Future Car Wars 18-19

Home , Canoo, Daimler AG, Navistar International, Stellantis

Media Briefing, June 10, 2021

US Automotive Product Pipeline Car Wars 2022-2025 Electric Vehicles shock the product pipeline

John Murphy, senior automotive analyst

This research report provides general information only. No part of this report may be used or reproduced or quoted in any manner whatsoever in Taiwan by the press or other persons without the express written consent of BofA Securities. >> Employed by a non-US affiliate of BofAS and is not registered/qualified as a research analyst under the FINRA rules. Refer to "Other Important Disclosures" for information on certain BofA Securities entities that take responsibility for the information herein in particular jurisdictions. BofA Securities does and seeks to do business with issuers covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.Refer to important disclosures on page 31-40. Price Objective Basis/Risk on page 25-28. Analyst Certification on page 29. 12291440 Agenda

• Car Wars background & thesis 3-4

• Industry & manufacturer trends 5-12

• Select company analysis 13-17

• Future Car Wars 18-19

• Conclusions 20

• Appendix – Company analysis 21-23

2 Car Wars background & thesis

• An annual proprietary study ‒ Based on numerous primary and secondary sources • Quantifies industry product trends ‒ Counts number of new, all new, or next generation models ‒ Forecasts annual unit volume of new models • Measures the competitiveness of OEM product plans in several ways ‒ Replacement rate (% of OEM’s volume replaced annually) ‒ Average showroom age (years on the market) ‒ Mix of new model volume by segment ‒ Key is to measure performance relative to competitors, industry average • Provides historical perspective ‒ First published in 1991 ‒ Datasets extend back to 1987 ‒ Time series for replacement rate, showroom age, and model mix 3 Car Wars background & thesis Replacement rate ▼ Showroom age ▼ Market share ▼ Profitability ▼ Stock Price

Replacement Rate, Showroom Age (Vol Weighted), Market Share (2002-2021) Avg. Replacement Avg. Showroom Age US Market Share Rate[1] O/(U) D[2] Stellantis 11.4% 0.4 -2.0% GM 15.1% 0.0 -11.0% Ford 15.2% 0.7 -9.2% Industry Avg. 15.9% 0.0 0.0% European 16.8% (0.2) 3.4% Toyota 17.5% 0.1 5.3% Honda 17.8% (0.2) 2.6% Nissan 19.1% (0.0) 1.9% Korean 20.0% (0.9) 6.1% Source: BofA Global Research [1] Volume weighted average annual replacement rate for MY2002-2021 4 [2] Market share change is based on calendar years 2001-2020 Industry trends Industry trends – New model launches 70 63 62 2002-2021 Average = 40 2022-2025 Average = 60 60 60 55 55

50 47 48 43 43 41 42 40 40 39 39 40 40 40 37 38 35 34 32 32 32 30

20 Number of New Model LaunchesofNumberModelNew 10

2008 2017 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 2019 2020 2021

2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E We expect OEMs to launch 240 new models during our forecast period (MY2022-25), or an average of 60 per year. Typically, this level of new model introductions is a positive sign for the industry, which we believe is the case as the cycle recovers from the COVID-induced trough in MY2021 (CY2020). However, many incumbent and entrant automakers appear to be chasing the same hot segments of the market.

Source: BofA Global Research estimates Industry trends 5 Industry trends – Annual replacement rate 35%

30% Average 2002-2021 = 16% Average 2022-2025 = 21% 29%

25% 22% 21% 20% 20% 18% 19% 17% 17% 18% 18% 17% 17% 16% 15% 16% 15% 15%14%15% 14% 15% 13% 13% Replacement RateReplacement 12% 10% 10%

2002 2009 2015 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

Between model years 2002 and 2021, the industry replaced about 16% of its volume each year with new models. Over the next four model years, we expect the annual replacement rate of industry volume will trend at about 21%, above the historical average level, which partially reflects the relatively low volume base in 2020 to which it is measured.

Source: BofA Global Research estimates 6 [1] Average is volume weighted Industry trends Industry trends – Average showroom age

4.0 Average 2002-2021 = 3.1yrs Average 2022-2025 = 3.1yrs 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0 AverageShowroomAge(Years)

0.5

2004 2008 2017 2021 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 2019 2020

2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

Competitive pressures, newer entrants, product line expansion, and product cancellations will help keep the industry’s average showroom age relatively fresh over our forecast period. Specifically, we estimate that average age for the next three years will tick up just slightly, before dropping once again in MY2025, but overall averaging around the historical level at 3.1 years.

Source: BofA Global Research estimates 7 [1] Average is volume weighted Industry trends Industry trends – New models by segment 100% Crossover 90%

80% 38% 52% Light Truck 70%

60% Luxury & 50% 24% Sporty Car

40% 20% 7% Mid/Large 30% Car 16% 7% 20% 10% 10% Small Car 15% 11% 0% 12-21 22-25 New model emphasis remains on Crossovers and Light Trucks, with launches accounting for 52% and 20% of new volume in MY2022-25, respectively, which should continue to support industry mix. However, the proliferation of CUV models (117 launches) will likely pressure OEM’s profitability in the segment as the market gets increasingly crowded and price competition emerges.

Source: BofA Global Research estimates 8 Not volume weighted Industry trends Industry trends – Crossover surge intensifies 180 90% 160 Crossover Existing CUVs New CUVs 140 120 60% Light Truck 100 80 Luxury & Sporty 60 30% Car Mid/Large 40 Car 20 Small Car

0% 0

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2011 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021

2024E 2022E 2023E 2025E

2023E 2025E

100 100 Existing Cars New Cars Existing Light Trucks New Light Trucks

80 80

60 60

40 40

20 20

0 0

1997 2021 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

2001 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021

2023E 2025E

2023E 2025E Automakers are aggressively pursuing the Crossover segment, particularly at the premium price point. This industry overweight will likely pressure the segment’s profitability in the next few years.

Source: BofA Global Research estimates Industry trends 9 Manufacturer trends – Dispersion of replacement rate widens

Honda 112% Toyota 102% Industry Avg. 83% European 80% VW 78% Nissan 76% Korean 71% Ford 69% Stellantis 59% GM 55%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

The dispersion in product replacement rates among OEMs over the next four model years is the widest that it has been in recent history. The delta in the spread of cumulative replacement rates among OEMs is 57% from the high end (Honda) to the low end (GM). For comparison, this disparity is about 3x what it has been in recent years.

