DOCSLIB.ORG

Intelligence Brief

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Intelligence Brief 5 I s ' r- - - rsd 1 R Fh 1 t hLENT 0+ iiii Rtlata-155 INTELLIGENCE BRIEF DIRECTOR OF INTELLiGENCE AND RESEARCH fgd/ Chile Proiect (¹S19990000Q U.S. Department of State ~eiease ~cise ~y ~eciass Exemption(s) To : The Secretary ep em er , 1970 Through: S/S From : INR - Ray S. Cline Subject: Chile: Stop-Allende Stratagem Unlikely to Prosper The efforts by rightists and some Christian Democrats to defeat Salvador Allende in the October 24 congressional run-off election appear unlikely to prosper. President Eduardo Frei would have to coInnit himself totally if the ploy were to have any chance of success. Thus far indications are that while Frei is encouraging the maneuver, he also is holding back and keeping his options open. Frei's real aim could be to exact the strongest possible institutional safeguards from Allende and his coalition. The strata em and Frei's role. Since Allende did not gain a majority on September 4, Congress will meet on October 24 to decide between Allende and runner-up independent Jorge Alessandri. The stratagem is for Frei to persuade large numbers of Christian Democrats to combine with the Alessandri forces and some Radical Party members to elect Alessandri who would resign, setting the stage for new elections in which Frei could run and probably win. ' I'I . Po I . oroo C oc I B of Inlell cene ' and Resea ch. Asrde I.om ormal ' hslan(rse ecchance u rh as, n» at the oh st I, I h not h en coornnaled else herc n,—~I, rC/(/, / -2- Even if Frei were to go all out and deliver a large b1oc of his party, the move would not be assured of success. Anything less than an all-out effort by Frei would appear to doom the strata- gem from the outset: Allende won the popular elections; Congress has always voted for the front-runner under the 1925 Constitution; a sizable faction of the Christian Democrats appear convinced that the country can only be governed successfully by a coalition with the far left; and Allende appears to hold the upper hand with the Radicals. Frei. From evidence to date Fref has not yet put himself completely behind the stop-Allende stratagem. This apparent in- decision may be due to a lack of will. A group of Christian Democrats visiting Santiago to get a reading of the situation noted that Frei bewailed his own impotence, that the party was badly divided and that there was little hope of stopping Allende. Frei is probably bothered by the probability of widespread violence if the ploy succeeds and the likelihood that failure would leave the party so weak and divided that ft would no longer represent a potential stumbling block. to Allende in his attempt to establish an authori- tarian Marxist state. Frei's "heyitation", however, may be the manuevering of the consumnate politician. Frei might believe that if the Christian Democrats (PDC) went en masse hat in hand to Allende after the elections —as Tomic did —they could expect to receive few meaningful -3- guarantees concerning the status of the military, education, the com- munications media and opposition political parties. But hy making the alternative of supporting Alessandri a credible one, the Christian Democrats would enonaously improve their bargaining position. This could explain Frei's apparent half-hearted comaitment to the stratagem. A special Comaission of five PDC leaders drew up a list of proposed guarantees and presented them to the POC Council on September 14. The Council will discuss these demands with Allende and then report in October to the party national comaittee on the results of the talks. The national coaanlttee will then set policy regarding the voting in Congress. Tb 'litarh, Military leaders pill probably proride tacit support to the anti-Allende moves, but only so long as these moves conform to constitutional norms and promise success without too much stress and risk of violence. If the politicians hesitate and bicker or if popular protests arise, the military might well disassociate themselves from the movement, fearful of cmnpromislng the military's arbiter role. Illustrative of the Armed Forces' desire to keep their options open, military leaders reportedly have been discussiog the status of the institution under an Allende administration with Popular Unity leaders and have also requested Frei supporters not to turn the September 19 military parade into a demonstration of popular support for Frei..
