Cell-Phones and the Reconnection of the Iraqi Diaspora with a (Home)

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Cell-Phones and the Reconnection of the Iraqi Diaspora with a (Home) Out of Sight, In Mind: Cell-phones and the Reconnection of the Iraqi Diaspora With a (Home)land Introduction Those were the words of my Abdulla Majeed grandmother the first time we heard her voice after losing touch for several weeks Abstract after the beginning of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Al Thuraya referenced in the It was only after the invasion of 2003 and the quote were the satellite cell-phones that gradual collapse of the Iraqi state that appeared on the Iraqi scene immediately cellphones began to surface on Iraq's public following the overthrow of the Iraqi market, for they have been previously government, connecting a large portion of banned by the regime of Saddam Hussein. the Iraqi diaspora with their families in Iraq. This fairly recent breakage of the digital Since then, multiple telecommunication barrier rendered Iraq at the time as one of corporations and operators have been the most promising ICTs markets in the established across the country. This paper Middle East, with critical consequences on will begin by providing a brief introduction the larger Iraqi society, particularly since it on the state of digital access, particularly also saw the introduction of the previously with regards to cellphones, in post-2003 banned Internet. Using personal experience, Iraqi society and how this access contributed as well as interviews with Iraqis from to the reshaping of certain cultural attitudes Baghdad, this paper argues that Iraqis and practices, particularly within the urban creatively employed, and continue to Baghdadi society. This will then be followed employ, ICTs and Cellphones not merely as by an examination of the role cellphones a tool of reconnection between the Iraqi have had on the relationship between Iraqis diaspora and the homeland (and vice versa), in the diaspora and the homeland, and the continuously reconstructing their national transformations that resulted from that identities, but also as tool of survival and reconnection, particularly with regards to risk assessment for Iraqis on the inside. This the renegotiation of an Iraqi national is of particular importance since the identity. Here, it is important to devastating consequences of the 2003 acknowledge that this relationship needs to invasion and occupation of Iraq are still be approached from two different yet evident on the Iraqi social, urban, and interdependent trajectories: diasporic Iraqis political space until this day. on Iraq and Iraq on the Iraqi diaspora. Finally, I will also examine how the fragile “Thank god I am finally able post-2003 Iraqi political atmosphere of to hear your voices again. I occupation and militant sectarianism has am in Al Karada now [a rendered the cellphones as a tool of survival popular local market in and risk assessment for the Iraqi individual. Baghdad]. The owner of Al Thuraya bast-ta [street ICT in Iraq vendor] is asking for too Any discussion on ICT (Information much money. I might lose Communication Technologies) in Iraq must connection in a few minutes. first acknowledge the fact that the Let me speak to your mother introduction of ICT into Iraq is fairly recent. quickly.” Cell-phones, internet, and satellite television 1 were all banned by the dictatorial Ba’athist which she argues that materials need not be regime of Saddam Hussein prior to 2003, defined merely by human interaction with while state-operated landlines were them, but one also needs to consider their perceived as being tapped by the interior ‘socially consequential’ existence beyond ministry (Mark et al 2009). Thus, post- human input. Similarly, the statistics invasion Iraq witnessed the concurrent mentioned above suggest that following the introduction of multiple forms of ICT, invasion, Iraqi society not only developed a breaking the digital barrier that had been strong response to the new opportunities firmly maintained under the dictatorship. ICT provided, but also exhibited new The digital barrier identified here is materialistic tendencies and prestige represented by the geographical borders of associated with phone ownership. For Iraq, beyond which Iraqis were able to example, ownership of the newest cell- access, but not necessarily acquire, different phone brands symbolized an elevated status forms of ICTs. This introduction of a new and socioeconomic achievement at a time market in the Middle East for ICTs rendered when the hopes for freedom and social and Iraq as one of the best telecommunication economic development had been dashed markets in the region, with an estimated cell- (and remain unfulfilled). In fact, this phone penetration rate of 70% of the materiality was manifested less than one population within 6 years of the invasion, in year following the invasion by the addition to the market of Iraqi Kurdistan, establishment of more than 400 privately which have already had access prior to 2003 owned internet cafes in Baghdad alone (Best 2011). Zain Iraq, one of