The reactive and the extended : A fourth position1

Francisco Calvo Garzón

Department of Philosophy University of Murcia Campus de Espinardo Murcia 30100 - Spain Phone: 968-36-34-60 Fax: 968-36-39-67 Email: [email protected]

Abstract: Clark and Chalmers (1998) exploit a “parity” argument to argue in favour of the . In their view, any worldly dimension which does contribute to the achievement of a cognitive task and which would count as cognitive, had that contribution come from endogenous processes, should count as a cognitive input. The conclusion they draw is that the mind spreads out into the world. They contrast their position, coined “active ”, with internalism and externalism à la Putnam. Internalism and externalism reject the parity argument, and argue, on different grounds, that the mind doesn’t extend into the world. More recently, Clark (2005) replies to a number of criticisms. In this paper I argue for a fourth position (“reactive primagenesis”) that is left unexplored by Clark in his latest treatment. According to reactive primagenesis, although the parity argument is to be accepted (contra internalism and externalism à la Putnam), the extended mind thesis can still be resisted (contra active externalism).

1 I would like to thank Ken Aizawa, Richard Campbell and Terry Dartnall for their helpful comments and suggestions. 2

The reactive brain and the extended mind: A fourth position

1. Introduction

Clark and Chalmers (hereafter, C&C; 1998) ask “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” (p. 7). To pave the way for their particular response, they call into question the intuitive appeal to the boundaries of skin and skull, and the more technical approach according to which mind stuff is on a par with meaning externalism à la

Putnam (“externalism about meaning carries over into externalism about mind”, ibid., p.

7). In C&C’s view, however, a third (still externalist) position opens up in logical space.

To wit, a sort of active externalism where the environment is part and parcel of cognition. In their view, cognition spreads out into the world in a non-trivial way. As

C&C argue, any worldly dimension which does contribute to the achievement of a cognitive task and which would count as cognitive, had that contribution come from endogenous processes, should count as a cognitive input. Put bluntly, skin and skull are irrelevant to the identification of a cognitive process.

Externalist approaches appear as somehow trivialized or at least, as far less radical than active externalism. In particular, whereas (orthodox) externalism exploits issues that belong to the theory of reference and the narrow/wide content debate, “active externalism” focuses on how narrow content itself effectively widens up via causally- efficacious exogenous vehicles. Factually, according to active externalism, the mind spreads out there. There is, however, a philosophically tenable stance left unexplored in

C&C’s study; a position that is not biased, not even minimally, by skin-and-skull 3 preconceptions, but that nevertheless eschews active externalism. The purpose of this paper is to vindicate such a stance.2

2. Opening up the landscape

To make their case, C&C put to work an “intuition pump” embedded in their parity argument. According to the parity argument,

If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (C&C, 1998, p. 8; emphasis in original).

The parity argument considers a competency that almost no one would hesitate to count as cognitive, and asks the reader to deem what would happen in case a feature of the world was rather the critical part that allows the individual to perform the task in question.

Recalling very briefly C&C’ well-known example, Inga is a subject who can exploit her “biological” memory to get to a museum somewhere downtown. On the other hand, Otto, an agent who suffers from Alzheimer, exploits the he has patiently “stored” in a notebook he always carries around with him. Thanks to this notebook, Otto can also successfully navigate through his complex surroundings and find the museum. According to C&C, Otto executes cognitive (information-processing) manipulations as much as Inga does, or as any other person who achieves the same

2 C&C spell out in great detail the differences between Putnam-like externalism, and the sort of “active” externalism they endorse. The reader not familiar with their arguments is encouraged to visit their paper.

The position I’m about to defend arises independently of the (historical) externalist considerations that readers familiar with the philosophy of language and mind will surely be aware of. 4 competency by exploiting her “biological” memories does. Manipulation of external objects (notebooks or what may) is tantamount to endogenously generated operations.

