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Jhering's Concept of Rechtsgefühl and Its Role in the Struggle For
TRANSFORMACJE PRAWA PRYWATNEGO 4/2017 ISSN 1641–1609 JOSEFA BIRR* Jhering’s concept OF RECHTSGEFÜHL AND ITS ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW “It is the energy of our moral nature protesting against the violation of the law; it is the most beautiful and the highest testimony which Rechtsgefühl can bear to itself […]”. With these words, Rudolf von Jhering captured the attention of his audience at his Vienna lecture of The Struggle for Law in 872. The following paper is divided into three parts. I begin with a review of Jher- ing’s concept of Rechtsgefühl2. I then go on to look at its particular meaning in The Struggle for Law. Finally, I show how the function of Rechtsgefühl in The Struggle for Law fits into Jhering’s overall concept ofR echtsgefühl. In the late 9th and early 20th centuries, German jurisprudence was concerned with the phenomenology of Rechtsgefühl. This concept is enigmatic. Its range of meaning extends from an inner psychological disposition, or something that is given a priori, to an educated feeling for legal right, similar to legal intuition. Re- lated terms and frequently used synonyms such as Rechtsbewusstsein, Rechtsemp- finden, Gewissen and Sittlichkeit make a clear definition difficult. Rechtsgefühl is widely translated as “the feeling of the legal right” or “sense of justice”. The concept of “legal sentiment” comes closest. Still, in my opinion, none of these is quite accurate. Thus, in the following I use the term Rechtsgefühl. * Dipl.-Jur., Göttingen. R. von Jhering: The Struggle for Law (1872), translated from the fifth German edition by J.J. -
The First Step Remarks on the Juristic Origin of Some Weberian Concepts
From law to social science and back again - the first step Remarks on the juristic origin of some Weberian concepts Péter Cserne I. Introduction In the last decades, "Weber Studies"1 has grown to a genuine big industry of the academia. The number of books, monographs and dissertations written on or explicitly related to Weber's person and/or work increases by hundreds every year. This applies to almost every discipline in the social sciences and humanities, and characterises not only the German and English speaking world but Spain, Italy and Japan too. The approaches present in these works are diverse as well, ranging from the bio-bibliographical to the reconstructive and the analytic.2 If one is not completely sceptical about the (material) rationality of the work in social sciences, he has to acknowledge that this enduring interest is, at least to a certain extent, due to the inherent values of Weber's work – even if the quality of the interpretations is rather fluctuating.3 In what follows I shall expose the question of the legal origin of certain Weberian categories and ideas, and make some remarks in general on the possible effects of Weber being a jurist on his sociological work. This problematic, yet not fully appreciated in the secondary literature on Weber, can be considered as a small step or episode in the history of ideas (Ideengeschichte). But with two further steps we can arrive to a new perspective on Weber's oeuvre showing, to put it in a metaphor, a "way from law to social science and back again". -
Summary of Academical Accomplishments 1. Christoph-Eric
Summary of academical accomplishments 1. Christoph-Eric Mecke 2. Diploma of general studies of French law (“Diplôme d'Études Juridiques Générales Françaises”) at the Faculty of Law and Economics of the University of Tours (France) obtained in 1986 after completing studies in France during one year. Diploma after legal studies at the Faculty of Law at the Georg August University in Göttingen obtained in 1991 (first state law examination). Diploma after a two-year law application in courts, public administration, public prosecutor's office and private law offices, conferral of the title of an assessor of law (entitles in Germany to practice as judge, prosecutor and attorney) granted by the High Court of Lower Saxony in Celle in 2007 (second state law examination). Degree of a Doctor of Legal Science awarded by the Council of the Faculty of Law at the Georg August University in Göttingen on July 17, 2007 on the basis of a comprehensive law examination (“Rigorosum”) and the presented monographic dissertation entitled Begriff und System des Rechts bei Georg Friedrich Puchta [= Concept and legal system in the legal thought of Georg Friedrich Puchta] marked with the highest possible final grade “summa cum laude”. 3. Information on employment in academic positions: 1991-1993 - junior researcher at the Department of Legal Theory at the Faculty of Law at the Georg August University in Göttingen; from February 1, 2008 to March 31, 2016 – researcher at the Department of Civil Law and History of Law and lecturer at the Faculty of Law at the Leibniz University in Hanover, there I’m still an academic teacher in the field of legal history from April 15, 2016 to December 31, 2017 – researcher at the Department of Roman Law and Pandetics at the Faculty of Law of the Georg August University in Göttingen; from January 1, 2018 until today – researcher and lecturer at the Brunswick European Law School at the Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences in Brunswick (Braunschweig). -
