CHAPTER 22 HAMBURG—THE LAST RAIDS ON ITALY— THE STRUGGLE AGAINST S

Y mid-July 1943 conditions in the Ruhr and Rhineland had reache d B stage of physical and mental disorganisation which required only occasional "topping-up" .attacks to prevent any dispersal of the immense enemy static and fighter defences in these regions . Although the industrial Ruhr had by no means been eliminated during the highly-successful spring - summer campaigns of Command, the scale of devastation actuall y accomplished, if repeated throughout Germany, was considered certain to achieve the main aim of the "progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system" . It was now clear to both sides that aerial bombardment, which during the first three year s of had caused little damage in relation to the effort expended, coul d now by the use of Pathfinder and incendiary techniques, play a decisive part. There was little possibility of Germany sharing the fruits of annihilation bombing because her strategic bombing force had withered away . Her only possible recourse was to a vigorous defence which would make Allied raids too costly to maintain, just as in 1940-41 German bombing attacks against England had been virtually defeated by a small well- organised fighter defence . Thus, during 1943, Germany withdrew units from Russia, the Mediterranean and France, and also further weakened the bomber arm by employing Ju-88 and Do-217 aircraft a s night fighters. Indeed the twin-engined fighter force nearly doubled, expand- ing from 410 aircraft in January to 780 in December 1943, while local - defence single-engined fighters (many of which could be employed at night) also increased from 635 to 870 . This ever-growing force was used mainly in cooperation with the radar, gun and searchlight zone defence s of the , which stretched along the north-west coast of Europe, but during the spring two innovations were introduced . Single- engined fighters were employed in conjunction with searchlights at th e target proper while stronger forces of twin-engined fighters were throw n against the bomber stream both on its outward and homeward journey. Thus night fighting developed from closely-controlled operations in smal l box sectors to a coordinated operation over large areas . There was also a significant reorientation of German gun and searchligh t defences . Previously these had been parcelled out in small batteries amon g a network of defensive sectors, each of which was responsible for the defence of a limited area . The method of defence was to concentrate al l searchlights in a sector on a single aircraft and then for all guns to fire at the apex of the light cone. The concentration in time and space of th e British bomber streams during 1943 made this system largely ineffective . Accordingly guns were brought together into large batteries at all important

582 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY 194043 targets. Anti-aircraft guns were withdrawn or withheld from use in Italy and Russia while by the end of the year a vigorous production program ensured 30 new heavy batteries, 10 light batteries and 12 searchligh t batteries each month . l was thus relieving pressure on the Russian an d Mediterranean fronts ; hastening the eclipse of German bombing strength ; causing dilution and fatigue among enemy fighter units ; and denuding France of both guns and fighters in advance of the projected Allied inva - sion. 2 These incidental results of area bombing were not lightly won, for during April, May and June aircraft losses averaged 4 .6 per cent of all sorties, as against an over-all loss of 4 per cent during 1942 and 2 .5 per cent during 1941 . This casualty rate seriously prejudiced the growth of Bomber Command because, with an average production rate of betwee n 200 and 300 bombers a month, little expansion was possible unless losse s were kept low. To the basic difficulty of building up a force large enoug h to carry a bomb tonnage sufficient to obliterate individual targets wa s now added the necessity of engaging in large-scale air . Solution of this deadlock alone would give the ability to operate as frequently as was now desirable if destruction rate were to outstrip enemy resources to repair bombed areas . As previously the answer was sought partly in planning, partly in ne w scientific devices and partly in the training, faith and willingness of crews to surmount any degree of opposition. All German defences depended i n some measure on four types of radar installations : (1) Freyas, for long-range early warning of the approach of bombers . These were reinforced by wide-beam scanning installations dubbed "Hoardings" and narrow-beam installations called "Chimneys" . (2) Giant Wurzburgs, accurate detectors to locate the actual position of bombers and to direct fighters within reach of them. (3) Small Wurzburgs, to aim radar-predicted anti-aircraft guns . One of these installations was captured during the raid on Bruneval on 27th February 1942 . (4) Airborne interception sets . These aids were in principle similar to English defensive measures, an d their vulnerable features were well known . Radio counter-measures (R.C.M.) were first employed to any degree in war for the defence of Britain against German bombing attacks durin g 1940-41 . First, the system of normal radio beacons upon which enem y aircraft depended for navigation was upset by the introduction of fals e echoes which led bombers astray and caused crews to lose faith . Then the more precise " Knickebein", " X " and " Y" beams evolved by the Germans not only to keep aircraft along a true track but to indicate the target area itself, were successfully bent so that on many occasions enem y

I The standard heavy gun was 8 .8-cm, a gun widely used also as an anti-tank . Guns of 10.5-cm and I2.8-cm were increasingly used in 1943 . (A heavy bty had four guns and two 20-mm light, a light bty twelve 20-mm or nine 37-mm with sixteen 60-cc searchlights, a searchlight bt y had nine 150-cc searchlights . ) 2 The Western front German air defences preoccupied : 68% of the total fighter aircraft (i .e . 1,650 out of 2,440) . 70% of the trained anti-aircraft personnel (900,000 men) . 75% of heavy plus 55% of light gun batteries .

1941-43 SCIENTIFIC INVENTIVENESS 583 bombs fell in open country. To the scientist each twist in the night- bombing war set a problem which could be answered, given time fo r research and experiment, and provided authority was forthcoming t o manufacture and employ the often very complex apparatus required . In general, new developments by the enemy could be quickly detected ; many of them could be foreseen as logical desiderata for accurate navigation or target finding . It was realised early that different applications of this scientific inventive- ness could be applied offensively to prevent enemy interference with our own bombing campaign, but there was a well-founded view at level s higher than Bomber Command, that, while Britain herself was in dange r of attack, it would be premature to commence a jamming war which woul d evoke a similar response from the enemy—because at that time the British night-defence organisation in particular was extremely vulnerable to elec- tronic jamming . By August 1942, however, the position had changed con- siderably; enemy raids had diminished and our own defences wer e improved, so that an operational research section appreciation (then unde r consideration) of the advantages to be gained from employing radio counter-measures met with general acceptance. Thereafter what Mr Churchill called the "Wizard War" went on apace although delayed a t times by difficulties in design, production and retrospective fitting of equipment . The earliest attempt of Bomber Command to surmount enemy nigh t defences had been by tactical measures such as evasive routeing or con- centration of aircraft in time and space. The first positive move to disrupt the defences was a spontaneous campaign by aircrews themselves against the early sound-locators serving enemy searchlight and gun teams in th e Kammhuber Line . Crews found that if empty bottles were dropped in th e vicinity of searchlights, they would frequently be doused or appear to be ranged erratically . This effect was ascribed to the noise interferenc e caused by the bottles as they fell . A comparable trial-and-error assumptio n led crews repeatedly to switch on and off electrical equipment in their aircraft while in danger areas in the hope that this would interfere wit h radar-directed searchlights. Although neither of these expedients really induced the confusion of enemy controls attributed to them, they wer e widely popular among Australian and other aircrews, and since at the tim e of their hey-day in 1941-42 the searchlight belt played a large part i n enemy defences, they were certainly responsible for increased morale i n the bomber force . The scientific jamming campaign in support of Bomber Command wa s to become an essential background to the struggle between bomber an d fighter, just as, in the war at sea, radar devices took an ever-increasin g role in the hide-and-seek between U-boats and aircraft . When the jamming campaign began, late in 1942, the existing mai n enemy defences were thought to be individual contiguous "boxes" lying along the entire northern coast of Europe . The weakest links in the chain of control (and therefore the most profitable to attack) were the

584 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY 1943 Freya early-warning system and the ground-to-air radio-telephony by whic h fighters were actually directed while in the air. Jamming techniques to blanket these at the crucial time for any single operation were not difficult to devise in theory and could be put into practice although th e enemy had great latitude in himself devising ways and means of avoidin g or overcoming jamming . It was not so simple to design equipment t o jam enemy airborne interception sets carried by the fighters, so that while this problem was never neglected, much effort in the early days wen t into providing bombers with various types of warning devices, which, whil e not strictly radio counter-measures (since they did not jam anything), di d much to ensure the safety of an. alert crew. As had been forecast, the enemy was by no means idle . By the end of August 1943 his fighter-control technique had undergone a radical change and he had virtually abandoned the ground-controlled intercep- tion (G.C.I.) box system to oppose increasingly heavy and concentrate d raids. Instead he relied on-controlling fighters en masse; that is, the fighters deployed against any raid were not individually directed against a particular aircraft but received their orders through a broadcast running commentary . This gave them particulars as to the position, height, course and speed o f the raiders together with general instructions to ensure that the fighter cloud would settle over the bomber stream ; the fighter pilots then acted according to their own individual initiative . This naturally called for some readjustment for the British jamming effort both in extent and application . The next major development came when the Germans turned to th e Benito method of controlling their night fighters . This was a system b y which individual night fighters could be ranged and continuously locate d while at the same time receiving the necessary instructions from their ground stations, but once again a weak link in this method was identifie d and systematically jammed. By November 1943 the Germans were so hard pressed by these various counter-measures on all frequencies the y were known to have in use, that they were forced to the expedient o f employing the medium-frequency band on which were operated the public broadcast and propaganda stations of all countries . An evasive attempt to pass instructions in the form of a simple musical code by this means wa s quickly discovered . There were to be many further developments in this fantastic nightl y but the situation at the end of 1943 was that, however adroit the enemy was in using one or more of the means of communication which he had devised, his night fighters found it extremely difficult at crucial moments in their operations to find and hold an unjammed channel. Mean- while in Bomber Command there was a realisation that even greate r efforts must be made, if possible in the air itself, for the protection of th e bomber force. On 1st December 1943 No. 100 Group was formed i n Bomber Command to control all radio counter-measures and bomber - support activities . The earliest of these counter-measures had demonstrably failed to prevent British losses attaining a dangerously high rate during the Battle