Source: BofA Global Research Manufacturer trends 10 Manufacturer trends – Average showroom age by OEM 9 General Motors Ford Stellantis 8 Industry European Korean 7 Toyota Honda Nissan 6

AverageShowroomAge(Years) 2

2006 2010 2014 2018 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 2021

2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

Average age in the industry continues to converge around the 3 year range, with only slight outliers on either side, which is largely a function of disparities in product cadence. By the end of our forecast period (MY2025), the biggest outliers include Toyota (1.5yrs) and Honda (2.0yrs) at the low end and GM (4.0yrs) and Stellantis (3.7yrs) at the high end.

Source: BofA Global Research estimates Manufacturer trends 11 Manufacturer trends – Expected market share shifts MY2022-25 Annual Avg. Showroom 2020 Mkt. Direction of US Mkt. Share, Replacement Age O/(U) Share CY24 vs. CY20 [2] Rate [1] Honda 28.0% (0.5) 9.3% Up Toyota 25.6% 0.5 14.0% Up Industry Avg. 20.7% 0.0 nm Nm European 20.1% (0.0) 8.3% Neutral Nissan 19.1% (0.3) 6.2% Neutral Korean 17.8% (0.8) 8.5% Neutral Ford 17.3% (0.9) 13.6% Neutral Stellantis 14.6% 1.3 12.5% Down GM 13.7% 0.4 17.5% Down

Over the next four model years, there is a relatively wide dispersion of OEM replacement rates. This appears to be due to differences in product investment towards traditional models versus alternative powertrain development. There is theoretically some market share opportunity at Honda and Toyota, and conversely risk at GM and Stellantis.

Source: BofA Global Research estimates [1] Volume weighted average annual replacement rate for MY2002-2021 12 [2] Market share change is based on calendar years 2001-2020 Manufacturer trends Company analysis – Honda Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 70% 100% Honda Crossover 90% 60% Honda 02-21 Avg. 80% 50% 52% 52% Lt. Truck Industry 70% 40% 60% Luxury & 30% 50% Sporty Car

9% Replacement Rate Replacement 40% 20% 20% Mid/Large 30% 17% Car 10% 7% 20% 10% Small Car 0% 10% 22% 11%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E Industry Honda Average showroom age (years) 7 . Honda historical replacement rate above average at 18% 6 5 . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 28% is above the industry Average Showroom Age average at 21% 4 (Years) 3 . Honda’s showroom age starts our forecast period above industry 2 average, but drops precipitously and remains below average through 1 Relative to Industry: MY2025 Older - . Mix is roughly equalweight on CUVs versus the industry, but the primary (1) differentiating factor is an overweight on Small and Mid/Large Cars (2) Conclusion: Honda’s cumulative replacement rate leads the industry over Younger . (3) our forecast period, with very strong MY2022-24 and slightly lighter

MY25. Key pillars of Civic, CR-V, Pilot, and Accord will be re-launched.

2012 2016 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 13 Company analysis – Toyota Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 70% 100% Toyota Crossover 90% 60% Toyota 02-21 Avg. 80% 44% 50% Industry 52% Lt. Truck 70% 40% 60% Luxury & 30% 50% Sporty Car 22%

Replacement Rate Replacement 40% 20% 20% 4% Mid/Large 30% Car 7% 10% 20% 19% 10% Small Car 0% 10% 11% 12%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E Industry Toyota Average showroom age (years) 7 . Toyota historical replacement rate above average at 17% 6 Average Showroom Age (Years) . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 26% is above the industry 5 average at 21% 4 . Toyota’s showroom age starts our forecast period above industry 3 average, but declines to well below industry average by MY2025 2 Relative to Industry: . Mix is heavily skewed towards Small & Mid/Large Cars versus the 1 Older industry, and slightly overweight Light Trucks - . Conclusion: Toyota’s product cadence through MY2022-25 leads the (1) industry behind only Honda, and accelerates meaningfully over our Younger (2) forecast period, with a particularly strong MY2024-25 due to the re-

launch of several high-volume models (Camry, Corolla, RAV4).

2018 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 2021

2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 14 Company analysis – General Motors Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 50% GM 100% Crossover 45% GM 02-21 Avg. 90% 40% 80% Industry Lt. Truck 35% 52% 70% 30% 71% 60% 25% Luxury & 50% Sporty Car

Replacement Rate Replacement 20% 40% 15% 20% Mid/Large 10% 30% Car 7% 20% 5% 25% 10% Small Car 0% 10% 11% 2%

2003 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2022E 2024E 2025E 2023E Industry General Motors Average showroom age (years) 5 Average Showroom Age (Years) . GM historical replacement rate below average at 15% 4 . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 14% is well below the 3 industry average at 21% Relative to Industry: 2 . GM’s average showroom age increases through much of our forecast Older period with slower product cadence, but then drops again in MY2025 on 1 higher replacement rate

- . New model launch mix is heavily skewed towards CUVs and Light Trucks, Younger driven by focused EV product launches across pickups/SUVs (Hummer, (1) etc.) and a slew of Cadillac CUV models (2) . Conclusion: GM’s replacement rate is below average, but this is due to a

concerted effort on powertrain investment and launch of niche, lower-

2016 2021 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 2019 2020

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E volume electric vehicles over our forecast period. Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 15 Company analysis – Ford Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 50% 100% Ford Crossover 45% 90% Ford 02-21 Avg. 32% 40% 80% 35% Industry 52% Lt. Truck 70% 30% 60% 25% Luxury & 50% Sporty Car

Replacement Rate Replacement 20% 40% 15% 20% 63% Mid/Large 10% 30% Car 7% 20% 5% 10% Small Car 0% 10%

11% 6%

202… 202… 202…

202… 0%

2012 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2002 Industry Ford Average showroom age (years) 7 . Ford historical replacement rate below average at 15% 6 Average Showroom Age 5 . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 17% is below the industry average at 21% 4 . Ford’s showroom age starts our forecast period below industry average, 3 Relative to Industry: where it remains (albeit increasing) through MY2025 2 Older . Mix is heavily skewed towards Light Trucks with the F-150 Lightning EV, 1 Maverick, and E-Transit in MY22, SuperDuty in MY23, and then - Expedition and Navigator in MY24 Younger (1) . Conclusion: Ford’s product cadence began reaccelerating in MY2020 (2) and remains solid over our forecast period, but at a slower rate than the

industry, although its efforts on EV product launches are finally coming

2020 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E through. Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 16 Company analysis – European OEMs Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 50% 100% European Crossover 45% 90% European 02-21 Avg. 40% 80% 35% 52% Lt. Truck Industry 70% 59% 30% 60% 25% Luxury & 50% 20% Sporty Car

