrate on development to bring to our people, human security and economic empowerment, self empowerment. Those are part of what can form a national vision that will lead us out of this morass in which we find ourselves. I hope that the government was willing enough to give up its complete attention and control and misuse [of] resources and would try to achieve and formulate a vision that incorporate some of these new ideas. Kanneh: Thank you Mrs. Sir leaf. I appreciate your opinion. Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf: Thank you also.

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Gen. Roosevelt Johnson: Taylor is Not the Right Material to Bring Reconciliation

George H. Nubo

During his recent visit to the United States to seek medical attention, The Perspective had the opportunity to interview Gen. Roosevelt Johnson, former factional leader of the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO-J). Gen. Johnson offered his views on the Liberian civil war that killed over 250,000 hapless Liberians, and on current developments in Liberia.

TP: What are your positions regarding the turn of events specifically regarding the Dokie's murder, Camp Johnson Road shooting and the mysterious disappearance of seven of your former commandos? Gen. Johnson: With reference to the Dokie situation, I think all of you followed the trend of developments as they happened. In the first place, we condemned

the brutal murder of Dokie and his family . . . and then subsequently the trial. We also called on the government and the human rights organizations in Liberia and outside of Liberia to bring pressure to bear on the government that the killers of the Dokie family be brought to justice. After the death of the Dokies, and the deaths of several other

persons who were murdered before the Dokies . . . . I reiterated that this government that came to power after the election did not come to power through the constitution. The constitution was sidelined. Because of the events that we found ourselves in at the time, ECOWAS and the international community deemed it necessary to work out a plan. The plan they worked out to resolve the Liberian conflict is the ECOWAS Peace Plan. Out of this ECOWAS Peace Plan produced the Abuja Accords. The Abuja Accord states three basic cardinal issues: Disarmament, elections, and restructuring of the army and the security apparatus. I know you all, no doubt, agree that the security apparatus is the basic foundation for lasting peace in that country. Unfortunately, the NPP-led Taylor government, which was signatory to the accord, has hijacked the last part of the Abuja agreement and has refused for it to be implemented. So we raised the concern that ECOMOG/ECOWAS

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should be allowed to restructure the army and that did not go too wen with Mr. Taylor because he wanted to have his own way to continue to murder the people. And so he decided to go after me-"let's get rid of the man who's doing all this talking." And that was why they made the attempt. TP: With respect to this Abuja Accord, since Mr. Taylor has defied the agreement and has insisted on patterning the military and the security forces with his former fighters, we wonder whether there is any discussion between yourself and other former factional leaders as to what should be done about this. Gen. Johnson: Well, I had discussion with a former faction leader. But I think the issue is the document which is the evidence. It is unfortunate that Mr. Taylor is talking about his constitutional rights that he has the jurisdiction to restructure the Liberian army. It is unfortunate because if we are talking about the constitution of Liberia, then Harry Moniba (Vice President of Liberia during Doe administration) should become the president of Liberia. But the constitution was sidelined by the ECOWAS Peace Plan out of which Abuja Accord came from, and it was the Abuja Agreement that brought Mr. Taylor to power. Now, legally if you implement part of the agreement and leave out another portion of the agreement, that document becomes null and void. So we are saying, in accordance with the terms that we agreed on, that the spirit of the Abuja Agreement must be maintained. TP: So what is ECOWAS position on this issue with respect to implementing the provisions of the Abuja Accord? Gen. Johnson: The former field commander, Gen. Malu, has been very vocal about this issue, insisting that ECOMOG must be allowed to restructure the Liberia army. That didn't go well with Mr. Taylor. He started insulting Gen. Malu and accusing Nigeria. And even the present field commander, Brig. Gen. Shelphidi, has been very vocal on the issue too. But Mr. Taylor is so stubborn. So he does not want to do it. TP: So where does this leave us since Mr. Taylor consistently reneges on this agreement-what does that mean for Liberia? Gen. Johnson: It's very dangerous. It's dangerous because people will not sit supinely and allow themselves to be slaughtered like chickens. Several people who Mr. Taylor perceived as enemies have been slaughtered or murdered like that-even quite recently you learned of seven of my security guards who were abducted and murdered. We believe that after elections, there should have been some signal to every Liberian that it is now time to

