Tax Planning for European Expansion in a Changing Landscape (2021)

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Tax Planning for European Expansion in a Changing Landscape (2021) OUTBOUND ACQUISITIONS: TAX PLANNING FOR EUROPEAN EXPANSION IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE (2021) Insights Special Edition © Practising Law Institute. Reprinted from the PLI Publication, The Corporate Tax Practice Series 2021 (Item #304752). TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORS’ NOTE For several years, the Summer Edition of Insights examined various cross border Editors’ Note structures available to serve as part of an overall tax plan for European expansion by U.S. companies. Author Contacts Historically, these plans followed a road map designed to deconstruct business op- Introduction ................................ 5 erations, placing production, financing, and I.P. functions in separate group mem- bers in different countries. If the road map was carefully followed, European taxes B.E.P.S. and Holding on operations could be driven down in ways that did not result in immediate U.S. Companies .............................. 24 taxation under Subpart F. Large U.S. based multinationals became expert in navi- gating the road map. European Tax Law ................... 50 Events beginning in 2017 and carrying through to 2021 make it unrealistic to believe Luxembourg ............................. 76 that old planning strategies still yield benefits. Too many barriers now exist. Switzerland ............................ 103 • The first barrier consists of the actions taken by the O.E.C.D. to curtail base erosion and profit shifting through the B.E.P.S. Project. Netherlands ........................... 114 • The second barrier is a never-ending stream of directives issued by the Euro- Ireland .................................... 132 pean Commission and proposals by the European Parliament attacking vari- ous tax plans involving affiliated companies and their beneficial owners, with Spain ..................................... 145 the intent of exposing tax plans to name and shame attacks by stakeholders. Portugal ................................. 158 • The third barrier consists of several decisions of the European Court of Jus- tice, known as the “Danish Cases,” judicially mandating that all plans must United Kingdom ..................... 177 reflect economic substance and business purpose in order to be effective. Belgium .................................. 214 • The fourth barrier is D.A.C.6, a European Council Directive on Administrative Cooperation, imposing reporting obligations on intermediaries who advise Sweden .................................. 247 clients or provide services in support of cross-border tax arrangements con- taining certain hallmarks of abusive tax planning. Denmark ................................ 256 • The fifth barrier consists of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 proposed by the O.E.C.D. Austria ................................... 274 in support of the B.E.P.S. project, which proposes to adjust taxing rights of countries touched by international business, investment, and trade transac- France ................................... 291 tions and to impose a global minimum tax. Italy ........................................ 326 If these were not sufficient impediments to old-fashioned tax plans, the U.S. en- acted the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (“T.C.J.A.”) in late December 2017, which turned Germany ................................ 357 cross-border tax planning on its head. The T.C.J.A. included many changes to U.S. international tax law. Among its international provisions are the following: Cyprus ................................... 372 • The adoption of a dividends received deduction with a low ownership thresh- Malta ...................................... 401 old in place of the indirect foreign tax credit tax credit available to corporations About Us • The imposition of mandatory gain recognition for outbound transfers of prop- erty to be used in an active trade or business conducted outside the U.S. • The adoption of G.I.L.T.I. provisions on previously deferred income of con- trolled foreign corporations • Attacks on cross-border hybrid transaction among related C.F.C.’s Insights Special Edition | Table of Contents | Visit www.ruchelaw.com for further information. 