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JOBNAME: EE0 d’Aspremont PAGE: 1 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Wed Jan 30 08:58:14 2019 1. Introduction: The life of international law and its concepts Sahib Singh and Jean d’Aspremont ‘What meaning has the concept of murder, when we are confronted with the mass production of corpses?’1 Hannah Arendt asks this question of her readers as she attempts to understand the workings of totalitarianism. It may, though, also sound apt for today’s international law and its concepts. Contemporary international lawyers ply their trade knowing full well that significant parts of this law are structurally implicated in and perpetuate on-going economic and social injustices. Yet lawyers idealistically and increasingly resort to international law’s promises. How could our greater recourse to concepts such as universality, aggression, development, humanity or rights (to name but a few) not be tinged with a sense of futility? But this would miss Arendt’s point, for her question is a critique of how we are prone to think with concepts. Recourse to the concept of murder in order to understand, explain and evaluate the known horrors of the concentration camps meant giving in to a certain common sense. It was to concede to the ‘great temptation to explain away the intrinsically incredible by means of liberal rationalizations’.2 Modes of thought or attitudes that seek to reduce the complexities (and horrors) of our social world to inadequate categories are not merely unwarranted but potentially dangerous. It is, after all, not inadequate concepts or attempts to grasp the ungraspable and infinitely complex that Arendt indicts, but rather those who would do so by turning away from life and hence responsibility.3 Rather the question becomes: may we think of the relation(s) between concepts, life and living in international law? We broach this question in three sections. -
Natural Law in the Modern European Constitutions Gottfried Dietze
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Natural Law Forum 1-1-1956 Natural Law in the Modern European Constitutions Gottfried Dietze Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Dietze, Gottfried, "Natural Law in the Modern European Constitutions" (1956). Natural Law Forum. Paper 7. http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Law Forum by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NATURAL LAW IN THE MODERN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONS Gottfried Dietze THE SECOND WORLD WAR has brought about one of the most fundamental revolutions in modem European history. Unlike its predecessors of 1640, 1789, and 1917, the revolution of 1945 was not confined to one country. Its ideas did not gradually find their way into the well-established and stable orders of other societies. It was a spontaneous movement in the greater part of a continent that had traditionally been torn by dissension; and its impact was immediately felt by a society which was in a state of dissolution and despair. The revolution of 1945 had a truly European character. There was no uprising of a lower nobility as in 1640; of a third estate as in the French Revolution; of the proletariat as in Russia. Since fascism had derived support from all social strata and preached the solidarity of all citizens of the nation, there could hardly be room for a class struggle. -
Books-Library.Online-10121733Gh1h9.Pdf
Chapter 9 “Die Rechtssätze in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang zu erkennen” – The Thrust of Legal Formalism 9.1 A Genealogy of Legal Concepts by Georg Friedrich Puchta The Historical School of Law, founded by Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861) at the early nineteenth century, underscored the historical essence and roots of law. It highlighted the role of the Volksgeist, i.e. the historically evolving “spirit of the nation” on the evolvement of the law. The Volksgeist of a nation found its paramount expression in the customary law and, in the more sophisticated legal systems, in the legal conceptions and doctrinal constructions created by the legal profession (Juristenrecht, Professorenrecht). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the historicist notion of law became transformed into full-fledged con- ceptualist jurisprudence in Germany. A hierarchical system of legal concepts, as created by the legal science so as to deal with the legal issues, was placed at the centre of legal analysis. Among the German conceptualists there were Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798–1846), Bernhard Windscheid (1817–1892), and the young Rudolf von Jhering (1818–1892), who later turned into a vehement opponent and critic of legal formalism under the Interessenjurisprudence, or jurisprudence based on the analysis of social interests in law.1 It was Philipp Heck, himself a pro- ponent of the Interessenjurisprudenz, who introduced the openly pejorative term Begriffsjurisprudenz for the German conceptualists.2 According to the Begriffsjurisprudenz, there is an immutable logico-conceptual element in law “frozen’ in the legal concepts and their mutual systemic relations. Even earlier, the historical school of law had found the immutable element of law in the community-centred legal concepts, like the spirit of the nation (Volksgeist) and the “organically” evolving legal consciousness of its people. -