Both are genuinely cognitive insofar as both are seen as part of a broader system that comprehends all brain, body and environment. Their conclusion is that the mind extends into the world (see also Clark, 1997; Dennett, 1996; and Hutchins, 1995).3

C&C frame the parity argument conditionally, and so framed, the argument is clearly valid. The antecedent, however, may be false. That is, we may actually hesitate to recognize a process done in the head as cognitive. In this case, we would be confronted with a valid, although harmless type of argument. C&C may have very good reasons to treat endogenous and exogenous activity on a par, but if the antecedent is false, we may end up concluding that a process that is performed out there doesn’t count as cognitive either.4

In short, C&C’s three-fold picture, I contend, doesn’t exhaust the landscape. Both endogenous and exogenous factors may be equally (non-trivially) causally efficacious in the generation of the agent’s behaviour. However, granting that says nothing as to whether the behaviour in question is cognitive or not. My thesis is that coupled

3 C&C carefully flesh the Alzheimer patient example up so as to draw the analogy. Thus, for example,

Otto can retrieve the information in the notebook effortlessly whenever required, automatically endorsing it. C&C also go over a number of more or less obvious rejoinders. Reviewing all this would take us far afield. The reader may care to consult C&C (1998) for a detailed elaboration of their example. To see the main lines of attack launched so far, the reader may care to consult Adams & Aizawa (2001); Dartnall

(2005); Gertler (manuscript); O’Brien (1998); Rupert (2004); Sterelny (in press); and Weiskopf

(submitted). See also Clark (2005; forthcoming) for replies. In what follows, rather than reviewing the structure of their arguments, I shall concentrate on a fourth alternative, which in my understanding emerges naturally as a result of turning C&C’ position upside-down (see below).

4 Note that this possibility should at least be granted for the sake of the argument. C&C’s position is also usually appraised as highly counterintuitive, and that doesn’t prevent it from being argued for or against. 5 processes of the type C&C mull over are on a par with endogenously generated processes, but, crucially, because they both count as reactive processes. This way, my position grants the parity argument. We may agree that inner and outer factors are to be treated on a par; but they are to be treated on a par for good and for bad! There is thus still some room left for a fourth answer to C&C’ initial question; an option that remains faithful to the dynamicist spirit (see below) that underlies their “extended mind” thesis.5

This position differs substantially from other strategies found in the literature. A common line of response would consist in the identification of divergences in the explanation of Inga’s and Otto’s behaviour. The strategy of the defender of the extended mind thesis is then to resist and show how parity still remains under enemy fire (see

Clark, 2005). Adams and Aizawa (2001), for instance, make the non-modal claim that

Otto’s notebook only delivers derived content. And they further argue that there are cognitive processes going on in Otto that are unlike those going on in Inga. This way, although they wouldn’t call into question the parity principle per se, they question

C&C’s parity argument.

Although, in principle, it may be wise not to treat derived and intrinsic content on a par, my position is to grant the parity argument. Reconciliation may be achieved by arguing that neither endogenous nor exogenous states can be ascribed intrinsic content.6

My reasons then for questioning the extended mind thesis are pretty different from the

5 Notice, however, that nothing hinges on endorsing an anti-representationalist perspective tout court. All

I’m saying is that these states may count as a genuine non-cognitive natural kind and that nothing in

C&C’ thesis cancels that option out. It is thus an alternative that cannnot be discarded beforehand.

6 It might be good to find a reason to disallow intrinsic content. Dennett gives it a shot in “The Myth of

Original Intentionality,” but see Adams and Aizawa (forthcoming) for a response. 6 ones typically adduced from the internalist/externalist corners.7 What are then the reasons to argue that the piece of behaviour C&C consider is not cognitive?

3. A way to offload the cognitive cargo

We are now in a position to assess the extended mind thesis. C&C’s thesis seems to be inspired by a “soft” notion of representation (see Wheeler and Clark, 1999; Clark &

Grush, 1999) such that there’s enough room for (cognitive) computations to be performed both endogenously and in the external medium. This “soft” notion of representation, at least in the case of Clark,8 is inspired by research in dynamic systems theory. According to dynamicism,9 embodiment (Clark, 1997) is the mark of the mental.

