ORE Open Research Exeter
TITLE '...All was hushed up': the hidden Trafalgar
AUTHORS Duffy, Michael
JOURNAL The Mariner's Mirror
DEPOSITED IN ORE 08 May 2009
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http://hdl.handle.net/10036/67673
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The ,l4ariner's ,\!rror \,/ol.9I lto. 2 (May 20At), 21d-24A
'...ALL \fAS HUSF{EDUP': TFIE FIIDDE,NTRAFALGAR
By MichaelD"ffy
A decadelater Rodney briefed the new civilian First Lord of the Admiralty that Sea officers are aPt to be censorious.It is their misfortune ro know little of the world, and to be bred in seaport towns, where they keep company with few but themselves. This makes them so violent_in party, so partial to ihor. who'have sailed with them, and, so grossiy unjust to others.5 The feuds of tVar the American were continued into that againstthe French Revolution and added to by the growing competitivenessand standard s of professionalism of the ."p"ttding offi"c.r.orir. A dicade of victories sdil witnessed ....ALL \TAS HUSHED UP,: THE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 217
courts martial and controversy after almost every battle. Even Nelson enteredinto 'a this, condemningthe limited achievementsof Lord Flowe'svictory' afterthe First of June 1794 and Flotham's lethargy in the Mediterranean actions of 1795.6 Codrington similarly complainedof Bridport's failure to presshome successat the Isle de Groix rn 1,795.7For failing to bring their ships into action, Captain Molloy was dismissedhis ship afrerthe First of June and Viliiamson dismissedthe service afterCamperdown rn 1,797.8 The victory of CapeSt Vincent in 1797became tarnished by SirJohnJervis'sffe at the conductof Admiral Sir CharlesThompson and by the offencetaken by Sir Villiam Parker and his squadron,which had borne the brunt of the battle, at the way Nelson securedmost of the credit for the victory to himself.e After the victory at Copenhagenin 1801the commanderin chief, Sir Hyde Parker, was summarily recalled,while afterthe victorlr atFerrol in 1805the commander,Sir Robert Calder, who had captured two ships from a larger combined fleet, was censuredfor not renewing the battle on the secondday and his careereffectively terminated.loAfter Trafalgar there was yet another major court martial to come when Admiral Lord Gambierwas tried for neglectingto takeeffectual steps to destroy the enemy ships stranded after Cochrane'sattack at the BasqueRoads in 1809 - though acquitied,he never commandedat seaagain.ll This wasthe navy that was becomingsovereign of the seas! Amidst this maelstrom of controversy two victories of Nelson emergedpublicly unblemished.The Battle of the Nile rn1798was so obviouslycomplete, with 11 of the 13 Frenchships of the lirre taken or destroyed,while Trafalgarhas becomethe benchmark for naval victory. Nelson's 27 shipsof the line attackedthe 33 of the combined fleet, capturing 17 and blowing up another.However there was some feeling amongstthe victors that the triumph was incompiete.Nelson's devotedfriend Thomas Fremantle,captain of the 'On Ir{eptwnqwrote that this occasionas on all occasionsof this sort many have in my opinion behavedimproperly; had all gone into action with the determination that Nelson did, it is probablefew only could have escaped...'.12One of his 'Had midshipmen,William StanhopeBadcock, echoedhim: we had more daylight, and all the other ships come into action, there would havebeen much more done. I do not think abovesix shipswould have got away...'.13Looking back sevenyears later,Lieutenant William Pringle Green,master's mate in the ConqweroratTrafalgar, deciaredthat'...in my opinion if the officershad done their duty in every ship,the actionwould havebeen over sooner, and the whole of the enemytaken or destroyed'.t+ Those voicing such views had caught Nelson's aggressivethirst for a battle of annihilation and their hopeshad fallen short of fulfiiment. Repeatedlyin the three '. rnreeksbetween his arrivaiand the battle Nelson had expressedthe hope . .that as an Enemy'sFleet they may be annihilated',that'...it is, asMr Pitt knows, annihilation that the Country wants, and not merely a splendidvictory of twenty three to thirty six, - honourable to the parties concerned,but absolutelyuseless in the extended scaleto bring Bonaparteto his marrow-bones...'.15'\flehave only one greatobject 'that in view,' he told Coilingwood, of annihilatingour enemies,and gettinga giorious peacefor our country.'16FIe told the Victory'scre% as he toured the decks just beforethe battle,that he would not be content with the 12 lsic)that he had taken at the Nile, and he told Hardy that he'bargainedfor twenty'of the 33 shipshe was engaging- which would have fulfilled his objective of annihilating them'as an Enemy's Fleet'.i 7
i ....ALL 218 \TASHUSHED UP': THE HIDDEN TRAF'ALCAR
Captures on this scalewere unprecedentedin contemporary naval warfare, but how #.r. they to be achieved?Late October days *...^rhori - we know that it grew dark about 5.15pm on the 21,st.18The loss of time involved in manoeuvringa 'in single line of battle, perhapsfive miles long, variable winds, thick weather,and other circumstanceswhich must occur', was likely to lose him the opportunity of bringing about a decisivebattle.1e Nelson opted thereforefor a number of shorter lines (three in his 9 October memorandum,two with the reducedfleet atTrafalgar) which would operatesimultaneously and independently but in accordancewith overallprinciples outlined to his admiralsand captainsin his memorandum.Believing 'numbers that can only annihilate',2Qhis object was to concentratean overwhelming force to take the last 12 shipsof the enemy rear.In the memorandumthis task was assignedto 16 ships(out of+O; under Coliingwood, but evenwith his reducedfleet of zl atTrafalg"t,he still intendedCollingwood to be kept up to his full strengrhof 16, for the Africd,was to havebeen among the ships of his lee line (Table 1).ztThe 9 October memorandum envisagedan.even more massiveattack (24 against14) on 'advanced the enemycentre by Nelson'sown division and the third squadron'(drawn from the fastestships in the two 2O-stronglines of his order of sailing),though this force also had to be strong enough to contain any riposte by the leading 20 enemy ships.Nevertheless he trusted that the whole line from two or three aheadof their commander in chief to the rear of their fleet would be overpowered before the unengagedships ahead to the van could rerurn to their assistance.Nelson still sought to achievethis with his single,much reduceddivision of t t ships(plus the wayward Africa) at Trafalg"r, holding the enemy van by feinting to afiack it before driving through their centre.The basicprinciple remainedthe same,however. Nelson added a note to the 9 October memorandum that if either the British or their enemy were 'on1y lessthan the 40 against46he then envisaged, a proportionatenumber of Enemy's Ships are to be cut off; B[ritish] to be /+ superior to the E,[nemy] cut off'.22 To be successfulin his'new...singular...simp1e'23mode of attack,Nelson was dependingupon three things:surprise, speed and closeengagement. To avoid delays through the need to rearrangethe fleet into battle order, he decidedthat the fleet's standardorder of sailingwould also be its order of battle. With it, he told Keats at 'go Merton in September,he would at them at once'and he expectedthat his formation 'surprise and direction of attackwould and confound the enemy.They won'r know what I am about'.2aHe seemsto havebeen hoping that this would hold them in their single line expectingthat his divisions would reform into one line of battle when they drew closer,so enablinghim to concentratehis shipsagainst the centreand rear 'bring part of that line, break it up and forward apell-mell battle' which was what he wanted. FIe stil1,howevea had to get through the concentratedfire of their line of battle and, althoughit was his low opinion of the gunnery of the combined fleet that made his pian feasible,he stil1needed to get in quickly to minimize the number of broadsidesand damagethey could inflict upon his shipsin their approach.Flence he 'set instructed that his ships should all sails,even steeringsails, in order ro ger as quickly as possibleto the Enemy'sline...'. No victory.o.rld be decisivewithout a 'no 'no pell-mell closeaction in which he had fearsof the result', and Captain can do ve_rywrong if he placeshis Ship alongsidethat of an enemy'.2sHis final instructions, which he asked his frigate commanders to convey to his captains as rhe Victory 'if engaged,were that by the mode of attack prescribedthey found it impossibleto ....ALL \7AS FIUSFIE,DUP': THE FIIDDEN TRAFALGAR 2r9
get into action immediately,they might adopt whateverthey thought best,provided it led them qwicklyand closelyalongside an enemy'.26 This was the intention, but in the eventit did not work out that smoothly.Nelson 'something had admitted that must be left to chance;nothing is sure in a seafight beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes...' .27Chance was againsthim in the shapeof the weather:ships' logs arefull of 'light 'light referencesto airs' and breezes'which reduced the British attack to a crawl.28This in itself limited the possibility of surprise,but that was in any case small sinceVilleneuve had seenNeison in action at the Nile and correctly predicted the tactics he would employ - no parallel line of battle, attempts to enveloptheir rea\ to break through the line and to act in groups againstthe ships he cut off. Nelson'sfeint at the van may haveheld it longer in its station,but the combinedfleet knew what to expect.2e To counter Nelson's expectedtactics, Villeneuve ordered a close-formedline of battleand mutual support.3oNelson's course of action- a head-onattack by successive individual ships againsta iine of battle - now gavethe maximum opportunity for chanceto take effect,since his hopes of avoiding incapacitatingdamage by r rapid assaultcarrying all sail were jeopardrzedby the light airs and breezes.Fortunately the gunnery of the combined fleet was as bad as,perhaps worse than, he expected. 'The As one of his opponentslater commented, audacitywith which admiralNelson attackedus, and which had so completely succeeded,showed the completecontempt which he had, not without reason)for the effect of our gunnery'.31The French propensity to fire high in order to disablemasts, yards, sailsand rigging, rather than at the hulls to kill, like the British, meant that much of their shot was wasted.The French failure to abandon slow matches,which fired guns slowly and erratically, rather than follow the British and Spanishin adopting mechanicalgunlocks, which fired guns instantaneousiy,upset their attempt at precisionfire in rolling ships,and the effect of this was exacerbatedat Trafalgar by the heavy swe1lthat was taking their ships abeam.In consequencethe leading British ships got up without major damage.32 Flowever Nelson may not have taken sufficient account of human error on his own side.Firstly one ship, the 54 gun Africa, becamedetached from the fleet in the night and at 1Oamwas still 6-7 miles north-northeast aheadof the two fleets, hasteningback but unable to take her place in the order of sailing/order of battie which, as shown below, should have been in Collingwood's column. Eight minutes after Collingwood began the battle towards the enemy rear, the Africa beganto engageeach ship of their van in successionas she moved down their line towards Nelson, joining in his attackon the centret hour 5Bminutes after the battle began.33 SecondlyCollingwood and Nelson addedto their task by eachengaging higher up the line than originally intended. Collingwood choseto break the line between the fifteenth and sixteenthships from the rear rather than at the twelfth asspecified in the 9th October memorandum.He has beenexcused by claimsthat did not see three ships behind the rear line, but his journai seemsto indicate his actionswere 'About deliberate: noon, the Royal Souereignopened a fire on the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th shipsfrom the enemy'srear and stoodon with all sailto breakthe enemv's line'. Rathei he was drawn by honour to attack the enem),closest to his o*rl ,ir.
