Forming a Public Power Utility
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Economic Regulation of Utility Infrastructure
4 Economic Regulation of Utility Infrastructure Janice A. Beecher ublic infrastructure has characteristics of both public and private goods and earns a separate classification as a toll good. Utilities demonstrate a Pvariety of distinct and interrelated technical, economic, and institutional characteristics that relate to market structure and oversight. Except for the water sector, much of the infrastructure providing essential utility services in the United States is privately owned and operated. Private ownership of utility infrastructure necessitates economic regulation to address market failures and prevent abuse of monopoly power, particularly at the distribution level. The United States can uniquely boast more than 100 years of experience in regulation in the public in- terest through a social compact that balances and protects the interests of inves- tors and ratepayers both. Jurisdiction is shared between independent federal and state commissions that apply established principles through a quasi-judicial pro- cess. The commissions continue to rely primarily on the method known as rate base/rate-of-return regulation, by which regulators review the prudence of in- frastructure investment, along with prices, profits, and performance. Regulatory theory and practice have adapted to emerging technologies and evolving market conditions. States—and nation-states—have become the experimental laborato- ries for structuring, restructuring, and regulating infrastructure industries, and alternative methods have been tried, including price-cap and performance regu- lation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Aging infrastructure and sizable capital requirements, in the absence of effective competition, argue for a regula- tory role. All forms of regulation, and their implementation, can and should be Review comments from Tim Brennan, Carl Peterson, Ken Costello, David Wagman, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy are greatly appreciated. -
Title 61 Public Utility Regulation Chapter 1
TITLE 61 PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION CHAPTER 1 PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW -- APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS 61-101. Title and application. This act shall be known as "The Public Utilities Law" and shall apply to the public utilities and public services herein described and to the commission herein referred to. 61-102. Commission. The term "commission" when used in this act means the Idaho public utilities commission. 61-103. Commissioner. The term "commissioner" when used in this act means one of the members of the commission. 61-104. Corporation. The term "corporation" when used in this act includes a corporation, a company, an association and a joint stock association, but does not include a municipal corporation, or mutual nonprofit or cooperative gas, electrical, water or telephone corporation or any other public utility organized and operated for service at cost and not for profit, whether inside or outside the limits of incorporated cities, towns or villages. 61-105. Person. The term "person" when used in this act includes an individual, a firm and a copartnership. 61-106. Transportation of persons. The term "transportation of persons" when used in this act includes every service in connection with or incidental to the safety, comfort, or convenience of the person transported and the receipt, carriage and delivery of such person and his baggage. 61-107. Transportation of property. The term "transportation of property" when used in this act includes every service in connection with or incidental to the transportation of property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer, switching, carriage, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, dunnage, storage, and handling, and the transmission of credit by express corporations. -
Where and Why Public Ownership Has Failed [1912]
The Online Library of Liberty A Project Of Liberty Fund, Inc. Yves Guyot, Where and Why Public Ownership has Failed [1912] The Online Library Of Liberty This E-Book (PDF format) is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a private, non-profit, educational foundation established in 1960 to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. 2010 was the 50th anniversary year of the founding of Liberty Fund. It is part of the Online Library of Liberty web site http://oll.libertyfund.org, which was established in 2004 in order to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. To find out more about the author or title, to use the site's powerful search engine, to see other titles in other formats (HTML, facsimile PDF), or to make use of the hundreds of essays, educational aids, and study guides, please visit the OLL web site. This title is also part of the Portable Library of Liberty DVD which contains over 1,000 books and quotes about liberty and power, and is available free of charge upon request. The cuneiform inscription that appears in the logo and serves as a design element in all Liberty Fund books and web sites is the earliest-known written appearance of the word “freedom” (amagi), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 B.C. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash, in present day Iraq. To find out more about Liberty Fund, Inc., or the Online Library of Liberty Project, please contact the Director at [email protected]. -
