THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1812

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Social Sciences

Morehead State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in History

by

Steven E. Siry

July 24, 1980 APP.~/THESES

°'"Sl,:;).\f ":).~\

Accepted by the faculty of the School of Social Sciences, Morehead State University, in partial fulfillment of the require­ ments for the Master of Arts in History degree.

7

Master's Committee:

August 18. 1980 (date) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

ABSTRACT iv

PREFACE · • vii Chapter

I. JAMES MADISON AND THE MALCONTENTS 1

II. DE WITT CLINTON BEGINS HIS CHALLENGE 8

III. MADISON'S NEW STRATEGY • 12

IV. TOWARDS WAR • • • 19

V. PRAGMATIC POLITICS 22

VI: PIE DECISION FOR WAR'. 37

VII. WHY WAR? • • • • • • •. 46

VIII. THE CLINTON CANDIDACY: A RISING TIDE. so

IX. THE ELECTION • • • • 63

X. THE DECISIVE STATES .. 72

XI. THE END RESULT: AN EVALUATION 90

BIBLIOGRAPHY ••••••• 96 THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1812

Steven E. Siry, M.A. Morehead State University, 1980

Director of Thesis: Dr. Stuart S. Sprague

"The relationship between party politics and James Madison's

1812 decision for war and a reevaluation of De Witt Clinton's 1811_;

1812 presidential challenge to Madison are the subjects of this thesis.

A significant part of my work is based on a provocative chapter from John C. A. Stagg's doctoral dissertation. In addition, I have used extensively Irving Brant's multi-volume James Madison, and an essay by Norman K. Ri'sjord on the 1812 election has. been of great value concerning the political situation within individual states. Primary sources used include the writings of the major Republican leaders and runs of prominent newspapers.

I have interpreted the primary reason for the declaration of war in 1812 as being due to political expediency. During Madison's first two presidential years he was. faced with increased dissent within the

Republican party by those desirous of a belligerent approach towards (v)

Great Britain for nationalistic, economic, and/or. political reasons.

Madison was not going to remain a spectator of this internal faction­ alism within the Republican party while waiting for the conflict in

Europe to end and thereby solve America·• s diplomatic problems. He saw the dangers caused by the malcontents over foreign affairs. An insurgent uprising would have a devastatingly divisive effect if the malcontents threw their support to another presidential candidate in

1812. Madison was prepared to act to meet this threat. Beginning in

March, 1811 the President initiated a dual approach towards dissenters.

This involved placating the pro-war faction of the Republican party while breaking all ties with those malcontents whose disenchantment could not be removed by merely holding a more belligerent attitude in foreign affairs.

The Federalists opposed Madison's continuation of Jefferson's economic policies as well as the idea of war with Great Britain. With this web of conflict between the Federalists and the· Republicans and with the dissension in the Republicans' own ranks, De Witt Clinton saw a chance to capture the Presidency. Consequently, Clinton challenged the ruling Virginia based party by forging a coalition of anti-Madisonians and most Federalists. Despite the opinion of many historians, the New Yorker was politically astute; his ambitions were advanced by calculated decisions which came very close to success.

But the events that Clinton used to oppose Madison were also the events that prompted. the President's counter-actions that kept the New

Yorker from victory. (vi)

The election results showed a sectional vote •. Every state

located east of the Delaware river (save Vermont) gave its electoral

vote to Clinton. And every state south and west ?f the Delaware river (save Delaware) gave its. electoral.vote.to Madison. Maryland

divided. Of the original. thirteen states, 'Madison won ninety electoral

votes to Clinton's eighty-nine, a virtual tie. But the five new

states, particularly the four of the West that had obtained 'from the

Virginian the war they had clamored for., .. gave. their thirty-eight votes _and the election to, Madison.

Madison's politically motivated actions saved his Presidency

and prevented a spl~tting of the Republican party. But the President . . also led the nation on an untimely and ill-prepared crusade. Delay

would have been diplomati'cally and militarily the wiser course.

Political circumstances, however,.had led Madison since 1811 to re- .frain from any period of procrastination.

Accepted by:

i.,..-' (vii)

The latent causes of faction are ••• sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions ••• concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment of different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power. have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good •••

Federalist No. 10 JAMES MADISON AND THE MALCONTENTS

(i)

James Madison came to the Presidency in 1809 as Thomas

Jefferson's hand-picked successor. The times were unpropitious for a

President advocating continued economic solutions to diplomatic questions because a majority of Americans would no longer be satisfied by a

realistic though inconclusive foreign policy. In the eyes of many, moderation had come to mean lukewarm patrio~ism. The seeds of discord

had been sown in the final years of Jefferson's Presidency; Madison would reap the harvest.

The diminutive Virginian had been the heir apparent since 1800.

When in 1808 Jefferson decided t~ follow Washington's example and not

seek a third term, Madison, with key support from influential Republican

leaders, overcame the opposition candidacies of George Clinton and

James Monroe to win the Presidency. He was elected, however, more by

consent than by acclamation. He did not command the esteem that

Jefferson held, and he inherited a party threatened by dissension.

Dissatisfied Republicans looked on warily and waited to see the-direction

in which Madison would lead the nation. When that direction proved

unsatisfactory, they rebelled. Thus, within two years of his being

elected, Madison faced a political crisis of ominous proportions.

(ii)

Nationally there was a dissident group of Republicans who opposed

Madison, desiring hostilities with Britain and/or opposing Madison for

personal reasons. Individuals from the middle Atlantic states had an (2) additional complaint. Their region had rapidly increased in population

and consequently increased their voting strength in Congress and in the

Electoral College. The region, however, felt neglected in its ability

to influence national policy. They resented more than ever the "Virginia

Dynasty." The dissidents tired of a political system that lacked new concepts as alternatives to the "Virginia Dynasty's" connnercial restric­

tions and the Federalists' desire for free trade subject to foreign regulations. This disenchantment endangered the old Jeffersonian coalition which had been anchored in Virginia and New York.

Western states were unhappy with the government's inability or unwillingness to move the Indians beyond the Mississippi. To some dissidents, it was believed that the British agents and traders dis­ obeyed the official government.policy which called for stopping the agitation of Indians, and instead, at times, Britishers were provoking the Indians to attack Americans. The political importance of Western unrest can be seen by the section's dramatic increase in population and . . 1 1 po 1itica power. Madison realized that it would be extremely difficult to be reelected if he did not retain the support of the West.

By early 1811 the Eastern malcontents2 were attempting to alter the Madison Administration's policies, or failing to achieve that, to remove him from power. The insurgents were concentrated in Pennsylvania,

Maryland, Virginia, and New York. The insurgency began in mid-1807 when Thomas Ritchie, editor of Virginia's Richmond Enquirer, and his cousin Spencer Roane pushed for energetic anti-British measures on the heels of the Chesapeake affair. Senator Wilson Cary Nicholas, one of the Jeffersonian floor leaders, was advocating war. By the following (3) year, Nicholas held the embargo and commercial restrictions in contempt, and because of these measures he refused in 1810 to return to Congress.

Nicholas, two other Virginians, John W. Eppes and John G. Jackson, plus

David R. Williams of South Carolina, composed the core of a Republican pro-war group. 3 Advocating war for natio~alistic, political, and economic reasons, they were the precursors of the famed 1811-1812 "war hawks."

The initial move against the Madison Administration came when the President's chief lieute~ant, Albert Gallatin, was attacked by

Robert and Samuel Smith of Maryland and William Duane of Pennsylvania.

In 1808, the Smiths and William Branch Giles had led a group in the

Senate that blocked Madison's appointment of Gallatin as Secretary of State. Gallatin's appointment would not only have threatened their presidential ambitions since they could not use the State position as a stepping stone, but also the choice disregarded the key support they have given Madison in 1808 that helped fend off the Clinton-Monroe challenge for the Presidency. Madison finally appointed Robert Smith as Secretary of State. The controversy, however, left a legacy of ill­ will. The Smiths would continue to oppose the Madison Administration, believing hi_s foreign policy 'to be too pro-French, and opposing

Gallatin's attempt to recharter the Bank-of the United States. 4

Duane, too, aimed his attacks at Gallatin. Jefferson claimed that such attacks were based upon the belief that Gallatin told John

Randolph that Madison had "no cabinet," and that Gallatin was hostile to Jefferson. Jefferson declared that the first item had been taken out of context and the other was false. Despite their lack of basis, (4)

Jefferson believed that such opinions led to attempts to drive the

most able man, except for Madison, from government.5

Actually, Duane held grudges against Gallatin. In 1802 Gallatin

had cut off Duane's lucrative government printing contract because the

Philadelphian was over-charging. Furthermore, Duane had been a

regular correspondent of Jefferson's but such communication had ended

when Madison was elected. Duane blamed Gallatin for this. 6

Overall, the malcontents had two main complaints against Gallatin.

They considered the Treasury Secretary a roadblock to energetic foreign

affairs. And secondly, many malcontents held personal grudges against 7 Gallatin. Thus, in early 1811 it was ·the Treasury Secretary who received

the brunt of the hostility directed towards the Administration. Madison

realized that such attacks endangered his reelection bid; that it would

be only a matter of time before the most severe criticism was leveled at himself.

On March 18, 1811 James Monroe wrote an extremely candid and

prophetic letter to Senator George Brent of Virginia. It read in part:

I am aware that our public affairs are far from beingin a tranquil and secure state. I may add that there is much reason to fear that a crisis is approaching of a very dangerous tendency; one which menaces the overthrow of the whole Republican party. Is the Administration impressed with this sentiment and prepared to act on it? Are things in such a state as to allow the Administration to take the whole subject into consideration, and to provide for the safety of the country and of free government by such measures as circumstances may require and a comprehensive view of them suggest?· Or are we pledged by wha~ is already done to remain spectators of the interior movement, in the expectation of some change abroad as t_he ground on which we are_ to act?8

Indeed, Madison was impressed with the situation. He was not going to remain a spectator of the "interior movement" (the internal (5) factionalism.within the Republican party), while waiting for the conflict in Europe to end and thereby solve America's diplomatic problems.

He saw the dangers caused by the malcontents over foreign affairs. An insurgent uprising, particularly if the Eastern malcontents gained influence over the Western states, would have been devastatingly divisive. Madison was prepared to act to meet this threat. (6)

FOOTNOTES Chapter 1

1John C. A. Stagg, "James Madison and the 'Malcontents': The Political Origins of the War of 1812," The William and Mary Quarterly XXIII (October 1976): 560-561, 565; D.R. Anderson, "The Insurgents of 1811, 11 Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, 2 Vols. (Washington D.C.: American Historical Association) 1913, 2:169-171.

2Tbe term 'malcontents' is used in John C. A. Stagg's "The Revolt against Virginia: Republican Politics and the Connnencement of the War of 1812. 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1973), and in a subsequent article.

3Anderson, "The Insurgents of 1811,11 p. 168.

4stagg, "James Madison and the 'Malcontents"' pp. 561-562; Irving Brant, James Madison, Vol. 5: The President 1809-1812, (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956), p. 195. 5 Thomas Jefferson to William Wirt, 3 May 1811, Andrew A. Lipscomb,. ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 Vols. (Washington D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), 13: 53-55.

6James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 3 May 1811, Letters and other Writings of James Madison Fourth President of the United States, 4 Vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1865), 2: 507.

7Brant, The President - 1809-1812, pp. 265-266; Charles C. Tansill, "Robert Smith," in The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, 17 Vols., ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1958), 3: 188-192.

8James Monroe to George Brent, 18 March 1811, Henry Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3 Vols. (New York: Antiquarian Press Ltd., 1960), 1: 497-498. In addition, on November 19, 1810 Monroe had written to John Taylor: "In speaking of a systematik republican opposition to a republican admn ••• (i)t ought ••• even by those in private life,, to be conducted with great prudence, and moderation, or it will fail in its object". It should move within the republican limit, fix soundly and deeply its principles, and trace aberrations from them in a tone of regret. Its chidings should be those of a friend to a friend, who sought his reformation, not his ruin. The subject should be so managed as to enlighten the whoie republican party, without irritating any portion of it (7)

But if they are carried further, and pushed w.i.th violence, especially in the Congress, or by those who have acted under the government, they• drive the members in the Congress, and the people at large, into the necessity of Clinging to and supporting the ch: Magistrate for the purpose of supporting themselves; that is, of saving the.party from ruin. Thus the misconduct of the adm.n, which under another mode of investigation and exposure would produce its removal, might become by a violent one, the cause of increasing its strength and ascendancy over the party, so long at least as the party lasted." James Monroe to John Taylor, 19 November 1810, Stanislaus M. Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe, 7 Vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901), 5: 151. DE WITT CLINTON BEGINS HIS CHALLENGE

In New York, Madison, like Jefferson before him, had favored the Livingstons in their battle with the Clintonians for political supremacy in the state. This was due to three reasons: (1) their friendship with Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, (2) the Clintonians' anti-Federalist roots, and (3) because the Virginians sought to maintain a balance of power between the Livingstons and Clintons to prevent either from gaining power enough to challenge the Virginians nationally.

