N°27 June 2011 The European Union and the challenges of populism Yves Surel lectures in political science at the Université de Paris II and also teaches at Sciences Po Paris and the Institut des Hautes Études de l’Amérique Latine. He edits the Logiques politiques collection at L’Harmattan and, with Emmanuel Négrier, leads the Politiques publiques group of the Association Française de Science Politique (AFSP). Yves Surel Several recent elections have thrown the spotlight (detailed below) but above all it was the first col- back onto populism in Europe. French local elections lective response to a phenomenon which was once of March 2011 pushed the Front National back to its “localised” in certain countries but has now become level of support 10 to 15 years ago (around 15%). a widespread “pathology”. Finland’s parliamentary elections of April 2011 made the “True Finns” Finland’s third party with The electoral success of such movements is often 19%. Earlier, the entry of Geert Wilders’s party into seen now as both an indicator and a component of a the Dutch governing coalition (his Freedom Party general crisis affecting both European political sys- is now the country’s third party with 24 seats) and tems and EU integration. For some this new populism the breakthrough of Sweden’s Democrats in parlia- is a consequence of globalisation and international mentary elections (5.7% and 20 seats) had already integration, and a cause of nationalist tensions. It revived the heated debate over the rise of populism is also associated with a growing feeling of sepa- and placed it in a truly European context. ration between governments and the governed, fed by scandal. The emergence or revival of extremist This debate is not new, dating back to the success outfits and rhetoric – which denounce elites, supra- of the Austrian FPÖ in the 2000s, which led seve- national institutions, immigration, or all three – are ral EU members to advocate “disciplinary” mea- seen as a danger to institutions and to traditional sures against the Austrian government of the time. representative bodies. Rather than any formal EU condemnation, the “sanc- tions” adopted involved suspending official bilate- How then should these “populist” parties and poli- ral relations between Austria and the then 14 other tical leaders be interpreted? In particular, is there a EU members. Their effect was based on the desire, coherence about these movements, either ideologi- more or less explicit, to assert common values and cal or concerning their organisations or leaders? And to safeguard the “spirit” of European democracy. is this a phenomenon partly related to the European The “Austrian crisis” had institutional consequences Union, and one liable to disrupt the EU’s institutions or cooperative dynamics? 2011/no.27 I - The Faces of Contemporary Populism The analysis of populism as an ideology or political legitimately to the people; a desire to return to a kind movement is not new, dating from its first “manifes- of golden age, to restore the people to the heart of tations”. Authors have pointed to the narodki move- institutions as their justification. This could explain ment in Tsarist Russia and the People’s Party in the the somewhat unclear picture formed of these poli- USA, both at the end of the 19th century, as the first tical phenomena, described as democratic and anti- occurrences of modern populism1. These two move- political (Schedler, 1996) or as a coherent ideology ments, both ideological and political, were similar in and/or a heterogeneous class of political movement. several ways: denunciation of incumbent elites and institutions as corrupt usurpers of power belonging 1. Cf. one of the first systematic analyses of populism, still a classic: Gellner, Ionescu, 1969. The historical uses of the term «populism» cular, elections). Meanwhile, constitutionalism is in constant tension with the people’s fundamental legi- This confusion and vacillation has only grown since. timacy (for example, the principle of self-limitation Firstly because the term “populism” has been applied by courts). applied to a wide variety of political movements exis- ting at different times and in singular socio-political This explains the positive connotation of populism circumstances. One example is Latin America, where in the United States, where it is a constant reminder parties and leaders – such as Perón and his heirs of necessary respect for the people. Conversely, it – have at different times been called “populist”2. sometimes feeds criticism of the system of European Another is contemporary Europe, where the tag has governance, often accused of being “regulatory” and been applied to parties often very different to one not democratic due to the weakness of mechanisms another, such as Italy’s Northern League, Belgium’s which legitimise decisions by the people. The elec- Vlaams Belang and France’s National Front – and tion by universal suffrage of the European Parliament even to more centrist leaders (Berlusconi, Chirac and (on often low turnout) is the only “populist” compo- Blair have all received the label).3 nent of European governance – in contrast to the role of the Court of Justice, preeminent since the start of In addition to this dispersion, the media’s pejorative European integration. use of the term “populism” – increasingly conside- red as a dangerous development, similar to demago- Beyond this first meaning, another possible interpre- guery – has led to a dilution of its original meaning. tation of populism is as a recurring ideology, atta- Recent pronouncements by European leaders, both ched to other more complex ideologies. Examination at domestic and European level, are typical of this of “populist” discourse reveals certain constants, deprecatory usage, aiming to delegitimise an adver- around three fundamental propositions: sary. • the reminder (as an extension of the previous point) that all power derives necessarily from But this pejorative trend is not systematic. In the the people, a group defined by nationalism or United States “populist” has positive connotations, other social criteria (“the people against the signifying proximity to the people. For example, powerful”, for example, as shown by Pierre President Clinton was labelled “populist” by some Birnbaum, 1979); of the American media, in reference to his ability to • the idea that institutions and politicians have remain close to his electorate. undermined this ideal by diverting the exercise of power from its first mission, that of respect for The three principal dimensions of populism the sovereign people, which gives rise to a rhe- toric focusing on betrayal by various elites5; and Beyond the various uses of the term, what is striking • the desire to restore a previous and/or more from the point of view of analysis is the extreme dif- legitimate order guaranteeing the sovereignty of ficulty of defining the substance of populism in an the people and their representatives. acceptable way. Clarification may be found by means of three perspectives we will use here, which together Such an ideological framework, with three entry form the most widely-used and complementary basis points, is simplistic and therefore malleable and for analysis in political science: “soluble” in other more complex ideologies. In this • populism as a necessary element of democracy; sense populism can be both right- and left-wing, • populism as a recurring ideology; depending on the relative importance of the role of • populism as a rhetorical resource associated the people, the particular elites criticised, and the with positions held by a leader or party. type of “restoration” envisaged. On the first perspective, it must be remembered that This flexibility doubtless explains the fact that popu- in political theory populism has long been seen as lism is also described as an ideological or rhetorical 2011/no.27 an essential tension in democracy.4 As a principle for resource, accessible to leaders or parties in a politi- organising and legitimising power which is based on cal system. Several analyses have tried to show that the people’s sovereignty, populism is one of demo- populism can become a rhetorical device to be mobi- cracy’s two constitutive processes, along with consti- lised in accordance with political strategies (Mény, tutionalism and the rule of law. These two “pillars” Surel, 2002). For fringe parties populism is often of democracy, populism and constitutionalism, are an easy “marker” which allows them to distinguish often complementary. Populism is conditioned by themselves from established parties and leaders. respect for procedural, constitutional rules (in parti- It is therefore also a means of capturing an varied 2. For a comparative analysis of Latin American populism, see the recently 5. Cf. as a recent example, Qu’ils s’en aillent tous!, Paris, Flammarion, translated work of Laclau (2008). 2010. 3. Mény Y., Surel Y., 2000. 4. Cf. well described by Canovan (1999) or Leca (1994). electoral base which is attracted by (more or less ture” and the incumbent political and bureau- forceful) rejection of traditional institutions. The cratic elites (Mény, Surel, 2000). “populist” label currently attached to certain political figures, such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon in Populism, therefore, is a difficult subject to France or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, can apprehend, and to categorise. It is seen some- thus largely be explained by these actors’ posi- times as an essential dimension of democracy, tioning as alternatives to parties