Cognitive activity cannot be accounted for without taking into account the perceptual and motor apparatus that facilitates in the first place the agent’s dealing with the

7 A word of caution is needed before we proceed. The reader will consistently find in the literature (see e.g., Rupert, 2004; Weiskopf, submitted) an explicit distinction between the extended mind thesis and a thesis of extended cognition. The distinction in my opinion is helpful and correctly drawn. Whereas the extended mind thesis lays the stress on propositional attitude states, the thesis of extended cognition focuses on those states of the world that are part of the causally-efficacious chain that comprehends all sorts of cognitive processes (personal and/or subpersonal). Nevertheless, these states, however primitive or complex they are, need not involve the propositional attitudes. Although distinguishing between beliefs or desires extending into the world, and cognitive processes, in general, being extended, may help foes of the parity argument narrow down their targets, for present purposes we need not dwell on this separation.

I shall speak generally about cognitive abilities, bearing in mind that, if my line of reasoning holds, the argument carries straightforward to both theses (extended mind and extended cognition).

8 Clark and Chalmers manifest different degree of belief in the extended mind thesis (see C&C, 1998, fn.

1.) I suspect that parts of this section are only applicable to Clark. The bearing, nonetheless, upon the extended mind thesis, to both.

9 For a philosophical treatment see Eliasmith (1996). 7 external world. The driving force of this joint effort is a distrust for cognitive science orthodoxy, in particular for its reliance on the foundational notions of computation and representation, and the belief that cognition ought to be studied in the continuous interactions of brain, body and environment.

Dynamicism may be interpreted as endorsing what I shall dub the “(cognitive) continuity hypothesis” (CCH; BLIND REFERENCE, in press). Two constraints characterize CCH: On the one hand, a homogeneity constraint according to which (i) higher-level cognition is on a par with bodily and nervous processes, and can be thus accounted for in terms of continuity, temporality and non-linearity; and, on the other hand, an interactivity constraint that says that (ii) multiple level interactions take place in a continuous fashion all the way down from high-level cognitive activity to perception, motor control and non-cognitive processes in general.

Although CCH seems at first sight in unison with C&C’s dynamicist-inspired extended mind thesis, continuity may be seen as a hurdle for dynamicism when issues of representation arise in the context of higher-level cognitive activity. System states which are subject to a representational treatment need not evolve in a continuous fashion. A well-known illustration is what Clark (1997) dubs representation-hungry cases; cases such as counterfactual reasoning, de-coupled tasks, etc. (see Clark and

Toribio, 1994, for an overview). Thus, after all, representational states may not be subject to CCH above. There is, put bluntly, a representational gap that marks a watershed between lower-level behaviour that meets CCH and higher-level behaviour that doesn’t. Once we take into account representation-hungry cases, we may say that whatever model ultimately succeeds in accounting in dynamic terms for higher-level 8 cognitive activity will have to incorporate the inherently discontinuous character of representational states.10

The coming arguments will serve to further specify the critical relation between the demand for discontinuities and CCH in the context of the extended mind thesis. I shall then argue that the type of behaviour that both Inga and Otto exhibit when they navigate their environment, need not rely on the exploitation of internal and/or external representations.

In their closing remarks, C&C claim that in order to deny extended cognition, “we would have to shrink the self into a mere bundle of occurrent states, severely threatening its deep psychological continuity” (p. 18). In my view appraising occurrent states as a threat depends on the level of explanation we favour in order to study a coupled system.11 The issue boils down to what level of explanation we favour in order to study a coupled system. In my view (BLIND REFERENCE, in press), the safest

(open-minded) approach is to posit different sets of variables which may be low-level ones as in the case of neural patterns of firing, or high-level ones, as must be the case if we are to keep track of overt behaviour. Results thus of cellular and molecular manipulations in control experiments may in principle be included when inserting neurobiologically plausible parameters in dynamical models.

Granting this for argument’s sake, let, what I shall dub, level A be the lowest level of aggregation of a system that our best neuroscience can successfully integrate with the

10 Discontinuities in content find a natural interpretation in dynamicism. A change of representational content is described in terms of the evolution of states of activation in a dynamic field (see Spencer and

Schöner, 2003). Two states are discontinuous when field evolution does not require the activation of all locations in between the states to build up.

11 The reader may care to consult Hüttemann and Papineau (2005) for an insightful discussion of physicalism and levels. I shall obviate it for present purposes. 9 principles of dynamic systems theory. We may then define primagenesis (BLIND

REFERENCE, in press) as referring to the continuous set of processes at level A that remains linked to higher-level performance and produces a given piece of stable behavioural data.