j- ....ALL 224 \TAS HUSFIE,DUP,: THE,HIDDEN TRAFALGAR
'a and statusnearest his target point - the sixteenthship: Spanishthree-deck ship Ithe SantaAna] with a Vice-Admiral'sflag...'. It meanr,however, that insteadof the 1,6agatnst 12 of the memorandum, his remaining 15 would face 16 - assumingthat all his division cameup in good time.3aNelson too told his two seconds,the Tembraire and I'{eptune,that he intendedto break the enemy'sline about 14 shipsfrom rhe van, but, seekingthe French commanderin chief in the proximity of the four-decked Spanish Sairissima Trinidad he cut through behind the twelfth, which, perhaps fortuitously,was Villeneuve's Bwcentaure.Twenty-one ships were cut off, with Nelson apparently intending to make sail up the lee side of the enemy line towards their Yan.'-1q With only 24 ships following the Royal Sovereign and Vitctory,this was a ratio now below the quarter superiority for annihilation that Nelson specifiedin the 9 October memorandum. It was therefore even more important that the rest of the !1e9tgot up quickly to support their leaders.This, however,was amongstthd grearesr failures in British performancein the battle and one that was subr.q.,r.ntly covered uP. Nelson had declaredthat the order of sailingshould be the order of attack,and to appreciatewhich ships fulfilled their intended roles best or worsr we need to know the order of sailing.At leastfive different copies of the order of sailing exist for 9-10 Octobe\ at a time when Nelson was projecting a fleet of +o shipi. The differencescan be ascribedto the hourly changesof situaiion as new ships arrived and others were expectedto depart. The first was assignedto 9 October by Sir Nichoias Harris Nicolas, and has beenregarded as probably an initial draft of those signed by Nelson and given out on the 1Oth.Julian Corbett printed one from the 1Oth,which he found in the United ServicesInstitution, in Tbe Campaign of \ofolgor.36 Corbett usedhis list to reconstructthe Traf algarorder of battle, r.-o,ring thosenot presenton the 21stand replacingthem with thosewho had joined sincein an order basedon a varietyof likely or unlikely reasons.This wascontested as regards the lee line (Coliingwood's) by R. C. Anderson, who produced his reconstruition basedon what some officers lalrcrsaid was the intended placeof their o'wn ship and on positionslogged on previous days.37 Floweverthree clearly subsequentcopies of the order of sailingof the same1O October date exist with alterationsthat help clartfy the final ordei of battle. One sent to Captain Bayntun of the Leviathd,n was printed by AdmiralTaylor as an appendixto his 1950Mariner's Mirror article on Trafalgar(Fig. 1). Another sent to Captain PulteneyMalcolm of the Donegal differs from former lists by removing the Prince of Wales,which Nelson decidedto allow Calder to sail home for his i,rrt martial, and, like Bayntun's copr includes the Belleisle,which arrived in the course of the 1Oth.Vhereas Bayntun's copy placed theAfrica,which joined on the 14th, in Nelson's division,Malcolm's has her subsequ.ntiypencilled into Collingwood's.38 This last placing of the Africt rs confirmed by a fuither copy, apparently a record 'Order coPy,headed of Battle', and associatedwith two lett.ru r.ttt by the Victory's master,Thomas Atkinson, to a friend.3e Vhile this latter is the last surviving order of sailingproduced from the Victory, there is another surviving list from the Royal Sovereign^,dated to rhe 21,stitself,in the.entry il Admiral Collingwood's journai in which Lt. lirm the British shipswhich took part in the battle, and overlooked by Corbett and Anderson.aoCollingwood ....ALL \VASHUSHED UP,: THE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 221
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headshis list with the ships of the three admirals - Victorlt,Royal Sovereign and Britannia - bu he then puts the remaining ships in an order so similar ro the later copiesof t OOctober that it seemsto be the finally intendedorder of sailing/orderof battle for Traf algar.arThe five orders of sailing/battieand Collingwood's list niay be comParedin Table L, set in the order in which, judged by internal evidence,they were produced.
TABLE 1: The order of sailing/order of battle of Nelson'sfleet (ships in round brackets absent from the Battle of Trafalgar) L23456 9 oct. 10 oct. 10 oct. 10 oct. 10 oct. 21.oct. Nicolas" Corbettb Taylor. SHMd BL. Sturges Jacksonf Starboard Division/Veather Line Temeraire Temeraire Temeraire Temeraire Temeraire Temeraire (Superb) (Swperb) (Swperb) (Swperb) (Superb) Victory Victory Victory Victory Victory Neptwne Neptwne l{eptwne Neptwne Neptune Neptune (Tigre) (Tigre) (Tigre) (Tigre) (Tigre) (Canopws) (Canopus) (Canopus) (Canopws) (Canopus) Conqweror Conqueror Conqweror Conqueror Conqueror Conqueror Agamemnon Agamemnon Agamemnon Agamemnon Agamemnon Agamemnon Leaiatban Leviatban Leviathan Ler.,iathan Leviathan Lersiatban .Wales) (Prince of Wales) (Prince of (Prince of Wales) Ajax Ajax Ajax Ajax Ajax Ajax Orion Orion Orion Orion Orion Minotawr Minotaur Minotawr Minotawr Minotaur Minotaur (Qween) (Queen) (Queen) (Qween) (DonegaL) (Donegal) (Donegal) (Donegal) (Spencer) (Spencer) (Spencer) (Spencer) Africa Spartiate Spartiate Spartiate Spartiate Spartiate Spartiate Larboard Division/Lee Line Prince Prince Prince Prince Prince Mars Mars Mars Mars Mars Prince Royal Sooereign Royal Soaereign Royal Soaereign Royal Sovereign Royal Sooereign Tonnant Tonnant Tonnant Tonnant Tonnant Tonnant Belleisle B elleisle Belleisle Belleisle Bellerophon Bellerophon Bellerophon Bellerophon Bellerophon Belleropbon Colossws Colossus Colossws Colossus Colossus Colossws Acbille Achille Achille Achille Acbille Achille Polypbemws Polyphemws Polyphemus Polypbemus Polyphemus Polyphemws Revenge Revenge Re"senge Revenge Revenge Revenge Britannia Britannia Britannia Britannia Britannia Suiftsure Swiftswre Sruiftswre Swiftswre Szaiftswre Swiftswre Defence Defence Defence Defence Africa Defence [AfricaJe Defence Africa Orion (Kent) (Kenr) (Kent) (Kent) (Zealows) (Zealows) (Zealows) (Zealous) (Zealows) Thwnderer Thwnderer Thwnderer Tbunderer Thwnd,erer Thwnderer Defiance Defiance Defiance Defiance Defiance Defiance Dreadnought Dreadnowgbt Dreadnowght Dreadnowgbt Dreadnowght ....ALL \VASHUSHED UP,: THE,HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 223
" Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters,vol. 7,94. b J.S.Corbett, The Campaign of Trafalgar (new ed. London, 1919),392-3, copl then in oossessionof the United ServicesInstitution. 'Trafalgar', ; T"ylor, MM (1950), appendix 1',314-5, Captain Bayntun's coPy. d Vincennes, ServiceHistorique de la Marine, SHM V MS236 Nelson. . British Library, Add. Mss 33,963 fo. IO4: a photograph of the original is reproduced in N' Tracy, Ir{elson'sBattles. The Art of Victory in tbe Age of Sail (London, 1996), 177. f SturgesJackson, Logsof the Great Sea Figbts, vol. 2, 202 Coilingwood's Journai, 21 October 1805.NB: This list is undivided and the present author has split it at the obvious place, omitting the Victory, Royal Sovereign and Britannia, since their actual place in the order is not indicated. s Added in pencil later.
