Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

Risk-Sharing Mechanism for PPP Projects – the Case Study of the Cross City Tunnel

APC Chan, PTI Lam, DWM Chan and E Cheung*

ABSTRACT

The Cross City Tunnel in Sydney, Australia is a good example of how the improper allocation of risks could affect the success of a Public Private Partnership (PPP) project. It is not incorrect for risks to be passed on to the private sector, especially when they are able to manage them. But maybe there should be a ‘partnership’ in place when the private sector is unable to manage all the risks themselves. Some critiques considered this project as an unsuccessful PPP as the Government has had to cope with handling much public opinions dissatisfaction and criticisms for their inaccurate traffic forecasts, leading to the investor making a financial loss. This paper aims to derive a risk-sharing mechanism for projects similar to the Cross City Tunnel, by reviewing the underlying causes leading to the ‘failure’ of this project. In addition, the objectives are to ensure that appropriate risk allocation is achieved in the best interests of all parties so as to make the project successful. Unpredictable circumstances and inaccurate predictions of the Government could make it difficult if not impossible for the private sector to handle the project. In these situations the Government should step in, share the responsibilities and overcome the problems encountered with the consortium. The Government should be able to offer assistance in these circumstances in the form of finance, manpower, governmental procedures, etc. depending on the need. In addition, this paper advocates that such mechanism should be in place for similar projects in the future. Benefits for both sector parties are anticipated when this mechanism is included in the project contract. After all, a PPP is a ‘partnership’ and the parties should work together to overcome obstacles for mutual benefit.

KEYWORDS

Public private partnership Sydney Cross City Tunnel Risk sharing mechanism

*Department of Building and Real Estate, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong SBE E-mail : [email protected] 67 Risk-Sharing Mechanism for PPP Projects – the Case Study of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

INTRODUCTION describes that:

The definition of a PPP has been ‘Privately financed projects involve reported by numerous researchers. Each provision by investors of equity definition varies slightly depending on capital and debt capital to fund what the author, jurisdiction and the time. might otherwise be wholly publicly As the Cross City Tunnel (CCT) in funded projects financed from NSW Sydney, Australia is a Government borrowings and/or budget Government infrastructure project, it revenue’. is therefore logical to consider their definition of a PPP. According to the This further emphasizes the importance New South Wales Government the term of the financing of PPP projects. ‘public private partnership’ (PPP) is Passing on financial risks is appealing used to mean: to governments.

‘An arrangement for the provision of The PPP form of procurement is assets or services, often in combination recognized as an effective way of and usually for a substantial or complex delivering value-for-money public “package”, in which both private infrastructure or services. It seeks to sector supplier and public sector client combine the advantages of competitive share the significant risks in provision tendering and flexible negotiation, and/or operation’. (Infrastructure and to allocate risk on an agreed basis Implementation Group, 2005). between the public sector and the private sector (Akintoye et al. 2005). In this definition the emphasis is on It is essential for the public client and both the public and private parties the private bidders to evaluate all of the sharing a large proportion of the risks potential risks throughout the whole in a PPP project. In reality it is not life of the project. Public and private always the case that an equal split of sector bodies must pay particular risks is experienced. Often the public attention to the procurement process sector takes up minimal risk and aims while negotiating contracts for a PPP to pass on as many risks as possible to to ensure a fair risk allocation between the private sector. This occurs more them. Systematic risk management commonly in developing countries or allows early detection of risks and jurisdictions where the Government encourages the PPP stakeholders has less experience in this alternative to identify, analyze, quantify and procurement method. This paper respond to the risks, as well as take therefore aims to derive a risk-sharing measures to introduce risk mitigation mechanism for projects similar to the policies (Akbiyikli and Eaton 2004). CCT. In addition the objectives are to A fundamental principle (Grimsey and ensure that appropriate risk allocation is Lewis, 2002) is that risks associated achieved; and that the aims of all parties with the implementation and delivery of SBE are to make the project successful. The services should be allocated to the party 68 New South Wales Government further best able to manage the risk in a cost Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554 effective manner. A delicate balance the project will have to be approved has to be sought amongst private via the Gateway review process and sector capacity, government regulatory to see which procurement option it function and public satisfaction. should adopt. Planning assessment via a number of different line agencies would In general, the typical processes be necessary. Finally the project will be for delivering PPP projects in New offered to the market, consortia will bid South Wales include five major steps for it and the Government will select (Figure 1): 1. project identification; the most suitable candidate after a long 2. project approval; 3. planning series of negotiations. The project will assessment; 4. project delivery; and 5. typically be designed and constructed project implementation (Infrastructure over 3 to 5 years. It will then be put into Implementation Group, 2005). Before operation and maintained for a further a project is even considered it will go 25 to 30 years as the concession period. through a series of governmental in- Thereafter, the project will normally be house procedures to decide whether returned to the Government, completely it is a public facility or service that is ending its life as a PPP project. needed. If it is decided to be necessary,