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Establishing Credibility: the Role of Foreign Advisors in Chile's 1955
    This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises Volume Author/Editor: Sebastian Edwards, Gerardo Esquivel and Graciela Márquez, editors Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-18500-1 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/edwa04-1 Conference Date: December 2-4, 2004 Publication Date: July 2007 Title: Establishing Credibility: The Role of Foreign Advisors in Chile’s 1955–1958 Stabilization Program Author: Sebastian Edwards URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10659 8 Establishing Credibility The Role of Foreign Advisors in Chile’s 1955–1958 Stabilization Program Sebastian Edwards 8.1 Introduction The adoption of stabilization programs is usually a painful process, both politically and economically. History is replete with instances where, even in the light of obvious and flagrant macroeconomics disequilibria, the implementation of stabilization programs is significantly delayed. Why do policymakers and/or politicians prefer to live with growing inflationary pressures and implement price and other forms of highly inefficient con- trols instead of tackling the roots of macroeconomic imbalances? Is the prolongation of inflation the consequence of mistaken views on the me- chanics of fiscal deficits and money creation, or is it the unavoidable result of the political game? Why, after months of apparent political stalemate, are stabilization programs all of a sudden adopted that closely resemble others proposed earlier? These questions are at the heart of the political economy of stabilization and inflationary finance.1 In recent years the analysis of these issues has attained new interest, as a number of authors have applied the tools of game theory to the study of macroeconomic pol- icymaking.
    [Show full text]
  • Cómo Citar El Artículo Número Completo Más Información Del
    Tzintzun. Revista de Estudios Históricos ISSN: 1870-719X ISSN: 2007-963X [email protected] Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo México Soto, Angel; Garay, Cristián Tecnocracia y apartidismo de derechas en Chile. El “relato” de Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) Tzintzun. Revista de Estudios Históricos, núm. 68, 2018, Julio-, pp. 255-274 Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo México Disponible en: https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=89860339009 Cómo citar el artículo Número completo Sistema de Información Científica Redalyc Más información del artículo Red de Revistas Científicas de América Latina y el Caribe, España y Portugal Página de la revista en redalyc.org Proyecto académico sin fines de lucro, desarrollado bajo la iniciativa de acceso abierto Tecnocracia y apartidismo de derechas en Chile. El “relato” de Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) Angel Soto y Cristián Garay Resumen La tecnocracia gerencial tuvo su primera expresión en Chile en el gobierno de Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, un liberal ecléctico. En efecto, quien gobernó entre 1958 y 1964, se caracterizó por una primera fase de su gobierno que incluyó el Gabinete de los Gerentes, obedeciendo a varias influencias de corte tecnocrático y despolitizador frente a la tradicional forma de la administración política partidista. Palabras clave: Historia de Chile, Tecnocracia, Administración del Estado, Derechas. Ángel Mauricio Soto Gamboa ∙ Universidad San Sebastián Correo electrónico: [email protected] Cristián Garay Vera . Universidad de Santiago de Chile Correo electrónico: [email protected] Tzintzun. Revista de Estudios Históricos ∙ Número 68 (julio - diciembre 2018) ISSN: 1870-719X ∙ ISSN-e: 2007-963X 255 ANGEL SOTO Y CRISTIÁN GARAY Technocracy and non-partisanship of rights in Chile.
    [Show full text]
  • Power, Coercion, Legitimacy and the Press in Pinochet's Chile a Dissertation Presented to the Faculty Of
    Writing the Opposition: Power, Coercion, Legitimacy and the Press in Pinochet's Chile A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Brad T. Eidahl December 2017 © 2017 Brad T. Eidahl. All Rights Reserved. 2 This dissertation titled Writing the Opposition: Power, Coercion, Legitimacy and the Press in Pinochet's Chile by BRAD T. EIDAHL has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Patrick M. Barr-Melej Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT EIDAHL, BRAD T., Ph.D., December 2017, History Writing the Opposition: Power, Coercion, Legitimacy and the Press in Pinochet's Chile Director of Dissertation: Patrick M. Barr-Melej This dissertation examines the struggle between Chile’s opposition press and the dictatorial regime of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1973-1990). It argues that due to Chile’s tradition of a pluralistic press and other factors, and in bids to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy, Pinochet and his top officials periodically demonstrated considerable flexibility in terms of the opposition media’s ability to publish and distribute its products. However, the regime, when sensing that its grip on power was slipping, reverted to repressive measures in its dealings with opposition-media outlets. Meanwhile, opposition journalists challenged the very legitimacy Pinochet sought and further widened the scope of acceptable opposition under difficult circumstances. Ultimately, such resistance contributed to Pinochet’s defeat in the 1988 plebiscite, initiating the return of democracy.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States, Eduardo Frei's Revolution in Liberty and The
