Bibliography for Vision, Color, and Seeing

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Bibliography for Vision, Color, and Seeing Bibliography for Vision, Color, and Seeing Abney, William (1910) On the changes in hue of spectrum colours by dilution with white light. Proceedings of the Royal Society London 83, 120-127. [color] [hue] [saturation] Abrams, Richard A.; and Landgraf, Jonathan Z. (1990) Differential use of distance and location information for spatial localization. Perception and Psychophysics, 47, 349-359. Addams, Robert (1834) An account of a peculiar optical phenomenon seen after having looked at a moving body. London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 5, 373-374. Adelson, Edward H. (1993) Perceptual organization and the judgment of brightness. Science, 262, 2042-2044. Adelson, Edward H.; and Bergen, James R. (1985) Spatiotemporal energy models perception of motion. Journal of the Optical Society of America A: Optics, Image Science, and Vision, 2, 284- 299. Aglioti, Salvatore J.; DeSouza, Joseph F. X.; and Goodale, Melvyn A. (1995) Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand. Current Biology, 5, 679-685. Ahissar, Merav; and Hochstein, Shaul (2004) The reverse hierarchy theory of visual perceptual learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 457-464. Ahmed, Bashir; Anderson, John C.; Douglas, Rodney J.; Martin, Kevan A. C.; and Nelson, J. Charmaine (1994) Polyneuronal innervation of spiny stellate neurons in cat visual cortex. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 341, 39-49. Akita, Munehira; Ejima, Yoshimichi; and Takahashi, Shigeko (1982) Differences of unique yellow loci between individuals. Color Research and Application, 7(2/2), 168-172. Alais, David; and Blake, Randolph (2005) Binocular Rivalry and Perceptual Ambiguity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Albers, Josef (1963) Interaction of Color. New Haven: Yale University Press. Aldrich, Michael S.; Alessi, Anthony G.; Beck, Roy W.; and Gilman, Sid (1987) Cortical blindness: Etiology, diagnosis and prognosis. Annals of Neurology, 21, 149-158. Allman, John Morgan; and Kaas, Jon H. (1971) A representation of the visual field in the caudal third of the middle temporal gyrus of the owl monkey (Actus trivirgatus). Brain Research, 31, 85- 105. Allman, John Morgan; Miezin, Francis M.; and McGuinness, EveLynn (1985) Stimulus-specific responses from beyond the classical receptive field: Neurophysiological mechanisms for local- global comparisons in visual neurons. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 8, 407-430. Alpern, Mathew; Kitahara, Kenji; and Krantz, David H. (1983) Classical tritanopia. Journal of Physiology, 335, 655-681. Amedi, Amir; Merabet, Lotfi B.; Bermpohl, Felix; and Pascual-Leone, Alvaro (2005) The occipital cortex in the blind: Lessons about plasticity and vision. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(6), 306-311. American Society for Testing and Materials (1968) Standard method of specifying color by the Munsell system. Designation D 1535-68. Philadelphia: American Society for Testing and Materials. Andersen, Richard A. (1997) Neural mechanisms of visual motion perception in primates. Neuron, 18, 865-872. Anderson, Barton L.; and Winawer, Jonathan (2005) Image segmentation and lightness perception. Nature, 434, 79-83. Anderson, Jeffrey S.; Lampl, Ilan; Gillespie, Deda C.; and Ferster, David (2000) Contribution of noise to contrast invariance of orientation tuning in cat visual cortex. Science, 290, 1968-1972. Anderson, Robert M. Jr. (1974) The illusions of experience. In: Robert S. Cohen and Alex C. Makalos (ed.), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 1974, 549-561. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Andrews, Timothy J.; and Purves, Dale (1997) Similarities in normal and binocularly rivalrous viewing. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 94, 9905-9908. Andrews, Timothy J.; Halpern, Scott D.; and Purves, Dale (1997) Correlated size variations in human visual cortex, lateral geniculate nucleus and optic tract. Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 2859- 2868. Armstrong, David M. (1961) Perception and the Physical World. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Armstrong, David M. (1969) Colour-realism and the argument from microscopes. In: Robert Brown and C. D. Rollins (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy in Australia, 119-131. London: Allen and Unwin. Armstrong, David M. (1978) Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, David M. (1979) Perception, sense data and causality. In: Graham F. MacDonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with His Replies, 84-98. London: Macmillan. Arnheim, Rudolf (1974) Art and Visual Perception. Berkeley: University of California Press. Arnold, Derek H.; and Clifford, Colin W. G. (2002) Determinants of asynchronous processing in vision. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 269, 579-583. Arnold, Derek H.; Clifford, Colin W. G.; and Wenderoth, Peter (2001) Asynchronous processing in vision: Color leads motion. Current Biology, 11, 596-600. Asenjo, Ana B.; Rim, Jeanne; and Oprian, Daniel D. (1994) Molecular determinants of human red/green color discrimination. Neuron, 12, 1131-1138. Astafiev, Serguei V.; Shulman, Gordon L.; Stanley, Christine M.; Snyder, Abraham Z.; Van Essen, David C.; and Corbetta, Maurizio (2003) Functional organization of human intraparietal and frontal cortex for attending, looking, and pointing. Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 4689-4699. Austin, John Langshaw (1980) Wittgenstein's solution to the color exclusion problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41, 142-149. Autrum, Hansjochem (ed.) (1979) Handbook of Sensory Physiology, vol. 7(6A): Comparative Physiology and Evolution of Vision in Invertebrates. Berlin: Springer. Averill, Edward W. (1982) Color and the anthropocentric problem. Journal of Philosophy, 82(6), 281-303. Averill, Edward W. (1992) The relational nature of color. Philosophical Review, 101(2), 351-588. Azzopardi, Paul; and Cowey, Alan (1997) Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 94(25), 14190-14194. Azzopardi, Paul; and Cowey, Alan (1998) Blindsight and visual awareness. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 292-311. Azzopardi, Paul; and Cowey, Alan (2001) Motion discrimination in cortically blind patients. Brain, 124, 30-46. Bach-y-Rita, Paul (1972) Brain Mechanisms in Sensory Substitution. New York/London: Academic Press. Backus, Benjamin T. (2000) Stereoscopic vision: What's the first step? Current Biology, 10(19), 701-703. Backus, Benjamin T.; Fleet, David T.; Parker, Andrew J.; and Heeger, David J. (2001) Human cortical activity correlates with stereoscopic depth perception. Journal of Neurophysiology, 86, 2054-2068. Baddeley, Alan D. (1993) Verbal and visual subsystems of working memory. Current Biology, 3, 563-565. Bahill, A. Terry; and Stark, Lawrence W. (1979) The trajectories of saccadic eye movements. Scientific American, 240, 108-117. Bair, Wyeth (1999) Spike timing in the mammalian visual system. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 9, 447-453. Baird, Abigail A.; Kagan, Jerome; Gaudette, Thomas; Walz, Kathryn A.; Hershlag, Natalie; and Baos, David A. (2002) Frontal lobe activation during object permanence: Data from near-infrared spectroscopy. Neuroimage, 16, 1120-1126. Baizer, Joan S.; Ungerleider, Leslie G.; and Desimone, Robert (1991) Organization of visual inputs to the inferior temporal and posterior parietal cortex in macaques. Journal of Neuroscience, 11, 168-190. Bálint, Rudolf (1909) Seelenlämung des "Schauens," optische Ataxie, räumliche Störung der Aufmerksamkeit or Sense of the visible, optical ataxia, and loss of feeling of space and concentration. Monatschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie, 25, 51-81. Banister, Harry; and Zangwill, Oliver Louis (1941) Experimentally induced visual paramnesias. British Journal of Psychology, 32, 30-51. Bar, Moshe (2000) Conscious and non-conscious processing of visual identity. In: Yves Rossetti and Antti Revonsuo (ed.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing, 153-174. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Bar, Moshe; and Biederman, Irving (1998) Subliminal visual priming. Psychological Science, 9, 464-469. Bar, Moshe; and Biederman, Irving (1999) Localizing the cortical region mediating visual awareness of object identity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 96, 1790- 1793. Bar, Moshe; Kassam, Karim S.; Ghuman, Avniel Singh; Boshyan, Jasmine; Schmid, Annette M.; Dale, Anders M.; Hamalainen, Matti S.; Marinkovic, Ksenija; Schacter, Daniel L.; Rosen, Bruce R.; and Halgren, Eric (2006) Top-down facilitation of visual recognition. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 103, 449-454. Barbur, John L.; and Thomson, W. David (1987) Pupil response as an objective measure of visual acuity. Ophthalmic and Physiological Optics, 7, 425-429. Barbur, John L.; Harlow, J. Alister; and Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1994) Spatial and temporal response properties of residual vision in a case of hemianopia. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 343, 157-166. Barbur, John L.; Harlow, J. Alister; Sahraie, Arash; Stoerig, Petra; and Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1994) Responses to chromatic stimuli in the absence of V1: Pupillometric and psychophysical studies. In: Vision Science and its Applications. Optical Society of America Technical Digest, 2, 312-315. Barbur, John L.; Sahraie, Arash; Simmons, Andrew; Weiskrantz, Lawrence; and Williams, Steven C. R. (1998) Residual processing of chromatic signals in
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