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IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 31 August - 15 September 2017

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IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 31 August - 15 September 2017 IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 31 August - 15 September 2017 Coverage map OVERALL FINDINGS: 31 August -15 September1 • 302 out of 1,183 ISMI-covered communities in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs and Idleb governorates experienced inward or outward SYRIA movement of IDPs: • 23,192 IDP arrivals !( !(!(!(!( • 14,105 IDP departures !(!(!(!(!(!(!( !(!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(!(!( !( !( !(!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(!( !(!(!( !( !(!( !( !( !( !(!( !(!(!(!( !( !( !( !(!( !(!(!(!(!( • The evolving situation in eastern Hama governorate !( !( !( !(!( !(!( !( !( Al-Hasakeh !(!( !( !(!( !( !(!(!(!( !( led to the displacement of 3,189 IDPs from Rahjan !(!( !(!(!(!( !(!(!(!(!( !(!(!(!(!( !(!( !(!(!(!( !(!(!( !( Aleppo !(!(!( !( !( !(!( !(!(!(!(!( !(!( !( !(!( !( (2,372) and Oqeirbat (817) communities to Idleb !(!( !(!(!(!( !(!( !( !(!(!( !( !( !(!(!( !(!( !( !(!( !( !( !(!( !( !( !( !( !(!(!( !( !(!( !(!(!( !( !(!( governorate. !( !( !( !(!( !( !( !(!( Ar-Raqqa !( !( !(!( !( Idl!(eb !( !(!( !(!( !(!( !( !( !( !( !(!( !( !( !( !( !(!(!( !(!(!( !( !( !(!(!(!(!(!(!(!( • Aleppo governorate saw the second largest number !( !(!( !( !(!( !( !(!( !( !( !( !( !(!( !( !( !( !(!(!( !( !( !( !( !(!( !( !( !( of arrivals (6,283), with more than half arriving to Al !( !(!( Ham!(a Deir-ez!(-Z!(or !( !( Bab, Menbij and Jarablus sub-districts. !( !( !(!( !(!( !( !( !( !( !( !(!( !(!( Homs !( • A total of 2,291 IDPs arrived to Ein Issa community, !(!( !( most commonly originating from Ar-Raqqa sub- !( district. (! IDP Arrivals (! IDP Departures (! Both ISMI coverage Table 1: Recorded IDP arrivals to ISMI-covered communities, by governorate, 31 August - 15 September 2017 IDP ARRIVALS 16-30 August Reported Change Reported Communities with largest IDP arrivals Most common origins2 of IDP arrivals from last arrivals arrivals (# IDPs) (# IDPs) two (# IDPs) weeks (# IDPs) Maaret Elekhwan Atma Camp Rahjan Daret Azza Idleb 10,023 5,175 (1,120) (798) (2,372) (2,098) Al Bab Rasm Elakhdar Ein Issa Abu Kamal Aleppo 6,283 9,934 (866) (510) (946) (912) Ein Issa Karama Ar-Raqqa Sabka Ar-Raqqa 4,981 8,703 (2,291) (780) (1,874) (408) Janat Elsawarneh Bayud Oqeirbat Jeb Abyad - Byud Hama 1,003 1,090 (119) (100) (320) (218) GOVERNORATE Kishkiyeh Gharanij Muhasan Al Mayadin Deir-ez-Zor 882 559 (185) (162) (143) (138) Wazeiyeh Qneitrat Homs 20 NA NA 7 (20) (20) Table 2: Recorded IDP departures from ISMI-covered communities, by governorate, 31 August - 15 September 2017 IDP DEPARTURES 16-30 August Reported Change Reported Communities with largest IDP Most common destinations3 of IDP from last departures departures departures (# IDPs) departures (# IDPs) two (# IDPs) weeks (# IDPs) Dana Marata Aleppo Madiq Castle Idleb 4,167 5,396 (912) (624) (360) (339) Menbij Maskana - Onaiza Al-Thawrah Aleppo 4,090 Shamarin 6,439 (624) (360) (396) (330) Ein Issa Ar-Raqqa Ein Issa Menbij Ar-Raqqa 3,572 5,806 (1,083) (600) (514) (342) Kafr Nabutha Dakileh Atma Qah Hama 1,371 269 (186) (160) (201) (199) GOVERNORATE Shmeitiyeh Sbeikhan and Mabruka Sarmada Deir-ez-Zor 702 257 (156) Dahleh (each 78) (120) (90) Ar-Rastan Tal Dahab and Hama Tir Maallah Homs 203 181 (35) Taldu (each 30) (99) (35) 1 Due to the Eid holiday, the data collection cycle for this factsheet includes the 31 August. 