Policing and Sectarian Conflict in Divided Societies A
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO From the Bottom-Up: Policing and Sectarian Conflict in Divided Societies A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Matthew Jacob Nanes Committee in charge: Professor Karen Ferree, Chair Professor Claire Adida Professor Eli Berman Professor David Lake Professor Philip Roeder 2017 Copyright Matthew Jacob Nanes, 2017 All rights reserved. The dissertation of Matthew Jacob Nanes is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Chair University of California, San Diego 2017 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page . iii Table of Contents . iv List of Figures . vi List of Tables . vii Acknowledgements . ix Vita . xi Abstract of the Dissertation . xii Introduction . 1 Chapter 1 From the Bottom-Up: Rank-And-File Integration in Divided Societies . 23 Chapter 2 The Police as a Political Institution . 51 Chapter 3 Sectarianism and Conflict in the Iraqi Police . 71 Chapter 4 Sectarian Integration in the Police and Support for Anti-Government Violence: Evidence from Iraq . 93 4.A Vignettes . 135 4.B Vignette Experiment Balance Table . 137 4.C List Experiment Mechanics and Interpretation . 138 Chapter 5 Religious Identity, Inclusion, and the Israeli Police . 140 Chapter 6 Police Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence in Israel . 161 6.A Vignettes . 196 6.B Item-Count Response Methodological Concerns . 198 6.C Vignette Prime Balance Table . 200 6.D Effects of Experimental Treatment on Attitudes Towards Police and Government . 201 6.E Robustness Tests and Alternative Model Specifications . 203 iv Chapter 7 Bottom-Up Integration and Police Service Provision: Evidence from Israel . 207 7.A Summary Statistics . 232 7.B Robustness Checks . 233 Chapter 8 Conclusion: The Consequences of Police Integration in Divided Societies . 238 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Institutional Structure and Diversity . 34 Figure 4.1: Do you think that greater sectarian integration of the Iraqi Po- lice Services would make citizens like you better off, worse off, or about the same? . 102 Figure 4.2: Iraq: Perceived Integration . 104 Figure 4.3: Local Police Integration and Population Demographics . 105 Figure 4.4: Support for Anti-Government Violence (Sunnis) . 110 Figure 4.5: Shia Opposition to Integration { Fear of Subversion . 130 Figure 4.6: Shia Opposition to Integration { Jobs . 131 Figure 5.1: Israel Police Demographics by Assignment . 149 Figure 5.2: Israel Police Demographics by Religion . 150 Figure 5.3: Officer Fractionalization by Station . 152 Figure 5.4: Officer Fractionalization and Station Size . 153 Figure 6.1: Perceived National and Local Police Integration . 168 Figure 6.2: Perceived Local Police Demographics . 169 Figure 6.3: Perceived National and Local Police Integration . 171 Figure 6.4: Throughout Israel in general, would you say that the police are very integrated, somewhat integrated, or not at all integrated? . 173 Figure 6.5: Now please think specifically about your neighborhood. How often do you see or hear about Jewish and non-Jewish officers working together? . 174 Figure 6.6: Police Integration and Support for Violence (Non-Jews) . 180 Figure 6.7: Experimental Priming on Police Integration and Support for Violence . 192 Figure 7.1: Willingness to Report Crimes . 215 Figure 7.2: Perceived Police Integration . 224 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Arab Evaluations of the Federal Government . 64 Table 2.2: Iraqi Evaluations of the Federal Government . 67 Table 2.2: Iraqi Evaluations of the Federal Government, Continued . 68 Table 2.3: First Differences, Arab versus Kurdish Respondents . 69 Table 4.1: Iraq: Support for Anti-Government Violence . 109 Table 4.2: Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence (Sunnis) 111 Table 4.3: Perceived Integration and Fairness of Service Provision . 115 Table 4.3: Perceived Integration and Fairness of Service Provision, Continued116 Table 4.3: Perceived Integration and Fairness of Service Provision, Continued117 Table 4.4: Ability to Get a Job with the Iraqi Police . 120 Table 4.4: Ability to Get a Job with the Iraqi Police, Continued . 121 Table 4.5: Perceived Integration and Fear of Repression . 124 Table 4.5: Perceived Integration and Fear of Repression, Continued . 125 Table 4.5: Perceived Integration and Fear of Repression, Continued . 126 Table 4.6: Integration and Support for Non-Peaceful Methods (Shias) . 131 Table 4.7: Balance Table: Vignette Experiment . 137 Table 4.8: Balance Table: List Experiment . 138 Table 4.9: List Experiment: Support for Non-Peaceful Methods . 138 Table 5.1: Officer Demographics by Subdistrict (2014) . 154 Table 6.1: Distribution of Respondents . 166 Table 6.2: Support for Anti-Government Violence (All Respondents) . 178 Table 6.3: Support for Anti-Government Violence (Non-Jewish Respondents)178 Table 6.4: Police Integration and Support for Violence (Non-Jews) . 