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Article II US Constitution

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Article II US Constitution ARTICLE II EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CONTENTS Page Section 1. The President ........................................................................................................... 413 Clause 1. Powers and Term of the President ................................................................... 413 Nature and Scope of Presidential Power ................................................................... 413 Creation of the Presidency .................................................................................. 413 Executive Power: Theory of the Presidential Office .......................................... 415 Hamilton and Madison ................................................................................. 416 The Myers Case ............................................................................................. 418 The Curtiss-Wright Case .............................................................................. 418 The Youngstown Case ................................................................................... 420 The Practice in the Presidential Office ....................................................... 422 Executive Power: Separation-of-Powers Judicial Protection ............................ 422 Tenure .......................................................................................................................... 425 Clauses 2, 3 and 4. Election .............................................................................................. 426 Electoral College .......................................................................................................... 427 ``Appoint'' ............................................................................................................... 428 State Discretion in Choosing Electors ................................................................ 429 Constitutional Status of Electors ........................................................................ 430 Electors as Free Agents ....................................................................................... 431 Clause 5. Qualifications ..................................................................................................... 433 Clause 6. Presidential Succession ..................................................................................... 435 Clause 7. Compensation and Emoluments ....................................................................... 435 Clause 8. Oath of Office ..................................................................................................... 436 Section 2. Powers and Duties of the President ....................................................................... 436 Clause 1. Commander-in-Chiefship; Presidential Advisers; Pardons ............................ 436 Commander-in-Chief ................................................................................................... 437 Development of the Concept ................................................................................ 437 The Limited View ......................................................................................... 437 The Prize Cases ............................................................................................. 438 Impact of the Prize Cases on World Wars I and II .................................... 439 Presidential Theory of the Commander-in-Chiefship in World War IIÐand Be- yond ........................................................................................................................... 440 Presidential War Agencies ........................................................................... 441 Constitutional Status of Presidential Agencies .......................................... 441 Evacuation of the West Coast Japanese ..................................................... 442 Presidential Government of Labor Relations ............................................. 443 Sanctions Implementing Presidential Directives ....................................... 444 The Postwar Period ...................................................................................... 445 The Cold War and After: Presidential Power to Use Troops Overseas Without Congressional Authorization ................................................................................... 447 The Historic Use of Force Abroad ....................................................................... 448 The Theory of Presidential Power ...................................................................... 450 The Power of Congress to Control the President's Discretion .......................... 451 The President as Commander of the Armed Forces ................................................. 453 409 410 ART. IIÐEXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Section 2. Powers and Duties of the PresidentÐContinued Clause 1. Commander-in-Chiefship; Presidential Advisers; PardonsÐContinued The Commander-in-Chief a Civilian Officer ...................................................... 455 Martial Law and Constitutional Limitations ............................................................ 456 Martial Law in Hawaii ........................................................................................ 458 Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs .................................................................. 459 Articles of War: World War II Crimes ................................................................ 461 Martial Law and Domestic Disorder .................................................................. 461 Presidential Advisers .................................................................................................. 462 The Cabinet .......................................................................................................... 462 Pardons and Reprieves ............................................................................................... 463 The Legal Nature of a Pardon ............................................................................ 463 Scope of the Power ............................................................................................... 465 Offenses Against the United States; Contempt of Court ........................... 465 Effects of a Pardon: Ex parte Garland ........................................................ 466 Limits to the Efficacy of a Pardon ............................................................... 468 Congress and Amnesty ............................................................................................... 468 Clause 2. Treaties and Appointment of Officers .............................................................. 469 The Treaty-Making Power .......................................................................................... 469 President and Senate ........................................................................................... 469 Negotiation, a Presidential Monopoly ......................................................... 470 Treaties as Law of the Land ............................................................................... 471 Origin of the Conception .............................................................................. 472 Treaties and the States ................................................................................ 472 Treaties and Congress .................................................................................. 474 Congressional Repeal of Treaties ................................................................ 477 Treaties versus Prior Acts of Congress ....................................................... 478 When Is a Treaty Self-Executing ................................................................. 479 Treaties and the Necessary and Proper Clause ......................................... 480 Constitutional Limitations on the Treaty Power ............................................... 482 Interpretation and Termination of Treaties as International Compacts ................ 487 Termination of Treaties by Notice ............................................................... 487 Determination Whether a Treaty Has Lapsed ........................................... 491 Status of a Treaty a Political Question ....................................................... 491 Indian Treaties ..................................................................................................... 492 Present Status of Indian Treaties ............................................................... 493 International Agreements Without Senate Approval ............................................... 494 Executive Agreements by Authorization of Congress ....................................... 495 Reciprocal Trade Agreements ...................................................................... 496 The Constitutionality of Trade Agreements ............................................... 496 The Lend-Lease Act ...................................................................................... 497 International Organizations ......................................................................... 498 Executive Agreements Authorized by Treaties .................................................. 498 Arbitration Agreements ................................................................................ 498 Agreements Under the United Nations Charter ........................................ 499 Status of Forces Agreements ....................................................................... 500 Executive Agreements on
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