Project identification and early consideration

Project approval

Planning assessment

Project delivery

Project implementation

Figure 1 Typical processes for delivering PPP projects in New South Wales, Australia (Adapted from the Infrastructure Implementation Group, 2005) SBE 69 Risk-Sharing Mechanism for PPP Projects – the Case Study of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

BACKGROUND OF THE the closing date of 24 October 2001. It SYDNEY CROSS CITY was announced on 27 February 2002 that the Cross City Motorway Pty. Ltd. TUNNEL (CCT) PROJECT was selected as the winning consortium. The primary objectives of the CCT The construction for the project project were to reduce through commenced on 28 January 2003. It was traffic in Central Sydney and as a delivered ahead of schedule and took result easing traffic congestion and only 31 months to construct (typical for improving environmental amenity in PPP projects). The tunnel was officially the central business district, and on opened for service to the public on streets approaching the central business 28 August 2005. Unsurprisingly the district, and to improve the east to west project attracted the private sector traffic flows (Roads Traffic Authority, from within Australia and abroad. The 2003). selected consortium included strong financiers, Cheung Kong Infrastructure The CCT is a 2.1 km twin two- of China, Bilfinger Berger of Germany motorway that runs east and west and RREEF Infrastructure of Australia. underneath the busy central business They would bring in equity and recover district of Sydney. It opted for a design- the cost of design, construction, build-operate (DBO) arrangement under operation and maintenance via the a 30-year concession agreement. The tolls collected. Therefore the project project was part of a network of a new company, Cross City Motorway Pty transportation infrastructure plan of the Ltd, was allocated all the demand Roads and Traffic Authority of the New risk for the project. Innovation was South Wales Government. Its large introduced by the contractor. The tunnel project sum of AUD680 million meant was the first motorway in Sydney that a PPP was an attractive option to to have full electronic tolling. There the New South Wales Government. were high levels of expectations by all the parties and the traffic forecast for The initial concept of the tunnel was the tunnel was predicted to be 90,000 mooted in 1998 (Cross City Tunnel Pty. vehicles per day. Ltd., 2007). After a series of complex consultations, exhibitions, modification A number of benefits were sourced and approvals the private sector was from materials published and released finally asked for an expression of from the project company Cross City interest on 15 September 2000 (Roads Motorway Pty Ltd (Cross City Tunnel, Traffic Tunnel, 2003). In response, 2007) and the government agency a total of eight consortia expressed client the Roads and Traffic Authority interest by 23 October 2000. Three of New South Wales (Government consortia were shortlisted and asked Roads Traffic Authority, 2007). These to submit detailed proposals for the parties claimed that as a result of the project on 8 June 2001. All the three Cross City Tunnel project the following SBE consortia submitted their proposals by 70 benefits would be experienced: Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

