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A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information
University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper Series ISSN 1664-7041 (print) ISSN 1664-705X (online) Working Paper No. 336 A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information Christian Ewerhart and Dan Kovenock Revised version, February 2021 A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information Christian Ewerhart Dan Kovenocky Department of Economics Economic Science Institute University of Zurich Chapman University Revised version: February 1, 2021 Abstract. In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource ≥ allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M N, full-support ≤ type distributions, and network games. Keywords. Colonel Blotto games Private information Bayes-Nash equilibrium · · · Generalized Dirichlet distributions Networks · *) Corresponding author. Postal address: Schönberggasse 1, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail address: [email protected]. ) E-mail address: [email protected]. y 1 Introduction In a Colonel Blotto game, players simultaneously and independently allocate their en- dowments of a resource across a set of battlefields. The player that deploys the largest amount of the resource to a given battlefield scores a win and enjoys a gain in utility equivalent to her valuation of that battlefield. Thus, a player’s utility corresponds to the sum of the valuations of all battlefields won by the player. -
Algorithmic Design and Techniques at Edx: Syllabus
Algorithmic Design and Techniques at edX: Syllabus February 18, 2018 Contents 1 Welcome!2 2 Who This Class Is For2 3 Meet Your Instructors2 4 Prerequisites3 5 Course Overview4 6 Learning Objectives5 7 Estimated Workload5 8 Grading 5 9 Deadlines6 10 Verified Certificate6 11 Forum 7 1 1 Welcome! Thank you for joining Algorithmic Design and Techniques at edX! In this course, you will learn not only the basic algorithmic techniques, but also how to write efficient, clean, and reliable code. 2 Who This Class Is For Programmers with basic experience looking to understand the practical and conceptual underpinnings of algorithms, with the goal of becoming more effective software engi- neers. Computer science students and researchers as well as interdisciplinary students (studying electrical engineering, mathematics, bioinformatics, etc.) aiming to get more profound understanding of algorithms and hands-on experience implementing them and applying for real-world problems. Applicants who want to prepare for an interview in a high-tech company. 3 Meet Your Instructors Daniel Kane is an associate professor at the University of California, San Diego with a joint appointment between the Department of Com- puter Science and Engineering and the Department of Mathematics. He has diverse interests in mathematics and theoretical computer science, though most of his work fits into the broad categories of number theory, complexity theory, or combinatorics. Alexander S. Kulikov is a senior research fellow at Steklov Mathemat- ical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint Petersburg, Russia and a lecturer at the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at University of California, San Diego, USA. -
Campaigning Is Hard but Approximately Manageable
Computational Analyses of the Electoral College: Campaigning Is Hard But Approximately Manageable Sina Dehghani,1 Hamed Saleh,2 Saeed Seddighin,3 Shang-Hua Teng4 1 Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences 2 University of Maryland 3 TTIC 4 University of Southern California [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract Electoral College, Political Campaigns, and In the classical discrete Colonel Blotto game—introduced Multi-Battleground Resource Allocation by Borel in 1921—two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across multiple battlefields. The winner of each The president of the United States is elected by the Electoral battlefield is determined by a winner-take-all rule, indepen- College, which consists of electors selected based on 51 con- dently of other battlefields. In the original formulation, each current elections. The number of electors each of the 50 colonel’s goal is to win as many battlefields as possible. The states and D. C. can select is determined every 10 years by Blotto game and its extensions have been used in a wide the United States Census. All but two states1 use a winner- range of applications from political campaign—exemplified take-all system, and in typical election without any third- by the U.S presidential election—to marketing campaign, party candidate, the ticket that wins the majority votes in the from (innovative) technology competition to sports compe- state earns the right to have their slate of electors from that tition. Despite persistent efforts, efficient methods for find- state chosen to vote in the Electoral College. Thus, in prin- ing the optimal strategies in Blotto games have been elu- sive for almost a century—due to exponential explosion in ciple, the team that receives the majority of electoral votes the organic solution space—until Ahmadinejad, Dehghani, wins the race and its main candidate is elected as president. -
Optimal Power Allocation Strategy Against Jamming Attacks Using the Colonel Blotto Game