It remainsto placetheVictory, Royalso'uereign and Britanniainto the final order, though always bearing in mind that Nelson exceptedthe flagshipsof the first and 'Order secondin command, rhe Victory andRoyal Sovereign,from his of Sailingis to be the Order of Battle' instructions.a2If the former orders were adheredto, then in the absenceof the Swperb,the Victory would have been left as secondin her line, while tbe Royal Sorserrig,had been third in hers in all previous lists.The station of Admiral Northesk's Britannia ts more problematicai.On 2I October shewas to be found in Nelson's line, though her poor sailingqualities led Nelson to signalher to take such srarionas was -oti convenientat the time without regardfor the order of sailing.She was in Nelson'sline becausetwo of the admirals(Calder and Louis) and rVales rwo thr.e-d.ckers (Calder'sPrince of and Qween)were absentfrom his iine. Corbett has proposedthat Northesk was simply moved acrossfrom leading the seconddivisibn of th. lee line to Calder'splace leading the seconddivision of the weather line.a3However Table 1 shows that at the point when Nelson aPParently decided to allow Calder to take his flagship home and so removed the Prince of Wales from the order, he did not replace her with the Britannia. Moreover the Britanniawas sixth of the weather line into action atTrafalg"t, which evenallowing that theAgamemnon was not in her stationstill seemshigh f9r a thip of poor.saiiing qualities iT she began in Calder's former position. This migfrt indicate that she had b.g.rr further up, in the station formerly assignedto Admiral Louis in the Canoprys. Oi thes. gto.r.tdsin Table 2 the Britannia hasbeen assignedas replacementto the Canopwr a final intended order of sailing/order of battle suggestedas for the "rd ships^ sailing into action at Trafalgar. If the oid.r in Table2 is correci,then ilreAfrica should havebeen in Collingwood's lee line on rhe 2Ist, and it wouid appearthat Nelson adaptedhis initial plan to his reduced force at Trafalgarby keeping Collingwood up to full strength in order to annihilaterhe enemy rear)while girri"g maximum impact to his much-reducedvan bv placing all his own three-deckersat the head of his line. FIow quickly did theseships get into action? Nelson'sfeint towards the van meantthat it was Collingwood's line that got into action first. Nelson's original plan had envisagedan approachparallel to the enemy rearunril, at a signal,Col[ngwood's shipswould bear up together and_cutthrough 'go their opposit. trr.t-b.rs. The hasteto at them at once' in the prevailingweather conditions led ro an approach at a more vertical angle of around 70o towards an enemy thrown into r ion.r"e line by an earlier reversalof course and the lack of
i- 'r -, ....ALL / /-,l \flAS FTUSHEDUP,: TF{E,HIDDE,N TRAFALCAR
TABLE 2:The final intendedorder of sailing/orderof battle on 21 October Nelson's weather line Collingwood's lee line Temeraire M ars Victory Prince l,{eptune Royal Sovereign Britannia Tonnant Conqweror Belleisle Agamemnon Belleropbon Leviathan Colossus Ajax Achille Orion Polypbemws Minotaur Re'uenge Spartiate Sruiftswre Defence Africa Tbwnderer Defiance Dreadnowgbt Can this list can be reconciled with the statementsof participants as to their station in the battle? It has to be born in mind that some seem to have taken account of ships missing from their placeson the 21st and others did not. Robert Moorsom (T. SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great Sea Figbts, vol. 2,244) declared the Revenge srxth from the rear of the lee line, which 'Lee she was if the Africa was counted absent,while Thomas Huskisson (Anderson, Line', MM,vol.57 l197|l, 157) placed the Defence fifth from the rear, which she was if the Africa was still included! Henry Bayntun's statement (SomersetRecord Office, MS DD/HI 554) that the 's Leviatban station was four ships from the Victory but that he was able to place her third, involves even more complex counting. Table 1'shows that, excluding ships .,o, p..r.nr ar Trafalgar,he was fourth from theVictory.However on the2lst the Victory moved ahead of the Temeraire, but the Agamemnon was not in station and the Leaiatban overtook the Conqweror so that she was indeed third from the VictorT. This takes no account of the Britannia and Bayntun might thus seem to negate the placing of the Britannia in Table 2 which displacesthe Leviathan from her original fourth, but he possibly discounted her becauseshe had been moved acrosssubsequent to the 1O October order and on the 19th and 21st was also excusedfrom taking starion. Lastly, the late exchange of stations of the Prince and Mar.s seems supporred by Henry Mason's statement (NMM, MSN/1-7) that the Prince's allotted station was as second to Collingwood - i.e. supporter, next to him, in the same way that Nelson spoke of Keat's Swperbas his second when Nelson, like Collingwood, was third in his line (Nicolas, Dispatches and Letters, vol. 7, 123). wind.aaTo get his ships into action more quickiy all along the enemy rear, Collingwood signalledthem about 8.45amto form alarboard line of bearing and make more sail. Thereafterhe made a seriesof signalsto those sailing best ro ger them into action as quickly as possible:to the Belleisle(to changeplaces with the slower Tonnant),the Revengeand Achille. Collingwood's leadingships consequenrly plunged into the enemy rearon a very irregular quarter line from theRoyal Sovireign;s 'Ve starboardquarter. went down in no order but every man to take his bird', wiote Lieutenant Clements(Tonnant).'Admiral Collingwood dasheddirectly down, ....ALL \VASHUSFIED UP,: TFIE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 225 supportedby such shipsas could get upi Lord Nelson did the same,and the rest as fast asthey could', wrote Captain Moorsom of the Reoenge.a5\(/ithin 20 minutes of Collingwood engagingthe SantaAna (sixteenthfrom the rear) the next sevenships of his division were in action. The other seven,however, took considerablylonger: the first of them not until at least50 minutes after the battle began;the last not until nearly three hours later (Table 3).
TABLE 3: Approximate time shipsopened fire (in minutes) a Time after Time after Victory (c.12.20) Royal So'uereign(c.1,2.00) Africa + 8 (after Royal Temeraire + 1. Belleisle+ 10-13 Sovereign) Neptwne+ 10 Mars + 1.5 Leaiatban+ 3 Tonnant+ 1,5-20 Conqueror + 50 ' Bellerophon+ 10-15 Britannia+ 10 Colossws+ 20 Achille + 15 Reaenge+ 10 Ajax + c.4B Orion + 75 b Agamemnon+ 38-58 Polyphemws+ 50-60 d Dreadnought+ 65 Swiftswre+ ?' tll-AI hunderer + /v Defiance + 75 Spartiate + I2B Defence + 120-130 t Minotawr + 14Bc Prince + 170 " Although she was overtaken by the Leviathan before passingthe line, this time is so different from what is known of the Conqweror'sactions and those around her as sureiy to be an error in the log. b The Orion did not fire until she had a clearand close target. Her log records the she passed through the line c.45 minutes after the Victory opened fire. ' The Spartiate's log records the Minotawr as opening fire at the same time as her, but the Spartiate had passedthe latter in order to engagethe van. d The latter time in Henry Blackburn's letter, 1 November 1805,MM, vol. 65 (1979), 196. 'The Sruiftsure'slog failed to record the time she went into action, but the log of the Polypbemws \ocates her close on the latter's starboard quarter. f First figure from Midshipman Reid's letter,28 October 1B05,'Contemporary Letter on tafalgar', MM, vol. 9 (1,923),60. These figures are compiled from the ships' log entries printed in Sir N. H. Nicolas (.d.), Dispatcbesand Letters of Vice Admiral Lord ViscowntI,{elson (London, 1845-6), vol.7, SturgesJackson (.d.), Logsof the Great Sea Fighrs 1794-180I, vol. 2 (NRS, voi. 18, 1900), and the Report of a committee dppointed by the Admiralty to examine and consider the eoidence relating to tbe tactics employed by Nelson at tbe Battle of Trafalgar (London, 1913), using time lags of c.1Cminutes between the enemy opening fire and the Royal Sortereign,and c. five more minutes before the latter broke the line as benchmarks when others are not given. Becauseof the difficulties of recording or remembering times in action, these can only be very approximate, and they relate to when ships opened fire, which almost all recorded, rather th".r when they broke the line, which few noted (having other things on their mind at the rime!). 226 ....ALL \TAS HUSHE,DUP,: THE, HIDDE,N TRAFALGAR
A similar situation developedin Nelson's line, though his leadingships were tighter rogerherand constituted an awesome array of concentratedhitting 'thePower. Looking aheadfrom the Orion's quarterdeck,Edward Codrington saw that lee line were in much more open order than ours', whereas'[o]ur line pressedso much upon eachother asto go bow and quarterinstead of line ahead' .46 The next {ive ships *.t. in actionwithin 1O-15minutes of the Victory openingfire, though only four of these followed the Victory through the line, the last, the Britannia, remaining to windward, ranging the line firing at a distance,and not passingthrough for another two hours.azFlaving smashedtheir way into the enemy line a powerful follow-up was then needed,but the first of Nelson'sremaining five did not open fire for nearly 50 minutes after their commander and the last nearly two and a half hours later. Moreover, as will be shown below, many of these lagging ships opened fire long before they reachedthe positions of close engagementalongside which Neison desired.In consequencethe brunt of the fighting, the losses(Table 4) and the damage inflicted on the combined fleet'wascarried by eight of Collingwood's ships,five of Nelson's (six if the Britannia ts included) and the Africa movtng down the enemy van.
