Fas HUSF{ED UP': TFIE FIIDDE,N TRAFALGAR
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ORE Open Research Exeter TITLE '...All was hushed up': the hidden Trafalgar AUTHORS Duffy, Michael JOURNAL The Mariner's Mirror DEPOSITED IN ORE 08 May 2009 This version available at http://hdl.handle.net/10036/67673 COPYRIGHT AND REUSE Open Research Exeter makes this work available in accordance with publisher policies. A NOTE ON VERSIONS The version presented here may differ from the published version. If citing, you are advised to consult the published version for pagination, volume/issue and date of publication 7' The ,l4ariner's ,\!rror \,/ol.9I lto. 2 (May 20At), 21d-24A '...ALL \fAS HUSF{EDUP': TFIE FIIDDE,NTRAFALGAR By MichaelD"ffy A decadelater Rodney briefed the new civilian First Lord of the Admiralty that Sea officers are aPt to be censorious.It is their misfortune ro know little of the world, and to be bred in seaport towns, where they keep company with few but themselves. This makes them so violent_in party, so partial to ihor. who'have sailed with them, and, so grossiy unjust to others.5 The feuds of tVar the American were continued into that againstthe French Revolution and added to by the growing competitivenessand standard s of professionalism of the ."p"ttding offi"c.r.orir. A dicade of victories sdil witnessed ....ALL \TAS HUSHED UP,: THE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 217 courts martial and controversy after almost every battle. Even Nelson enteredinto 'a this, condemningthe limited achievementsof Lord Flowe'svictory' afterthe First of June 1794 and Flotham's lethargy in the Mediterranean actions of 1795.6 Codrington similarly complainedof Bridport's failure to presshome successat the Isle de Groix rn 1,795.7For failing to bring their ships into action, Captain Molloy was dismissedhis ship afrerthe First of June and Viliiamson dismissedthe service afterCamperdown rn 1,797.8 The victory of CapeSt Vincent in 1797became tarnished by SirJohnJervis'sffe at the conduct of Admiral Sir CharlesThompson and by the offencetaken by Sir Villiam Parker and his squadron,which had borne the brunt of the battle, at the way Nelson securedmost of the credit for the victory to himself.e After the victory at Copenhagenin 1801the commanderin chief, Sir Hyde Parker, was summarily recalled,while afterthe victorlr atFerrol in 1805the commander,Sir Robert Calder, who had captured two ships from a larger combined fleet, was censuredfor not renewing the battle on the secondday and his careereffectively terminated.loAfter Trafalgar there was yet another major court martial to come when Admiral Lord Gambierwas tried for neglectingto takeeffectual steps to destroy the enemy ships stranded after Cochrane'sattack at the BasqueRoads in 1809 - though acquitied,he never commandedat seaagain.ll This wasthe navy that was becomingsovereign of the seas! Amidst this maelstrom of controversy two victories of Nelson emergedpublicly unblemished.The Battle of the Nile rn1798was so obviouslycomplete, with 11 of the 13 Frenchships of the lirre taken or destroyed,while Trafalgarhas becomethe benchmark for naval victory. Nelson's 27 shipsof the line attackedthe 33 of the combined fleet, capturing 17 and blowing up another.However there was some feeling amongstthe victors that the triumph was incompiete.Nelson's devotedfriend Thomas Fremantle,captain of the 'On Ir{eptwnqwrote that this occasionas on all occasionsof this sort many have in my opinion behavedimproperly; had all gone into action with the determination that Nelson did, it is probablefew only could have escaped...'.12One of his 'Had midshipmen,William StanhopeBadcock, echoedhim: we had more daylight, and all the other ships come into action, there would havebeen much more done. I do not think abovesix shipswould have got away...'.13Looking back sevenyears later,Lieutenant William Pringle Green,master's mate in the ConqweroratTrafalgar, deciaredthat'...in my opinion if the officershad done their duty in every ship,the actionwould havebeen over sooner, and the whole of the enemytaken or destroyed'.t+ Those voicing such views had caught Nelson's aggressivethirst for a battle of annihilation and their hopeshad fallen short of fulfiiment. Repeatedlyin the three '. rnreeksbetween his arrivaiand the battle Nelson had expressedthe hope . .that as an Enemy'sFleet they may be annihilated',that'...it is, asMr Pitt knows, annihilation that the Country wants, and not merely a splendidvictory of twenty three to thirty six, - honourable to the parties concerned,but absolutelyuseless in the extended scaleto bring Bonaparteto his marrow-bones...'