Healthy Data Protection
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Load more
Recommended publications
-
Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment
RECONCILING DATA PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT Neil M. Richards This Article challenges the First Amendment critique of data privacy regulaion- the claim that data privacy rules restrict the dissemination of truthful information and thus violate the FirstAmendment. The critique, which is ascendant in privacy discourse, warps legislative and judicial processes and threatens the consti- tutionalization of information policy. The First Amendment critique should be rejected for three reasons. First, it mistakenly equates privacy regulation with speech regulation. Building on scholarship examining the boundaries of First Amendment protection, this Article suggests that "speech restrictions" in a wide variety of commercial contexts have never triggered heightened First Amendment scru- tiny, refuting the claim that all information flow regulations fall within the First Amendment. Second, the critique inaccurately describes current First Amendment doctrine. To demonstrate this point, this Article divides regulations of information flows into four analytic categories and demonstrates how, in each category, ordinary doctrinal tools can be used to uphold the constitutionality of consumer privacy rules. Third, the critique is normatively unpersuasive. Relying on recent intellectual histories of American constitutional law, this Article argues that fundamental jurisprudentialreasons counsel against acceptance of the First Amendment critique. From the perspective of privacy law, there are striking parallels between the critique's advocacy of "freedom of information" and the discredited "freedom of contract" regime of Lochner. More importantly, from the perspective of First Amendment law, the critique threatens to obliterate the distinction between economic and political rights at the core of post-New Deal constitutionalism. Rejecting the FirstAmendment critique thus has real advantages. -
Data Privacy: De-Identification Techniques
DEVELOPING AND CONNECTING ISSA CYBERSECURITY LEADERS GLOBALLY Data Privacy: De-Identification Techniques By Ulf Mattsson – ISSA member, New York Chapter This article discusses emerging data privacy techniques, standards, and examples of applications implementing different use cases of de-identification techniques. We will discuss different attack scenarios and practical balances between privacy requirements and operational requirements. Abstract The data privacy landscape is changing. There is a need for privacy models in the current landscape of the increas- ing numbers of privacy regulations and privacy breaches. Privacy methods use models and it is important to have a common language when defining privacy rules. This article will discuss practical recommendations to find the right practical balance between compli- ance, security, privacy, and operational requirements for each type of data and business use case. Figure 1 – Forrester’s global map of privacy rights and regulations [4] ensitive data can be exposed to internal users, partners, California Customer Privacy Act (CCPA) is a wake-up call, and attackers. Different data protection techniques can addressing identification of individuals via data inference provide a balance between protection and transparen- through a broader range of PII attributes. CCPA defines Scy to business processes. The requirements are different for personal information as information that identifies, relates systems that are operational, analytical, or test/development to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, as illustrated by some practical examples in this article. or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a We will discuss different aspects of various data privacy tech- particular consumer or household such as a real name, alias, niques, including data truthfulness, applicability to different postal address, and unique personal identifier [1]. -
Leveraging GDPR to Become a Trusted Data Steward
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) is a global management consulting firm and the world’s leading advisor on business strategy. We partner with clients from the private, public, and not-for- profit sectors in all regions to identify their highest-value opportunities, address their most critical challenges, and transform their enterprises. Our customized approach combines deep insight into the dynamics of companies and markets with close collaboration at all levels of the client organization. This ensures that our clients achieve sustainable competitive advantage, build more capable organizations, and secure lasting results. Founded in 1963, BCG is a private company with offices in more than 90 cities in 50 countries. For more information, please visit bcg.com. DLA Piper is a global law firm with lawyers located in more than 40 countries throughout the Ameri- cas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia Pa- cific, positioning us to help clients with their legal needs around the world. We strive to be the leading global business law firm by delivering quality and value to our clients. We achieve this through practical and innovative legal solutions that help our clients succeed. We deliver consistent services across our platform of practices and sectors in all matters we undertake. Our clients range from multinational, Global 1000, and Fortune 500 enterprises to emerging compa- nies developing industry-leading technologies. They include more than half of the Fortune 250 and nearly half of the FTSE 350 or their subsidi- aries. We also advise governments and public sector bodies. Leveraging GDPR to Become a Trusted Data Steward Patrick Van Eecke, Ross McKean, Denise Lebeau-Marianna, Jeanne Dauzier: DLA Piper Elias Baltassis, John Rose, Antoine Gourevitch, Alexander Lawrence: BCG March 2018 AT A GLANCE The European Union’s new General Data Protection Regulation, which aims to streng- then protections for consumers’ data privacy, creates an opportunity for companies to establish themselves as trusted stewards of consumer data. -