2 Location of origin refers to the most recent location from which IDPs have departed. 3 The ISMI bi-weekly displacement summary tracks only displacements which occur inside Syria. 1 IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 31 August - 15 September 2017 IDLEB GOVERNORATE A total of 10,023 IDPs were recorded arriving to ISMI-covered communities in Recorded IDP arrivals Idleb governorate between 31 August and 15 September. Meanwhile, 4,167 IDPs • 10,023 IDPs left communities in Idleb governorate, the majority of whom intended to travel % of arrivals from other governorates to other governorates. • 70% Most common shelter of newly arrived Figure 1: Idleb sub-districts receiving the largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) IDPs 2,566 • Rented/owned housing (2,595 IDPs) 1,491 1,295 1,195 • Collective centres (2,143 IDPs) 690 540 321 252 206 189 Recorded IDP departures Dana Tamanaah Maaret Ma'arrat Ariha Heish Sanjar Ehsem Armanaz Abul • 4,167 IDPs Tamsrin An Nu'man Thohur % of departures to other governorates Map 2: Major displacement to and across Idleb governorate • 63% !( !( Daret Azza Most common reasons for IDPs leaving " Number of IDP arrivals !( !( ( 31/08/17 - 15/09/17 ) Idleb communities !( !( (! 5 - 100 (! 251 - 600 ² !(!( !( !( !( !( !( !( (! (! • Reduced conflict in area of origin !( !(!( !( 101 - 250 601 - 1,120 !( !( !( Maaret Major displacements (>450 IDPs) • Family reunification elsewhere !(!( !( !(" Elekhwan !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(!( A L E P P O Figure 2: Five most common sub-districts of origin !( !( !( !(!( !( !( Ariha !( of arrivals (# IDPs) !( !( !(" !( !( !( As-Saan 2,407 !( !( "Ballisa !( I D L E B !( !( !( !( Daret Azza 2,098 !( !( !( !( !( Oqeirbat 1,337 !( !( Halbeh !( Abul Thohur 1,120 L A T T A K I A !("!( !( !( !( !( !(!( !( !( !(" !( !( !( Abu Habbeh !( !( Dana 413 !( !( !( "Rahjan Figure 3: Five ISMI-covered communities receiving largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) Maaret Elekhwan 1,120 Atma Camp 798 H A M A Halbeh 700 T A R T O U S Kms Oqeirbat Ariha 660 0 25 50 " Dana 552 AR-RAQQA GOVERNORATE Between 31 August and 15 September, 4,981 IDPs arrived to ISMI-covered Recorded IDP arrivals communities in Ar-Raqqa governorate, most commonly to Ein Issa (2,291) • 4,981 IDPs community (Figure 6). Meanwhile, 3,572 IDPs were recorded departing % of arrivals from other governorates ISMI-covered communities in Ar-Raqqa governorate. • 18% Figure 4: Ar-Raqqa sub-districts receiving IDP arrivals (# IDPs) Most common shelter of newly arrived IDPs 2,291 • Camps (2,891 IDPs) 1,035 1,005 550 • Hosted (1,330) 70 30 Recorded IDP departures Ein Issa Ar-Raqqa Karama Sabka Suluk Tell • 3,572 IDPs Abiad Figure 5: Five most common sub-districts of origin Figure 6: Five ISMI-covered communities receiving % of departures to other governorates of arrivals (# IDPs) largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) • 19% Ar-Raqqa 1,874 Ein Issa 2,291 Most common reason for IDPs leaving Sabka 483 Karama 780 Ar-Raqqa communities Maadan 393 Akeirshi 350 • Improved safety and security in area Ashara 342 Katuniyeh 