Replacement Rate Replacement 15% 40% 20% 2% Mid/Large 10% 30% Car 7% 5% 20% 36% 10% Small Car 0% 10% 11%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2024E 2023E 2025E 2022E Industry European Average showroom age (years) 8 . Europeans historical replacement rate above average at 17% 7 . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 20% is just below the 6 Average Showroom Age (Years) industry average at 21% 5 4 . European OEMs’ showroom age on a combined basis is generally in line with the industry average over our forecast period, but pops slightly 3 Relative to Industry: above in MY2024-25 2 Older 1 . Mix is naturally skewed towards Luxury & Sporty Car segment, but also - overweight CUVs versus the industry due to OEMs’ increasing focus on Younger (1) the segment (2) . Conclusion: European OEMs cumulative replacement rate is just below

average. VW, in particular, slightly lags the industry in replacement rate;

2004 2011 2018 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 2021

2025E 2023E 2024E 2022E however, this is driven by a product pipeline that is focused on EVs. Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 17 Future Car Wars – Powertrain

Nameplate offerings by powertrain type [1] Number of nameplate offerings by powertrain type

180 Fuel Cell 151 1%

119 Electric 120 109 31% ICE 39%

Hybrid 4 29% 0 ICE Hybrid Electric Fuel Cell

Tallying up all the powertrain offerings across all the new model nameplates over MY2022-25, we estimate over 60% will be some alternative powertrain variant (hybrid, electric, fuel cell). We expect many traditional ICE models will be offered with an alternative powertrain variant (mostly hybrid), although there will also be 90 standalone alternative powertrain vehicles (primarily electric) launching.

Source: BofA Global Research Future Car Wars 18 Future Car Wars – Powertrain

Powertrain offering mix by OEM - % of total Powertrain offering by OEM = # of models

100% 90

90% 80 28% 29% 32% 35% 80% 39% 43% 45% 42% 44% 70 53% 0% 70% 7% 62% 0% 40 0% 60 60% 23% 0% 28% 50 50% 31% 3 26% 40 40% 36% 39% 24% 23 12 19 66% 42% 30 2 8 30% 47% 19% 6 3 48% 20 8 9 5 10 20% 40% 4 10 35% 10 11 31% 4 8 9 24% 10 22 7 24 10% 21% 19% 22% 0 18 17 12% 12 11 13 6% 8 8 9 9

0% 0

FCA

Ford

BMW

Other

Toyota

Honda

Nissan

Korean

Daimler Daimler Electric Hybrid Fuel Cell ICE ICE Hybrid Electric Fuel Cell

Over our forecast period, it appears that GM and VW are pushing the most aggressively into EVs, with a slew of standalone models launching over MY2022-25, although others are not far behind. In addition to many standalone electric models, many OEMs have focused on introducing varying levels of hybridization/electrification across existing nameplates. A number of startup EV automakers (Rivian, Lucid, Fisker, Lordstown, Canoo, etc.) are also expected to launch new products over our forecast period.

Source: BofA Global Research Future Car Wars 19 Ten key conclusions 1. Product activity is increasingly varied among OEMs and relative gaps are opening again. The range of strategies span OEMs with product pipelines focused on traditional high-volume models to OEMs focused on lower-volume electric vehicles.

2. Replacement rates appear elevated versus historical levels due to the low volume base of 2020, although product activity is generally still strong.

3. New model mix is 72% CUVs and Light Trucks and 28% Small/Mid/Large/Luxury Cars, with a still significant overweight towards CUVs (52%), which creates risk.

4. Our lower average showroom age estimates are partially a result of an elevated level of product cancellations by OEMs, particularly in the passenger car segment.

5. In terms of traditional replacement rate, the best positioned OEMs appear to be Honda and Toyota, by our estimates. However, GM (and to a lesser extent VW) appear well positioned with regard to powertrain investment and EV introductions.

6. The Detroit Three (or Two now) all lag the industry replacement rate, but Ford is slightly ahead on a reaccelerated product cadence, GM behind due to lower-volume EV launches, and Stellantis (former FCA) in the middle after a few hot launch years.

7. The Japanese OEMs each have a somewhat volatile product cadence over MY2022-25, and with differentiated segment focus relative to the rest of the industry. Honda and Toyota lead the industry in cumulative replacement rate, while Nissan lags.

8. Hyundai’s and Kia’s replacement rates are a bit behind the industry average, but accelerate through each year of our forecast period. The duo’s model launch mix is overweight Small Cars and CUVs versus the industry.

9. European OEMs’ total replacement rate is just below the industry average, with Daimler above, VW more in line, and BMW below. Product launches are dominated by the Luxury & Sporty Car and CUV segments, as well alternative powertrains.

10. A litany of start-up EV automakers have emerged with product targeted to launch over our forecast period, but a fierce competitive environment may limit success. Key conclusions 20 Appendix … Company analysis – Stellantis Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 50% Stellantis 100% Crossover 45% Stellantis 02-21 Avg. 90% 40% 80% Industry 35% 52% Lt. Truck 70% 30% 67% 60% 25% Luxury & 50% 20% Sporty Car Replacement Rate Replacement 40% 15% 20% Mid/Large 30% 10% Car 7% 18% 20% 5% 10% Small Car 0% 10% 11% 15%

2004 2013 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E Industry Stellantis Average showroom age (years) 7 Average Showroom Age . Stellantis (former FCA) historical replacement rate below average at 11% 6 . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 15% is below the industry 5 average at 21% 4 . Stellantis’ showroom age has consistently been above industry average, 3 which should persist through our forecast period, but converging closer 2 Relative to Industry: to average by the end of our forecast period 1 Older . Mix is heavily skewed towards CUVs and Light Trucks, driven by Jeep and - Ram brands, but launches are also overweight Luxury segment, with Alfa (1) Romeo and Maserati launches Younger (2) . Conclusion: After several hot launch years, FCA’s product cadence is

relatively solid in MY2022, hits another air gap in MY2023-24, before

2009 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2022E 2024E 2025E 2023E reaccelerating again in MY2025. Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 21 Appendix … Company analysis – Nissan Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 70% 100% Nissan Crossover 90% 60% Nissan 02-21 Avg. 39% Industry 80% 50% 52% Lt. Truck 70% 40% 60% Luxury & 30% 50% 23% Sporty Car