Optimal Power Allocation Strategy Against Jamming Attacks Using the Colonel Blotto Game Yongle Wu, Beibei Wang, and K. J. Ray Liu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA. {wuyl, bebewang, kjrliu}@umd.edu Abstract—Cognitive radio technologies have become a promis- adversaries. So far, there have been only a few papers regard- ing approach to increase the efficiency of spectrum utilization. ing security issues. For instance, the primary user emulation Although cognitive radio has been intensively studied in recent attack was described and a transmitter verification scheme was years, only a few works have discussed security aspects. In this paper, we focus on the jamming attack, one of major threats to proposed to test whether the given signal came from a primary cognitive radio networks, where a malicious user wants to jam user in [8]; [9] employed a Hammer model to identify, analyze the communications of secondary users by injecting interference. and assess denial of service attacks; in [10], security issues Aware of the absence of several primary users and the presence of the IEEE 802.22 standard were addressed; [11] discussed of a malicious user, a secondary user can allocate power to those an attack that malicious users attempted to affect an artificial- fallow bands with a randomized strategy, in hope of alleviating the damage caused by the malicious user. We model this scenario intelligence-based secondary user’s behavior by misleading the into a two-player zero-sum game, and derive its unique Nash learning process. Equilibrium under certain conditions using the Colonel Blotto In this paper, we mainly focus on one kind of malicious at- game approach, which provides a minimax strategy that the tacks in cognitive radio networks, namely, the jamming attack secondary user should adopt in order to minimize the worst- [12], where a malicious user, or the “jammer”, wants to prevent case damage caused by the malicious user. -
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Economics 221: Political Economy II Winter 2006-2007 Professor Matthew Jackson Oce: 241; Phone: 723-3544 Email: [email protected] Web site: http://www.stanford.edu/ jacksonm Overview: This course examines political processes and the studies how the design of political in- stitutions a ect societal welfare and economic outcomes. The course starts by examining the motivations for and challenges of forming political states and institutions, and how the structure and workings of political institutions a ect economic outcomes and societal welfare. Topics include: the origins of states, anarchy and the social contract, liberalism, wars and arms races, constitutional design, federalism, models of strategic voting behavior, asymme- tries of information and voting behavior, agenda formation and control, logrolling, lobbying, vote-buying and political in uence, nomination processes, and the politics of federations of states. Prerequisite: Economics 220. Requirements: You will be continuing the work on the projects that you began in Economics 220. This will involve re ning a model and producing some results if the problem you proposed in 220 was theoretical in nature, and if the work is empirical, then you should begin or continue your analysis of data. There will be several di erent due dates of updates on the project. The projects will be judged based on the progress made past what was completed in 220. In the latter part of the course, there will also be student presentations and discussions of some of the papers. A note on the readings and class discussions: Reading the papers before class is critical to the course, as much of the emphasis of the course will not only be on \what" the papers tell us, but also on \why" these are interesting issues and \how" the research was conducted. -
Generalizations on the Colonel Blotto Game
Generalizations on the Colonel Blotto Game Dan Kovenock∗and Brian Robersony Abstract In this paper we characterize the equilibrium in a relaxed version of the Colonel Blotto game in which battlefield valuations maybe heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players and the, possibly asymmetric, budget constraints hold only on average, and then show how this characterization partially extends to the full Colonel Blotto game, in which the budget constraints must be satisfied with probability one. For the non-constant-sum generalization of the Colonel Blotto game examined, we find that there exist non-pathological parameter configurations with multiple, payoff inequivalent, equilibria. ∗Dan Kovenock, Economic Science Institute, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman Uni- versity, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866 USA t:714-628-7226 E-mail: [email protected] yBrian Roberson, Purdue University, Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, 403 W. State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907 USA t: 765-494-4531 E-mail: [email protected] (Correspondent) 1 1 Introduction The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player resource allocation game in which each player is endowed with a level of resources to allocate across a set of battlefields, within each battlefield the player that allocates the higher level of resources wins the battlefield, and each player's payoff is the sum of the valuations of the battlefields won. This simple game, that originates with Borel (1921), illustrates the fundamental strategic considerations that arise in multi- dimensional resource allocation competition such as: political campaign resource allocation, research and development competition where innovation involves obtaining a collection of interrelated patents, attack and defense of a collection of targets, etc. -
Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game
Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game Soheil Behnezhad∗, Sina Dehghani∗, Mahsa Derakhshan∗, MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi∗, Saeed Seddighin∗ Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland fsoheil, dehghani, mahsaa, hajiagha, [email protected] Abstract In the Colonel Blotto game, which was initially introduced by Borel in 1921, two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across different battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is determined independently by a winner-take-all rule. The ultimate payoff of each colonel is the number of battlefields he wins. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications from the U.S presidential election, to innovative technology competitions, to advertisement, to sports, and to politics. There has been persistent efforts for finding the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. After almost a century Ahmadinejad, Dehghani, Hajiaghayi, Lucier, Mahini, and Seddighin [2] provided an algorithm for finding the optimal strategies in polynomial time. Ahmadinejad et al. [2] first model the problem by a Linear Program (LP) with both an expo- nential number of variables and an exponential number of constraints which makes the problem intractable. Then they project their solution to another space to obtain another exponential-size LP, for which they can use Ellipsoid method. However, despite the theoretical importance of their algorithm, it is highly impractical. In general, even Simplex method (despite its exponen- tial running time in practice) performs better than Ellipsoid method in practice. In this paper, we provide the first polynomial-size LP formulation of the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. We use linear extension techniques. -
Political Game Theory Nolan Mccarty Adam Meirowitz
Political Game Theory Nolan McCarty Adam Meirowitz To Liz, Janis, Lachlan, and Delaney. Contents Acknowledgements vii Chapter 1. Introduction 1 1. Organization of the Book 2 Chapter 2. The Theory of Choice 5 1. Finite Sets of Actions and Outcomes 6 2. Continuous Outcome Spaces* 10 3. Utility Theory 17 4. Utility representations on Continuous Outcome Spaces* 18 5. Spatial Preferences 19 6. Exercises 21 Chapter 3. Choice Under Uncertainty 23 1. TheFiniteCase 23 2. Risk Preferences 32 3. Learning 37 4. Critiques of Expected Utility Theory 41 5. Time Preferences 46 6. Exercises 50 Chapter 4. Social Choice Theory 53 1. The Open Search 53 2. Preference Aggregation Rules 55 3. Collective Choice 61 4. Manipulation of Choice Functions 66 5. Exercises 69 Chapter 5. Games in the Normal Form 71 1. The Normal Form 73 2. Solutions to Normal Form Games 76 3. Application: The Hotelling Model of Political Competition 83 4. Existence of Nash Equilibria 86 5. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Non-Finite Games* 93 6. Application: Interest Group Contributions 95 7. Application: International Externalities 96 iii iv CONTENTS 8. Computing Equilibria with Constrained Optimization* 97 9. Proving the Existence of Nash Equilibria** 98 10. Strategic Complementarity 102 11. Supermodularity and Monotone Comparative Statics* 103 12. Refining Nash Equilibria 108 13. Application: Private Provision of Public Goods 109 14. Exercises 113 Chapter 6. Bayesian Games in the Normal Form 115 1. Formal Definitions 117 2. Application: Trade restrictions 119 3. Application: Jury Voting 121 4. Application: Jury Voting with a Continuum of Signals* 123 5. Application: Public Goods and Incomplete Information 126 6. -
Multiplicative Differentials
Multiplicative Differentials Nikita Borisov, Monica Chew, Rob Johnson, and David Wagner University of California at Berkeley Abstract. We present a new type of differential that is particularly suited to an- alyzing ciphers that use modular multiplication as a primitive operation. These differentials are partially inspired by the differential used to break Nimbus, and we generalize that result. We use these differentials to break the MultiSwap ci- pher that is part of the Microsoft Digital Rights Management subsystem, to derive a complementation property in the xmx cipher using the recommended modulus, and to mount a weak key attack on the xmx cipher for many other moduli. We also present weak key attacks on several variants of IDEA. We conclude that cipher designers may have placed too much faith in multiplication as a mixing operator, and that it should be combined with at least two other incompatible group opera- ¡ tions. 1 Introduction Modular multiplication is a popular primitive for ciphers targeted at software because many CPUs have built-in multiply instructions. In memory-constrained environments, multiplication is an attractive alternative to S-boxes, which are often implemented us- ing large tables. Multiplication has also been quite successful at foiling traditional dif- ¢ ¥ ¦ § ferential cryptanalysis, which considers pairs of messages of the form £ ¤ £ or ¢ ¨ ¦ § £ ¤ £ . These differentials behave well in ciphers that use xors, additions, or bit permutations, but they fall apart in the face of modular multiplication. Thus, we con- ¢ sider differential pairs of the form £ ¤ © £ § , which clearly commute with multiplication. The task of the cryptanalyst applying multiplicative differentials is to find values for © that allow the differential to pass through the other operations in a cipher. -
