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A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S
The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections∗ Michael A. Specter James Koppel Daniel Weitzner MIT† MIT‡ MIT§ Abstract The company has recently closed a $7-million series A [22], and is on track to be used in the 2020 Primaries. In the 2018 midterm elections, West Virginia became the In this paper, we present the first public security review of first state in the U.S. to allow select voters to cast their bal- Voatz. We find that Voatz is vulnerable to a number of attacks lot on a mobile phone via a proprietary app called “Voatz.” that could violate election integrity (summary in Table1). For Although there is no public formal description of Voatz’s se- example, we find that an attacker with root access to a voter’s curity model, the company claims that election security and device can easily evade the system’s defenses (§5.1.1), learn integrity are maintained through the use of a permissioned the user’s choices (even after the event is over), and alter the blockchain, biometrics, a mixnet, and hardware-backed key user’s vote (§5.1). We further find that their network protocol storage modules on the user’s device. In this work, we present can leak details of the user’s vote (§5.3), and, surprisingly, that the first public security analysis of Voatz, based on a reverse that the system’s use of the blockchain is unlikely to protect engineering of their Android application and the minimal against server-side attacks (§5.2). -
VP MIKE PENCE at the GOP Convention Site in Charlotte, NC
Aug 24, 2020 View in browser B Y JAKE SHERMAN , ANNA PALMER , GARRETT ROSS A N D E L I O K U N Presented by THE MESSAGE? … VP MIKE PENCE at the GOP convention site in Charlotte, N.C.: “We’re going to make America great again -- again.” Republicans officially nominated President DONALD TRUMP and PENCE for a second term today. THE PRESIDENT visited the site early this afternoon. “Think about your life just prior to the plague," he told the crowd. This week’s schedule and speakers THIS MORNING WAS YET ANOTHER PIECE OF EVIDENCE for the legion of political observers who believe some high-profile congressional hearings turn out to be a waste of time. MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE spent the morning lecturing Postmaster General LOUIS DEJOY about the USPS -- oftentimes without asking a single question. When they asked questions, they sometimes sounded like this: Do you believe you need to follow the law? Is your backup plan to be pardoned like Roger Stone, Rep. JIM COOPER (D-Tenn.) asked? Why are the Democrats out to get you, Rep. JIM JORDAN (R-Ohio) queried? Why doesn’t this hearing about the USPS include debate about the PPP -- it’s a “waste of time,” Rep. CHIP ROY (R-Texas) said. In addition, the hearing was riddled with technical difficulties. REP. STEPHEN LYNCH (D-Mass.) asked if DEJOY would replace removed sorting machines -- DEJOY said no, but they couldn’t get around to figuring out why, because LYNCH had used up all of his time. MEANWHILE, millions of Americans are wondering if their prescription drugs are going to get delivered, if their mail-in votes will actually be counted and what elected officials are actually doing to make their lives better in the middle of a pandemic and economic recession. -
Self-Censorship and the First Amendment Robert A
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy Volume 25 Article 2 Issue 1 Symposium on Censorship & the Media 1-1-2012 Self-Censorship and the First Amendment Robert A. Sedler Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp Recommended Citation Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 13 (2012). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol25/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES SELF-CENSORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ROBERT A. SEDLER* I. INTRODUCTION Self-censorship refers to the decision by an individual or group to refrain from speaking and to the decision by a media organization to refrain from publishing information. Whenever an individual or group or the media engages in self-censorship, the values of the First Amendment are compromised, because the public is denied information or ideas.' It should not be sur- prising, therefore, that the principles, doctrines, and precedents of what I refer to as "the law of the First Amendment"' are designed to prevent self-censorship premised on fear of govern- mental sanctions against expression. This fear-induced self-cen- sorship will here be called "self-censorship bad." At the same time, the First Amendment also values and pro- tects a right to silence. -
Bloggers and Netizens Behind Bars: Restrictions on Internet Freedom In
VIETNAM COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUÊ ME: ACTION FOR DEMOCRACY IN VIETNAM Ủy ban Bảo vệ Quyền làm Người Việt Nam BLOGGERS AND NETIZENS BEHIND BARS Restrictions on Internet Freedom in Vietnam Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, January 2013 / n°603a - AFP PHOTO IAN TIMBERLAKE Cover Photo : A policeman, flanked by local militia members, tries to stop a foreign journalist from taking photos outside the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court during the trial of a blogger in August 2011 (AFP, Photo Ian Timberlake). 2 / Titre du rapport – FIDH Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 -
The Stored Communications Act, Gag Orders, and the First Amendment