This Clinton - "Virginia Dynasty" animosity increased dramatically in 1808, when Madison, not George Clinton, obtained the Republican presidential nomination. This division was further deepened when

Madison favored Clinton's rivals for government posts.1 When in 1810

George Clinton's health deteriorated, the Clinton mantle passed to his nephew, De Witt.2

De Witt Clinton had been a powerful political figure in New

York since the beginning of the century. As a member of the Council of Appointment and as mayor of New York City he had handed out offices, money, and charitable contributions. In this manner he consolidated the backing of supporters during the continual infighting of New York politics. Moreover, his political yosition was enhanced by his standing among the Irish and other foreign born citizens. He was greatly admired because as a United States Senator he had obtained a reduction in the period of naturalization from fourteen to five years, and he helped repeal the alien and sedition acts.3 (9)

Clinton was opportunistic and pragmatic. He was a man of integrity but without a strict ideology. Yet among a generation of political

figures who were thought to hold principle in more esteem than

policy, Clinton was an outsider.4

In late 1810 and early 1811 unrest by the malcontents caused

Clinton to turn his attention in earnest towards challenging James

Madison for President. The death of Lieutenant-Governor John Broome

in August, 1810 triggered the initial step. The state legislature

passed an act in early 1811 that called for the election of Broome's

replacement. Clinton, who had been appointed mayor of New York

City in January of that year,.wished to fill the position and on March

14, 1811, the Republican legislative caucus nominated Clinton for the

lieutenant-governorship.

Why did Clinton seek a position that was impotent and that

contrasted glaringly to the power of Governor Daniel D. Tompkins?

The answer lies in Clinton's presidential aspirations. Clinton wanted

to maintain better party control and therefore he needed to be in

Albany during the legislative sessions·. Such control of New York

was essential to his presidential designs. He would have preferred

to have been selected as a state legislator but he feared he might

be passed over.

Immediately, however, Clinton was faced with a challenge to

his plans. The Martling Men, a splinter group within the New York

Tammany Society, had been long and bitter enemies of Clinton. They

first clashed in 1802 when Clinton spoke in opposition to Aaron Burr's

intriguing against Jefferson. The bitterness grew when Clinton removed (10)

Burr and his supporters from the directorate of the.Manhattan Bank.

In 1809 Clinton's agents vainly sought to reconcile the warring camps. The Martling Men in 1811, led by Teunis Wortman, claimed that

Clinton was looking only to advance his personal interests. There- fore, they opposed his candidacy. The father-in-law of Governor Tomp­ kins, Mangle Minthorne, presided at the initial meeting. The group proclaimed that Clinton no longer supported Madison and thus the Martling

Men nominated Marinus Willet for lieutenant-governor.

The meeting claimed that it supported the caucus system, -an ironic statement since they themselves were attacking Clinton, the nominee of the legislative Republican caucus. As Clinton had feared,

Tammany nominated popular Nathan Sanford for the Assembly, and thus prevented Clinton from considering an assembly race to gain a position in Albany. Sanford had been appointed by Madison to the high paying position as a New York district attorney, and it is doubtful that

Sanford would associate with the Martling Men unless he knew that

Madison approved.

The Federalists nominated Nicholas Fish making the election a three-way race. As election day approached the contest became more bitter. A Clintonian meeting at New York's Union Hotel, was broken up by the Martling Men. Nevertheless, Clinton's support held together though he lost New York City. Upstate brought Clinton victory.

Ironically, many members of Tammany, who opposed Clinton because of his alleged support of Federalist interests, voted for the Federalist candidate Fish.5 It was indicative of the factionalism and inclination towards temporary coalitions that made the New York political scene ripe for open rebellion within the party. (11)

FOOTNOTES Chapter II

1stagg, "James Madison and the 'Malcontents'" pp. 560-561; 565. Also on the political history of New York in national electional see William B. Morgan, "Presidential Nominations in the Federal Era, 1788- 1828," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1969), and John J. Turner, Jr., "New York in Presidential Politics, 1788- 1804, ,;Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1968).

2John S. Jenkins, Lives of the Governors of the State of New York. (Syracuse: Hall, Mills & Co., 1852), pp. 245-247.

3De Alva Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York, 3 Vols. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1906), 1: 183.

4Norman K. Risjord, "Election of 1812," In History of American Presidential Elections - 1789-1968, 4 Vols. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Fred Israel, eds., (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971).

5Jabez D. Hammond, The History of Pdlitical Parties in the State of New York, 2 Vols. (Cooperstown: H. & E. Phinney, 1846), 1: 288-289, 291-295, 298, 304; Alexander, A Political History, 1: 182. MADISON'S NEW STRATEGY

(i)

Clinton's "availability" endangered Madison's political existence and southern dominance of the Republican party. This was in addition to other problems. William Duane's "Philadelphia Junta" exploited the bad relations between the Administration and Pennsylvania's Governor,

Simon Snyder. Bad blood existed over the Olmstead Affair, a controversy concerning Snyder's initial opposition to federal enforcement of a Supreme

Court decision against Pennsylvania. 1 Additionally, John Armstrong,

Minister to France, resigned in August, 1810 over what he believed was the Administration's pro-French foreign policy. De Witt Clinton's brother-in-law, Ambrose Spencer, brought together Armstrong and the

Clintonians in April, 1811. The meeting sought to find ways to make

New York a more powerful force at the national level. Madison feared, however, that Armstrong might settle in Pennsylvania and become

Clinton I s running mate •. 2

In letters dated March 18, April 1, and April 19 the President wrote Jefferson that he believed Armstrong's animosity stemmed not from foreign policy but rather from Madison's reinstatement of David

Warden to the Paris Consulship, a position from which Armstrong had had him removed. Madison believed it might become "the ground of an open hostility. 113

(ii)

Congress, in the spring of 1810, repealed the non-intercourse acts which prohibited trade with England and France. But if either (13)

France or Britain repealed their acts against neutrals, the United

States would again enforce a non-importation policy against the"other country. Consequently, when in August, 1810, Napoleon stated that the

Berlin and Milan decrees no longer applied to America if the United

States made England respect its rights, Madison jumped at this chance and proclaimed non-importation with Great Britain on November 2, 1810. 4 Congress confirmed this policy by an Act of March 2, 1811.

Madison's action became.controversial. It was apparent that

French assurances that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked were extremely questionable. Madison did not denounce this deception, but pressed the British to renounce their orders-in-council.5 Secretary of

State Robert Smith stated privately that France was violating its word and that Great Britain should be admitted to trade equality. 6 Madison saw Smith as a saboteur of his foreign policy, and the President felt now he had more reason than ever to remove Smith from his Administra­

tion.7

Yet Madison, despite his desire to be rid of Smith, could not act until after the Senate, in which Samuel Smith was a major force, had passed the non-importation amendments. Thus, the President waited until after Congress adjourned. Such a delay also enabled

Madison to have Smith's replacement serve some eight or nine months

before his appointee would have to go before the Senate for confirmation.

After Congress adjourned, Gallatin offered to resign. This would

allow Madison to dismiss Smith at the same time. But Madison refused

the resignation. Instead, ·through Senator Brent of Virginia, he (14) inquired unofficially whether James Monroe, recently elected

Governor of Virginia, would accept the State position.8 On either

March 19 or March 20 the President asked for Smith's resignation, and offered him the position of Minister to the Court of St.

Petersburg. On the 20th Madison officially offered Smith's position to Monroe. 9

Less than two months earlier Monroe had written to John Taylor stating:

The truth is that on points of policy there has been great difference of opinion between the adm.n & me. My letters to you shew that fact. This applies to the rejection of the treaty (Monroe-Pinkney rreaty of 1806), and to the measures that have resulted· from it. There can be no doubt that if I had had any weight in the publick councils our course would have been a different one. My views of policy have not altered, nor has anything escaped me to countenance such an idea.10

But the promise of power and the national crisis of the time led

Monroe to reconsider his position. He consulted political figures

including John Taylor of Caroline and John Randolph of Roanoke.

Randolph opposed his accepting, but the others, hoping Monroe could

influen~e the direction of foreign policy, urged acceptance. With

this support, Monroe accepted, though knowing that he did so on

Madison's terms. 11

Monroe's appointment aided the President. It rid the Administra­

tion of Robert Smith, it improved relations with the Congress, it kept

Monroe from being a contender for the Presidency, and it helped unite

the badly divided Virginia Republican party. But it also had its

drawbacks. Discontent in the Middle States posed the greatest threat

to Madison and the Republican party. Monroe, being a Virginian, added to the problem. In addition, if Clinton had had any doubts about his

candidacy they must have disappeared with the appointment of Monroe,

for his position as Secretary of State seemed to forecast a continuation of the "Virginia Dynasty. nl2

The Smith-Monroe shuffle indicated that the President was

charting a new course, one that he would follow until the Presidential

election of 1812. This course consisted in breaking all ties with

those malcontents whose disenchantment could not be won over by

Madison merely holding a more belligerent pose on foreign affairs. But

at the same time Madison did continue, as he had since the invoking of

non - importation against Great Britain in November 1810, his policy

of placating pro-war Republicans.

In addition, Madison moved to mend his Pennsylvania fences by

appointing Gabriel Duval of Maryland, a pro-Smith figure, to the Supreme

Court, and replacing him in his position as Comptroller of the Treasury with Richard Rush, a Snyderite. And Treasury Secretary Gallatin pre­ vented Madison's opponents from gaining patronage power in Philadelphia.

This alliance to the majority Republican faction in Pennsylvania

brought Madison needed support. 13

Responding to these moves, the malcontents mounted a counter­ offensive. Duane said Monroe's appointment was a sell out to the

British; the Smiths attacked Monroe's record during the negotiations of

18.06. Replying, Madison wrote in the National Intelligencer that prevailing problems were Britain's fault. He stated that the British blockade, orders-in-council, and impressment would have to end, (16) though he had told Monroe that impressment was not a major obstacle to a settlement. 14

Robert Smith followed up this exchange with a new attack. Just prior to British Minister Augustus Foster's arrival in America, Smith published a pamphlet, "Address to the People of the United States."

He charged that Madison was a meek Francophile who endangered his nation through his foreign policies. A more energetic man was required for the Presidency, one who would maintain American rights. Smith's

"Address" was refuted by Joel Barlow, Minister-designate to France.

Barlow claimed that Smith's only motive was to create opposition to 15 Madison without cause. The National Intelligencer said of Smith's pamphlet:

We trust we shall, after this, hear no more of want of. energy in Mr. Madison's conduct respecting our foreign relations, especially not as contrasted with the policy of Mr. Smith,· as deducible from his address. The charge of subservience to France rest on no better foundation.16

This conflict showed that Gallatin did not remain as the lone target for the Smiths, Duane, and their allies. The malcontents were now taking-aim at the President, and in retaliation Madison was pursuing a new course. Only the coming months could tell whether the detractors would bring down Madison or if the Virginian would emerge triumphant. .(17)

FOOTNOTES Chapter III

lstagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," p. 27. 2 stagg, "James Madison and the 'Maleontents, "' pp. 567-568, 571, 574; Brant, The President 1809-1812, p. 278.

3James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 18 Mareh, l April, and 19 April 1811, Letters and other Writings of James Madison, 2: 491-493. 4 Julius W. Pratt, "James Monroe," In The Ameriean Seeretaries of State and their Diplomaey, 17 Vols. Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1958), 3: 216-217.

5Brant, The President 1809-1812, pp. 273-275. 6 Ibid., p. 277.

7Tansill, "Robert Smith," pp._216-217. 8 Brant, The President 1809-1812, pp. 277, 282-286.

9Ibid.

10James Monroe to John Taylor, 23 January 1811, The Writings of James Monroe, 5: 167.

11Brant, The President 1809-1812, pp. 277, 282-286. Madison on April 1, 1811 wrote to Jefferson: "You will have inferred the ehange whieh is taking plaee in the Department of State. Col. Monroe agrees to sueeeed Mr. Smith, who deelines, however, the mission to Russia, at first not unfavorably looked at. I was willing, notwithstanding many trying eircumstanees, to have smoothed the transaction as much as possible, but it will be pretty sure to end in secret hostility if not open warfare. On account of my great esteem and regard for eommon friends, sueh a result is truly painful to me. For the rest, I feel myself on firm ground, as well in the publie opinion as in my own consciousness." James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 1 April 1811, Letters and other Writings of James Madison, 2: 492.

12stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," p. 23; Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler, "The War Hawks and the Question of Congressional Leadership in 1812," Pacific Historieal Review 45 (February 1976), 19-20. (18)

13stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," p. 27: Stagg, "James Madison and the 'Malcontents,"' p. 575. Prior to the enactment of non­ importation with England, Madison was already attempting to appease the expansionist South and West. He fostered an atmosphere that led a group of adventurers to capture West Florida from the Spanish and on October 27, 1810 he issued a proclamation annexing the region. Later, in the spring of 1811, Madison issued an official proclamation to George Matthews authorizing him to seize East Florida for the United States by any means. This led to the abandoned mission in the spring of 1812. 14 Stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," pp. 27-28.

15rbid., pp. 31-32. 16 . Tansill, "Robert Smith," pp. 196-197. TOWARDS WAR

Jefferson complained during the height of the Smith controversy:

The two last Congresses have been the theme of the most licentious reprobation for printers thirsting after war, some against France and some against England. But the people wish for peace with both. They feel no incumbency on them to become the reformers of the other hemisphere, and to inculcate, with fire and sword, a return to moral order. When, indeed, peace shall become more losing than war, they may owe to their interests what these 1 Quixotes are clamoring for on false estimates of honor.

Jefferson, like other Republicans, had to reconcile the conflict between personal opinion and Madison's movement towards war. Ultimately to Jefferson the party was more important than the policy of the moment. 2

"To the principles of union," he wrote, "I sacrifice all minor differences of opinion. 113

Madison's more belligerent attitude began to pay off when

Thomas Ritchie came out in favor of the President and against Smith. 4

Madison's advantage coming from favoring the pro-war faction was enhanced when it appeared that Russia's imminent break with Napoleon's

Continental System would lead to a Russo-French war. France was

expected to win, leaving the British more dependent on the United States.

Therefore, in Madison's opinion, the time to pressure Britain on

America's grievances was at hand. If war resulted, the Administration's

situation was more favorable than in the past as the Republicans now

controlled Massachusetts, a state necessary for a successful invasion

of Canada. Given the Administration's attitudes towards the world

_situation in July 1811, it would have been very difficult for the Adminis­

tration and the British to have reached a mutually satisfying agreement.5 (20)

When the talks between British Minister Augustus Foster and

Secretary of State Monroe failed to reach an agreement, Madison on July

24, 1811, issued a proclamation calling the twelfth Congress into early session. 6 The President's November S State of the Union message was another step towards war. Madison declared:

I must now add that the period is arrived which claims from the legislative guardians of the national rights a system of more ample provisions for maintaining them. Notwith­ standing the scrupulous justice, the protracted moderation, and the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States to substitute for the accumulating dangers to the peace of the two countries all the mutual advantages of re-established friendship and confidence, we have seen that the ·British cabinet perseveres not only in withholding a remedy for other wrongs, so long and so loudly calling for it, but in the execution, brought home to the threshold of our territory, of measures which under existing circumstances have the character as well as the effect of war on our lawful commerce.

With this evidence of hostile inflexibility in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congress will fill the duty of putting the United States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations.7

Hoping to even further ride the wave of war spirit, Madison in

December 1811-January 1812 wrote letters to the legislatures of Tennessee,

North Carolina, and South Carolina agreeing with their previous statements that American rights must be defended. To Governor Hawkins of North

Carolina he wrote:

I heartily join in the hope you express that the state of our national affairs will have its proper influences in converting party feelings and prejudices into united exertions against the aggressions and insults which the just conduct of our Country has failed to avert • 8

The path Madison intended to take was clear. The progress towards a declaration of war against Great Britain had begun. There was no turning back. (21)

FOOTNOTES Chapter IV

1 Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 3 May 1811, Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 60. 2 Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 30 April 1811, Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 52. 3 Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 25 July 1811, Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 65-67. 4 Thomas Jefferson to William Wirt, 3 May 1811, Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 56. 5 stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," pp. 30, 33.

6stagg, "James Madison and the 'Malcontents;"' p. 581. 7 James Madison's third annual message, 5 November 1811, Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, 9 Vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908, 8:161.) 8 James Madison to the Tennessee legislature, 10 December 1811; Madison to the North Carolina legislature, 4 January 1812; Madison to the South Carolina legislature, 8 January 1812; Letters and other Writings of James Madison, 2: 522-525. PRAGMATIC POLITICS

In the late summer of 1811 Clinton saw an opportunity to-gain support from New York Federalists, At the August 6 Columbia College

commencement exercises, graduating students each gave an oration.

One graduate was told to tone down the political aspects of his speech which were-offensive to the Federalist dominated faculty and

administration. He refused. Consequently, he was informed that he would

not receive his diploma on that day. A disturbance followed when two

students, Hugh Maxwell and Gulian C. Verplanck, demanded to know

the reason for such an outrageous act against a fellow student. Sub­

sequently, Verplanck, Maxwell, and others were called before Mayor De

Witt Clinton's court on charges of rioting. Clinton saw polftical

possibilities. His slim margin in the lieutenant-governorship election

was caused by local district Republicans having for the most part voted

for Willett or Fish. Thus, Clinton felt he had little to lose among

Republican support and much to gain among Federalists. In the end, he

fined Verplanck and Maxwell two hundred dollars each, and the action 1 was popular among the Federalist ranks.

Attempting to acquire additional support, Clinton looked to the

West with a view to enlarging his geographical base. Kentucky was the

most attractive state. It had increased its Congressional strength

dramatically as a result of the new 1810 census, and it would be a

great triumph to wrest this Republican stronghold from Madison. Clinton's

agents had suggested that Henry Clay would be an ideal running mate for

Clinton, In January, 1812, when Clinton was in Washington, rumor had (23) it that a Republican Congressional caucus rejected Madison and had chosen instead a Clinton-Clay ticket. But Clay's friends declared it to be a falsehood, started only to create trouble, and thus, the trial balloon, launched by the pro-Clinton press, burst. 2

Throughout most of December and January, Clinton and Gouverneur

Morris were in Washington, promoting the New York canal project.

Others saw political motives for their presence. Senator James A

Bayard of Delaware wrote to Caesar Rodney, December 22, 1811: "The characters of the two men (Clinton and Morris) are pretty well known and it is rather supposed that they mean' to open a road to the presidency than a canal from the lakes. Tho' a young republic we are already old in intrigue." And on February 1, 1812 Bayard wrote: "Morris who was here nearly two .months once appeared upon the subject of the canal before a Connnittee of the House and Clinton who came on the same business was never heard to say a word about it. 113

Madison saw Clinton's canal project as a means to win New York

State's support and possibly Western support for his presidential bid. Madison believed that Federal aid for the project was unconstitu­ tional but he saw the political dangers involved. Thus, after meeting with Clinton and Morris at the White House, the President sent a message to Congress which directed that body to take "'whatever steps may be proper on their part."' Because the canal situation could only be detrimental to Madison if he opposed it, his message avoided out- right·opposition without going against his constitutional beliefs. 4

Madison, the day he met with Clinton an~ Morris, attempted to remove another political problem by signing a reapportionment bill that (24)

showed the great increases of population in the North. The Congress

had handled the minimum population in each district in such a way as to

create large unrepresented areas in. the South. This gave the North an

increase of eighteen seats, thus mollifying the outcry from New York and

other northern states for a greater voice in the national government.·

Even so, the Madison Administration made sure the increased representa­

tion was mostly in Republican areas. 5

Following these actions, Madisun ·initiated another political

maneuver. The Republicans in the Virginia assembly caucused in February

and chose electors who endorsed Madison. This type of action had in 1808

helped stop Monroe's candidacy. On March 7 Pennsylvania followed suit,

but such support could not insure a Congressional caucus nomination

unless a large number of states gave the President their backing. 6

The Clintonians considered exercising a number of options. They

still held out hope of obtaining Western support .despite their setback

in proposing a Clinton-Clay ticket. At a secret Albany caucus on March

16, Clintonians decided to remain inactive until states of the North and

West could be sounded out on their opinions. Towards this end a

committee of nine was appointed. 7

Concurrently, the Clintonians looked to Washington in hope of

finding if there was any support for a Republican Congressional I () nomination of Clinton. With this in mind, the Clintonians enticed

Congressman Thomas Sammons to leave in March for a journey to Washington.8

But before Clinton could hope for any support in Washington, he knew he

had to demonstrate his New York support, particularly the gaining (25) of a nomination for the Presidency by the Republican legislature of that state. Thus, New York in the spring of 1812 was the scene of a major political confrontation.

(ii)

Previously, in February, 1811, the United States Senate considered the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. 9 The debate centered on the.question as to whether or not a national bank was so vital to the government's economic policies as to be considered applicable to the implied powers clause of the Constitution. Politically, the Clintons and the Smiths hoped that if Gallatin's request for renewal was defeated it would cause such financial problems that Madison in

1812 mig. h t not b e renominate.· d 10

Vice-President George Clinton broke a 17-17 tie, casting the deciding vote against renewal. 11 This decision did not result in such

Treasury problems as to hinder Madison politically, but the non­ renewal did send a large amount of uninvested cash capital back to the stockholders. People realized that New York City was replacing

Philadelphia as the country's commercial center. This led financiers, many of whom were Federalists, to attempt to establish a large bank in

New York -- The Bank of America. This created a great stir as the bank was perceived as the successor to the Bank of the United States, which 12 many considered as Federalist and British controlled.

Chartering the Bank of America became·the focus of a vicious political confrontation that threatened Clinton's quest for the

Presidency. For Clinton, political considerations overrode all others.

Financially he would suffer if the Bank of America was chartered -- he (26) was connected with its competitor, the Manhattan Bank. Clinton explained that if forced to vote, he would oppose the charter, but he was not going to be drawn into the quarrel. In taking this stand, Clinton was severely criticized, for in 1805 he had opposed chartering the

Merchants Bank because it would hurt the Republican party. 13 Jabez

Hammond, a contemporary of Clinton and chronicler of New York politics of the period, states:

On this occasion, as on many others, Mr. Clinton afforded evidence of a lamentable defect in his character as a politician. That defect was this: a neglect to cast about for means for the accomplishment of his end. His objects were always magnificent, his ends were always such as evinced an elevated and lofty mind, but he did not seem to be aware of the necessity of providing ways and means to accomplish these ends •••

-It is not improbable to me that the ardor of his ambitions hurried him into a determination to engage in this contest without any regular or fixed scheme of action.14

To ·:the contrary, however, it would seem that Clinton was well aware of the ways and means that.were required to accomplish the desired ends. He had realized that he could not capture the

Congressional caucus nomination. Therefore, he was forced to forge a coalition of dissatisfied Republicans and most Federalists. Practicality required that he begin such a coalition in his home state and build outward. Obviously he understood that he was running the risk of alienating a large part of his Republican support by his "alliance" with Federalists. Clinton was required to make completely different appeals to the two groups. He initiated his first major move towards building this coalition during the bank charter debate.

Clinton hoped his charter stand would prevent him from alienating (27) either group. The deadlock on this issue, however, worked to his detriment. For those bank advocates who were dissatisfied Republicans refused to caucus to nominate Clinton until the bank was chartered.

Clinton was extremely anxious that his nomination by the New York caucus occur before the Republican Congressional caucus renominated 15 President Madison .. Clinton probably believed that an early nomination in New York might cause the Congressional caucus to split.

The bank bill passed the Assembly by a vote of fifty-two to forty­ six and was sent to the Senate. There a Committee of the Whole moved that it be rejected, but this measure failed. It became obvious that the bill would soon pass and become law subject to any action by the Council of Revision. This was the situation on }!arch 27, 1812 when Governor

Tompkins sent the legislature a message informing it that the session was prorogued until May 21. The governor declared that the bank applicants had employed or tried to employ corrupt means to assure the 16 passage of the charter. Tompkins' accusation was based on the fact that a powerful lobby had been organized to achieve passage of the bank charter. The managers of this lobby included Solomon Southwick, a devoted friend to De Witt Clinton. And the managers employed a group of assistants who were not highly esteemed. 17

According to Niles Weekly Register the prorogation by Governor

Tompkins was". . in order, we are told, to ascertain the public sentiment through the intervening elections, on t~is momentous matter. 1118

But a Clintonian paper stated: "A more aristocratical and arbitrary (28)

measure, we hesitate not to say, was never, under similar circumstances,

adopted in any government, short of an absolute military despotism. 19 And

the Clinton men and the banlonen believed Tompkins' action was intended

to destroy Clinton's presidential hopes and to allow himself to be 20 a future presidential contender. Most likely, Tompkins' decision was made predominantly to prevent Clinton's New York caucus nomination until after Madison•~ Congressional caucus renomination. By proroguing

the legislature, Tompkins prevented action on the bill and consequently

Clinton was forced to wait until late in May to obtain the Republican

endorsement in New York, In the meantime, Madison could act.

