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CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE (Prepared by the Editors) In the past, the editors of Indonesia have periodically prepared lists of officers holding key’positions in the Indonesian Armed Forces* hierarchy to keep readers abreast of developments. The present list (updated to late March 1977) offers some interesting insights into intra-army politics since our last listing in Indonesia3 No. 18 (Octo ber 1974), pp. 155-67. The general format presented here differs somewhat from earlier listings. In part because of the reorganization of the Department of Defense and Security announced in February 1974 (but implemented only in February 1975), and in part because of the great decline in the power of Kopkamtib (Restoration of Security and Order Command) since the fall of General Sumitro in March 1974, we have decided to follow the full official organizational structure of the department, listing all the various bodies under the minister’s control, and to eliminate the section we earlier included on Kopkamtibfs internal staff structure. (Readers are warned that we have so far been unable to get the kind of full background material on some of the heads of departmental agencies that we usually provide for staff and line officers.) The data suggest both strong continuities with previous New Order military politics, and certain instructive changes. The most important continuities are: (a) increased centralization of power in the upper echelons of the department; (b) further Javanization of the ruling officer corps; (c) a careful balancing of personnel from the three Java Divisions (Brawijaya, Diponegoro, and Siliwangi). Centralizing tendencies can be seen along two dimensions. First, the structural changes implemented in February 1975 have rationalized the department’s hierarchy and put crucial power in the hands of the minister’s eleven assistants. For example, the newly created position of Assistant for Personnel and Manpower Development combines the func tions of the old G-3, the Assistant for Manpower Development, and the Assistant for Education. The new position of Assistant for Logistics, Material Development and Installations combines the roles of G-4, the Assistant for Material Development, and the Badan Penampungan dan Penyaluran Barang2 ABRI. (Another sign of centralization, continued from 1974, is that none of the Outer Island territorial commands [Kodam] are held by ’’native son” officers.) Secondly, the turnover of personnel at the higher levels of the department has been markedly slower than at subordinate levels. In spite of the formal military requirement that a normal tour of duty in any one position be about two years (24 months), men like Darjatmo (77 months!!), Panggabean (49), Saleh Basarah (48), Sudomo (39), Yoga Sugama (39), Subijono (39), Hasnan Habib (38), Makmun Murod (36), and Surono (35) , have been in the same positions for much longer periods, a circumstance that should, other things being equal, increase their organizational control. 175 176 As for Javanization and divisional balance, the following data speak for themselves: As of July 1974, at least 74% of the officers holding listed jobs were Javanese (35 out of 47), while only 12% were Sumatrans (5), 8% Sundanese (4), and 6% others (2). As of March 1977, the proportions are 76% Javanese (58 out of 76), 11% Sundanese (8), 8% Sumatrans (6), and 5% others (4). Analysis of Divisional a f f i l i a tions, where these can be ascertained, suggests a rough parity between Diponegoro (13) and Siliwangi (13), with Brawijaya close behind (10). The only other Division seriously represented is Bukit Barisan. The changes that we believe can be detected are of two rather different kinds: First, there has been an interesting increase in the proportion of listed officers who are identified not so much with the territorial divisions as with the specialized services, such as the Artillery, the Judge-Advocacy, the Military Police, and so forth. No less than thirteen appointees come from these specialized units, a figure that compares favorably with the representation for the terri torial divisions. The appointments of men like Norman Sasono or Soe- weno to Kodam commands is especially striking, since these commands have traditionally been Divisional spoils. This tendency suggests that in the Armed Forces of the late 1970s the influence of Divisional loyalties, with their roots in the Revolutionary period, have seriously declined. The effects of the rationalization of promotions according to academic or para-academic criteria since the mid-1960s have height ened the weight of the specialized services’ claims to greater intra military power. In the absence of much serious fighting for a decade (except for the Timor debacle), successful careers have more and more been made in staff rather than in line positions; the officers of the specialized services, typically much better educated than the infantry men, have taken advantage of this change. (We may also note that