TABLE 4: British casualtiesat Traf.algar Veather line Lee line Victory 57k 1,02w 1,59 Royal Sovereign 47k 94w 141 Temeraire 47k 76w I23 B elleisle 33k 93w 1,26 l\,leptwne 10k 34w 44 M ars 29k 68w 98 Le,uiatban 4k 22w 26 Tonnant 26k 50w 76 Conqweror 3k 9w L2 Bellerophon 27k I23w 150 Colossws 49k 160w 200 Britannia 10k 42w 52 Achille 13k 59w 72 Revenge 2Bk 51w 79 Africa 18k 44w 62 Ajax 2k 9w 11, Polypbemws 2k4w6 Orion 1k 23w 24 Dreadnowght 7k 26w 33 Agamemnon2k 8w 10 Swiftswre 9k 8w 17 Minotawr 3k 22w 25 Thwnderer 4k I2w 16 Spartiate 3k 20w 23 Defiance 17k 53w 70 Defence 7k 29w 36 Prince ^ UKUWUal - " The diary of volunteer Lst classHenry Mason of the Prince records six wounded presumably too lightly to be returned as disabled (NMM, MSN/1 -7, entry for 2I October 1Bo5).
Vhat happenedto the remaining 12 and to the Britannia? What had they in common? If we look at the 24 captainsoutside the flagships,and henceresponsible for their own decisions,and comparethe 12 first engagedwith the 12 who lagged behind,it was not a matter of battle experience:four of thosenever in a battle before were among the former and three in the latter; all five who had not been in a battle for over 20 yearswere among the former. It was perhapsmore a matter of command ....ALL \VASHUSFIED UP,: TFIE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 227 experience:of 15 in their first command of a ship of the line, only six were among the first engagedand nine amongthose behind. The six most junior captains(includin[ two first lieutenantswho had been acting captainsfor just over a week while theii captainsreturned home for Calder'scourt martial) and nine of the ten most iunior were all in the rear.48 Due allowancemust be made for the light airs and breezeswhich meant that the better sailersinevitably surged aheadof the poorer, and those in the rear included the worst sailers,the Prince(98) and Dreadnowght(9S) who, like the Britannia,were permitted by Nelson to take station as convenient,without regardto the established order of sailing. Flowever, besidesthe Prince two others, the Agamemnon and Polyphemus)whosestation should have put them amongstthe leadinggroups engaged, found themselvesamong those at the rea\asdid otherswho might havebeen expe-ted to. move up from further down the line in the sameway as Moorsom's Riaenge when he correctly interpreted the situation as one in which the ships were ro ger down as fast as they could. After the battle Collingwood complained privately to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Barham,that'...although the exertionon the 21stwas very great,it was not equal by any means;some of the shipsin the rear of my line, although good sailing ships,did not answermy expectationsfully'.+r Collingwood possiblyhad threeparticular ships in mind. The 64 gun Polypbemus had been among the five'fastest-sailingships'sent aheadat nightfall on the 19th when Nelson thought the combined fleet was making a break for the Straits of Gibraltar.soYet going into action the Polyphemwswas behind her station and about to fall back further.Vhen Nelson madehis'England expects...'signal she had rhe siow Dreadnowgbt on her starboardbeam who returned her cheers,and about an hour and a quarter later the Dreadnowghlwas sti1lup with her, now on her porr beam and asking to passso that she could take on Gravina'sthree-decker flagihip Principede Asturias, thtd from the enemlrrear. The Polypbemusveered towards the sternmostship of the enemy line to let her through. Quite why shewas so siow to g_etinto actionis unciear,though onceshe got thereih. b.h"ved well enough,doubling the enemy line, relievingthe dismastedBelleisle by taking off her the FrenchAchttti, bringing down the latter's mtzzenmastand maintopmast and shooting away her foreyard. Vhen the Acbille's foretop caughtfire, she ceasedfiring and those in the Polyphemussaw a union flag being waved from her cathead.Passing on without stopping to take possession,she then went to the aid of the outnumbered Defence and finally bore up to prevent the escapeand take possessionof tw-o surrendered shipsdrifting towards the escapingenemy survivors.It was a creditablefinish from a shaky start. Her captain,Robert Redmill, who had only recently taken this, his first battleshipcommand, was allowed ill-health retirement the foliowin g year.sr The Defence too should have been further up the line. Despite her age (built 'Advanced 1763)she had beenone of Nelson's Squadronof fast-s"iiitrgShips Letween me and the Frigates'in the watch on Cadiz, and one of her midshipmen, Thomas 'one Huskisson,later thought her without doubt of the fastestships in the serviceon all points of sailing' .52 She had beendetached between the fleetstb watch the enemy motions, and 32 yearslater Fluskissonrecalled that rather than wait for heavy sailers to passin order to take up her stationfive from the rear,she came into action sooner .ttd..tgaged t hour 15 minutesafter theRoyalsoverrig:r.This is, however,not born out by the ship's log or by a letter written by another midshipman, Charles Reid, 228 ....ALL WAS HUSHED IJP,:THE HiDDE,N TRAFALGAR soon afterthe battle. Reid put her in action two hours after Coilingwood and the master'slog put it at 2 houis 1Ominutes. Reid declaredher to be'the last station'd ship'- probably becausethe Princehad fa1lensome 50 minutesbehind her, and most historians'accounts piace her the secondfrom last of Collingwood's line to enterthe batt1e.53Why shewas so slow into action is a mystery. FIer captain,George Hope, had commandeda frigate in Hotham's action off Genoa in 1795,and severalmore frigatesthereafteq taking command of the Defence rr^April 1805.FIe was one of the 'skilful Officers who would spareno pains to executewhat was possible',to whom Coliingwood entrustedthe sinking of the hulks after the storm, to prevent them falling backinto the handsof the enemy,and later he performed well administratively in the Baltic and at the Admiralty.saOnce engagedat Trafalgarhe performed well also in action,taking on the Berwick, another Frenchmanand the San lldefonso f.or 46 minutes until relievedbv the British Achille (which took off the Berwich) and Polyphemus)whereupon he chased,caught and after a long fight captured the San Ildefonso - all of which makes the Defence'sslow approachto the battie the more inexplicable. The Defiance had the ability to advancebeyond her station yet seemsto have 'the failed to do so. Her captain,Philip Durham, thought her fastestsailing ship of her rate in the British navy', and a number of historianshave shown her up to ninth place in their battle plans.Howevea if the time of opening fire is any measure,she was still in her stationbehind the Thunderer,with only the Defence andPrince behind her. As will be shown below, there do seemto have been captainsmore concerned with keepingtheir station rather than getting up quickly, and perhapsDurham was one. Once engaged,however, he was preparedto get alongside,incurring the biggest casualtiesof the rear ships in his contestswith the Principe de Asturias and L'Aigle, the latter of which struck to him.55 Two other ships, the Su:iftsure and Thwnderer, as well as the lumbering Prince, also seemto have allowed themselvesto be overtakenby the slow sailing Dreadnowgbr,which enteredthe battle well aheadof her station accordingto Collingwood'sjournal, beginning to engageabout t hour 5 minutesafter Collingwood in a performancethat was rather better than that for which he subsequentiygave her credit. The Swiftsure's captain,\flil1iam Rutherford, who was one of the more junior, had only in 1805taken over this his first battleshipcommand, and seemshitherto to have specializedin amphibious warfare and not been in a seabattle or lesseraction before. \Whenfinally up, the Swiftsure headedthe Polypbemusin the relief of the Belleisle,exchangirg shots with a Spanishand a French ship and, accordingtoJames, who later interviewedparticipants, joining with the Polyphemusin the fight with the Achille, and passingon when the latter surrenderedto assistthe Defence agarnstthe San Ildefonso.The Tbwndererwas commandedby her first lieutenant,going first to the assistanceof the Reoenge,beieaguered by the Principe de Asturias and others, joining with the Dreadnoughr in the attack on the Spanishflagship, then engaging the Frenchlr,leptune)which cameto the latter'sassistance. Vhen the latter two then 'haul'd made off, the Thunderer our wind and stood into the body of the Fleet', where she was ordered by Collingwood to chasefour fleeing ships from the van, which shedid until abandoningthe pursuit at dusk.56The Prince,though stationed Collingwood's second,in fact becamethe last of his line to enter the battle. Shewas '1ike describedthe yearbefore as sailing a haystack',and daylight on the 21stcaught ....ALL \(/ASHUSHED UP': TFIE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 229