Although linked to endogenous activity, primagenesis should not be seen as explicitly stressing intrinsic brain processes against exogenous activity. The emphasis is on being primary, in the sense of targeting whatever level of aggregation is the lowest one where a linkage to overt behaviour obtains. In this way, were we to observe an external stimulus directly linked to the internal state thought responsible for it, it would count as a genuine case of primagenesis. What really matters is the fact that the patterns of activation evolve continuously.

Thus, rather than claiming that endogenous and exogenous inputs to the system interact non-linearly and their contributions are to be summed up in the cognitive equation, we may say that level A reflects the activation generated by those contributions at immediately previous time steps. Primagenesis understands the external dimension as part of a non-trivial multi-causal spread chain, and need not be subject to a cognitive interpretation. My working hypothesis it that C&C’ occurrent states could in principle be identified with continuous states of the sort that primagenesis could in principle identify.

Imagine now that Inga’s propositional attitude states are couched at the cellular and molecular level. In this way, there will be a (primagenetic) level A of aggregation such that our best neuroscience could make reference to the continuous set of processes at that level that remains linked to her successful street-navigation performance. On the other hand, let’s suppose that Otto has been implanted some fancy high-tech mechanism (choose your favourite sci-fi prototype), such that level A, in his case, 10 identifies the implanted structure as the level of aggregation at which continuity obtains.

We may be inclined to claim that primagenesis now drives us towards internalism. In the case of Inga, it is clearly so, since all we’ve done has been to reduce her beliefs to the level of her neurobiology. However, the case of Otto can be misleading. The implant may fool us and make us conclude that primagenesis must posit the crucial piece within the boundaries of skin and skull. But this is only a contingent fact. Primagenesis is neutral between internalism and externalism. Star-treck fans (I’m not one, I must admit) may easily find a primagenetic level A that extends beyond skin and skull. Thus, the gadget may be a microchip in Otto’s belt that, as it processes the information he’s stored in his notebook, transmits it to the implant. The possibility exists that, in the system formed by Otto, his inner implant, and the outer microchip and notebook, primagenesis applies to the microchip; or the possibility that no implant exists at all, and the information in the microchip is passed on directly and effortlessly to Otto’s peripheral nervous system, in such a way that his behaviour as he walks to the museum is functionally indistinguishable from Inga’s. My contention is that now we’re talking of a primagenetic reactive agent.

But why is primagenesis to be read reactively, the reader may wonder? In a nutshell, the answer is that once we grant primagenesis, the (representation-hungry) demand for discontinuities fails to be met. The basic working hypothesis of representation-hungry cases (Clark, 1997) is that whatever model succeeds in accounting dynamically for representation-hungry situations (e.g., following by means of your biological memory directions to get to the museum) will have to incorporate the inherently discontinuous character of representational states. The problem with Inga, then, and the explanation of her behaviour in terms of representations, is that it fails to 11 meet the “(cognitive) continuity hypothesis,” (CCH). Certainly, a dynamical picture of

Inga’s behaviour will respect the interactivity hypothesis (see above). Unfortunately, it wouldn’t respect the other part of the CCH equation: the homogeneity constraint (see above). Notice that in order to meet CCH, the model should describe those continuous changes undergone by Inga which are at the heart of the homogeneity constraint. If her

“biological memory” reduces to cellular and molecular mechanisms (Bickle, 2003), the description of her behaviour will be correct only if it respects those continuous aspects of neurobiological changes that are empirically linked to her navigating capabilities.

The interactivity constraint, on the other hand, once level A is empirically settled upon, won’t suppose the inclusion of discontinuities, since it will reflect the continuous processes at level A that remain linked to higher-level behaviour and produce the actual piece of getting-to-the-museum behaviour.