Replacement Rate Replacement 40% 20% 4% 20% Mid/Large 30% Car 10% 7% 20% 33% 10% Small Car 0% 10% 11%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E Industry Nissan Average showroom age (years) 7 . Nissan historical replacement rate above average at 19% 6 Average Showroom Age (Years) . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 19% is below the industry 5 average at 21% 4 . Nissan’s showroom age begins our forecast period around industry 3 average after an aggressive MY2021 launch year, and remains around 2 average through MY2025 Relative to Industry: 1 Older . New model launch mix is heavily skewed towards Mid/Large Cars, - slightly overweight Light Trucks, and underweight CUVs versus industry (1) average (2) Younger . Conclusion: After a boom year of product in MY2021, Nissan’s product

cadence over our forecast period remains somewhat uneven, with

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E stronger book-end years of MY22 and MY25 and weaker interim years. Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 22 Appendix … Company analysis – Korean OEMs Replacement rate vs. industry New model volume mix 70% Korean 100% Crossover 90% 60% Korean 02-21 Avg. Industry 80% 50% 52% Lt. Truck 70% 62% 40% 60% Luxury & 30% 50% Sporty Car 40% Replacement Rate Replacement 20% 20% 5% Mid/Large 3% 30% Car 10% 7% 20% 10% 29% Small Car 0% 10% 11%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E Industry Korean Average showroom age (years) 7 . Koreans historical replacement rate well above industry average at 20% 6 . Average replacement rate for MY2022-25 of 18% is below the industry 5 Average Showroom Age (Years) 4 average at 21% 3 . Hyundai/Kia’s combined showroom age is currently below the industry 2 average after several solid product launch years, where it should remain Relative to 1 over our forecast period Older - . New model mix is slightly overweight CUVs versus the industry, with (1) several new and next-generation models to be launched, although mix is (2) also overweight Small Cars Younger (3) . Conclusion: Hyundai and Kia’s cumulative replacement rate through

MY2022-25 slightly trails the industry after several strong product years,

2018 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 2021

2023E 2024E 2025E 2022E but builds over our forecast period. Source: BofA Global Research estimates Company analysis 23 Stocks Mentioned

Stocks mentioned Prices and ratings for stocks mentioned in this report BofA Ticker Bloomberg ticker Company name Price Rating NSANF 7201 JP Nissan Motor ¥ 558.1 B-1-7 NSANY NSANY US Nissan Motor US$ 10.271 B-1-7 TOYOF 7203 JP Toyota Motor ¥ 9917 B-1-7 TM TM US Toyota Motor US$ 180.8 A-1-7 HNDAF 7267 JP Honda Motor ¥ 3590 B-1-7 HMC HMC US Honda Motor US$ 32.86 B-1-7 GOEV GOEV US Canoo US$ 8.9 B-3-9 XQEJF DAI GY Daimler EUR 80.14 B-1-7 DDAIF DDAIF US Daimler US$ 97.84 B-1-7 FSR FSR US Fisker US$ 17.4 C-1-9 FSR FSR US Fisker US$ 17.4 C-1-9 GM GM US General Motors US$ 63.23 B-1-9 HYMLF 005380 KS Hyundai Motors W 241500 B-1-7 KIMTF 000270 KS Kia Corp W 90000 B-1-7 POAHF PAH3 GY Porsche Auto EUR 101.2 B-2-7 XFYKF STLA IM Stellantis EUR 17.454 B-1-8 STLA STLA US Stellantis US$ 21.22 B-1-8 TSLA TSLA US Tesla US$ 605.13 C-2-9 VLKAF VOW GY Volkswagen AG EUR 313.6 B-2-7 VWAGY VWAGY US Volkswagen AG US$ 38.35 B-2-7 VLKPF VOW3 GY Volkswagen AG EUR 238.8 B-2-7 Source: BofA Global Research

24 Price Objective Basis and Risk

Nissan Motor (7201 / NSANF / NSANY) Our 12-month PO for Nissan is ¥700 (USD13.03/ADR). We apply a fair-value EV/EBITDA multiple of 2.0x, derived from the average EV/EBITDA of 1.9x for FY3/18-FY3/19 and the addition of a new +5% electrification premium to our FY3/23 EBITDA (ex finance biz) forecast of ¥453.3bn, and then add back the financial services equity capital of ¥1.62trn discounted by 10% (thus ¥1.46trn). Downside risks are deterioration in the alliance relationship with Renault and unfavorable forex fluctuations, a prolonged semiconductor shortage, and an increase in material costs. Toyota Motor (7203 / TOYOF / TM) Our 12-month PO for Toyota is ¥10,500 (USD191.20/ADR). We apply fair-value industrial EV/EBITDA (excl. financial services) of 3.9x derived from FY3/17-FY3/19 average to FY3/23 industrial EBITDA of ¥4.07trn to give fair-value industrial market cap. We add back financial business shareholders' equity of ¥4.1trn to derive companywide market cap. Risks are rapid forex changes, and a possibility that wholesale sales may be affected if the impact of the February earthquake is prolonged and the extent of reduction in production volume is large, Honda Motor (7267 / HNDAF / HMC) Our 12-month PO for Honda Motor is ¥3,900 (ADR: US$36.42). We applied a fair-value EV/EBITDA of 1.0x, derived from FY3/18-20 average EV/EBITDA (ex. financial services) of 1.05x and electrification discount of -5%. Multiplying that by FY3/23E EBITDA (ex financial services) gives fair-value EBITDA of ¥1.27trn. We add back financial services shareholders' equity (¥2.9trn) after applying 8% discount (thus ¥2.7trn) to calculate overall fair market cap. The speed of US recovery in demand is a risk. Canoo (GOEV) Our price objective of $6 is based on an EV/Sales multiple of 0.3x on our 2025 estimates, which is consistent with an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 6x. These multiples are: 1) a discount to TSLA's early EV/Sales multiple, but a premium on an EV/EBITDA, both measured on a rolling forward five year basis. 2) about in line with an average of multiples we use to value GOEV's closest peers - FSR and RIDE, but 3) a discount to the trading range of multiples from the start-up EV and traditional OEM universe. Upside risks: 1) significant and better than expected customer traction for introduced/unveiled products, 2) successful execution of go-to-market strategy across B2B and B2C markets, 3) successful execution of insourced and outsourced manufacturing processes, 4) breakthrough in advanced battery technology to drive ICE/EV parity, 5) incremental government/regulatory support/stimulus for EV market. Downside risks: 1) inability to continue to raise low cost capital to fund business ventures, 2) inability to convert applications for subscription or orders/reservations into vehicle sales, 3) inability to execute a successful go-to-market strategy across B2B and B2C markets, 4) inability to reach sustainable positive EBITDA/FCF, 5) significant future change in company strategy and business model. Daimler (XQEJF / DDAIF) Our price objective of €94 ($114.83 ADR) is based on our sum-of-the-parts analysis. We base our valuation on the years 2021-23e. We value Daimler based on EV/Sales, EV/EBIT and P/E and use the average to arrive at our price objective. For MB cars and Vans we assign EV/Sales of 0.25x and EV/EBIT of 2.5x, which is broadly in line with the German peer's LV divisions, whereas for Daimler Trucks and Buses we assign EV/Sales of c0.6x and EV/EBIT of 5.3x, equivalent to c50% discount to the peer Volvo due to the margin differential. Overall, we assign a (clean) P/E of 8.0x at group level, which compares against the 10y avg of 8.6x and the 3y avg. of 7.1x. Upside risks: 1) Usual market demand related upside risk, 2) Overestimation of negative impact from Coronavirus, 3) Underestimation of Daimler's ability to offset rising Co2 content costs through efficiency gains and pricing. 25 Price Objective Basis and Risk

