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The Mythology of Holdout As a Justification for Eminent Domain and Public Provision of Roads
The Mythology of Holdout as a Justification for Eminent Domain and Public Provision of Roads —————— ✦ —————— BRUCE L. BENSON ne of the alleged justifications for government provision of roads is that the power of eminent domain is necessary in order to overcome holdout prob- Olems and obtain right-of-way properties (Goldstein 1987).1 After all, this argument continues, only the state has such power, so the private sector would be unable to supply the efficient amount of roads.2 In this article, I examine this mar- ket-failure justification for public roads from three different perspectives and demon- Bruce L. Benson is DeVoe Moore Distinguished Research Professor in the Department of Economics at Florida State University. 1. In the United States, the power to force a private-property holder to sell property to a government entity (federal, state, or local government agency) is called eminent domain, but this term is not widely used or recognized in other parts of the world. The more general term is compulsory sale. 2. There are other alleged justifications for public roads as well. Perhaps the primary one, at least from a theoretical perspective, is the public-good/free-rider argument, which implies that coercive taxation is needed to pay for roads and therefore that the private sector cannot provide an efficient supply of roads. I have rejected this argument elsewhere (Benson 1994). Indeed, private provision of roads is common. Also see Roth (1996, 196–207) for discussion of fallacies in other objections to privately provided roads (justifications for public roads). The Independent Review, v. -
Foreword by Paul Johnson
Choice, Community, and Civil Society David T. Beito Edited by Peter Gordon, and Alexander Tabarrok Foreword by Paul Johnson Ann Arbor The University of Michigan Press Copyright © by the Independent Institute 2002 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America c Printed on acid-free paper 2005 2004 2003 2002 4321 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The voluntary city : choice, community, and civil society / edited by David Beito, Peter Gordon, and Alexander Tabarrok. p. cm. — (Economics, cognition, and society) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-472-11240-6 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-472-08837-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Municipal government. 2. Voluntarism—United States—History. 3. Voluntarism—Great Britain—History. 4. Volunteer workers in community development. 5. Public-private sector cooperation—United States. 6. Public-private sector cooperation—Great Britain. 7. Civil society. 8. Social service. I. Beito, David T., 1956– II. Gordon, Peter, 1943– III. Tabarrok, Alexander. IV. Series. JS78.V6 2002 307.76—dc21 2001006444 Cover image: Evening cityscape © Copyright Bill Ross/CORBIS Contents Foreword vii Paul Johnson 1 Toward a Rebirth of Civil Society 1 David T. Beito, Peter Gordon, and Alexander Tabarrok Part 1. Building the Voluntary City 2 Laissez-Faire Urban Planning 18 Stephen Davies 3 The Private Places of St. -
Libertarian Party at Sea on Land
Libertarian Party at Sea on Land To Mom who taught me the Golden Rule and Henry George 121 years ahead of his time and still counting Libertarian Party at Sea on Land Author: Harold Kyriazi Book ISBN: 978-1-952489-02-0 First Published 2000 Robert Schalkenbach Foundation Official Publishers of the works of Henry George The Robert Schalkenbach Foundation (RSF) is a private operating foundation, founded in 1925, to promote public awareness of the social philosophy and economic reforms advocated by famed 19th century thinker and activist, Henry George. Today, RSF remains true to its founding doctrine, and through efforts focused on education, communities, outreach, and publishing, works to create a world in which all people are afforded the basic necessities of life and the natural world is protected for generations to come. ROBERT SCHALKENBACH FOUND ATION Robert Schalkenbach Foundation [email protected] www.schalkenbach.org Libertarian Party at Sea on Land By Harold Kyriazi ROBERT SCHALKENBACH FOUNDATION New York City 2020 Acknowledgments Dan Sullivan, my longtime fellow Pittsburgher and geo-libertarian, not only introduced me to this subject about seven years ago, but has been a wonderful teacher and tireless consultant over the years since then. I’m deeply indebted to him, and appreciative of his steadfast efforts to enlighten his fellow libertarians here in Pittsburgh and elsewhere. Robin Robertson, a fellow geo-libertarian whom I met at the 1999 Council of Georgist Organizations Conference, gave me detailed constructive criticism on an early draft, brought Ayn Rand’s essay on the broadcast spectrum to my attention, helped conceive the cover illustration, and helped in other ways too numerous to mention. -
NATURAL LAW and the JURISPRUDENCE of FREEDOM Frank Van Dun*