    The Gathering Storm: The United States, Eduardo Frei's Revolution in Liberty and the Polarization of Chilean Politics, 1964-1970 A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Sebastian Hurtado-Torres December 2016 © 2016 Sebastian Hurtado-Torres. All Rights Reserved. 2 This dissertation titled The Gathering Storm: The United States, Eduardo Frei's Revolution in Liberty, and the Polarization of Chilean Politics, 1964-1970 by SEBASTIAN HURTADO-TORRES has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Patrick Barr-Melej Associate Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT HURTADO-TORRES, SEBASTIAN, Ph.D., December 2016, History The Gathering Storm: The United States, Eduardo Frei’s Revolution in Liberty, and the Polarization of Chilean Politics, 1964-1970 Director of Dissertation: Patrick Barr-Melej This dissertation explores the involvement of the United States in Chilean politics between the presidential campaign of 1964 and Salvador Allende’s accession to the presidency in 1970. The main argument of this work is that the partnership between the Christian Democratic Party of Chile (PDC) and the United States in this period played a significant role in shaping Chilean politics and thus contributed to its growing polarization. The alliance between the PDC and the United States was based as much on their common views on communism as on their shared ideas about modernization and economic development. Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, headed by men strongly committed to the success of the Christian Democratic project, involved itself heavily in the inner workings of Chilean politics as an informal actor, unable to dictate terms but capable of exerting influence on local actors whose interests converged with those of the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Mirrors of Change
    Mirrors of Change A Study of Industry Associations in Chile and Uruguay Mirrors of Change A Study of Industry Associations in Chile and Uruguay ANDRÉS RIVAROLA PUNTIGLIANO INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY 2003 MONOGRAPH SERIES 39 June 2003 © The author and the Institute of Latin American Studies S – 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden ISBN: 91-85894-60-5 ISSN: 0284-6675 Techinical Editing: Akhil Malaki Printed in Sweden by Akademitryck AB, Edsbruk, Sweden To Alma and Camila Contents List of Abbreviations i Acknowledgements v Preface ix INTRODUCTION 1 Institutions and Organisations 4 Studying Industry Associations in Latin America 9 Method and Sources 15 Limitations and Structure 24 CHAPTER 1 EARLY ORGANISATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 29 URUGUAY 29 CHILE 36 CHAPTER 2 THE ASSOCIATIONS IN THE SIXTIES 45 THE URUGUAYAN CASE 52 National Level 54 Regional and Global Levels 70 THE CHILEAN CASE 79 National Level 81 Regional and Global Levels 98 CHAPTER 3 THE MILITARY INTERLUDE 109 URUGUAY 110 CHILE 117 CHAPTER 4 THE ASSOCIATIONS IN THE NINETIES 127 THE CHILEAN CASE 135 National Level 136 Regional and Global Levels 156 THE URUGUAYAN CASE 171 National Level 173 Regional and Global Levels 191 CONCLUSIONS 209 EPILOGUE 219 Appendix 223 Selected References 231 Index 255 List of Abbreviations AGCI Agencia de Cooperación Internacional de Chile AID Agency for International Development AILA Asociación de Industriales Latinoamericanos ALADI Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración ASEXMA Asociación de Exportadores de Manufacturas de Chile ASIMET
    [Show full text]
  • Can Land Reform Avoid a Left Turn? Evidence from Chile After the Cuban Revolution
    doi 10.1515/bejeap-2012-0044 BEJEAP 2013; 14(1): 31–72 Contributions Felipe González* Can Land Reform Avoid a Left Turn? Evidence from Chile after the Cuban Revolution Abstract: Following the creation of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, several structural reforms were implemented in Latin America in response to the poli- tical effects of the Cuban Revolution. Among these, land reform was arguably the most important policy. Using a unique dataset of land expropriations, and a plausible exogenous variation in land concentration, this paper studies the causal effects this policy had on political support for the incumbent party in the central government. In a context where the incumbent was losing political support (and the power of the left wing was rising), municipalities affected by land reform voted by 3–5 percentage points higher for the incumbent than municipalities not affected by this process. Although it did not prevent the first democratically elected Marxist government, land reform decreased the political support for the left wing party. I discuss several theoretical mechanisms that can explain this empirical result. Keywords: land reform, political outcomes, land concentration *Corresponding author: Felipe González, Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile; Economic History and Cliometrics Lab (EH Clio Lab); E-mail: [email protected] 1 Introduction During the Punta del Este Conference in 1961 and via consensus of all Latin American governments, the Alliance for Progress was born. One of the main objectives of this alliance was transform historically unequal agrarian struc- tures (Huerta 1989, p.14). To accomplish this and other goals, several loans and aid programs were granted to Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Chile, among others (Taffet 2007, see Table 3.1).