(iii)

During the weeks after prorogation, Tompkins wrote letters to prominent New Yorkers declaring that Clinton was completely committed in his opposition to the proposed bank. On April 6 he wrote to

Colonel Henry Rutgers, stating:

Suspicions seem to be entertained in New York that the Lieutenant-Governor has either been friendly to or silent about the Bank. Rest assured,, my Dear Sir, great injustice is done him by such insinuation, He has uniformly been as decided, steady, and open in his opposi­ tion to the Bank as I have been and as I really believe, interested himself more, and taken greater pains to convince members of the impropriety of voting for it, than I have done. His real friends will, I do not hesitate to say, be equally decided and animated upon the subject now pending if a disposition for·union and mutual exertions shall be met by a corresponding temper on bhe part of the Madisonians.21

By this method Tompkins apparently hoped to prevent a split in the

Republican party until at least after the April elections. He also stated: (29)

This is the first letter I have ever ventured to write to you or any other person respecting the afflicting dissensions in New York; and I trust you will ascribe this departure from my usual studied silence on that subject to an anxious solicitude, if you view the importance of the approaching Election in the same light I do, to animate and draw forth your kind and good offices in producing a reconciliation amongst the Republicans of the city, at least at this election. 22

Once the Republicans controlled the legislature there would remain six months to dissuade Clinton from continuing his campaign, or that failing, to destroy his political base. Despite Tompkins' best efforts, the Republicans failed to gain control of the lower house. And though the joint houses found a Republican advantage,23 there was, nevertheless·, a problem for the Madisonian faction. If the Clintonians and Federalists combined they would have a majority.

Madison was renominated on May 18 by the Republican Congressional caucus by a vote of eighty for Madison and two abstensions. Fifty- one eligible Congressmen were not present. Though many were out of town for reasons other than politics, the turn out was indicative of the strain within the party. John Langdon of New Hampshire, first

President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, received the vice-presidential nomination with sixty-four votes to Elbridge Gerry's sixteen votes.

The caucus adopted a resolution advocating its candidates, and declared, as they had four years before, that caucus members acted only as private citizens.

The vice-presidential nomination was evidential of the Southern states' control over the Republican party; Langdon's nomination was. due to their influence and desires. Northern Republicans preferred (30)

Gerry, but the South, assisted by the obedient Pennsylvanians, dictated 24 the second place on the ticket as well as the first. The New England press acquiesced in the selection of a Southern nominee for the Pre­ sidency as New England, not New York, received the vice-presidential 25 nominee.

But Langdon, citing his seventy years, declined the position, 26 and forced a second caucus. Here Gerry was chosen. Gerry would be of som~ help in New England, particularly Massachusetts which

Madison still hoped to carry, and his age made him no threat to the

Virginia succession planned for 1816. At the second caucus ten more

Republicans supported Madison, thus more than two-thirds of the 27 Republicans in Congress came out for the President.

Clintonians immediately attacked Madison's nomination. The

Connecticut Courant inaccurately reported on May 26 that the Republican

Congressional caucus had been unable to decide on a candidate; that the 28 Northern members had·not even attended. Within a matter of weeks,

Madison's caucus nomination had been approvingly confirmed by the

Republican legislatures of nine states. 29 Madison, with Tompkins'

help, had foiled Clinton's plan for splitting the Congressional caucus.

(iv)

Three days after the Republican Congressional caucus, the New

York State legislature reconvened. Immediately the bank charter bill 30 was taken up and it passed the Senate. By ending the impasse,

Clinton's moment had arrived. On May 28 the Republican members of the

legislature ~aucused to consider nominating Clinton for the Presidency. (31)

Ninety-one of the ninety-five members in the New York Assembly were present at the caucus. Morgan Lewis and Nathan Sanford did not attend 31 for political reasons, and the other two were unavoidably absent.

The caucus did not innnediately move to nominate Clinton, for a number of those present questioned the expediency of such action. Some feared Clinton's nomination would have a devastatingly divisive effect on the Republican party; some doubted that Clinton had a chance to defeat

Madison; others supported the policies of the President; still others feared that Clinton would do irreparable damage to his political 32 career by challenging the President during a time of mounting crisis.

But at this crucial point Pierre Van Cortlandt, Jr., and other members of Congress arrived from Washington. They pushed for Clinton's nomination, and they presented letters from Postmaster-General Gideon

Granger imploring the caucus to nominate Clinton. 33 In the end, these voices, in conjunction with the death of Vice-President George Clinton 34 the preceding month, helped obtain the support of the caucus.

The caucus passed a resolution to proceed to nominate a candidate for

President, and followe~ that with a unanimously supported resolution to back Clinton. The caucus then ordered the appointment of a

Connnittee of Seventeen, one from each Congressional district, to 35 further Clinton's election.

After adjournment, the Committee of Seventeen published a letter entitled "To the People of the United States" stating that Clinton was a peace candidate and advocated the Federalists' benevolent neutrality 36 attitude towards England. (32)

On the nomination, a Clintonian paper said:

This nomination speaks a language that will not be misunderstood anywhere; and in our humble opinion, will tend more to lower the proud crest of the lordly Virginians than any measure which has been adopted since the election of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency The people of all parties in the Northern and Eastern sections of the Union have had their eyes opened by that ruinous system of measures whi°ch has been pursued for the last ten years; by a government pretending to be the friends of the people but in reality their worst enemies ••• It must rejoice the heart of every good man, of every friend to his country, to find that the democratic-republicans of the FIRST STATE OF THE UNION, have dared to make a stand against the us~ pation and overbearing aristocracy of Virginia ••• 7

The Madisonian press disagreed:

We cannot but view with extreme concern the late nomination at Albany of a President of the U. States. We respect the opinions of our fellow-men, and the unanimity with which the measures passed certainly entitles it to serious consideration. We are proud of the talents of the candidate selected, and under other circumstances would have hailed with cheerful acclamations his nomination to the presidency. We are, however, of the decided opinion, and freely express it, that this nomination is extremely impolitic, and, if persisted in, the division and ultimate ruin of the republican party must ensue.

These untoward circumstances are much to be regretted in the present state of both foreign and domestic concerns, and when unanimity is above.all other objects desirable ..• we ••• condemn the misguided zeal of his friends, in thus prematurely making use of his name for an object which cannot at this time be attained, and for a competition which we confidentially anticipate he will decline.. 38 (33)

FOOTNOTES Chapter V

1Dixon Ryan Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York 1801-1840, Robert V. Remini, ed., (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), pp. 162-166.

2 Bernard Mayo, Henry Clay: Spokesman of the New West, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937), pp. 485-486. 3 Elizabeth Donnan, ed., "Papers of James A. Bayard, 1797-1815," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1913, 2 Vols. (Washington D.C.: American Historical Association, 1915), 2: 484-485.

4Brant, President 1809-1812, p. 383.

5 I b'1.d., pp. 383-384.

6Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 252.

7Brant, President 1809-1812, p. 456.

8Ibid. 9Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War, 2 Vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 1: 210.

10 Br~nt, President 1809-1812, p. 269.

11Ibid. 12 J. Hammond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 299-300: B. Hammond, Banks and Politics in America, 1: 162, 164.

13Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy, p. 166; J. Hammond, The History of Political Parties, pp. 307-308, 332. 14 J. Hammond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 298-299. 15 Ibid., pp. 308-310.

16rbid., p. 309. Tompkins also said that the proposed banks could issue bank notes totaling up to $94,000,000 which was at least sixteen times more than the entire specied capital of the state. This he feared would lead to a debt that would end in bankruptcy. B. Hammond, Banks and Politics in America, 1: 162. (34)

17B. Hanunond, Banks and Politics in America, 1: 162; J. Hanunond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 301. 18 Niles Weekly Register, 4 August 1812.

19connecticut Courant, 3 April 1812.

20 J. Hanunond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 310. 21 Daniel D. Tompkins to Colonel Henry Rutgers, 6 April 1812, Hugh Hastings, compiler, Public Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins Governor of New York 1807-1818 Military, 2 Vols. (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 1907), 1: 534-535. In addition, on April 6 he wrote to Colonel Macomb: "Mr. Clinton has been as sincere and decided in.his efforts to induce members to vote against the Bank of America as I have and has had more effect·. Any information, therefore, connecting him with the advocates of the Bank or calculated to sever him from his sincere friends here are cruel and unjust and wound our feelings." Daniel D. Tompkins to Colonel Macomb, 6 April 1812, Hastings, compiler, Published Papers of Daniel-D. Tompkins, 1: 525.

22Daniel D. Tompkins to Colonel Henry Rutgers, 6 April 1812, Hastings, compiler, Published Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 1: 535. Tompkins worried about. the election of anti-Madisonians (including Clinton) from the Southern District, and thus he desired a Mr. Bingham, who was considered a poor candidate, to withdraw from the state Senate race. Tompkins wrote: "It must be recollected that the members to be chosen this spring are to select Electors for President, and surely Mr. Madison's friends ought not to do anything which will hazard the choice of Republican Electors. The opinion of all our best and most tried friends in the country and here, is that every sacrifice of individual feeling ought to be made to accomplish the objects I have mentioned above, and they as well as myself sigh for the restoration of harmony amongst our Republican brethern in New York," Daniel D. Tompkins to Colonel Henry Rutgers, 6 April 1812, Hastings, compiler, Published Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 1: 532-533. 23 J. Hanunond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 311.

24Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., The American Nation: A History, 28 Vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1906); Vol. 13: The Rise of American Nationality 1811-1819 by Kendrick C. Babcoock, p. 62; Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 252; John Bach McMaster, !_ History of the People of the United States, 7 Vols. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1907), 4: 196; Edward Stanwood, A'History of the Presidency from 1788-1897, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1892), pp. 99-100. (35)

25 National Intelligencer, 19 May 1812. On the selection of Langdon, Albert Gallatin wrote to Joseph H. Nicholson: "I fear that the Massachusetts people will attempt to make him decline, under pretence that it will unite; and he is, I am told, anxious not to enter again in public life. But the fact that it would unite is not true. We want as much popularity as is attainable; and Mr. Langdon's name is by far the most popular we can get. How beloved his person by all who know him I need not tell you. Gerry is, in both respects, the reverse; and I much fear that, if elected, he would give us as much trouble as our late Vice-President." Albert Gallatin to J_oseph H. Nicholson, 21 May 1812, Henry Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 1: 518. 26 Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, p. 99. 27 Risj ord, "Election of 1812," pp. 252-253. 28 connecticut Courant, 26 May 1812. 29 The renomination led to a strange alliance within the party. "Each side understood the other and tacitly accepted the situation; Madison secured his renomination, but with it the direction of a distasteful war; the war-hawks got their war, but with a most unwarlike commander-in-chief of the army and navy." Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality, p. 61. 30 J. Hammond, A History of the Political Parties, 1: 314. 31 National Intelligencer, 4 June 1812. Morgan Lewis, one of the two Republican members of the legislature who opposed Clinton's nomination, had just been appointed by Madison to the office of Quarter-Master General. Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States of America, 6 Vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1871), 6: 299-300. . 32 J. Hammond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 315. 33 J. Hammond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 315-316; Dorothie Bobbe, De Witt Clinton, (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1933), pp. 186-187. 34 McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, 3: 455-456. 35 Nationa· l Inte11' igencer, 4 June 181 2 • 36 James Broussard, The Southern Federalists 1800-1816, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), p. 142. 37 Cooperstown Federalist, 6 June 1812. (36)

38 · National Intelligencer, 9 June 1812. Five days earlier the President's leading paper had stated: "On the relative merits of James Madison and De Witt Clinton let the question stand; and to the (Party) we cheerfully leave the award, (withto) single remark, that the men pronouncing these names in the same breath forces on our observation a contrast (so) mocked that we will not at present .. (trust) our pen.to describe it." National Intelligencer, 4 June 1812. THE DECISION FOR WAR

Congress:fonal opponents, from November 1811 to February 1812, ridiculed Madison's war preparedness proposals as either too much or too little. In addition, on a number of issues traditional Jeffersonian­

Republican opposition to excessive spending and permanent military forces became a major problem for the Administration. By February,

1812 it was apparent that Congress was moving cautiously towards war while also opposing the means with which to wage it.

The Administration had to accept a·congressional commitment to

impose taxes only after the war had actually begun, and even this decision was hotly debated before its passage on March 4, 1812.

Furthermore, a plan to have the national government supply arms to the states' militia was defeated despite the Southern states being severely under-supplied. Then a proposal for the building of twelve seventy-four gun ships of the line and twenty frigates was defeated and appropriations for repairs was cut.

Only on troop increases did the Congress favor more expenditures

than did the Administration. The President was forced to advocate

the raising of only ten thousand regular troops because funds did not exist to arm-or clothe any number beyond this. Congress' desire for more than ten thousand regulars was primarily due to the Smith-Giles faction in the Senate trying to make Gallatin and the Treasury

Department appear penny-pinching and unpatriotic. It became strikingly apparent that the primary goal for some of the malcontents was the destruction of Madison's Presidency rather than the changing (38) of American foreign policy.