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put down the guns and try to reconcile, console ourselves, and reconstruct our country. But it is unfortunate that Mr. Taylor does not see it that way. It is important for the international community which has invested a whole lot in Liberia, and all peace-loving Liberians to bring pressure to bear on Mr. Taylor so that these things will stop-because they are not healthy for the nation. TP: Have you made any representation to ECOMOG/ECOWAS with respect to the abduction and the mysterious disappearance of the former loyalists of yours? Gen. Johnson: Yes, my people on the ground and their parents have complained to the government and requested the government to have them returned immediately. I have complained to ECOMOG which represents ECOWAS on the ground, I have complained to the U.S. Embassy, and we have also taken the matter to Mr. Howard Jeter, President Clinton's Special Envoy to Liberia. Plans are under way for another meeting with Mr. Jeter. We've communicated to the Chairman of ECOWAS and we are waiting for the result. TP: Many Liberians believe that the only way the country can move forward, and the wounds created by the war be healed, and our differences reconciled is for the perpetrators in the war to be brought to justice. What is your position? Gen. Johnson: I have advocated long before now that an international court or tribunal be established so that those who perpetrated criminal acts against humanity during the Liberian civil conflict could be tried. It is unfortunate that at the time people continued to call some of us who were involved in the war as warlords. And I offered to be the first person to appear before the tribunal. I have justification-I have never gone on the offensive, I never brought war into Liberia, I was on the defensive-to defend my life and the lives of our people and we have demonstrated that. We didn't go into that war because we wanted power, we went into it because we wanted our country to be free of arms and to save the lives of our people. And so if this is an offense, if this is a crime that we have committed by defending ourselves and the nation, then of course we stand accused and prepared to stand the consequences. We think that, just as it was done in Bosnia and other areas, an international trial supposed to be carried out for those people who brought war into the country and destroyed several thousands lives.

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TP: Gen Johnson, most Liberians as well as the international community believe that stability in Liberia depends on reconciling our differences, restoring trust in one another and working to rebuild our country, apparently the situation on the ground suggests otherwise-what do you think will be essential to let these things happen? Gen. Johnson: Look, the only person who is causing the problem is Charles Taylor

. . .We have shown by the role that we have played in this conflict to all Liberians and to the international community and we demonstrated that even to the time of the elections. We were no member of any political party, and we have achieved our goal because we said Mr. Taylor should put the arms down and go to the ballot box. And since he agreed to go to the ballot box, for us, the war was over. That was our limitation. Even when he appointed us as minister of Rural Development, only 2% of the national budget was allocated to the ministry. We told them the only thing we want is to demonstrate that we are sincere for stability, and we do not want any witch- hunting. I think it is our (Liberians and peace-loving people of other nations) responsibility to bring pressure to bear on Mr. Taylor that these killings should be stopped. TP: Many people have given their own views as to what is the cause and result of the civil war in our country. Some feel that the civil war showed that those of you who are "country-people" are incapable of ruling Liberia because you are polarized by ethnicity. What is your own view about this statement? They say country people went after President Doe and that was the basis of the war. Gen. Johnson: I disagree with that. The so-called country people you are referring to are competent and qualified to run the government. And I think Mr. Doe demonstrated that. During Doe era there was very fast infrastructure construction all over the country. Those who visited Liberia in 1984, or 1985 can attest to that. It was not the natives against natives-it was the few heads of Congo-people who wanted to come back to Liberia and apply the divide and conquer method. What these few Congo people did was to knock the heads of country people together, and before the country people realized, it was too late. We should all realize that Liberia belongs to all Liberians and there is no way that you can marginalize one tribe. What we need now is reconciliation and reconstruction, but Mr. Taylor is not thz right material to do that. He has shown the Liberian people that he's not the right

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material. And I think it is time for him to step down. Instead of uniting us, they are killing us. TP: So, Gen. Johnson, are you saying that if the killing continues, and Mr. Taylor continues to renege on the Abuja Accord, he must be asked to step down? Gen. Johnson: Exactly! TP: Speaking of reconciliation, I wonder whether there is any efforts between groups (the Krahn people and the Nimba people) so as to have some conversation between the two groups. Most Liberians believe that the two groups settling their differences may help the larger Liberian community to follow suit. Is there any discussion between Grand Gedeh and Nimba with respect to this issue? Gen. Johnson: Believing that the war was a tribal war between Grand Gedeans and the Nimbaians is like falling into trap of the divide and rule tactics. As far as I know, there isn't any problem between Nimba and Grand Gedeh. Since my arrival to the States, Mr. Harry Nyuan, Dorliae and other people have been visiting me. Even when I was in Ghana, Dorliae family and the late Sam Dokie came and they were there with us. The late Sam Dokie and myself

were very close before he died . . . . When I was in Ghana, he used to come and spend weekends with me. The problem is not with all the Congo people. The principal problem is Mr. Taylor who wants to perpetuate himself into power. He wants to crown himself from president to king. And he's trying to find an alibi. TP: Taylor supporters make us to feel that he launched this war to "restore democracy" in Liberia. Why was ULIMO organized to fight the so-called democratic forces of Mr. Taylor if his aim was to restore democracy? Gen. Johnson: I think at the end of the tunnel, we can clearly see who really was fighting for democracy. At the end of the tunnel, we can see that I was the only one who was fighting for democracy. I said that nobody (including Mr.