    [Show full text]
  • Abridged Timeline of Chile's Recent History
    ABRIDGED TIMELINE OF CHILE’S RECENT HISTORY 1970 November 3 Salvador Allende, as leader of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity party), defeats a former president, Jorge Alessandri, to assume the presi- dency. Allende implements controversial social and economic reforms in his “Chilean Way to Socialism” program. 1973 September 11 Pinochet leads the Chilean army in a violent coup that ends Allende’s government and brings the country under a harsh military dictatorship. (Allende makes a farewell speech shortly before the capture of the palace and is believed to have committed suicide.) 1973–1990 Some 130,000 Chileans are brutally detained by officials working for Pinochet; many are tortured and an estimated 3,000 are killed or “dis- appeared.” 1974 A group of women in search of disappeared family members organize the first of the arpillera workshops. Making arpilleras that chronicle the human rights violations of Pinochet’s regime becomes not only a means for Chilean women to support their families but also a powerful form of protest and resistance. 1988 October 5 Under provisions in Chile’s constitution of 1980, a referendum is held to decide the country’s leadership. Chileans vote for a return to democ- racy and elections are held in 1989. 1990 March 11 Pinochet steps down and Patricio Alwyn is democratically elected presi- dent. (Pinochet becomes the commander-in-chief of the army.) 2006 March 11 Michelle Bachelet, whose father died three decades earlier at the hands of DINA, is sworn in as Chile’s first female president. As the defense minister in 2003, Bachelet helped formulate a declaration that Chile’s military would “never again” depose a democratically elected govern- ment.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy, Dictatorship and Economic Performance in Chile
    Democracy, Dictatorship and Economic Performance in Chile William R. Keech Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 [email protected] Paper presented at the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society Santiago, Chile July 28-30, 2004 The political and economic experience of Chile between 1932 and the present provides a natural experiment for a comparison of democracy and dictatorship with respect to their impact on economic performance. Democracy existed in Chile between 1932 and 1973, and was associated with a very wide range of efforts at economic reform, though without lasting success in any of them. This period also shows that democratic politics can provide economically perverse incentives, and can legitimately elect a president who carries out disastrous economic policies. In the period between 1973 and 1990, Chile had a dictatorship that, with a long lagtime, successfully reformed economic institutions, and brought about constructive changes in economic performance. This regime made some mistakes that may have prolonged the recovery, but the notable thing was the fact that the economy not only recovered, but achieved a new level of prosperity. My argument is that the neoliberal economic policies were central to economic success. Since 1990, democratic governments have maintained the institutions and policies that brought about improved economic performance under the dictatorship, and have continued to enjoy the resulting prosperity. The democratic governments have been more sensitive to equity issues, but not at the expense of economic performance. Chile’s experience is not typical, but it is instructive about the relationship between political institutions and economic performance.
    [Show full text]
  • Chile Después Del Autoritarismo
    asisiSi ;.iri|':íii"^^,n-í/--r.,/ £:.•.='• Rejas ir.'.éiior úe Caía en e) Bordemar Chile después del autoritarismo- CARLOS HUNEEUS Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile MAURICIO MORALES Investigador del Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC). Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Los partidos han sido organizaciones de gran im­ sindical y en el movimiento estudiantil de las uni­ portancia en el desarrollo político de Chile. La lar­ versidades. Esta centralidad de los partidos explica ga tradición democrática de Chile está estrecha­ que sus conflictos hayan constituido uno de los mente ligada a los partidos desde que en el siglo factores que agravó la crisis de la democracia desde XIX se desarrollara el estado independiente, con fines de los años 60 y que condujo a su colapso en dirigentes a nivel nacional y con presencia en las 1973. La singularidad del panorama partidista de principales ciudadades. Los partidos, a su vez, pu­ Chile hasta 1973 era no sólo su larga continuidad, dieron fortalecerse porque actuaron en un país en que Colombia lo aventaja con la historia de Li­ que consiguió tempranamente, a diferencia de la berales y Conservadores, sino su amplitud, pues es­ mayoría de los países de América Latina, estable­ taba constituido por un amplio abanico de partidos cer un Estado en forma, con una considerable es­ relevantes, desde un Partido Comunista en la iz- tabilidad política que fiíe de la mano con eleccio­ quierda^, que alcanzó un considerable apoyo elec­ nes periódicas y alternancia de los gobiernos, al toral y una gran influencia en el movimiento sindi­ menos desde 18701.
