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SEMI PERIPHERAL DEVELOPMENT Giovanni Arrighi

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EXPLORATIONS IN THE WORLD-ECONOMY: Publications of the Fernand Braudel Center Series Editor Immanuel Wallersteln Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations Explorations in the World-Economy: Publications of the Fernand Braudel Center Volumes in this series: Volume 5 1. WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: Theory and Methodology · by Terence K. Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Associates 2. LABOR IN THE WORLD SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEMIPERIPHERAL edited by Immanuel Wallerstein 3. HOUSEHOLDS AND THE WORLD-ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT edited by Joan Smith, Immanuel Wallerstein, Hans-Dieter Evers The Politics of 4. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND WORKERS' MOVEMENTS Southern Europe edited by Melvyn Dubofsky in the 5. SEMIPERIPHERAL DEVELOPMENT: The Politics of Twentieth Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century edited by Giovanni Arrighi Century Giovanni Arrighi Editor ~SAGE PUBLICATIONS ~ Beverly Hills London New Delhi -'- ;~rY- 1 10 FASCISM TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM Logic and Limits of a Transition Giovanni Arrighi Southern Europe as Semiperiphery As often happens, a concept introduced to solve a problem has itself become the main problem. In the course of the two colloquia, the applicability of the concept of semiperiphery to Southern European countries has largely lost its initial reference to the issue of the transition of Southern Europe from fascism to socialism. It has displaced this issue and become itself the main object of discussion. In this concluding chapter I shall try to redress the balance by relating the main issues raised in the two colloquia to the premises and hypotheses of the original project briefly summarized in my introduction to this volume. In my view, much of the controversy over which Southern European states have been or are semiperipheral has arisen because of a lack of operational criteria for identifying semiperipheral states. Wallerstein's criteria as set out in his contribution to this volume are rather vague and formal. They are vague mainly because we are not told what weight to assign to the mix of economic activities that fall within a state's boundaries, on the one hand, and to its position in the interstate system, on the other. They are formal mainly because we are not told, substantively, which activities in the various commodity chains are core-like and which are periphery-like, how the two types of activity have changed over time, above all, how peripherality, semiperipherality, and coreness can be operationally measured. As a result, the semiperipheral zone expands and contracts according to the particular combination of criteria used to define it. At one AUTHOR'S NOTE: In rewriting this paper for publication, I have greatly benefited from the comments and criticisms of Bill Martin and Beverly Silver and the members of the Semiperiphery Research Working Group of the Fernand Braudel Center. 143 Giovanni Arrighi 245 244 FASCISM TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM · , ceptualization of the semiperiphery provides us with a Wallerstem s con . h- · · extreme, the use of an ill-defined combination of criteria (which · these questions. According tot is conceptuahzat1on, lue to answering · · presumably includes the position of a state in the interstate system and c . · ·ther a residual category nor a trans1t1ona 1 stage. ·penphery lS net . the mix of economic activities falling within its boundaries) has led t h esemi .d . t yi·f asinthernoreextrem.eformulationsof be a rest ua1 ca egor , . Wallerstcin in an earlier writing to identify as semiperipheral a vast It wou ld h d y towards core-periphery polarization theory t e ten enc . number of states as diverse as Canada and India> altogether accounting depend ency • b. tt systemiccountertendenc1es. lfthat .•andnotsuieco . for something in the order of two-thirds of world population.1 At was overw hle mtno . uld ultimately be pulled in one 1 · termed1ate zones wo . - another extremej the use of more restrictive but equally vague standards was the case, a1 in e- eri hery polarity, producing a bt- can just as easily dissolve the semiperipheral zone. This is what would direction or the other of the colr p p e measurement of the core­ happen with reference to Southern Europe if we combined Papa­ modal distribution of states a ong som dantonakis's downgrading of Portugal, Greece, and Turkey to periph­ periphery sp_ectrum. resent a transitional stage if we eral status with Lange's upgrading ofitaly to the "perimeter of the core" The semtpenphery would rep . t1·ng of states at different Id omy as cons1s and Logan's remark that the same should be done in the case of Spain. conceived of the wor -econ k d ess to