DOCSLIB.ORG

Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War The Great Transformation? Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War The Graduate Institute, Geneva September 24-26, 2015 INTRODUCTION: The conference “The Great Transformation? Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War” aims to move beyond the simple identification of individual protagonists (the winners or the losers), while focusing on the processes and interactions that climaxed with the developments of 1989-1991 (from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the collapse of the Soviet Union). At the moment, the state of research on the causes and consequences of the end of the Cold War – necessarily still at its initial phase – seems to have focused on isolated themes (e.g. the role of such individuals as Ronald Reagan or Mikhail Gorbachev; the impact of the human rights movements; the consequences of the economic reforms in the Soviet bloc), largely independent and detached from each other. The conference seeks to act as a unique forum for bringing many of these strands together. The topics addressed at the conference will be diverse and wide-ranging, reflecting the latest developments in the field of Cold War studies. Many of the papers presented at the conference will be based on primary research on previously classified documents. The conference will produce several publications, and thus make a clear impact on the yet to be fully developed historiography on the causes and consequences of the end of the Cold War. Moreover, by searching for the roots of some of the issues that have dominated the international scene since the 1990s, the conference will also open a window on the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the conference will link the past to the present, searching for the ‘lessons’ of history that are relevant for today’s policy makers. DRAFT CONFERENCE PROGRAM Thursday, September 24th 9.00- 10.30 Opening words and Roundtable: the Great Powers and the end of the Cold War • Odd Arne Westad (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) • Vladislav Zubok (London School of Economics) • Jeremi Suri (University of Texas at Austin) • Anne Deighton (University of Oxford) Chair: Jussi Hanhimäki (The Graduate Institute, Geneva) 10.30-11.00 Coffee break 11.00-12.30 Panel I: Did the Unites States ‘win’ the Cold War? • Susan Colborn (University of Toronto): Reagan as an ‘Atlantist’: NATO’s role in US policy • Simon Miles (University of Texas at Austin): the Reagan aDministration’s initial engagement with Soviet Union • Tom Blanton (The National Security Archive, Washington DC): Reagan, Gorbachev anD the end of the Cold War Comments: Jeremi Suri (University of Texas at Austin) Chair: Geir Lundestad (The Norwegian Nobel Institute) 12.30-14.00 Lunch 14.00-15.30 Panel II: Developments in the Soviet bloc • Wolfgang Muller (Austrian AcaDemy of Sciences): The role of seconD rank political actors in ending the Cold War • Svetlana Savaranskaya (The National Security Archive, Washington): Soviet withDrawal from Eastern Europe • Robert Brier (German Historical Institute in Warsaw): US support for East European DissiDents, the enD of the ColD War anD the contesteD meaning of human rights Comments: VlaDislav Zubok (LSE) Chair: ODD Arne WestaD (HarvarD University) 15.30-16.00 Coffee break 16.00-17.30 Panel III: The ‘Arc of Crisis’ and its impact on the end of the Cold War • Sean Kalic (US Army CommanD anD Staff College, Kansas): The unattended consequences of US policy in Afghanistan • Barbara Zanchetta (The GraDuate Institute, Geneva): Arming the ‘freeDom fighters’: from the Carter doctrine to the Reagan doctrine • Malcolm Byrne (The National Security Archive): The Iran-Iraq war and its repercussions Comments: Olav NjolstaD (Norwegian Nobel Institute) Chair: Michael Cox (LSE) 17.30-19.00 Keynote speech and aperitif: Geir LunDestaD (Norwegian Nobel Institute): “A prize winning performance: Mikhail Gorbachev, the Nobel Peace Prize and the End of the Cold War.” 19.30 Conference Dinner * * * Friday, September 25th 9.30-11.00 Panel IV: Western European developments • BernharD Blumenau (The GraDuate Institute, Geneva): German foreign policy and the ‘German problem’ before anD after unification • Eleonora Guasconi (University of Genoa): The Single European Act, European political cooperation and the end of the Cold War • Ruud Van Dijk (University