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Deradicalization of Poso Muslim Society: Evidence from Indonesia

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Deradicalization of Poso Muslim Society: Evidence from Indonesia Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142 Deradicalization of Poso Muslim Society: Evidence from Indonesia Nanang Wijaya1, Budi Radjab2, M. Munandar Sulaeman3, Soni Akhmad Nulhaqim4 1,2,3,4Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia Email: [email protected] Abstract This research examines the process of deradicalization in the Poso Muslim community in Indonesia by using Peter Berger's social construction theory as an analytical tool. This research uses a constructivist paradigm with a qualitative approach to interpreting data with data sources in this study: informants, documents, archives, and data from the BNPT, FKPT, Police, TNI, and the Poso Regional Government related to countering radicalism, terrorism, and deradicalization in Poso. Data collection was carried out through observation, interview, and documentation study. For the accuracy and validity of the data found in the field, the researchers carried out triangulation. This research concludes that the Poso Muslim community's radicalism is closely related to the conflict and weak post- conflict law enforcement. Deradicalization efforts consist of structural deradicalization by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and FKPT (Counter-Terrorism Coordination Forum) and cultural deradicalization by religious and community leaders. Keywords: Radicalism, Deradicalization, Significant Others. INTRODUCTION After the fall of the New Order, the Poso district in Indonesia became one of the areas that experienced communal conflicts with many victims and for a long time (Klinken, 2007). Various opinions answered why a small place like Poso experienced a significant conflict because of the long- standing competition for the spread of Islam and Christianity. (Bertrand, (2004), the struggle for natural resources between local communities and immigrant communities caused some immigrants to dominate politics and the economy (Acciaioli, 2001), rapid democratization and decentralization created competition for political elites entering the Poso regent election after the collapse of the New Order regime. (Aragon, 2011), there was a national transition, access to power was open to anyone (Davidson, 2009), a weakening of the repressive state and a change in the position of Muslims in national politics with a balance of Muslim and Christian propositions which were not much different, giving birth to local political competition in Poso Regency (McRae, 2008). The protracted Communal conflict attracted radical groups from outside Poso district to have been involved in the competition since 2001 by recruiting and providing semi-military training for the Muslim community of Poso such as Laskar Jihad (LJ), Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council ( MMI), the Crisis Management Committee (KOMPAK) and Wahdah Islamiyah formed local radical groups (Karnavian, 2008). With a strict doctrinal interpretation of the Koran text (Fenton, 2014), radical groups with various strategies can cause communal conflict to move into a revolutionary terrorism movement with acts of kidnapping, shooting, and massive suicide bombings being carried out (Nasrum, 2016). The government made several attempts to stop the growing conflict and radicalism, especially in the Muslim community. On August 22, 2000, Rujuk Sintuvu Moroso carried out the peace agreement, and on 19-20 December 2001, the Malino Declaration was reached. However, local radical groups 131| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142 continued to commit violence because they felt they were not represented in the agreement (Karnavian, 2008). Communal conflicts have turned into violent radicalism with violence that continues to occur in society targeting people of different religions, police officers, soldiers and officials deemed traitor (ICG, 2019). To combat acts of terrorism that continued to occur, the Indonesian police took a challenging approach step by carrying out the maleo awareness operation (2000), the Bintulu Moroso operation (2001-2004), the lantodago process (2005-2007), the siwagilemba operation (2008-2009), the maleo safe operation. (2009-2012), Operation Camar Maleo (2009-2016), Tinombala operation from 2017- 2019 (Albanna, 2017). In addition to the police operation, the Special Detachment 88 was also formed to combat terrorism, specifically in Poso, a Poso Anti-terror Crime Unit (ICG, 2008). The procedure and presence of Densus 88 and the Anti-terror Task Force with a hard approach received resistance from the Muslim community of Poso because it caused many victims, so the government changed the challenging approach strategy to a soft approach strategy, namely the deradicalization program in countering the spread and development of radicalism and terrorism in Poso. To streamline efforts to combat terrorism and terror violence, the Government of Indonesia established the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) to anticipate radicalism developing in society (Agus, 2014). Deradicalization is a policy aimed at those influenced by radical ideas by neutralizing radical ideas through interdisciplinary approaches such as law, psychology, religion, and society to be re- integrated with the organization (Golose, 2009). The deradicalization program is a debate among scholars and experts because deradicalization is a long process with the lengthy process but is considered to stop violence (Suratman, 2017) immediately. However, the Indonesian government's deradicalization is more top-down in nature, so that sometimes it does not address the needs and desires of the community (Sumpter, 2017). Deradicalization by BNPT requires radical restructuring by involving more elements of society (IPAC, 2019). Several studies on deradicalization in correctional institutions in Indonesia, such as Purwoko (2007) and Hartanto (2018), concluded that the development of terrorism convicts that was carried out did not succeed in achieving the results mandated by the objectives of punishment and the deradicalization program. This can be seen from the following indicators: 1) the prisoner does not feel guilty; 2) have no regrets; 3) not repenting; 4) still vital in holding onto the ideology of terror; 5) still involved in acts of terror; 6) several obstacles in the process of deradicalization of the facilities and infrastructure, the minimum number of officers, the lack of cooperation with other institutions and the existence of terror convicts who do not want to change and do not wish to take part in the deradicalization program, and 7) prisoners who are undergoing the deradicalization process are in fact in the process radicalization in prisons so that the deradicalization program is ineffective. So it is not uncommon for other prisoners or even correctional officers to experience a radicalization process. Meanwhile, Erwin (2017), who focuses on the Indonesian Armed Forces and the National Police, has concluded that the operations carried out by the TNI and Polri have not been effective so that from the community, radical movements are still growing and developing in Poso. Hwang's research (2013) found that three factors that occur make the perpetrators of violence (Jihadists) experience a process of awareness and behavior change. The three elements are 1) structural; 2) pull factors, namely the opening of personal relationships with other people outside the old jihadist or terrorist groups; 3) push factors, in the form of growing disappointment with the ideology, tactics, or the leader of a terrorist organization. This research examines the process of deradicalization in the Muslim community of Poso using Peter Berger's social construction theory as an analytical tool and deliberately choosing the Muslim Poso 132| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142 community to be the object of discussion when compared to the Christian Poso community because the development of local radical groups with violent actions is more prevalent in the Muslim community. LITERATUR REVIEW Radicalism Neumann (2008). illustrates that radicalism is all processes and activities before violent activity explodes. At the same time, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) see radicalism as "the development of beliefs, feelings, and actions supporting groups or causes in a conflict and violent war. Three general trends characterize Golose's (2009) radicalization: first, radicalization is a response to conditions. This response usually appears in the form of evaluation, rejection, or even resistance. The rejected problems can be in the form of assumptions, ideas, institutions, or values that can be considered responsible for the continuation of the left conditions; second, radicalization does not stop on refusal efforts but continues to strive to replace this order with another form of order. This characteristic shows that radicalization contains a separate program or world view; third, the firm belief of radicalizes in the correctness of the program or ideology they carry—this attitude at the moment coupled with denial of the truth with another system that will be replaced. There are seven crucial points in understanding radicalism and terrorism, namely (1) radicalism is a reaction to social, political, and economic situations; (2) using wrong interpretations and religious symbols in their movements; (3) using violent actions; (4) has a political objective, in the sense that acts of terrorism are not for personal purposes but on behalf of
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