    [Show full text]
  • The Miracle of Chile: Capitalism by Force How a Military Dictator and Some Unorthodox Economists Saved a Nation
    The Miracle of Chile: Capitalism by Force How a military dictator and some unorthodox economists saved a nation Sean F. Brown Senior Division Historical Paper Paper Length: 2,500 words Brown 2 To find a dictatorship that made a country better off is rare. But Chile’s Augusto Pinochet did just that. His successful economic policies eventually made Chile the richest nation in South America,1 breaking ground for similar reform in China, Britain, America, and elsewhere.2 But is economic revival worth paying any price? Prelude: Marxism Arrives in Chile On September 4, 1970, Chilean voters elected the first democratic Marxist government in history.3 At the height of the Cold War, the United States in particular despised this turn of events, but despite all their efforts, the left-wing Popular Unity coalition, headed by Chilean Socialist Party nominee Salvador Allende, prevailed. CIA meddling in Chilean politics stretched back at least six years prior. To help defeat the Socialists in the 1964 presidential election, the CIA directly funded roughly half of the campaign of centrist Eduardo Frei,4 the only viable alternative, who ultimately won with 56% of the vote.5 Over the next five years the CIA would spend another $2 million on covert political action designed to strengthen anti-Marxist groups. The CIA’s efforts between 1964 and 1969 were deemed “relatively successful”, but at the same time, “persistent allegations that the… parties of the center and right were linked to the CIA may have played a part in undercutting popular support for them.”6 1 Oishimaya Sen Nag, "The Richest Countries In South America," WorldAtlas, September 28, 2017, 1, accessed February 04, 2018, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-richest-countries-in-south-america.html.
    [Show full text]
  • NOTE on RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE and the EUROPEAN UNION Summary
    DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B – POLICY DEPARTMENT – NOTE ON RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION Summary: After 16 years of dictatorship between 1973 and 1989, Chile began a process of democratisation under the authority of the military. That process culminated in August 2005, when the Congress adopted a reform of the Constitution that had been imposed in 1980 by General Pinochet’s government. This political success has been mirrored by good economic progress, which is largely the result of structural reforms. These have helped open up the economy, which has been strengthened via the implementation of several free-trade agreements and by focusing on national production. In January 2006 Michelle Bachelet won the Presidential elections. It is an unprecedented event for a woman to achieve such a high position in the Southern Cone. Her priority areas will be health, education and the reduction of poverty. Relations between the EU and Chile in terms of politics, the economy and cooperation are excellent. The association agreement concluded in 2002 has done much to strengthen relations between the two partners, and the fields of activity to which the agreement applies have increased as a result. DGExPo/B/PolDep/Note/2006_138 September 2006 EPADES\DELE\D-CL\NT\628801EN 1 PE 378.960EN This note was requested by the Delegation to the EU-Chile Joint Parliamentary Committee. It is available in the following languages: English Author: Pedro NEVES Manuscript completed in September 2006. To obtain copies, please email [email protected] European Parliament, Brussels, September 2006.
    [Show full text]
  • La Derecha En El Chile Después De Pinochet: El Caso De La Unión Democrata Independiente
    LA DERECHA EN EL CHILE DESPUÉS DE PINOCHET: EL CASO DE LA UNIÓN DEMOCRATA INDEPENDIENTE Carlos Huneeus Working Paper #285 – July 2001 Carlos Huneeus is a Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Católica, Santiago, Chile, and Executive Director of the CERC Corporation. His undergraduate degree is in Juridical and Social Sciences, Universidad de Chile, and his Master of Arts is in Political Science, University of Essex. PhD University of Heidelberg. Among his publications are Der Zusammenbruch der Demokratie in Chile, Eine vergleichende Analyse (Heidelberg, 1980), La Unión de Centro Democrático y la transición a la democracia en España (Madrid, 1985), Los chilenos y la política (Santiago, 1986) and El régimen de Pinochet (Santiago, 2001). He has been a Visiting Professor at the University of Siena and at Columbia University. He was an ambassador to Germany during President Patricio Aylwin’s Administration (1990–1994). He was a Visiting Scholar at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies (spring 2000). ABSTRACT The large literature on political parties in new democracies tends to look for patterns of continuity in the post authoritarian era. Less attention has been paid to factors that explain the emergence of new political parties. The political and organizational bases of these parties in the previous regime have not been studied systematically either. The present text analyzes the case of a new party in Chile—the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI)—which emerged during General Augusto Pinochet’s authoritarian regime (1973–1990). Its leaders constituted the main civil elite support for the regime and its founder, Jaime Guzmán, was the most influential civil actor in it.
    [Show full text]