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INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

DIRECTOR OF INTELLiGENCE AND RESEARCH fgd/ Proiect (¹S19990000Q U.S. Department of State ~eiease ~cise ~y ~eciass Exemption(s) To : The Secretary ep em er , 1970 Through: S/S From : INR - Ray S. Cline Subject: Chile: Stop-Allende Stratagem Unlikely to Prosper

The efforts by rightists and some Christian Democrats to defeat in the October 24 congressional run-off

election appear unlikely to prosper. President Eduardo Frei would

have to coInnit himself totally if the ploy were to have any chance

of success. Thus far indications are that while Frei is encouraging

the maneuver, he also is holding back and keeping his options open.

Frei's real aim could be to exact the strongest possible institutional

safeguards from Allende and his coalition.

The strata em and Frei's role. Since Allende did not gain a

majority on September 4, Congress will meet on October 24 to decide

between Allende and runner-up independent Jorge Alessandri. The

stratagem is for Frei to persuade large numbers of Christian

Democrats to combine with the Alessandri forces and some Radical

Party members to elect Alessandri who would resign, setting the

stage for new elections in which Frei could run and probably win.

' I'I . Po I . oroo C oc I B of Inlell cene ' and Resea ch. Asrde I.om ormal ' hslan(rse ecchance u rh as, n» at the oh st I, I h not h en coornnaled else herc n,—~I, rC/(/, / -2-

Even if Frei were to go all out and deliver a large b1oc of

his party, the move would not be assured of success. Anything

less than an all-out effort by Frei would appear to doom the strata-

gem from the outset: Allende won the popular elections; Congress has always voted for the front-runner under the 1925 Constitution; a sizable faction of the Christian Democrats appear convinced that

the country can only be governed successfully by a coalition with

the far left; and Allende appears to hold the upper hand with the Radicals.

Frei. From evidence to date Fref has not yet put himself completely behind the stop-Allende stratagem. This apparent in-

decision may be due to a lack of will. A group of Christian Democrats visiting to get a reading of the situation noted

that Frei bewailed his own impotence, that the party was badly

divided and that there was little hope of stopping Allende. Frei is

probably bothered by the probability of widespread violence if the

ploy succeeds and the likelihood that failure would leave the party

so weak and divided that ft would no longer represent a potential

stumbling block. to Allende in his attempt to establish an authori- tarian Marxist state.

Frei's "heyitation", however, may be the manuevering of the consumnate politician. Frei might believe that if the Christian

Democrats (PDC) went en masse hat in hand to Allende after the elections —as Tomic did —they could expect to receive few meaningful -3-

guarantees concerning the status of the military, education, the com-

munications media and opposition political parties. But hy making the alternative of supporting Alessandri a credible one, the Christian

Democrats would enonaously improve their bargaining position. This

could explain Frei's apparent half-hearted comaitment to the stratagem.

A special Comaission of five PDC leaders drew up a list of proposed

guarantees and presented them to the POC Council on September 14. The

Council will discuss these demands with Allende and then report in

October to the party national comaittee on the results of the talks. The national coaanlttee will then set policy regarding the voting in Congress.

Tb 'litarh, Military leaders pill probably proride tacit

support to the anti-Allende moves, but only so long as these moves

conform to constitutional norms and promise success without too much stress and risk of violence. If the politicians hesitate and bicker or if popular protests arise, the military might well disassociate themselves from the movement, fearful of cmnpromislng the military's arbiter role. Illustrative of the Armed Forces' desire to keep their options open, military leaders reportedly have been discussiog the status of the institution under an Allende administration with Popular

Unity leaders and have also requested Frei supporters not to turn the

September 19 military parade into a demonstration of popular support for Frei.