1943 AUTUMN OFFENSIVE 58 5 of the Ruhr . Furthermore since the abandonment in February 1943 o f an early experiment there was no counter-measure directed specificall y against radar-operated guns and searchlights . While analysis had shown that fighters were the major factor in British bomber losses, the growing efficiency of enemy gun defences could not be ignored. There was a further tactical consideration in that searchlight and guns frequently broke u p the rhythm of the bomber stream, causing early aiming errors whic h were then magnified by later arrivals bombing apparently well-establishe d fires. Therefore in July 1943 Air Chief Marshal Harris requested per - mission to use "Window", a technique of confusing radar stations whic h had been discovered in principle during 1941 but never exploited as i t could equally well have been employed against British defences . The threat of German bombing had so decreased by 1943, however, and Bombe r Command' s need had become so great that the use of Window could n o longer be delayed . 3 This innovation was simply the dropping, during passage over enemy territory, of metallised strips which gave the sam e indication on a radar screen as did an aircraft and thus flooded enem y control screens with multitudinous true and false responses . Differing sizes of strips were to be employed against the Wurzburgs and airborne-intercep- tion radar sets. 4

Thus, when Bomber Command turned from the badly-hit Ruhr t o prosecute an autumn offensive deeper into German territory, there wa s no under-estimation of the problem of fighting through to each target . At the same time the old problem of precise target identification remained, for the spring successes had been attained within the limits of - controlled target marking, while for the wider raids now considered, would necessarily have to be employed . The first great blow was therefore directed against Hamburg (see Table No . 41), where the coastline an d river were expected to give sharp pictures on the radar screen, and which , moreover, could be approached over the sea with a minimum of enemy opposition, so that accurate, unhurried Pathfinder marking could b e obtained. During late July and early August four major attacks wer e made within ten days . All three R.A.A .F. squadrons took part in these raids, which were the heaviest yet attempted in any area . The re-equipment of many squad- rons with Lancaster and Halifax bombers had greatly increased the actua l striking power of the force. On 24th-25th July, 26 per cent fewer in num- bers dropped 58 per cent more bombs than in the historic 1,000-bombe r raid against Cologne a year earlier. It was on this occasion that Windo w

S Throughout the war a priority system evaluating advantage and disadvantage to various service s had to be adopted . Thus Coastal Cd's Leigh light was delayed because of Fighter Cd experiment s with a nose searchlight ; ASV Mark III for anti-submarine operations had to give place to H2 S for Bomber Cd ; the jamming of the German radio-telephone network by Bomber Cd was oppose d by the Admiralty because it also distorted the wavelength employed by E-boats. 4 This simple but effective method of jamming had also been devised by the enemy, who likewis e had refrained from using it in air operations because it was a double-edged weapon. Extrem e urgency in the war at sea had led Admiral Doenitz in Jun 1943 to use the same principle in th e "Aphrodite " radar decoy balloon which trailed metallic strips simulating a U-boat response.

586 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY July-Aug

was first used and it scored an immediate spectacular success . 5 The sky was cloudless and the Pathfinder crews had no difficulty in marking th e target so that crews arriving promptly in the main force found ideal con- ditions for their task . The searchlights were disorganised and the groun d defences weakened considerably during the attack . Although three Lan- casters of No. 467 sighted enemy aircraft, there was little serious opposi- tion pressed home against the bombers . This swift and unprecedentedly heavy attack in the words of an official German report : caused gigantic fires which could not be put out even after twenty-four hours ha d elapsed . Coal and coke supplies stored for the winter in many houses caught fir e and could only be extinguished weeks later . Essential services were severely damaged

TABLE No. 41 HAMBUR G

Total Force RAAF Force Tons Total RAAF o f aircraft aircraft Dis- Attack- Sqn Bombs lost lost patched ing No. Disp Atkg

1943

Jul 24-25 791 740 460 26 26 2,300 12 1 466 17 17 — 467 15 15 —

Jul 27-28 787 739 460 24 23 2,313 17 — 466 15 15 — 467 17 17 2

Jul 29-30 777 726 460 24 23 2,277 28 2 466 8 8 — 467 17 17 1

Aug 2- 3 740 425 460 24 22 939 30 — 466 15 14 — 467 15 15 —

and telephone communications were cut early in the attack . Dockyards and industrial installations were severely hit. At midday next day there was still a tremendous dense cloud of smoke and dust hovering over the city, which, despite the clear sky , prevented the sun from penetrating through . . . . The Central Control Room was completely engulfed by fire and had to be evacuated . . . . Officers on damage recon- naissance could not on account of long detours get back with their observations an d reports for hours. Despite employment of all available fire-fighting forces big fires could not be prevented from flaring up again and again.°

Aircraft were discharging Window over Hamburg at a rate of one bundle each per minute an d this diffused cloud of foil was estimated to produce echoes similar to a force of 12,000 aircraft. The enemy radar screens were blotted out with a confused mass of echoes, only a small propor- tion of which were genuine and which were hopelessly submerged in the general confusion. 6 Translation in "21st Army Group Report", 18 Jun 1945 .

25-30July SUCCESSFUL RAID 587 Although all returning crews reported large fires, precise analysis of th e damage inflicted was not immediately possible . At this stage all that was known was that an outstandingly successful raid had been achieved wit h extremely economical losses of only 1 .5 per cent . ? It was not thought , however, that even such a heavy attack would destroy Hamburg, which with a sprawling built-up area of 8,380 acres was the second-largest city in Germany. However, just as it had been proved that an increase in th e weight and density of individual attacks brought results in geometric rathe r than arithmetic progression, now Bomber Command proposed to hea p attack on attack while defences were disorganised and thus achieve th e maximum result . Accordingly, on 25th July 122 American Fortresses mad e a daylight attack to impede fire-fighting and that night, while the mai n bomber force was at Essen, six Mosquitos made a nuisance attack . Next day fifty-one Fortresses stirred up the fires once more, and at nigh t Mosquitos again alerted the sorely-pressed civil defence organisation. On the night of 27th-28th July Bomber Command operated in maximu m force and in forty-five minutes dropped almost exactly the same tonnage of bombs as in the first attack . Forty-one Lancasters and fifteen Welling- tons were sent out by the R .A.A.F. squadrons and aided by good weather, all except one attacked . More enemy searchlights were observed but agai n the apparent result of the Window counter-measure was that they seeme d unable to seek or hold aircraft accurately . Some aircraft were coned, bu t to the surprise of the crews they were not then subject to the usual fierc e gun fire. Wing Commander Bailey of No . 466 Squadron and other pilots were more impressed with the "incredible column of smoke, resembling a cumulo-nimbus cloud" which rose to 22,000 feet and obscured th e target-indicator bombs. Against weak defences and an already blazin g target, crews found little difficulty in attacking, although some like Pilo t Officer Symonds 8 preferred to dive 6,000 feet in order to see clearly on the bombing run . Black, sooty specks covered the windscreens an d turrets of other aircraft, and fires in Hamburg could be seen for 200 miles on the return journey. Again no night photography was possible but the same German report states: The continuation of the first attack by daily and nightly nuisance raids made th e enemy's intention to destroy Hamburg systematically quite plain. Therefore the fact of a fifth raid . . . was not surprising. Its magnitude and consequences howeve r were far beyond all expectations . . . . The main weight of the attack this time was at the left shore of the Alster. Within half an hour the whole left side was in a terrible situation by a bombardment of unimaginable density and almost complete annihilation of those town districts was achieved . . . . Tens of thousands of smal l fires united within a short period of time to conflagrations which developed to fire - storms of typhoon-like intensity in the course of which trees of three-foot diamete r were pulled out of the ground . After a light harassing attack by Mosquito bombers on 28th-29th July , the main bomber force of the R .A.F. again visited Hamburg on 29th-30th

4 Since Jan 1942 the previous loss rate against Hamburg had averaged 5 .4% . 8 F-Lt D. S . Symonds, DFC, 409611 . 467 and 36 Sqns . Clerk ; of Launceston, Tas ; b. Kual a Lumpur, Malay States, 29 Mar 1923 .