Replacing Property Taxes on Utility Generation with Revenues from a Carbon-Based Tax: a Minnesota Tax Shift Opportunity I
Memo: To: Michael Noble, ME3 From: John Bailey, David Morris, ILSR (Tel: 612-379-3815) Date: 11/15/98 Re: Replacing Property Taxes on Utility Generation With Revenues from a Carbon-Based Tax: A Minnesota Tax Shift Opportunity I. Introduction Electric utilities in Minnesota pay four types of taxes: income tax, franchise fee (or gross receipts tax), sales tax, property tax.1 The total amount paid in each category is shown in Table 1. In 1995, the total came to $375 million. Table 1. Electric Utility Tax Paid in Minnesota in 1995 Property Tax MN Sales Tax MN Income Tax Franchise Fee Total NSP $152,078,365 $65,076,000 $31,709,000 $25,505,000 $274,368,365 Minnesota Power $34,706,493 $5,963,664 $3,843,817 $700,000 $45,213,974 Otter Tail $7,152,715 $4,197,450 $1,370,067 $233,643 $12,953,875 Interstate $3,670,381 $1,935,124 $573,770 $569,969 $6,749,244 Anoka Elec. Coop $3,179,055 $4,658,862 $0 $534,379 $8,372,296 Dakota Elec. Assoc. $4,742,500 $4,487,719 $0 $144,025 $9,374,244 Cooperative Power $7,095,000 $0 $0 $0 $7,095,000 United Power Assoc. $10,827,954 $0 $5,000 $0 $10,832,954 Total $223,452,463 $86,318,819 $37,501,654 $27,687,016 $374,959,952 Source: Minnesota Department of Public Service, 1996 Energy Policy and Conservation Report, December 1996 Recently, Minnesota has re-examined the utility tax structure in light of the restructuring of electricity occurring throughout the country. -
Nuclear Power Reactors in California
Nuclear Power Reactors in California As of mid-2012, California had one operating nuclear power plant, the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant near San Luis Obispo. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) owns the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, which consists of two units. Unit 1 is a 1,073 megawatt (MW) Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) which began commercial operation in May 1985, while Unit 2 is a 1,087 MW PWR, which began commercial operation in March 1986. Diablo Canyon's operation license expires in 2024 and 2025 respectively. California currently hosts three commercial nuclear power facilities in various stages of decommissioning.1 Under all NRC operating licenses, once a nuclear plant ceases reactor operations, it must be decommissioned. Decommissioning is defined by federal regulation (10 CFR 50.2) as the safe removal of a facility from service along with the reduction of residual radioactivity to a level that permits termination of the NRC operating license. In preparation for a plant’s eventual decommissioning, all nuclear plant owners must maintain trust funds while the plants are in operation to ensure sufficient amounts will be available to decommission their facilities and manage the spent nuclear fuel.2 Spent fuel can either be reprocessed to recover usable uranium and plutonium, or it can be managed as a waste for long-term ultimate disposal. Since fuel re-processing is not commercially available in the United States, spent fuel is typically being held in temporary storage at reactor sites until a permanent long-term waste disposal option becomes available.3 In 1976, the state of California placed a moratorium on the construction and licensing of new nuclear fission reactors until the federal government implements a solution to radioactive waste disposal. -
NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0
NIST Special Publication 1108 NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0 Office of the National Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability NIST Special Publication 1108 NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0 Office of the National Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability January 2010 U.S. Department of Commerce Gary Locke, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Patrick D. Gallagher, Director Table of Contents Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ 7 1 Purpose and Scope .................................................................................................................. 13 1.1 Overview and Background............................................................................................. 13 1.2 How This Report Was Produced.................................................................................... 16 1.3 Key Concepts ................................................................................................................. 18 1.3.1 Definitions............................................................................................................... 19 1.3.2 Applications and Requirements: Eight Priority Areas............................................ 20 1.4 Content Overview .......................................................................................................... 21 2 Smart Grid Vision.................................................................................................................. -
An Overview of Pucs for State Environment and Energy Officials – May 20, 2010 2 Adopted IRP Requirements