of AmsterDam): Peace activists anD the enD of the ColD War: the case of the Dutch Inter-Church peace council Comments: Anne Deighton (University of OxforD) Chair: Mario del Pero (Science Po, Paris) 11.00-11.30 Coffee break 11.30-13.00 Panel V: Eastern European developments • Sielke Kelner (The Graduate Institute, Geneva): The survival of the Socialist Republic of Romania at the enD of the ColD War: DepenDency on the bipolar worlD • Maximilian Graf (Austrian AcaDemy of Science): The opening of the Austria-Hungarian borDer revisiteD: how European Détente contributeD to overcoming the Iron Curtain • Paul Maddrell (University of Loughborough, UK): The KGB, the Stasi and the End of the Cold War Comments: Svetlana Savaranskaya (The National Security Archive, Washington DC) Chair: FeDerico Romero (European University Institute) 13.00-14.30 Lunch 14.30-15.30 Panel VI: Negotiating the end of arms race or managing continued Cold War? The impact of nuclear arms control • James Graham Wilson (Office of the Historian, US Department of State): SALT II anD the INF Treaty • AnDrea Chiampan (The GraDuate Institute): DiD Nuclear Weapons? EviDence from the TNF/INF Controversy, 1973-1983 Comments: Olav NjolstaD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute) anD LeopolDo Nuti (University of Roma III) Chair: Christian Ostermann (The Wilson Center, Washington DC) 15.30-16.00 Coffee break 16.00-17.00 Discussion: Accessing sources on the end of the Cold War • Matthew Connelly (Columbia University) • Tom Blanton (National Security Archive, Washington DC) • Christian Ostermann (The Wilson Center, Washington DC) Chair: Jussi Hanhimaki (The GraDuate Institute, Geneva) 17.00 Aperitif (sponsored by the History and Policy-Making Initiative) 17.30-19.00 History and Policy Roundtable: Did the Cold War really ‘matter’? Lessons for today’s policy-makers • Jussi Hanhimäki (The GraDuate Institute, Geneva) • MahmouD MohameDou (Geneva Centre for Security Policy anD GraDuate Institute) • James GolDgeier (American University) • Michael Cox (LSE) • ODD Arne WestaD (HarvarD University) Chair: Barbara Zanchetta (The Graduate Institute, Geneva) 19.30 Boat excursion on Lake Geneva and dinner Saturday, September 26th 9.30-10.30 Panel VII: Exploring the causes of Soviet ‘implosion’ • Chris Miller (Yale University): The Tiananmen Crisis anD Soviet Debate about Perestroika • Fredrik Stocker (Uppsala University, Sweden) – The economic ‘Westernization’ of Soviet Estonia Comments: VlaDislav Zubok (LonDon School of Economics) Chair: Svetlana Savaranskaya (The National Security Archive) 10.30-11.00 Coffee break 11.00-1200 Panel VIII: The End of the Cold War and the rise of non-state actors • Timothy Nunan (HarvarD University): Humanitarian invasion: the Soviet Union anD Humanitarianism in Afghanistan • Riina Turtio (The GraDuate Institute): Private military companies in Africa anD the enD of the Cold War Comments: Christian Ostermann (The Wilson Center, Washington DC) Chair: Tom Blanton (The National Security Archive) 12.00-14.00 Lunch and closing roundtable: the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the international system • Michael Cox (LonDon School of Economics) • Leopoldo Nuti (University of Rome III) • Mario del Pero (Science Po, Paris) • FeDerico Romero (EUI) • Olav Njolstad (The Norwegian Nobel Institute) Chair: Jussi Hanhimäki (The GraDuate Institute, Geneva) .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Communiquéthe Magazine of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation
    The Magazine of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation Communiqué Fall 2017 Volume 21 Meet America’s Most Innovative Ash Center Presents Winners of 2017 Innovations in American Government Awards Teaching in Technicolor Ash Alumna Transforms Myanmar Education with Virtual Reality Inaugural Martha H. Mauzy Award Winner Kate O’Gorman MPA ’17 Is Working for an Inclusive Economic Future Letter from the Director Communiqué Fall 2017, Volume 21 Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation Harvard Kennedy School 79 John F. Kennedy Street Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Welcome to the Fall 2017 issue of the Ash Center’s Communiqué magazine. I 617-495-0557 am proud to report that my many colleagues at the Ash Center continue to www.ash.harvard.edu advance its mission of engaging scholars, students, and practitioners in the Director most important