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Clark & Chalmers Ask Where Does the Mind Stop The reactive brain and the extended mind: A fourth position1 Francisco Calvo Garzón Department of Philosophy University of Murcia Campus de Espinardo Murcia 30100 - Spain Phone: 968-36-34-60 Fax: 968-36-39-67 Email: [email protected] Abstract: Clark and Chalmers (1998) exploit a “parity” argument to argue in favour of the extended mind thesis. In their view, any worldly dimension which does contribute to the achievement of a cognitive task and which would count as cognitive, had that contribution come from endogenous processes, should count as a cognitive input. The conclusion they draw is that the mind spreads out into the world. They contrast their position, coined “active externalism”, with internalism and externalism à la Putnam. Internalism and externalism reject the parity argument, and argue, on different grounds, that the mind doesn’t extend into the world. More recently, Clark (2005) replies to a number of criticisms. In this paper I argue for a fourth position (“reactive primagenesis”) that is left unexplored by Clark in his latest treatment. According to reactive primagenesis, although the parity argument is to be accepted (contra internalism and externalism à la Putnam), the extended mind thesis can still be resisted (contra active externalism). 1 I would like to thank Ken Aizawa, Richard Campbell and Terry Dartnall for their helpful comments and suggestions. 2 The reactive brain and the extended mind: A fourth position 1. Introduction Clark and Chalmers (hereafter, C&C; 1998) ask “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” (p. 7). To pave the way for their particular response, they call into question the intuitive appeal to the boundaries of skin and skull, and the more technical approach according to which mind stuff is on a par with meaning externalism à la Putnam (“externalism about meaning carries over into externalism about mind”, ibid., p. 7). In C&C’s view, however, a third (still externalist) position opens up in logical space. To wit, a sort of active externalism where the environment is part and parcel of cognition. In their view, cognition spreads out into the world in a non-trivial way. As C&C argue, any worldly dimension which does contribute to the achievement of a cognitive task and which would count as cognitive, had that contribution come from endogenous processes, should count as a cognitive input. Put bluntly, skin and skull are irrelevant to the identification of a cognitive process. Externalist approaches appear as somehow trivialized or at least, as far less radical than active externalism. In particular, whereas (orthodox) externalism exploits issues that belong to the theory of reference and the narrow/wide content debate, “active externalism” focuses on how narrow content itself effectively widens up via causally- efficacious exogenous vehicles. Factually, according to active externalism, the mind spreads out there. There is, however, a philosophically tenable stance left unexplored in C&C’s study; a position that is not biased, not even minimally, by skin-and-skull 3 preconceptions, but that nevertheless eschews active externalism. The purpose of this paper is to vindicate such a stance.2 2. Opening up the landscape To make their case, C&C put to work an “intuition pump” embedded in their parity argument. According to the parity argument, If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (C&C, 1998, p. 8; emphasis in original). The parity argument considers a competency that almost no one would hesitate to count as cognitive, and asks the reader to deem what would happen in case a feature of the world was rather the critical part that allows the individual to perform the task in question. Recalling very briefly C&C’ well-known example, Inga is a subject who can exploit her “biological” memory to get to a museum somewhere downtown. On the other hand, Otto, an agent who suffers from Alzheimer, exploits the information he has patiently “stored” in a notebook he always carries around with him. Thanks to this notebook, Otto can also successfully navigate through his complex surroundings and find the museum. According to C&C, Otto executes cognitive (information-processing) manipulations as much as Inga does, or as any other person who achieves the same 2 C&C spell out in great detail the differences between Putnam-like externalism, and the sort of “active” externalism they endorse. The reader not familiar with their arguments is encouraged to visit their paper. The position I’m about to defend arises independently of the (historical) externalist considerations that readers familiar with the philosophy of language and mind will surely be aware of. 4 competency by exploiting her “biological” memories does. Manipulation of external objects (notebooks or what may) is tantamount to endogenously generated operations. Both are genuinely cognitive insofar as both are seen as part of a broader system that comprehends all brain, body and environment. Their conclusion is that the mind extends into the world (see also Clark, 1997; Dennett, 1996; and Hutchins, 1995).3 C&C frame the parity argument conditionally, and so framed, the argument is clearly valid. The antecedent, however, may be false. That is, we may actually hesitate to recognize a process done in the head as cognitive. In this case, we would be confronted with a valid, although harmless type of argument. C&C may have very good reasons to treat endogenous and exogenous activity on a par, but if the antecedent is false, we may end up concluding that a process that is performed out there doesn’t count as cognitive either.4 In short, C&C’s three-fold picture, I contend, doesn’t exhaust the landscape. Both endogenous and exogenous factors may be equally (non-trivially) causally efficacious in the generation of the agent’s behaviour. However, granting that says nothing as to whether the behaviour in question is cognitive or not. My thesis is that coupled 3 C&C carefully flesh the Alzheimer patient example up so as to draw the analogy. Thus, for example, Otto can retrieve the information in the notebook effortlessly whenever required, automatically endorsing it. C&C also go over a number of more or less obvious rejoinders. Reviewing all this would take us far afield. The reader may care to consult C&C (1998) for a detailed elaboration of their example. To see the main lines of attack launched so far, the reader may care to consult Adams & Aizawa (2001); Dartnall (2005); Gertler (manuscript); O’Brien (1998); Rupert (2004); Sterelny (in press); and Weiskopf (submitted). See also Clark (2005; forthcoming) for replies. In what follows, rather than reviewing the structure of their arguments, I shall concentrate on a fourth alternative, which in my understanding emerges naturally as a result of turning C&C’ position upside-down (see below). 4 Note that this possibility should at least be granted for the sake of the argument. C&C’s position is also usually appraised as highly counterintuitive, and that doesn’t prevent it from being argued for or against. 5 processes of the type C&C mull over are on a par with endogenously generated processes, but, crucially, because they both count as reactive processes. This way, my position grants the parity argument. We may agree that inner and outer factors are to be treated on a par; but they are to be treated on a par for good and for bad! There is thus still some room left for a fourth answer to C&C’ initial question; an option that remains faithful to the dynamicist spirit (see below) that underlies their “extended mind” thesis.5 This position differs substantially from other strategies found in the literature. A common line of response would consist in the identification of divergences in the explanation of Inga’s and Otto’s behaviour. The strategy of the defender of the extended mind thesis is then to resist and show how parity still remains under enemy fire (see Clark, 2005). Adams and Aizawa (2001), for instance, make the non-modal claim that Otto’s notebook only delivers derived content. And they further argue that there are cognitive processes going on in Otto that are unlike those going on in Inga. This way, although they wouldn’t call into question the parity principle per se, they question C&C’s parity argument. Although, in principle, it may be wise not to treat derived and intrinsic content on a par, my position is to grant the parity argument. Reconciliation may be achieved by arguing that neither endogenous nor exogenous states can be ascribed intrinsic content.6 My reasons then for questioning the extended mind thesis are pretty different from the 5 Notice, however, that nothing hinges on endorsing an anti-representationalist perspective tout court. All I’m saying is that these states may count as a genuine non-cognitive natural kind and that nothing in C&C’ thesis cancels that option out. It is thus an alternative that cannnot be discarded beforehand. 6 It might be good to find a reason to disallow intrinsic content. Dennett gives it a shot in “The Myth of Original Intentionality,” but see Adams and Aizawa (forthcoming) for a response. 6 ones typically adduced from the internalist/externalist corners.7 What are then the reasons to argue that the piece of behaviour C&C consider is not cognitive? 3. A way to offload the cognitive cargo We are now in a position to assess the extended mind thesis.
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