2 The 2021 Summer Edition of Insights addresses the broad range of impediments that must be overcome in planning cross-border operations. It begins with a de- tailed overview of post-T.C.J.A. U.S. tax law, comparing old rules with new realities, and a general preview of revisions proposed by the current Administration in the U.S. From there, B.E.P.S. provisions applicable on a global basis are addressed, followed by European attacks on illegal State Aid and abusive tax planning within Europe, in which several embarrassing losses for the European Commission and an important win for the Danish tax administration are addressed. It concludes with detailed explanations of corporate tax rules in 16 European jurisdictions by recog- nized experts in the respective countries. In sum, the 2021 Summer Edition of Insights is a treatise that addresses corporate tax planning for European expansion in a changing landscape that is 2021. We hope you enjoy this issue. - The Editors © Practising Law Institute. Reprinted from the PLI Publication, The Corporate Tax Practice Series 2021 (Item #304752). Insights Special Edition | Table of Contents | Visit www.ruchelaw.com for further information. 3 AUTHOR CONTACTS JOÃO LUÍS ARAÚJO STANLEY C. RUCHELMAN TELLES Ruchelman P.L.L.C. Porto, Porugal New York, U.S.A. [email protected] [email protected] GUILLERMO CANALEJO LASARTE Uría Menéndez MATTHIAS SCHEIFELE Madrid, Spain Hengeler Mueller [email protected] Munich, Germany [email protected] MICHEL COLLET CMS-Francis Lefebvre DR. NIKLAS SCHMIDT Neuilly-sur-Seine, France Wolf Theiss [email protected] Vienna, Austria [email protected] NAIRY DER ARAKELIAN-MERHEJE Der Arakelian-Merheje LLC Nicosia , Cyprus JAMES SOMERVILLE [email protected] A&L Goodbody Dublin, Ireland ERIC FORT [email protected] Arendt & Medernach New York, U.S.A. PETER UTTERSTRÖM [email protected] Peter Utterström Advokat AB Stockholm, Sweden DR. STEFAN P. GAUCI Attorney-at-Law [email protected] Malta [email protected] EWOUT VAN ASBECK Van Doorne N.V. WERNER HEYVAERT Amsterdam, Netherlands AKD Benelux Lawyers [email protected] Brussels, Belgium [email protected] FRANK VAN KUIJK Loyens & Loeff STEPHAN NEIDHARDT Stephan Neidhardt A&S Luxembourg Zürich, Switzerland [email protected] [email protected] DR. WOLF-GEORG VON RECHENBERG ARNE RIIS BRL Böge Rohde Lübbehusen BDO Denmark Berlin, Germany Copenhagen, Denmark [email protected] [email protected] ELOISE WALKER LUCA ROSSI Facchini Rossi Michelutti Pinsent Masons L.L.P. Milan, Italy London, U.K. [email protected] [email protected] Insights Special Edition | Table of Contents | Visit www.ruchelaw.com for further information. 4 INTRODUCTION Author GLOBAL TAX PLANNING IN A PRE-2018 WORLD Stanley C. Ruchelman Ruchelman P.L.L.C. Prior to 2018, widely-used tax plans of U.S.-based multinational groups were de- New York, U.S.A. signed to achieve three basic goals in connection with European operations: (i) the reduction of European taxes as European profits were generated, (ii) the integration of European tax plans with U.S. tax concepts to prevent Subpart F from applying to intercompany transactions in Europe, and (iii) the reduction of withholding taxes and U.S. tax under Subpart F as profits were distributed through a chain of European companies and then to the global parent in the U.S. Reduction of Taxes in Europe The first goal – the reduction of European taxation on operating profits – often en- tailed the deconstruction of a business into various affiliated companies, which can be illustrated as follows: • Group equity for European operations was placed in a holding company that served as an entrepôt to Europe. • Tangible operating assets related to manufacturing or sales were owned by a second company or companies where the facilities or markets were located. All of the authors acknowledge the contribution of Claire Melchert of • Financing was provided by a third company where rulings or legislation were Ruchelman P.L.L.C. and Hali R. favorable. Woods for converting 19 separate submissions prepared by persons • Intangible property was owned by a fourth company qualifying as an innova- having a multitude of birth tion box company. languages into a cohesive and accurate monograph. If the roadmap was carefully followed, European taxes on operations could be driv- en down in ways that did not result in immediate U.S. taxation under Subpart F. A simplified version of the plan that was widely used by U.S.-based multinational groups involved the following steps: • Form an Irish controlled foreign corporation (“TOPCO”) that is managed and controlled in Bermuda. • Have TOPCO enter into a qualified cost sharing agreement with its U.S. parent providing for the emigration of intangible property to TOPCO for ex- ploitation outside the U.S. at an acceptable buy-in payment that could be paid overtime. • Have TOPCO form a Dutch subsidiary (“DCO”) to serve as a licensing compa- ny, and an Irish subsidiary (“OPCO”) to carry on active business operations. Insights Special Edition | Table of Contents | Visit www.ruchelaw.com for further information. 5 • Make check-the-box elections for DCO and OPCO so that both are treated as branches of TOPCO. • Have TOPCO license the rights previously obtained under the qualified cost sharing agreement to DCO and have DCO enter a comparable license agree- ment
Recommended publications
  • Insights Vol 7 No 1
