Deradicalization of Poso Muslim Society: Evidence from Indonesia

Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142 Deradicalization of Poso Muslim Society: Evidence from Indonesia

Nanang Wijaya1, Budi Radjab2, M. Munandar Sulaeman3, Soni Akhmad Nulhaqim4 1,2,3,4Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia Email: [email protected]

Abstract

This research examines the process of deradicalization in the Poso Muslim community in Indonesia by using Peter Berger's social construction theory as an analytical tool. This research uses a constructivist paradigm with a qualitative approach to interpreting data with data sources in this study: informants, documents, archives, and data from the BNPT, FKPT, Police, TNI, and the Poso Regional Government related to countering radicalism, terrorism, and deradicalization in Poso. Data collection was carried out through observation, interview, and documentation study. For the accuracy and validity of the data found in the field, the researchers carried out triangulation. This research concludes that the Poso Muslim community's radicalism is closely related to the conflict and weak post- conflict law enforcement. Deradicalization efforts consist of structural deradicalization by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and FKPT (Counter-Terrorism Coordination Forum) and cultural deradicalization by religious and community leaders.

Keywords: Radicalism, Deradicalization, Significant Others.

INTRODUCTION After the fall of the New Order, the Poso district in Indonesia became one of the areas that experienced communal conflicts with many victims and for a long time (Klinken, 2007). Various opinions answered why a small place like Poso experienced a significant conflict because of the long- standing competition for the spread of Islam and Christianity. (Bertrand, (2004), the struggle for natural resources between local communities and immigrant communities caused some immigrants to dominate politics and the economy (Acciaioli, 2001), rapid democratization and decentralization created competition for political elites entering the Poso regent election after the collapse of the New Order regime. (Aragon, 2011), there was a national transition, access to power was open to anyone (Davidson, 2009), a weakening of the repressive state and a change in the position of Muslims in national politics with a balance of Muslim and Christian propositions which were not much different, giving birth to local political competition in Poso Regency (McRae, 2008). The protracted Communal conflict attracted radical groups from outside Poso district to have been involved in the competition since 2001 by recruiting and providing semi-military training for the Muslim community of Poso such as Laskar Jihad (LJ), Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council ( MMI), the Crisis Management Committee (KOMPAK) and Wahdah Islamiyah formed local radical groups (Karnavian, 2008). With a strict doctrinal interpretation of the Koran text (Fenton, 2014), radical groups with various strategies can cause communal conflict to move into a revolutionary terrorism movement with acts of kidnapping, shooting, and massive suicide bombings being carried out (Nasrum, 2016). The government made several attempts to stop the growing conflict and radicalism, especially in the Muslim community. On August 22, 2000, Rujuk Sintuvu Moroso carried out the peace agreement, and on 19-20 December 2001, the Malino Declaration was reached. However, local radical groups

131| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142 continued to commit violence because they felt they were not represented in the agreement (Karnavian, 2008). Communal conflicts have turned into violent radicalism with violence that continues to occur in society targeting people of different religions, police officers, soldiers and officials deemed traitor (ICG, 2019). To combat acts of terrorism that continued to occur, the Indonesian police took a challenging approach step by carrying out the maleo awareness operation (2000), the Bintulu Moroso operation (2001-2004), the lantodago process (2005-2007), the siwagilemba operation (2008-2009), the maleo safe operation. (2009-2012), Operation Camar Maleo (2009-2016), Tinombala operation from 2017- 2019 (Albanna, 2017). In addition to the police operation, the Special Detachment 88 was also formed to combat terrorism, specifically in Poso, a Poso Anti-terror Crime Unit (ICG, 2008). The procedure and presence of Densus 88 and the Anti-terror Task Force with a hard approach received resistance from the Muslim community of Poso because it caused many victims, so the government changed the challenging approach strategy to a soft approach strategy, namely the deradicalization program in countering the spread and development of radicalism and terrorism in Poso. To streamline efforts to combat terrorism and terror violence, the Government of Indonesia established the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) to anticipate radicalism developing in society (Agus, 2014). Deradicalization is a policy aimed at those influenced by radical ideas by neutralizing radical ideas through interdisciplinary approaches such as law, psychology, religion, and society to be re- integrated with the organization (Golose, 2009). The deradicalization program is a debate among scholars and experts because deradicalization is a long process with the lengthy process but is considered to stop violence (Suratman, 2017) immediately. However, the Indonesian government's deradicalization is more top-down in nature, so that sometimes it does not address the needs and desires of the community (Sumpter, 2017). Deradicalization by BNPT requires radical restructuring by involving more elements of society (IPAC, 2019). Several studies on deradicalization in correctional institutions in Indonesia, such as Purwoko (2007) and Hartanto (2018), concluded that the development of terrorism convicts that was carried out did not succeed in achieving the results mandated by the objectives of punishment and the deradicalization program. This can be seen from the following indicators: 1) the prisoner does not feel guilty; 2) have no regrets; 3) not repenting; 4) still vital in holding onto the ideology of terror; 5) still involved in acts of terror; 6) several obstacles in the process of deradicalization of the facilities and infrastructure, the minimum number of officers, the lack of cooperation with other institutions and the existence of terror convicts who do not want to change and do not wish to take part in the deradicalization program, and 7) prisoners who are undergoing the deradicalization process are in fact in the process radicalization in prisons so that the deradicalization program is ineffective. So it is not uncommon for other prisoners or even correctional officers to experience a radicalization process. Meanwhile, Erwin (2017), who focuses on the Indonesian Armed Forces and the National Police, has concluded that the operations carried out by the TNI and Polri have not been effective so that from the community, radical movements are still growing and developing in Poso. Hwang's research (2013) found that three factors that occur make the perpetrators of violence (Jihadists) experience a process of awareness and behavior change. The three elements are 1) structural; 2) pull factors, namely the opening of personal relationships with other people outside the old jihadist or terrorist groups; 3) push factors, in the form of growing disappointment with the ideology, tactics, or the leader of a terrorist organization. This research examines the process of deradicalization in the Muslim community of Poso using Peter Berger's social construction theory as an analytical tool and deliberately choosing the Muslim Poso

132| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142 community to be the object of discussion when compared to the Christian Poso community because the development of local radical groups with violent actions is more prevalent in the Muslim community.

LITERATUR REVIEW Radicalism Neumann (2008). illustrates that radicalism is all processes and activities before violent activity explodes. At the same time, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) see radicalism as "the development of beliefs, feelings, and actions supporting groups or causes in a conflict and violent war. Three general trends characterize Golose's (2009) radicalization: first, radicalization is a response to conditions. This response usually appears in the form of evaluation, rejection, or even resistance. The rejected problems can be in the form of assumptions, ideas, institutions, or values that can be considered responsible for the continuation of the left conditions; second, radicalization does not stop on refusal efforts but continues to strive to replace this order with another form of order. This characteristic shows that radicalization contains a separate program or world view; third, the firm belief of radicalizes in the correctness of the program or ideology they carry—this attitude at the moment coupled with denial of the truth with another system that will be replaced. There are seven crucial points in understanding radicalism and terrorism, namely (1) radicalism is a reaction to social, political, and economic situations; (2) using wrong interpretations and religious symbols in their movements; (3) using violent actions; (4) has a political objective, in the sense that acts of terrorism are not for personal purposes but on behalf of a group or community; (5) relates to a particular ideology; and (6) well organized; (7) has a national or international network.

Deradicalization Deradicalization is a counter-terrorism concept formulated by the UN Agency, namely the Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) in 2005. CTITF is a working group formed in the effort to tackle global terrorism crimes. This institution identifies that the cause of terrorism comes from radicalism. Therefore, CTITF designed two programs, namely counter-radicalization and deradicalization. (Golose, 2009). Agus (2014) explains that the choice of the deradicalization program is due to the proliferation of radical ideas in the name of religion with acts of terrorism that destroy lives and lives, destroy the order and guidance of religion and society; 2) efforts to invite the public to be directly involved in the counter-terrorism process. The deradicalization of terrorism is manifested in a motivational reorientation program, re-education, resocialization, internalization of values, and the correct understanding of religion and values that counter radical understanding.

Social Construction Theory The social construction of reality is defined as a social process through actions and interactions in which individuals continuously create a fact that is shared and experienced subjectively. Constructivism is seen as individual cognitive work to interpret the existing world of reality due to social relations between individuals and the environment or people. The individual then builds his knowledge of the fact he sees based on the pre-existing knowledge structure. This social construction shapes values and behavior in society (Poloma, 1994).

