The Failure of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun

Focus

THE FAILURE OF THE WTO beyond pre-determined demands of others and showed little propensity to “negotiate seriously” MINISTERIAL MEETING IN with other delegations. CANCUN:IMPLICATIONS FOR The purpose of this essay is not to dissect precisely FUTURE RESEARCH why the Cancun Ministerial is said to have failed. Nor is the goal here to offer predictions about the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO’s) future, SIMON J. EVENETT* although some of the factors discussed here must surely be relevant. Instead, the objective of this short essay is to identify some questions that in my view n September 14th 2003, the meeting of WTO ought to receive more attention from the scholarly OMinisters in Cancun ended without reaching community.This is not to say that the questions iden- a consensus. According to press reports and subse- tified here are necessarily novel or to suggest that quent statements by those present at that meeting, there are not thoughtful perspectives on them in the the apparent and proximate cause of the existing legal, economic, historical, and political sci- Ministerial’s collapse was a failure to agree on ence literatures on the evolution of the world trading launching formal negotiations on the so-called system. Rather it is that I doubt we have adequately 1 Singapore Issues. Others, however, have put for- answered some of these questions and that revisiting ward alternative explanations for the meeting’s them may be a worthwhile endeavour – especially as, failure, including poor chairmanship of the after the Cancun Ministerial, many feel that the Ministerial meeting by Mexico’s Foreign Minister, world trading system is at a “cross roads.” This Mr. Luis Ernesto Derbez; a failure to agree on the affords an excellent opportunity for scholars – some modalities for negotiations on agricultural trade of whom may not have focused on policy-oriented barriers, export subsidies, and domestic support matters before – to contribute to the debate over the There are questions policies; the inability of many WTO members to future course of – what is no less than – an important that ought to receive negotiate or discuss many issues simultaneously more attention by element in the governance of international econom- the scholarly during and before the Cancun Ministerial ic relations. If this essay persuades a few more schol- community 2 Conference ; and a perception that some national ars to enter this debate then my efforts will not have representatives in Cancun were not prepared to go been in vain.

Some other preliminary remarks are in order. First, * Simon J. Evenett is a University Lecturer at the Saïd Business School and Fellow of Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford. it is important to note that the failure to reach con- He is also the moderator of the Brookings-George Washington University Roundtable on Trade and Investment Policy in sensus at the Cancun Ministerial does not mean Washington, DC. I would like to thank all of those individuals who have shared with me their thoughts on the collapse of the Cancun that previously-agreed commitments by WTO Ministerial. Of course, I alone bear responsibility for what is con- members are no longer binding. (Of course, the tained herein. Please send any comments to [email protected]. Mailing address: Saïd Business degree to which WTO members feel compelled to School, Oxford University, Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HP, United Kingdom. Telephone number: (44) (1865) 288875. adhere to those commitments is another matter.) 1 The Singapore Issues are currently taken to include four matters relating to international commerce namely, the relationship Therefore, the expiry of the so-called “peace between trade and investment policy, the interaction between trade clause” on disputes on agricultural subsidies will and competition policies, transparency in government procurement practices, and trade facilitation practices (such as more efficient still go ahead. So will the formal ending of the customs procedures). It is worth pointing out that some WTO members, including the European Union and its Member States, Multifibre Arrangement on January 1st 2005. took the view before the Cancun Ministerial meeting that an agree- Second, the failure to reach consensus at Cancun ment to launch the Singapore Issues had been taken at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, and that at the Cancun meeting WTO members would determine the modalities for those negotiations. Other WTO members – notably from Africa – had argued that no such decision was taken at the Doha Ministerial 2 This argument is often put differently; that the negotiating agen- Conference and that the Singapore Issues should be addressed da for the Doha Development Round is “overloaded” and beyond after (not at) the Cancun Ministerial. the capacity of many developing countries to effectively negotiate.

