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Sanctions Under Rule 11 Practice Series Sanctions Under Rule 11 Jerold S. Solovy Norman M. Hirsch Margaret J. Simpson © 2010 JENNER & BLOCK LLP ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Offices w 353 N. Clark Street w 919 Third Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60654-3456 37th Floor Firm: 312 222-9350 New York, New York 10022-3908 Fax: 312 527-0484 Firm: 212 891-1600 Fax: 212 891-1699 w 633 West 5th Street Suite 3500 w 1099 New York Avenue, NW Los Angeles, CA 90071-2054 Suite 900 Firm: 213 239-5100 Washington, DC 20001-4412 Fax: 213 239-5199 Firm: 202 639-6000 Fax: 202 639-6066 Website w www.jenner.com Author Information w Margaret J. Simpson w Jerold S. Solovy Partner Chairman Emeritus of the Firm Jenner & Block Jenner & Block Tel: 312 923-2857 Tel: 312 923-2671 Fax: 312 840-7257 Fax: 312 840-7671 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] w Norman M. Hirsch Partner Jenner & Block Tel: 312 923-2782 Fax: 312 840-7782 E-Mail: [email protected] © 2010 Jenner & Block LLP. Jenner & Block is an Illinois Limited Liability Partnership including professional corporations. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice but to provide information on legal matters and Firm news of interest to our clients and colleagues. Readers should seek specific legal advice before taking any action with respect to matters mentioned in this publication. The attorneys responsible for this publication are Jerold S. Solovy, Norman M. Hirsch and Margaret J. Simpson. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Attorney Advertising. Table of Contents I. Introduction ..........................................................................................................1 A. Supreme Court Cases Involving Rule 11................................................1 B. Scope of Outline......................................................................................2 C. History of Rule 11...................................................................................3 II. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995...............................................6 III. Text of Rule 11 ................................................................................................18 IV. Rule 11(a) ........................................................................................................21 A. What Must Be Certified: The Reach of Rule 11..................................21 B. Who Must Certify..................................................................................22 C. Required Statements..............................................................................22 D. Consequences of Not Certifying...........................................................22 V. Rule 11(b) .........................................................................................................23 A. Contents of the Certificate ....................................................................23 B. Objective Standard ................................................................................24 1. Frivolousness Test .....................................................................24 2. Purpose of Objective Test..........................................................26 C. Reasonable Inquiry................................................................................27 1. Affirmative Duty of Inquiry.......................................................27 2. Requirement to Specifically Identify Lack of Evidentiary Support...........................................................................................33 3. Different Language for Factual Contentions and Denials .........34 4. Reasonableness of Inquiry .........................................................34 (a) Time Available for Investigation..................................40 (b) Availability of Evidence...............................................41 (1) All evidence in client’s hands must be reviewed.................................................................41 (2) Evidence in the opponent’s exclusive control. ...................................................................42 (c) Reliance Upon Client’s Statements..............................44 (d) Consultation with the Client.........................................47 (e) Reliance upon Other Attorneys ....................................48 (f) Responsibilities of Pro Se Litigants..............................50 (g) Attorney’s Inexperience ...............................................53 (h) Inadvertent Factual Errors............................................54 ii D. Warranted by Law.................................................................................54 1. Warranted by Existing Law .......................................................55 (a) Filing Need Not Ultimately Prevail..............................58 (b) Dismissal of Action......................................................60 2. Not Warranted by Existing Law ................................................62 (a) Adhering to Position After Court’s Warning ...............62 (b) Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous Summary Judgment Motion ...............................................................64 (c) Assertion Contrary to Settled Precedent.......................64 (d) Advocating Legal Positions Where Issue Is Of First Impression in the Circuit ...........................................68 (e) Advocating Position Rejected by Circuit Court, but Accepted By Other Courts...........................................69 (f) Asserting a Claim with Clear Procedural or Jurisdictional Defects.........................................................70 3. Warranted by a Nonfrivolous Argument for a Change of Law ................................................................................................72 (a) Argument Rejected in the Past .....................................73 (b) Duty of Candor in Arguing for Change of Law...........74 E. Improper Purpose ..................................................................................77 1. Harassment.................................................................................78 2. Delay..........................................................................................81 3. Other Improper Purposes ...........................................................82 4. Mixed Purposes..........................................................................85 5. Filing a Well-Founded Complaint for Improper Purpose..........87 F. Piecemeal Evaluation of Papers.............................................................90 VI. Rule 11(c) ........................................................................................................91 A. Notice and Reasonable Opportunity to Respond ..................................92 1. “Safe Harbor” Provision ............................................................93 2. Due Process Requirements ......................................................102 B. Court May Impose a Sanction.............................................................104 C. Who May Be Sanctioned.....................................................................105 1. Attorneys..................................................................................106 (a) Certifying Attorney ....................................................106 (b) Local Counsel.............................................................107 (c) Substitute Counsel......................................................108 2. Parties.......................................................................................108 (a) Represented Parties ....................................................108 (b) Pro Se Litigants ..........................................................110 Sanctions under Rule 11 iii (c) Sovereign Immunity Problem When United States Violates Rule 11 ....................................................114 3. Allocation of Sanctions Between Party and Attorney .............115 (a) Joint and Several Liability..........................................116 (b) Insurability of Sanctions.............................................117 (1) Duty to Defend...............................................118 (2) Duty to Indemnify ..........................................120 (c) Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges and Other Ethical Considerations ...................121 D. Who May Seek Sanctions ...................................................................125 E. District Court Practice .........................................................................125 1. Sanctions Initiated by Motion..................................................125 2. Sanctions on Court’s Initiative.................................................127 3. The Nature of Sanctions and Limitations on Sanctions...........130 (a) Discouraging Monetary Awards.................................130 (b) Nonmonetary Sanctions .............................................135 (c) No Sua Sponte Sanctions Proceeding May Be Instituted After a Case Is Settled or Voluntarily Dismissed.........................................................................137 4. Requirements for the Sanctions Order.....................................138 5. Obligation to Mitigate..............................................................139 6. Timing of a Rule 11 Motion ....................................................142 7. Magistrate Judges.....................................................................144 8. Discovery .................................................................................145 9. Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous
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