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MICROCOMP Output File GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: THE SILENT PROLIFERATION OF BIO-LABORATORIES IN THE UNITED STATES HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION OCTOBER 4, 2007 Serial No. 110–70 ( Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce energycommerce.house.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 44–948 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California JOE BARTON, Texas EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts Ranking Member RICK BOUCHER, Virginia RALPH M. HALL, Texas EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey FRED UPTON, Michigan BART GORDON, Tennessee CLIFF STEARNS, Florida BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois NATHAN DEAL, Georgia ANNA G. ESHOO, California ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BART STUPAK, Michigan BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico GENE GREEN, Texas JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, Vice Chairman Mississippi LOIS CAPPS, California VITO FOSSELLA, New York MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania STEVE BUYER, Indiana JANE HARMAN, California GEORGE RADANOVICH, California TOM ALLEN, Maine JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARY BONO, California HILDA L. SOLIS, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska JAY INSLEE, Washington MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MIKE ROGERS, Michigan MIKE ROSS, Arkansas SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana JOHN BARROW, Georgia BARON P. HILL, Indiana PROFESSIONAL STAFF DENNIS B. FITZGIBBONS, Chief of Staff GREGG A. ROTHSCHILD, Chief Counsel SHARON E. DAVIS, Chief Clerk DAVID L. CAVICKE, Minority Staff Director (II) SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana Ranking Member Vice Chairman GREG WALDEN, Oregon HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey GENE GREEN, Texas TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JAY INSLEE, Washington JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio) JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) (III) C O N T E N T S Page Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement ................................................................................................ 3 Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement ................................................................................................ 5 Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement .................................................................................... 6 Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, opening statement ............................................................................ 8 Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michi- gan, prepared statement ...................................................................................... 49 Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, prepared statement ....................................................................... 50 WITNESSES Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Center for Technology and Engineering, U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 10 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 Richard Besser, M.D., Director, Coordinating Office for Terrorism, Prepared- ness and Emergency Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 67 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69 Hugh Auchincloss, M.D., Deputy Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ............................................................................... 74 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 Eddie J. Davis, interim president, Texas A&M University ................................. 91 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 92 Gigi Kwik Gronvall, senior associate, assistant professor of medicine, Center for Biodiversity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center ............................... 105 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 106 Alan Pearson, director, Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation ................................................ 110 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 112 Edward Hammond, the Sunshine Project ............................................................. 143 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 145 SUBMITTED MATERIAL ‘‘High-Containment Biodefense Research Laboratories: Meeting Report and Center Recommendations’’ Gigi Kwik Gronvall, et al. ...................................... 174 Subcommittee hearing exhibts ............................................................................... 185 (V) GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: THE SILENT PROLIFERATION OF BIO-LABORATORIES IN THE UNITED STATES THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2007 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak (chairman) presiding. Members present: Representatives Stupak, DeGette, Green, Ins- lee, Burgess, Blackburn, and Barton. Staff present: John Sopko, John Arlington, Paul Jung, Scott Schloegel, Kyle Chapman, Kristen Carpenter, Peter Spencer, and Alan Slobodin. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENT- ATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Mr. STUPAK. Today we have a hearing on Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Laboratories in the United States. Each Member will be recognized for 5 minutes for an open- ing statement. I will begin. This is the first of what will likely be several hearings this com- mittee intends to hold to examine the risk associated with the re- cent proliferation of high-containment biological research labora- tories. Today’s hearing is focused on high-contaminate bio-labora- tories known as BSL–3 and BSL–4 labs in the United States. We anticipate a future hearing will examine the proliferation of high- containment labs outside of the United States. Another hearing will examine the Department of Homeland Security’s plan to close Plum Island Animal Disease Center and build a new $500 million animal research facility elsewhere, including a new BSL–4 lab. Our hearing today will focus on the risk associated with the re- cent increase of domestic BSL–3 and BSL–4 labs. These BSL–3 and 4 labs are the facilities where research is conducted on highly in- fectious viruses and bacteria that can cause injury or death. Some of the world’s most exotic and most dangerous diseases are handled at BSL–3 and 4 labs, including anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease and Ebola fever. The accidental or deliberate release of some of the biological agents handled at these labs could have catastrophic con- sequences. Yet, as we will hear from the Government Accountabil- ity Office, GAO, no single Government agency has the ultimate re- (1) 2 sponsibility for ensuring the safety and securing of these high-con- tainment labs. However, GAO states there is a major expansion of the number of BSL laboratories is occurring both in United States and abroad but the full extent of that expansion is unknown. No one in the Federal Government even knows for sure how many of these labs there are in the United States, much less what research they are doing or whether they are safe and secure. What we do know is that the Federal Government has been fund- ing the proliferation of these labs on an unprecedented scale. For the past 5 years, the NIH has spent more than $1 billion on the construction of new BSL–3 and BSL–4 labs. Given the serious risk associated with these labs, we must ask if all these new labs are necessary. Has the NIH carefully assessed the need for these labs before writing checks to build them? Would we be better off ex- panding existing facilities rather than building dozens
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