Journal of Libertarian Studies Volume 18, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 31Ð54 2004 Ludwig von Mises Institute www.mises.org NATURAL LAW AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF FREEDOM Frank van Dun* For by the Fundamental Law of Nature, Man being to be preserved, as much as possible, when all cannot be pre- servÕd, the safety of the Innocent is to be preferred. Ñ John Locke1 In ÒAgainst Libertarian Legalism,Ó I criticised Walter Block and N. Stephan Kinsella for their legalistic approach to law and their behav- iourist approach to human action.2 I focused on their attempt to reduce Òlibertarian jurisprudenceÓ to a strict, quasi-mechanical application of the Rothbardian non-aggression rule. My article was not intended to present an alternate theory of libertarian jurisprudence. It merely aimed to show that BlockÕs and KinsellaÕs position ill accords with the Aus- trian or praxeological analysis of the free market with which RothbardÕs work is associated, and that it conflicts with common notions of mo- rality and justice. Nevertheless, I added a rough sketch of a theory of natural law to give the reader some idea of the sources of my criticism. *Faculty of Law, University of Ghent, Belgium, and Faculty of Law, Univer- sity of Maastricht, The Netherlands. 1John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, chap. 3, ¤16, in Two Trea- tises of Government, ed. Peter Lasslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 279. 2Frank van Dun, ÒAgainst Libertarian Legalism: A Comment on Kinsella and Block,Ó Journal of Libertarian Studies 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003); Walter Block, ÒToward a Libertarian Theory of Blackmail,Ó Journal of Libertarian Studies 15, no. -
Response to Callahan on Deductive Libertarianism WALTER E
Response to Callahan on Deductive Libertarianism WALTER E. BLOCK Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business Loyola University New Orleans 6363 St. Charles Avenue Box 15, Miller Hall 318 New Orleans, LA 70118 United States Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.walterblock.com Bio-sketch: Walter E. Block is Harold E. Wirth Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics, College of Business, Loyola University New Orleans, and senior fellow at the Mises Institute. He is the author of some 500 refereed articles, two dozen books, and thousands of op eds. He is the Schlarbaum Laureate (Mises Institute, 2011) and has won the Loyola University Research Award, the Mises Institute’s Rothbard Medal of Freedom (2005) and is the recipient of the Dux Academicus award (Loyola University, 2007). 38 viewpoint, anarcho-capitalism (Barnett, 1977; Childs, 1977; COSMOS + TAXIS COSMOS I. INTRODUCTION Evers, 1977; Rothbard, 1977; Sanders, 1977), so will not rise Most critiques of the Rothbardian version of libertarianism1 to his defense either. are unsophisticated. They attack this political philosophy on I will, instead, show the flaws in Callahan’s (2012) critique the ground that it supports greed and selfishness, or is in the of Rothbard, since he is no longer available to do so in his pay of big business, or amounts to crony capitalism, or some own behalf, and because I am a Rothbardian. Hoppe is still such.2 It is thus a pleasure to respond to a far more sophis- actively writing, so, even though I am in virtually full agree- ticated opponent of this perspective, Callahan (2012). -
Policy Paper on Tax Reform (Pdf)
CSI Policy Study Civil Society Institute • Santa Clara University 500 El Camino Real • Santa Clara, CA 95053 • [email protected] • 408/554-6931 January 2006 The Ultimate Tax Reform: Public Revenue from Land Rent by Fred E. Foldvary** The U.S. tax system is widely perceived as too complex, too intrusive, and too demanding of workers’ paychecks. Taxes today claim a greater share of the average family’s budget than food, clothing, housing, and transportation combined.1 In 2005, the average American had to work 107 days just to pay taxes, compared to 44 days in 1930.2 Tax reform proposals, not surprisingly, are popular among voters and the politicians who If land value is taxed, the land will not represent them. President George W. Bush flee, shrink, or hide. A tax on land created an advisory panel on tax reform. value has no deadweight loss. Some economists and institutes have proposed reforms to flatten and simplify the income tax, or to replace it entirely with a national sales or consumption tax or value-added tax. These would be an improvement, but if we seek to reform taxes, we should consider all the possibilities and choose, as Milton Friedman puts it, the “least bad” tax. Even a relatively flat income tax imposes what economists call a “deadweight loss” or “excess burden” on society. Taxes on productive activity increase the price of labor or goods beyond economic costs, and so reduce the quantity provided. This reduction in production, income, and * Fred Foldvary received his Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University in Virginia. -
David Friedman and Libertarianism: a C Ritique