• 34 traffic signals avoided (16 sets sought and are shown in the Appendix. westbound and 18 sets eastbound); Among these seven headlines, three are • Major reduction of traffic across the related to the toll. This shows that the central business district; toll is probably one of the key factors • Improved quality of life for affecting the satisfaction level of the pedestrians and cyclists in the general public towards the CCT, and central business district; also one of the issues that is highly • Higher reliability of bus services in sensitive among them. the central business district; • Cut trips across the city to The PPP has been given a bad name and approximately 2 minutes, from up investors have been driven away from to 20 minutes by avoiding traffic New South Wales, at least temporarily lights; (AAP General News Wire 2006a). The • Improved access and movement CCT encountered severe difficulties in within the city for taxis, delivery reaching the predicted traffic volume. vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians; Motorists expressed their unhappiness • Make city streets safer and more about the high toll levels (AAP General pleasant for pedestrians, residents News Wire 2006b) and the government and business people by removing closing off the surface roads to direct intrusive through traffic and the traffic into the CCT (AAP General providing more footpath space in News Wire 2006c). These problems some streets; resulted from the inaccurate traffic • Reduced traffic noise levels; and forecast and a flawed concession • Better air quality by taking cars off agreement. Currently, the CCT has surface streets. entered into receivership and the concessionaire has written off their Despite the benefits of the PPP which equity (Project Finance, 2007). have been highly publicized, some may consider that there are also many In this project it has been unfortunate ‘failures’ in the project. The next that the public client and the private section takes a closer look into these consortium have argued openly in ‘failures’. public. Newspapers have reported them criticizing each other for their faults (Field 2006a). The Premier spoke out UNDERLYING CAUSES publicly expressing his frustration LEADING TO ‘FAILURE’ that motorists were able to use the without paying. He criticized the CCT has been perceived as an operators for not enforcing the charge unsuccessful project by the general and how it was unfair for the motorists public and as a result the government’s who did pay (AAP General News Wire image has suffered (Jean 2006). 2006d; Field 2006b). On the other To illustrate some of the negative hand the consortium also criticized portrayals of the project, some the Premier for failing to demonstrate headlines related to the project were SBE leadership (AAP General News Wire 71 Risk-Sharing Mechanism for PPP Projects – the Case Study of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

2006e). It can be seen how the media the Government, as a result of which has portrayed a tense battle between the further risks are passed on to the private public and private sectors. This is an sector. For example, in the document image that nobody wants to create for they expressed their preference for any project whether it is delivered by bidders with the ‘lowest’ toll. This line a PPP or not. But being a PPP project of thinking is similar to selecting the creates an even higher sensitivity, as lowest cost bidder, which should not be taxpayers will query whether they are the only way to select the consortium. actually getting value for money from Instead, value for money for the project the Government’s decision. overall should be their main concern. By focusing on the toll only, other Following the unfortunate events important features adding to value experienced, the private consortium may be neglected such as innovative requested the Government to pay them techniques and skills used in the project a toll subsidy and compensation for to make it more efficient and as a result the road changes. Unfortunately the creating value for money. The quality two parties were unable to come to a of the work may also suffer. satisfactory agreement (AAP General News Wire 2006f). But in order for In the report it was also mentioned the CCT case not to be repeated the that in Victoria all the main variables Government considered paying the which would affect the commercial consortium compensation for the Lane outcome of the project for all parties Cove Tunnel, which is also in Sydney, would be negotiated at the bidding if unfortunately traffic forecasts for stage. But in New South Wales the toll that are also predicted inaccurately level or the possibility of a Government (Cratchley and Jean 2006a; 2006b). contribution would not be open to This action from the government was negotiation. Therefore whether positive as it showed that they were value for money for the taxpayers is aware that there were problems in the achieved is questionable. The report CCT project, and that they should share has indicated that the New South Wales the responsibilities by undertaking Government is clearly aware of their more of the risks rather than passing faults, but whether they actually rectify the pressure solely to the private the situation remains to be seen. consortium. To consolidate the findings reported In 2005 the New South Wales by the press discussed previously, the Government produced a report titled underlying causes leading to the ‘failure’ ‘Review of Future Provision of of the CCT project include: Motorways in NSW’ (Infrastructure • Inaccurate traffic forecast; Implementation Group, 2005). The • High toll levels; report reviews recent road projects, • Government closing off the surface including the CCT, in order to improve roads to direct the traffic into the SBE future similar projects. It is unfortunate CCT; 72 that more barriers are set up to protect • Flawed concession agreement; Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