10 BURKE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2017 1:29 PM WHEN SILENCE IS NOT GOLDEN: THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, GAG ORDERS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT Alexandra Burke* I. INTRODUCTION Cloud computing has completely changed the landscape of information storage. Sensitive information that was once stored in file cabinets and eventually on computers is now stored remotely using web-based cloud computing services.1 The cloud’s prevalence in today’s world is undeniable, as recent studies show that nearly forty percent of all Americans2 and an estimated ninety percent of all businesses use the cloud in some capacity.3 Despite this fact, Congress has done little in recent years to protect users and providers of cloud computing services.4 What Congress has done dates back to its enactment of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in 1986.5 Passed decades before the existence *J.D. Candidate, 2018, Baylor University School of Law; B.B.A. Accounting, 2015, Texas A&M University. I would like to extend my gratitude to each of the mentors, professors, and legal professionals who have influenced my understanding of and appreciation for the law. Specifically, I would like to thank Professor Brian Serr for his guidance in writing this article. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends, who have always shown me unwavering support. 1 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (defining cloud computing as “the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself”); see also Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. -
Case 4:15-Cv-00358-O Document 41 Filed 06/17/21 Page 1 of 28 Pageid 502
Case 4:15-cv-00358-O Document 41 Filed 06/17/21 Page 1 of 28 PageID 502 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:15-cv-358-O Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER A. NOVINGER, et al., Defendants. June 17, 2021 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REOPEN AND FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO F. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and subsect. (4) and (5) Margaret A. Little N.D. Tex. Bar No. 303494CT Kara M. Rollins, pro hac vice forthcoming New Civil Liberties Alliance 1225 19th St. NW, Suite 450 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202-869-5210 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Attorneys for Movants Christopher A. Novinger and ICAN Investment Group, LLC Case 4:15-cv-00358-O Document 41 Filed 06/17/21 Page 2 of 28 PageID 503 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................... 1 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3 I. STANDARDS RELATING TO RULE 60(b)(4) MOTIONS ........................................................... 3 II. THE GAG ORDER VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT ......................................................... -
Gagged, Sealed & Delivered
Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket Stephen Wm. Smith* What is the most secret court docket in America? Many would point to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, set up during the Carter Administration to oversee requests for surveillance warrants against suspected foreign intelligence agents.1 Due to the sensitive nature of its bus- iness, FISA proceedings and records are closed to public view. Since 1979, that court has processed over 28,000 warrant applications and renewals,2 a rate of nearly one thousand secret cases a year. But the FISA court is not number one in the secrecy parade, not by a long shot. According to a recent study by the Federal Judicial Center, there is another federal docket that handles tens of thousands of secret cases every year.3 That docket is presided over by federal magistrate judges in United States district courts around the country. Most of its sealed cases are classi- fied as “warrant-type applications,” a category that includes not only routine search warrants but also various forms of electronic surveillance, such as the monitoring of electronic communications and data transmitted by the cell phones, personal computers, and other digital devices that now dominate our everyday lives. This type of electronic surveillance is regulated principally by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).4 Although the ECPA has often been amended, most changes have been technical tweaks to the existing framework.5 Some are now pushing for an update of the ECPA, which after all was enacted over two generations ago, long before Google or the smart phone was even conceived. -
Some Observations on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers
Denver Law Review Volume 59 Issue 4 Article 5 February 2021 Some Observations on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers Richard M. Schmidt Jr. Gregory M. Schmidt Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr Recommended Citation Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. & Gregory M. Schmidt, Some Observations on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, 59 Denv. L.J. 721 (1982). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SWINGING COURTHOUSE DOORS OF GANNE7T AND RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, JR.* GREGORY M. SCHMIDT** INTRODUCTION For nearly two hundred years, the closing of a courtroom in the United States to the press or public was an extremely rare event. In the last five years it has become commonplace. The closure motion is threatening to become a routinely employed weapon in every criminal defense attorney's arsenal and its use in civil proceedings is growing at an alarming rate. The Supreme Court has both promoted and responded to this develop- ment. It has now granted certiorari in three courtroom closure cases in the last four years. The first two decisions addressed the validity of closures designed to protect criminal defendants from the dissemination of prejudi- cial publicity. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,l the Court approved closure of a pretrial suppression hearing, holding that the sixth amendment right to a public trial is personal to the accused and does not provide the public or the press an independent right to attend such a proceeding. -
Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy Volume 47 Intellectual Property: From Biodiversity to Technical Standards 2015 Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters Brett Weinstein Washington University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy Part of the National Security Law Commons Recommended Citation Brett Weinstein, Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters, 47 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 217 (2015), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters Brett Weinstein INTRODUCTION In early June of 2013, governmental surveillance suddenly and dramatically entered the public consciousness, prompting a torrent of debate and backlash. The Guardian published a top secret court order requiring Verizon to hand over all telephone call records to the National Security Agency (NSA); the Washington Post disclosed a secret but widespread Internet surveillance program, and months of similar revelations followed, all stemming from leaks by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden.1 As a result, the public and the press began to question the tools that the government uses for surveillance, including National Security Letters (NSLs), and the relationship between the government and the technology and telecommunications companies that seemingly possess all personal and private information generated in the modern, digital world.2 J.D. -