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Berger connects objective and subjective concepts through three momenta, namely externalization- objectivation-internalization. 1. Externalization is the adjustment of oneself to the socio-cultural world as a human product (Society is a human product); 2. Objectivation is social interaction in an intersubjective world which is institutionalized or institutionalized (Society is an objective reality); 3. Internalization is that individuals identify themselves amid social institutions or social organizations in which the individual is a member (Man is the social product).

METHOD This study uses a constructivist paradigm in analyzing the deradicalization of the Muslim community in Poso. This study uses a qualitative approach that is in line with constructivists; this approach allows researchers to interpret and explain a phenomenon holistically by emphasizing the meaning, reasoning, and definitions of certain situations related to everyday life. Sources of data in this study were informants, documents, data archives, and 25 informants. Data collection was carried out through observation, interviewing, and documentation study. The accuracy and validity of the data is triangulated.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION The Prolonged Conflict in Poso Before the Poso communal conflict outbreak, some factors could be interpreted as the seeds of the ongoing conflict. However, the New Order's repressive attitude was able to keep the potential for competition from breaking out into open warfare. The reform movement that overthrew President Soeharto led to freedom over democracy nationally, making people feel they had equal rights to political positions in the regions. At the same time, local officials tried to maintain the power they had controlled. Meanwhile, local Poso factors that build up the potential for conflict in the Poso community are: 1. Competition for the spread of religion between Islam, which is widely embraced by immigrant communities, and Protestant Christianity, is widely adopted by local communities. 2. Economic competition between local communities and migrants. Control over natural resources has resulted in economic competition between immigrants and local communities. This happens in almost all Poso districts, but the majority of traders and employees are residents who live in Poso Kota. 3. Political competition, control of natural resources changed immigrants' lives to become landowners and occupied a high social stratification in the Poso community. Community leaders who were originally migrants began to be active in the political world to open new competition, namely political competition in Poso with local community leaders. The Poso conflict volume I at the start of a fight between two youth groups in the courtyard of the Darussalam Poso mosque on December 24, 1998, resulted in the death of Muslim youth, namely Ahmad Ridwan, who was stabbed by Roy Bisalema, a Protestant Christian youth when the Muslim community was observing fasting prayer. The Christian community was preparing for Christmas. In the Poso Conflict Volume II in Poso Kota in 2000, political competition between the Muslim community and the Christian community heats up again, triggered by competition in the Regional Secretary of Poso Regency's determination. Actually, there is an unwritten agreement to share Poso 134| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142

District positions; if the Regent is a Muslim, then the Sekda must be Christian or vice versa. However, political interests caused issues, rumors and provocations to circulate again and again among Poso district's people, making Poso Kota's condition heated up again. Starting with a fight between a group of Muslim youths and Christian youths, Firman Said (Muslim) was seriously injured on April 15, 2000. Poso Conflict Volume III (extending beyond the Poso Kota sub-district). The Christian community feels driven out of Poso and is compelled to return immediately and take revenge. The months of April and May are spent arranging power, training and making homemade weapons centered in Kelei Village, southeast of Tentena City. Receiving assistance from the Manguni group, the Christian radical group of around 700 people was formed, after experiencing sufficient training on May 23, 2000, the Christian radical group armed with homemade weapons began trying to enter and invade Poso Kota which was guarded by a Muslim youth group. The Poso conflict volume IV (inside and outside Poso Kota) occurred when members of the Muslim radical group arrived in Poso just a few weeks after the conflict volume III took place, directly recruiting Poso youths, especially those who were able to protect Poso Kota from attacks by Christian radical groups. Two interests were met in this Poso conflict, the ideological interests of jihad from Muslim radical groups in Indonesia and the Poso Muslim community's interests, especially the youth who wanted to protect Poso and take revenge on Christian groups.