11 CESifo Forum 3/2003 Focus

will not result in the shutting down of the WTO’s sures (which, some say, include the Singapore relatively small secretariat in Geneva; nor will it Issues); and the need to complement the tradition- see the end of dispute settlement cases between al goal of enhancing market access with that of WTO members. Moreover, ongoing negotiations promoting development (whatever that may among WTO members are technically supposed to mean.) Indeed, it is an open question as to whether continue, although the enthusiasm to complete the current system of reciprocal negotiations in them may well have diminished.3 The third point to trade rounds is suitable in a world trading system bear in mind is that WTO Ministerial meetings which has enlarged along the above dimensions. have failed before.According to some observers, of the nine meetings of Ministers from members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade What next? A streamlined agenda for the Doha (GATT) and the WTO, four have been branded Round? “failures.” Inevitably, some old hands have claimed that “we have been here before.” In short, failure One response to this open question has been to call to agree is neither uncommon nor will it formally for a reduction in the number of subjects that are undermine the legal and organisational founda- on the negotiating table in the Doha Round. The tions of the world trading system. principal target is typically the Singapore Issues and, since the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial One could, of course, end this essay on such a san- meeting, calls for their removal have intensified guine note, retreat back into the ivory tower and (see, for example, Hoekman 2003). Without in any wait for the next successful WTO Ministerial meet- way denying the importance of the policies associ- ing. (After all, if the old hands are right, then there ated with the Singapore Issues for economic devel- is over a fifty percent chance that the next opments, those supporting the removal of these Ministerial meeting – which must be held in the topics from WTO trade negotiations make two next two years – will be successful and so revive arguments. The first is that the Singapore Issues Should the Singapore Issues the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotia- are not related – or not sufficiently related – to the be taken off the tions!) Unfortunately, there are at least two rea- market-access core of the world trading system, agenda? sons not be so sanguine. The first is that while wait- and therefore do not adhere to the tried-and-test- ing for the next successful WTO Ministerial meet- ed formula of improving economic welfare through ing (or other initiative to re-launch this round) trade negotiations that result in reciprocal reduc- market outcomes will continue to be distorted by tions to impediments to international commerce.4 discriminatory trade barriers and the like. If the And, second, that negotiating and implementing World Bank’s estimates of hundreds of billions of any WTO agreement on the Singapore Issues dollars of gains from the successful completion of would be both too complex and too expensive. the Doha Round are to be believed, then the soon- er these welfare-reducing barriers are eliminated Taken separately or together, I have not been per- the better. The second reason is that past experi- suaded that these two arguments settle the matter. ence with ministerial meetings on trade matters With respect to the first argument above, one may provide a misleading guide to as to the likely might pose a few questions. Are we sure that the success of future WTO Ministerial meetings. efficiency of a nation’s customs procedures has lit- Specifically, in the view of many, the Cancun tle bearing on the extent to which foreign firms can Ministerial differed from its predecessors in the make good on a nation’s market access commit- three following respects: by seeing the active par-

ticipation of many more developing countries (and 4 I note in passing that some recent estimates of the effects of liber- perhaps, more importantly, of the engagement of alising certain elements of the traditional market access agenda are surprisingly small, casting the issue of the relative benefits of pursu- seemingly robust groupings of developing coun- ing some elements of the traditional agenda and the Singapore Issues in a rather different light than is usually represented.Take, for tries); a greater focus on “behind the border” mea- example, the IMF’s and World Bank’s joint study on market access that was published in 2002 (see International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2002). This study estimated the total increase in non- OECD countries’ welfare from liberalisation of OECD countries’ 3 Indeed, to the extent that the failure to reach consensus on the agricultural policies at US$8.7 billion. Interestingly, the same study modalities for a number of negotiations in Cancun constrains the found that the total welfare cost for non-OECD countries of other ability to make cross-issue trade-offs, then concluding the on-going non-OECD countries’ agricultural policies was US$21.7 billion, negotiations may have been made more difficult. Another knock- more than twice the amount of harm done by OECD countries. In on effect of the loss of negotiating momentum in the aftermath of the light of these numbers, and others, I suspect that future histori- the Cancun Ministerial is that WTO members are less likely to ans of the Doha Round will question why so much prominence was refrain from bringing dispute settlement cases if they fear less will put on agricultural trade reform by developing countries in the run be lost in current and future negotiations with “defendant nations.” up to, and at, the Cancun Ministerial Conference.