split foretopsail, she quickly her already out of station having ro lepa_ira .so,that and ob.y.d N.lron's permissivesignit U;r hauling to po.t to allow the lines to form 50 then saiied down between the"two iines. Sh; did not get up untii some 2 hours the minutes afterCollingwood first engaged.Arriving at the end of the battle' to apparentastonish-.it of onlookersln"th. Polypheh?t.,she-three then attackedthe Acbille, her #tri.l, had already struck to them, and in broadsidesbro"ghJ down - - fire to the rest of-the ship so remaining burning foretopmasr, which spreadth.e Ric^hardGrindall, at the age of 5s was the that rh. Jhortly bleir.rp.sT H.o captain, 'skilful oldest in the fleet. FIe was among tir. *ort experiencedand another of those Officers' ..rr..rrredby CollingwJod to disposeo{ endangeredprizes. in the aftermath of the battle.Collingwood *"i willing to .i.nre the Prince'spoor sailingperformance, with that of ih. Dread,norgbti^s due to bad copper sheathing,writing to the "Lorrg 'Th-. get fLyrrlonth dock yard commission'erthat ships thrt were foul never could^ *.tt up. I ,.ri. thePrince andDreadnow.ght*..9 to be pitied.-Hitg every effort, "* the businesswas finished almost before th.y could get down'. Flowever' looking back ren yearslater, Collingwood's f|1g captan)Edward Rotheram, acidly recorded 'behav.d that Grindali ,,ot6riously ill in the Traf algaraction'.58 Admiral Tayior has alsosougLrt to excusethe delay in theseships entering action more by proposing ti^tthe rear shigsLf th..:".TI.line'drifting, altered course_four points or them, to leew"rd tl avoid the piled-"p m0l6e of fighting, ships aheadof 'brought the which the ,"^i ships of Cottingwood's coiumn nearly astern' and as converging,Jtion becam" , .frrr.'. This is not altogetherconvincing asships such and.enqtgi",g thepriirii, d.,Astwrias and thosearound her stayed.to!gh.l,entering, felt shipsi.r, th. mO16e,and it is not an explanationused_by Collingwood. He clearly thrt some of his rearships should have got uP quicker.se be Nor was such an excuseavailable ro ih. weatherline, where somethingh1t 1o said of Lord Northesk and the Britannia's conduct before looking at those behind eyes him in Nelson's rear.Northesk's was an undistinguishedcareer, tarnished i1 the to of his superiorswhen as caprainof the Mon*orth at the Nore mutiny, he bowed. to the Admiraity' pressureiro* the mutin..., to 89 to London and explaintheir case h. ..rigned his command*hetithe mutiny.collapsedand so missedthe oppgrtunity to redeemhimself at Camperdown.F{e was third in command atTrafalgarless because Scottish .f f.i, than be."rrseof his political'pu11'-.since^- 1796 he had been a "Uifi,y and becauseof the temPorary absence represenrarlvef ..,- in the House tf Lords of other more senior admirals- Louis guarding the Passageof a trooP c-onvoyTd Duckworth not yet arrived to replaceCllder. n. h"d, howeve\ an active flag captain overtaken by the in Charles Bul1l.r, the Britannia, a slow sailer,was 9"lI "rrd through between Conqweror andLeviathan rngettingup sixth when the Victory .bro.k5 and his theBucentaure and Red.out;bledig. 2). The claim by Northesk's chaplain signals*idrhip*" that shewas io.rith in in Nelson'sline must be interpreted ".tion ahead.of as'the fo.rrrh io op.r fire - one of his own lieutenantslists the five ships studding him.6oFl"rri.rg nearthe enemyline, however,the Britannia rcokin her "rri,r.d tradition sails earlyand did not passthrough'it. Bullen'sbiographer records a family to obey that ,h. i*o ilJ qr".i.lled in,1i. withlh. fl"g cap.tainre{using "pproach was Northesk's desir. io ,horren sail.61At^all events,the Britannia'sweight and size s.ignals not used ro engageclosely alongside and overPowerany enemy ship'Y:t 'our as midshipman ,..Zoid.d, that iir. -"r not directed to one particular ship, but ....ALL na \TAS HUSHED UP': THE,HIDDEN TRAFALGAR
u"*F-r_:a$1*.*'t_rv3t'
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Fig. 2 (above and adjacent). Charts of the battle drawn rp by Captains Lucas (Redowtable) and Majendie (Bucentawre).It suited the French captives to show that they were overwhelmed by denselypacked columns of British ships. Majendie's diagram quickly appearedin print in London and influenced British images of the battle. ....ALL WAS HUSHED UP,: THE HIDDE,N TRAFALGAR 231,
Position of the two Fleets at the opening of the Battle of Trafalgar
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SKETCH-I',LAP ANT\EXED TO THE REPORT OF CAPTAIN LUCAS OF THE REDOUTABLE 232 ....ALL \VASFIUSHED IJP,:THE, HIDDEN TRAFALCAR soon as one had struck to us we immedi ately made to others and at one time had S shipsblazing awayupon us, but we soon tired them out'. There is no record of any ship striking to the Britannia - the Bucentaure struck to the Conqueror, with whom shewas closely engaged ratherthan to the Britannia frctnginto her from a distance. , 'Continued One of the laiter's-lilutenants, Barclay,explained the fact that she John 'main edgingon slowly' asdue to the very little wind and that the topsailin particular was shot almost entirely from the yard'. Two hours and ten minutes after she went into action she finally passedthrough the line and tacked to larboard. There she 'kept played out a protective role, being variously describedas having up a heavy fire on both sideson everyFrench or Spanishensign flying nearus', and by the naval 'singly biographerMarshall that she engagedand kept at bay three of the enemy's van ships that were attempting to double on the Victory at that time much disabled and.warmly engagedwith two of the enemy'. This again ignores the rather lrlore positive contribution and capturesmade by others in confronting the van attack. There is little to positively contradi.ctRotheram's subsequentjudgement that 'behaved Northesk too notoriously ill in the Trafalgar action'.62 If Table 2 rs acceptedas the intended order of sailing,the ship that should have followed the Conqueror into action was Edward Berry's Agamernnon,and she too playedan equivocalpartin the battle.From his knowledgeof his former ship,Nelson 'Advanced had added her to his Squadron of fast-sailingships between me and the frigates'when shearrived shortly before the battle.The Agamemnon)however, was not well handled by his former flag captain. On the day before the battle it took 'with repeatedsignals made many guns'by the commanderof the frigates,Blackwood, to prevent the Agamemnon from sailing into the enemy f1eet.Blackwood then sent her to signalto Nelson the sizeand situation of the enemy fieet, but on the way she lost her maintopmastin a squall and stoppedto replaceit, and this put her far out of position to.takeher stationin the line on the morning of the 21,st.Even then shewas siow to get up: whereasthe log of the Conqueror, near Nelson ahead,records that 'Bore between 5am and 6am she up and made all sail in chace',it was only at Bam 'Made that the Agamemnon'smaster recorded that she all Saiito get in our Station', and she arrived up three behind her appointed station astern of the Conqweror.63 Berry was not renowned for his seamanship,but rather as a doughty fighter who was reputed to have been in more battlesthan any other officer. Flowever while he excelledunder the direction of others,he seemsto havefloundered when in command himself. FIe made a bloodily expensivemess of the capture of the Guillawme Teil when in command of the superior ship Foudroyant tn 1800.In the approach at 'far Trafalgar,the Orion's captain,Codrington, describedthe Agamemnon as astern of us, ...blaztng awayand wasting her ammunition'. When Berry finally got up, the 'i. 19! naval biographer}Iarc\4l opaquely recorded that dggr apqear that .any opportunity wasafforded him of particularly distinguishinghimself on that occasion'. This contrasts with Codrington and with Bayntun of the Leviathan who made opportunitiesfor themselvesby selectingand capturing targetswhen the enemy van camedown towards the enciof the battle.6a Berry, like the othersin the rea\ was in receipt of Nelson'sfinal instructionsthat 'they if they could not get into action immedi atrJyby the prescribedmode of attack might adopt whatever they thought best, provided it led them quickly and closely alongsidean enemy'. This was carried down the line by ^ lieutenant of the frigate ....ALL \TAS HUSHED IJP,:THE HIDDEN TRAFALCAR 233
Euryalus, finally reaching the last ship Spartiate I hour 46 minutes after Nelson engaged.65However only Codrington in the Orion seemsto have respondedto it, striking out to starboard from Nelson's approach and breaking the enemy line bet-ei theSanta Ana,,which had struck, and the largelydismasted Royal Sortereign. Thencehe continuedto the assistanceof the Colossusin Coilingwood's division where he delivered the cowpde grkce to her battered opponent, the French Swiftswre,with a devastatingclose broadside which brought down her masts,leaving her to strike to the former. FIe then moved up tos/ards the van, relieving the Leviatban and Africa from the damaging attack of the fresh French Intr|pide, which he then engaged closely and captured aftera stubborn resistance.66The Ajax, aheadof the Orion tn the line, was in the hands of her first lieutenant,who had only been acting c^ptatn for a week and who, Codrington charitablp,recorded,did not seethings as quickiy asher far more experiencedabsent captain would havedone. Both actingcaptains in the fleet played fatrly safeand conventionally in their first battie in comm and.67 Harder to explain is the far slower approachof the last two ships in Nelson's line, rheMinotawr andSpartiate,which dropped considerablybehind the rest. So far behind were they that they neverreached the enemyline. Insteadthe enemyreached them when five of the van camedown the windward side of the battle to seewho they might rescueand found the Minotaur and Spartiatein their path. Why they were so far behind is uncleaqbut it seemsthat attention to station-keepingplayed its parr. As they beganto go down towards the enemy,the ships of both lines that had fallen out of placeattempted to get backinto their sailingorder/order of battle. 