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Is Molinism As Bad As Calvinism?

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Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 5 1-1-1990 Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism? Jerry L. Walls Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Walls, Jerry L. (1990) "Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism?," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil1990712 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol7/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. IS MOLINISM AS BAD AS CALVINISM? Jerry L. Walls This paper compares the theories of providence and predestination in Molinism and Calvinism. My particular concern is with whether Molinism is beset with the same sort of disturbing moral implications which plague Calvinism. I conclude that Molinism is better off than Calvinism in this regard, but still fails to give us a satisfactory account of God's goodness and will to save all persons. I suggest an amended version of Molinism to repair this difficulty, according to which God gives all persons an optimal amount of grace and equal opportunity to respond to it. I In his little book The Natural History of Religion, David Hume has an interesting account of why men profess belief in divine goodness. At its roots, this profession is largely motivated by fear. That is to say, men ascribe goodness to God because they are afraid of what He might do to them if they were to say or think anything negative about Him. In spite of this, men often detest God in their hearts. For God is depicted as acting toward us in ways which we would find highly blameworthy in other persons. There is, Hume says, a strong contradiction between religious represen­ tations of God and "our natural ideas of generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice. "1 To illustrate his point, Hume cites the doctrines of predestination and reproba­ tion. In a footnote, he quotes at length a passage from Chevalier Ramsay, a writer who rejected these doctrines in favor of a doctrine of universal salvation. Ramsay depicts predestination as a doctrine surrounded by a thick cloud of mystery. It is utterly baffling to us why God would choose to elect the vast majority of mankind to eternal reprobation. The predestinarian Doctors would insist, however, that we must not question God: "He has secret reasons for his conduct, that are impenetrable; and though he appears unjust and barbarous, yet we must believe the contrary, because what is injustice, crime, cruelty, and the blackest malice in us, is in him justice, mercy, and sovereign goodness."2 Hume goes on to tell us that Ramsay further asserts, in other places, "that the Arminian and Molinist schemes serve very little to mend the matter." This is the claim I wi sh to explore in this paper. Is Molinism reall y as bad as Cal vinism T FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 85 Vol. 7 No.1 January 1990 All rights reserved. 86 Faith and Philosophy Before proceeding farther, I wish to spell out in a bit more detail the key terms of this question. By Molinism, I mean the theory of providence and predestination proposed by Luis de Molina during a sixteenth century controversy over the relation between divine grace and human free will. Molina, a Jesuit, developed his theory as an alternative to the view which he attributed to his Dominican opponents. He summarized what he took to be their position in four propositions, which I paraphrase as follows: 1) before predestination, some were elected to salvation through an absolute choice on God's part, prior to any foreknowledge of the circumstances and use of free choice on the part of men; 2) likewise, others were rejected by an absolute choice on God's part; 3) the predestination of those elected for salvation was fixed in a predetermination to confer on them the efficacious aids by which their wills would be so determined that they would certainly perform those works which lead to eternal life; 4) the others are excluded from salvation by virtue of the fact that God did not decide to confer on them similar aids. 4 The view thus summed up by Molina is what I shall call Calvinism. While this view is prominently associated with John Calvin, the great reformer, it has been held by a number of significant thinkers, both Roman and Protestant. So I am using the term "Calvinism" generically to refer to this broad account of predestination. This conception of predestination is problematic for a number of reasons. These reasons are clearly expressed by Molina in the following significant pas­ sage: In fact, if the method of predestining some adults and not others was the one which has been gleaned from the theory of these authors with their predeterminations, then I do not see in what sense it is true that God wills that all human beings be saved if they themselves do not prevent it, or in what sense it is true and not fictitious that all human beings without exception have been created by God for eternal life. Nor do I see how God could justifiably reproach the nonpredestinate for not living in a pious and holy manner and for not attaining eternal life; indeed I do not see how it is true that God has placed human beings in the hand of their own counsel, so that they might direct their actions as they will. To the contrary, given this method of predestination and predeterminations, the freedom of the created faculty of choice perishes, and the justice and goodness of God with respect to the reprobate are greatly obfuscated and obscured. Thus, this theory is neither pious nor in any way safe from the point of view of the faith. 5 The difficulties cited by Molina are obviously interrelated. What is most unacceptable about the view in question is that it undermines any substantial MOLINISM VS. CALVINISM 87 view of God's goodness and justice. God's goodness is closely connected with His desire to save all persons. An essential component of goodness is a desire for the happiness of others. God's goodness is evident in His wish that all persons enjoy the happiness of eternal life. An essential aspect of justice is demanding no more of others than they are able to perform. God's demand that we live holy lives is just only if we are able to do so, or are enabled by grace to do so. As Molina saw it, his opponents' view of predestination entailed that those who are lost are never really able to live holy lives. This brings us to what is perhaps the fundamental difficulty with this account of predestination, namely, that it eliminates the freedom of created wills. In the pages which precede and follow the passage above, Molina expends considerable energy arguing this point. He maintains that his opponents' theory of intrinsically efficacious grace entails that those who are deprived of such grace are not able to dissent from the sins they commit; nor are they able to perform any of the good acts which they fail to perform. Those who receive such grace, on the other hand, cannot but perform the good acts which they perform. For Molina, it is essential to maintain an account of freedom such that created wills are able either to cooperate with or to resist God's grace. Freedom is not compatible with the sort of determinism he perceived in his opponents. 6 Now then, let us come back to the problems which Calvinism poses with respect to God's justice and mercy. The notion that God predestines some persons for damnation by withholding from them the grace with which they would live holy lives and attain salvation seems to make nonsense of both of these divine attributes. For what sense would it make to say God desired the salvation of persons from whom He deliberately chose to withhold efficacious grace? And in what sense could God be just if He demanded persons to live righteously who were never able to do so? It is hard to imagine how God could be just in punishing such persons with eternal damnation. For such punishment seems arbitrary and wicked. Indeed, it is little wonder that John Wesley said Calvinism made God worse than the devil. 7 However, it is worth stressing that even defenders of Calvinism struggle with the moral implications of their theory. The typical way out is to make an appeal to mystery. While Ramsay's depiction of Calvinism---<:ited above-is perhaps a bit of a caricature, it is not far off the mark. Calvinists often revel in mystery to the point of making it a virtue. They see it as an expression of true piety to quell all moral doubts and objections in the face of God's impenetrable decrees. Molina of course, had a very different notion of piety: for him it would be "neither pious nor safe" to subscribe to the Calvinistic theory of predestination. Now then, it should be clear what I mean when I ask whether Molinism is as bad as Calvinism. This is shorthand for the question of whether Molinism is equally beset by the sort of disturbing moral implications which plague Calvinism. 88 Faith and Philosophy It is my impression that Calvinists often find comfort in the thought that Molinism is just as bad.
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