CESifo Forum 3/2003 12 Focus ments? Indeed, doesn’t the long history of negotiat- effects of signing WTO agreements on the ing rules on customs procedures and the like in the Singapore Issues would be the same. Sometimes world trading system suggest that the link between reasoning by analogy is convincing, sometimes it is trade facilitation and market access has been well not. I would suggest that a better approach is to established? If the current discussions on the trans- conduct separate empirical analyses of the eco- parency in government procurement did not in fact nomic consequences of the proposed multilateral have a market-access component to them, then how provisions on the Singapore Issues. In my view can one explain the numerous remarks made by here is a substantial opportunity to advance our leading developing countries that current proposals knowledge, but to be persuasive a change in for further international rules in this regard will research strategy will be needed. It is not enough have consequences for foreign access to their state for trade economists merely to apply first princi- procurement markets? Nor am I persuaded that ples to the analysis of some “trade and X” issue securing improvements in market access will neces- (X could be any of the Singapore Issues or indeed sarily translate into welfare gains unless states take any issue that might fall within the remit of the steps to prevent the formation of international car- WTO.) Instead, scholarship should at a minimum tels and other anti-competitive practices. Moreover require a thorough understanding of the proposals I find it difficult to argue that, on the one hand, advanced at the WTO and of the policy field in improving market access for products is essential to question.7 Hopefully this would see the era of the Doha Round while simultaneously contending trade economists moonlighting as competition pol- that improvements to another mode of entering icy experts, trade facilitation experts, and the like. foreign markets – through foreign investments – is unnecessary. Indeed, the latter attitude is a little There is a much deeper question raised by the hard to square with the considerable effort expend- debates over the Singapore Issues: What areas of ed on negotiating the General Agreement on Trade policy have characteristics such that they can and in Services during the Uruguay Round. In sum, the should be subject to binding international commit- view that the Singapore Issues would have little or ments at the WTO? I do not pretend that this is a no bearing on market access seems particularly novel question, as the debates over “shallow” and Which policy areas hard to sustain.5 “deep” integration in the early 1990s can attest. should be subject Rather, in my view, this question has yet to be to international In fact, much of the commentary from academic answered satisfactorily. Are the only legitimate commitments at the writers and officials from the international finan- prerequisites for including a policy instrument in WTO? cial institutions on the appropriate scope of the the WTO that there be some discernable impact on Doha Round is influenced by a few papers that market access and that there be some impediment purport to examine the experience of developing to domestic reform that prevents the optimal poli- countries in implementing the Agreement on the cy being chosen unilaterally? (These two charac- Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property teristics of tariffs and quotas are said to account for Rights and the Agreement on the Application of the success of reciprocal bargaining on border Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, known as measures in successive GATT and WTO rounds.) the TRIPS and SPS agreements respectively.6 Even Or are there other characteristics of a policy that if one is convinced that the latter research is credi- make it suitable for inclusion in the WTO? ble, it is quite a different matter to assume that the Presumably, the latter question would say some- thing about the potential desirable trajectory for the WTO and its relationship to other internation- 5 This is all the more so once one appreciates that substitution between discriminatory trade policies is possible. For instance, if a al organisations and agreements that impinge on reader thinks that the phasing out of the MFA (which is essential- ly a system of quotas) in the West will trigger a large number of economic policy matters. Alternatively put, tack- antidumping and safeguards cases against developing countries, then it would seem that only in the most limited sense can the ling this latter question would help in thinking removal of the MFA actually be thought to have improved market through whether the WTO should become a more access. Given the discretion available to governments in implementing their unfair and fair trade laws, how can one have any con- important forum for international economic gover- fidence that lowering a discriminatory trade barrier must improve market access? Once one accepts that the consequences for market nance, as has been suggested by some European access of the liberalisation of traditional border barriers can be meagre or nil, then how can one be sure that their liberalisation has scholars and policymakers. Just as economists have a greater effect on market access than some of the initiatives associated with the Singapore Issues? 6 Finger and Schuler (2000) is perhaps the best known of the very small number of papers of this genre. Hoekman (2003) and Finger 7 Hopefully the chapters in Evenett and SECO (2003) demonstrate (2002) both cite this paper in the manner described in the above some desire to practice what I preach. No doubt subsequent research paragraph. will remedy the deficiencies and omissions from this volume!