.15'\flehave only one greatobject 'that in view,' he told Coilingwood, of annihilatingour enemies,and gettinga giorious peacefor our country.'16FIe told the Victory'scre% as he toured the decks just beforethe battle,that he would not be content with the 12 lsic)that he had taken at the Nile, and he told Hardy that he'bargainedfor twenty'of the 33 shipshe was engaging- which would have fulfilled his objective of annihilating them'as an Enemy's Fleet'.i 7 i ....ALL 218 \TASHUSHED UP': THE HIDDEN TRAF'ALCAR Captures on this scalewere unprecedentedin contemporary naval warfare, but how #.r. they to be achieved?Late October days *...^rhori - we know that it grew dark about 5.15pm on the 21,st.18The loss of time involved in manoeuvringa 'in single line of battle, perhapsfive miles long, variable winds, thick weather,and other circumstanceswhich must occur', was likely to lose him the opportunity of bringing about a decisivebattle.1e Nelson opted thereforefor a number of shorter lines (three in his 9 October memorandum,two with the reducedfleet atTrafalgar) which would operatesimultaneously and independently but in accordancewith overallprinciples outlined to his admiralsand captainsin his memorandum.Believing 'numbers that can only annihilate',2Qhis object was to concentratean overwhelming force to take the last 12 shipsof the enemy rear.In the memorandumthis task was assignedto 16 ships(out of+O; under Coliingwood, but evenwith his reducedfleet of zl atTrafalg"t,he still intendedCollingwood to be kept up to his full strengrhof 16, for the Africd,was to havebeen among the ships of his lee line (Table 1).ztThe 9 October memorandum envisagedan.even more massiveattack (24 against14) on 'advanced the enemycentre by Nelson'sown division and the third squadron'(drawn from the fastestships in the two 2O-stronglines of his order of sailing),though this force also had to be strong enough to contain any riposte by the leading 20 enemy ships.Nevertheless he trusted that the whole line from two or three aheadof their commander in chief to the rear of their fleet would be overpowered before the unengagedships ahead to the van could rerurn to their assistance.Nelson still sought to achievethis with his single,much reduceddivision of t t ships(plus the wayward Africa) at Trafalg"r, holding the enemy van by feinting to afiack it before driving through their centre.The basicprinciple remainedthe same,however. Nelson added a note to the 9 October memorandum that if either the British or their enemy were 'on1y lessthan the 40 against46he then envisaged, a proportionatenumber of Enemy's Ships are to be cut off; B[ritish] to be /+ superior to the E,[nemy] cut off'.22 To be successfulin his'new...singular...simp1e'23mode of attack,Nelson was dependingupon three things:surprise, speed and closeengagement. To avoid delays through the need to rearrangethe fleet into battle order, he decidedthat the fleet's standardorder of sailingwould also be its order of battle. With it, he told Keats at 'go Merton in September,he would at them at once'and he expectedthat his formation 'surprise and direction of attackwould and confound the enemy.They won'r know what I am about'.2aHe seemsto havebeen hoping that this would hold them in their single line expectingthat his divisions would reform into one line of battle when they drew closer,so enablinghim to concentratehis shipsagainst the centreand rear 'bring part of that line, break it up and forward apell-mell battle' which was what he wanted. FIe stil1,howevea had to get through the concentratedfire of their line of battle and, althoughit was his low opinion of the gunnery of the combined fleet that made his pian feasible,he stil1needed to get in quickly to minimize the number of broadsidesand damagethey could inflict upon his shipsin their approach.Flence he 'set instructed that his ships should all sails,even steeringsails, in order ro ger as quickly as possibleto the Enemy'sline...'. No victory.o.rld be decisivewithout a 'no 'no pell-mell closeaction in which he had fearsof the result', and Captain can do ve_rywrong if he placeshis Ship alongsidethat of an enemy'.2sHis final instructions, which he asked his frigate commanders to convey to his captains as rhe Victory 'if engaged,were that by the mode of attack prescribedthey found it impossibleto ....ALL \7AS FIUSFIE,DUP': THE FIIDDEN TRAFALGAR 2r9 get into action immediately,they might adopt whateverthey thought best,provided it led them qwicklyand closelyalongside an enemy'.26 This was the intention, but in the eventit did not work out that smoothly.Nelson 'something had admitted that must be left to chance;nothing is sure in a seafight beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes...' .27Chance was againsthim in the shapeof the weather:ships' logs arefull of 'light 'light referencesto airs' and breezes'which reduced the British attack to a crawl.28This in itself limited the possibility of surprise,but that was in any case small sinceVilleneuve had seenNeison in action at the