588 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY July-Aug July. No other city in Germany had received more than one raid of ove r 2,000 tons, but this was the third for Hamburg in six nights . Fires had been seen blazing continuously in the city since the 24th, and once again more than half the bombs were of incendiary types . The target indicators were compactly laid well on time by the Pathfinder Force, and Australia n crews reported that it was just a matter of stoking up fires of dull re d until the target area was a single mass of flames two miles square . Again enemy defences had been strengthened, and Flight Lieutenant Henderson 9 reported that he had never seen so many active searchlights, which on thi s occasion had recovered some efficiency and worked in cooperation with an increased number of fighters some of which burned navigation lights . Predicted anti-aircraft fire also seemed more accurate, and the enemy had correctly anticipated the route along which he had massed mobile searchlights and batteries . Pilot Officer Pickles' (No. 100 Squadron R.A.F.) was one of several Australians who were in combat s with fighters, but, although two gunners were killed, he finally escaped fro m two very determined oppone'-_ts . Losses were about twice as high as on the two previous raids but still remained well below the previous rate t o be expected against a target of this nature, and certainly were small i n relation to the military result achieved . The port area and the thickly- populated suburb of Barmbeck were severely hit and, economically, Ham - burg was temporarily knocked out as even the undamaged sections had t o stop work on account of the destruction of water, gas and electricity supplies . A German report stated: The cause of the terrific damage lies in the firestorms . The alternative dropping of block busters, high explosives and incendiaries made fire fighting impossible, smal l fires united into conflagrations in the shortest time and these in turn led to the firestorms. To comprehend these firestorms which go beyond all human imagination, one can only analyse them from a physical meteorological angle. Through the unio n of a number of fires the air gets so hot, so on account of its decreasing specifi c weight, receives a terrific momentum, which in turn causes other surrounding air t o be sucked toward the centre . . . . In a built-up area, the suction could not follow its shortest course, but the overheated air stormed through the streets with immens e force taking along not only sparks but burning timber and roof beams, so spreadin g the fire farther and farther, developing in a short time into a fire typhoon such a s was never witnessed, against which every human resistance was quite useless . Smoke did not clear sufficiently until 1st August to permit photographi c reconnaissance but then it was revealed that 74 per cent of Hamburg 's closely-built residential districts was heavily damaged . There were larg e areas extending for thousands of acres especially east of the city wher e every building in every street had been demolished or left roofless an d gutted. This general destruction was on a scale, and more sudden an d complete, than ever before seen in a city of that size during any war . A final raid of the same dimensions, timed for 2nd-3rd August failed , not through enemy opposition but through the intervention of unexpectedl y

e Sqn Ldr J. R . Henderson, DSO, DFC, 412810 ; 460 Sqn . Factory student; of Mosman, NSW; b . Mosman, 24 Sep 1916 . 3 Sqn Ldr E. L . Pickles, DFC, 413248 . 100, 625 and 550 Sqns RAF . Share farmer ; of Balldale , NSW ; b . Wangaratta, Vic, 10 Nov 1920.

July-Aug WEATHER HAZARDS 589 bad weather. The bomber stream ran into severe electrical storms and icing conditions, and consequently became very dispersed . Few Australian crews could find the target indicators and although all but three droppe d their bombs, most of them admitted that they did so by navigational aid s only. Many bombs were jettisoned all over north-west Germany and mor e than a hundred crews bombed alternative targets in Bremen and Wilhelms- haven. One pilot of No. 466 who struggled through the extremely advers e conditions and descended to 9,000 feet over Hamburg could see only a few scattered fires and Pathfinder markers in the target area . Enemy defences were ineffective and few fighters were seen, but several Australia n aircraft suffered engine trouble caused by ice . These flew home only with great difficulty so it is probable that most of the aircraft missing on this occasion fell victims to weather hazards rather than enemy action .

TABLE No. 42 ITALIAN TARGETS

Total Force RAAF Force Total RAA F Tons air- air- Target Dis- Attack- Sqn of craft craft patched ing No . Disp Atkg Bombs I lost lost

1943 i

Jul 12-13 Turin 299 277 460 22 20 734 13 2 467 18 17 —

Jul 16-17 Cislago 18 18 467 5 5 75 —

Jul 24-25 Leghorn 33 33 467 3 3 84 —

Aug 7- 8 Turin 74 74 460 17 17 191 — —

Aug 7- 8 Genoa 73 72 467 16 16 163 —

Aug 12-13 Milan 504 481 460 25 24 1,247 4 — 467 16 16 —

Aug 14-15 Milan 140 133 460 11 11 403 1 — 467 6 6 —

Aug 15-16 Milan 199 185 460 12 11 567 7 — 467 10 10 2

This devastation of Hamburg occurred mid-way in a series of twelv e raids against cities in northern Italy designed to cripple Italian will t o resist the invasion of Sicily and then of the mainland (see Table No . 42) . Australian Lancaster squadrons flew on eight of these raids . The small losses reflect the weakness of Italian opposition compared with that met at German targets and although a round trip of some 2,00 0

590 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY July-Aug miles was entailed in each case, crews generally felt that the task wa s easy. Thus on 12th-13th July, when electrical storms and icing condition s prevailed along the route, two pilots of No . 467 flew their Lancasters most of the way on three engines, although having to make twice the dangerou s crossing of the Alps . Their perseverance was rewarded for all crews foun d clear weather over Turin, and the Fiat steel, aircraft-engine and automobil e factories were heavily hit in a deliberate attack. Wing Commander C . E. Martin of No. 460 Squadron reported that the actual defences were so weak and uncoordinated that, if necessary, a ten-minute bombing ru n could have been made without interference. In the next raid against Turin

Lake Gcneua

•Cislago Venic e Plain *Milan Verona

i mnel Lombard y • Turin I T A L

Arquata Scrivi a • Reggio Emilia • San Polo d'Enza Genoa • Bologna

,--,, Spezia OF

i\ I 1 . Leghorn

80 100 120 MILES

Bomber Command : Targets in northern Italy .

only No . 460 was represented but the small force was on this occasio n aided by a master of ceremonies who, in excellent visibility, supervise d the dropping of Pathfinder markers . This technique was very helpful in that few bombs fell outside the target area, although no large uncontrollabl e fires resulted, as houses and buildings in Turin contained relatively littl e timber to start a conflagration.2 On the same night, however, another small force including No. 467 started large fires in the dock area of Genoa and some of these spread into the town itself. Milan now became the prime target, and on 12th-13th August was raided by the largest force ever sent to Italy . A master of ceremonies

*The same diminution of fire risk, the greatest single factor in area bombing devastation, ha d already been abundantly clear during enemy raids on Malta where most of the houses were o f stone .

• (R_A .A .F . ) Kittyhawk fighter-bombers of Nos . 3 and 450 Squadrons, armed with 250-lb bombs, moving towards the take-off point for a flight over Sicily, July 1943 . The airman riding on the win g gave directions to the pilot as the forward view was obscured from the cockpit while th e aircraft was taxi-ing .

(R .A .A .F . ) Ground crews of No . 450 Squadron place a bamboo roof on new quarters near Agnon e airfield, south of Catania, in Sicily . August 1943 . (Air 19inietrr l A typical Bomber Command two-squadron station seen through the nose of a Hamilcar glide r approaching to land on one of the airfield's three runways . A perimeter track can be see n circling the alighting area, with tracks leading from it to the hangars and Lancaster dispersa l areas .

(R .A .A .F . ) Preparing to bomb-up a Lancaster of No . 460 Squadron, armourer Cpl W . E . Dawson rides on a 4,000-lb high-capacity bomb (a "cookie") . while behind is a portion of the incendiary - bomb containers which made up the normal load for area attacks . September 1943 .