LIBERTARIAN PAPERS VOL. 3, ART. NO. 35 (2011) DAVID FRIEDMAN AND LIBERTARIANISM: A CRITIQUE WALTER E. BLOCK* 1. Introduction There is not one philosophy of libertarianism, but rather there are two. One of them, the utilitarian, is predicated on the notion that the free economy tends to bring about that state of affairs which is preferred by all or at least most of its members; the one that maximized utility. The other school of libertarian thought is the deontological one. It is based on the non aggression principle (NAP), according to which no one may properly initiate violence against another person or his justly owned property. The latter is based upon homesteading and legitimate title transfers, such as those that emanate from free trade or gifts. Friedman (1989) is clearly in the former camp, and attempts to show the advantages of this thesis over the latter. In his chapter 41, the main focus of the present critique, this author explicitly criticizes the deontological theory. Well, not that explicitly, in that he never once quotes or cites a single advocate of principled libertarianism. Rather, he attributes views to this perspective which are all but straw men and then proceeds to demolish them, at least to his own satisfaction. The present paper will attempt to defend deontological libertarianism against his unscrupulous attacks on it, and then return the favor by subjecting his own utilitarian libertarianism, to critical scrutiny. But there will be one difference in method between his procedure and ours. We will not insult his side of the debate by referring to hearsay evidence. -
Efficient Anarchy
Working Paper 48 Efficient Anarchy * PETER T. LEESON Abstract Can anarchy be efficient? This paper argues that for reasons of efficiency, rational, wealth-maximizing agents may actually choose statelessness over government in some cases. Where markets are sufficiently thin or where government is prohibitively costly, anarchy is the efficient mode of social organization. If total social wealth under conditions of relatively lower levels of trade is not substantially smaller than under conditions of relatively higher levels of trade, the cost of government may exceed the social benefits it provides. Likewise if the cost of a formal state is sufficiently large, even substantial difference in social wealth in these two scenarios may prove too small to justify the formation of government from a cost/benefit perspective. The framework I provide explains the persistence of anarchy in two major areas where we tend to observe it: among primitive societies and at the global level. (JEL P48) * Peter T. Leeson is an Assistant Professor of economics at West Virginia University. Previously, he was a Mercatus Center Social Change Graduate Fellow and a PhD student in economics at George Mason University. The author is grateful to Peter Boettke, Tyler Cowen and Chris Coyne for indispensable comments and suggestions. The financial assistance of the Oloffson Weaver Fellowship is also gratefully acknowledged. Dr. Leeson conducted this research in his time as a Visiting Fellow in the Political Economy and Government program at Harvard University. The ideas presented in this research are the author’s and do not represent official positions of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. -
By C. Lowell Harriss
25 Rothbard's Anarcho-Capitalist Critique BY C. LOWELL HARRISS Professional economists who were contemporaries of Henry George generally opposed his views. Other chapters in this volume discuss the leading examples. More recently, in academe as well as elsewhere, there has developed support for property-tax revision along the lines he so fervently advocated—much greater reliance on site values and a corresponding reduction in burdens on capital and other products of human labor. Land-value taxation relates to countless issues of (local) government finance, including many types of distress in urban areas; land-use policies, the environment, energy, and "externalities" of endless variety are related in one way or another to present and potential taxes on land. For dealing with these and other matters, all potentially useful insights deserve attention—George's as well as those of his critics who have claim to competence. Among contemporary economists, few if any have written more extensively in explicit criticism of George's work than has Murray N. Rothbard, widely recognized as a leading libertarian and student of Ludwig von Mises. He explains in the preface to Power and Market that he devotes more attention than is now customary to this topic because "the Georgists are correct in noting that their important claims are never mentioned, much less refuted, in current works. " I His critique draws heavily upon analyses made by two other writers—Frank H. Knight (1885-1972), in his day one of America's foremost economists,' and Spencer Heath (1876-1963), a successful inventor and patent attorney who published a book and several pamphlets in the field of social and political theory.' Rothbard's statement of his basic position, that ". -
Vol 5 Issue 3 + 4 | 2018