'made Codrington in the fast-sailingOrion recorded that he and shortenedsail occasionallyto keep our station'. This station-keepinginevitably produced a tatl- back effectas slower sailersheld back othersin the line behind them, but Codrington 'a later told his wife that ship being late in action was no discredit to her if shewas not behind her station',and while he took an independentcourse once he had received Nelson's message,others still looked to keep to that principle.68This seems particularly true of_theSpartiate which, when stationedastern of the Minotaur the 'like prevrousyear, was describedas sailing a witch', alwaysbest at night and putri.g 'pooped' th. l"tt.r in constantdanger of being by her.The Minotawr'slog showsthat throughout the morning she crawled down at a consistentone knot, whereasthose aheadof her were logging 1,y2-3knots. Yet only asthe enemy van shipscame down did the Spartiate'scaptain hail to be allowed to passahead of her in order to get into a better position to prevent them linking with their centre.6eBoth captainswere in their first battle and their first ship of the line command. The Spartiate'scaptain, Laforey,had been a successfulfrigate commander,but the impressionremains of an officer more concernedwith keeping his station in the line than with Nelson's injunction ro get into battle quickly. The two ships behavedweil once threatened, standingtogerher to engagethe first four French ships asthey came by in a manner vrhich h.lped influence the van commander,Dumanoir, to abandon an1 designsto rnterveneand to make off, and then combining againstthe final Spanishl{eptwno, which stoppedto fight, and which they took afteranother stubborn resistance.To The .o.rr.qn.n.. of all this was that a cleargap developedbetween the leading half of eachline which engagedquickly and closely(the Britannia excepted)and the remainder who straggledrp more slowly from the rear. Collingwood's first ejght shipswere al1in .lose ,ction scattereddown the enemy rearwithin 20 minutes of the 234 ...ALL \TAS FIUSHE,DUP': THE FIIDDEN TRAFALGAR
Royal Sooereignopenrng fire, most of the rest of his ships then came into action between 50 and 75 minutes later and the last two 150 and 1/O minutes later resp.ectively.Flowever, coming. into action for them meant gpening fire rather than getting up to engageclosely alongside(see below). Similarly with Nelson, whose first sixships were in actionwithin 10-15minutes, three more entering40-50minutes after the Victory opened fire, and two more between 128 and 150 minutes later. Lastly, theAfrica,whrle openingfire about 15 minutes beforetheVictory andplaying some part in distractingand holding the van as she ran down it, did not get into a position to provide direct support to Nelson's attack for about 95 minutes after the Victory openedfire, when the'poor little 64' joined the attack on the 130 gun SantissimaTrinidad by taking up a raking position on her larboard bow. Not oniy did the delay in these ships getting up jeopardize the outnumbered ships aheadof them, but growing impatient to contribute, they beganto fire earlyat Iong distance.I have explored and explainedmore fully elsewherethe considerable variations in British gunnery performance at Trafalg"t, and this long-distancefire was a major handicap.TlThe ensuingsmoke hindered their ability to selecta target 'It to attackwhen they got up. After the Britannia openedfire, wrote John Barclay, becameimpossible to tracefarther exceptat intervals,when the smoke clearedaw^y a little'.72Codrington reservedhis fire in coming down, looking for a targetthat he would get alongsideand then open fire, but he found that he was alone in this and that'the shot from friends and foeswere flying about us like hailstones'.Ten minutes before he felt himself nearenough to fire at a ship he was approaching,Codrington 'not had to ask a ship on his quarter to fire into us in her eagernessto fire at the distant enemy'.73Similarly the Polyphemushad to ask the Swiftswre to ceasefiring when shebegan to take hits from the latter firing acrossher bow.7aNelson had told his captainsto get quickly and closely alongsidean enemy,but a number who failed to do either of these obstructed the efforts of others. Attempting to close with a French two-deckea Codrington found himself cut out by the Ajax and could only '...made fire at a distance.He then for Admiral Gravina in the Princeof the Asturias, but the Dreadnowgbt againcutme out there,and yet, like theAjax didnot.lor. "rri make a finish of it'. A secondattempt to get alongsidethe Spanishflagship was 'by similarly prevented the Britannia ranging her line, and continued in acti.on'.75 The battle beganabout noon, giving only just over 5Y+hours of fighting time to achievedecisive victory before dusk put an end to the chancesof successfulpursuit. In that time the sheerhard fighting of the leadinghalf of eachof the British lines that were quickest into action createdthe conditions for victory. Their sustainedheavy hitting when surrounded by superior numbers is{ justly iauded high point of the British performancein the baltle. This was not only becaur. oi the immense destructionthey infiicted and the shipsthat struck to them, but alsothrough enabling a number of easierand less costly victories over shatteredenemy ships for those eventuallycoming into actionbehind them. Floweverthere were neverenough British ships up in time to prevent a number of enemy ships escapingfrom those targeted for annihilation by Nelson - those cut off from just in front of the cenrre baik to their rear.Eight of theseescaped, as did sevenmore from those forward ro the van - of whom more could havegot away had not three othersT6sought ro savehonour by making hopelesslate rescue charges back into British fleet where they were inevitably outnumbered and overwhelmed: 1B captured or destroyed (Nelson had bargained ....ALL \TAS HUSHE,DUP,: THE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 23s for 20) might so easilyhave been only 15! On the other hand more might havebeen taken (and less casualtiesinflicted on the leading British ships) if the rear British ships-Vhy had got up quicker and engagedthe enemy more ciosely. they were slower in getting up and why they did not engageclosely will never be fully explainedbecause there was no enquirS no courts martial after the battle. Questions were soon askedafterwards, as the survivors in the leading ships comparedcasualty lists and consideredwho and what they had seen.The verdict of 'only the lower deck was swift: fourteen of us to come into action', wrote seaman John Brown of the Victory.'There is some of our shipsto be kept out of land for seven)rears for not coming into action[,] there was the most of our heavy ships sculk't away and the poor little 6a lAfricaf come into action. There is the Prince 98 had nobody killed and wounded.'77 Neverthelessthings did not degenerateinto the vicious feuding and back-biting so frequently seenin the past. Partly, this would seemto have been becauseof a reluctancero do anything that would besmirchthe memory of Nelson'sheroic death amidst his last and greatestvictory, but more clearly it seemsto havebeen the result of the determinedefforts of the new commanderin chief,Collingwood. An eyewitness recordedthat when the fri$ate commanderBlackwood hinted to Coilingwood after 'there the battle that had beena want of exertionon the part of someparticuiar ship', 'Sir, the latter startedup and said, this has been a glorious victory f9l England and for Europe - don'tlet therebe a reflectionagainst [even] a cabinboy'.7s Collingwood 'wrote to his and Nelson's old patron, Sir Peter Parker,that
Our ships were foughtwith a degree of gallantry that would have warmed your heart, - everybody exerted themselves,and a glorious day they made of it. People who cannot comprehend how complicated an affat a battle is at sea,and judge of an officer's conduct by the number of sufferers in his ship, often do him wrongi though there will appear great difference in the loss of men, all did admirably well, and the conclusion was grand beyond descripti on.7e Why was Collingwood so determined to cover up for his more errant subordinates?Principally becauseof bitter memories of having been implicitly malignedhimself on zuclran occasion11 yearsbefore. At the Glorious First of June lZg{Coilingwood had beenflag captainof the Barflewr,taking full_command when his admiralwas wounded. Vhen afterthe battle the commanderin chief,Earl Howe, was askedto write a public letter naming thosewho had distinguishedthemselves in the action,Collingwood's namewas not included.Only thosewho were namedwere then given.o-r.r.-orative medals.He complained that the fleet was thrown into 'the uimost consternationand astonishment'by Howe's letter and, asfor himself,he was