July-Aug EXPERIMENTAL RAIDS 59 1 accompanied the bombers in order to ensure that the Breda aircraf t works was hit. Crews of No . 460 heard him correcting the aim of thos e undershooting to the north of the town, and advising pilots to "go in straight and level as the defences were hopeless" . One Australian wa s challenged by an Italian fighter as he prepared for his bombing run bu t the enemy veered away without firing and the Lancaster continued its deliberate approach . The total result was a well-concentrated attack and many large fires soon enveloped the whole area . As always against Italian targets, crews were willing to take considerable risks to ensure maximum success, and Flight Sergeant Rees 3 of No. 460, although hampered b y one engine firing only intermittently from the outset and a second givin g trouble soon after, determined to continue his flight . There was no hydraulic power for the mid-upper turret, the Lancaster would not climb above 17,000 feet and it fell behind the main stream . Rees, however, successfully threaded his way through the lower mountain passes, reached Milan , bombed and made a similarly isolated and hazardous return . Two nights later a much smaller force was sent to Milan in two waves , one to attack the town and the other the Breda works . Pathfinders were punctual over the town but late over the factory target . Some crews of No. 460 briefed to attack the latter bombed prematurely relying on excellen t visibility, but the majority of pilots preferred to circle while the "spectacula r but pathetic" ground defences vainly attempted to engage them . Lancasters from No. 467 had no difficulty in attacking the town centre, because ther e marking was excellent and fires were still burning from the previous raid . One aircraft from this squadron, damaged while outward bound over France, bombed and then landed in North Africa . On 15th-16th August the bombers returned for the third time in four nights and in bright moon - light another successful attack was made . Ground defences were still inadequate but fighters were very active. No. 467 suffered a relatively heavy loss when the commanding officer, Wing Commander Gomm, and a deputy flight commander, Flight Lieutenant Sullivan, 4 failed to return . Gomm had nursed the squadron through its formative stages and earl y career until it had reached a very high pitch of efficiency . Although not an Australian, his breadth of understanding and effective leadership had evoked the best qualities in his crews . He needed only one more sortie to complete his second tour of operations. In addition to these "area bombing" attacks in July, No . 5 Group also made experimental raids against electricity plants in northern Italy, usin g the experience gained in the Mohne and Eder dams ' attack. On 15th-16th July four groups each of six Lancasters were sent against transformer stations at Arquata Scrivia, Reggio Emilia, San Polo d 'Enza and Bologna . Flight Lieutenant H . B. Martin (No. 617 Squadron R.A.F.) was the only Australian pilot involved and, taking off at 10.20 p.m. in the fading light of the long summer evening, he and five others flew in formatio n

8 F-Lt D . Rees, CGM, 415193 . 460 Sqn, 7 Commas Unit . Civil servant ; of Spearwood, WA ; b . Maylands, WA, 5 Feb 1922 . * F-Lt J. McD. Sullivan, 404909; 467 Sqn. Joiner machinist; of Coolangatta, Qld ; b . Twee d Heads, NSW, 4 Jan 1919 . Killed in action 15 Aug 1943.

AWG 3 —20

592 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY 12-25 July across France at 100 feet, rising to clear the Alps at 1 a .m. The Lancasters maintained contact as best they could, and then, in deteriorating con- ditions, dropped down into the Plain of Lombardy to identify and bom b the San Polo target from 800 feet . The small force then flew out into the western Mediterranean and headed southwards, landing at Blida in North Africa. No. 467 Squadron had also carried out special training fo r operations of this character and on the next night provided five Lancaster s for a similar attack against Cislago. One aircraft with its radio-telephon e out of action lost contact with the formation and made a lone attack o n Spezia from 14,000 feet only to receive the concentrated fury of th e entire ground defences, but although badly damaged it just managed t o reach North Africa. Meanwhile, the other aircraft had great difficulty in identifying their precise target and during the hour and a half spen t combing the area suffered several attacks from Italian night fighters, but eventually Cislago transformer station was found and left in flames . Finally on 24th-25th July, the same night that the first Hamburg raid wa s attempted, thirty-three Lancasters left North Africa and made individua l attacks against Leghorn from altitudes between 5,000 and 9,000 feet and then made an uneventful return to their parent stations in England . These last stages of attacks against Italy were extremely successful both in causing material damage and in finally destroying what littl e inclination remained among the civil population of that country to con- tinue a disastrous war. Neither these attacks nor the impressive results at Hamburg did more than to show that under favourable conditions bombing could cause tremendous damage, certainly they did not prove that in every case similar success could be expected. The range, flexibility of operation and weight of attack of the four-engined bomber, however, had been vindicated fully, and it was clear that the harder battles of th e future would be fought primarily with the Lancaster bomber . The range, ceiling and bomb-carrying capacity of this aircraft outstripped that of the other four-engined types, the Halifax and Stirling, to an extent that o n distant targets it was becoming tactically and economically disadvantageou s to employ mixed forces of these aircraft. It was doubly unfortunate that industrial strikes during August should curtail production of Lancasters and thus prohibit expansion of Bomber Command during the good cam- paigning weather of autumn. Lancasters were withdrawn from operational training units to boost front-line strength ; henceforth crews were traine d on Halifax or Stirling aircraft and did a final short conversion course a t a Lancaster finishing school . The era of the medium bomber was manifestly past as far as the main campaign against Germany was concerned . Although No . 466 had reached its highest peak of efficiency in the raids against Hamburg whe n all but one of the fifty-five aircraft dispatched attacked without loss, it conducted only two more bombing raids before it was withdrawn fo r re-arming with Halifax aircraft. The Wellington, rugged and reliable though it was, had an inferior bomb load, required practically the sam e crew as a four-engined bomber, and was vulnerable to the new weight

Aug 1943 SOUTHERN GERMANY 59 3 of enemy attack. No. 466 could take no part in the long-range raids durin g August and, after one appearance on 30th-31st August with the mai n bomber force at Munchen Gladbach (see p . 603) , it made its final raid with Wellingtons against ammunition dumps in the Hesdin Forest in northern France. This was a small but successful attack, designed primarily to assis t the simulated raid (Operation STARKEY) by ground troops against Boulogne timed for 9th September . But No. 466 was by no means idle during August, and the Wellingtons laid 236 mines off the Frisian Island s and the west coast of France. As they had no specialised equipment such as H2S which was later to facilitate greatly accurate mine-laying in al l areas, the Wellingtons still sowed their mines after a timed run from a visually-identified coastal landmark . Haphazard sowing out of normally- used navigational channels was wasteful and because meticulous care wa s required No . 466 was allowed to choose its own route and pinpoints o n these trips, which had special hazards of their own, although by skilfu l application to the problem in fact only four Australian aircraft were los t during 1943 . Nor, although the application of mining was pre-eminentl y in relation to the war at sea hindering U-boats and blockade runners an d tying up on defensive tasks a seriously high percentage of German nava l manpower and material, was it really divorced from Bomber Command' s own main task . Serious dislocation and delay in enemy vital seaborne communications had a complementary effect on raw materials for Ruh r industries and on military supplies for the Russian front and Norway .5 On bombing and mining duties No . 466 flew 168 sorties during August, a record for any two-flight squadron in No . 4 Group. The crews began training with Halifax aircraft with the same enthusiasm and determination , although it was realised that there would be no further operations for thre e months. On 25th September Wing Commander Forsyth 6 assumed comman d of the squadron, replacing Wing Commander Bailey who had led it sinc e it formed .

With lengthening nights in the late summer and autumn, Bomber Com- mand revisited the major cities in southern Germany . The success or failure of raids almost entirely depended on the accuracy with which target in- dicators were dropped by Pathfinder crews. Heavy losses in the Ruhr raid s had led to a shortage of experienced crews, and H2S, which was now to be the main means of locating the target, suffered from frequent unservice- ability and moreover required a steady uninterrupted run of several minute s before the indicators could be dropped . On well-defended targets there was thus a tendency for indicators to drop very wide . This could result in concentrated but wasted bombing in open country especially as ther e was a tendency among inexperienced main-force crews to drop bomb s on the first indicator seen, and a fire once started in an unimportant are a

6 Bomber Cd laid 13,835 mines during 1943 . Of this total RAAF sqns sowed 972 (661 by No. 466, 174 by No . 467 and 137 by No. 460) . Gp Capt D. T. Forsyth, DFC, 141 . Comd 25 Sqn 1941-42 ; SASO HQ Western Area 1942-43 ; comd 466 Sqn 1943-44, RAF Stn Driffield 1944-45 . Regular air force offr ; of Glen Iris, Vic ; b. Melbourne, 14 Jun 1915 .

594 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY Aug-Sept usually attracted more and more of the succeeding bomb loads . On these long-distance raids, too, the difference in speed between Stirlings an d Lancasters of the Pathfinder Force often led to poor timing so that th e real aiming point was not indicated throughout the raid . Nor was it possible after August to give any one target the swift repeated hammer blows which had won such success at Hamburg . After three raids early in September, weather and the full moon kept Bomber Command inactive for fifteen nights, the longest period for a year, and only four more raids followe d before the end of the month . Similarly, in October, six raids were possibl e during the first eight days, but only another three later in the month . Mannheim (see Table No. 43), the first target chosen, had already received 4,500 tons of bombs in 27 raids without suffering more tha n superficial damage . It had one advantage as a target in that it was a compact town which with its satellite Ludwigshaven (joint populatio n 450,000), lay athwart the Rhine and thus gave a satisfactory response on an H2S screen. Three major raids were mounted .