The Art of Judging and Power, Pedagogy, & Praxis: Article 4 Moving the Classroom to Action
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Volume 32 Number 3 Symposia—The Brennan Legacy: The Art of Judging and Power, Pedagogy, & Praxis: Article 4 Moving the Classroom to Action 4-1-1999 The Brennan Legacy: The Art of Judging Ruggero J. Aldisert Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Brennan Legacy: The Art of Judging, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 673 (1999). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol32/iss3/4 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE BRENNAN LEGACY: TIE ART OF JUDGING Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert* I. INTRODUCTION What does ajudge do when he or she decides a case? Benjamin Cardozo posed this question in 1921 and answered it in what has become a classic of American legal literature, The Na- ture of the Judicial Process.' Drawing from his wealth of scholar- ship and experience as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Ap- peals, he described the ingredients that enter "that strange compound which is brewed daily in the caldron of the courts."2 Cardozo's analysis and philosophy examined the accepted definition of the ju- dicial process: What courts do and should do, and how judges rea- 3 son and should reason in deciding particular cases. -
The Classification Into Branches of Modern Legal
THE CLASSIFICAT ION IN T O BRANCHES OF MODERN LEGAL SYS T EMS 443 Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso XXVII (Valparaíso, Chile, 2º semestre de 2006) [pp. 443 - 472] THE classiFicatiON INTO BRANCHES OF MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ROMAN laW TRADITIONS [“La clasificación en ramas de los sistemas legales modernos y las tradiciones del Derecho romano”] GÁBOR HAMZA * RESUMEN ABS T RAC T El presente trabajo se basa en la lec- This paper is based on the author’s ción inaugural del autor para su ingreso opening lesson upon his entry into the en la Academia Húngara de Ciencias; y Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He en él examina las diversas divisiones en hereby discusses the various divisions in partes o ramas de que ha sido objeto el parts or branches of the Law throughout Derecho, a través de la historia, empe- history, beginning with those formulated zando por las formuladas por los juristas by Roman jurists of public and private romanos, de Derecho público y privado y Law, and of civil and praetorian (hono- Derecho civil y pretorio (honorario). Es rary) Law. The first one has undoubte- sobre todo la primera que ha tenido una dly some influence, which the author influencia posterior, que el autor analiza analyzes among the commentators, in entre los glosadores y comentaristas, en la the humanistic judicial practice, and in jurisprudencia humanística y en diversas several later schools, with an extension escuelas de la época posterior, con exten- to Scottish law and to the common law sión al derecho escocés y al common law, and, of course in the juridical science of y desde luego en la Ciencia jurídica de the XIX and XX centuries. -
Law As a Learned Profession: the Forgotten Mission Field of the Professional Movement
South Carolina Law Review Volume 52 Issue 3 Article 12 Spring 2001 Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the Professional Movement Rob Atkinson Florida State University College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the Professional Movement, 52 S. C. L. Rev. 621 (2001). This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Atkinson: Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the P LAW AS A LEARNED PROFESSION: THE FORGOTTEN MISSION FIELD OF THE PROFESSIONALISM MOVEMENT ROB ATKINSON* I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................623 II. THE DOMAIN OF LAW-AND LEGAL EDUCATION ............................627 A. Law's Insularity: Dean ChristopherColumbus Langdell 's "Discovery". ............................................................627 B. Law's Universalism:Legal Education in the Grand Tradition .........................................................................628 1. The Two Hemispheres ofLaw's Domain .............................629 a. The DescriptiveRealm of the Social Sciences ..............630 b. The Normative Realm ofthe Humanities ......................632 c. Two Hemispheres, One World -
67 Spatial Aspects of Moral Judgements in Lawyers