Downside risks: 1) Usual market demand related downside risk, 2) Underestimation of impact from Coronavirus, 3) Unexpected FX and raw material price changes, 4) Overestimation of Daimler's ability to offset rising Co2 content costs through efficiency gains and pricing, 5) Risk of missing CO2 targets in the EU (or China), particularly more if launch of upcoming EV models is delayed 6) Ongoing legal proceedings regarding the diesel issue could result in higher fines and damage claims lower/higher than we forecast. Fisker (FSR) Our price objective of $27 is based on an EV/Sales multiple of 0.6x on our 2025 estimates, which is consistent with an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 6x. These multiples are: 1) broadly in line with TSLA's early trading multiples (measured on a rolling forward five-year basis), 2) a premium to the multiples we use to value FSR's closest peers - RIDE and GOEV, due to its better business model, and 3) somewhat in line with the current trading range of multiples from the start-up EV and traditional OEM universe we deem as FSR's peer group. Downside risks: 1) inability to continue to raise low cost capital to fund business ventures, 2) inability to convert paid reservations or account registrations into vehicle sales, 3) slower than expected progress by contract manufacturer towards start of production and lack of success in production ramp, 4) flexible leasing program could result in substantial operational/financial hiccups, 5) inability to reach sustainable positive EBITDA/FCF. Upside risks: 1) significant and better than expected customer traction for introduced/unveiled products, 2) successful execution of go-to-market strategy via purchase and flexible lease offering, 3) better than expected progress by contract manufacturer towards start of production and success in production ramp, 4) breakthrough in advanced battery technology to drive ICE/EV parity, 5) incremental government/regulatory support/stimulus for EV market. Ford Motor (F) Our price objective of $17 is based on an EV/EBITDAP multiple (EV/EBITDA adjusted for pension) of roughly 5x on a blended average of our 2021 and 2022 estimates. This valuation methodology reflects a multiple towards the higher end of, but still within, Ford's historical range (3-6x), which we believe is warranted as the company is on the verge of executing something analogous to our Core to Future transition framework, by which it will strengthen its core business pillars to fund its future business. Downside risks: 1) a more swift and/or material downturn in US auto sales, 2) a sharp and sustained rise in input costs, 3) disruption in the supply base, 4) significant increase in gas prices, 5) new vehicle pricing deteriorates, 6) market share losses pressure results, 7) unwillingness of dealers to shoulder inventory risk, 8) suppliers gain significant pricing power, 9) stress in capital markets makes borrowing more expensive, 10) Incremental execution risk as management ramps up. Upside risks: 1) continued strength in US auto cycle, 2) growth in China remains robust, which Ford is able to leverage with product launches, 3) mix and pricing remain favorable, 4) capital allocation is directed towards shareholder returns (special dividend, etc.). General Motors Company (GM) Our price objective of $80 is based on an EV/EBITDAP multiple of roughly 6x on a blended average of our 2021 & 2022 estimates, which is at the higher end, but still in line with, the company's historical range. We believe a valuation multiple at the higher end of the range (3x-6x) is deserved because the core business is being well managed even amidst a fading US/NA cycle, while the accelerating focus on future-proofing the business with the development of the necessary components of the future of mobility services, including an autonomous electric vehicle fleet (Cruise Automation + Bolts), car sharing (Maven), and connectivity (OnStar), may provide upside. Downside risks: 1) a more swift and/or material downturn in US auto sales, 2) a sharp and sustained rise in input costs, 3) disruption in the supply base, 4) significant increase in gas prices, 5) new vehicle pricing deteriorates, 6) market share losses pressure results, 7) unwillingness of dealers to shoulder inventory risk, 8) suppliers gain significant pricing power, 9) stress in capital markets makes borrowing more expensive, 10) key members of management leave. Upside risks: 1) continued strength in US auto cycle, 2) growth in China remains robust, which benefits GM through its established market position, 3) mix and pricing remain favorable, 4) capital allocation is directed towards shareholder returns (share repurchases, etc.). 26 Price Objective Basis and Risk