Why Pseudonyms Don't Anonymize
Why Pseudonyms Don’t Anonymize: A Computational Re-identification Analysis of Genomic Data Privacy Protection Systems Bradley Malin Data Privacy Laboratory, School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890 USA [email protected] Abstract Objectives: In order to supply patient-derived genomic data for medical research purposes, care must be taken to protect the identities of the patients from unwanted intrusions. Recently, several protection techniques that employ the use of trusted third parties (TTPs), and other identity protecting schemas, have been proposed and deployed. The goal of this paper is to analyze the susceptibility of genomic data privacy protection methods based on such methods to known re-identification attacks. Methods: Though advocates of data de-identification and pseudonymization have the best of intentions, oftentimes, these methods fail to preserve anonymity. Methods that rely solely TTPs do not guard against various re-identification methods, which can link apparently anonymous, or pseudonymous, genomic data to named individuals. The re-identification attacks we analyze exploit various types of information that leaked by genomic data that can be used to infer identifying features. These attacks include genotype-phenotype inference attacks, trail attacks which exploit location visit patterns of patients in a distributed environment, and family structure based attacks. Results: While susceptibility varies, we find that each of the protection methods studied is deficient in their protection against re-identification. In certain instances the protection schema itself, such as singly-encrypted pseudonymization, can be leveraged to compromise privacy even further than simple de-identification permits. In order to facilitate the future development of privacy protection methods, we provide a susceptibility comparison of the methods. -
Law, Technology, and Public Health in the COVID-19 Crisis
Privacy in Pandemic: Law, Technology, and Public Health in the COVID-19 Crisis Tiffany C. Li* The COVID-19 pandemic has caused millions of deaths and disastrous consequences around the world, with lasting repercussions for every field of law, including privacy and technology. The unique characteristics of this pandemic have precipitated an increase in use of new technologies, including remote communications platforms, healthcare robots, and medical AI. Public and private actors alike are using new technologies, like heat sensing, and technologically influenced programs, like contact tracing, leading to a rise in government and corporate surveillance in sectors like healthcare, employment, education, and commerce. Advocates have raised the alarm for privacy and civil liberties violations, but the emergency nature of the pandemic has drowned out many concerns. This Article is the first comprehensive account of privacy in pandemic that maps the terrain of privacy impacts related to technology and public health responses to the COVID-19 crisis. Many have written on the general need for better health privacy protections, education privacy protections, consumer privacy protections, and protections against government and corporate surveillance. However, this Article is the first comprehensive article to examine these problems of privacy and technology specifically in light of the pandemic, arguing that the lens of the pandemic exposes the need for both wide-scale and small-scale reform of privacy law. This Article approaches these problems with a focus on technical realities and social * Visiting Clinical Assistant Professor, Boston University School of Law; Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. The author thanks Tally Amir, Chinmayi Arun, Jack M. -
What to Know About the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? FAQ
What to know about the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? FAQ www.bitkom.org What to know about the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? 2 Imprint Publisher Bitkom e. V. Federal Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media Albrechtstraße 10 | 10117 Berlin Contact Sausanne Dehmel | Member of the Executive Board responsible for security and trust T +49 30 27576 -223 | [email protected] Graphics & Layout Sabrina Flemming | Bitkom Coverimage © artjazz – fotolia.com Copyright Bitkom 2016 This publication constitutes general, non-binding information. The contents represent the view of Bitkom at the time of publication. While great care is taken in preparing this information, no guarantee can be provided as to its accuracy, completeness, and/or currency. In particular, this publication does not take into consideration the specific circumstances of individual cases. The reader is therefore personally responsible for its use. Any liability is excluded. What to know about the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? 3 Table of Contents Table of Contents Introduction ________________________________________________________________ 4 When does the GDPR enter into force? __________________________________________ 5 How does the GDPR apply in Germany? _________________________________________ 5 Which rules remain largely unchanged? _________________________________________ 7 Which are the new elements and most important changes? ________________________ 9 Which processes and documents do I have to review? ____________________________ 17 What are the costs and effort I should expect? ___________________________________ 18 Which company departments should be informed about the changes? ______________ 18 Who provides guidance on interpretation? ______________________________________ 19 What to know about the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? 4 FAQ Introduction The extensive provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) cause small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) initial difficulties. -