The Development of Radicalism and Terrorism Movement in Poso The development of radicalism in the Poso district cannot be separated from the communal conflicts that occurred, especially during the invasion of Christian groups from villages trying to enter Poso City as the center of government in conflict volume III. Information and news about the attack, arson, and massacre of Muslim communities and the slow response of the security forces in resolving conflicts spread throughout the country, building sympathy and solidarity from Muslims outside the Poso district. There are at least 7 (seven) radical Muslim Islamic groups sympathetic to the Poso Muslim community who enter Poso district to carry out semi-military recruitment and training, namely: the al Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) group, the Crisis Response Committee (Kompak) group, the Indonesian Islamic State Group (NII). ), The Laskar Jundullah Group, the Wahdah Islamiyyah Group, and the Laskar Jihad Group (LJ). These Jihadi groups came to Poso district after being from Ambon Province, which has also experienced inter-religious conflict (Muslim-Christian) since 1999. Muslim radical groups easily entered and recruited Muslim Poso Kota to join forces and help Poso Muslims maintain Poso Kota as the capital of a Muslim-majority district. The radicalism of the Poso Muslim community was awakened by two mutual interests which mutually reinforce and need to meet. The symbiosis of mutualism between radical Muslim groups and local Muslim groups is protecting Muslim areas.

Deradicalization is Carried Out by the Government Implementing the deradicalization program, the government formed the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) through Presidential Decree No. 46 of 2010 and to help BNPT carry out its duties in each province, a Terrorism Prevention Communication Forum (FKPT) was formed in each province based on the regulation of the Head of the Counter-Terrorism Agency No: PER-02 / K.BNPT / 1/2012 regarding general guidelines Regional Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT) (Idris, 2017).

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The Communication Forum on Prevention of Terrorism (FKPT) has become a public representation in preventing terrorism (Rauf, 2018). However, the Poso Muslim community's perception towards BNPT and FKPT activities in implementing the deradicalization program is more project-oriented than implementing countering radicalism and terrorism in the Poso district. FKPT Central Sulawesi only carried out non-instinctive actions, and there was no follow-up to these activities. FKPT did not maximally carry out the process of community involvement in deradicalisation efforts in Poso, so efforts to resolve radicalism that led to violent actions in Poso were not maximized. Central Sulawesi FKPT was impressed by the Muslim community that it only held seminars, talk shows and meetings. BNPT and FKPT Central Sulawesi in collaboration with religious leaders who are members of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of Central Sulawesi Province, Muhammadiyah, al Khairaat and the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB). So far, the BNPT and FKPT Central Sulawesi held religious and national guidance without a clear schedule and theme and no patent. It depends on the willingness of religious leaders who can come to give lectures or studies. So that the religious guidance carried out in Poso Kota is incidental depending on the readiness of the figures and the place. Meanwhile, neither the BNPT nor the FKPT Central Sulawesi has a standard for evaluating this religious coaching program's success, so that until this study took place, the BNPT and FKPT Central Sulawesi administrators had never assessed the success of spiritual coaching. It is common for BNPT and FKPT to present senior figures from terrorism perpetrators who will have undergone and accepted the deradicalization process to speak in front of terror convicts and former terrorists. The presence of former terrorism convicts who are considered older, more senior, and have higher radical network positions is more listened to. The deradicalization program is manifested in the development of nationalism and nationality as well as skills training for terror convicts in the form of work skills: sewing, welding or lathe, woodworking, fisheries, agriculture/plantation, screen printing, soap making, shoemaking, mattress making, and automotive or workshop. For the development of independence, the local government, the police collaborated with the BNPT and FKPT through the Poso Kesbangpol to provide terror convicts with a business capital of 10 million for the first phase in 2010. With the money provided by the terror convicts and former combatants, they are allowed to open a business which is their source of income. . In the second phase in 2012, BNPT and FKPT collaborated with the Poso District Social Service to provide non-cash assistance only to former terrorism convicts in the form of business equipment needed to develop a business. The third stage of this self-reliance development was carried out in 2014 in the form of the Joint Business Assistance (KUBE) program. The KUBE program is implemented in line with the resocialization program and reintegration of terror convicts with the community by forming business groups consisting of 5 terror convicts and five ordinary people. The fourth stage in 2016 is developing self-reliance through the Productive Economic Enterprises (UEP) program by the Social Service begins with the making of a proposal by former terror convicts about the business to be built. For each form of business to be built, the assistance provided is only 5 million rupiahs. In this fourth stage, there are 35 former terrorism convicts with various efforts to be made. They quickly do the resocialization process with the community. Because the Muslim community in Poso does not see the violence perpetrated by some Muslim youth negatively, this violence is only an effort to defend themselves and take revenge from Muslim groups. This causes the community to accept openly when the perpetrators of violence return after undergoing the punishment process. Directly live together and even have a separate position in the community structure as the hero guarding Poso. After these former terrorist convicts were accepted by the

136| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142 family and society and interacted well. So the next program of resocialization is reintegration, where ex-convicts interact well with the community. In addition to ex-terror convicts, reintegration and resocialization programs are also carried out for ex-convict families. The deradicalization process aimed at the BNPT and FKPT terror families and the government through the Social Service, include the families of former terrorist prisoners into the Family Hope Program (PKH) and recipients of the Healthy Indonesia Card (KIS). After reporting to Kesbangpol Poso, families receiving cash assistance from the Family Hope Program underwent identifying the status of families involved in violent acts, had served sentences, or were on the run (fugitive). For those who have served their sentences, families are included in the program of spiritual development, nationalism and nationalism development, and independence development while still receiving cash assistance from the Family Hope Program. The amount received by each terrorist family is not the same, depending on the size of the family's responsibility. Revenue is divided into four phases from Rp. 300,000 to 500,000 in each stage. Apart from receiving cash assistance from the Family Hope Program, the families of former Terrorist Prisoners also accept a Healthy Indonesia Card (KIS) to help each family member have their health checked. The PKH program and the KIS program have much helped the families of former terrorist convicts fulfill their daily needs after the family head or family members left behind because they were involved in the jihadist network. With the Healthy Indonesia Card (KIS), families who have family members who have been involved in violent or terrorist acts who have served their sentence and have participated in the deradicalization program can have their health checked at the designated hospital for free. However, business capital assistance for terror convicts and Social Service assistance with facilities for ex-convict families can trigger social jealousy, especially those who do not know and experience conflict so they do not see the position of terror convicts in the Poso community. In carrying out general community coaching, BNPT and FKPT divide the community into six categories, namely: 1) village/government; 2) students and students; 3) women; 4) media and journalists; 5) figures (community, custom, religion) and 6) the general public. This coaching takes the form of seminars, discussions, Forum Discussion Group (FGD), work camps, and training. Guidance for deradicalization outside prisons is community leaders, traditional leaders, and religious leaders. The three categories of figures have high stratification in society. The patron-client character characterizes the interaction between the community and the leaders. This causes all decisions, policies, and fatwas from the leaders to be very well heard by the public. This is quite supportive in the socialization process of deradicalization in society and those directly involved in acts of violence or terrorism. This has led BNPT and FKPT to carry out deradicalization guidance for community leaders, traditional leaders, and religious leaders.

Deradicalization is Carried Out by the Community The realization of the Poso Muslim community's deradicalization began with involvement in the Malino declaration on December 20, 2001. However, the determination of the participants who could follow the Malino declaration and the implementation of the results of the Malino declaration created disappointment in the Muslim Poso community so that the Poso Muslim community was divided into two major groups, namely; a) accept the Malino Declaration and endeavor to socialize and implement it in society; b) reject the results of the Malino declaration and continue acts of violence as an effort to take revenge.