Hyundai Motor Company (HYMLF) We use SOTP valuation to derive our PO of W330,000. We add (1) Operating Value, and (2) Investment asset value to estimate HMC's Enterprise value. For its operating value, we separately value its Internal combustion engine (ICE) business unit and Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) business units. For ICE, we take the average value derived from 3.5x 2021E EV/EBITDA and 0.4x 2021E EV/EBITDA, which respectively correspond to global peers' average. For its BEV business, our target multiple is 4.5x 2021E EV/Sales, which corresponds to Tesla/Nio's historical average valuation level. For HMC's investment asset value, we take 30% discount to its current key shareholding, and for its net cash position, we apply 10% discount. The upside risks to our price objective are (1) turnaround of global automotive demand post COVID-19 normalization, (2) stronger penetration into luxury brand market with Genesis, (3) stronger market share gain in BEV market, and (4) favorable shareholder policies and advanced corporate governance during potential ownership structure change. The downside risks to our price objective are: (1) more severe real economy impact from COVID-19, (2) prolonged deterioration in China operations, Kia Corp (KIMTF) Our PO is W124,000. We conduct SOTP valuation to derive our PO. We aggregate (1) Kia's operating value, and (2) investment asset value to derive enterprise value. For Kia's operating value, we value its Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) business unit and Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) business unit separately. We take the average of 3.3x 2021E EV/EBITDA and 0.4x 2021E EV/Sales to derive Kia's ICE business unit value. Our target multiple corresponds to global peers' average. For Kia's BEV business unit value, we apply 3.2x 2021E EV/Sales, which is 30% discount to historical average of Nio and Tesla's valuation (4.5x). Our discounts reflect the fact that BEV with OTA features will be launched later than HMC. We value Kia's investment asset value at 30% discount, and net cash at 10% discount. Upside/downside risks to our PO are: (1) stronger/slower sales recovery in major markets, (2) favorable/unfavorable shareholder policies, (3) faster/slower-than-expected NEV sales volume growth, and (4) improved/weakened corporate governance. Porsche Automobil Holding SE (POAHF) Our price objective of €108 is based on SOTP analysis. Because Porsche SE is a holding company, valuation can only be carried out on a SOTP basis in our view. We value Porsche's net assets at €50.2bn which includes i) €49.6bn of stake in VW, arrived as a product of VW ordinary share's PO of €317 and number of shares held by Porsche, and ii) net cash of around €0.6bn. We then apply Hold Co discount of 34% to Porsche's net asset value, broadly inline with historical average. Upside risks, In terms of its holding in VW 1) usual market demand related upside risk, 2) Overestimation of negative impact from Coronavirus, 3) Unexpected FX and raw material price changes, 4) underestimation of VW's ability to offset rising Co2 content costs through restructuring and pricing Downside risks to our price objective would be a successful appeal by shareholders in the outstanding litigation. In terms of its holding in VW 1) usual market demand related downside risk, 2) Underestimation of impact from Coronavirus, 3) Unexpected FX and raw material price changes, 4) Overestimation of VW's ability to offset rising Co2 content costs, 5) Risk of missing CO2 targets in the EU (or China), particularly more if launch of upcoming EV models is delayed. Stellantis NV (XFYKF / STLA) Our PO of €19 (USD22.81) is derived by 1) FCA standalone fair value of c€33bn and 2) PSA standalone fair value c€28bn. FCA's & PSA's standalone fair values are derived using a multiples-driven SOTP, based on the avg of our 2021-22e estimates. For FCA's NAFTA division, we assign EV/sales and EV/EBIT of 25% and 2.5x, a premium to other mass market divisions, to account for the higher profitability of NAFTA. By contrast, we assign 10% EV/Sales, 1.0x EV/EBIT to the EMEA core auto business (i.e. ex JVs) and APAC business, as we expect profitability of these divisions to remain very pressured. We value PSA's automotive business at EV/Sales of 15% and EV/adj. EBIT of 1.5x, between Renault Automotive and VW's mass market business. Overall, we assign PE of 6.0x to the FCA & PSA group in our respective standalone fair value calculations. 27 Price Objective Basis and Risk

Upside risks: 1) Sales & pricing are better than expected, implying increasing Co2 content costs would be better compensated, 2) Unexpected FX and raw material price changes 3) Realization of better than expected synergies from the combination Downside risks: 1) Sales & pricing are worse than expected, 2) Unexpected FX & raw material price changes 3) Realization of lower than expected synergies from the combination, 4) failure of cultural integration post-merger Tesla Motors (TSLA) Our $700 PO is based on 15x EV/Sales and 89x EV/EBITDA on our 2021-2022 estimates and a PEG of 2.5x on capital-induced growth through 2025E. Our new valuation framework follows five key steps: 1) What the current stock price affords to TSLA in incremental plants/units. 2) What the incremental units translates into in incremental revenue/profits. 3) What the incremental revenue/profits translates into in terms of multiples on theoretical pro-forma 2025 metrics. 4) A slight premium to these multiple is ascribed for TSLA's track record of growth, consistent capital raises, and overall investor hype. 5) Assuming a negligible discount rate, these multiples are stacked up against TSLA's comp set and historical multiples. Downside risks: 1) inability to continue raising low-cost capital to fund business ventures, 2) inability to generate positive earnings/FCF, 3) slower ramp in electric vehicle demand, 4) setbacks or lack of advancements in battery technology, 5) fierce competition from incumbent OEMs, 6) inability to execute efficiently with higher volume, 7) low gasoline prices, and 8) loss of management. Upside risks: 1) better execution and cost containment, 2) a sharp/sustained rise in gasoline prices, 3) a breakthrough in advanced battery technology, 4) increase in federal or state incentives, 5) short covering. Volkswagen AG (VLKAF / VWAGY) Our price objective of €317 (VW Ords)/ USD37.94 (ADRs) is based on our SOTP analysis. We base our valuation on the recovery years 2021-23e. We value VW based on EV/Sales, EV/EBIT and PE and use the average to arrive at our price objective. We assign EV/sales of 0.25x & EV/EBIT of 2.5x to VW's mass market business (VW passenger car, Skoda, SEAT, VW CV). EV/Sales of 0.25x & EV/EBIT of 2.5x to Audi. This is broadly in line with LV division multiples of German peers BMW and Daimler's LV division. Whereas to Porsche and Bentley, we assign EV/sales of 2.0x and 1.0x respectively and EV/EBIT of 15.0x and 7.5x, a premium over other divisions due to their margin profile. Other auto divisions which primarily consist of VW's truck business, we assign EV/Sales of 0.50x and EV/EBIT of 5.8xx, which still represents a discount to Daimler Trucks and Volvo. Overall, we assign a PE of 10x at group level, which is a premium to the 3 year historical 12 month fwd PE average of 6.1x. Upside/downside risks: 1) usual market demand related upside/downside risk, 2) Overestimation/underestimation of impact from Coronavirus, 3) Unexpected FX and raw material price changes, 4) Overestimation/underestimation of VW's ability to offset rising Co2 content costs, 5) Risk of missing CO2 targets in the EU (or China), particularly more if launch of upcoming EVs is delayed. Volkswagen AG (VLKPF) Our price objective of €265 (VW Prefs) is based on our SOTP analysis. We base our valuation on the recovery years 2021-23e. We value VW based on EV/Sales, EV/EBIT and PE and use the average to arrive at our price objective. We assign EV/sales of 0.25x & EV/EBIT of 2.5x to VW's mass market business (VW passenger car, Skoda, SEAT, VW CV). EV/Sales of 0.25x & EV/EBIT of 2.5x to Audi. This is broadly in line with LV division multiples of German peers BMW and Daimler's LV division. Whereas to Porsche and Bentley, we assign EV/sales of 2.0x and 1.0x respectively and EV/EBIT of 15.0x and 7.5x, a premium over other divisions due to their margin profile. Other auto divisions which primarily consist of VW's truck business, we assign EV/Sales of 0.50x and EV/EBIT of 5.8xx, which still represents a discount to Daimler Trucks and Volvo. Overall, we assign a PE of 10x at group level, which is a premium to the 3 year historical 12 month fwd PE average of 6.1x. Upside/downside risks: 1) usual market demand related upside/downside risk, 2) Overestimation/underestimation of impact from Coronavirus, 3) Unexpected FX and raw 28 material price changes, 4) Overestimation/underestimation of VW's ability to offset rising Co2 content costs, 5) Risk of missing CO2 targets in the EU (or China), particularly more if launch of upcoming EVs is delayed. Analyst Certification