• The public client and the private more or less all the risks associated consortium arguing openly in with the project. The private sector is public; often willing to take up large risks to • No toll subsidy and / or gamble for their desired returns. The compensation from the government; Government is also concerned about • The toll level or the possibility of a the consortium's readiness to accept Government contribution was not risk (Ahadzi and Bowles 2004). But open to negotiation. it is a surprise that the Government was willing to allow the private sector to take up such a large proportion of APPROPRIATE RISK the risks. However in the arrangement ALLOCATION the social responsibility will always be the public sector’s. Therefore the Grimsey and Lewis (2002) identified Government should consider whether nine main risks affecting all types of the consortium is able to handle the infrastructure projects. These included risk effectively. The risks that the technical risk, construction risk, consortium agreed to take on board operating risk, revenue risk, financial in the Project Deed included (Roads risk, force majeure risk, regulatory/ Traffic Authority, 2003): political risk, environmental risk, and • All risks associated with the project default. On the other hand Lam financing, design, construction, et al. (2007) identified seven key risk operation, maintenance and repair allocation criteria: costs of the project; • Whether the party is able to foresee • The risks that traffic volumes or the risk; project revenues may be less than • Whether the party is able to assess expected; the possible magnitude of the • Income tax risks; and consequences of the risk; • The risks that their works or • Whether the party is able to control operational and maintenance the chance of the risk occurring; activities might be disrupted by the • Whether the party is able to manage lawful actions of other government the risk in case it occurs; and local government authorities or • Whether the party is able to sustain a court or tribunal. the consequences if the risk occurs; • Whether the party will benefit from Clifton and Duffield, 2006 undertook bearing the risk; and a study where they looked into the risk • Whether the premium charged by allocation structure for several recent the risk-receiving party is considered PPP projects in Australia. One of these reasonable and acceptable for the cases included the CCT (Table 2) and owner. realized that the risks for each party were quite evenly spread. But further According to the terms and conditions study showed that the intensity of the set out in the Project Deed of the risks allocated to the private sector CCT, the private consortium accepted SBE was actually much greater compared to 73 Risk-Sharing Mechanism for PPP Projects – the Case Study of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

those allocated to the Government, as shown in Table 1:

Risk Allocated to Government Risk Allocated to Consortium Native title risks Design, construction and commissioning risks Force majeure Delay and completion risks Uninsurable risks Ground/geotechnical conditions risks Legislative and Government Operation and maintenance/ Policy facility management risks

Table 1 Risk allocation structure for the CCT (Clifton and Duffield, 2006)