Schrems II Compliant Supplementary Measures
Schrems II Compliant Supplementary Measures 11 November 2020 © 2020 Anonos www.anonos.com 1 Summary The attached documents serve as evidence of the feasibility and practicability of the proposed measures enumerated in the EDPB’s Recommendations 01/2020 on Measures That Supplement Transfer Tools to Ensure Compliance With the EU Level of Protection of Personal Data; the first document, prepared by Anonos, describes several use cases, and the others include independent audits, reviews and certifications of Anonos state-of-the-art technology that leverages European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) recommendations for GDPR compliant Pseudonymisation to enable EDPB proposed measures. Table of Contents 1. Maximizing Data Liquidity - Reconciling Data Utility & Protection 3 2. IDC Report - Embedding Privacy and Trust Into Data Analytics Through 20 Pseudonymisation 3. Data Scientist Expert Opinion on Variant Twins and Machine Learning 29 4. Data Scientist Expert Opinion on BigPrivacy 38 Anonos dynamic de-identification, pseudonymization and anonymization systems, methods and devices are protected by an intellectual property portfolio that includes, but is not limited to: Patent Numbers: CA 2,975,441 (2020); EU 3,063,691 (2020); US 10,572,684 (2020); CA 2,929,269 (2019); US 10,043,035 (2018); US 9,619,669 (2017); US 9,361,481 (2016); US 9,129,133 (2015); US 9,087,216 (2015); and US 9,087,215 (2015); including 70 domestic and international patents filed. Anonos, BigPrivacy, Dynamic De-Identifier, and Variant Twin are trademarks of Anonos Inc. protected by federal and international statutes and treaties. © 2020 Anonos Inc. All Rights Reserved. MAXIMIZING DATA LIQUIDITY RECONCILING DATA UTILITY & PROTECTION August 2020 www.anonos.com © 2020 Anonos 3 MAXIMIZING DATA LIQUIDITY RECONCILING DATA UTILITY & PROTECTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Eight years of research and development have created a solution that optimizes both data protection and data use to maximize data liquidity lawfully & ethically. -
Privacy As Privilege: the Stored Communications Act and Internet Evidence Contents
PRIVACY AS PRIVILEGE: THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND INTERNET EVIDENCE Rebecca Wexler CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 2723 I. THE INTERNET AND THE TELEGRAPH ....................................................................... 2730 A. The Puzzle ........................................................................................................................ 2731 B. The Stored Communications Act .................................................................................. 2735 C. Telegraph Privacy Statutes ............................................................................................. 2741 II. PRIVACY AS PRIVILEGE .................................................................................................... 2745 A. Statutory Privileges ........................................................................................................ 2745 1. Defining Statutory Privileges ................................................................................... 2745 2. Common Features of Privileges ............................................................................... 2748 3. Confidentiality Without Privilege ........................................................................... 2750 4. The Current Stored Communications Act Privilege ............................................. 2753 B. The Rules that Govern Statutory Privilege Construction ......................................... -
Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution Kimberly L
University of Baltimore Law ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship Winter 2014 Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution Kimberly L. Wehle University of Baltimore School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons Recommended Citation Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 409 (2014) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 2014] 409 ANONYMITY, FACEPRINTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION Kimberly N. Brown' INTRODUCTION Rapid technological advancement has dramatically expanded the war rantless powers of government to obtain information about individual citi zens directly from the private domain. Biometrics technology I-such as voice recognition, hand measurement, iris and retinal imaging, and facial recognition technology ("FRT")-offers enormous potential for law en forcement and national security. But it comes at a cost. Although much of the American public is complacent with government monitoring for securi ty reasons,2 people also expect to go about daily life in relative obscurity unidentifiable to others they do not already know, do not care to know, or are not required to know-so long as they abide by the law. The reality is quite different. The government and the private sector have the capacity for surveillance of nearly everyone in America. -