    A GRETT-ABLE SITUATION: NEW TRENDS IN GERMAN REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX ON SHARE DEALS PORTUGUESE TAXATION OF DISTRIBUTIONS FROM TRUST CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT O.E.C.D. UNIFIED APPROACH GARNERS LESS UNIFIED COMMENTS FROM EUROPE’S TECH PRODUCERS AND USERS AND MORE Insights Vol. 7 No. 1 TABLE OF EDITORS’ NOTE CONTENTS In this month’s edition of Insights, our articles address the following: Editors’ Note • A gRETT-able Situation: New Trends in German Real Estate Transfer A gRett-able Situation: New Tax on Share Deals. For decades, the German Real Estate Transfer Tax Trends in German Real Estate Act (“gRETT Act”) has imposed a transaction tax on the sale of real estate Transfer Tax on Share Deals ..... 4 in Germany. In recent years, the tax has applied to the sale of shares that indirectly transfer real estate located in Germany. When initially enacted, a Portuguese Taxation of sale of all shares was taxable under the gRETT Act. In the year 2000, the Distributions from Trust Capital: triggering percentage was reduced to 95%. Last year, proposed legislation A Critical Assessment .............. 11 would have reduced the triggering percentage to 90%, but the draft bill was never enacted. In 2020, the triggering percentage may be reduced to as O.E.C.D. Unified Approach low as 75% or some other percentage whenever new legislation is adopted. Garners Less Unified Comments Exactly what constitutes an indirect sale of German real estate is surprisingly from Europe’s Tech Producers broad, and unlike comparable taxes in other countries, the sales need not be and Users ...............................
    [Show full text]
  • Deloitte Legal Perspectives: International Dismissal Survey
    Deloitte Legal Perspectives International Dismissal Survey February 2018 Brochure / report title goes here | Section title goes here Contents Introduction 5 Cost projection 6 Main conclusions 13 Dismissal Calculator 20 Country reports 25 This is a survey conducted in December 2017 and consequently reflects the legislation of the different countries at that particular time. The figures used in the cost projection date from December 2017 and therefore do not take into account any changes in legislation of a later date. Although this survey has been performed with the greatest care, the material in this guide is only for information purposes on general practices. The authors may not be held responsible in any way for any possible error that might occur or for any use or interpretation that could be made of this information. It is not intended to be used as advice in any event. 3 International Dismissal Survey Countries across all Introduction regions (America, This 4th edition of the International Dismissal Survey is more than a refresh. Firstly, the number of participating countries has increased by 15. In addition to more European countries (Cyprus, Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.), the survey for the first Europe and APAC) time also includes countries from Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador) and the Asia- Pacific region (e.g. China, Singapore, Japan etc.). In total, this survey comprises the legislation of 46 countries: share many similar Austria, Albania, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Myanmar, employment termination Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Vietnam.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Tax Governance Or National Tax Discrimination: the Case of EU
    Masthead Logo North East Journal of Legal Studies Volume 39 Fall 2019 Article 2 Fall 2019 Global Tax Governance or National Tax Discrimination: The aC se of EU vs. APPLE John Paul CUNY Brooklyn College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb Recommended Citation Paul, John (2019) "Global Tax Governance or National Tax Discrimination: The asC e of EU vs. APPLE," North East Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 39 , Article 2. Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol39/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It has been accepted for inclusion in North East Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Fairfield. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 15 / Vol 39 / North East Journal of Legal Studies GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE OR NATIONAL TAX DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF THE EU VS. APPLE by John Paul* I. INTRODUCTION On August 30, 2016, the European Commission (EC) concluded that Ireland and Apple Inc. (Apple) had violated the European Union (EU) state aid rules when Ireland granted tax advantages to Apple; therefore, the EC ordered Ireland to collect up to €13 billion euros ($15.3 billion U.S. dollars) in tax underpayments from Apple for the 2003 to 2014 period.1 The amount at issue makes this case one of the largest tax controversies in history and has generated a lot of press as a result.2 While the amount in the EC vs. Apple case is unprecedented, it is only one of several EC Decisions dealing with the taxation of multinational transfer pricing activities issued recently, possibly in response to both a United States (U.S.) Senate investigation into U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Overview of the SWISS TAX SYSTEM