After the implementation of the Malino declaration was constrained by differences in the interpretation and meaning of each of the points resulting from the order; however, efforts to deradicalize the Muslim community in Poso were continuously carried out by Ustaz Adnan Arsal with various activities that were different from the deradicalization program by BNPT and FKPT. Ustaz Adnan Arsal's deradicalization activities, namely: a) the formation of the Poso Islamic Forum for Struggle (FPUI), which continues to try to coordinate the youths who remain in Poso; b) the establishment of the Muslimat Muslimat Council (IMTM) aimed at fostering women victims of conflict and the wives of perpetrators of terrorist acts; c) establishing the Waqaf Amanatul Ummah Foundation which is specialized in promoting perpetrators of violence and their families. Waqaf Amanatul Ummah Foundation is engaged in education by establishing Islamic boarding schools for boys and girls and 2 (two) elementary schools (SD), which are specifically intended for children who are victims of conflict and children of terror convicts or ex-terror convicts; the economy by managing zakat, Waqaf, Infaq and Sadaqah which as long as they are accepted as business capital for Terrorist Prisoners and their families, Former Terrorist Prisoners and Muslim families and families who are victims of conflict; coaching former terrorist convicts by coordinating them and forming a Search and Rescue Team that immediately works in the event of a disaster or accident; the formation of the Muslimat Muslimat Council Association was created to provide guidance to women, wives, mothers and children of conflict victims and the families of terror convicts and former terror convicts so that wives who have become widows and orphaned children immediately receive guidance from the Amanatul Ummah foundation by carrying out recitation every afternoon Friday at the Amanatul Ummah boarding school complex. Apart from Ustad Adnan Arsal, the leading figure implementing the deradicalization effort in the Muslim community of Poso is Budiman Maliki, the founder of the Civil Society Studies Institute (LPMS). At a time when the conflict and acts of terror by the radical groups were raging in Poso, a group of students from Poso who were currently studying in Palu City gathered and looked for what help they did for their families in Poso, a non-government organization (NGO ) Civil Society Studies Institute (LPMS) on July 23, 2005. The Civil Society Studies Institute that agreed to assist the repatriation of refugees from Poso was none other than the students' families. Initially, the LPMS cooperated with the National Unity and Political Body to identify and coordinate the return of refugees back to the Poso area. LPMS again coordinates with Kesbangpol and Poso Regency in fostering ex-combatants and terrorists by channeling venture capital for ex-combatants and terrorism. LPMS activities concentrate on returning refugees and fostering ex-combatants and radical groups in particular in socializing humanity and democracy in the form of seminars, discussions and FGDs. LPMS always coordinates with the local government in this case the Social Affairs and Kesbangpol in an effort to develop. Another figure who became the motor for the implementation of deradicalisation efforts in Poso is Arifudin Lako, who is usually called Iin Brur, a former prisoner who was detained for 8.6 years. After serving his term of detention, Arifudin Lako immediately coordinated his friends who were his subordinates while active in radical groups and formed the Rumah Katu community in November 2015, which consisted of former terrorism convicts who wanted to work in the socio- cultural field in seeking conflict resolution, peace and deradicalization. The activities of the Rumah Katu Community are: 1) Cultural gathering between the two Muslim and Christian communities; 2) Cultural festival between the two Muslim and Christian communities; 3) making a short film containing messages of peace, conflict resolution, and deradicalization; 4) fostering the younger generation (SMP and SMU) in creating harmony between the two Muslim and Christian communities.

The Rumah Katu community became a ransom for what they had done, making Poso and the Poso people trapped in a prolonged conflict. In the Rumah Katu Community, there were around 50 ex- Muslim Poso combatants and former terrorism convicts gathered by Arifuddin Loko. Saifuddin Loko was one of the most courageous and well-known mass leaders during the conflict. That is why Arifudin Loko is highly respected and admired by the Muslim Community in Poso. These three figures, namely: Ustad Adnan Arsal, Arifudin Loko, and Budiman Maliki, are currently influential figures in efforts for peace and deradicalization efforts in Poso today.

Analysis of the Social Construction of the Deradicalization of the Muslim Community in Poso Social reality construction describes how through actions and interactions, humans continuously create a shared reality that is experienced factually objectively and subjectively meaningful. Berger connects objective and subjective concepts through three momenta, namely externalization- objectivation-internalization. 1. Eksternalitation The reality of the par excellence of the Muslim community in Poso is a) prolonged communal conflict has resulted in losses and suffering for both fighting parties, both the Muslim community and the Christian community. Conflict is interpreted as something that needs to be resolved and avoided. This encourages people, both Muslim and Christian, to try to resolve disputes in various ways. Willing to create a state of peace and security; b) the entry and development of radical groups by conducting semi-military recruitment and training to the Muslim community of Poso spreading radical ideology and acts of terrorism by local Poso groups. Radical ideology and semi-military skills have become a stock of knowledge for the Muslim community in Poso; c) conflict and terrorism countermeasures operations by security forces that are hard approach interpreted as an attempt to attack Muslim groups and a form of injustice by the security apparatus with maleo conscious operations, peace-loving operations, sintuvu Moroso operations, siwagilembah operations, lantodago operations, safe maleo operations, maleo gull operation, and tombola operation. Meanwhile, Densus 88 is considered to have committed violence against Muslims 2. Objectiation The government has objectified the momentum of externalization in the form of the formation of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and the Communication Forum for Prevention of Terrorism (FKPT) to become the technical implementer of the deradicalization program in collaboration with community leaders, religious and traditional leaders to carry out rehabilitation, re-education, resocialization and reintegration in the form of recitation, discussion group forums (FGD), seminars, screening of films, anti-radicalism campaigns and providing skills and business capital assistance to former terrorists. Meanwhile, the Muslim community in Poso in particular; 1) Ustadz Adnan Arsal formed the Pos Islamic Struggle Gathering Forum (FSPUI), the Amanatul Ummah Foundation, the Muslimat Muslimat Council (IMTM), Baitul Mal Amanatul Ummah, and the SAR (Search and Rescue) Team as a training forum for former terrorists by continuing to carry out intense recitation and discussion of Islam rahmatan lil 'Alamin; 2) Budiman Maliki formed a Civil Society Studies Institute which concentrates on returning conflict victims who left Poso in collaboration with the National and Political Unity Agency (Kesbangpol Poso) in identifying and coordinating the return of refugees back to the Poso area. To guide former Poso conflict combatants and their families and assist the Poso Regional Government in channeling assistance and business capital for former terrorist convicts. In its development, LPMS emphasizes humanity and democracy in seminars, discussions, and FGDs. 139| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142