ISSN 2291-5079 Vol 5 | Issue 3 + 4 2018 COSMOS + TAXIS Studies in Emergent Order and Organization COVER ART: COSMOS + TAXIS Paula Wright Studies in Emergent Order and Organization Ryton Oak (Gold) 2016 VOL 5 | ISSUE 3 + 4 2018 www.paulawrightart.wordpress.com IN THIS ISSUE EDITORIAL BOARDS ARTICLES HONORARY FOUNDING EDITORS EDITORS Civil Society as a Complex Adaptive Phenomenon ..... 3 Joaquin Fuster David Emanuel Andersson* University of California, Los Angeles (editor-in-chief) Mikayla Novak David F. Hardwick* RMIT University, Vietnam Reconsidering Urban Spontaneity and Flexibility The University of British Columbia William Butos after Jane Jacobs: How do they work under Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai (deputy editor) Trinity College different kinds of planning conditions? ............... 14 University of Hong Kong Frederick Turner Laurent Dobuzinskis* Stefano Cozzolino University of Texas at Dallas (deputy editor) Simon Fraser University Cities, Agriculture, and Economic Development: Leslie Marsh* The Debate over Jane Jacobs’s ‘Cities-First Thesis’ ... 25 (managing editor) Sanford Ikeda The University of British Columbia Detecting and Directing Emergent Urban Systems: assistant managing editors: a Multi-Scale Approach ............................ 32 Thomas Cheeseman Elena Porqueddu Dean Woodley Ball Alexander Hamilton Institute Connecting the Dots: Hayek, Darwin, and Ecology .... 51 Gus diZerega The Role of Spontaneous Order in Video Games: CONSULTING EDITORS A Case Study of Destiny ........................... 63 Corey Abel Peter G. Klein Denver Baylor University William Gordon Miller Thierry Aimar Paul Lewis Sciences Po Paris King’s College London Nurit Alfasi Ted G. Lewis REVIEWS Ben Gurion University Technology Assessment Group of the Negev Salinas, CA The Infidel and the Professor: David Hume, Theodore Burczak Joseph Isaac Lifshitz Adam Smith, and the Friendship that Denison University The Shalem College Shaped Modern Thought Gene Callahan Jacky Mallett by Dennis C. -
MAN, ECONOMY, and STATE with POWER and MARKET by Joseph Stromberg
MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE ATREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES WITH POWER AND MARKET GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY MURRAY N. ROTHBARD SCHOLAR’S EDITION Man, Economy, and State: Copyright 1962 by William Volker Fund and D. Van Nostrand Copyright 1970 by Murray N. Rothbard Copyright 1993 by Murray N. Rothbard, revised edition Copyright 2001 by Ludwig von Mises Institute Copyright 2004 by Ludwig von Mises Institute, second edition, Scholar’s Edition Power and Market: Copyright 1970 by Institute for Humane Studies Copyright 1977 by Institute for Humane Studies, second edition Copyright 2004 by Ludwig von Mises Institute, third edition, Scholar’s Edition All rights reserved. Written permission must be secured from the publisher to use or reproduce any part of this book, except for brief quotations in critical reviews or articles. Published by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 518 West Magnolia Avenue, Auburn, Alabama 36832-4528. ISBN: 0-945466-30-7 TO Ludwig von Mises (Man, Economy, and State) AND TO Libertarians of the Past, who Blazed the Trail and to Libertarians of the Future, who Shall Overcome (Power and Market) The Ludwig von Mises Institute dedicates this volume to all of its generous donors and wishes to thank these Patrons, in particular: George W. Connell Andreas Acavalos, Richard Bleiberg, John Hamilton Bolstad, Louis Carabini (Monex International), Anthony Deden (Sage Capital Zurich AG), Mrs. Floy Johnson, Neil Kaethler, Mr. and Mrs. R. Nelson Nash Mr. and Mrs. J.R. Bost, Dr. John Brätland, William H. Conn, Carl Creager, Dr. and Mrs. George G. Eddy, Douglas E. French, John R. Harper, Roland Manarin, Ronald Mandle, Mr. -
The World Jurist Association's 24 Biennial
THE WORLD JURIST ASSOCIATION’S 24TH BIENNIAL CONGRESS IN PRAGUE CZECH REPUBLIC OCTOBER 27, 2011 PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES: A CROSS CULTURAL COMPARISON DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, FAICP ROBINSON & COLE LLP HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT USA In the last half-century throughout the world there has been a near geometric increase in the number of private residential communities, many of them gated and secured from their larger communities. England, New Zealand, France, Portugal, Spain, Mexico, China, South Africa, Russia, Argentina and numerous other Latin American countries, Lebanon, and the United States of America have all experienced this growth in varying ways and with some similar impacts and some different ones. This article reviews the experiences across several nations for a cross-cultural comparison to identify points of commonality and differences and how we might learn from each other in terms of managing private residential communities now and in the future. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA In 1964 there were fewer than 500 so-called “common interest developments.” The terminology here reaches a number of different types of development and organizational scenarios. Common interest developments include single-family residential developments where there are covenants and cross-easements and other legal restrictions imposed on individual property owners. The term might also include condominiums which are not so much a form of development as they are a form of ownership in which individual residential units are owned individually. In condominiums, in addition to the privately-owned units there are “limited common elements” which might include a porch or patio and a small backyard, and “common elements” shared equally and openly by all owners, including access drives, parking, parks, recreational amenities.