    OVERVIEW OF THE SWISS TAX SYSTEM 10.1 Taxation of Corporate Taxpayers ...................................... 109 10.2 Tax Rate in an International Comparison ........................ 112 10 10.3 Taxation of Individual Taxpayers ..................................... 113 10.4 Withholding Tax ................................................................ 116 10.5 Value Added Tax................................................................ 117 10.6 Other Taxes........................................................................ 120 10.7 Double Tax Treaties .......................................................... 121 10.8 Corporate Tax Reform III .................................................. 121 10.9 Transfer Pricing Rules....................................................... 121 Image Tax return, stock image The Swiss tax system mirrors Switzerland’s federal struc- 10.1 TAXATION OF CORPORATE TAXPAYERS ture, which consists of 26 sovereign cantons with 2,352 10.1.1 Corporate Income Tax – Federal Level independent municipalities. Based on the constitution, all The Swiss federal government levies corporate income tax at a flat rate of 8.5% on profit after tax of corporations and cooperatives. cantons have full right of taxation except for those taxes For associations, foundations, and other legal entities as well as that are exclusively reserved for the federal government. As investment trusts, a flat rate of 4.25% applies. At the federal level, no capital tax is levied. a consequence, Switzerland has two levels of taxation: the
    [Show full text]
  • Portuguese Investment Funds – New Tax Regime
    Portuguese Investment Funds – new tax regime Ana Paula Basílio Head of the Tax Department at Gómez-Acebo & Pombo in Portugal Decree-Act 7/2015, of 13 January, has approved a In addition to the limitations on CIT-deductible new tax regime for Portuguese Securities Investment expenses, the former tax regime does not allow for Funds and Real Estate Funds, covering both tax losses computed in a certain year in respect of investment funds with a contractual and corporate a specific category of income to be offset against tax nature (“Funds”), as well as the corresponding profits computed in respect of another category of unitholders/shareholders (“Investors”). income; on the other hand, tax losses computed in a certain year cannot be carried forward and deducted To summarize, under the new regime, most of the against future tax profits (even if computed within income obtained by Funds will become exempt the same category of income). from Corporate Income Tax (CIT). Non-resident Investors without a local permanent establishment Although income distributed by Portuguese Funds (provided they do not have their residence in to non-resident Investors was already exempt from a ‘tax haven’ and no more than 25% of its taxation in Portugal, non-resident Investors could not share capital is held by Portuguese-residents) obtain, in their countries of residence, a tax credit on will remain exempt from Portuguese taxation the CIT paid by the Portuguese Funds themselves. in respect of income derived from Securities Investment Funds and, in respect of income The new tax regime will not trigger such downsides, derived from Real Estate Funds, they will become because results obtained by the Funds related to taxed in Portugal at a 10% rate.
    [Show full text]
  • Taxing Wealth: Evidence from Switzerland
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES TAXING WEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM SWITZERLAND Marius Brülhart Jonathan Gruber Matthias Krapf Kurt Schmidheiny Working Paper 22376 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22376 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 June 2016 We are grateful to Jonathan Petkun for excellent research assistance, to Etienne Lehmann, Jim Poterba and seminar participants at Bristol, Geneva, Kentucky, MIT and Yale for helpful comments, to the tax administration of the canton of Bern for allowing us to use their micro data for the purpose of this research, to Raphaël Parchet and Stephan Fahrländer for sharing valuable complementary data and to Nina Munoz-Schmid and Roger Amman of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration for useful information. Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (Sinergia grant 147668) is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22376.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2016 by Marius Brülhart, Jonathan Gruber, Matthias Krapf, and Kurt Schmidheiny. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Taxing Wealth: Evidence from Switzerland Marius Brülhart, Jonathan Gruber, Matthias Krapf, and Kurt Schmidheiny NBER Working Paper No.
