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ENNETT EHAVIOR SSAYS ON M ONSCIOUSNESS ONSCIOUSNESS WEET EASONING EMANTICS YLYSHYN

E. D E P ■ ■ ■ S J. E B C ■ C R W L’esprit humain, son organisation, sa nature, ses relations avec le humain, son organisation, L’esprit les thèmes sont depuis toujours parmi corps et avec le monde elle- La psychologie contemporaine centraux de la philosophie. Elle s’est au sein de la philosophie. même a pris naissance consacre l’émergence des sciences cognitives émancipée, mais ce champ de le retour de la philosophie dans d’une certaine façon de l’informatique et des recherche. Les développements lumière sur les phénomènes neurosciences, en jetant une nouvelle le débat philosophique. La mentaux, ont eu pour effet de relancer «philosophie de l’esprit» jamais. Ce est ainsi plus florissante que la philosophie dont il est retour n’a rien d’une régression, car scientifique, informée par question est en phase avec la recherche elle. elle et en constante interaction avec à promouvoir les recherches Les Conférences Jean-Nicod visent et à faire connaître en philosophiques se rapportant à la cognition dans ce domaine. Le France les travaux réalisés à l’étranger par le comité Jean-Nicod, présente ses sélectionné conférencier, recherches au cours d’un cycle de conférences qu’il rassemble ensuite en un livre. ■ (1995) (1998) D (2003) ■ S D. S M Conférences Jean-Nicod de Jean-Nicod Conférences philosophie cognitive philosophie Conférenciers Jean-Nicod (1993-2006) Collection Jean-Nicod Comité Jean-Nicod , . ARIS ARIS ARIS ARIS CTES CTES CTES ICOD EBATE A A A ATAUD -N LUDGES D R ORALITY K M EAN J 75005 Paris MPHITHÉATRE , 75005 P , 75005 P , 75005 P , 75005 P ISAGREEMENT 29, rue d’Ulm A ALLE DES ALLE DES ALLE DES Pavillon Jardin D LM LM LM LM ODGEPODGE OF Stephen Stich MMEUBLE , S , S , S ’U ’U ’U ’U RENSEIGNEMENTS , I NSTITUT I ORAL : A H ULTIPURPOSE RUE D RUE D RUE D RUE D M EFINITION OF M D 45, 45, 45, 45, UPÉRIEURE UPÉRIEURE UPÉRIEURE École normale supérieure [email protected] Mardi 15 mai de 14h à 16h S S S UPÉRIEURE ECONSTRUCTING THE http://www.institutnicod.org HE S Mercredi 9 14h à 16h de mai ORALITY T Vendredi 11 mai de 14h à 16h Vendredi Mercredi 16 mai de 14h à 16h : D M Quand la Théorie Morale la Théorie Morale Quand ORMALE ORMALE ORMALE ORMALE N N N ERSISTENCE OF N

Moral Theory Science: Meets Cognitive LTRUISM P COLE COLE COLE . A EBUNKING HE E E E COLE T rencontre les Sciences Cognitives les Sciences rencontre D E Remise du prix Jean-Nicod et cocktail après la conférence Remise du prix Jean-Nicod et cocktail après

GOISM VS E How the Cognitive Science Can Transform Traditional Debates Traditional Science Can Transform How the Cognitive •Cogni 2007 dépliant 9/04/07 14:00 Page 1 Page 14:00 9/04/07 dépliant 2007 •Cogni •Cogni 2007 dépliant 9/04/07 14:00 Page 2 P

Stephen Stich Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science: How the Cognitive Science Can Transform Traditional Debates hiloso

Professeur de philosophie et de sciences cognitives (Board of Conférence du 9 mai Conférence du 15 mai Governors) à l’Université de Rutgers, Stephen Stich dirige The Definition of Morality Egoism vs. Altruism: Deconstructing the Debate le Groupe de Recherche sur l’Évolution et la Cognition Debates about the definition of “moral judgment” and “moral rule” Psychological egoism maintains that all human motivation is Supérieure. have a venerable history in philosophy. In addition to debating the ultimately selfish. Though people often desire to help others, Également professeur honoraire de philosophie à l’Université de merits of various proposed definitions, philosophers have also egoists maintain that these desires are always instrumental, Sheffield, il a participé activement au projet sur la P disagreed about what the definition is supposed to do: What counts caused or sustained by the belief that helping will lead to the «Structure de l’Esprit et l’Innéisme» et il est actuellement as getting the definition right? One proposal is that moral rules or satisfaction of some self-interested desire. By contrast, hie co membre du comité d’organisation du projet « Esprit et moral judgments are a psychological natural kind, and that the psychological altruism maintains that some of our ultimate or Culture». Ses domaines de recherche sont la philosophie correct definition should specify the essential features of this kind. non-instrumental desires are not self-interested; their object is de l’esprit, les fondements des sciences cognitives, Recently, a number of philosophers and psychologists have the well-being of others. Philosophers from Hobbes to the l’épistémologie naturalisée, la théorie de l’esprit et la suggested that research using the moral/conventional task, first present have worried that if egoism is true, moral behavior may psychologie morale. introduced by Elliot Turiel, has uncovered some of the essential be threatened, and drastic steps have been proposed to counter Outre son enseignement à l’Université de Rutgers et de Sheffield, properties of this natural kind. If the empirical generalizations drawn this threat. Recently both psychologists and evolutionary Stephen Stich a enseigné à l’Université du Michigan, à