political and governance challenges we face both in the US and Tony Saich globally. In this issue, we highlight the winners of the 2017 Innovations in American Government Awards (p. 10) and Professor Odd Arne Westad’s per- Editor Jessica Engelman spective on the Cold War as set forth in his new book (p. 8). In our Q+A (p. 4), we talk with Jie Bai, assistant professor of public policy, about the economic Associate Director for Communications challenges firms face in developing countries and emerging markets such as Daniel Harsha Vietnam and China. On p. 12, we introduce Hla Hla Win MC/MPA ’16, who was a Communications Coordinator Ford Foundation Mason Fellow with the Ash Center and who is using virtual Sarah Grucza reality to transform the educational experience in Myanmar.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Fear of Contagion
    China’s Fear of Contagion China’s Fear of M.E. Sarotte Contagion Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example For the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), erasing the memory of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre remains a full-time job. The party aggressively monitors and restricts media and internet commentary about the event. As Sinologist Jean-Philippe Béja has put it, during the last two decades it has not been possible “even so much as to mention the conjoined Chinese characters for 6 and 4” in web searches, so dissident postings refer instead to the imagi- nary date of May 35.1 Party censors make it “inconceivable for scholars to ac- cess Chinese archival sources” on Tiananmen, according to historian Chen Jian, and do not permit schoolchildren to study the topic; 1989 remains a “‘for- bidden zone’ in the press, scholarship, and classroom teaching.”2 The party still detains some of those who took part in the protest and does not allow oth- ers to leave the country.3 And every June 4, the CCP seeks to prevent any form of remembrance with detentions and a show of force by the pervasive Chinese security apparatus. The result, according to expert Perry Link, is that in to- M.E. Sarotte, the author of 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe, is Professor of History and of International Relations at the University of Southern California. The author wishes to thank Harvard University’s Center for European Studies, the Humboldt Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University of Southern California for ªnancial and institutional support; Joseph Torigian for invaluable criticism, research assistance, and Chinese translation; Qian Qichen for a conversation on PRC-U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cold War As a System - Michael Cox
    The Cold War as a System - Michael Cox Many leftists saw the Cold War as a genuine clash between Soviet 'Socialism' and Western capitalism. Michael Cox, however, shows how Soviet Stalinism and the Cold War helped stabilise global capitalism for 40 years. Introduction: Stalinism and the New Left Until the fifties, the influence of Stalinism upon the left was clear and unambiguous. Destalinization, followed by the process of youth radicalization in the sixties however, began to reduce the political hold of Stalinism upon the left, and it seemed that a new marxism was going to emerge. However, things were never quite that simple. For although the new left challenged Stalinism, it never fully broke with it theoretically. Indeed, often without thinking, it frequently took up positions which were, to all intents and purposes, supportive of Stalinism. For instance, the majority of the new left gave almost total support to Ho Chi Minh and the NLF in Vietnam, while many were nearly religious in their adoration of Mao and China during the cultural revolution. Moreover, the new left, again almost without thinking, uncritically endorsed nationalist movements in the Third World, little realizing that they were simply repeating Soviet and Chinese anti-imperialist rhetoric. Furthermore, much of the economic theory of the new left, notably on development, bore a distinct Stalinist imprint as well.1 Finally, even those influenced by Trotsky, accepted the argument that the left had a 'duty' to defend the Soviet Union from its enemies. In spite of its greater radicalism therefore, it was evident that the new left never really came to terms with Stalinism intellectually, nor broke completely with its assumptions.