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency State Climate and Energy Technical Forum Background Document An Overview of PUC s for State Environment and Energy Officials May 20, 2010 Public utility commissions (PUCs) regulate electric, gas, telecommunications, water and waste water utilities. In most states a single agency will regulate these sectors; however, in some states these functions may be split between more than one agency. Commissioners are typically appointed by the governor and generally serve 4 to 6 year terms, although in approximately one quarter of the states commissioners are elected. As a general rule, utility commissions are charged with assuring that utilities provide reasonable, adequate and efficient service to customers at just and reasonable prices. Utility regulation takes many forms, including price regulation, resource planning and acquisition, reliability and quality of service regulation. PUCs typically regulate all investor-owned utilities (IOUs) in their state. Municipal and cooperative utilities are often exempted from PUC regulation or have limited regulation. Focusing on electric utility regulation, this document will explore the responsibilities of PUCs, their decision making processes, how their decisions can affect clean energy1 and air quality. Background Electric Utility Market Structure Throughout most of the 20th century, electric utilities were regulated monopolies, with utility companies owning the generation, transmission and distribution assets for their service territory (this model is referred to -
Toward a Sustainable Electric Utility Sector
The Distributed Utility Concept: Toward a Sustainable Electric Utility Sector Steven Letendre, John Byrne, and Young-Doo Wang, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware The U.S. electric utility sector is entering an uncertain period as pressure mounts to cut costs and minimize environmental impacts. Many analysts believe that exposing the industry to competition is the key to reducing costs. Most restructuring proposals acknowledge the need to maintain environmental quality and suggest mechanisms for assuring continued support for end-use efficiency and renewable energy in a deregulated electric utility industry. Two of the most prominent ideas are non-bypassable line charges and portfolio standards. This paper suggests another option based on the distributed utility (DU) concept in which net metering and a form of performance-based ratemaking allow distributed generation, storage, and DSM to play an important role in a new competitive electric utility sector. A DU option directly incorporates these resources into the electric system by explicitly acknowledging their value in deferring distribution equipment upgrades. INTRODUCTION electric utility industry. In our view, the DU option has been neglected in the current debate. The electric utility sector in the U.S. is on the verge of A DU strategy involves a fundamental shift in the way fundamental change as regulators, policymakers, and indus- electricity is delivered, with a move away from large-scale try officials seek a strategy for introducing competition into central generation to distributed small-scale generation and the industry. The move toward competition is driven by the storage, and targeted demand-side management. To date, belief that significant efficiency gains could be realized by the DU concept has mainly been analyzed in terms of its exposing the industry to market forces. -
What the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Regulates
What the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Regulates The PUC has jurisdiction over 11 electric distribution companies who serve the majority of the Commonwealth. Rural electric cooperatives and most utilities owned and operated by cities, boroughs or townships are not regulated by the Commission. For information on these, contact the electric co-op, Pennsylvania Rural Electric Association, or your municipality. The PUC has jurisdiction over 25 gas utilities. It does not have jurisdiction over bottled propane gas, and most utilities owned and operated by cities, boroughs, or townships. For information on these, contact your local municipality or the state Attorney General’s Office. The PUC has jurisdiction over intrastate, local, toll and access telephone services and providers. The Commission does not regulate broadband, wireless, or cable TV companies. For more information on these, contact your local municipality about cable TV problems or the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The PUC regulates motor carriers that transport property, passengers and household goods such as taxis, moving companies, limousines. It also conducts motor vehicle, railroad facility, and track inspections. The Commission also regulates Transportation Network Companies such as Uber and Lyft. Note: Taxis, limousines and Transportation Network Companies operating in Philadelphia are regulated by the Philadephia Parking Authority, not the PUC. The PUC’s Pipeline Safety Division conducts inspections on pipelines operated by public utilities that fall under PUC jurisdiction and ensures compliance with state and federal safety regulations. The PUC enforces federal and Commission pipeline safety regulations as they apply to public utilites providing natural gas distribution and intrastate transmission service, and public utilities providing intrastate transmission of hazardous liquids. -
North Carolina's Public Utility Infrastructure & Regulatory Climate