Conférences Jean-Nicod 2007 from this work were correct, it would be reasonable to conclude that biologists lavished a great deal of attention on the egoism vs. l’Université de Californie et à l’Université de San Diego

we have indeed discovered the essence of morality. However, a altruism debate. However, neither the psychologists nor the G après avoir obtenu son doctorat à l’Université de growing body of evidence indicates that those generalizations are biologists have taken adequate account of the range of cognitive

Princeton en 1968. Il a également été professeur invité nitive not correct, and thus that the moral/conventional task tells us states and processes invoked in contemporary cognitive science. d’universités américaines, britanniques, australiennes et nothing of interest about the definition of morality. Another When these options are made explicit, they undermine the best néo-zélandaises. proposal is that the correct definition of morality should capture the psychological and evolutionary arguments for altruism. They also concept underlying people’s ordinary use of terms like “moral rule”. undermine most of the reasons philosophers have offered for However, there is reason to suspect that there may be no coherent thinking that psychological egoism would be morally problematic. Ouvrages de S. Stich concept in this area.

■ 1975. (ED.) INNATE IDEAS. BERKELEY AND LONDON: UNIVERSITY OF Conférence du 16 mai CALIFORNIA PRESS ■ 1979. THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE. Conférence du 11 mai Debunking Morality: a Hodgepodge ENGLEWOOD (ED. AVEC D.A. JACKSON) CLIFFS, NJ: PRENTICE-HALL, INC The Persistence of Moral Disagreement of Multipurpose Kludges ■ 1983. FROM FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THE CASE Moral disagreement is widespread. But would that disagreement A venerable view, still very much alive in contemporary debates, AGAINST BELIEF. CAMBRIDGE, MA: BRADFORD BOOKS/MIT PRESS ■ 1990. persist even under hypothetical idealized conditions in which all THE FRAGMENTATION OF REASON: PREFACETOAPRAGMATIC THEORY OF urges that our spontaneous moral judgments reflect a deep parties to a moral debate are rational, impartial and fully COGNITIVE EVALUATION. CAMBRIDGE, MA: BRADFORD BOOKS/MIT wisdom, except when the processes underlying those judgments PRESS ■ 1991. PHILOSOPHY AND CONNECTIONIST THEORY (ED. AVEC W. informed about the relevant non-moral facts? The answer is are interfered with by morally problematic forces. However, much RAMSEY & D.E. RUMELHART). HILLSDALE, N.J.: LAWRENCE ERLBAUM important for many moral theories. On some versions of theories recent work suggests that we should have a very different view of ASSOCIATES ■ 1994. MENTAL REPRESENTATION (ED. AVEC T.A. in the “ideal observer” tradition, a positive answer entails either our spontaneous moral judgments. This work indicates that there ■ WARFIELD). OXFORD: BLACKWELL 1996. DECONSTRUCTING THE MIND. moral relativism or moral skepticism, and many contemporary is no one psychological system underlying moral judgments. ■ NEW YORK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1996. BENACERRAF AND HIS moral realists hold that a negative answer would show that moral Rather, there is a hodgepodge of different systems that pull in CRITICS (ED. AVEC A. MORTON). OXFORD: BLACKWELL ■ 2002. THE realism is false. A number of recent empirical studies of moral different directions. Moreover, some of these systems were COGNITIVE BASIS OF SCIENCE (ED. AVEC P. C ARRUTHERS ET M. SIEGAL). judgments in different cultural groups suggest that moral designed to perform cognitive functions that have little to do CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS ■ 2003. THE BLACKWELL disagreement would indeed persist under idealized GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (ED. AVEC T.A. WARFIELD). OXFORD: with morality. When they are co-opted to play a role in moral circumstances, though much turns on exactly how the idealized BLACKWELL ■ 2003. MINDREADING (AVEC S. NICHOLS). OXFORD: judgment they often reflect aspects of these other functions. One OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS ■ 2005. THE INNATE MIND: STRUCTURE AND circumstances are characterized. The persistence of moral example that illustrates this phenomenon is the intertwining of CONTENTS (ED. AVEC P. C ARRUTHERS ET S. LAURENCE). OXFORD: OXFORD disagreement is also suggested by an empirically motivated moral and causal judgments revealed by the work of Joshua UNIVERSITY PRESS ■ 2006. THE INNATE MIND: CULTURE AND COGNITION account of the psychological mechanisms underlying the Knobe. Other examples depend on the role of emotion in moral (ED. AVEC P. C ARRUTHERS ET S. LAURENCE). NEW YORK: OXFORD acquisition and implementation of moral norms, and by judgment. If the mechanisms underlying moral judgment are ■ UNIVERSITY PRESS 2007. THE INNATE MIND: FOUNDATIONS AND THE theoretical work on how those mechanisms might have evolved. indeed a bricolage—a hodgepodge of multipurpose kludges—it FUTURE (ED. AVEC P. C ARRUTHERS ET S. LAURENCE). NEW YORK: OXFORD The model proposed for the psychology of norms leaves abundant poses a major challenge to those who believe that the UNIVERSITY PRESS room for reasoning in moral deliberation, but does not support pronouncements of those systems should be relied upon. the idea that rational deliberation will lead to convergence.