13 CESifo Forum 3/2003 Focus

long worried about the boundaries of the firm, Development Round meet these five criteria and what are the boundaries of the WTO? whether the cross-border spillovers associated with those issues are of sufficient magnitude to warrant I do not propose to answer this question in its negotiating an international initiative. The fact that entirety in this short essay, however I would like to few, if any, such comprehensive assessments have develop some ideas that might take the discussion been conducted to date may be because many skills forward. The starting point of my argument is the are probably needed to undertake them (including long-recognised idea that a case for international economic, empirical, legal, and political science collective action can also be constructed when the analyses). Perhaps this is an area where some seri- effects of a state’s policy decisions (including deci- ous inter-disciplinary research could be initiated. sions not to take action) “spill over” national bor- ders and affect the welfare of inhabitants or economic entities in another jurisdiction. One type of Capacity constraints and multilateral trade decision that creates such spillovers are the numer- negotiations ous recent prosecutions by the European Com- mission and by the United States’ Department of One often-mentioned and quite distinct objection Justice of international cartels. These decisions are to broadening the scope of the multilateral trading likely to have had positive knock-on effects out- system is that it places additional demands on the side Europe and the United States, where other negotiating capacities of developing country mem- nations’ purchasers are likely to have benefited bers of the WTO. Furthermore, it is also argued from the break-up of these international conspira- that the “newer” subjects for discussion at the cies. Another example of cross-border spillovers WTO are “complex” and “highly technical.”8 My created by national policy choices is in environ- own view is that the latter argument is very uncon- mental policy (see the analysis in Bhagwati and vincing and the former one is doubtful but is, in Srinivasan 1996, section 4.5). principle, potentially subject to empirical investi- gation. If the complexity of a trade issue alone

Collective action But is demonstrating the existence of spillovers determined whether it should be included in multi- must satisfy enough to warrant the inclusion of a policy instru- lateral trade negotiations, then arguably the last five criteria ment in the WTO? Arguably not. It seems to be subjects to be discussed in the WTO would be agri- that whatever collective action is proposed it must culture and anti-dumping. Indeed, on these also satisfy the following five criteria, listed in no grounds much of the cherished non-manufacturing particular order of importance: market access agenda would be ruled out! Having written a Ph.D. thesis on the U.S. antidumping law • There must be a discernable positive welfare and its implementation, I am at a complete loss to understand how following the details of antidump- impact to undertaking the collective action, ing negotiations is less complex than assessing the • At least one domestic constituency in each of proposed multilateral rules on competition policy. the major trading partners must support the Moreover, given that many developing countries negotiation of the initiative at the WTO, have enacted and implemented both antidumping • Reasons must be advanced as to why the pro- laws and competition laws in the last fifteen years, posed multilateral obligations must be binding one cannot argue that they necessarily have more (ie., as to why hortatory language expressing domestic capacity on antidumping to draw upon. best intentions is insufficient), The complexity argument is a red herring. • The obligations must be codified precisely, their implementation observable, and where the col- The argument that developing countries simply do lective action at issue permits some discretion not have the talented personnel to negotiate and for national policymaking, the latter must be implement multilateral provisions requires careful relatively transparent, assessment. Scarcity of talent at a point in time cer- • The obligations created must be amenable to tainly argues for identifying the most beneficial enforcement through the WTO’s dispute settle- negotiating priorities; again reinforcing the need ment understanding.

It would be useful to assess whether each of the 8 Comments like this can be found in the recent editions of the policies proposed for inclusion in the Doha World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report.