TABLE No . 43 MANNHEIM-LUDWIGSHAVEN

Total Force RAAF Force Tons Total RAA F of aircraft aircraft Dis- Attack- Sqn Bombs lost los t patched ing No . Disp Atkg

194 3

Aug 9-10 457 432 460 24 17 1,684 9 — 467 17 17 —

Sep 5- 6 605 546 460 19 18 1,463 34 — 467 12 12 —

Sep 23-24 630 571 460 19 16 1,862 32 1 467 16 16 2

On 9th-10th August crews observed the glow of large fires developin g around the position of markers, and several very large explosions, but in fact only a limited amount of damage was caused in the most southern part of the city. Guns and searchlights were as disorganised as they ha d been at Hamburg, but free-lance fighters were active . Four Lancasters of No. 467 were intercepted over Mannheim, but all escaped and Flying Officer Good7 and his crew on their first operational flight shot down a n Me-109. The Lancasters of No . 460 were among the first to be fitted with a device which gave visual warning of approaching fighters, and thes e

4 F-0 M . R . Good, 285324 ; 467 Sqn. Clerk ; of Alberton, SA ; b. Gawler, SA, 15 Oct 1918 . Killed in action 28 Aug 1943 .

5-24 Sept BATTLE ROYAL 595 aircraft reported no combats . The raid was thus largely negative, neither offence nor defence gaining any decided advantage . A month later o n 5th-6th September a battle royal developed because both sides ha d revised their tactics . In favourable weather with cloud en route but clea r skies over Mannheim, the main bomber stream was aided navigationall y by flares dropped at turning points over France and Germany . The Path- finders made a well-timed and very thorough identification of the targe t before releasing their coloured target indicators . The whole force attacked in the short space of forty-five minutes, a very satisfactory average of on e aircraft every five seconds . Material damage amounted to devastation of more than 300 acres of business and residential property and heav y damage to factories, railways and warehouses . But although Bomber Com- mand thus scored its first real success against this city, the Germans shot down 5 .6 per cent of the attackers, a dangerously high proportion . Guns at first fired at maximum intensity in order to upset the opening rhythm of attack, and they then fired box barrages to lower altitudes to keep th e bombers up in an area swept by 200 searchlights cooperating with larg e numbers of fighters. Although all the Australian Lancasters returned safely, several suffered heavy damage . Warrant Officer Wicks8 of No. 460 was coned in searchlights as his aircraft began its bombing run, but h e broke clear and bombed only to be held a second time by the persisten t searchlights . To escape them he dived down through the to 11,000 feet, but even there he was attacked by a Ju-88 which disabled one of his engines before he could escape. The third occasion proved slightly more favourable to the defenders . As before, heavy gun fire soon gave way to fighters hastily summoned t o Mannheim, and these, besides cooperating with searchlights, laid lines o f white flares over the bomber stream to assist their own attacks . Thus, although the raid had been further compressed into a space of thirty-thre e minutes (a rate of one aircraft every 3 .5 seconds), again over 5 per cent of the bombers were lost . Equally important, although the Pathfinders ha d done their job well, there was an ominous creep back of the bomb lin e into open country as inexperienced crews or those unsettled by the for- midable defences hastily bombed the first fire they saw . Nevertheless enough extra damage was inflicted on both Mannheim and Ludwigshave n during this raid to remove them from the priority bombing list, althoug h the most important target of all—the I .G. Farben factories at Ludwigs- haven—had escaped lightly . The effect of the Window counter-measure, while immediately an d permanently reducing the percentage of bombers damaged by anti-aircraf t gun fire, thus appeared temporarily to have actually increased the danger from night fighters. The Germans had been forced to abandon their rigi d ground-controlled interception system but on the skeleton of the target free-lance fighter system they rapidly, built up a new potentially successful defence. Radio and visual beacons were used to congregate fighters in th e

s W-0 R . R . Wicks, 409356 . 460 Sqn, 156 Sqn RAF . Warehouse assistant ; of Caulfield, Vic ; b . Caulfield, 12 May 1922. Killed in action 2 Dec 1943 .

596 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY Aug-Oct air until the target of the bombers became apparent, and they were the n sent there in force from as many directions as possible. Technical counter- measures were to involve minor tactical changes but this new system o f large-scale, loosely-controlled night fighting by both single- and twin- engined aircraft continued throughout the remainder of the war . Bomber Command therefore set itself to defeat the time factor on which the Germans depended. As at Mannheim on 23rd-24th September, raids wer e compressed into shorter and shorter intervals over the target, so that onl y the nearer fighters could arrive in time . The running commentary of German ground controllers was repeatedly imitated by bogus controller s giving false instructions . The Freyas, which gave early warning of a bomber stream, were opposed by jamming apparatus, so that the bombers appeare d to burst through a curtain at any point on the enemy coast. "Spoof" (i .e. diversionary) raids were mounted to lure fighters away from the tru e target at the critical moment, in much the same way that minor Circuse s were trying in daylight to clear the air for major bombing attacks . Single bluff soon became double bluff, with the whole radio war ostentatiously waged on nights when no bombing was contemplated, to be followe d by actual raids when the tell-tale preliminaries were omitted.

TABLE No. 44 NUREMBERG

Total Force RAAF Force Tons Total RAAF of aircraft aircraft Dis- Attack- Sqn Bombs lost lost patched ing No . Disp Atk g

1943

Aug 10-11 653 611 460 24 23 1,608 16 — 467 16 16 —

Aug 27-28 674 621 460 21 20 1,671 33 467 14 14 1

Whenever possible, spoof raids were directed against targets of intrinsi c value, and thus on 4th-5th October (real objective—Frankfurt-on-Main ) sixty-six Lancasters, including fifteen of No. 460, returned to Ludwigshave n to attack the I .G. Farben works. Australians found the target indicator s scattered in two widely separated groups . They were unable to make a visual check, and in choosing to bomb the more southerly concentration , they dropped their bombs well clear df the chemical factories . The same battle of tactics was apparent during two attacks against Nuremberg (see Table No . 44) which now ranked as one of the mos t important armament and engineering centres in Germany.

Aug-Oct HIGH CASUALTIES 597 On 10th-11th August heavy cloud unexpectedly covered the target an d Pathfinder flares soon fell from view . Enemy dummy fires and prematur e release of bombs soon added to the confusion of aim apparent among late r arrivals. Flight Lieutenant Lane9 (No. 460), one of the first Empire Ai r Scheme pilots, completed his second tour of operations during this flight . This experienced pilot reported that incendiary fires formed an approximate line from the position of the target indicators to a point twenty mile s farther to the north-west . From this random sowing came only a smal l and scattered crop of damage, but the cloud also interfered with search- lights so that German fighters, although present in large numbers, als o had little success. On 27th-28th August conditions were radically different and visibility was marred only by slight ground haze . The attack bega n well but imitation red markers were dropped by German aircraft and these, together with dummy fires, again spread the attack over non-vulner- able rural areas . Enemy fighters flew around with their navigation lights burning so that both they and the ground defences had great freedom of action, and took a heavy toll of the attackers . With lengthening nights the main bomber force could again range as far afield as Munich (see Table No. 45), which since March had suffere d only light harassing attacks by Mosquitos .

TABLE No . 45 MUNIC H

Total Force RAAF Force Tons Total RAA F o f aircraft aircraft Dis- Attack- Sqn Bombs lost lost patched ing No . Disp Atkg

1943

Sep 6- 7 404 365 460 - 17 16 1,020 16 — 467 7 7 —

Oct 2- 3 294 273 460 18 18 958 7 2 467 17 14 2

The first raid began punctually but marking was scattered and Aus- tralian pilots reported that bombs were falling as far distant as Augsburg . Nevertheless the more experienced crews persevered and lit moderate fire s in the southern districts of Munich . Searchlights and strings of fighter flares were well in evidence and on this occasion the fighters employed pyrotechnic signals to attract their comrades to the bomber stream . The dangerously high ratio of casualties to positive success on these long - distance raids caused great anxiety, and on 2nd-3rd October two tactica l

9 F-Lt E . O . Lane, DFC, AFC, 402057 . 148 and 216 Sqns RAF, 460 Sqn . Solicitor ; of Artarmon, NSW ; b . Grenfell, NSW, 26 Apr 1916 .