    [Show full text]
  • Cold War: Crises and Détente: Volume II Edited by Melvyn P
    Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83720-0 - The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Crises and Détente: Volume II Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad Frontmatter More information THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR Volume II of The Cambridge History of the Cold War examines the developments that made the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union a long-lasting international system during the 1960s and 1970s. A team of leading scholars explains how the Cold War seemed to stabilize after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and how this sense of increased stability evolved into the détente era of the early 1970s. The authors outline how conflicts in the Third World, as well as the interests and ideologies of the superpowers, eroded the détente process. They delve into the social and eco- nomic roots of the conflict, illuminate processes of integration and disintegration, analyze the arms race, and explore the roles of intelligence, culture, and national identities. Discussing the newest findings on US and Soviet foreign policy as well as examining key crises inside and outside Europe, this authoritative volume will define Cold War studies for years to come. M ELVYN P. LEFFLER is Edward Stettinius Professor of American History at the Department of History, University of Virginia. His previous publications include To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine (2008, as co-editor), For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (2007, winner of the AHA George Louis Beer Prize), and A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (1992, winner of the Bancroft Prize, the Robert Ferrell Prize, and the Herbert Hoover Book Award).
    [Show full text]
  • Ronald Reagan and the Northern Ireland Conflict Abstract. A
    ‘The situation over there really bothers me’: Ronald Reagan and the Northern Ireland conflict Abstract. A neglected area of transatlantic history is the relationship between the Reagan administration and the Northern Ireland conflict. This article will seek to address this situation by charting the extent of Ronald Reagan’s interest in the Northern Irish conflict and the ways and means that other protagonists sought to secure or prevent his involvement. It will examine the president’s approach in the context of different views within his administration, the State Department’s wish to maintain American neutrality on the issue, and the desire of leading Irish-American politicians for the American government to be much more interventionist. These debates coincided with significant developments in Northern Ireland. Therefore, Reagan’s contribution to the Anglo-Irish process encapsulates a variety of issues: the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland during the 1980s; the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement; and the internationalisation of the conflict before the election of President Bill Clinton in 1993. The contribution of President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) to the Northern Irish peace process has been the subject of considerable discussion, both journalistic and scholarly. In contrast, the role of President Ronald Reagan (1981-9) and his administration in the Anglo-Irish process has received comparatively little attention.1 1 Journalistic accounts include: Conor O’Clery, The Greening of the White House (Dublin, 1996), and Daring Diplomacy: Clinton’s Secret Search for Peace in Ireland (Boulder, CO., 1997); Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, Endgame in Ireland (London, 2001); and, Eamonn Mallie and David 1 As a result, scholarship relating to U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolving Interpretations of the Origins of the Cold War
    Háskóli Íslands Hugvísindasvið Rússneska The Evolving Interpretations of the Origins of the Cold War Have Historians Reached a Consensus on the Origins of the Cold War? Ritgerð til B.A. prófs Saga Helgason Morris Kt.: 011097-3329 Leiðbeinandi: Jón Ólafsson 1 Abstract The Cold War and its origins have been a constant source of debate among historians and quite rightly so. With no access to Soviet archives until 1991 and the outcome of the hostilities unknown, historians were left to draw their own conclusions from official documents and published propaganda. Hence, as with any historical event, interpretations have changed over time. In this paper, I set out to explore whether assessments have shifted to a degree whereby historians today have come together in their understanding of the origins of the Cold War. In order to answer this question, an investigation is required to explore how and why these historical perspectives have changed. First, the two traditional viewpoints of the Cold War are discussed, namely the orthodox and revisionist interpretations. The orthodox view places responsibility on the USSR for the development of the Cold War whereas the revisionist view argues that the hostilities developed as a result of reacting to one another’s actions. Subsequently, the viewpoints of a selected group of post-Cold War historians are explored. Gaddis argues that hostilities between the United States and Soviet Union had their roots in the nations’ different perceptions of security. Zubok and Pleshakov maintain that Stalin’s character and diplomatic actions were of particular importance in the onset of the Cold War.