Anonymity, Obscurity, and Technology: Reconsidering Privacy in the Age of Biometrics
ANONYMITY, OBSCURITY, AND TECHNOLOGY: RECONSIDERING PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF BIOMETRICS JONATHAN TURLEY ABSTRACT For decades, cinematic and literary works have explored worlds without privacy: fishbowl societies with continual, omnipresent surveillance. For those worried about a post-privacy world, facial recognition technology and other biometric technology could well be the expanding portal to that dystopia. These technologies are rapidly transforming a society predicated on privacy into a diaphanous society where identity and transparency are defining elements. Biometric technology is perfectly suited to evade current privacy protections and doctrines because it presents new challenges to the existing legal framework protecting privacy. The greatest threat of this technological shift is to democratic activities—the very reason that countries such as China have invested so heavily into biometric surveillance systems. This Article explores how our traditional privacy notions fit into a new age of biometrics. It seeks to frame the debate on what values society’s notions of privacy protect, and how to protect them. After exploring prior approaches and definitions to privacy, it proposes a shift from an emphasis on anonymity to a focus on obscurity. The truth is that we now live in a “nonymous” world where our movements and associations will be made increasingly transparent. This Article concludes by recommending a comprehensive approach to biometric technology that would obscure increasingly available images and data while recasting privacy protections to fit a new and unfolding biometric reality. This obscurity will allow participation in society to continue unimpeded by the chilling effects created by the new technology. Without it, our democratic society will never be the same. -
Sypse: Privacy-First Data Management Through Pseudonymization and Partitioning
Sypse: Privacy-first Data Management through Pseudonymization and Partitioning Amol Deshpande, [email protected] University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA ABSTRACT there has been much work in recent years on techniques like dif- Data privacy and ethical/responsible use of personal information ferential privacy and encrypted databases, those have not found are becoming increasingly important, in part because of new reg- wide adoption and further, their primary target is untrusted en- ulations like GDPR, CCPA, etc., and in part because of growing vironments or users. We believe that operational databases and public distrust in companies’ handling of personal data. However, data warehouses in trusted environments, which are much more operationalizing privacy-by-design principles is difficult, especially prevalent, also need to be redesigned and re-architected from the given that current data management systems are designed primarily ground up to embed privacy-by-design principles and to enforce to make it easier and efficient to store, process, access, and share vast better data hygiene. It is also necessary that any such redesign not amounts of data. In this paper, we present a vision for transpar- cause a major disruption to the day-to-day operations of software ently rearchitecting database systems by combining pseudonymiza- engineers or analysts, otherwise it is unlikely to be widely adopted. tion, synthetic data, and data partitioning to achieve three privacy In this paper, we present such a redesign of a standard relational goals: (1) reduce the impact of breaches by separating detailed per- database system, called Sypse, that uses “pseudonymization”, data sonal information from personally identifying information (PII) partitioning, and synthetic data, to achieve several key privacy and scrambling it, (2) make it easy to comply with a deletion re- goals without undue burden on the users. -
Pseudonymization and De-Identification Techniques
Pseudonymization and De-identification Techniques Anna Pouliou Athens – November 21, 2017 The Value of Data Benefits of Data Analytics ● Product/consumer safety ● Improvement of customer experience ● Overall improvement of products and services in many sectors, some critical ● Safety and efficiency of operations ● Regulatory compliance ● Predictive maintenance of equipment ● Reduction of costs ● … De-Identification in the General Data Protection Regulation GDPR and De-Identification - Definition ● Recital 26 and Art.5: “The processing of personal data in such a way that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information.” The additional information must be “kept separately and be subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure non attribution to an identified or identifiable person”. => A privacy enhancing technique where PII is held separately and securely to ensure non-attribution. GDPR and De-Identification - Incentives ● Art 5: It may facilitate processing personal data beyond original collection purposes ● Art 89 (1): It is an important safeguard for processing personal data for scientific, historical and statistical purposes ● Art 25 (1): It is a central feature of “privacy by design” ● Art 32 (1): Controllers can use it to help meet the Regulation’s data security requirements ● Art 15-20: Controllers do not need to provide data subjects with access, rectification erasure or data portability if they can no longer identity a data subject. ● Art 40 (20) d: It encourages