598 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY 2-5 Oc t expedients were introduced by Bomber Command. Firstly to improve bombing, the Pathfinders dropped flares over the Wurm Lake so tha t aircraft could make a timed run into the centre of Munich. There was still a tendency for incendiary bombs to fall shorts and Flight Lieutenan t Locke 2 who made a painstaking approach estimated that the main fires were four miles away from the centre of the city. This was later confirme d by photographs which showed the business and residential areas largely intact although significant isolated damage had resulted in outlying suburbs . The whole raid was over within fifteen minutes and, although fighters were present over the target, they had fewer opportunities there . The second innovation was an angle interposed in the bombers ' withdrawal route, so that German fighters airborne to attack them during the return fligh t assembled in incorrect positions. 3 Nevertheless it was a costly night fo r Nos. 460 and 467, each of which lost two Lancasters out of the tota l of seven which failed to return from the whole force . Many Australian crews also commented on insufficiency of petrol for evasive routeing on such a long trip . One Lancaster of No . 460 had to put down at Tangmere as soon as it reached the English coast, and Pilot Officer McIver, 4 an experienced pilot of No . 467, was killed when he crashed into th e Channel twenty-five miles short of the nearest emergency airfield . These raids, although far from faultless, caused worthwhile damage to railway communications and an I .G. Farben instrument factory. For the attack against Frankfurt-on-Main on 4th-5th October No . 467 sent twelve Lancasters. This was the fourth successive night on which th e squadron had operated, and there was official commendation of the skil l and keenness of ground crews who worked exceptionally hard to servic e and bomb up the aircraft. Apart from routine engine and airframe checks , complicated radio and radar equipment, guns and turrets, oxygen apparatus , the hydraulic system, parachutes, instruments, bomb-release and electrical systems all had to be thoroughly inspected and replaced where necessar y before each flight. After the night-flying test each Lancaster had then to be loaded with an average of four tons and a half of bombs 5 and pyro- technics each properly fused and the aircraft then refuelled . To do this on four successive nights without an aircraft experiencing any technical failure or delay in take-off was an excellent example of teamwork betwee n the English and Australian tradesmen at Bottesford . On this occasion all twelve Lancasters returned safely although Locke's aircraft was heavil y damaged by fighter attack before it reached the target and he was force d

r Throughout the war the ballistics of incendiary bombs were unreliable . When dropped from great heights some types of bomb oscillated in trajectory . Special tail fans cured this defect but restricted the number of bombs which could then be carried. s Sqn Ldr H. B . Locke, DSO, DFC, 401980. 467 and 463 Sqns, 97 Sqn RAF. Bank clerk ; of Kyabram, Vic ; b . Kyabram, 1 Oct 1919. 3 Bomber Cd thus began to use the " diversionary routeing" tactics which had been employed b y convoys to escape U-boats known to be massing for attack. 4 P-O K. A . McIver, DFC, 412636; 467 Sqn. Contractor ; of Merriwagga, NSW; b. Bendigo, Vic , 1 Jan 1918. Killed in action 3 Oct 1943 . 6 Bomb loads varied with the nature and distance of the target . A typical mixed explosive and incendiary load for area attack was : 1 x 4,000-lb H .E . plus 64 x 30-lb incendiaries plus 1,200 x 4-lb incendiaries.

Aug-Oct SPECIAL ATTACK 599 to jettison its blazing incendiaries . The other Australian pilots found the target well marked and, against relatively weak opposition, attacked th e river dock area in the eastern half of the city which was soon ablaze . Altogether 1,100 tons of bombs were dropped by the total of 357 aircraf t which reached the target and besides widespread commercial and civilia n damage, thirty-seven factories were severely damaged . On 7th-8th October simulated raids by Mosquitos and Lancasters against Munich and Friedrichshafen drew enemy fighters away from Stuttgar t which was the main target for 342 Lancasters . The two Australian squad- rons dispatched thirty-seven aircraft and all except one bombed in th e face of negligible opposition . The only Australian aircraft attacked was actually fired on by an over-anxious gunner in another Lancaster .6 This tactical freedom of action over the target was largely wasted, however , because Pathfinder marking through a complete overcast was on this occasion ineffective . The target indicators fell in two groups five mile s apart and indiscriminate bombing destroyed the pattern of attack. Few bombs fell on Stuttgart which thus experienced yet another lucky escape . Long-range area attacks were thus mainly against cities in souther n Germany, but Bomber Command was also called upon during Augus t to make a special attack against the experimental scientific station a t Peenemunde in the Baltic . With no strategic-bombing force wherewith to strike at England, the Germans had turned to develop pre-war experi- ments with rockets in order to perfect a means of retaliation for the ever - increasing weight of attack on Germany .? Peenemunde had been under constant watch by the photographic reconnaissance squadrons and it wa s apparent that the "secret ", increasingly heralded in Germa n propaganda, were indeed in a stage which might easily prejudice th e success of the impending Anglo-American invasion of Europe . Such a raid at extreme range, and designed to hit many small buildings adequatel y dispersed over a wide area, demanded special preparation and the accept- ance of increased risks to achieve success in one surprise attack . Accord- ingly, not only was it considered justified to mount the raid in bright moon- light on 17th-18th August so that visual marking would be practicable , but specialist squadrons of No . 5 Group, using the low-level technique pioneered at Mohne and Eder, were in the van of the attacking force led for the first time during a heavy raid against Germany by a master o f ceremonies. Thirty-four Australian Lancasters were included in the total force of 597 heavy bombers, the largest yet sent against Germany . At briefing crews were urged to make special efforts to ensure that they would indeed hi t the target. It was therefore with an unusual sense of purpose and deter-

9 This followed a general instruction to gunners to think and act offensively and thus deter nigh t fighters from pressing in close . In a closely-packed bomber stream, this entailed some risk of endangering friendly aircraft but in fact, like the danger of collision, was not in practice great . The absence of a device to distinguish between friendly and enemy indications on the radar tail-warning apparatus was an obvious handicap . 7 Rocket missiles weighing up to 80 tons were being developed by the German Army . The mos t advanced of these projects was the A .4 rocket bomb which was later employed as Vergeltunswaffen (Reprisal Weapon) or V .2. The German Air Force was similarly engaged with a pilotless aircraf t —the Fernzielgerat 76 (Long-range Target Implement) which became the V .I .

AWG 3—20a

600 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY 17-18 Aug mination that all set out on this hazardous venture in which poor execution , by warning the enemy, might be more costly than not attempting the rai d at this time. 8 As the route to the target coincided with that previousl y used against Berlin, a harassing raid was made against the Germa n capital to preoccupy night fighters while the bomber stream in thre e waves headed on for Peenemunde. In clear weather early Pathfinder crew s identified their targets visually from low level before a defensive smok e screen could be brought into operation. Pilot Officer Coldham9 (No. 156 Squadron R.A.F.) met intense light gun fire but saw his own and other target indicators falling accurately on key points in the sprawling comple x of buildings which covered an area four miles and a half long by half a mile wide . The master of ceremonies then flew up and down advising the consecutive waves of bombers by radio-telephone which target indicator s to attack so that the destruction would be spread to all vital points . All R.A.A.F. crews agreed that this controlled tactical direction was o f very great value, for they were especially warned about a few misplace d indicators and accordingly an abnormally high percentage of bombs di d fall on their correct targets . The destruction in both manufacturing build- ings and living quarters was very heavy . As soon as the real object of the raid was apparent the Germans hurried up the night fighters deployed over Berlin and sent others from as far south as the Ruhr to cover th e withdrawal route . Consequently the third wave of bombers suffered heavily . Forty bombers were lost in the clear moonlit sky which favoured fighte r interception but in relation to the considerable delay caused to enemy plans for a robot offensive, this was an outstanding success for Bomber Command.' Only two Australian aircraft were shot down but two others managed to return only by the most consummate airmanship . A Lancaste r piloted by Warrant Officer Wilson 2 was hit by cannon fire from an Me-109 while over Peenemunde . The rear gunner was wounded, his turret hydraulic lines shot away and his ammunition set on fire but he shot down the attacker and then helped other members of the crew to extin- guish the fires. Elevator and rudder controls had also been damaged but Wilson evaded several other fighters which approached and safely flew th e bomber home. Pilot Officer Rees also was attacked four minutes afte r he had bombed, and though his gunners drove off the attacker he had t o face the long return journey with one faulty engine, his starboard tai l plane shot away, and one tank pierced and drained of petrol. Within a month of its phenomenal success at Hamburg, Bomber Com- mand made three heavy attacks against Berlin (see Table No . 46) within the short space of ten nights. Now that a sufficient number of heavy

8 Crews were not informed of the true purpose of this raid . For security reasons they were briefed that the enemy was developing a new radar measure against night bombers and tha t unless the experimental station was destroyed there would inevitably be increasingly heavy casualties in the bomber force . This explanation was ideal to inspire all to do their best. 8 F-Lt P . A. Coldham, DFC, 401908 . 460 Sqn, 156 Sqn RAF. Law student ; of Caulfield, Vic ; b . Sydney, 18 Feb 1919. 1 There were other factors ; in particular the offensive against launching sites which also cause d delay in the enemy preparations . 2 F-Lt W. L. Wilson, DFC, 403972 ; 467 Sqn . Clerk; of Willoughby, NSW; b . Willoughby, 29 Jun 1921 .

Aug-Sept INACCURATE PATHFINDER MARKING 60 1 bombers seemed assured, a winter campaign against the German capita l was desirable both to damage industrial capacity and national morale . Any raid against Berlin, however, entailed a minimum flight of 500 miles ove r hostile territory. This minor autumn series was thus mainly to test th e probable new enemy defences in preparation for the main campaign .