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Publication
    WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS Lee H. Hamilton, 77 CONVERSATIONS Christian Ostermann, Director Director Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977 BOARD OF TRUSTEES: ADVISORY Edited by COMMITTEE: Joseph A. Cari, Jr., Chairman Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, William Taubman Steven Alan Bennett, (Amherst College) Nguyen Vu Tungand and James G. Hershberg Vice Chairman Chairman PUBLIC MEMBERS Working Paper No. 22 Michael Beschloss The Secretary of State (Historian, Author) Colin Powell; The Librarian of Congress James H. Billington James H. Billington; (Librarian of Congress) The Archivist of the United States John W. Carlin; Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland- The Chairman of the National Endowment Baltimore) for the Humanities Bruce Cole; The Secretary of the John Lewis Gaddis Smithsonian Institution (Yale University) Lawrence M. Small; The Secretary of Education James Hershberg Roderick R. Paige; (The George Washington The Secretary of Health University) & Human Services Tommy G. Thompson; Washington, D.C. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. PRIVATE MEMBERS (Woodrow Wilson Center) Carol Cartwright, May 1998 John H. Foster, Jean L. Hennessey, Sharon Wolchik Daniel L. Lamaute, (The George Washington Doris O. Mausui, University) Thomas R. Reedy, Nancy M. Zirkin COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN, Series Editor This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry.
    [Show full text]
  • (An H-Diplo Article Review Forum) on “Special Issue: the Cold War in Retrospect: 25 Years After Its End.”
    H-Diplo H-Diplo Article Review 548 (An H-Diplo Article Review Forum) on “Special Issue: The Cold War in Retrospect: 25 Years after its End.” Discussion published by George Fujii on Wednesday, September 9, 2015 H-Diplo Article Reviews No. 548 An H-Diplo Article Review Forum Published on 9 September 2015 H-Diplo Article Review Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Commissioned for H-Diplo by Thomas Maddux H-Diplo Forum on “Special Issue: The Cold War in Retrospect: 25 Years after its End.” Cold War History 14:4 (November 2014): 455-703. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fcwh20/14/4 Reviewers: Jerald Combs, San Francisco State, Emeritus Campbell Craig, Aberystwyth University Michelle Getchell, Dartmouth College Peter Grosser, Sciences Po, Paris John Taylor Vurpillat, University of Texas URL: http://tiny.cc/AR548 [1] Introduction by Beatrice Heuser, University of Reading A quarter of a century has passed since the end of the Cold War. Lecturers are confronted almost daily with the fact that to current students, the Cold War is as remote a past as the Second World War was to contributors to this special issue, and that the very real fears many of us had of World War III are barely, if at all, intelligible, let alone credible, to them. Even at the time, perceptions differed in East and West. As Sergei Zhuk demonstrates, watching the U.S. movie “On the Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Article Review 548 (An H-Diplo Article Review Forum) on “Special Issue: The Cold War in Retrospect: 25 Years after its End.”.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction Era of Negotiations (
    Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION Era of Negotiations ( This image is not available in this open access ebook due to rights restrictions. ILLUSTRATION 1: Chancellor Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Minister of the Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher (from right to left) during a Bundestag session in December 1972. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, B 145 Bild-00114278, Photographer: Ulrich Wienke. "A State of Peace in Europe: West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975” by Petri Hakkarainen is available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license with support from Knowledge Unlatched. OA ISBN: 978-1-78920-107-9. Not for resale. 2 | A State of Peace in Europe I was resented in the East for it, and not everybody in the West agreed with me either, when I said that the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in a European security conference would be pointless if the relationship between the two parts of Germany had not been settled first. The Federal Republic had some leverage here; I did not overestimate it, but we had it. My argument: if a wedding is planned and the other half of the bridal couple does not turn up, the other partner will not be very happy about it. – Willy Brandt in his memoirs1 This conference will simultaneously address the possibilities of cooperation and the questions of security. Between East and West, North and South, I see the possibility to create common interests and responsibilities in Europe through economic and other connections which can develop more security for everyone. – Willy Brandt’s