As the spring of 1812 approached, Madison was looking for some major event that would compel the Congress towards a more belligerent stand. He hoped that the Henry papers would provide this. These documents, which Madison submitted to Congress, showed that in

1809 while his Administration was negotiating with Great Britain's government the British had sent a secret agent, John Henry, to New

England to find out whether British assistance would be accepted if the

New·England states decided to separate from the union or remain neutral in case of war. 1 When Canadian and British officials refused to pay Henry for the information he had gathered, he turned to the

United States. Madison was seeking national unity whe~ he disclosed the existence of the Henry papers. The President did not try to imply

New England's complicity in the intrigue, only that of a small group. 2 Madison thereby hoped to get Federalists behind a drive for war.

On March 10 Gallatin wrote to Jefferson that the efforts to preserve peace had failed because of the domestic factionalism. Gallatin added that war was unavoidable and that he hoped that the people would unite behind the government to prevent the dissidents from

causing any more disunity. He believed the Henry papers would end 3 all internal opposition due to public pressure.

But the Federalists and the Randolphites doubted that the Henry ' papers _chang_ed things, rather they were of the opinion that Madison was trying to influence the upcoming Massachusetts state elections.

They said that on February 20 Monroe received Henry's letter relating

what was in the agent's possession, but that at least twenty-five days (39) went by before the Secretary revealed their existence to Congress.

The delayed disclosure, just twenty-eight days before the Massachu­ setts election, was deemed political in nature, the Madisonians hoping that the impact of the affair would not diminish by the time of the 4 election. But with war expected, the Governor's "Gerrymandering," and the general unpopularity of the Republican Administration's measures, the Federalists regained control of the state government.

Also, the papers contained no names and stated no acts; the imputations pertained only to a conjectured situation. As a conse­ quence, the initial excitement began to fade. The effect of the papers was diminished further when shortly after their public ·release news of George Matthews revolution-organizing activities in East

Florida reached Washington (see Chapter three -- footnote no. 13).

Matthews, backed by the United States' government, was committing the exact type of activity that the Madison Administration was accusing

Great Britain of having attempted. To protect their image as an innocent neutral that had been wronged, the Administration disavowed 5 Matthew's actions. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Henry papers suffered as a consequence of the incident.

The Henry affair was the first of a series of Administration initiated steps in its effort to force a stand on Britain's activities. The President considered a sixty day embargo which would please those who wished to avoid war or to postpone the day of decision, and it would allow Americans to bring their ships into 6 safety prior to any possible military action. Additionally, however, (40)

it would injure the British by stopping the shipment of provisions

to Spain. Moreover, it was felt that by the end of the embargo

the Hornet would have returned with news concerning Britain's

decision on its orders-in-council. But in mid-March the French

burned American ships along the coast from Philadelphia to 7 Boston. Secretary of State Monroe blasted French Minister Seruries.

telling him that within a week the Administration had planned on

proposing the embargo, and the declaration of war was to follow within a short time. The French actions, however, had perhaps

completely endangered the Administration's progress.8

The French actions aroused not just the anti-Madisonians who

had been promoting the idea of a triangular war, but also some pro­

Madisonians believed that France as well as England should have war

declared upon it because of its actions against the United States.

Later, Jefferson wrote to Madison concerning this:

The triangular war must be the idea of the Anglomen and · the malcontents, in other words, the federalists and quids. But it would reconcile neither. It would only change the topic of abuse with the former, and not cure the mental disease of the latter. It would prevent our eastern capitalists and seamen from employment in privateering, take away the only chance of conciliating them, and keep them at home, idle, to swell the discontents; it would completely disarm us of the most powerful weapon we can employ against Great Britain, by shutting every port to our prizes, and yet would not add a single vessel to their number; it would shut every market to our agricultural productions, and engender impatience and discontent with that class which, in fact, composes the nation; it would insulate us in general negotiations for peace, making all the parties our opposers, and very indifferent about peace with us, if they should have it with the rest of the world, and would exhibit a solecism worthy of Don Quixote only, that of a choice to fight two enemies at a time, rather than to take. them by succession. And the only motive for all this is (41)

a sublimated impartiality, at which the world will laugh, and our own people will turn upon us in mass as soon as it is explained to them, as it will be by the very persons who are now laying that snare. 9 ·

. Despite the "French crisis," the President soon felt

politically sound enough to send a confidential message to Congress

on April 1 asking for his sixty day embargo. The Senate lengthened

the embargo to ninety days and the House adopted this amendment. 10 Madison signed the bill into law. Then Madison considered Joel

Barlow's announcement of a possible commercial treaty with France

as placing the two nations back on good relations. The President

hoped to get the United States moving solely and steadily

towards war with England. On April 14 the National Intelligencer

resumedi ts appea lfor war against. Britain. .. 11

Those who sought peace believed that.Congress' refusal to create two additional war department bureaus was a promising sign.

The Smith group in the Senate had condemned the division of respon­ sibility and declared that Secretary of War Eustis was to blame. The peace men attempted to bring about an adjournment of the Congress to forestall any belligerent move by the President. The Senate voted to 12 adjourn but the House voted against it.

On the extreme right John Randolph's Quids had opposed war towards either France or England. Their opposition to belligerency was based on the belief that war would lead to centralization and bureaucratization, and their cherished states' rights would be lost.

They distrusted all government bureaus, but particularly the War

Department which was for them a parasite upon the nation. (42)

For years the Quids had associated themselves with Virginia

Federalists. Now as war approached they became allied, to a certain extent, with other Federalists as well. The fear of war brought them together, and the fact that the Federalists now espoused a states' rights position strengthened the bond. Even in combination, however, the two dissenting groups were weak, and their effective- 13 ness in Congress was correspondingly minimal.

In March, Madison was probably hoping to have Congress declare war by the end of April. This would rally the party behind him and assure his renomination, thus slowing the Clinton challenge. When

Clinton's plans were delayed by the bank controversy, Madison must have been very optimistic. However, the April elections brought a resurgence of Federalism in New York and Massachusetts. Most impor­ tantly, Federalist control of Massachusetts raised questions as to whether an invasion of Canada was still possible. Such an invasion had always been considered central to any war plans, thus this setback posed serious problems. 14

Even so, the movement of events made the possibility of war a greater probability. Seeing the trend, the Clintonian press took the offensive. On May 5 the Connecticut Courant reported that before the embargo was enacted the House Connnittee on Foreign Relations conducted a closed-door interview with Secretary of State Monroe. When asked whether the United States was prepared for war, Monroe was proported to have stated: "'As to the prepared state of the country, in case of a declaration of war, the President would not pledge him­ self, nor take more than· his share of the responsibility. 11115 But (43) the President pushed the issue and within a week he began the final drive towards war.

Madison's unswerving advocacy of war was crucial. War sentiment had been stronger, earlier, in Congress but the pro-war group in 1812, though loosely organized, still expressed the dominant mood. The

President's stubborn persistence, with aid from connnittee chairmen, eventually solidified a sufficiently large Republican majority to gain his declaration of war.

At this crucial point, there was total unity in the_ President's immediate circle. Madison dominated the cabinet. Gallatin and

Secretary of War Eustis, despite their pro-British leanings, were solidly behind the President. Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton was completely devoted to the Administration and Monroe broke his last 16 ties with the Randolphites.

The cabinet met on May 11 and two days later the House voted to recall absent members so that they could reach Washington by June

1. On May 18 the Hornet carrying diplomatic information from England arrived in America. Administration spokesman, Richard Rush, claimed that the dispatches contained no new revelations about British foreign policy. A secret session of Congress was held on June 1 and Madison sent a message asking for a declaration of war against Great Britain.. . 17

Aiming at the Federalists and those malcontents who had obstructed his proposed war preparations, Madison stated in part:

And I do moreover exhort all the good people of the United States ••• (to) exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be adopted by the Constituted Authorities, for obtaining a speedy, a just, and an honorable peace.18 (44)

FOOTNOTES Chapter VI

1 Stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," pp. 52-55; Hildreth, The History of the United States of America, 6: 276-277 ,. 281; Brant, President 1809-1812, p. 404. For a specific view of the difficulties Madison encountered on his proposed defense measures see Brant, President 1809-1812, pp. 390-405; Stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," pp. 45-56. 2 Brant, President 1809-1812, pp. 413, 419-420. 3 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, 10 March 1812, Henry Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 1: 517.

4William Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public characters, and Public Events; from the Peace of 1783, to the Peace of 1815, (Boston: Russell, Odiorne, and Metcalf, 1834), pp. 295-296; Brant, President 1809-1812, p. 416. Henry Adams says that a part of the agreement between Madison and Henry was that the papers would not be made public until after Henry was at sea. This news arrived on March 7 and Madison sent the papers to Congress on March 9. It can be argued, however, that such an agreement would not have been made if it had not been politically expedient to do so. ·Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, 9 Vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891-1896), 6: 179-181. 5 Adams, History of the United States, 6: 204; Stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," p. 60. 6 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 24 April 1812, Letters and other Writings of James Madison, 2: 533; Hildreth, The History of the United States of America, 6:293.

7Brant, President 1809-1812, pp. 421-424. 8 Ibid., p. 424.

9Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 30 May 1812, Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 153-154.

10Ibid., pp. 429-430. "The act, as passed, prohibited the sailing of any vessel for any foreign port, except foreign vessels, with such cargoes as they had on board when notified of the act." The embargo helped Bonaparte "by stopping shipment of provisions to Spain, where the British armies were beginning to be triumphant." Hildreth, The History of the United States of America, 6: 291. (45)

11 Stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," p. 66.

12Hildreth, The History of the United States of .America, 6: 296-298. 13 Norman K. Risjord, The Old Republicans ·southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson, (New York: Columbia Unfversity Press, 1965), pp. 141, 146-147.

14stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," pp. 58, 65.

15connecticut Courant, 5 May 1812.

16stagg, "James Madison and the 'Malcontents"' pp. 585; Brant, President 1809-1812, p. 336. 17 Stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," pp. 67-68.

18National Intelligencer, 20 June 1812. WHY WAR?

The New York legislature adjourned on June 20, two days after

Congress declared war against Great Britain. New York Congressmen, for the most part, voted against the declaration either because they did not feel New York and the nation·were prepared for hostilities or because they felt the declaration was wrong. 1 Twenty-two Repub­ licans in Congress, mainly Clintonians, joined the Federalists in opposing war. 2

Many factors had led to the decision for war, but perhaps the most important one for causing war in 1812 was that this was a presidential election year. Herman von Holst stated:

The enthusiasts in favor of war were in a condition to- give importance to another element, and this decided the issue. The presidential election was impending, and the war party made the unconditional adoption of their policy a sine qua non of his renomination. That the threat could be carried into effect was to be looked upon as certain ••. Madison was not a man of such rigid moral firmness that his convictions could have withstood such a temptation. He fell victim, like others before him ••. to the presidential fever.3

Richard Hildreth commented:

The idea of being ignominously thrown overboard by the upstart and imperious leaders of the war party must, no doubt, have been in the highest degree mortifying to these veteran politicians, to whom habit had rendered official station almost a necessary of life ••• Madison and Gallatin might find excuse for submitting their own better judgment to the storm of popular passion, in the Republican doctrine of the right of the majority to rule; and they might hope, by still clinging to the helm, to diminish the calamities to which the country and the Republican party might be exposed, under more reckless and less experienced leadership. (47)

Whatever might have been Madison's motives, this at least is certain, that, yielding to the urgency of the war party, he reluctantly consented to take the leadership in a new step toward war ••• 4

If Madison had not decided in late 1811 to push the war issue, the war faction of the Republican party might well have placed its own candidate in opposition to the President or turned . 5 to C1 inton. Though a peace candidate, Clinton had become many things to many factions. Madison was aware of this. As a result, it can be argued that the upcoming election was the deciding factor in his taking charge of the "war hawk" movement.

Beyond this most significant step, Mad~son sought other ways to injure Clinton's candidacy. When the war began, Clinton expected

John Armstrong, a major critic of.Madison's foreign policy and who had been at odds with Madison over the Warden· incident, to support his candidacy. But New York Governor Daniel D. Tompkins moved to have

Armstrong appointed by Madison as Commander of the Port and Harbor of

New York City. And Armstrong, due to his Revolutionary War service, outranked all Major-Generals of 1812, Tompkins thus desired

Armstrong to have an independent command answerable only to the 6 President or the Secretary of War. On June 20, 1812, Tompkins wrote to Peter B. Porter; after expressing his position on· Armstrong,

Tompkins stated:

Will you please to consider this communication confidential, except so far as to make known to the President or Secretary of War alone its contents, in such a way as may be best calculated to produce useful ends and to convey to them my most decided opinion that no arrangement can be made which will be so satisfactory and beneficial as that of the appointment of General Armstrong.7 (48)

In short, Tompkins' political ma_neuvering and rhetoric

persuaded Madison to use Presidential patronage to damage Clinton.