TABLE No . 46 BERLIN

Total Force RAAF Force Tons Tota l RAA F of aircraft aircraft Dis- Attack - Sqn Bombs lost lost patched ing No . Disp Atk g

194 3

Aug 23-24 719 625 460 24 22 1,765 57 1 467 14 14 1

Aug 31 - Sep 1 621 512 460 21 21 1,359 47 1 467 15 14 —

Sep 3- 4 320 295 460 24 24 906 22 3 467 15 15 2

During the first raid German aircraft dropped dummy target indicator s well clear of vital areas, but Australian pilots reported that these imitation markers lacked brilliance and did not cascade ; however, they did attract many bombs. The main weight of effective attack fell in south and south - west suburbs despite the attempts of a large force of free-lance fighter s to disrupt the timing and concentration of the raid. Pilot Officer Whiting3 was attacked three times in the target area and finally had to jettison hi s bombs without precise aiming in order to withdraw his damaged aircraft . Other Australians encountered fighters over all stages of the route, though these were mostly evaded by good crew cooperation . For the second attack a fairly heavy diversionary raid, including twelve Wellingtons from No. 466, was made against ammunition dumps in the Hesdin Forest, but this had little effect on fighter defences at the capital where parachute flare s at 20,000 feet illuminated the bomber stream which then sustained per- sistent attacks . Apart from relatively high losses the raid itself was almos t a complete failure because an unexpected veer in the wind led to badly- timed and inaccurate Pathfinder marking so that most of the bombs fell ten or more miles south of Berlin . The third attack against Berlin on 3rd-4th September, although the smallest in numbers, was in some ways the most effective and caused heavy

S F-Lt J . H. Whiting, DFC, 407853 ; 467 Sqn. Law student ; of Adelaide ; b . Fullarton Estate, SA, 14 Nov 1920 .

602 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY Aug-Sept damage in the Siemenstadt, Charlottenburg and Mariendorf industria l suburbs. Four Mosquitos dropped decoy fighter flares well clear of the bomber stream and the usual diversionary attacks against towns and air- fields were also mounted. The defences of Berlin were still strong, how - ever, and the Australian squadrons suffered relatively high losses . No. 467, which had lost one commanding officer at Milan and his temporary relie f three nights later at Peenemunde, now lost a newly-appointed flight com- mander, Flight Lieutenant Carmichael,4 and one other crew. No. 460 also lost a flight commander (Squadron Leader Kelaher 5 ) and two other aircraft. One of these, captained by Flying Officer Randall, 6 was badly crippled by gun fire and then by fighter attack over Berlin, but the pilo t managed to fly it to Sweden before ordering his crew to bale out . Several other aircraft were badly damaged but the desperate battles with fighter s had not brought any lowering of morale or determination . Flying Office r Gardner' continued his journey to bomb Berlin although his Lancaste r had been badly damaged in a collision with another aircraft . None of these attacks was an unqualified success but the autumn raid s were in general heavier and more successful than previous attacks agains t the capital. By this time approximately 500 acres of the totally built-u p area had been destroyed or heavily damaged, but, although important, this was still only 3 per cent of the whole city. Probably the most significant result was the effect on German morale, for the panic evacuation which followed the first heavy attack was compared by German and neutral observers to that experienced at Hamburg. The raids, as expected, had been met by correspondingly heavier opposition . Each side had tested the other and the stage was now set for the winter battle . Although there was no sustained offensive against Ruhr and Rhineland cities (see Table No. 47) during autumn 1943, several raids were made against outstanding industrial targets with the additional objective of upset- ting the progress of reconstruction and the removal of defences to othe r threatened areas. The Leverkusen raid was a military failure. Heavy cloud obscured the target indicators and most Australians admitted that they bombed th e estimated position of the town from the best indication they could find . One pilot of No. 460 Squadron checked his position by observing th e searchlights at Cologne and Dusseldorf before attacking the estimate d target position. The I.G . Farben chemical works was not hit and althoug h the glow of widespread fires could be seen, these were scattered ove r neighbouring towns and had only secondary effect . More successful was the double thrust a week later against Munchen Gladbach and its dormitory suburb Rheydt . Both were centres of textile

4 F-Lt R. Carmichael, 412391 ; 467 Sqn. Clerk; of Bourke, NSW; b . Bourke, 17 Apr 1918 . Killed in action 4 Sep 1943 . 6 Sqn Ldr C . R. Kelaher, 39465 RAF, 267504; 460 Sqn . Regular air force off r ; of Sydney ; b . Sydney, 4 Mar 1914. Killed in action 4 Sep 1943 . e F-O F. A. Randall, DFC, 413896 ; 460 Sqn . Student ; of Wollongong, NSW ; b. Sydney, 15 Jun 1922 . Killed in action 16 Dec 1943 . Sqn Ldr C . C. Gardner, DFC, 416423 ; 460 Sqn . Branch manager ; of Streaky Bay, SA; b. Streaky Bay, 19 Jul 1915.

Aug-Nov CONCENTRATED FIRES 603 industries . Lancasters of No. 460 were included in the first wave attacking Munchen Gladbach and pilots observed that, after a somewhat scattere d beginning, concentrated fires sprang up in the south-east of the town. Twenty minutes later No . 467 arrived in the second wave and confirme d that fires were burning in Rheydt before the markers were laid . More than 50 per cent of the central area of each town was swept by ragin g fire and photographs showed that 143 factories had been damaged in som e degree. Enemy fighters arrived too late to intercept the first wave an d No. 460 was untroubled. The attack on Rheydt, however, was bitterly opposed and the bombers were followed during part of their homewar d journey. One Australian Lancaster was attacked but immediate counter- fire from both turret gunners drove off the fighter . The Wellingtons of No. 466 equipped with two special radar sets suffered no losses at th e target but two aircraft collided shortly after taking off. Both crews were killed and one Wellington fell in the centre of Goole in Yorkshire causin g civilian damage and casualties.

TABLE No . 47 RUHR AND RHINELAND

Total Force RAAF Force Tota l RAAF Tons air- air- Target Dis- Attack- Sqn of craft craft patched ing No . Disp Atkg Bombs lost lost

194 3

Aug 22-23 Leverkusen 462 427 460 21 21 1,690 5 — 467 11 11 —

Aug 30-31 Munchen Gladbach 660 616 460 23 22 2,272 25 — 466 15 13 2 467 14 14 —

Sep 29-30 Bochum 352 312 460 15 15 1,318 7 — 467 16 16 —

Oct 1- 2 Hagen 251 240 460 17 17 1,103 2 — 467 18 18 —

Nov 3- 4 Dusseldorf 589 527 460 23 23 2,234 18 — 467 18 18 1

On 29th-30th September a spoof raid against Gelsenkirchen kep t enemy fighters well clear of Bochum . Visibility was very good but at first the raid threatened to go astray because the Pathfinders were late . One Australian on his first sortie, seeing no other indication at the stipu- lated time of bombing, attacked a green flare dropped to mark the last

604 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY Sept-Oct turning point on the route. His bombs started a fire in open country, and , as always happened, this soon attracted more bombs . However, once the true target indicators were laid, collieries, steel works and railways in th e northern and north-western suburbs were severely damaged . The raid against Hagen, the main known centre for the manufacture of U-boat accumulators, was the smallest but by far the most successfu l of this series, both in the devastation caused and the freedom from any opposition. 8 The Oboe system of target marking was employed and R.A.A.F. Lancasters arrived to find the attack already well centred on the city, and in all thirty-nine factories were damaged . These extremely favour- able conditions were not present, however, when a large bomber forc e returned after an absence of five months to the important target of Dussel- dorf. The bombing was of high order, but the relatively small losses wer e due to the fighting spirit of the R .A.F. crews rather than lack of opposition, which was determined and sustained . Flight Lieutenant Trobe, 9 in a Halifax of No. 10 Squadron R .A.F., was singled out for particularly heavy attack. Firstly two Me-110's appeared, and, while one flew roun d burning a nose-searchlight to attract attention, the second attacked wreck- ing the compass, inter-communication system and rear turret of the Halifax . The decoy fighter now attacked but by skilful cooperation between Trobe and his mid-upper gunner, Flight Sergeant Mowatt , l was eventually shaken off. A few minutes later a third fighter approached and damaged the port-side fuel lines, stopping two engines, although one was coaxed into action again while Mowatt drove off the fighter . A fourth enemy appeared and the Halifax was again damaged but as the fighter came in close Mowatt, wounded and his turret bursting into flame, continued his retur n fire and set the enemy on fire also. Even after the fires in its fuselage were extinguished the Halifax was in far from airworthy condition, but, with three wounded men aboard, Trobe refused to give the order to bal e out and courageously turned for England . After a nightmare flight he suc- ceeded in reaching an emergency airfield . Squadron Leader Kingsford - Smith2 of No. 467 was also attacked by four fighters one of which wa s damaged, while the R .A.F. mid-upper turret gunner of a Lancaster pilote d by Flying Officer Patkin3 shot down another fighter, and several othe r R.A.A.F. Lancasters were in combat . Attention also turned at this time to the large cities in the west-centra l plain of Germany . Although only at medium range these had consistently escaped lightly owing to their location in featureless country which pre - vented precise identification. Hanover (see Table No . 48) in particular

8 Allied planning was based on the assumption that Hagen was the main centre of this industry , but an unlisted industry of equal size actually existed in Hanover . 6 Sqn Ldr J . H. Trobe, DSO, DFC, 416468 ; 10 Sqn RAF. Clerk ; of Berri, SA ; b. Prospect, SA, 28 Jun 1913. P F-0 W. Mowatt, DFM, 413637 ; 10 Sqn RAF . Journalist ; of Earlwood, NSW ; b. Newcastle-on- Tyne, Eng, 7 Sep 1911 .