Therefore, we can see that a system that meets CCH’s homogeneity and interactivity constraints is actually orthogonal to the demands behind C&C’s parity argument. States of Inga, subject to a primagenetic (level A) analysis, do not necessarily have the discontinuous character putatively required. The idea that representations are involved in the case of Inga is due to the fact that her biological memory, which is crucial for the explanation of her competency, is modelled at a level of aggregation that does not allow us to exploit primagenesis. The intuition pump behind the parity argument is due to a cognitive phrasing of their argument. In particular, C&C are phrasing cognitively the antecedent in: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.” (C&C, 1998, p. 8). 12

This rendering of the situation presupposes an answer which forces us to question the parity itself, unless we’re happy to accept the extended mind thesis. On the contrary, my proposal simply involves a continuous transformation along a sensory-to- neural pathway, such that the antecedent fails to be met. Thus, the question appropriately recast would be: What sensory-to-neural continuous transformations permit Inga to get to the museum?

In my view, the burden of proof is always placed on the non-cognitivist’s side and discussion proceeds without further ado. By contrast I reject that burden, and put matters the other way round: There are no representations because they require discontinuities, and level A dynamics are always continuous.

C&C allow for the possibility that propositional attitude states are constituted exogenously. Rejoinders to the extended mind thesis concentrate in showing that they must be constituted endogenously. However, I’ve allowed for the possibility that we have external primagenesis. The reader can see that I’m invoking no skin and skull prejudices whatsoever. Rather, I venture to say, C&C have representational content- related prejudices. I respect parity, but I turn C&C’s argument upside-down. If the behaviour of Inga is purely reactive, why should we assume that Otto’s is not?

Primagenetically speaking, we’ve identified a certain continuous level of aggregation in the system (Inga), such that discontinuous content simply doesn’t exist.

In C&C’s view, the general methodology of the cognitive sciences constitutes a toolkit that can be used when talking about notebooks as cognitive aids, in the same way it is currently used when trying to understand (biological) memory. Explanatorily speaking the research methodology will pay off in both sorts of situations, once it is granted that they constitute a natural kind. The reader should notice that the degree of reductionism that reactive primagenesis hint at is perfectly compatible with a functional 13 level of description. Notice that primagenesis is not committed to the lowest level of physical aggregation, but rather to the lowest level where continuity obtains, which may be a pretty high level indeed, and will need to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Therefore, we can stick to an internal or external primagenetic level A that allows for the satisfaction a the global economy of the agent as functionally identified. That is, all we need is to allow for is the existence of external primagenetic states in the case of

Otto that satisfy the functional role of the alleged mental states of Inga.

4. Ways to be reliable

So far, we’ve being wondering whether the behaviour of Inga and Otto can be accounted for in a transient manner? Some comments in Clark’s latest defence of the extended mind hypothesis may point towards that direction. Clark (2005) claims:

“[b]iological … are by nature open-ended controllers. To deal fluently with bodily change and growth, they have developed ways of computing, pretty much on a moment-to-moment basis, what resources are readily available and under direct control.” (pp. 8-9). Certainly, Clark’s aim is not to show that biological brains are the locus of reactive agency, but rather to emphasize the radically embodied and embedded character of cognition, something that here Clark refers to as “ecological control”. In this vein, he continuous: “[Ecological control] allows much of our skill at walking to reside in the elastic properties of muscles and tendons (Thelen and Smith 1994). And it allows (I claim) much of our prowess at thought and reason to depend upon the robust and reliable operation, in dense brain-involving loops, of a variety of non-biological epistemic devices.” (p. 9; emphasis added). The key question is what we mean by a

“reliable operation.” 14

The crucial observation that may make us agree with C&C that cognition spreads out into the world is the view of the environment as a reliable medium for offloading cognitive workload. A reliable environment allows agents to reduce inner computational demands by relying on external cues (Hutchins, 1995). Thus, C&C consider for instance the evolution of the visual system as triggered by a considerable degree of reliance on contingencies about the underlying structure of the agent’s niche. The reader may think of her favourite example of cognitive offload into the world, but the structure is basically the same. Namely, the extension of cognition by invoking those reliable aspects of the world that enter into the equation of coupled cognition in such a way that they preserve causal efficacy.

We may nonetheless think of reliability in a whole different way while agreeing that the role played by the notebook in the case of the subject with Alzheimer is functionally equivalent to the role played by a biological memory in healthy subjects.

In fact, when we look closer to memory-involving information-processing, we realize that exploiting reliable information is compatible with interpreting the behaviour of the subject in a reactive manner.