On July 6 Armstrong, who had alreadybeen leaning towards a

reconciliation with Madison, accepted a commission of brigadier-

general with the command of New York City and its defenses. s

During this same period, on June 24, Tompkins wrote to the peace candidate Clinton. Obliquely, Tompkins reminded Clinton of his responsibilities to the state in his capacities as mayor of New 9 York City and Lieutenant-Governor of the state. This was a coDll!lent by Tompkins on Clinton's peace position. And it was a sample of how the

campaign rhetoric'was heating up as Clinton refused to end his

challenge to Madison. (49)

FOOTNOTES Chapter VII 1 J. Hammond, The History of Political Parties, 1: 317; Hatzenbuehler, "Party Unity," p. 386. 2 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, p. 141.

¾erman von Holst, The Constitutional and Political History of the United States, Vol. 1: 1750-1833 State Sovereignty and Slavery (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1899), pp. 230~231. 4 Hildreth, The History of the United States of America, 6: 290. 5 Bobbe, De Witt Clinton, p. 186. 6 Daniel D. Tompkins to Peter B. Porter, 20 June 1812, Hastings, compiler, Public Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 1: 633.

7Ibid., pp. 633-634. 8 Adams, History of the United States, 6: 427. Perhaps also contributing to Armstrong's decision was the fact that in 1804 the opposition in the Senate to his appointment as Minister to France had been led by Samuel Smith. Donnan, ed., "Papers of James A. Bayard," 2: 168. Madison may have first become aware that Armstrong was not going to break with the Administration when on September 2, 1811 he wrote a letter to the President disavowing a report by the Baltimore Federal Republican that said Madison and Armstrong, the previous winter, had discussed the incompetence of George W. Erving who was in Madrid, but that Madison had then appointed Erving to be Minister to Denmark. Brant, President 1809-1812, pp. 352-353. 9 Daniel D. Tompkins to De Witt Clinton, 24 June 1812, Hastings, compiler, Public Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 1: 641. THE CLINTON CANDIDACY: A RISING TIDE

(i)

Clinton's agents were in Washington and areas of New England 1 during the summer of 1812. To Federalists they spoke of peace and to the Republicans they spoke of a President who could wage war effi­ ciently. Extreme F~deralists, like members of the "Essex Junto," were prepared to support Clinton as they had Burr because they hated

Virginians. In New York, however, the Federalist party was divided in sentiment. Those supporting Clinton did so to be rid of Madison.

Gouverneur Morris was so tired of S:outhern domination he favored the election of Clinton to assert the North's independence, even if the nation was split in the process. Eventually, Josiah Ogden Hoffman, Federalist lawyer and political leader, after private negotiations, pledged

New York City's Federalist delegation to the Mayor. In addition, other leading New York City figures and several Congressmen 2 conferred and gave their belated support. This was a strong, though limited, beginning for Clinton as he sought Federalist support in the state.

As Clinton was solidifying his ties with Federalists, a new problem arose within the Federalist ranks. Ben Stoddert, Secretary of the Navy under John Adams, started in July a "draft Marshall" movement. Stoddert believed Clinton was a second string Republican and Madison was a puppet of Jefferson. The man needed was John

Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and a Southern

Federalist who could prevent the destruction of the nation.3 Stoddert (51) reasoned that any Federalist could win the ninety-five electoral votes to be found in New England, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware.

The difference between victory and defeat lay in Virginia and North

Carolina. And Marshall was the only man who could win those two states. 4

Albert Beveridge, biographer of Marshall, stated that were it not for Clinton's efforts and the Federalists' desire to retain Marshall as Chief Justice, the Virginian might have been a candidate in 1812.

Beveridge believed that because Marshall would have done better among the mercantile classes, lawyers, and Federalists in general, that he might have carried North Carolina, Vermont, and Pennsylvania and won the election.5 This was probably wishful thinking on Stoddert's and

Beveridge's part.

The Federalists were in a dilemma. Marshall's assets included not being tainted by any connection with New England secessionism and not having Clinton's reputation for intrigue. But the bottom line was that Madison must be defeated in New York for a Federalist to 6 win and only Clinton seemed able to accomplish that.

On September 3, Stoddert told John Steele of North Carolina that his state might cast the deciding votes for Marshall, but if

Marshall declined to stand as a candidate then Clinton would be taken 7 to save the country from Madison. Marshall declined and Clinton moved closer to obtaining a national Federalist following.

(ii)

New York remained a trouble spot fdr Clinton. To impress the (52) rest of the nation's Federalists, he must set his own house in order.

William Coleman, of the Evening Post, visited Rufus King on July 27 and said that Clinton had promised a group of Pennsylvania Federalists to make immediate peace if elected President. Four days later, Dr.

John Mason, provost of Columbia College, met with Rufus King, and related how Clinton had told him that he would welcome Federalist support against Madison. But King declared he must confer with his colleagues b~fore answering. As a result, King met on August 3 at Morrisania with

Gouverneur Morris, John Jay, and William Clarkson. Here, King revealed his opposition to Clinton whom he felt would abandon his present supporters and uriite with rival factions when politically expedient. Furthermore, he believed that so long as Armstrong, Tompkins, and Spencer opposed him in New York, he was too risky to endorse, especially when he might misrepresent Federalist motives. King wanted Federalists to keep their integrity by supporting no one or else a Federalist.8

Two days after this meeting, Clinton went to Morrisania and met with King, Jay, and Morris. During the discussion Morris read the proposed peace resolutions that were to be made public at the first meeting of the "Friends of Liberty, Peace, and Commerce" organization.

Clinton wanted postponement of the public release of these proposals until after he had secured dissident Republican support more solidly behind him. He claimed he was not temporizing; he was permanently split with the Madison Administration. Additionally, he argued that had he followed the Administration's line he would have eventually become

President, but he refused to follow such a course. The Federalist (53)

9 leaders refused to call off the August 18 peace rally. By now, however, most New York Federalists decided that they would risk supporting Clinton, King being the most notable exception.

At Washington Hall on August 18 a large crowd adopted eight resolutions condemning Madison's anti-commercial policy, stressi~g the country's financial and military unpreparedness for waging a 10 war, and calling for committees of correspondence.

The day before the Washington Hall meeting, a committee of

New York Clintonians issued their "Address to the People of the

United States," a document that sought a broad national public appeal:

They opposed the Congressional caucus arguing that this was an encroach­ ment by the legislative branch into the area of the executive branch, and cautioned that the small minority that controlled the caucus might be influenced by a foreign power. The "Address" also appealed to the

North's jealousy of Virginia and stated that New York, a middle

state, might hold the balance between the conflicting agricultural

and commercial states. And since New York was a frontier state this

was even more of a reason for it to be the home of the next President.

In concluding, the pamphlet said that Madison had led the nation

unpreparedly into war, and that the Administration had been inept in

conducting the war. By comparison, Clinton was an energetic, adminis-

trat1ve. giant,. wh o h a d teah b i 1·1ty to end t h e war qu1c. kl y. 1l

(iii)

September brought the-Federalist convention in New York City,

an event. that Clinton hoped would push him ahead of Madison. This (54)

gathering resulted from a summer meeting at Saratoga Springs when

William Sullivan, the president of the Boston branch of the

Washington Benevolent Society, and some friends met shortly after

war had been declared. There Sullivan and Jonathan Knight: both of

. Massachusetts, and Connecticut's Governor Roger Griswold, decided

that a Federalist convention should be held in the early autumn. 12

Helping to bring these Federalists together were Philadelphia Federalists,

New Jersey Federalists, and John Pintard of New York, all of whom

· corresponded with Federalists throughout the nation. 13

Through their efforts and the efforts of others, a Federalist

convention was held September 15-17. More than sixty delegates·

attended representing eleven states. In addition, there was extensive

COIIIIIlunication with North Carolina and Virginia Federalists. Ohio was

the only state that had active Federalists but was unrepresented.

The delegates came from all the states north of the Potomac and from

South Carolina, and they met at Kent's Tavern on Broad Street to hold

thier proceedings. The small Southern turnout was due to distance and

weather. In addition, the Virginia Federalists organized their own

state convention. Overall, the delegates were chosen by state general

coIIIIIlittees or coIIIIIlittees of correspondence and thus did represent the 14 state organizations though not necessarily the rank and file.

No major Federalist figure was willing to accept the Presidential

nomination -- Jay, King, and C. C. Pinckney refused. Consequently, the 15 issue became whether to support Clinton or to sit out the race.

Rufus King viciously attacked Clinton's character, and emphasized party

integrity. This type of Federalist opposition to Clintonians had (55) deep roots. For between 1777-1800 the greatest enemies of the

Federalists had been George Clinton and his followers. And even after

1800 when the Federalists alternated their allegiance between fending

Rep'ublican factions, there never occurred a time when a high , 16 percentage of Federalists was aligned with the Clintonians.

Those who did not trust Clinton and yet who, did not want to sit out the contest attempted to implement their "Southern Strategy," that is choosing some prominent Southern Federalist who might garner enough North Carolina votes to win. This was based on the original idea as proposed by Stoddert. The group, however, was confounded by a letter sent to the convention by C. C. Pinckney declaring 17. that no Southern Federalist should be supported.

The other position presented was the one that for the most part car.ried the convention. The Massachusetts Federalists led by Harrison

Gray Otis felt that there was no hope_ of electing a candidate to the

Presidency unless they combined with dissident Republicans. They 18 urged an alliance to defeat Madison to obtain peace. Otis managed to ,get a resolution adopted opposing the nomination of a Federalist. 19

To 1Clinton, who might alienate dissident Republicans if he associated too closely with Federalist policies, the convention gave him all that he could desire.

Five Pennsylvanians were appointed as a committee to learn the views of the electors picked by the states and then to inform the electors of other states. Therefore, most Federalist delegates left the convention with the understanding that a formal nomination of

Clinton would depend on the judgment of the Pennsylvania committee (56)

20 and in particular the situations in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.

After the convention, Robert Goodloe Harper wrote that the object

was "'to let the Clintonian Democrats take the lead, in all the

Democratic states and districts, and to support them silently with our

votes.'" The desire was to carry all seaboard states from North

Carolina northward except for Virginia. 21 Clinton's hope for secrecy

vanished a month later when the National Intelligencer exposed his plan.

Clinton and the Federalists denied the accusations but the disclosure upset their plans. 22

After the convention the controversy in the press grew more 23 bitter. Maturin Livingston said that in New York Clinton's patronage

control allowed him to maintain presses in all of New York's counties

and to use the New York Columbian as a vehicle for propaganda. The

Clintonian press attacked the idea of Congressional caucus

-nominations and said that New York deserved a President. These

positions were countered by the Madisonian press. First they pointed

out that the President's renomination had been approved by nine state

legislatures including Pennsylvania's and Massachusetts'. In Pennsyl­

vania it was argued that the Keystone state had a better claim on the

Presidency than did New York, and yet Pennsylvania was supporting

Madison. Overall, Clinton was backed by most Federalist newspapers, 24 and Madison by almost every Republican paper outside of New York.

This alignment of papers, however, proved unimportant as in the autumn 25 weeks of 1812 many newspapers made no mention of the election.

Despite the mostly unified support Federalists had given to

Clinton, there were pockets of unrest. The greatest example was in (57)

Virginia. In that state the Federalists were very weak with no representation in three-fourths of the counties. But as a result of their dislike of Clinton, the Federalists of Loudon County, at an August

22 mass meeting, called for a state party convention to be held at

Staunton on September 21. The turnout was disappointing as only thirty­ two delegates came, and they represented only ninety-nine counties and cities. Henry Lee and Charles Fenton Mercer wanted the convention to let the electoral nominees that were chosen to be given a>free,choice in supporting any candidate. This measure failed 15-16. The convention had a difficult time choosing a candidate although they remained opposed to

Clinton, feeling that if elected.he only planned to be more aggressive in the application of Jeffersonian and Madisonian policies.

In the end, the convention nominated New York's Rufus King and North Carolina's William R. Davis. The convention created a five member central committee in Augusta County which was to inform the electoral nominees of their selection and to arouse support for their candidates. The committee was to contact anti-war men throughout the state urging them to create local organizations for promoting King and

Davis. The party capped its proceedings by condemning Madison and the

Republican party for bringing on the war and for their conduct of it since. i t b egan. 26

(iv)

Republicans attempted to get Clinton to withdraw his ~andidacy in late September. Most specifically, William King, Rufus King's half-brother, led a delegation of Republicans from Massachusetts to deliver a letter suggesting that in return for Clinton's withdrawing from (58) the race,. the Republican party in Massachusetts in 1816 might support

Clinton. Since Massachusetts and the North in general had little influence in Republican party-decision-making, Clinton must have been amused by this worthless, ambiguous offer. In response to the Massachu­ setts proposal, Richard Riker, a leading a1d of Clinton's, released a 27 public statement, stating that the friends of the constitution throughout the nation looked to him, and he could not decline the service thrust upon him. Furthermore, he stated that political bargains were an affront to Republican dignity, and that he would 28 not withdraw from the contest.