CESifo Forum 3/2003 14 Focus for careful (often country-by-country and not tions could be developed empirically as well as broad brush) studies of the consequences of differ- evaluating the capacity building implications of ent types of multilateral provisions. I know of no entering into different types of trade negotiations. theorem or body of empirical work that demon- Such a research programme might go a long way to strates that the identified trade liberalisation priori- add flesh to the bones of the capacity building ties would be the same for each developing country. question. Again, I suspect that the claims made (Incidentally, taking the argument a step further, if currently in this regard are far ahead of the data scarcity of talent is a particular problem for a devel- necessary to support them. oping country, it is not clear that the overall policy priorities are trade-related; they could in fact be domestic policy initiatives.) Moreover, even if two The so-called development focus of the Doha trade-related negotiating priorities are expected to Round. Where is the pay off to this political have approximately the same potential benefits for correctness? a given country, the amount of time needed to pre- pare for negotiations, to engage in negotiations, and Given the failure of the Cancun Ministerial to implement any provisions that are agreed may Conference, I feel it is incumbent on analysts of the differ. Exploring these matters carefully would world trading system, and of the international insti- require substantial data collection, empirical analy- tutions more generally, to pose another potentially sis, and a precise knowledge of what it takes to pre- controversial question: What have been the conse- Has the pare for and implement multilateral trade accords; quences of putting development considerations at development focus all of which should be undertaken before sweeping the centre of the Doha Round and, therefore, at the of the Doha Round contributed to the statements are made about the implications of heart of the current operation of the multilateral failure of the Cancun capacity constraints for developing countries’ nego- trading system?12 Just as it is perfectly acceptable to Ministerial? tiating strategies. Indeed, on the basis of the consid- question whether the so-called Singapore Issues erations laid out above, I am doubtful that any have “overburdened” the new round, so it is legiti- generic claims about the implications for the scope mate to ask whether the new developmental focus of of the Doha Round, or for developing countries’ the WTO has unnecessarily complicated the comple- interests in that Round, that are based on personnel tion of the Doha Round and whether it contributed constraints can withstand careful scrutiny. to the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial Con- ference? A related but distinct question is whether With respect to the scarcity of trade negotiators, the new development mandate for the WTO is con- the more significant challenge is probably how to sistent with its long-standing role as an institution expand their numbers in developing countries over where agreements on certain trade-related matters the near to longer term and how to retain such tal- are negotiated and where compliance with those ent. Given the pressing nature of this challenge, it agreements is monitored and assessed? If not, then it is perhaps a little discouraging that the last “mini- strikes me that some serious thought is needed as to census” of negotiating talent in Geneva was com- the purpose of the WTO. pleted five years ago.9 (Another such “mini-census” is underway.)10 Moreover, we know little about how Given the partisan – and quite honestly vicious – much trade-negotiating talent (if any) resides in nature of the trade and development debate in the national capitals. Without this type of information, undertaking a needs assessment is very difficult. Furthermore, it would be useful to understand the 11 The following vignette crystallised this issue for me. Recently the Caribbean nations negotiated the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, pros and cons of developing countries pooling nego- part of which contains provisions for the creation of a “common market” in that region. One of the chapters of this treaty was on tiating expertise in regional or other groupings. competition law and policy, and many of the provisions in that chapter were similar to those being discussed in the WTO’s (While on the subject of regional groupings another Working Group on the Interaction of Trade and Competition interesting, yet unexplored, question is the extent to Policy. One wonders if the experience acquired in negotiating this regional trade agreement left the Caribbean nations in a better which preferential trade negotiations “crowd out” or position to participate in the debate over the benefits of multilateral rules on competition policy? Trinidad and Tobago definitely “crowd in” the capacity available to negotiate multi- played their part in these multilateral discussions. 12 11 It is widely accepted that the Doha Ministerial Declaration lateral trade agreements. ) Many of these observa- marked the official acceptance of a greater focus on development considerations in the deliberations of the World Trade Organization. Having said that, I know of no clear and precise 9 See Michalopoulos (1998). statement of what in practical terms is meant by this enhanced 10 One of my students is completing a masters thesis on this subject, commitment to development. There is a sense among some hopefully developing and extending the measures reported in observers and trade negotiators that the developmental focus in Michalopoulos (1998). the Doha Ministerial Declaration means “all things to all men.”