Applications of Search Techniques to Cryptanalysis and the Construction of Cipher Components. James David Mclaughlin Submitted F
Applications of search techniques to cryptanalysis and the construction of cipher components. James David McLaughlin Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of York Department of Computer Science September 2012 2 Abstract In this dissertation, we investigate the ways in which search techniques, and in particular metaheuristic search techniques, can be used in cryptology. We address the design of simple cryptographic components (Boolean functions), before moving on to more complex entities (S-boxes). The emphasis then shifts from the construction of cryptographic arte- facts to the related area of cryptanalysis, in which we first derive non-linear approximations to S-boxes more powerful than the existing linear approximations, and then exploit these in cryptanalytic attacks against the ciphers DES and Serpent. Contents 1 Introduction. 11 1.1 The Structure of this Thesis . 12 2 A brief history of cryptography and cryptanalysis. 14 3 Literature review 20 3.1 Information on various types of block cipher, and a brief description of the Data Encryption Standard. 20 3.1.1 Feistel ciphers . 21 3.1.2 Other types of block cipher . 23 3.1.3 Confusion and diffusion . 24 3.2 Linear cryptanalysis. 26 3.2.1 The attack. 27 3.3 Differential cryptanalysis. 35 3.3.1 The attack. 39 3.3.2 Variants of the differential cryptanalytic attack . 44 3.4 Stream ciphers based on linear feedback shift registers . 48 3.5 A brief introduction to metaheuristics . 52 3.5.1 Hill-climbing . 55 3.5.2 Simulated annealing . 57 3.5.3 Memetic algorithms . 58 3.5.4 Ant algorithms . -
Approximation Schemes for Clustering with Outliers
Approximation Schemes for Clustering with Outliers Zachary Friggstad∗ Kamyar Khodamoradi Mohsen Rezapour Mohammad R. Salavatipoury Department of Computing Science University of Alberta Abstract Clustering problems are well-studied in a variety of fields such as data science, operations research, and computer science. Such problems include variants of centre location problems, k-median, and k-means to name a few. In some cases, not all data points need to be clustered; some may be discarded for various reasons. For instance, some points may arise from noise in a data set or one might be willing to discard a certain fraction of the points to avoid incurring unnecessary overhead in the cost of a clustering solution. We study clustering problems with outliers. More specifically, we look at uncapacitated facility location (UFL), k-median, and k-means. In these problems, we are given a set of data points in a metric space δ(:; :), a set of possible centres (each maybe with an openingX cost), maybe an integer parameter k, plus anC additional parameter z as the number of outliers. In uncapacitated facility location with outliers, we have to open some centres, discard up to z points of and assign every other point to the nearest open centre, minimizing the total assignment costX plus centre opening costs. In k-median and k-means, we have to open up to k centres but there are no opening costs. In k-means, the cost of assigning j to i is δ2(j; i). We present several results. Our main focus is on cases where δ is a doubling metric (this includes fixed dimensional Euclidean metrics as a special case) or is the shortest path metrics of graphs from a minor-closed family of graphs. -
Dynamic Programming
Chapter 19 Dynamic Programming “An interesting question is, ’Where did the name, dynamic programming, come from?’ The 1950s were not good years for mathematical research. We had a very interesting gentleman in Washington named Wilson. He was Secretary of Defense, and he actually had a pathological fear and hatred of the word, research. I’m not using the term lightly; I’m using it precisely. His face would suffuse, he would turn red, and he would get violent if people used the term, research, in his presence. You can imagine how he felt, then, about the term, mathematical. The RAND Corporation was employed by the Air Force, and the Air Force had Wilson as its boss, essentially. Hence, I felt I had to do something to shield Wilson and the Air Force from the fact that I was really doing mathematics inside the RAND Corpo- ration. What title, what name, could I choose? In the first place I was interested in planning, in decision making, in thinking. But planning, is not a good word for var- ious reasons. I decided therefore to use the word, ‘programming.’ I wanted to get across the idea that this was dynamic, this was multistage, this was time-varying—I thought, let’s kill two birds with one stone. Let’s take a word that has an absolutely precise meaning, namely dynamic, in the classical physical sense. It also has a very interesting property as an adjective, and that is it’s impossible to use the word, dy- namic, in a pejorative sense. Try thinking of some combination that will possibly give it a pejorative meaning.