Shen et al. (2006) studied the risk suffered immensely due to the market allocation for public sector projects in and financial risks. If these were shared Hong Kong. From the literature they risks as suggested by Shen et al. (2006), identified a number of major risks the intensity of the damage to the affecting public sector projects. In consortium could have been minimized. their analysis they selected the Hong Kong Disneyland as a case study. This Traffic revenue risk has been identified case study demonstrated which risks as one of the most critical risks would be most suitably allocated to impacting the commercial success each party. The study concluded that of road projects delivered by a PPP the public sector should be allocated (Singh and Kalidindi 2006). In order the site acquisition risks, inexperienced to overcome traffic revenue risk, the private partner risk and legal and policy annuity-based build-operate-transfer risks. On the other hand, the private (BOT) model has been presented as a party should be allocated the design good solution. Unlike the traditional and construction risks, operation risks BOT type road economic projects, and industrial action risks. Lastly, Shen the concessionaire will be paid a et al. (2006) advocated the importance fixed semi-annual annuity by the of there being some risks which both governmental client. This approach parties should share. These include is similar to that used for the social development risks, market risks, infrastructure PPP projects such as financial risks and force majeure. hospitals and schools which are paid by Although Shen et al.’s 2006 study a regular fixed payment. Similarly the was conducted for a project in another annuity-based BOT model will require country and of a different nature; it the concessionaire to achieve certain is believed that these shared risks as milestones and standards. The payment SBE mentioned could also apply to other will be used to cover the design, 74 PPP projects such as the CCT. The CCT construction, maintenance and operation Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554 of the road and its facilities. As a result performance of the facility. Other the concessionaire does not undertake risks which are less predictable and any of the traffic revenue risk. This controllable are taken by governmental approach ensures that the governmental clients. By adopting this approach the client must also undertake their fair business case may not be as attractive share of risks. The risk allocation to the private sector. The private sector framework shown in Table 2 shows is often willing to take up more risks the appropriate risk allocation for each in return for the possibility of financial party under the annuity-based BOT benefits. The private sector should not model. Amongst the sixteen risks listed, be solely responsible for taking these nine are undertaken by governmental decisions. Instead the government clients. In general the concessionaire should also consider whether they is responsible for the risks related should allow the private sector to take to the construction and operational up large risk.

Risk Allocated to Government Risk Allocated to Consortium Pre-investment Delay in financial closure Resettlement and rehabilitation Time and cost overrun during construction Permit/approval Time and cost overrun during operation and maintenance Delay in land acquisition Non-political force majeure Delay in payment of annuity Performance standards Change of scope Lane availability Traffic revenue risk Interest rate risk Change in law Political risk

Table 2. Risk allocation framework for the annuity-based BOT model (Singh and Kalidindi 2006)

Another payment mechanism similar option is the performance-based DBFO to the annuity-based BOT model was system. For this payment mechanism proposed, in that the patronage risk the services and the operational stays with the government (Aziz 2007). performance of the contractor are The shadow-toll design-build-finance- emphasized rather than the usage of the operate (DBFO) system is similar facility. to the BOT system except shadow tolls are used instead of real tolls. From the experience of several road The government will pay a toll per projects including the CCT, the New vehicle per road kilometer instead of South Wales Government identified SBE the end users paying the toll. Another some lessons learnt (Infrastructure 75 Risk-Sharing Mechanism for PPP Projects – the Case Study of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

Implementation Group, 2005): the project company. As a result of this • Need for consultation and fault other actions were taken by the communication over the life of concessionaire to overcome the reduced project procurement; traffic flow. These actions led to further • Need for improved community complications which in turn ruined consultations and messages; the partnership agreement between the • Responsibility of Government client public and private sectors. over procurement life of project; • Greater onus on the consortium to In the case of the CCT the inappropriate accept full responsibility over the allocation of risks was believed to whole life of the concession period. be the root cause. In some cases the Government may subsidize or The fourth lesson learnt indicates that compensate the concessionaire if the the Government feels that they have project revenue is less than expectation accepted too much of the project risks. or if the contract is terminated. But Therefore they appear to be keen to often there is much argument as to ensure that the consortium will take a the amount which this subsidy or larger responsibility for risks in future. compensation should be.