179 Table 6.5: Perceived Fairness of Police/Government Service Provision . 182 Table 6.5: Perceived Fairness of Police/Government Service Provision, Con- tinued . 183 Table 6.6: Do you think that someone from your family could get a job with the police or security forces if they wanted one? . 185 Table 6.7: Fear of Repression by the Police/Government . 188 Table 6.7: Fear of Repression by the Police/Government, Continued . 189 Table 6.8: Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence (Jews) . 193 Table 6.9: Item Count Balance Table . 198 Table 6.10: Item-Count: Distribution of Responses . 199 Table 6.11: Balance Table: Vignette Treatment . 200 Table 6.12: Effects of Integration News Story Treatment . 202 Table 6.13: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Replication { Integration and Fear of Repression . 204 vii Table 6.14: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Replication { Integration and Perceived Fairness . 205 Table 6.15: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Replication { Integration and Employment206 Table 7.1: Police Integration and Crime . 220 Table 7.2: Do you think the Israeli Police genereally treat all citizens fairly, regardless of a citizen's ethnic or religious identity? . 226 Table 7.3: If you witnessed someone stealing money from a shop, would you contact the police? . 229 Table 7.4: Summary Statistics: Independent Variables (Crime Models) . 232 Table 7.5: Summary Statistics: Crime . 232 Table 7.6: Summary Statistics: Mechanisms . 233 Table 7.7: Predictors of Crime and Integration . 234 Table 7.8: Minor and Major Crimes . 235 Table 7.9: Willingness to Report a Crime (Table 7.3) . 236 Table 7.10: Perceived Fairness of Police Service Provision (Table 7.2) . 237 viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the participation of many remarkable individuals. First and foremost, the bulk of the evidence that I present comes from surveys in Iraq and Israel. The thousands of individuals who make up my \data points" are real people who had something important to say. I am grateful to them for lending their experiences, attitudes, and voices to my research. My ultimate hope for this dissertation is that it contributes in some small way to the welfare of these individuals and others like them. I would have been unable to hear what these people had to say without the help of two survey firms, IPSOS in Israel and IIACSS in Iraq. IIACSS and its staff were particularly helpful in gaining access to respondents in hard-to-reach places like Baghdad, adding richness to this project. I thank Munqith Daghir for his patience and guidance in helping me negotiate the hurdles of field research for the first time. I was fortunate to receive funding from numerous sources for this research. I received a pre-doctoral fellowship from the Israel Institute during the final two years of my PhD. The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and UCSD Policy Design and Evaluation Lab also provided critical funding for my research. I thank these funders for their support. I spent the summer of 2014 at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem where I appeared unannounced on the doorstep of the Institute of Criminology. Professors Badi Hasisi, Simon Perry, and David Weisburd generously shared their time and contacts, providing me with an indispensable introduction to policing in Israel and to the academic study of policing more generally. I am deeply indebted to them and hope they do not mind this political scientist reinventing a wheel which their field developed decades ago. Before coming to UCSD, the faculty at Rice University stoked my interest in research. They unwittingly convinced me to pursue a career in political science through thought-provoking courses and exposure to fascinating research. Royce Carroll and Cliff Morgan were particularly influential. Their mentorship early in my career continues to inform my work. ix At UCSD, I was incredibly fortunate to work under the supervision of a phenomenal dissertation committee. Karen Ferree, Claire Adida, Eli Berman, David Lake, and Phil Roeder's mentorship and guidance shaped the development of this project and my career. Their insistence on precision and analytic rigor are, I hope, reflected throughout my dissertation. Our conversations over the last five years challenged me to think more deeply and critically about the world I study and will shape my research far into the future. I thank them for their guidance and support. In particular, this dissertation would not have been possible without my wonderful advisor, Karen Ferree. Her commitment to this project and to me as a scholar allowed me to succeed. My time in San Diego would not have been the same without the \Best Cohort Ever." Our camping trips, poker games, visits to the beach, and dinners on Convoy Street were welcome distractions from work. The members of my cohort are not colleagues or friends; they are family. Pursuing a PhD would have been unthinkable without the love and sup- port of my family.