2 W Cdr R . Kingsford-Smith, DSO, DFC, 381 . 467 Sqn ; comd 463 Sqn 1943-44, 627 Sqn RAF 1945 . Regular air force offr; of Wollstonecraft, NSW ; b . Northwood, NSW, 14 Jul 1919 . S F-Lt L. B . Patkin, 401146. 296 Sqn RAF, 467 Sqn . Departmental manager ; of Hawthorn, Vic ; b. Melbourne, 28 Sep 1913 . Killed in action 2 Jan 1944 .

Sept-Oct SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 605 gave a very unsatisfactory response on an H2S screen even for the mos t experienced radar operator, and although four heavy raids were mad e against this city, only one was really effective. The first raid took place in clear weather conditions and R .A.A.F. crews reported that bombing was well concentrated round the targe t indicators and that there were huge palls of fire and smoke . Photographs taken by No. 467 during the raid revealed that despite this optimism, th e majority of bombs from that squadron fell about seven miles away fro m the true aiming point and only the southern suburbs were hit at all . Nearly 200 searchlights silhouetted the bombers against cloud and there wer e many desperate struggles with fighters which on this occasion had not been misled by diversionary attacks on Oldenburg and Emden . Another batch of German fighters was sent to attack the returning bombers a s they neared their own airfields. This disappointment was duplicated i n the second raid. The Pathfinder markers were again misplaced, this tim e to the north, and again only fringe areas were damaged.

TABLE No. 48 HANOVE R

Total Force RAAF Force Tons Total RAAF of aircraft aircraft Dis- Attack- Sqn Bombs lost lost patched ing No. Disp Atkg 1943 Sep 22-23 716 658 460 20 20 2,357 25 2 467 10 10 — Sep 27-28 683 599 460 19 18 2,196 38 1 467 16 15 — Oct 8- 9 504 457 460 18 17 1,667 27 2 467 6 6 — Oct 18-19 360 349 460 19 19 1,697 17 1 467 16 16 1

On 8th-9th October only six Lancasters of No . 467 Squadron were available as the aircraft had been dispersed to emergency landing field s on return the previous night from Stuttgart. Australian participation was thus relatively low in what proved to be a classic example of a really suc- cessful concentrated attack. Before the raid a message from the Ai r Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, was read to all crew s directing attention to previous failures against this target and exhortin g them to go to great pains . One large diversionary force of 104 aircraft went to Bremen and small groups of Mosquitos attacked Kastrop-Rauxel ,

606 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY 8-19 Oct Berlin and Duren in order to disperse widely enemy fighters, which o n previous raids had found it easy to reach Hanover because of its centra l position . The Pathfinders dropped flares and target indicators well place d in the centre of the city, and although a few were inevitably astray, the main bomber force, mindful of the appeal made to them, made sure tha t they attacked only the main markers . The important central area of Hanover between the principal railway station and the Machsee Lake (which had been roofed over and camouflaged) was almost completely devastated by fire . Sixty-two factories were damaged and fires were see n raging all night by Wing Commander Norman 4 (No. 460 Squadron) who was shot down and captured during the raid . Flying Officer Caffyn, 5 captain of the other R .A.A.F. Lancaster which failed to return, had go t his crew away safely over Hanover when the aircraft was set afire b y ground fire and fighter attack . After a vain attempt to fly to Holland, he was forced himself to bale out. He attempted to board a moving train bound for Bremen but was badly injured and captured soon afterwards . Another Lancaster piloted by Flight Sergeant Simpson 6 collided over th e target with an FW-190. 7 A gaping hole was torn in the bomber and Simp- son suffered severely during his return flight from the intensely cold win d which blew through the torn structure. Both his and his navigator 's hands were frost-bitten .

TABLE No. 49 KASSEL

Total Force RAAF Force Tons Total RAAF of aircraft aircraft Dis- Attack- Sqn Bombs lost lost patched ing No. Disp Atkg 1943 Oct 3- 4 540 501 460 13 12 1,544 24 — 467 14 14 1 Oct 22-23 569 486 460 19 19 1,824 42 — 467 15 14 1

Another raid ten nights later (the first night suitable for flying) was intended to ram home the advantage gained by this devastating stroke . It achieved little, however, although one northern suburb was well hit . Again the main difficulty was confused marking, as the Pathfinders began with

. W Cdr R . A . Norman, DFC, 400102 . 35 Sqn RAF ; comd 460 Sqn 1943 . Bank clerk ; of Mel - bourne ; b . Mildura, Vic, 3 Jul 1916 . 'F-0 M. C . Caffyn, 409506 ; 460 Sqn . Police detective ; of Melbourne ; b. Maryborough, Vic, 1 3 Dec 1913 . Died while POW 27 Oct 1943 . 6 F-Lt A . B . Simpson, DFC, 408881 . 467 Sqn, 511 Sqn RAF . Hotel manager ; of Numurkah, Vic ; b . Euroa, Vic, 23 Apr 1916 . Such incidents were almost certainly due to error rather than design on the part of Germa n fighters although the German press referred frequently to so-called "ramming tactics" .

Sept-Oct OUTSTANDING SUCCESS 607 ground target-indicators, switched to sky markers because of low cloud and then reverted to ground markers. Premature release by crews unable to assess the comparative value of the scattered flares, led to aggregat e errors which soon centred the attack in open country back along the approach line of the bombers. In addition to aircraft shot down, five Australian Lancasters suffered nine separate fighter attacks but in each case escaped by good crew cooperation . Second in importance to Hanover in this area, Kassel (see Table No . 49), a centre of locomotive, armoured vehicle, lorry and aircraft-engine production, was attacked in full strength twice during October 1943 . Haze prevented use of the ground-marking technique for the first rai d and the sky markers drifted downwind so that most of the bombs actuall y fell outside the city to the east . Paradoxically it was the hasty, inexperienced crews which actually hit one south-east industrial area . There were few night fighters at the target due to a successful spoof raid on Hanover , where the Germans were waiting in force with their flares already laid . The bombers made a feint towards Hanover to increase the threat, bu t then swung south to Kassel . The secondary German tactics of feeding fighters into the bomber stream had more success, however, and man y pilots criticised the Pathfinder route-marking flares as dangerous becaus e they attracted the enemy to all turning points . Some crews also ha d difficulty in distinguishing between the intense light of white and gree n flares and they bombed incorrectly . The raid on 22nd-23rd October was nearly spoiled by bad weather an d severe icing which forced many bombers to turn back . However, most of them struggled on and were rewarded by fine weather over Kassel which permitted visual marking and the main bomb load, dropped in a recor d time of only twenty-two minutes (or one bomber every 2 .7 seconds) , hit the city squarely, devastating 615 out of the total built-up area of 96 0 acres. All three Henschel locomotive and tank factories were damaged , although the aircraft works escaped lightly . The main purpose of the attack was outstandingly successful, but it was relatively costly . The undue con- centration over the target led to one R.A.A.F. Lancaster being hit and set on fire by incendiaries dropped from another aircraft, though luckily i t survived not only this, but shell fire and two fighter attacks. A badly- timed diversionary raid had failed to keep night fighters away from Kassel and mingling inside the dense stream of bombers they had extremely favourable targets and pursued the bombers for over 100 miles on their return journey . Six R.A.A.F. Lancasters were attacked but again Australian losses were very light in comparison with the whole force . Although, after the capitulation of Italy and the growing attack b y Mediterranean Air Command against northern Italy, Bomber Comman d was no longer called upon for area attacks against Italian industrial cities , there remained a few special targets against which its techniques and bomb - carrying capacity were peculiarly effective . Such a target was Modane, the railway border town at the French end of the Mont Cenis tunnel, and on 16th-17th September many individual R .A.A.F. airmen took part in a

608 HAMBURG AND RAIDS ON ITALY 10-11 No v successful attack although the R.A.A.F. squadrons were not included in the force. As soon as the railway system had been repaired another forc e of 311 bombers attacked on 10th-11th November, and this time thirty-tw o R.A.A.F. Lancasters took part. The raid was virtually unopposed and not one bomber from the whole stream was lost ; in bright moonlight a deliber- ate and wholly-successful attack resulted . No. 467 Squadron alone must have scarred the target badly, for fourteen out of its seventeen aircraf t returned with photographs showing accurate releases against the aiming point. The international railway station was completely destroyed and th e railway was still out of action a month later .