We, John Murphy, CFA, Chris Yun, Horst Schneider and Kei Nihonyanagi, hereby certify that the views each of us has expressed in this research report accurately reflect each of our respective personal views about the subject securities and issuers. We also certify that no part of our respective compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or view expressed in this research report.

29 Special Disclosures

Information on securities which are listed on the exchanges where ML Securities (Taiwan) Limited is not permitted to trade or solicit trades for clients is for informational purposes only and is not a recommendation or a solicitation to trade such securities. ML Securities (Taiwan) Limited will not execute transactions for nor accept orders from clients to trade such securities. Foreign investment in Taiwan securities is regulated and restricted. Currently, foreign investment in Taiwan securities is permitted by investment through: (1) global depository receipts, (2) convertible bonds, (3) mutual funds issued offshore of Taiwan, and (4) a special foreign institutional investors (FINIs) and foreign individual investors (FIDIs) program supervised by the Taiwan SFB whereunder FINIs/FIDIs may apply for investment ID to invest in Taiwan securities by registration with Taiwan Stock Exchange. FINIs will additionally need consent from the foreign exchange authority, ie, the Central Bank of China. In addition to the limitations above, various industry- specific percentage-based limitations on foreign ownership of Taiwan companies (and in some cases prohibitions) may apply. Investments are subject to exchange rate and currency conversion restrictions and risks. Dividends and interest earned by foreign investors' Taiwan securities/instruments are generally subject to a 20% withholding tax. Ordinary shares are not available to ML private client accounts in the U.S. This report is distributed in the Republic of China by Merrill Lynch Securities (Taiwan) Limited, which is regulated by the SFB of the Republic of China. BofA Securities is acting as Financial Advisor to Traton SE in connection with its proposal to the board of Navistar International Corp to acquire all outstanding shares of Navistar not already owned by Traton, which was announced on January 30, 2020.

Any resulting transaction would be subject to approval by shareholders of Navistar International Corp.

This research report is not intended to (1) provide voting advice, (2) serve as an endorsement of the proposed transaction, or (3) result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.

BofA Securities is acting as financial advisor to Daimler AG in connection with the proposed strategic cooperation agreement between Mercedes-Benz AG and Aston Martin Lagonda Global Holdings plc which was announced on October 27, 2020. The proposed agreement is subject to approval by shareholders of Aston Martin Lagonda Global Holdings plc. This research report is not intended to (1) provide voting advice, (2) serve as an endorsement of the proposed transaction, or (3) result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.

30 Important Disclosures

Equity Investment Rating Distribution: Autos Group (as of 31 Mar 2021)

Coverage Universe Count Percent Inv. Banking Relationships* Count Percent Buy 52 56.52% Buy 33 63.46% Hold 19 20.65% Hold 9 47.37% Sell 21 22.83% Sell 12 57.14%

31 Important Disclosures

Equity Investment Rating Distribution: Global Group (as of 31 Mar 2021) Coverage Universe Count Percent Inv. Banking Relationships* Count Percent Buy 1909 58.54% Buy 1218 63.80% Hold 653 20.02% Hold 395 60.49% Sell 699 21.44% Sell 356 50.93% * Issuers that were investment banking clients of BofA Securities or one of its affiliates within the past 12 months. For purposes of this Investment Rating Distribution, the coverage universe includes only stocks. A stock rated Neutral is included as a Hold, and a stock rated Underperform is included as a Sell.

32 Important Disclosures

’ ’

’ ’ Investment rating Total return expectation (within 12-month period of date of initial rating) Ratings dispersion guidelines for coverage cluster* ≥ ≤ ≥ ≤ ≥

’