300 of origin Kisreh 285 Hamrat Balasim 225 2 IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 31 August - 15 September 2017 Recorded IDP arrivals ALEPPO GOVERNORATE • 6,283 IDPs ISMI-covered communities in Aleppo governorate witnessed the arrival % of arrivals from other governorates of 6,283 IDPs between 31 August and 15 September, with two thirds travelling from • 65% other governorates. Meanwhile, 4,090 IDPs left ISMI-covered communities in Most common shelter of newly arrived Aleppo. IDPs Figure 7: Aleppo sub-districts receiving the largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) • Rented/owned housing (2,310 IDPs) 1,636 1,097 1,025 • Individual tents (1,201 IDPs) 617 593 421 399 184 Recorded IDP departures 115 82 Al Bab Menbij Jarablus A'zaz Ghandorah Zarbah Sharan Tall Ed- Ma'btali Jandairis • 4,090 IDPs daman % of departures to other governorates Map 3: Major displacement to Aleppo governorate • 10% Number of IDP arrivals Most common reasons for IDPs leaving ( 31/08/17 - 15/09/17 ) Aleppo communities ² (! 11 - 100 (! 251 - 500 (! (! !( 101 - 250 501 - 866 • Reduced conflict in area of origin !(!(!( !( !(!(!( !( !( Major displacements (>450 IDPs) !( !(!( !( !( • Improved safety and security in area !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( of origin !( !( !( !(" Rasm Elakhdar !( !( !( !(!( !(!( Ein Issa !( !( !(" !( " A L - H A S A K E H Al Bab Figure 8: Five most common sub-districts of origin of arrivals (# IDPs) !(!( !(!(!(!( A L E P P O A R - R A Q Q A Ein Issa 946 !(!(!( !( !( Abu Kamal 912 !( !( !( !( Oqeirbat 376 I D L E B Ar-Raqqa 301 Al Mayadin 274 Figure 9: Five ISMI-covered communities H A M A D E I R - E Z - Z O R receiving largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) Al Bab 866 Rasm Elakhdar 510 H O M S Qabasin 456 Jarablus 382 " Kms Abu Kamal Qatmet Efrin 382 0 25 50 DEIR-EZ-ZOR GOVERNORATE A total of 882 IDPs were recorded arriving to ISMI-covered communities in Recorded IDP arrivals Deir-ez-Zor governorate between 31 August and 15 September, all travelling • 882 IDPs from other areas within Deir-ez-Zor (Figure 11). During the same period, a total of % of arrivals from other governorates 702 IDPs left communities in Deir-ez-Zor, predominantly to other governorates. • 0% Figure 10: Deir-ez-Zor sub-districts receiving IDP arrivals (# IDPs) Most common shelter of newly arrived IDPs 557 • Hosted (692 IDPs) • Rented/owned housing (140 IDPs) 90 75 60 50 50 Recorded IDP departures Hajin Al Mayadin Jalaa Basira Abu Sur Kamal • 702 IDPs % of departures to other governorates Figure 11: Five most common sub-districts of origin of Figure 12: Five ISMI-covered communities • 82% arrivals (# IDPs) receiving largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) Most common reasons for IDPs leaving Muhasan 240 Kishkiyeh 185 Deir-ez-Zor communities Tabni 203 Gharanij 162 • Safety and security situation in the Kisreh 150 Abu Hamam 120 community compared to elsewhere Al Mayadin 138 Al Mayadin 90 • Escalation of conflict Sur 35 Hajin 90 3 IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 31 August - 15 September 2017 HAMA GOVERNORATE A total of 1,003 IDPs arrived to ISMI-covered communities in Hama between Recorded IDP arrivals 31 August and 15 September. Meanwhile, a total of 1,371 IDP departures from • 1,003 IDPs ISMI-covered areas
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