LPMS always coordinates with the local government, in this case, the Social Affairs and Kesbangpol, in coaching efforts, and: 3) Arifudin Loko founded the Rumah Katu Community, which is engaged in socio-culture and local wisdom in seeking conflict resolution, peace, and deradicalization. The activities of the Rumah Katu Community are a) Cultural gathering between the two Muslim and Christian communities; b) Cultural festival between two Muslim and Christian communities; c) making short films containing messages of peace, conflict resolution, and deradicalization; d) fostering the younger generation (SMP and SMU) in creating harmony between the two Muslim and Christian communities. Saifuddin Loko was one of the most courageous and well-known mass leaders during the conflict. The presence of institutions either formed by the government or the Muslim Poso community carries out the institutionalization process in various activities to create a sense of security, peace, and deradicalization in the Muslim Poso community. However, the activities and programs run independently and are not related to each other. Yet, they have the same fostering object, namely the Poso Muslim community, especially members of the Poso Muslim radical group, both of who are still at large, are undergoing the process of punishment, and are former terrorism convicts. The deradicalization process will run better if the government and the community unite steps in the process of deradicalization in the Muslim community of Poso. 3. Internalization The internalization process is an understanding or direct interpretation of an objective event as the expression of a meaning, which means it is a manifestation of others' subjective process, which then has a personal meaning for oneself. More precisely, internalization in a general sense is the basis, an understanding of oneself and an understanding of the world as something meaningful from existing social realities. The two central values that are the building factor (objective) and the built factor (subjective) in the Muslim Poso community are nationalism, Islam rahmatan lil 'alamin, and Sintuvu Moroso. Internalization carried out by institutions formed by the community starts with guidance for children who are victims of conflict and children of perpetrators of violence, wives of violence perpetrators, perpetrators of violence and society in the form of religious discussion, national discussion, FGD, and cultural practices with a load of nationalism, Islam rahmatan lil alamin and sintuvu maroso but they still have knowledge of war, weapons, and bombs. This has made the Poso Muslim community leave violent acts but will return to violence if their belief, theology, or religion is again disturbed. This can be called a type of latent radicalism. Latent radicalism is a radical attitude but by not using violence blindly or carelessly.

CONCLUSION The development of radicalism in the Muslim community in Poso is closely related to the conflict and weak post-conflict law enforcement. The radicalism construction was formed in the Muslim community by radical groups who came to regenerate the Poso Muslim community. The government made various attempts, in this case, the police and the TNI; however, they met with resistance from the Muslim community in Poso. Deradicalization carried out in the Poso Muslim community can be divided into two types, namely; structural deradicalization carried out by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and the FKPT (Counter-Terrorism Coordination Forum) with government programs and cultural deradicalization carried out by religious and community leaders called significant others by carrying out various activities in anticipating the radicalism of the Muslim community in Poso. 140| http://www.italienisch.nl ©Wijaya et al. Italienisch ISSN: 0171-4996, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2021, pp 131-142

It takes the coordination of structural interventions and cultural interventions so that the deradicalization program can be successful. BNPT and FKPT work in fostering nationalism, business skills, providing business capital, and solving legal problems while significant others carry out spiritual development and family education. The process of forming meaning, knowledge, and behavior is the joint responsibility of the government and significant others to achieve the goal of deradicalization.

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