C&C think of reliability insofar as the coupling of the embedded agent happens to be affected or not. Thus, they argue that what is crucial in order to have an extended mind is that there is a reliable coupling, say, between the subject and the notebook.

Dennett (1996) puts reliability similarly in terms that relate to the extended mind thesis.

He thinks of home environments where the elderly remain competent because of their reliance on a number of offloaded cues that serve as landmarks in their cognitive lives.

In his view, when they are taken to an institution they lose their competencies, because they cannot rely any longer on their home cues. In Dennett’s view, this literally 15 detaches them “from large parts of their ” (1996, p. 139).12 Situated cognition exploits the fact that cognitive activity cannot be detached from the surrounding environmental factors. The concept I have in mind differs slightly from C&C’s and

Dennett’s.

Under the lens of primagenesis, we may say that history reduces to previous (level

A continuous) time steps, in such a way that what we read as “having history” simply boils down to exploiting a reliable environment. In this context, what I call

“environmental reliability” simply refers to the uncontroversial fact that features of the external environment tend to correlate in appropriate ways. Or, putting it slightly differently, the world presents regularities that allow us to cut across idiosyncrasies, and crucially these regularities are presented reliably across diverse exposures.

However, rather than reflecting a correspondence with environmental factors, the model points to the lack of a tuning to underlying environmental regularities. In this way, we are able to fine-tune to the world’s regularities, not because we discover an underlying structure, but rather because the world is basically reliable.

We may then say that an environment is reliable if there’s a matching between external stuff and endogenous activity. But the locus is simply the activity that obtains at level A of processing, be it external or internal. This way, rather than interpreting

Inga’s memories in terms of an isomorphic structuring with environmental regularities that allow her to tune to the sources of the correlations found in nature (see Ryder,

2004), the story here told would be that Inga’s behaviour in the world simply exploits in a reactive manner the fact that the environment happens to be reliable. It is not the

12 See Rupert (2004) for some remarks on Dennett’s view in the context of the extended mind thesis. 16 fact that most of the information is out there what really matters, but rather the fact that it happens to be reliable, even though it may not be actually accessible when acting.13

5. Conclusion

In order to answer the question “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” (C&C, 1998, p. 7), C&C reject the boundaries of skin and skull. In their view, the mind extends outwards into the world. More recently, however, Clark (forthcoming) appears to briefly consider something related to the position that I’ve just put forward here. He says:

I also mention a possible alternative interpretation of the argument as (in effect) a reductio of the very idea of the mind as an object of scientific study. This is an interesting proposal, but one whose full evaluation must be left for another time.

And he continues,

Couldn’t we just eliminate the mind? Despite the mechanistic motley, we may still aspire to a science of the mind. Granted, this will be a science of

13 It is actually the fact that in many tasks it is usually out there what fools us, and doesn’t let us realize that the external object has nothing to do! Notice too that some minimal representationalist may well argue that peripherically transduced information in relatively simple agents may lead to forms of encoding that enter in direct (representational) correspondence with external features of the world. My position not only departs from C&C’s active externalism, but also from well-known positions such as

Brooks’. My claim is not that there is no representational content because the world itself “serves as its own best model” (Brooks, 1991, p. 145). Reactively, the concept of a model reduces, at time t, to the state of the system at time t-1. This could be either a world state or not, and we cannot know beforehand, since that will depend on where level A happens to be, which again, will need to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 17

varied, multiplex, interlocking and criss-crossing causal mechanisms, whose sole point of intersection may consist in their role in informing processes of conscious reflection and choice. It will be a science that needs to cover a wide variety of mechanistic bases, reaching out to biological brains, and to the wider social and technological milieus that (I claim) participate in thought and reason.

The general framework advocated here involves a radical alteration of how we understand cognition.14 The criterion I propose would be: Keep constant whatever part of the overall system under study (brain, body, environment), such that the maximum amount of data can be dealt with in terms of continuities while remaining behaviourally adequate.

I’m aware that the consequences of endorsing the views defended in this article are anything but inconsequential. Nevertheless, on this my thesis would be on a par with the thesis of the extended mind! Thus, a question that may be worth asking is:

What stops the spread of reactive, non-cognitive, behaviour when we move inwards?

My answer is that only representational content prejudices stop it.15

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