33 Important Disclosures

Price Charts for the securities referenced in this research report are available on the Price Charts website, or call 1-800-MERRILL to have them mailed. BofAS or one of its affiliates acts as a market maker for the equity securities recommended in the report: Canoo, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors, Honda Motor, Stellantis, Tesla, Toyota Motor. BofAS or an affiliate was a manager of a public offering of securities of this issuer within the last 12 months: Daimler, Ford Motor, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Stellantis, Toyota Motor. The issuer is or was, within the last 12 months, an investment banking client of BofAS and/or one or more of its affiliates: Canoo Inc, Daimler, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors Co, Honda Motor, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Porsche Auto, Stellantis, Tesla Motors, Toyota Motor, Volkswagen AG. BofAS or an affiliate has received compensation from the issuer for non-investment banking services or products within the past 12 months: Daimler, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors Co, Honda Motor, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Porsche Auto, Stellantis, Tesla Motors, Toyota Motor, Volkswagen AG. The issuer is or was, within the last 12 months, a non-securities business client of BofAS and/or one or more of its affiliates: Daimler, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors Co, Honda Motor, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Porsche Auto, Stellantis, Tesla Motors, Toyota Motor, Volkswagen AG. In the US, retail sales and/or distribution of this report may be made only in states where these securities are exempt from registration or have been qualified for sale: Daimler, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Porsche Auto, Volkswagen AG. BofAS or an affiliate has received compensation for investment banking services from this issuer within the past 12 months: Canoo Inc, Daimler, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors Co, Honda Motor, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Porsche Auto, Stellantis, Tesla Motors, Toyota Motor, Volkswagen AG. BofAS or an affiliate expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from this issuer or an affiliate of the issuer within the next three months: Daimler, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors Co, Honda Motor, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Porsche Auto, Stellantis, Tesla Motors, Toyota Motor, Volkswagen AG. BofAS together with its affiliates beneficially owns one percent or more of the common stock of this issuer. If this report was issued on or after the 9th day of the month, it reflects the ownership position on the last day of the previous month. Reports issued before the 9th day of a month reflect the ownership position at the end of the second month preceding the date of the report: Daimler, General Motors Co, Porsche Auto, Volkswagen AG. BofAS or one of its affiliates is willing to sell to, or buy from, clients the common equity of the issuer on a principal basis: Canoo, Daimler, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors, Honda Motor, Nissan Motor, Stellantis, Tesla, Toyota Motor, Volkswagen AG. The issuer is or was, within the last 12 months, a securities business client (non-investment banking) of BofAS and/or one or more of its affiliates: Daimler, Fisker, Ford Motor, General Motors Co, Honda Motor, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corp, Nissan Motor, Porsche Auto, Stellantis, Tesla Motors, Toyota Motor, Volkswagen AG. BofA Global Research personnel (including the analyst(s) responsible for this report) receive compensation based upon, among other factors, the overall profitability of Bank of America Corporation, including profits derived from investment banking. The analyst(s) responsible for this report may also receive compensation based upon, among other factors, the overall profitability of the Bank’s sales and trading businesses relating to the class of securities or financial instruments for which such analyst is responsible.

34 Other Important Disclosures

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35 Other Important Disclosures

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36 Other Important Disclosures

This information has been prepared and issued by BofAS and/or one or more of its non-US affiliates. The author(s) of this information may not be licensed to carry on regulated activities in your jurisdiction and, if not licensed, do not hold themselves out as being able to do so. BofAS and/or MLPF&S is the distributor of this information in the US and accepts full responsibility for information distributed to BofAS and/or MLPF&S clients in the US by its non-US affiliates. Any US person receiving this information and wishing to effect any transaction in any security discussed herein should do so through BofAS and/or MLPF&S and not such foreign affiliates. Hong Kong recipients of this information should contact Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) Limited in respect of any matters relating to dealing in securities or provision of specific advice on securities or any other matters arising from, or in connection with, this information. Singapore recipients of this information should contact Merrill Lynch (Singapore) Pte Ltd in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, this information. For clients that are not accredited investors, expert investors or institutional investors Merrill Lynch (Singapore) Pte Ltd accepts full responsibility for the contents of this information distributed to such clients in Singapore. General Investment Related Disclosures: Taiwan Readers: Neither the information nor any opinion expressed herein constitutes an offer or a solicitation of an offer to transact in any securities or other financial instrument. No part of this report may be used or reproduced or quoted in any manner whatsoever in Taiwan by the press or any other person without the express written consent of BofA Securities. This document provides general information only, and has been prepared for, and is intended for general distribution to, BofA Securities clients. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes an offer or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities or other financial instrument or any derivative related to such securities or instruments (e.g., options, futures, warrants, and contracts for differences). This document is not intended to provide personal investment advice and it does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of, and is not directed to, any specific person(s). This document and its content do not constitute, and should not be considered to constitute, investment advice for purposes of ERISA, the US tax code, the Investment Advisers Act or otherwise. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in financial instruments and implementing investment strategies discussed or recommended in this document and should understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be realized. Any decision to purchase or subscribe for securities in any offering must be based solely on existing public information on such security or the information in the prospectus or other offering document issued in connection with such offering, and not on this document. Securities and other financial instruments referred to herein, or recommended, offered or sold by BofA Securities, are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and are not deposits or other obligations of any insured depository institution (including, Bank of America, N.A.). Investments in general and, derivatives, in particular, involve numerous risks, including, among others, market risk, counterparty default risk and liquidity risk. No security, financial instrument or derivative is suitable for all investors. In some cases, securities and other financial instruments may be difficult to value or sell and reliable information about the value or risks related to the security or financial instrument may be difficult to obtain. Investors should note that income from such securities and other financial instruments, if any, may fluctuate and that price or value of such securities and instruments may rise or fall and, in some cases, investors may lose their entire principal investment. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Levels and basis for taxation may change. This report may contain a short-term trading idea or recommendation, which highlights a specific near-term catalyst or event impacting the issuer or the market that is anticipated to have a short-term price impact on the equity securities of the issuer. Short-term trading ideas and recommendations are different from and do not affect a stock's fundamental equity rating, which reflects both a longer term total return expectation and attractiveness for investment relative to other stocks within its Coverage Cluster. Short- term trading ideas and recommendations may be more or less positive than a stock's fundamental equity rating.

37 Other Important Disclosures

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38 Other Important Disclosures

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39 Other Important Disclosures

All opinions, projections and estimates constitute the judgment of the author as of the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. Prices also are subject to change without notice. BofA Securities is under no obligation to update this information and BofA Securities ability to publish information on the subject issuer(s) in the future is subject to applicable quiet periods. You should therefore assume that BofA Securities will not update any fact, circumstance or opinion contained herein. Subject to the quiet period applicable under laws of the various jurisdictions in which we distribute research reports and other legal and BofA Securities policy-related restrictions on the publication of research reports, fundamental equity reports are produced on a regular basis as necessary to keep the investment recommendation current. Certain outstanding reports or investment opinions relating to securities, financial instruments and/or issuers may no longer be current. Always refer to the most recent research report relating to an issuer prior to making an investment decision. In some cases, an issuer may be classified as Restricted or may be Under Review or Extended Review. In each case, investors should consider any investment opinion relating to such issuer (or its security and/or financial instruments) to be suspended or withdrawn and should not rely on the analyses and investment opinion(s) pertaining to such issuer (or its securities and/or financial instruments) nor should the analyses or opinion(s) be considered a solicitation of any kind. Sales persons and financial advisors affiliated with BofAS or any of its affiliates may not solicit purchases of securities or financial instruments that are Restricted or Under Review and may only solicit securities under Extended Review in accordance with firm policies. Neither BofA Securities nor any officer or employee of BofA Securities accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential damages or losses arising from any use of this information.