North Carolina’s Public Utility Infrastructure & Regulatory Climate Presented by NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION www.ncuc.net January 2020 NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION Dobbs Building, 430 North Salisbury Street 27603-5918 4325 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-4300 www.ncuc.net Phone: 919-733-4249 Fax: 919-733-7300 Commissioners Charlotte A. Mitchell, Chair ToNola D. Brown-Bland Kimberly W. Duffley Lyons Gray Jeffrey A. Hughes Daniel G. Clodfelter Floyd B. McKissick Jr. 22 Commissioner Brown-Bland Commissioner Gray Commissioner Clodfelter Chair Mitchell Commissioner Duffley Commissioner Hughes Commissioner McKissick 3 The Public Staff – North Carolina Utilities Commission • Established in the Commission is the Public Staff, an independent agency created in 1977 by legislation (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-15) • Represents the Using and Consuming Public of the State’s investor-owned public utilities and intervenes on their behalf in all Commission proceedings affecting rates or service Christopher J. Ayers, Executive Director Dobbs Building, 430 North Salisbury Street 27603-5918 4326 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-4300 ■ ■ ■ www.publicstaff.nc.gov Consumer Services Division (Consumer Complaints) Phone: 919-733-9277 Toll-Free: 1-866-380-9816 43 Regulation of Public Utilities Regulation of Public Utilities • Purpose: protect the public’s interest in receiving adequate service at reasonable rates • Traditional regulatory bargain: utilities exchange benefit of monopoly franchised service territory for obligation to provide adequate service at reasonable rates • Commission’s regulatory obligation: to be fair and reasonable to public utilities and their customers • Commission’s regulatory tools: ― certification of new facilities ― rate establishment or review ― service quality oversight • Recent trends: regulation of certain utility industries and services by the Commission has become more complex due to changes in State and Federal laws and rules, and industry trends. -
Disease and the Municipalization of Private Waterworks in Nineteenth Century England and Wales*
DISEASE AND THE MUNICIPALIZATION OF PRIVATE WATERWORKS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND AND WALES* Brian Beach Werner Troesken Nicola Tynan College of William & Mary University of Pittsburgh Dickinson College [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] This draft: August 2016 Nearly 40% of England’s privately built waterworks were municipalized in the late 19th century. We examine how this affected public health by pairing annual mortality data for over 600 registration districts, spanning 1869 to 1910, with detailed waterworks information. Identification is aided by idiosyncratic delays in the municipalization process. Municipalization lowered deaths from typhoid fever, a waterborne disease, by nearly 20% but deaths from non-waterborne causes were unaffected. One threat to identification, however, is the possibility of mean reversion as municipalization was motivated in part by steadily rising typhoid rates. We adopt multiple strategies to control for the possibility of mean reversion and other potential confounds. Results are robust to all of these strategies. Previous research exploring how ownership regimes affect public health yields conflicting results. The data and identification strategies we employ help reconcile these results and provide new insight into the forces that drove municipalization. JEL Codes: N33, N43, H44, I10 * For helpful suggestions, we thank seminar participants at Northwestern University and UCLA, as well as the Economic History Society, Economic and Business History, and Southern Economic Association’s annual meetings. Artemis Yang provided outstanding research assistance. 1 1. Introduction During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, nearly 40 percent of Britain’s more than 300 privately built waterworks became publicly owned. This transition also occurred in other parts of Western Europe and the United States such that by the mid twentieth century municipally-owned waterworks were the norm in much of the world (Thompson 1917; Grafton et al. -
Regularization of Business Investment in the Electric Utility Industry
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Regularization of Business Investment Volume Author/Editor: Universities-National Bureau Volume Publisher: Princeton University Press/NBER Volume ISBN: 0-87014-195-3 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/univ54-1 Publication Date: 1954 Chapter Title: Regularization of Business Investment in the Electric Utility Industry Chapter Author: Edward W. Morehouse Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3026 Chapter pages in book: (p. 213 - 282) REGULARIZATION OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY' EDWARD W. MOREHOUSE GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION Introduction THIS PAPER explores the possibilities of regularizing business invest- ment by the electric utility industry. The program for the conference adds, "as means of maintaining high productive employment in a private enterprise economy." This ultimate goal of "high productive employment" as an incen- tive for regularization of investment is of less importance in the electric utility industry than in other industries, as data submitted later tend to show. Electric utilities already have achieved a rela- tively high stability of employment of operating personnel, and the impact of investment on wages and employment in electric utility operations is relatively less significant to the total economy than it is in other industries. Any contribution that electric utilities might make by stabilizing their capital expenditures would be a contribu- tion to employment stability generally, and particularly to employ- ment in the building of plant, or the manufacture of plant and equipment items, needed by electric utilities. These indirect em- ployment effects would bulk larger than the direct effects on the number of employees used in utility operations.