    [Show full text]
  • At Cold War's End: Complexity, Causes, and Counterfactuals
    THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE At Cold War’s End: Complexity, Causes, and Counterfactuals Benjamin Mueller A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. London, 1 October 2015 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis I present for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work, except where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out by any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,864 words. 2 ABSTRACT What caused the Cold War to end? In the following I examine the puzzle of the fast and peaceful conclusion of the bipolar superpower standoff, and point out the problems this creates for the study of International Relations (IR). I discuss prevailing explanations and point out their gaps, and offer the framework of complexity theory as a suitable complement to overcome the blind spots in IR’s reductionist methodologies. I argue that uncertainty and unpredictability are rooted in an international system that is best viewed as non-linear.
    [Show full text]
  • Bull8-Cover Copy
    220 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN More New Evidence On THE COLD WAR IN ASIA Editor’s Note: “New Evidence on History Department (particularly Prof. Zhang Shuguang (University of Mary- the Cold War in Asia” was not only the Priscilla Roberts and Prof. Thomas land/College Park) played a vital liai- theme of the previous issue of the Cold Stanley) during a visit by CWIHP’s di- son role between CWIHP and the Chi- War International History Project Bul- rector to Hong Kong and to Beijing, nese scholars. The grueling regime of letin (Issue 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 where the Institute of American Studies panel discussions and debates (see pro- pages), but of a major international (IAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social gram below) was eased by an evening conference organized by CWIHP and Sciences (CASS) agreed to help coor- boat trip to the island of Lantau for a hosted by the History Department of dinate the participation of Chinese seafood dinner; and a reception hosted Hong Kong University (HKU) on 9-12 scholars (also joining the CWIHP del- by HKU at which CWIHP donated to January 1996. Both the Bulletin and egation were Prof. David Wolff, then of the University a complete set of the the conference presented and analyzed Princeton University, and Dr. Odd Arne roughly 1500 pages of documents on the newly available archival materials and Westad, Director of Research, Norwe- Korean War it had obtained (with the other primary sources from Russia, gian Nobel Institute). Materials for the help of the Center for Korean Research China, Eastern Europe and other loca- Bulletin and papers for the conference at Columbia University) from the Rus- tions in the former communist bloc on were concurrently sought and gathered sian Presidential Archives.
    [Show full text]
  • The End of the Cold War and Why We Failed to Predict It
    www.ssoar.info 1989 and why we got it wrong Cox, Michael Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Arbeitspapier / working paper Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Cox, M. (2008). 1989 and why we got it wrong. (Working Paper Series of the Research Network 1989, 1). Berlin. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-16282 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de Working Paper Series of the Research Network 1989 Working Paper 1/2008 ISSN 1867-2833 1989 and why we got it wrong Michael Cox IDEAS and the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom Abstract The Cold War generated more discussion and controversy than any other topic since 1945. Yet, the possibility that the Cold War might end was neither on the radar of scholars nor of politics and the military. This essay seeks to explain why ‘we’ got it wrong by focusing in the main on how ‘we’ in the West understood the Soviet system. Part one thus deals with the Cold War itself and its impact on what came to be known as western ‘Soviet Studies’. Part two then looks at the way in which the USSR was understood by an emerging group of new social scientists in the 1970s and 1980s.
    [Show full text]