    [Show full text]
  • ADECCO GROUP AG (Incorporated with Limited Liability in Switzerland) ADECCO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES B.V
    ADECCO GROUP AG (incorporated with limited liability in Switzerland) ADECCO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES B.V. (incorporated with limited liability in The Netherlands) ADECCO FINANCIAL SERVICES (NORTH AMERICA), LLC (incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware in the United States of America) EUR 3,500,000,000 Euro Medium Term Note Programme unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by ADECCO GROUP AG (incorporated with limited liability in Switzerland) Under this EUR 3,500,000,000 Euro Medium Term Note Programme (the Programme), Adecco Group AG (in its capacity as Issuer, Adecco, and in its capacity as guarantor of Notes issued by AIFS or AFS (each as defined below), the Guarantor), Adecco International Financial Services B.V. (AIFS) and Adecco Financial Services (North America), LLC (AFS and, together with Adecco and AIFS, the Issuers, and each an Issuer) may from time to time issue notes (the Notes) denominated in any currency agreed between the relevant Issuer and the relevant Dealer (as defined below). References in this Base Prospectus to the relevant Issuer shall, in relation to any issue or proposed issue of Notes, be references to whichever of Adecco, AIFS or AFS is specified as the Issuer of such Notes in the applicable final terms document (the Final Terms). The payments of all amounts due in respect of the Notes will be unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by the Guarantor (except where Adecco is the Issuer). The maximum aggregate nominal amount of all Notes from time to time outstanding under the Programme will not exceed EUR 3,500,000,000 (or its equivalent in other currencies calculated as described in the Programme Agreement described herein), subject to increase as described herein.
    [Show full text]
  • Private Client 2018 7Th Edition
    TheICLG International Comparative Legal Guide to: Private Client 2018 7th Edition A practical cross-border insight into private client work Published by Global Legal Group, in association with CDR, with contributions from: Aird & Berlis LLP Maples and Calder Alon Kaplan, Advocate and Notary Law Office Matheson Aronson, Ronkin-Noor, Eyal Law Firm Miller Thomson LLP Arqués Ribert Junyer – Advocats MJM Limited Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP Mori Hamada & Matsumoto Bircham Dyson Bell LLP Mourant Ozannes Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP New Quadrant Partners Limited DORDA Rechtsanwälte GmbH O’Sullivan Estate Lawyers LLP Griffiths & Partners and Coriats Trust Company Limited Ospelt & Partner Attorneys at Law Ltd. Hassans International Law Firm P+P Pöllath + Partners Higgs & Johnson Rovsing & Gammeljord Holland & Knight LLP Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP) Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP Spenser & Kauffmann Attorneys at Law Khaitan & Co Studio Tributario Associato Facchini Rossi & Soci (FRS) Lebenberg Advokatbyrå AB Tirard, Naudin, Société d’avocats Lenz & Staehelin Vieira de Almeida Loyens & Loeff Withers Bergman LLP Macfarlanes LLP Zepos & Yannopoulos The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Private Client 2018 General Chapters: 1 BREXIT: The Immigration Implications – James Perrott, Macfarlanes LLP 1 2 Keep Calm and Carry On: The Increasing UK Regulatory and Tax Issues Facing Offshore Trustees – Matthew Braithwaite & Helen Ratcliffe, Bircham Dyson Bell LLP 11 3 Pre-Immigration Planning Considerations for the HNW Client – Think
    [Show full text]
  • Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Switzerland*
    Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Switzerland* Marius Brülhart† Jonathan Gruber‡ Matthias Krapf§ University of Lausanne MIT University of Lausanne Kurt Schmidheiny¶ University of Basel October 10, 2019 Abstract We study how reported wealth responds to changes in wealth tax rates. Exploiting rich intra-national variation in Switzerland, the country with the highest revenue share of an- nual wealth taxation in the OECD, we find that a 1 percentage point drop in the wealth tax rate raises reported wealth by at least 43% after 6 years. Administrative tax records of two cantons with quasi-randomly assigned differential tax reforms suggest that 24% of the effect arise from taxpayer mobility and 20% from house price capitalization. Savings re- sponses appear unable to explain more than a small fraction of the remainder, suggesting sizable evasion responses in this setting with no third-party reporting of financial wealth. * Previous versions of this paper circulated under the titles ‘The Elasticity of Taxable Wealth: Evidence from Switzerland’ and ‘Taxing Wealth: Evidence from Switzerland’. This version is significantly extended in terms of both data and estimation methods. We are grateful to Jonathan Petkun for excellent research assistance, to Etienne Lehmann, Jim Poterba, Emmanuel Saez, and seminar participants at the Universities of Barcelona, Bristol, ETH Zurich, GATE Lyon, Geneva, Kentucky, Konstanz, Mannheim, MIT, Yale and numerous conferences for helpful comments, to the tax administrations of the cantons of Bern and Lucerne for allowing us to use anonymized micro data for the purpose of this research, to Raphaël Parchet, Stephan Fahrländer and the Lucerne statistical office (LUSTAT) for sharing valuable complementary data, and to Nina Munoz-Schmid and Roger Amman of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration for useful information.