the Javanizing trend mentioned above has been facilitated by the new role of these specialized services.) The other change is a more subtle one--but it has been hinted at earlier in our discussion of centralization. It is simply this: There has been a marked slowdown in promotions, not to say some stagnation, at the higher levels of the military hierarchy. This is particularly important insofar as the army has talked a great deal in recent years about the transfer of power from the generation of !45 to the post revolutionary generation. One might have expected the rhetoric to be accompanied by a speeding up of recruitment of younger men into key positions. That this has not taken place suggests that President Suharto and his long-standing inner circle feel increasingly insecure about the loyalty of the lower military. The shock of the Sumitro challenge in 1973-74 has been compounded by the Pertamina disaster (Indonesia must be the only OPEC country close to bankruptcy) and the military failures in Timor. One suspects that the feeling is strong in the presidential palace that now is not the time to gamble with significant changes in the key policy-making personnel in the military establishment. It remains to be seen how the officers who feel their advancement being slowed or blocked will respond to their plight. 177 Changes of Holders of Listed Positions 1974 through March 1977 1974 1975 1976 1977 January 4 3 - February 2 2 2 March - 2 - April 1 - May 1 - June 2 - July - - August - - - September - 3 - October - - - November - - - December - - - Total 0 13 7 2 Note that total changes for 1970 were 28; for 1971, 13; for 1972, 5; for 1973, 30; January through July 1974, 27. The list is organized according to the format developed in previ ous issues of Indonesia. As far as possible, the following information is given for each position: the name of the occupant, the date of his assumption of the office, the length of his tenure (where completed), the name of his predecessor, his own previous post, his divisional or service background, and his ethnic origin. Sample OFFICEHOLDER DATE OF INSTALLATION (LENGTH OF TENURE) NAME OF PREDECESSOR OFFICEHOLDER’S PREVIOUS POST DIVISIONAL BACKGROUND ETHNIC ORIGIN Abbrevations B = Brawijaya J = Javanese BB = Bukit Barisan S = Sundanese D = Diponegoro SI = Siliwangi 178 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY (HANKAM) COMMAND ECHELON Minister of Defense and Security/ Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Gen. Maradean Panggabean 28.III.73 Gen. Suharto Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces TT/II (S. Sumatra) Toba Batak Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Gen. Surono Reksodimedjo 11.V.74 Gen. Sumitro Army Chief of Staff D J STAFF ECHELON Chief of the Operations Staff1 1. Air Vice-Marshal Sudarmono 12.VI.73 to 11.XII.76 (42 months) Vice-Admiral R. Subono Deputy Commander of the Second Regional Defense Command (Kowilhan II) Air Force J 2. Rear-Admiral Drs. R. M. Soebroto 11.XII.76 Joedono Deputy Commander of the Third Regional Defense Command (Kowilhan III) Navy J Chief of the Administrative Staff2 Lt. Gen. A. Hasnan Habib 11.IV.73 Air Marshal Saleh Basarah Assistant for General Planning, Hankam BB Minangkabau Chief of the Functional Affairs Staff3 Lt. Gen. Darj atmo 3.XII.69 1The Chief of the Operations Staff is responsible for coordinating the work of the Assistants for Intelligence; Operations; Territorial Affairs; Communications and Electronics; and Security and Social Order. 2The Chief of the Administrative Staff is responsible for coordinating the work of the Assistants for Personnel and Manpower Development; Logistics, Material Development and Installations; Finance; and International Cooperation. 3The Chief of the Functional Affairs Staff is responsible for coordinating the work of the Assistants for Social and Political Affairs; and Functional Group Affairs. 179 (new position) Third Deputy (Special Affairs) to the Army Chief of Staff D J Assistant for Politics, Strategy and General Planning** Maj. Gen. Ignatius Jogi Supardi 21.1.76 Maj. Gen. R. Suprapto Commander, Army Staff and Command School Artillery J Assistant for Intelligence Maj. Gen. L. Benny Murdani 5.VIII.74 Maj. Gen. Charis Suhud Charge d*Affaires, Seoul RPKAD (paratroopers) J Assistant for Operations 1. Air-Vice Marshal Mochtar Lud 3.V.73 to 21.V.75 (24% months) Air Vice-Marshal Subambang Second Assistant (Operations) to the Air Force Chief of Staff Air Force J 2. Air Vice-Marshal Sukardi 21.V.75 Commander, Fifth Regional Air Command (Jakarta-lV. Java) Air Force J Assistant for Territorial Affairs Maj. Gen. Drs. Oemar Said 14.III.74 Maj. Gen. Aang Kunaefi Kartawirja Head, Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal), Hankam D J Assistant for Communications and Electronics Maj. Gen. Drs. Suryadi 17.11.75 (new position) Head of G-6 (Communications and Electronics), Hankam ? J Assistant for Security and Social Order **This post seems to be somewhat autonomous and to rank higher than that of all other Assistants in Hankam.