As the election date neared, the Madisonian press began an increased assault on Clinton's candidacy. One paper, on October 15, said: "We did think that Mr. Clinton would long ere this time have withdrawn himself -- but we have been disappointed in our expectation and we have now only to admonish him of the fate of Aaron Burr. 1129

And a group of Pennsylvanians, in referring to Clinton's New Yor~ positions_, wrote:

Mr. Clinton may have filled all of those situations with ability, and thus been a useful citizen of New York, but his usefulness has been confined to that state. He was so short·a time upon the national floor that the nation know him not; the nation have not tried, proved and found him honest and capable.30

In addition, on October 10, Madison sent a letter to the South

Carolina legislature acknowledging its address to the President and the Speaker. In his politically tinted reply Madison agreed that to maintain its honor, the United States had to use force and that South 31 Carolina was very patriotic in its actions. (59)

These politically motivated statements showed that the expected collapse of the Clinton candidacy had not occurred, and that Madison's reelection was in doubt. (60)

FOOTNOTES Chapter VIII

1A pro-Clinton paper stated: "It is time for the Eastern states to lay aside that cursed spirit of party, and unite in men of talents and political virtue, or prepare to sink into the lowest state of degredation and meaness." Connecticut Courant, 30 June 1812. 2 Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy, pp. 167-168. In opposition, however, the pro-war, pro-Madison group held a general meeting on June 24. It was headed by Colonel Henry Rutgers as chairman and Marinus Willett as Secretary. National Intelligencer, 30 June 1812. 3 william S. West, "John Steele: Portrait of a Moderate Southern Federalist," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1972), pp. 304-305. 4 Risj6rd, "Election of 1812," p. 254. 5 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, Vol. 4: The Building of the Nation 1815-1835, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), p. 47. 6 Irving Brant, James Madison, Vol. 6: Commander-in-Chief 1812'- 1836 (New York and Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1961), p. 98-99.

7Ibid., p. 98. 8 Robert Ernst, Rufus King American Federalist, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 314-315; Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 101. 9 Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics 1800-1816, (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Museum Commission, 1952), p. 261; Ernst, Rufus King, p. 316. 10 Ernst, Rufus King, p. 316. Madison wrote at this time: "We all feel the weight of the times; and it is to be regretted that all cannot unite in the measures opposed to them." James Madison to S. Spring, 6 September 1812, Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, 8: 214. 11 R·1SJOr . d , "Election of 1812," p. 257. 12 Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy, p. 170; Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, p. 101. Fraternal societies, particularly the Tammany Society and the Washington Benevolent Society, were very active in the (61)

Presidential contest. For the most part, they appealed to large groups of people due to their easy-to-obtain membership and. thus crated an electorate that was larger than it previously had been. "Their secrecy and ritual appealed to a nation of joiners ••• these voluntary asso­ ciations helped integrate the common man into the electoral process." Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 251. 13 Bobbe, De Witt Clinton, pp. 185-186; Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 254; David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), pp. 87-88. 14 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, pp. 142-143; Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism, pp. 87-89. 15 .West, "John Steele: Portrait of a Moderate Southern Federalist," p. 306; Ernst, Rufus King, pp. 318-319. 16 Alvin Kass, Politics in New York State, 1800-1830, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), p. ·74, 17 Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism, p. 89. 18 Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality, p. 62; Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism, pp. 88-89. 19 West, "John Steele: Portrait of a Moderate Southern Federalist," p. 306. 20 Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch, p. 261; Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism, pp. 89-90; Ernst, Rufus King, p. 319. 21 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 100. 22 Ibid. Throughout the campaign the Madisonian papers seemed " • more intent upon exposing the inconsistencies of Clinton than defending the Administration," Risjord, "The Election of 1812," p. 260. 23 Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy, p. 171. 24 . Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, pp. 103, 108. 25 stanwood, A History of the Presidency, p. 103, 26 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, pp. 144-146. 27 . J. Hammond, A History of Political Parties, 1: 319-320; Brant, Commander-in-Chief, p. 105. 28 Independent American, 3 November 1812. (62)

29 National Intellig·encer, 15 October 1812. 30 National Intelligencer, 10 October 1812. 31 James Madison to the South. Carolina legislature, 10 October 1812,· Letters and other Writings of James Madison, 2: 548. THE ELECTION

(i)

Each of the eighteen states set their own date for the presidential

balloting, with Louisia~a having been admitted as the most recent state

on April 8, 1812. Most states picked electors in the same manner as

in 1808, but there were some exceptions. Five states chose by

general ticket with the winner taking all the electoral votes --

New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio. Four

states voted by districts with the possibility of a divided electoral

vote -- Massachusetts, Maryland, _Tennessee, and Kentucky. The other

nine states chose electors by the legislatures. In several of these

states the legislature was elected during the presidential campaign,

and by indirect election might reflect the popular opinion towards

the presidential candidates. 1

As the balloting began, Clinton was sure to win New York, New

Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and Madison was certain of victory in Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, and the states west 2 of the mountains except for Ohio. Madison evaluated the situation

on October 14 as follows:

In the Congressional Districts the Republicans, I believe, have not lost ground at all, notwithstanding the auxiliaries to Federalism •.• Pennsylvania, although admitted to be shaken, is represented to be safe. New Jersey is doubtful, at least the same case with New Hampshire. North Carolina, also, is reported to be in considerable irritation. The other states remain pretty decided 3

(ii)

The New York legislature convened on November 2 to pick the (64) state's presidential electors with three tickets presented -- the

Madisonians, the Clintonians, and the Federalists. The Federalists had a small majority in the lower house; the Republicans (predominantly

Clintonian) had a majority in the upper house. The choice of the electoral ticket was by joint session, thus the Federalists could not win but might be the deciding factor. 4 A Republican caucus failed to nominate a list of electors thanks to Madisonian obstructionism.

The Martling Men wanted a portion of those chosen to be for the Pre­ sident. The Clintonians refused this, and finally a Clintonian ticket headed by Judge Robert Yates was chosen. This arrangement was nominated in the Senate. In the lower house the Federalists had fifty-eight votes for their electors, the Clintonians had twenty-nine, and the Madisonians twenty-two. In joint session a number of the

Federalists upheld the decision to support Clinton resulting in

Clinton receiving seventy-four votes, the Federalist ticket received forty-five, while the Madisonians cast twenty-eight blank votes. 5

In New Jersey the Clintonians surprised the Madisonians by holding a peace party convention at the end of June, denouncing the caucus system and nominating Congressional candidates who had opposed the war declaration. In this manner they hoped to attract dissident

Republicans. The regular Republicans moved up the date of their con­ vention from the autumn to July 10 to meet this challenge. One hundred delegates met at Burlington and issued a public address setting up a formal convention for Trenton in October. 6 There they created a committee consisting of two delegates from each county to draw up lists of nominees for. Congress and presidential electors. Another (65) connnittee drew up a platform expressing its principles.

In addition, the President made a rare campaign statement sending a letter to the New ,Jersey convention which found its way into the state's Madisonian press. In the letter, the President defended his action in the war, promised an honorable peace, praised New Jersey's patriotism during the Revolution, and appealed for the state to continue that tradition during the present crisis.

The state election in October had a voter turnout that was very high statewide, yet the level of participation varied. Republicans, who were against the war but not for Clinton, stayed home. Generally, however, the election showed the high intensity created by the election, and the sophistication of the state's political parties. Madison won by a statewide majority of four thousand. But this vote was deceptive because the President's majority was primarily derived from two counties.

As a result, the Federalists captured the legislature. The fusion of Federalists and Clintonians was more complete in New Jersey than in any other state except for Massachusetts and they innnediately replaced the popular election of electors with selection by the legislature, 7 guaranteeing eight electoral votes for Clinton.

Connecticut and Rhode Island were two assured Clinton states.

Both were controlled by the Federalists, and both opposed the war because it disrupted trade. Delaware, led by Federalists James Bayard and Louis McLain, was cool towards Clinton. But Federalist controlled

Delaware did support the New Yorker.

Republicans controlled New Hampshire since 1806. Nevertheless, in 1812 the governor's race was very close and some Congressmen began (66) to break with the Administration. New Hampshire's Presidential el_ection was held on a statewide basis, and the eight Clintonian electors defeated their opposites by a vote that varied from 20,386 to 18,839 out of 34,800 votes cast. The war had caused a greater turnout than the previous years' gubernatorial races, and the Clintonians-Federalists won the greatest percentage of these. The biggest gain was in the three traditionally Federalist, most northern counties which were mostly rural and which had no interest in maritime rights; instead they feared a 8 Canadian invasion.

In Massachusetts the Republicans had gained in power since the

1790's despite the Embargo and other setbacks. And in 1811 Massachusetts elected Elbridge Gerry governor and Republicans controlled the Assembly.

Half of her Congressional delegation were Republicans. The coming of the war changed this. In the spring elections of 1812 Federalist Josiah

Strong defeated Gerry for the Governorship by 1,370 votes out of·l04,000 votes cast and Federalists regained control of the House of Represen­ tatives.

For the approaching Presidential election the Republican Senate sought to have ~residential voting by the district system, hoping to win a portion of the electoral votes despite the increasing

Federalist tide. The Republicans managed to have the state's twenty­ two electors divided among six districts, but lost all districts in

November •.

Since Jefferson's Presidency the Massachusetts Republican party had increased greatly, depending largely on small farmers of the interior and the rising merchants of the seaboard. They were parti- (67) cularly strong in the mountainous west, in Maine, and along the seaboard south of Boston. But it was exactly in these areas that the Republican vote in November dropped dramatically from that of the previous spring.

There was a suffrage qualification of one year's residence for the

Presidential election that did not apply •in April, but the most significant reason for the decline in Republican votes was due to· dislike of the war. Since there was no corresponding increase in the opposition's vote it showed that many Republicans opposing the war were 9 also opposed to Clinton and thus stayed home.

Vermont alone of all the New England states entered the Republican camp. Since the 1790 1 s the state had inclined towards the Jeffersonians.

In 1812 the war was popular initially. The Republicans won in the

September state elections; Jonas Galusha defeated Martin Chittenden by the vote of 19,158 to 15,950 -- a greater plurality than when he beat

Chittenden in 1811. Except for Windham County in the southeastern part of the state, the Federalist majorities came from areas adjacent to Canada and Lake Champlain. The populace of these areas opposed the war that was ruining their Canadian trade and which might lead to . . 10 invasion.

With the Republican victory in Vermont's state election the

National Intelligencer, expanding its accusations as the Presidential election approached, stated that the hardy yeomanry of New England would not adhere to a group that called for a Northern Confederacy 11 as was exposed in the Henry letters.

The September elections led to a meeting of Republican legislators at Montpelier on October 9. This caucus adopted unanimously a resolution 12 supporting Madison and Gerry. And on October 30 the legislature (68)

13 elected six electors for the President.

In Virginia the election was held on November 2. The Federalists, due to the Staunton convention, supported King, though had King won, there was a chance they would have thrown their support to Clinton.

But there was no doubt that Madison would win the state's twenty-four electors because balloting was by general ticket.

As a result, only twenty-one thousand out of fifty thousand eligibles voted. The Federali,sts won the eastern shore, the upper

Potomac, and the Shenandoah Valley (actually doing better than in

1800). The Federalists increased their strength in the eastern shore and the lower Potomac, areas most exposed to the threat of invasion. It can be argued that the areas were also affected ~y Henry

Lee, a native son, being one of the martyrs in the Baltimore Riot

(see the Maryland election results). This sectional pattern had been fairly consistent since the 1790's indicating that party regularity was the most important force in 1812. Overall, Madison dominated by winning sixty-six out of seventy-nine counties and in thirty-two 14 counties he received between 90-100% of the vote.

In the states of the lower South the Clinton campaign became inverted from the stance it took in New England. Completely discarding the 'peace party' label, the rhetoric became belligerent and spoke of quickly ending the war by more efficient wartime 15 management.

The situation in the South, however, was not favorable to the anti­

Madisonians. The Federalists in South Carolina had been in decline (69) since 1800. By 1812 the party constituted only about ten percent ~f the vote of the state. In addition, in 1808 there was a reapportionment that gave the up-country districts a larger share of the vote, and in

1810 all adult white males were given the right to vote as opposed to the previous des1gnation of only three-shilling taxpayers. The

Federalists depended upon the planters, merchants, and professional men. In 1812 Federalists centered their effort in Charleston during

the October state, elections. The legislature was to pick the presidential electors. However, the Federalists failed dismally and

the Madisonians were assured of the eleven electoral votes in 16 December.