modernity. In this case, In order to avoid this kind of semantic impasse, we need a standard of stages of development, from ~:~e:~~e ntransition, some states would semiperipherality that, while reflecting as closely as possible the until all countnes had _c?mp . n would tend to produce a meaning (i.e., the purpose) of the concept of semi periphery, allows us to always be between pos1t10ns. This patter me measurement of the classify states in the three zones of the world-economy as unambigu­ uni-modal distribution of stat~sthal~;d:~rogressively shifting from ously as possible. It seems to me that GNP per capita is such a standard, backward-modern spectr~m wit ddi~ion we would expect to find in the since it is highly operational, and it is bound to reflect the degree of backwardness to '.".odermty .. fo a I st~tes that were previously at the semiperipherality as defined by Wallerstein. in-between/ trans1ttonal pos1t1on on y Wallerstein assumes the world-economy to be structured in core­ backward end of the spect.rum. Wallerstein maintains that the semi- peri pheral activities linked by commodity chains that cut across state In contrast to these views, f f the world-system and that . bl nd permanent eature o . boundaries. Core activities are those that command a large share of the periphery is a sta ea d eripheral positions. That IS total surplus produced within a commodity chain, and peripheral it can be clearly m~rked out fr~mnc~;:::en~ore and periphery does not activities are those that command little or no such surplus. to say, the increasing polanzatlo d I distribution of states along the All states enclose within their boundaries both core and peripheral produce a bi-modal but a tn-mo a the states that happen to occupy activities. Some (core states) enclose predominantly core activities, and core-peripher~ spectr~~· Moreover• articular point in time are not the intermediate poS1tton at any P.. th · ay" from backward- some (peripheral states) enclose predominantly peripheral activities. As ll states on eir w a consequence, residents of the former must command a large share of necessarily or even norma y 0 the contrary some states . dernity/coreness. n ' ness/ penphery to mo .t.on and many may have the total surplus produced in the world-economy while residents of the d d from core pos1 1 . latter must command little or no such surplus. And this difference must may have been downgra e . f the early stages of thetr be reflected in a large and growing differential between the per capita been in the semiperipheral pos1t1on rom GNP of the residents of the two types of states. Since semiperipheral incorporation in th_e world-eco_no~Y: ht we should be able to set the states are defined as those that enclose within _their territorial bound­ It follows that, if Wallerstem ts nf b inspecting the distribution of boundaries ofthesem1penphery s1mp y yl t·on) according to their per aries a more or less even mix of core-peripheral activities, their residents . h d by thetr popu a t must command a more or less average share of the total surplus states (presumab ly we1g e . Id be characterized by three clearly produced in the world-economy-a command that must be reflected in capita GNP. This dtstnbut1on shou . of the three zones of the identifiable modes, each corresponding todonte provided by the World "intermediate" per capita incomes. d. to the latest a a . This measurement of semiperipherality does not in itself settle the world-economy. A ecor mg - , ce tualization passes this simple issue of the boundaries of the semiperipheral zone, and this is Bank (1983: 148-49), Waller~tem s co: pl million inhabitants, we can presumably the reason Lange discards it. What is an intermediate level test Leaving aside states with less t an f "ta GNP and obtain a of per capita GNP? At which level of per capita GNP shall we set the re-;\assify all other states in five c[asshes oh peru:~~r of states and the · al d. t · b tion of bot t e n . lower and upper boundaries of the semiperipheral zone? Fortunately, clear tn-mod ts n u . df bythestatesmeachc1 ass. proportion of world population aecounte or 5 246 FASCISM TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM Giovanni Arrighi 247 TABLE 10.J only Portugal with a GNP per capita of approximately $2,500 is GNP per Capita, 1981 Number Class (in dollars) Percentage of relatively close to the median. The other two states (Spain with GNP per ' of States : i World Population I less than Boo capita of $5,640 and Italy with GNP of $6,940) fall into the "no man's 50 1 ' I/II BOO· 1,500 58 land' that separates the unambiguously semiperipheral from the II 19 5 1,500. 4,500 31 unambiguously core states (class II/ III). Lange's view that Italy belongs II/IJI 4,500. 9,000 20 10 to some special category at the perimeter of the core thus seems to be III more than 9,000 3 19 14 well grounded, and so does Logan's view that Spain's position is somewhat analogous to that of Italy.
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