15 CESifo Forum 3/2003 Focus

public arena, I should hasten to add that the question In considering the consequences of adopting a being asked here is not whether economic and other greater development focus at the WTO, I wonder if forms of development are desirable. I would hope the matter can be broken down into the following that all well-intentioned readers could conceive of questions.13 First, what do we mean by a greater an analyst being firmly pro-development yet at the developmental focus or developmental mandate?14 same time being not wholly convinced of the WTO’s Is the intention that the WTO’s activities should be new development mandate (in large part because it directed towards certain agreed outcomes that will is not clear what is meant by the latter!) benefit (in some, perhaps observable, way) developing countries? Or is the intention that the agen- One response to the questions posed above is to da and decision-making processes of the WTO argue that the development mandate agreed on at should better reflect the interests of developing the Doha Ministerial Conference is unimportant countries?15 Second, to what extent does the devel- window dressing that does not affect the substance opment mandate (whatever that may be!) replace of the WTO’s activities, or the status of its previous or augment the existing principal institutional agreements. It seems to this (potentially misin- objective of the WTO, which is to facilitate the formed) observer that few trade negotiators from negotiation and implementation of trade-related developing countries would see the matter in this agreements between sovereign states? Thirdly, way. Moreover, even if the so-called development does the development mandate only relate to the mandate is merely talk, it has added a degree of WTO’s activities after the Doha Ministerial smoke and mirrors to negotiations in Geneva and Conference? If not, then to what extent can previ- elsewhere that one can see little obvious benefit ous WTO and GATT agreements be reinterpreted, from. In contrast, it is quite likely that the develop- scrapped, or rewritten in light of the new development mandate has raised the expectations of some ment focus? Fourth, in what ways (if at all) will the trade officials from developing countries, embold- adjudication of disputes between WTO members ening them to make new and perhaps more ambi- change as a result of greater sensitivity to develop- Adding the tious proposals – some of which call into question mental concerns? Fifth, in what ways (if at all) will development the very status of previously agreed trade accords. the accession of new members to the WTO be mandate raises influenced by the new development mandate? a number of Overall, I am not sure that all this window dressing unanswered or this WTO-equivalent of political correctness has questions been cost-free. I do not want to give the impression that no thinking has gone into these – and similar – questions. For Another response might be to argue that by example, Hoekman, Michalopoulos, and Winters encouraging the opening of markets the WTO (2003) have made some suggestions for intelligently (and its predecessor the GATT) have, by and implementing special and differential treatment for developing countries. In addition, Cottier and large, promoted economic development; there- Takenoshita (2003) have considered the implica- fore, adding a formal development mandate to an tions of moving away from a consensus-based deci- institution which has been promoting it all along sion-making rule at the WTO. Finally,Abbott (2003) may not be problematic. While I tend to agree offers an interesting treatment of some of the issues with the first claim made, I am doubtful of the raised above.Yet, I know of no systematic treatment conclusion. There are a number of objections to of the implications of adopting a greater focus on this argument, especially when one appreciates development considerations at the WTO – and that there is no explicit statement that the new worse still, precious little evidence that much development mandate for the WTO refers only to thought went into these matters before the Doha traditional economic variables such as exports, Ministerial Declaration was adopted. employment, or the growth of national income. Others are therefore perfectly within their rights More constructively, I wonder if there are any to interpret the new mandate as meaning that lessons from the experiences of other international other dimensions of development (for example, the environment) are important and should

receive due attention in trade negotiations. And 13 This is almost certainly a non-exhaustive list of the questions that might be asked. so I contend that the questions posed at the begin- 14 For the sake of clarity, I use the expressions enhanced develop- ning of this section are important and cannot be ment focus and development mandate synonymously. 15 To use management speak, is the intention to alter the metrics or dismissed out of hand. processes of the WTO?