Taylor) was going to the mansion with guns . . . . And when they agreed to go to the ballot box, I said "here ends my war." I wanted Liberia to be free of arms and every citizen respected. So who is more democratic? TP: Let's bring you to the Jesse Jackson's so-called unity mission to Liberia which takes place in few days. What is your view of what Rev. Jackson is attempting to do. Gen. Johnson: I used to have very high respect for Jesse Jackson. I thought he was a product of a great hero, Martin Luther King. But it's unfortunate, after I

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checked Rev. Jackson's record, I found out that he's not the type of person I thought he was. For example, Rev. Jackson had a conference for reconciliation in Liberia in Chicago. When he got on the stand, he said the only time democracy failed in Liberia was when Doe came to power. He said it was the time the country was sieged. He said that the country belongs to the Americo-Liberians, so the Monrovia conference was organized as a going-back-home conference for the Americo-Liberians who founded the country. These statements contradict the title he has. He is called human rights activist, he's called the Rev. Jackson, he's called a democrat. Despite all these titles, he is supporting somebody who has killed more than thousands of fighters. When I met Mr. Jeter, Jackson requested an audience with me, and I refused. I said "I am talking about genuine reconciliation for my country. I am not going to meet with somebody who wants to divide our country again." I told him, "we don't need people like Jackson in Liberia, we need more Martin Luther Kings in Liberia, we need more Nelson Mandela in Liberia, we need more Sani Abachas and Bill Clintons in Liberia-and not Jesse Jacksons. Mandela believes in genuine reconciliation after civil war, and respect for human rights. Martin Luther King believed in the civil rights of the people. Sani Abacha believes in African solidarity and brotherhood. This is why he sent his brothers to Liberia to die for us. Bill Clinton believes in human development." These are the kinds of people we need in Liberia-we don't need people like Jesse Jackson. What kind of contribution has he made to his own black cause in the Americas? What has he done? What are his achievements? I understand, he was given $400,000.00 to organize that conference, and he thinks by going to Liberia he's going to get more money. (Mr. Taylor has stated that $2.5 million was spent on the Chicago "Reconciliation" conference, the Monrovia conference on the future of Liberia and the July 26th celebrations). TP: You were appointed ambassador to India, when are you going to take up your assignment? Gen. Johnson: I think you know why I am in this country-I am not well. As soon as I recover and get back home, I will discuss it with my family. I can't make any decision here on my own. TP: We understand that you were a teacher, but out of a sudden you became a general. Were you in the army before?

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Gen. Johnson: You know there is a common saying in Liberia, "hunger makes monkey eat pepper" (necessity compels monkey to eat pepper). When the war started it was directed at my tribal men. Because Doe came from Grand Gedeh, they wanted to kill Doe. And not only Doe, they wanted to kill all Grand Gedeans-guilt by association. After we ran away and went to Sierra Leone, Taylor people followed us into Sierra Leone and started killing people indiscriminately. They did not care who you were, they killed people indiscriminately at the refugee camp. The Sierra Leonean government got bitter, because they were killing Sierra Leoneans too. When I looked at it, I asked myself a question: what will I tell my children tomorrow? Will I say that I ran away when the people came to kill your grand parents? And this is what forced us to go into the war. TP: What kind of message do you want to send to Liberians? Gen. Johnson: I do not believe in rhetoric. I believe that when I tell you something, I must be able to demonstrate it. I want all Liberians who are patriots, who have that country at heart to emulate my example. My example is that I did not go to war because I wanted power, but to stop those who were destroying the lives of innocent Liberians, and to have a democratic society freed of harassment, and where there is respect for one another, and let by-gone be by-gone! We must know that no tribe or ethnic group can be marginalized. Liberia belongs to all Liberians and it is only Liberians that can rebuild that country through unification. We must look at our plight from that end-not from a Krahn end, not from a Gio end, not from a Lorma end, not from a Congo end. And Mr. Taylor is not the right material to bring reconciliation into Liberia.