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A Thesis Subrnitted to the Facuity of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial Fulfiiment of the Requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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A Thesis Subrnitted to the Facuity of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial Fulfiiment of the Requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The gestalt line by Geert-Jan A. Boudewijnse Department of Psychology McGill University, Montreal A Thesis subrnitted to the Facuity of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfiiment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Al1 rights reserved Geert-Jan Adriaan Boudewijnse, 1996 National Library Bibliothèque nationale I*(of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. tue Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 OttawaON KIA ON4 canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de rnicrofiche/~,de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be prhted or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent êeimprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. CONTENTS RES UME ACKNOWLEDGMENTS TRANSLATOR'S NOTE INTRODUCTION The lineage General Framework Previous work on the history of gestalt theory Overview FRANZ BRENTANO Aristotelean roots Unity of consciousness Intentionality Imer perception CHRISTIAN VON EMRENFELS The article Gestalt quality Ehrenfels' contribution Gestalt qualities as building blocks -4 doubtfid expianation What does the fùture have in store? EDGAR RüBN The experiments The explanation Rubin and the school of Brentano Contour versus gestalt quality CARL STUMPF Psychological origin of space perception Substance Learning Tone psychology Stumpf s scientific method Tone füsion Cornplex Rubin's critic Speech sound Stumpfs dualism versus his students' monism Stumpf and his students Theory of Knowledge BERLirY GESTALT SCHOOL THE GRAZ SCHOOL Meinong Production theory Benussi Witasek KofRa's criticisrn CONCLUSION Brentano and the gestalt notion Some other observations Divergent opinions Tasks for the tùture ABSTRACT The thesis specifies how Franz Brentano inspired some of his students and how those midents, in their tum, infiuenced the next generation of psychologists. Mer outlining the essentials of Anstotie's psychology, the thesis explains some generai positions that Brentano borrowed hmAristotle. It goes on to relate Brentano's concepts of 'presentation,' 'unity of consciousness,' and 'dserence berneen the mental and physicaI,' as well as his cal1 for a 'science of the minci' to ideas of Christian von Ehrenfels, Car1 Stumpf and Alexius Meinong. Ehrenfels thought that a mental element, which he named gestalt quality, explains why a string of presentations has a certain form. The thesis then iooks at a book of Edgar Rubin, even though Rubin was not a student of Brentano. His experiments that demonstrated the figure-ground phenornenon, however, were weil known to the Berlin gestalt schwl. My analysis of Ehredels also sheds light on Rubin's theory, a theory that the Berlin gestalt school seemed to have overlooked, perhaps because Rubin's findings fit so we1I into their own notions. Stumpf developed his theory of how presentations fom a unity pady in rejection of Aristotle's notion of substance. His theory grounds his criticism of associationisrn. Stumpf s students, however, would not accept his dualistic view, but they would benefit from the experimental methods that he developed and taught them. Stumpf adapted his theo~yin response to his students' work, and that version formed the basis of his objections against their explanations. Meinong's theory of how presentations are united was inspired by the Scholastics, 1 and his midents would render it into a psychological format. It is as a review of that latter work that the Berlin gestalt school presented its gestalt notion for the fira tirne in mature forrn. The conclusion very briefly reiterates Brentano's influence. it also contains Mme general observations regarding the diversity among the gesîalt notions, the wide scope of the gestalt authors, and their zeal for the pursuit of pure scientific knowledge. Cette thèse explique comment Franz Brentano a inspiré plusieurs de ces étudiants et comment ces étudiants, a leur tour, ont influencé la génération future de psychologues. Après avoir fait resso~irl'essentiel de la psychologie d7Aristotle7cette thèse explique certaines positions que Brentano a emprunté à Aristotle. EUe relate les concepts de "présentation", "unité de conscience" et "'différence entre le physique et le mentai" de Brentano ainsi que son penchant pour une "science de l'esprit" avec des idées de Christian von Ehrenfels, Car1 Smmpf et Aiexius Meinong. Ehrenfels pensait qu'un élément mental, qu'il a nommé qualité gestalt, explique pourquoi une séquence