    [Show full text]
  • Taxing the Informal Sector in Developing Countries: the Case of Ghana
    TAXING THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF GHANA By ALEXANDER AMPAABENG A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Accounting and Finance Birmingham Business School The University of Birmingham September 2018 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT Taxing the informal sector poses a significant challenge to every tax authority. The task of designing a system to encourage voluntary tax compliance in the informal sectors of developing economies is a particularly important task given the relative sizes of these sectors in their domestic economies. Due to lack of reliable data about the operators of the informal economy it is difficult to comprehensively understand what produces tax non-compliance, and even less what motivates compliance, however, this information is critical to the design of effective policy. Most tax authorities resort to using blunt and often punitive measures designed to deter evasion rather than promoting long term voluntary compliance. Existing literature on informal sector taxation in developing countries is limited, and what does exist emphasises development of the tax system rather than understanding the taxpayer.
    [Show full text]
  • A09029279 V2.0 Cleanlevel 2 Prospectus Call Options
    Credit Suisse International (registered as an unlimited liability company in England and Wales under No. 2500199) Principal Protected Securities and Non-Principal Protected Securities (Base Prospectus BPCSI-1) (Call Options and Put Options) Pursuant to the Structured Products Programme Under this Base Prospectus, Credit Suisse International (the “ Issuer ”) may issue Securities (“ Securities ”) on the terms set out herein and in the relevant Final Terms. This document constitutes a base prospectus (the “ Base Prospectus ”) prepared for the purposes of Article 5.4 of Directive 2003/71/EC (the “ Prospectus Directive ”). The Base Prospectus contains information relating to the Securities. The Base Prospectus shall be read in conjunction with the documents incorporated herein by reference (see the section entitled “Documents Incorporated by Reference”). This document has been filed with the Financial Services Authority in its capacity as competent authority under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “ UK Listing Authority ”) for the purposes of the Prospectus Directive. The Issuer has requested the UK Listing Authority to provide the competent authorities for the purposes of the Prospectus Directive in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden with a certificate of approval in accordance with Article 18 of the Prospectus Directive attesting that this Base Prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with the Prospectus Directive. The final terms relevant to an issue of Securities will be set out in a final terms document (the “ Final Terms ”) which will be provided to investors and, in the case of issues for which a prospectus is required under the Prospectus Directive, filed with the Financial Services Authority and made available, free of charge, to the public at the registered office of the Issuer and at the offices of the relevant Distributors and Paying Agents.
    [Show full text]
  • Guest Editorial
    GUEST EDITORIAL The Apple Case: Who Wins? What’s Next?* On 15 July the General Court of the EU (GC) passed down From a policy perspective, the main effect of the GC its much awaited judgment in cases Ireland v. Commission judgment is to correct the innovative use of Article 107 and Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe v. TFEU by the Commission as a tool to tax ‘untaxed profits’ Commission,1 annulling a Commission decision on state aid and eliminate international tax planning schemes of mul- granted to Apple by Ireland. The outcome was expected tinationals (MNEs). It is true that the judgment seems to since much of the relevant principles in the judgment were begin by (unsurprisingly) rejecting Apple’s and Ireland’s already established in previous case law (notably but not arguments that Member States and their tax policies are exclusively, Starbucks2 and Fiat3). not subject to scrutiny under the state aid rules and that The Apple judgment can be read in different forms: sovereignty is not a valid exception to the application of from a tax policy (or maybe politics?) perspective, from Article 107 TFEU. However, the judgment makes it very a purely state aid standpoint, or from a strictly transfer clear that the parameters to analyse whether there is state pricing perspective. Before advancing some conclusions on aid must be defined by taking into account the tax system these different fronts, it is useful to recall the main issue of the Member States, which severely limits the use by the discussed in the case.
    [Show full text]