To prevent similar cases from RISK SHARING occurring, an optimal risk-sharing MECHANISM mechanism is presented. The risk- sharing mechanism can be adopted A PPP should be adopted primarily in projects of a high risk nature. The based on value for money. Obviously CCT was a project of high risk due to the package is accompanied by various its scale and significance. In this risk- other advantages which are attractive sharing mechanism, projects which are to the government such as private traditionally economic infrastructure financing and the transfer of risks. But projects such as transportation projects the decision to adopt a PPP should not can adopt a regular fee payment from be solely based on these additional the government instead of bearing the advantages. revenue risk. This approach is similar to social infrastructure projects. As As discussed previously risks should mentioned previously in this paper always be allocated to the party best other researchers have also reported able to handle them. The party allocated the possibility and feasibility of this the risk should be the one most able arrangement for economic infrastructure to prevent it from occurring. And projects. if the risk does occur the allocated party should be the one most able to Under this mechanism, the consortium minimize the consequences. of high-risk economic infrastructure projects will be paid via a regular fee The inaccurate traffic forecast was the payment. In this way the payment will SBE main reason that led to the collapse of 76 be based on project performance rather Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554 than usage. As in social infrastructure public frustration. Although the local projects certain risks are still taken government could have prevented these by the concessionaire, such as those actions, they did not step in. If the associated with the design, construction, consortium had not needed to worry operation and maintenance. But the about the revenue, the public would other risks should be dealt with by the have been more satisfied. As a result Government including revenue risk. the public perception of the facility, the project company and the Government Although the economic package for would have been very different! projects paid by a regular fee may not be as attractive to the private sector, this type of mechanism for high-risk CONCLUSIONS projects can help to protect the private The CCT was designed as part of a sector. By protecting the private sector large infrastructure network plan for the government will also benefit, since New South Wales, Australia. Due to its as always the ultimate responsibility complexity and size, a PPP appeared to lies with them. The government may be an attractive delivery method. Under be able to pass on most of the financial the PPP procurement the financing risks but they cannot avoid the social would be provided by the private sector. responsibility. Hence this proposed Also expertise and innovation which mechanism is believed to benefit all would otherwise be unavailable within parties involved. the Government could be sought. As a result the Government managed to The details of the proposed risk- pass on many of the project risks to the allocation mechanism will vary private sector. Obviously for a project depending on the project itself. But of this size there would be abundant it is likely that the payment will be a financial opportunities for the private regular fee paid to the concessionaire sector, hence they were very willing based on performance and activity to take up the associated risks for the milestones. Under the agreed payment chance to be involved. The situation the concessionaire will deliver a could have been a win-win case but service to the public according to unfortunately this was not actually what standards as agreed to in the contract. happened. If the concessionaire under-performs then they will be penalized by a Media reports have reflected the CCT deduction of their fees. In this way as an unsuccessful PPP project. For the concessionaire is monitored by the consortium this may have been the the project’s performance rather than case. For the Government, although usage of the facility. In the CCT project they have received some negative the concessionaire had to bear the critiques, at the end of the day they revenue risk, hence their main priority have still constructed a world-class was to generate revenue. They used infrastructure facility. For the general toll prices and redirecting traffic to public, the scandal may have been more SBE bring in revenue which just caused 77 Risk-Sharing Mechanism for PPP Projects – the Case Study of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

amusing than having a serious effect. It Wire, 21 August 2006. is not easy and probably impossible to distinguish whether any case is either AAP General News Wire (2006d), solely successful or a failure. Instead Motorists have right to be angry over it is believed that lessons can be learnt toll inequities, AAP General News Wire, from each case. 20 September 2006.

This paper has looked into a highly- AAP General News Wire (2006e), profiled case and tried to recommend Cross City Boss says Lemma Fails to solutions to overcome the potential Show Leadership, AAP General News obstacles. As a result a more suitable Wire, 4 August 2006. risk-sharing mechanism for projects similar to the CCT has been presented AAP General News Wire (2006f), to achieve win-win service outcomes. Tunnel Operators Seek Millions in Compensation for Changes, AAP General News Wire, 26 August 2006. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Ahadzi M and Bowles G (2004), The content of this paper is based on the 'Public-Private Partnerships and initial findings of an ongoing research Contract Negotiations: An Empirical study which aims to develop a best Study', Construction Management and practice framework for implementing a Economics, 22 :9, 967-978. PPP in Hong Kong. The work described in this paper was fully supported by Akbiyikli R and Eaton D (2004), 'Risk a grant from the Research Grants Management in PFI Procurement: A Council of the Hong Kong Special holistic Approach'. Paper presented Administrative Region, China (RGC at the Proceedings of the 20th Project No. PolyU 5114/05E). Annual Association of Researchers in Construction Management (ARCOM) REFERENCES Conference, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, UK. AAP General News Wire (2006a), War of Words Erupts again Between Lemma Aziz AMA (2007), 'A Survey and Tunnel Boss, AAP General News of the Payment Mechanisms for Wire, 4 August 2006. Transportation DBFO Projects in British Columbia', Construction AAP General News Wire (2006b), Management and Economics, 25:5, Cross City not viable, higher prices not 529-543. the answer, AAP General News Wire, 26 August 2006. Clifton C and Duffield CF (2006), 'Improved PFI/PPP Service Outcomes AAP General News Wire (2006c, Lane through the Integration of Alliance SBE Cove Tunnel Road Changes May Be As Principles', International Journal of 78 Bad As Cross City, AAP General News Project Management, 24:7, 573-586. Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 67-80 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554