...sick with mortification that there should be the shadow of a suspicion that every possible exertion had not been made by the Barflewr, in the mind of any man, and felt it an injustice that such an insinuation shou'd go into the world. ...I could not help thinking, the manner in which we were exciuded,bore hard upon injustice:there was an impiication of defect, of which I was not conscious,for from the beginning of the Action until the end of it, we were hotly engaged.So himself at the Collingwood nursedhis grievanceuntil afterhe had -distinguished Battleof CapeSt Vincent in tlgl,whereupon he declinedto acceptthe victory medal ....ALL 236 VAS HUSHE,DUP,: TFIE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR until he also receivedone for the First of telling his commander in chief, Sir 'I June, John Jervis,that feelthat I was then improperly passedover: and to receivesuch a distinction now, would be to acknowledgethe propriety of that injustice'.81He receivedboth, and he praisedthe way he thought Jervis had avoidedthe possibility of recriminationsin his victory dispatch:
What is particularly h"ppy to this great event is that there is no drawback, no slander - though all were not equally engaged,all did what was in their power to reduce them, and I understand the Admiral has wisely avoided ail partial praise of those whose ill luck prevented their getting into conspicuous situations.82 In his own dispatch after Trafalgar he therefore tried to do the same.Apart from praising Blackwood for his vigilanceand reporting of the enemy movementswhen commanding the frigates,he named no-one except those who were dead and he singled out only one incident (the Temeraire sandwichedbetween the captured Fowgwewxand llleptuno) as an example strongly marking'the invincible spirit of British seamen,when engagingthe enemiesof their counrry'.83 He told the secretary to rhe Admiralty, Villiam Marsden, that
After such a Victory it may appearunnecessary to enter into encomiums on the particular parts taken by the severalcommanders; the conclusion says more on the subject than I have the language to express;the spirit which animated all was the same; when all exert themselveszeaiously in their country's service,all deservethat their high merits should stand recorded; and never was high merit more conspicuous than in the battle I have described.Ba
And he issueda generalorder to Northesk and all his captainsthanking them, their officers,seamen and marinesfor'their highly meritorioui conduct' in the battle and the storm that followed and askingfor this to be communicatedto their crews.S5 NeverthelessCollingwocd was fully awareof what had happenedand hostile to captainsclaiming too greatcredit asmuch asto others incurr,ingtoo much criticism. \flhen the captain of the Defiance boastedof his taking L'Aigli, Collingwood 'quite grew indignant at his pres_umption;because he himself saw-her closely and si"gly engagedwith the poor Belleropbonvery long before Captain [Durham] could hive beenin action'.86 Hit captainstook the hint asto their behaviourand toned down their judgements. Criticisms were made by Collingwood's officers,bur privately and cautiouily after the commander in chief's attitude becameknown. Black-ood told his wife that he '. watched the battle . .As a spectator,who saw the faults, or rather mistakes,on both sides...',and Codringtondeciaredthat'...itwas all well done errorsexcepted and I hope we shall have no abuseabout want of good conduct'.B7This is not io r"y that grlevanceswere not harbouredand neverre-emerged. Five years afterCollingwood's death, in 1815, his Trafalgar flag captain, Rotheram, responded ro rhe n."*r that Northesk and Grindall were to be promoted GCBs by drafting a letter ro a newspaper 'Philo editor, under the pseudonym Verus', protesting thai the rewards orrghi to 'having b:.1 given to those been really present at the battle of Trafal[ar'.ss !3". "stand NeverthelessCollingwood's actions ensured that the battle was allowed to unstainedas the classic,heroic British navalvictory. As a participanr,\X/illiam Pringle 'So Green,later wrote, greatwas the joy of all the peopleol Englandand the r.-"iri"r.g Admiral, that all was hushedup'.8e ....ALL \TAS HUSFIED UP,: TFIE HIDDE,N TRAFALGAR 237
References
1 Seefor examplesN. A. M. Rodger,TLe career of aTrafalgar captain, now admiral, Eliab Commandof tbe Ocean.A naoal bistoryof Brit- Harvey, whose violent abuse against Gambier ain 1649-181 t (London, 2004),1.65, 267 , 275, when the attack was entrusted to Cochrane led 324. to his court martiai and dismissal from the serv- 2 lbid, 1,46,266-7, 338-9; P. A. Luff, ice. Reinstatedin his rank and seniority in 1810, 'Matthews v Lestock:Parliament, politics and he was never employed again. the navy in mid-eighteenth-centuryEngland', 12 A. Perry (.d.), The Admirals Fremantle Parliamenta,ryHistoryt, vol. 1O(1.99L), 45-62; B. (London, 1,971),76. Tunstall,Admiral Byrg and the Lossof Minorca 1,3English Historical Review, vol. 5 (1890), (London, 1,928);D. Pope,At 12 Mr Byng zuas 769,letter to father,28 October 1805. 'The sbot (London, 1962);J. H. Broomfieid, 14 National Maritime Museum, Greenwich Keppel-PalisserAffair, 1778-1'779',MM, vol. 47 (hereafterNMM), JOD/48, \f' P. Green's ac- 'The (1,961),195-207; N. Rogers, Trial of Ad- count of Trafalgar 19. miral Keppef in N. Rogers,Crowds, Cwltwre 15 Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters, T5-6, and Politicsin GeorgianBritain (Oxford, 1998), BO,to Barham 5 October, to George Rose 6 122-5r. October 1805. 3 G. R. Barnesand J. H. Owen (eds),The 16 lbid,95, to Collingwood, 9 October Private Papersof John, Earl of Sandwich,vol. 3 1BO5. (Navy RecordsSociety, voI.75, 1,936),20L,to L7 Ibid, 25L; H. G. Thursfield, Fbe l''la'ual Sandwich,16 February1780. Journals 1789-181) (Nary Records Society,vol. 4 D. Spinney,Rodney (London, 1969), ch. 91,,1.951),364. 'Divided 'The 1B-2I; K. Breen, command:the Vest 1B E. Fraser, journal of Commander Indies and North Amerrca,L780-1,781', in J. Thomas Colby, R.N. 1797-181'8',MM, vol. 13 Black and P. Voodfine (eds),The Britisb Navy (1.927),264. and the Useof Naaal Poraerin tbe Eighteentb 19 Nicolas, Dispatcbesand Letters, vol.7, Century (Leicesteq1988), t91.-206. 89. 5 G. B. Mundy, Tbe Life and Correspond- 20 lbid,80. enceof tbe Late Admiral Lord Rodney (Lon- 21,Ibid,89. The memorandum was copied don, 1830),vol. 2, 358. and issuedto captainsover 9-10 October. For a 6 Sir N. H. Nicolas (ed.),Dispatcbes and recent extensivere-examination see M. Czisnik, 'Admiral Letters of ViceAdmiral Lord Viscowntlx[elson Nelson's tactics at the Battle of Trafal- (London,1845-6), vol. 1, 499;G. B. P. Naish gar', History, vol. 89 (2004), 549-59. FIer dis- (.d.), Nelson'sLetters to hisWife and otherdocw- cussion draws upon the much neglectedReport ment; 1785-183,1(Navy RecordsSociety, vol. of a committee appointed blt tbe Admiralty to 100,1 958), 200, 2024, 215-16. examine and consider the ersidencerelating to I'{elsonat the Battle of 7 J. Bourchier(ed.), Memoir of the Lrf, of tbe tactics employed b1t Admiral Sir Edward Codrington (London, Trafalgar (London, 1,913),to which the present 1873),vol.1, 36. Codrington was present in com- author has now added the evidence of the or- mand of the frigateLa Babet. ders of sailing. B C. Lioyd, St Vincentand Camperdor-un 22 lbid,90, n' 2. (London, 1963),L60-2. n lbid,60, to Lady Flamilton 1 October g C. Vhite, 1797.I',{elson's Year of Des- 1BOs. n. 9. tiny (London,1998 ), 53,73-B;Lloyd, St Vin- 24 |bid,89,241 centd,nd Camp erdown, 86-92. 25 lbid,91.. 'Sir 1ON. Tracy, Robert Calder'sAction', 26 lbid,150 (author'sitalics). MM, vol 77 (1991.),259-69. 27 lbid,9A. 11 SeeB. Vale, Tbe AwdaciowsAdmiral 28 SturgesJackson, Logs of tbe Great Sea Cochrane.The trwelife of a naoal legend(Lon- Fights,vol. 2, 14942aPassim. (transl') don,2OO4), Ch. 5. BasqueRoads also ended the 29 E. Desbribre and C' Eastwick ....ALL 238 \7ASFIUSHED UP': THE, HiDDE,N TRAFALCAR
(.d.), Tbe l,taval Campaignof 180t. Trafelgar encesin Collingwood's list from that in Table 1 (Oxford, 1933),vol 2, 131,Villeneuve's Final are that the stations of the Prince and Mars are Instructions. reversed and that Collingwood places the Af- Yl )Q I clem. rica astern of the Defence - which is also the 'souvenirs 31 A. Gicquei des Touches, d'un place at which the Africa has been pencilled in, marin de la R6publique', pt 2, Revwe des Dewx after 10 October, in Maicolm's list (Vincennes, Mondes,vol. 28 (1905),424. SHM V MS236 Nelson). 32 I dem; Desbridre/Easrwick,Ir,[ aval Cam- 42 Nicolas, Dispatchesand Lefiers, vol.7, paign of 1505,vol.2, I45,194. 89. 33 SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great Sea 43 Corbett, Campaign of Trafalgar,393J. Figbts, vol. 2, 297, lournal of Captain Henry 44 See the outline sketch in Captain Digby, 21 October 1805. Moorsom's letrer to his father, 1 November 1805, 34 Ibid, 202., Collingwood's Journal, 2I in NMM, AGC/M/5 (omitted in the printed October 1805; G. L. Newnham Collingwood, version in SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great A Selectionfrom the Pwblic and Private Corre- Sea Fights, vol. 2,2421). spondenceof Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood 45 lbid,, 243; E. Fraseq The Sailors whom (London, 1829), 125. Did Collingwood cover I,,[ekonled (London, 1913),318. up for himself when he wrote in his victory des- 45 Bourchter, Codrington, vol. L, 64. 