CESifo Forum 3/2003 16 Focus organisations that have changed their mandates in References significant ways, in particular to adopt new or dif- Abbott, Kenneth W. (2003). “Development Policy in the New ferent objectives or to give greater weight to the Millennium and the Doha ‘Development Round.’” Paper prepared interests of a subset of its members. Of particular for the Asian Development Bank and downloadable from http://www.adb.org/Economics/pdf/doha/Abbott_paper.pdf. May. interest in this regard may be certain elements of Bhagwati, Jagdish and T.N. Srinivasan (1996). “Trade and the the recent experience at the World Bank and the Environment: Does Environmental Diversity Detract from the 16 Case for Free Trade?” In Bhagwati, Jagdish and Robert Hudec (edi- IMF. First, towards the end of the 1990s the IMF tors) Fair Trade and Harmonization. Volume 1. Cambridge: MIT briefly gave more attention to poverty alleviation Press. and related matters and then soon ended this ini- Cottier, Thomas and Satoko Takenoshita (2003). “The Balance of Power in WTO Decision-Making: Towards Weighted Voting in tiative. It would be useful to learn, what lessons Legislative Response,” Aussenwirtschaft. Issue II. were learned and are transferable to the WTO, and Evenett, Simon J. and State Secretariat of Economic Affairs.(edi- whether any principles for the allocation of tors) (2003). The Singapore Issues and the World Trading System: The Road to Cancun and Beyond. Bern, Switzerland. June. responsibilities across international institutions The chapters from this book can be downloaded from http://www.wti.org/new/new.htm. could be deduced. Second, to what extent has the Finger, J. Michael and Philip Schuler (2000). “Implementation of shift away from a primary focus on the economic Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge.” consequences of development towards other World Economy, 23: 511–526. objectives been successfully accomplished at the Finger, J. Michael (2002). “The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round.” Paper prepared for the World Bank? Did this shift introduce new trade- Asian Development Bank and downloadable from offs between objectives and, if so, how where they http://www.adb.org/Economics/pdf/doha/Finger_paper.pdf. resolved? Again, what lessons are there for the Hoekman, Bernard M. (2003). “Cancun: Crisis or Catharsis?” Revised version of a paper presented to the Brookings-George WTO? In addition, given the existence of the Washington Roundtable on Trade and Investment Policy. September 23rd. Paper downloadable from: World Bank, the regional development banks, and http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/ the United Nations Development Programme and Hoekman-CancunCatharsis-092003.pdf the United Nations Conference on Trade and Hoekman, Bernard M., Constantine Michalopolous and L. Alan Winters (2003). “More Favourable and Differential Treatment of Development, one ought to ask whether the WTO Developing Countries: Towards a New Approach in the WTO.” World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 3107 and downloadable is taking on new development-related obligations after searching for paper at that might be better accomplished elsewhere? http://econ.worldbank.org/resource.php?type=5. August 1st. International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2002). Market Access for Developing Country Exports-Selected Issues. September 26th . In concluding this short essay I hope that I have Michalopoulos, Constantine (1998). “The Participation of provoked readers into thinking about what are the Developing Countries in the WTO.” World Bank Policy Research appropriate boundaries for the WTO and what role Paper No. 1906 and downloadable after searching for paper at http://econ.worldbank.org/resource.php?type=5. March. scholarly research, informed by discussions with policymakers and other interested parties, can play in addressing some of the more systemic factors that probably underlay the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun. If, as I suspect, we have not appreciated fully the consequences of adopting a greater focus on development-related concerns in the WTO – including the implications for what topics should be on the negotiating table in the Doha Round – then I fear the slide towards unilateral and preferential trade measures will continue, undermining the principle of non-dis- crimination that has served the world so well since the Second World War.

16 This is not to suggest that these two institutions have the same functions or resources as the WTO.

17 CESifo Forum 3/2003