Cratchley D and Jean P (2006a), Govt Li B, Akintoye A, Edwards PJ and May Compensate Hardcastle C (2005), 'The Allocation of Operators, AAP General News Wire, 28 Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects August 2006. in the UK', International Journal of Project Management, 23:1, 25-35. Cratchley D and Jean P (2006b), State Government May Compensate Lane Project Finance (2007), 'Skies not the Cove Tunnel Owners, AAP General limit', Project Finance, April 2007. News Wire, 28 August 2006. Roads Traffic Authority. Cross City Tunnel Pty. Ltd. (2007), (2007), http://www.rta.nsw.gov. http://www.crosscity.com.au, Retrieved au/constructionmaintenance/ 30 May 2007. majorconstructionprojectssydney/ crosscitytunnel/index.html, Roads Field K (2006a), Childish Act Shows Traffic Authority of New South Wales NSW Not Open For Business, AAP Government, Retrieved 30 May 2007. General News Wire, 10 October 2006. Roads Traffic Authority (2003), Cross Field K (2006b), Sydney's Cross City City Tunnel: Summary of contracts, Tunnel Operators to Pursue Toll Cheats, Roads and Traffic Authority of New AAP General News Wire, 20 September South Wales Government. 2006. Shen LY, Platten A and Deng XP (2006), Grimsey D and Lewis M (2002), 'Role of Public Private Partnerships to 'Evaluating the Risks of Public Private Manage Risks in Public Sector Projects Partnerships for Infrastructure Projects', in Hong Kong', International Journal International Journal of Project of Project Management, 24:7, 587-594. Management, 20:2, 107-118. Singh LB and Kalidindi SN (2006), Infrastructure Implementation Group 'Traffic Revenue Risk Management (2005), Review of Future Provision of Through Annuity Model of PPP Road Motorways in NSW, New South Wales Projects in India', International Journal Government. of Project Management, 24:7, 605-613.

Jean P (2006), Cronulla Riot, Tunnel Were My Toughest Days: Lemma, AAP General News Wire, 3 August 2006. APPENDIX Examples of Newspaper Headlines Lam KC, Wang D, Lee PTK and Tsang relating to the CCT when it opened YT (2007), 'Modelling Risk Allocation (Infrastructure Implementation Group, Decision in Construction Contracts', 2005) International Journal of Project Management, 25:5, 485-493. SBE 79 Development of a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Building Maintenance Operation Processes in the Context of Facility Management Surveying and Built Environment Vol 19(1), 81-101 December 2008 ISSN 1816-9554 Appendix Examples of Newspaper Headlines relating to the CCT when it opened (Infrastructure Implementation Group, 2005)

Tunnel cuts William St to one lane to trap drivers

The Daily Telegraph, 6 October 2005

‘Cheap’ tunnel buyback mooted

Australian Financial Review, 17 November 2005 $105m TOLL Motorists pay hidden charge OUTRAGE to cross city

The Daily Telegraph, 6 October 2005 CROSS CITY GROVEL Taken for Three weeks toll-free a ride but roads still colgged Tunnel at the crossroads

The Daily Telegraph, 14 October 2005-12-02 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 October 2005

Drivers Changes to to feel contract led squeeze to high tolls

SBE The Daily Telegraph, 17 November 2005 Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November 2005 80