Enhancing Cybersecurity for Industry 4.0 in Asia and the Pacific
Enhancing Cybersecurity for Industry 4.0 in Asia and the Pacific Asia-Pacific Information Superhighway (AP-IS) Working Paper Series P a g e | 2 The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) serves as the United Nations’ regional hub promoting cooperation among countries to achieve inclusive and sustainable development. The largest regional intergovernmental platform with 53 member States and 9 associate members, ESCAP has emerged as a strong regional think tank offering countries sound analytical products that shed insight into the evolving economic, social and environmental dynamics of the region. The Commission’s strategic focus is to deliver on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which it does by reinforcing and deepening regional cooperation and integration to advance connectivity, financial cooperation and market integration. ESCAP’s research and analysis coupled with its policy advisory services, capacity building and technical assistance to governments aim to support countries’ sustainable and inclusive development ambitions. The shaded areas of the map indicate ESCAP members and associate members. Disclaimer : The Asia-Pacific Information Superhighway (AP-IS) Working Papers provide policy-relevant analysis on regional trends and challenges in support of the development of the AP-IS and inclusive development. The findings should not be reported as representing the views of the United Nations. The views expressed herein are those of the authors. This working paper has been issued without formal editing, and the designations employed and material presented do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. -
Supreme Court of the United States
No. 19-783 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States NATHAN VAN BUREN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRcuIT BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE COMPUTER SECURITY RESEARCHERS, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, BUGCROWD, RAPID7, SCYTHE, AND TENABLE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER ANDREW CROCKER Counsel of Record NAOMI GILENS ELECTRONic FRONTIER FOUNDATION 815 Eddy Street San Francisco, California 94109 (415) 436-9333 [email protected] Counsel for Amici Curiae 296514 A (800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................i TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ..............iii INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ..................1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................4 ARGUMENT....................................5 I. The Work of the Computer Security Research Community Is Vital to the Public Interest...................................5 A. Computer Security Benefits from the Involvement of Independent Researchers ...........................5 B. Security Researchers Have Made Important Contributions to the Public Interest by Identifying Security Threats in Essential Infrastructure, Voting Systems, Medical Devices, Vehicle Software, and More ...................10 II. The Broad Interpretation of the CFAA Adopted by the Eleventh Circuit Chills Valuable Security Research. ................16 ii Table of Contents Page A. The Eleventh Circuit’s Interpretation of the CFAA Would Extend to Violations of Website Terms of Service and Other Written Restrictions on Computer Use. .................................16 B. Standard Computer Security Research Methods Can Violate Written Access Restrictions...........................18 C. The Broad Interpretation of the CFAA Discourages Researchers from Pursuing and Disclosing Security Flaws ...............................22 D. Voluntary Disclosure Guidelines and Industry-Sponsored Bug Bounty Programs A re Not Sufficient to Mitigate the Chill . -
Going from Bad to Worse: from Internet Voting to Blockchain Voting
Going from Bad to Worse: From Internet Voting to Blockchain Voting Sunoo Park Michael Specter Neha Narula Ronald L. Rivest MIT & Harvard∗ MITy MITz MIT§ November 6, 2020 (DRAFT) Abstract Voters are understandably concerned about election security. News reports of possible election in- terference by foreign powers, of unauthorized voting, of voter disenfranchisement, and of technological failures call into question the integrity of elections worldwide. This article examines the suggestions that “voting over the Internet” or “voting on the blockchain” would increase election security, and finds such claims to be wanting and misleading. While current election systems are far from perfect, Internet- and blockchain-based voting would greatly increase the risk of undetectable, nation-scale election failures. Online voting may seem appealing: voting from a computer or smartphone may seem convenient and accessible. However, studies have been inconclusive, showing that online voting may have little to no effect on turnout in practice, and it may even increase disenfranchisement. More importantly: given the current state of computer security, any turnout increase derived from with Internet- or blockchain-based voting would come at the cost of losing meaningful assurance that votes have been counted as they were cast, and not undetectably altered or discarded. This state of affairs will continue as long as standard tactics such as malware, zero days, and denial-of-service attacks continue to be effective. This article analyzes and systematizes prior research on the security risks of online and electronic voting, and show that not only do these risks persist in blockchain-based voting systems, but blockchains may introduce additional problems for voting systems.