'about patch that he broke through the rwelfth 47 The order given in Table 3 is to be pre- 'The from the rear' (Nicolas, Dispatchesand Lefters, ferred to the inaccurare Order in which th. vol.7,213)? Shipsof the British Squadron attackedthe Com- 35 SturgesJackson, Logs of tbe Great Sea bined Fleetson the 21stof October, 1BO5'which Fights, vol. 2,225, Ehab Harvey, Temeraire,to Collingwood attached in haste to his victory his wife, 23 October 1BO5;Nicolas, Dispatcbes dispatch immediately after the battie (Nicolas, and Letters.,vol.7, 186, n. 7, Irleptune'sLog - Dispatches and Lefiers, 'about vol. 7, 215), and which the 13th or 14th ship', 753,Victory's Log seemsbased on the list in his journal (Table 1:5) says she fel1 onboard the tenth and eleventh as amended by what he then knew of certain ships,but historianshave readjusted this. SeeFig. ships (e.g. Belleisle passrng Tonnant) and plac- 6 in the most authoritarive account, A. H. Tayloa ing the Britannia 'The and Africa at the end of Nel- Battle of Trafalgar', MM, vol. 36 (1950), son's line and the Prince and Dreadnougbt at 281-32r. the end of his own - the ships which had been 36 Nicolas, Dispatcltesand Letters, vol.7, put out of the line or had neier joined it. 9a; I.S. Corbetr., The Campaign of Trafalgar 48 For their dates of posting seeD. Syrett (new ed. London, 19i9),392-3. and R. L. DiNardo (eds), Tbe Commissioned .The 37 lbid, 393-5; R. C. Anderson, Lee Sea Officers of the Royallrtavy 1660-181t (Nrry Line at Trafalgar', MM, vol. 57 (1971), 157-61. Records Society Occasional Publications 1, 3B This order of sailing is held by the Serv- 1994). For their careers see the entries in R. H. ice Historique de la Marine at Vincennes (SHM Mackenzie, Tbe Trafalgar Roll (London, 1913), V MS236 Nelson). Curiously it also excludesthe the Oxford Dictionary of l{ational Biograpby Dreadnought entvely. The Africa has been pen- and John Marshail, Royal l,,laaal Biography cilled in later as fourteenth in Collingwood's (London, 1823-5). line after the Defence. I am grateful ,o ili.hol", 49 Sir J. K. Laughton (.d.), Letters and pa- Rodger for bringing this document to my at- pers of Charles, Lord Barham, vol. 3 (Navy tention. RecordsSociety, vol. 39, IglI),327, to Barham, 39 British Library Add. Mss 33,963,fo.1,04: 26 October 1805. a photograph 'The of the original is reproduced in 50 William Pryce Cumby, Battle of N. Tracy, Ir/elson'sBattles. The Art of Victory in Trafalgar (an unpublished narrative)', The Irline- the Age of Sait (London, 1996),I77. teenth Centwry, vol. 46 (Iggg),720. 40 SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great Sea 51 Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters, vol.7, Fights,vol.2,2O2,journal entry 21 October 1g05. 1,55-6,n. 7; SrurgesJackso n, Logsof tbe Great 41 Excluding the flagships, the only differ- Sea Figbrs,vol. 2,292-3; N. A. M. Rodger, .An ....ALL \TAS HUSHED UP,: THE HIDDEN TRAFALGAR 239
eye-witness account of Trafalgar', MM, vol. 55 Jackson, Logsof the Great SeaFights, vol. 2,2!4. (1,979),196. Between 4am and 9am the Poly- 61 A. M. Broadley, The Three Dorset Cop- phemws logged herself as making only one knot tains at Trafalgar (London, 1906),253 n. when everyone else whose log survives in the 62 SturgesJackson, Logs of tbe Great Sea lee iine except t"he Thwnderer were averaging Fights, vol. 2,214; RNM, MSS 225, Vells 30 more - at 7am the Tonnant \ogged 2, Rez,enge October; Marshall, Royal I',lartalBiographl, vol. Jl/aaal Cbroni- |s/e , Dreadnowgbt IVz , Swiftsure 21/2,Defiance 1 pt 1, 206-7 (taking his cue from 2, Tbwnderer 1.,Defence lVz and even Prince 2 cle vol. XV [1806), 444-7);NMM, LBK/3 B,Com- knots. monplace book of Captain Edward Rotheram. 52 Nicol as,Dispatcbes and Letters, vol. 7, 63 SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great Sea 73, 111; T. Huskisson, Eyezuitnessto Trafalgar Fights, vol. 2, 1,47-8;Report of...tactics...at... (Royston, Herts, 1985),66. Trafalgar,T, 14.The Conqwerorherself had been 'Contemporary 53 Letter on Trafaigar', overtaken by the Leviathan. There are shades MM, vol. 9 (1923),60; SturgesJackson, Logsof in the Agamemnon's dismasting of the incident the Great SeaFights, vol. 2,261-2. when Berry and Nelson in the Vangward were 54 Nicolas, Dispatcbesand Letters, vol. 7, caught by a storm off Corsica in M"y 1798 and 217, to Marsden, 24 October 1805;Mackenzie' dismastedwhile the rwo ships in company were Trafalgar Roll, 1Bo-1. undamaged (B. Lavery, Nelson and tbe Nile 55 Marshall, Royal I',[aval Biograpbl, vol. [London, 1998], 66-73). 'The 2,453; D. B. Smith, Defiance atTrafalgar', 64 For the Guillawme Tell episode see ScottisbHistorical Revier.u.,voi. 20 (1922-3),11,6- WilliamJames, The Ir{avalHistory of Great Brit- 21; Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters,vol. 7,203- ain (London, 1837),vol. 3,1.6-1,9and G. S. Par- (London, 1998 4, n. 6; SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great Sea sons, I'/elsonianReminiscences Figbts, vol. 2, 253-4. edn), 15-24; far Tra{algar, Bourchier, Cod- 'Journal 56 Fraser, of Commander Thomas rington, vol. 1, 64 and Marshall, Royal I'{aval Colby'. BiographT, vol. 1 pt 2,779. Three and a half 57 F. Hoffman, A Sailor of King George months later Berry in the Agamemnon agarn (new ed. London, L999), 109; Charles Ekins, lagged behind and scarcely came into action in at San Domingo (James, I'laaal Battles from 1744 tu the Peace in 1814 Duckworth's victorlr (London, 1824),280,quoting one of the Prince's I'{artal History, vol. 4, 191-6). lieutenants;Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters, 65 Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters, vol. 7, voi. 7, 156 n, 189 n; Report of. ..tactics. . . at' . . 168n. Trafalgar, vol. 47 (the latenessof her entrance to 66 SturgesJackson, Logs of tbe Great Sea the battle gives ground to suspectthat the Prince Fights, vol. 2, 279-BO;Bourchier, Codrington' was overlogging her speedat 2 knots for all ex- vol. 1,60-8. cept an hour [at one,,,knot]between 5am and 67 lbid,7',. midday); NMM, MSN/1-7, DrarY of HenrY 68 Report of...tactics...at...Trafalgar, 39, Mason of the Prince (which thought Acbille was Codrington's Journal; Bourchier, Codrington, making sail to get away). vol. 1,,63-4. Not until lOam does Codrington 5B Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters, vol.7, report setting his steering sails,whereas the Vic- 'Letters 217;H. Owen (.d.), from Vice Admiral tory and Il/eptwneset theirs about 6.3Oam. Lord Coilingwood' in M. Duffy (.d.), The lr[a- 69 Hoffman, Sailor of King George, 1'09; z;alMiscellany,vol. 6 (N"ty RecordsSociety, voi. Nicolas, Dispatcbesand Letters.'vol.7,168 n' 746,2003),186; NMM, LBK/38, Commonplace Quite why the Monitawr was so slow is a puz- book of Captain Edward Rotheram. zle sinceher log records her setting her steering 'Traf - 59 Tay\or, algar', MM, vol. 36 (1950)' sails between 8am and 9am after the Victory 305; also 44 above. and I'{eptune at 6.3Oambut before the Orion at 60 MarshaII, Royal I'{aval BiograpbT, vol. 1Oam.Report of...tactics...at.. Trafalgar, 30' 1 pt 1, 206; Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth 70 lbid,1,68-9n' 1, 198n' 9. 'The training, (henceforth RNM), MSS 225, Papers of John 71 See Gunnery/ at Trafalgar: Weils,letter to parents,30 October 1BO5;Srurges tacticsor temperament?',to be pubiished tnJowr- 1A^ ....4LI, L^tw \7AS HUSIIE,DUP': THE, HIDDE,N TRAFALCAR
nal for fularitime Research(2005), as an extended Redoutable on one side and the Fougwewxon 'La version of the author's artilleria en Trafal- the other, but Collingwood saw her when the gar: adiemestra-miento, tactrca y moral de two former had detached and the already sur- combate', in A. Guimer6, A. Ramos and G. rendered lr[eptuno had drifted down and fallen Butr6n (eds), Trafalgar y el mwndo atldntico on board her. (Madrid, 20a4), 127-44. 84 lbid,213. 72 SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great Sea 85 lbid,215-16. Fights,vol. 2,214. 86 Bourchrer, Codrington, vol. 1, 99. Many 73 Bourchter, Codrington, vol. 1, 64, 67. officers took exception to the boastingsof Eliab 74 Nicolas, Dispatcbesand Letters, vol.7, Harvey of the Temeraire, particularly after 156n. Collingwood had, unwittingly as to rhe conse- 75 Bourchier, Codrington., vol. L, 65; quences,so much praised his conduct in his vic- SturgesJackson, Logs of the Great Sea Fights, tory dispatch. Ibid, 72,,99. vol.2.279, BZ Nicolas, Dispatchesand Letters, vol. 7, 76 San Agustin, Intrdpide, It{eptuno. 225 (the cover-up continued when Blackwood's 77 Thursfield (.d.), Five l'[aval Jowrnals, criticism was left-out of his letter when pub- 365. lished rn Blackwood's Edinbwrgb Magazine, vol. 78 A. Murray, Memoir of the Ir{aval Life XXXN [],rly 18331,11); Bourchier, Codrington, and Seraicesof Admaal Sir Pbilip C.H.C. Dwr- vol. 1, 67. bam, GCB (London, 1846),64. BB NMM, LBK/38, Commonplacebook of 79 J. Alien, Memolr of tbe Life and Serv- Captain Edward Rotheram. ices of Sir Wtlliam Hargood (Greenwich, 1841), 89 NMM, JOD/48, Account of the Battle 150. of Trafalgar, 1.9. 80 E. Hughes (.d.), The Private Corre- spondenceof Admiral Lord Collingtaood (Navy Dr Michael Duffy is Reader in British History Records Society,vol. 98, 1957), 4B-9,51,. and Director of the Centre for Maritime His- 81 Newnham Collingwood, Public and torical Srudies at the University of Exeter. He is Private Correspondenceof Collingwood, 46. author of The Englishman and tbe Foreigner; 82 Hughes (.d.), Private Corresp. of Soldiers,Swgar and Seapower; and The Yownger Collingraood, 81,. Pitt; edrtor of The Ir.IewMaritime History of 83 Nicolas, Dispatchesand Lefters, vol.7, Devon; Tbe Parameters of Britisb l{apal Power 212-14. The Temeraire had earlier been in a 1650-1850; Tbe Gloriows First of June; and a group of four including the Victory and former editor of Tbe Mariner's Mirror.