the leading (Alexander 2005). Such developments telecommunication operators in the country, support Burrell’s strong materiality recorded more than 10 million subscribers proposition, in which the properties of ICT by 2009 (Figure 1). played a critical role in a cultural transformation, rendering the virtual space Figure 1. Coverage of Zain Iraq network provided by ICT as a space for possible between 2004 and 2009 cultural and social negotiation. This is of (Shapiro and Weidmann 2011). particular importance considering that for the eleven years preceding the invasion, the Here, it is important to recall the U.S. and its allies, represented by the United research conducted by Burrell (2012) on the Nations, had imposed suffocating economic strong materiality exhibited in Ghana sanctions on Iraq that had detrimental following the introduction of the internet, in consequences on the larger society. During 2 these punishing sanctions, Iraqis were extended family, including his two-year old prohibited from importing much needed nephew, after a U.S. airstrike mistakenly goods and services from beyond Iraq’s targeted their house in Baghdad: borders; goods that were not only necessary for their country’s development but also for I don’t know why the their own survival, such as heart and cancer house was hit. There was medicines, surgical gloves, and even pencils no intelligence, no army (Simons 1996). nearby, no weapons. Why The earliest introduction of mobile did Americans tell the ICTs to post-invasion Iraq was Al Thuraya world they hit only places satellite phone, which became the main of the army? Why did they means of communication with the outside hit civilian homes? world for many Iraqis. Even though Al (Human Rights Watch Thuraya provided a critical benefit for 2003: 34) Iraqis to contact their families outside of Iraq, the satellite phones had several According to the U.S. Department of drawbacks, including (most importantly) Defense, the intended target of this the cost of ownership and operation. When airstrike was the half-brother of Iraq’s they were first introduced in Iraq, Al previous president Saddam Hussein, who Thuraya satellite phones could cost was presumed to be at this location based between 600 and1000 USD, while the on the intercepted Al Thuraya signals. charge for international calls surpassed the 8 USD/minute mark (MENA 2003). Cell Phones and the Diaspora However, such high costs did not halt the Extensive research has been completed expansion of Al Thuraya phones, since by with regards to the role ICTs play in the May 2003 the provider had 20,000 relationship between diaspora and the subscribers in Iraq alone, which was homeland, and a main characteristic of that expected to rise to more than 100,000 by relationship is the role ICTs have on easing the end of the year (MENA 2003). Based on the psychological trauma geographical personal inquiries with family members distance has created and fostered. As who resided in Baghdad during that period, highlighted earlier, the influence of cell personal ownership of Al Thuraya satellite phones on this relationship needs to be phones was relatively rare due to its high approached within the two aforementioned costs. Instead, Iraqi small business owners contexts. For many Iraqis in the diaspora, employed Al Thuraya as another tool to homeland and family were not the only generate profit by renting the phones to the form of loss they had to endure; rather I public for a specified number of minutes in propose that there was a constant fear of the return for a fee that was generally higher loss of memory; memory that is associated than the actual cost of operation. Here, it is with the homeland itself and its physical important to mention that the U.S military elements. Thus, the digital barrier that utilized Al Thuraya signals to locate Iraqi existed prior to the invasion contributed targets in the early periods of the invasion; extensively to the maximization of this real a tactic that put civilian life at high risk due and imagined loss. Here, imagined loss to the inaccuracy of such data (Human refers to the loss of memories. One could Rights Watch 2003). Consider for example argue that the transformation of memory this excerpt from Sa’dun Hassan Salih, an from its ‘realized’ state prior to migration, Iraqi man who lost six members of his 3 to being imagined following migration is a diaspora. What Conversi (2012: 1360), form of initial loss within itself. What is borrowing from Eriksen (2007), termed as meant by ‘imagined’ here is that being “internet nationalism” has been manifested detached from the material contexts by the Iraqi diaspora extensively through associated with a specific memory political propaganda Facebook groups, jeopardizes the existence of that memory. email newsletters, and political websites The material base in which it was rooted is among many other outlets. Access to the no longer realized or experienced, Internet through the cell phone allowed such rendering that memory as solely imagined, individuals to remain in contact with each and thus threatened.
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