Vol. 1, N°2. Diciembre 2017, pp. 67 – 89 Spatial Aspects of Moral Judgements in Lawyers’ Heaven, Peoples’ Earth and Malefactors’ Hell: Leibniz, the Austro-Marxists and Durkheim’s Alleged ‘Disintegration’ Thesis 1 Mate Paksy ([email protected]) Recibido: 26/10/2017 Aceptado: 13/12/2017 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1133709 Abstract: Ever since antiquity, lawyers and philosophers have essentially been divided over whether they should keep law, morality and politics separate, or whether the need for their unity is more compelling. In the wake of countless bloody conflicts worldwide, the durability and resilience of this discourse on laws and morals is at once both impressive and sad. The aim of this paper is to show that individual moral deliberation is essentially local and cannot be dissociated from the spatial-communitarian context – neither by describing society as if it were the City of God (Leibniz), nor by demanding that collective spatial contexts should be deliberately ignored in favour of de-territorialized minority rights (Renner and Bauer), nor by criticizing the ‘disintegration’ thesis which seeks to justify a rights-based Republican vision of society (Hart). It probably goes without saying that recognizing the relevance and importance of the spatial character of our individual normative (legal, moral, religious) judgements in no way implies that legal, moral or political theory-based suggestions, explanations and statements about our societies are either impossible or wrong. The argument tries rather to show that outcome of moral judgments is influenced by the context, therefore a good theory of moral judgement should refer to the spatial contexts as well. -
Carl Schmitt and International Political Theory: Revisiting a Complex Encounter
PARI-WP No. 26, 2017 Carl Schmitt and International Political Theory: Revisiting a Complex Encounter Roberto Orsi Lecturer at the University of Tokyo Carl Schmitt and International Political Theory: Revisiting a Complex Encounter Roberto Orsi Lecturer at the University of Tokyo Abstract: Direct interest in Carl Schmitt’s work is recovering within International Political Theory, after a period of relative disengagement. However, the way in which Schmittian scholarship and IPT are interfaced continues to suffer from old issues, which limit the potential of the exchange. This article traces of the way Schmitt has entered IPT literature, offering an assessment of the encounter as well as a reflection on why and how a recovery of Schmitt may be desirable. Such recovery appears to be conditioned upon a more upfront contextualisation of his work, and a more coura- geous engagement with the idea of political theology as a sociological category. Fi- nally, the article identifies a number of areas where Schmitt’s role, which is to a cer- tain extent already present, can be further expanded. Keywords: Schmitt, international political theory, political theology *** ‘Lurking behind the contemporary interest in Carl Schmitt is the sense that this present cannot last for ever’. (Balakrishnan, 2000: 268) fter a period of relative disengagement from the work and intellectual legacy of Carl Schmitt, International Political Theory (henceforth: IPT) scholars ap- pear to have recovered some interest in this author. The moment seems fa- Avourable for a re-assessment of the encounter between IPT and Schmitt, aimed at the evaluation of whether and in what ways it would be desirable to see a more prominent re-instatement of Schmittian studies in IPT, particularly considering that interest in the German jurist appears to be continuing in a number of fields, which are more or less directly connected to IPT, such as general political theory, geopolitics and polit- ical geography, history of political ideas. -
A Matter of Pure Conscience? Franz Wieacker and His “Conceptual Change”*
STUDIA IURIDICA LXXXII CRITIQUE Tomasz Giaro University of Warsaw, Poland A MATTER OF PURE CONSCIENCE? FRANZ WIEACKER AND HIS “CONCEPTUAL CHANGE”* 1. A HIGH-RISK BIOGRAPHY Are private letters, particularly letters politically exonerating their author or addressee, reliable? May we consider the so-called Persilscheine of the Ger- man denazification procedure following WWII a trustworthy historical source? Can a work purporting to be a “history of the ideas of German legal historian Franz Wieacker” (V), which focuses on the personal development of these ideas in Wieacker’s own thought, be seriously written whilst omitting the sole publi- cation devoted to his scholarly activity and achievements during the Nazi era?1 If you would answer all these questions in the affirmative, you will no doubt con- sider the biography of Wieacker published recently by Dr. Ville Erkkilä a well- made piece of legal historiography. Wieacker, whom I remember as an urbane elderly gentleman, and whose pupils and pupils’ pupils are today still active in the academy, is an extremely unrewarding object of historical study. On occasion, we encounter his name in connection with awkward propositions; for instance, that he made his scholarly career “under the Nazis, but not with the Nazis”,2 that his characterization of the reception of Roman law in Germany as ‘scientification’ (Verwissenschaftlichung) * V. Erkkilä, The Conceptual Change of Conscience. Franz Wieacker and German Legal Historiography 1933–1968, Tübingen 2019, p. XIII & 314. Numbers in brackets refer to pages of the book. 1 R. Kohlhepp, Franz Wieacker und die NS-Zeit, „Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung Romanis- tische Abteilung” 2005, Vol.