de présentations a une certaine forme. La thèse se tourne ensuite vers un livre de Edgar Rubin, même si Rubin n'était pas un étudiant de Brentano. Ces expériences qui démontraient le phénomène %g~re-ground"~néanmoins, étaient bien connues de l'école Gestalt de Berlin. Mon analyse de Ehrenfels lève le jour sur la théorie de Rubin, une théorie que l'école getalt de Berlin semble avoir négligé, peut-ètre parce que les résultats de Rubin correspondent si bien à leur propre notions. Stumpf a développé, partieHement en rejetant la notion de substance d7Ariaotle,sa théorie à savoir comment des présemations forment une unité . Sa théorie fonde sa critique d'aSSOciati0nniSme. Les étudiants de Shimpf cependant, n'accepteront pas sa vision double mais bénificieront des méthodes expérimentales qu'il a développées et qu'il leur a enseignées. Stumpf a adapté sa théorie en parailde au travail de ses étudiants et cette version a formé la base de son objection pour leurs explications. La théorie de Meinong qui suggère que les présentations sont unies a été inspirée par les scholastiques, et ses étudiants avaient a le rendre dans un format psychologique. C'est lors d'une révision de travaux antérieurs que l'école gestalt de Berlin a présente sa notion gestalt pour la première fois dans un format complet. La conclusion réitère brièvement la notion de Brentano. Elle contient aussi des observations générales par rappon a la diversité parmi les notions gestalt, la grande possibilité des auteurs gestalt et leur grande ardeur vers la poursuite du savoir scientifique pur. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A thesis is not the result of a solitary effon, although reading, studying and writing mean one spends a lot of tirne alone. Sa most theses are the result of CO-operationand this one is no exception. A few years ago 1 approached professor John Macnarnara. Since my student yean at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands, where 1 obtained the quivalent of my bachelor's and master's degrees, 1 have wanted to write a thesis related to the history of pqchoiogy. In that nrst conversation with we didFranz Brentano, whom we both admired. When we realized the iink between Brentano and the later gestalt theorists, my research project took form. John was full of humour, had an enomous knowledge, was inspiring, and above all, an excellent teacher. in early 1995. he was diagnosed with a brain tumour. He undenvent therapy but to no avail. The cancer had, of course, a crippling effect on him. In the spring of 1995 he went to his office and asked me to corne by. He clearly summoned his concentration and we talked for an hour about my work. We had an idea what the thesis would look like, but there was not much on paper. My thesis has not deviated fiom the plan laid out at that moment. I was able to say goodbye to John a few days before his death and thank hirn for being such a wonderful person, but 1 still regret that he could not see the fhai produa. 1 hope it would not have disappointed hirn. 1 notice in rny conclusion that the gestalt theorists were broadly educated, pursued wide interests and were not &aid to enter new fields. That is dso true for professor James Ramsay who volunteered to take over John's task as my adviser. He staned his studies as an undergraduate in English teaching, but has made a name for himself as a statiaician. 1, however. know him as a scholar in the history of ideas who likes to place the great minds in their contemporary contexts. Besides, his enthusiasm and encouragement significantly sped up my writing. I have the fondest mernories of our weekly coffee chats. lim's approach can best be described as 'management by objectives' and he is amatingly good at it. He was able to make something as simple and everyday as a coffee break an event to work towards. His comments and remarks were always so fodated that they charged my batteries. 1 also want to thank here Albert Bregman and Don Donderi. They have read dr&s of the thesis and 1 learned much nom their knowledge of Aristotle, perception, and modem psychological research. Not ody the McGill Department of Psychology was supportive. 1 also found wiUùig help at the Department of Gennan Studies. 1 am very grateful to professor Iosef Schmidt, whose conscientiously revised my rendering into English of quotes from Stumpf and Rubin. He also brought to my attention a pmof Christian Morgenstern, which 1 have ùicluded in the thesis. 1 benefiaed much fiom my discussions with two fellow students at McGill, Dean Sharpe and David Nicolas. David carefully read my manuscript and offered many helpful questions and comments. I also appreciate Perry Fuchs for reading a draft and helping me with his suggestions. 1 like to remind my Canadian fiiends how much English is indebted to htch (incidentdy, my native language).
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