In Georgia, the Madisonians dominated the political scene

even more. Federalists hoped to have the legislature choose Republi­

cans who opposed Madison and who were so highly esteemed that they

could vote for Clinton without censure. This hope, however, was

illusionary. In late November the Georgian legislature chose Madisonian 17 electors.

Except for King's showing in Vi~ginia, the Federalists in the 18 South did worse in 1812 than they had in 1800 and 1808. The

pro-war South believed its native son, Madison, was the one for carrying

on the war they had so loudly called for. And the states of the

Southwest -- Kentucky, Tennessee, and Louisiana -- were also solidly

in Madison's column. Madison had met their demand for war and they

responded by showing their support. (70)

FOOTNOTES Chapter IX

1 Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 260; Stanwood; A History of the Presidency, p. 103; Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 110. 2 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 111. 3 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 14 October.1812, Letters and other Writings of James Madison, 2: 549-550. 4 Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy, pp. 171-172. 5 J •.Hammond, A History of Political Parties, 1: 321-322. Chroniclers of the New York legislature's vote for Clinton have emphasized Martin Van Buren's part in the results; (See J. Hammond, A History of Political Parties, 1: 321-322; Dorothie Bobbe, De Witt Clinton, pp. 187-188; and Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 264. These statements, however, seem to make Van Buren's political domination retroactive. In fact, the relatively new member of the Assembly probably had no significant effect on the voting outcome. For more than a year prior·to the election Clinton had been wooing the Federalists in New York. During the bank charter situation, with the discussions at Morrisania, and particularly at the Federalist convention in New York, the Federalists·had made it clear that they would be behind Clinton on a state and national level. There voting in the New York legislature was merely the following through on these decisions. 6 James Madison to the New Jersey Republican convention, 25 July 1812, Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, 8: 203. 7 Risjord, "Election of 1812," pp. 257-258, 265-266; Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 110. 8 Risjord, "Election of 1812," pp. 261-262, 267; John A. Munroe, Louis McLain: Federalist and Jacksonian (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973), p. 52. 9 Risjord, "Election of 1812," pp. 262-263. The Madisonian press said on the election returns from Massachusetts: "The Republicans of this state, dispirited by the defeat they experienced in the recent Election for Congress, were rather backward in turning out at the town meetings. It is not to be supposed that the state of parties in that state is correctly represented by the • • . returns." National Intelligencer, 26 November 1812. (71)

10 Risjord, "Eleetion of 1812," p. 261.

11National Intelligeneer, 19 September 1812.

12National Intelligeneer, 22 0etober 1812. 13 National Intelligeneer, 10 November 1812. 14 Risjord, "Eleetion of 1812," pp. 269-270; Broussard, The Southern Federalists, pp. 147-148.

15Risjord, "Eleetion of 1812," p. 259. 16 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, pp. 151-153. 17 Ibid., p. 153. 18 rbid: THE DECISIVE STATES

(i)

From the start the Clinton camp knew that its success depended upon a victory in Pennsylvania, or failing that, wins in North

Carolina and either Maryland or Ohio. Such prospects were bleak ever since early 1812.

The Pennsylvania situation was desperate from the beginning.

Clinton had Duane's support but the Aurora's editor soon began attack­ ing Simon Snyder, Pennsylvania's Governor. This was disasteious to the

Clintonians since they hoped to cause a split between Snyder and Madison by aggravating the wounds suffered over the Olmstead Affair. Such hopes vanished when the Governor in early 1812 made a toast stating: 1 "'The present will be the next President of the United States."' And then even before the Congressional caucus nomination, the Republican members of the Pennsylvania Legislature on March 7 prepared an 2 electoral ticket and pledged their support to the President.

Knowing the size of the problem and the necessity to win the

Keystone State, the Clintonians swept into Pennsylvania with ample funds and flooded the state with speeches and campaign documents.

Special emissaries were sent to pamper and patronize Republican leaders. These emissaries, known as 'Boring committees,' had limited 3 success b ut di.d create a roug h-e d ged state organization.. .

A key part of this maverick Republican organization was the inception of a secret group at a meeting in Lancaster on August 26, 1812.

The turnout was small, about a dozen, Congressman Joseph Lefever (73) being the only notable present. The meeting sent out an address to the people of Pennsylvania attacking Madison and recommending a state convention be held at Lancaster on September 24. But the convention saw only representatives from York, Lancaster, Nazareth, and

Pittsburgh. Clinton was nominated and former Governor Thomas McKean was 4 chosen to lead Clinton's list of electors in the state.

The most important move of the convention, in its attempt to overcome Madison's lead, was to name the Pennsylvania Federalist

Jared Ingersoll as Clinton's Vice-Presidential running mate in the state. Though this helped to bring together Pennsylvania's malcontents and Federalists, it did not overcome the general Republican allegiance to the President.5 Nevertheless, it made the Clintonian press very optimistic, and the press even speculated that Governor Snyder was coming around to Clinton's support and that a Clintonian tide would • 6 carry all before it. Their hopes were in vain.

Clinton's forces were on the short-end in a game of numbers.

Except for the nomination of Ingersoll, the Clintonians had avoided the

Pennsylvania Federalists, and refused to denounce the war. The

Federalists' state organization was pitifully weak, it had only one member out of Pennsylvania's twenty congressmen. The party was active only in Philadelphia and the lower Delaware counties where

Quakers and merchants opposed the war. Clinton's agents spent most of their effort trying to sway the regular Republicans by attacking 7 Madison's policies.

The Madisonians countered these attacks by stating that the

President was the peace and commerce candidate -- that Clinton made no (74) pledges on the war, ·either way. Moreover, the state Republican collllllittee of correspondence issued a continuous stream of campaign material to the county organizations. And on September 14, the

Democratic Press, the leading Madisonian paper in the state, revealed the attendance of Pennsyivania Federalists at the national convention in New York, and soon after the convention the paper reported that the Federalists would not run their own candidate. Thus, the Clintonian desire for secrecy concerning connections with the Federalists was unfulfilled. The Gazette of the United States, the.leading Federalist paper in the country, hedged its reply to these charges. It said the

Federalist party would support Clinton only if he had a chance, and it 8 further said that there was no prearranged understanding.

Despite th~se revelations the Pennsylvania Federalists did main­ tain more secrecy than did their Clintonian Republican counterparts.

In fact, the day after the Lancaster convention, the Federalists held a conference at Carlisle which was presided over by James Riddle.

They adopted resolutions similar to those passed at the New York convention the week before. The general public did not learn of these proceedings until revealed in a Federalist address only a few days 9 before the election. 10 When news of Hull's surrender reached Pennsylvania, a major crisis occurred for the Madisonians. Word of the capitulation brought out a flurry of Clintonian supporters with bundles of pamphlets blaming the Administration for the fiasco. The agents especially moved among

Pepnsylvania's western mountainous areas, hoping to cause the people of the region to give their support to Clinton. The President's (75) position was so tenuous that even the destruction of the British vessel 11 Guerriere failed to enhance the Administration's image. The possible effect .that Hull's surrender might have on the election worried

Madison's supporters. Hoping to place the blame solely on Hull, their rhetoric soon turned in that-direction. Jefferson wrote to Duane: "The treachery of Hull, like that of Arnold, cannot be a matter of blame on 12 our government." And the National Intelligencer stated that there had been no deficiency of supplies at Detroit, and that orders for needed provisions had been issued prior to the declaration of war. 13

Even so, there was much pressure on Madison by party leaders to dismiss Secretary of War William Eustis and shift the blame on to him.

But Madison refused to sacrifice the incompetent Eustis. To keep 14 Eustis was a political liability, but to.have· dismissed the Massachu- setts native might have been even a greater political liability in a 15 state that Madison still expected to do well in, in the election.

The threat to Madison's political fortunes was short lived.

Military setbacks were offset in the Middle States by the export of corn and flour to Wellington's armies, raising the price paid farmers.

During peace t:il!le the British had given such shipments special protection, and after war was declared, the Senate removed a provision that allowed for the enforcement of the restricted trade by the United States' forces. When critics asked about equating the flour shipments with the rights and true interests of the United States, Madison was evasive. He wanted to postpone the issue until his reelection. Madison knew that nothing could really be done until Congress reconvened, there- 16 fore he saw no reason not to take advantage of the political situation. (76)

Actually the significance of the grain exports went beyond this.

The topic was discussed in letters between Madison and Jefferson. As early as April' 17, 1812, Jefferson, in a letter to Madison, attempted to justify the shipments:

Supposing the objects of the government were merely to keep our vessels and men out of harm's way, and that there is no idea that the want of our flour will starve Great Britain, the sale of the remaining produce will be rather desirable, and what would be desired even in war, and even to our enemies. For I am favorable to the opinion which has been urged by others, sometimes acted on, and now partly so.by France and Great Britain, that commerce, under certain restrictions and licenses, may be indulged between enemies mutually advantageous to the individuals, and not to their injury as belligerents ••• I think a people would go through a war with much less impatience if they could dispose of their produce, and that unless a vent can be provided for them, they will soon become querulous and clamor for peace.

Nine days after the declaration of war, Jefferson reminded Madison of this situation. Again on August 5 he wrote:

Our farmers are cheerful in the expectation of a good price for wheat in Autumn. Their pulse will be regulated by this, and not by the successes or disasters of the war. To keep open sufficient markets is the very first object towards maintaining the popularity of the war, which is as great at present as could be desired. 17

Another argument used by Madisonian Republicans in Pennsylvania was to declare that only by driving the British out of Canada could the Indian atrocities in the west be stopped. Actually, the renewed

Indian activity was a part of continual frontier warfare that was 18 for the most part unrelated to Britain. Madisonians argued that the war could be won most easily if the country supported the President.

Madison's defeat would only signal to the British that the United

States had given up the fight for its rights. How, they asked (77)

19 rhetorica. 11 y, cou ld Clinton . ever resurrect t his· d etermination.· .· ?

In addition, the Pennsylvania Madisonian press defended the

Presjdent· and his policies. The editors stated that it was difficult and dangerous to prepare for war in peacetime, and only Congress 20 could provide the means. A great deal of pressure was brought to bear upon William Duane to completely reject Clinton and take a vigorous 21 part in Madison's reelection campaign. The pressure forced him to publicly state his support for the President on October 24, though some Philadelphia Republicans, led by Senator Michael Leib, remained 22 opposed to Madison.

Preparatory to the state elections of October 13, Federalists were very active in ward and district meeting. In Pittsburgh ~hey offered their first ticket since 1808. Though they did not denounce the war in this western town, they did denounce the way it was being waged. But the Federalist-Clintonian coalition was a dismal failure 23 in the state elections. The Madisonians triumphed completely.

The Presidential election was scheduled for October 30. The

Clintonian electoral ticket, headed by ex-Governor Thomas McKean, had its own problems as a number of the chosen electors refused to run and

the Clintonians were forced to revise their ticket right up to election day. In addition, Federalists dropped their neutrality facade, and on 24 October 17 the party announced its support of Clinton.

Most Pennsylvania Republicans had been and continued to be in

the forefront of the war movement in order to preserve the Republican party. 25 As the election approached, their denunciation of Clinton became more vituperative. They began stating that his candidacy was part of a conspiracy: (78)

.•. (New York) announces to the world a determination,. singly, and alone, to oppose, and, if possib:e, d:feat the deliberate choice of every other state, in which a democratic majority prevails ••• (Not content with the promised aid of the self-created convention of federal . gentlemen recently convened in New York: not content with the pledg~d co-operation of the self-delegated association of federalists which lately assembled at Carlisle; not yet satisfied with the spontaneous devotion of the British party· in America to the specious pretexts of her ambition:) she has ventured to introduce her political missionaries, principally the officers of her government, into every country, in the vain hope to ·seduce, to alarm, or to corrupt the democracy of Pennsylvania from the path of honor and of duty ••

You are now to maintain the Republican institutions and character of our country, in opposition to a combination of the friends of an aspiring citizen, (De W~tt Clinton, who has deserted the democratic cause and party) with the federalists and the British party in America; acting upon principles and plans of the years 1799 and 1800, as divulged by their agent, William Cobbett; and recently promulgated and sanctioned by the acts and proclamations of the government of Canada.26

·In the Presidential election in Pennsylvania Madison's electors averaged 48,946 votes to 29,056 for the Clintonians •. Nevertheless,

Madison's majority was ten thousand less than it had been just four years before; his greatest decline came in the mountain counties of

Western Pennsylvania where he was hurt by the issue of inept waging of the war. But still the President won a convincing victory and, most importantly, Madison garnered Pennsylvania's twenty-five electoral 27 votes.

(ii)

On Monday, November 2, the first.returns from Friday's election in Pen~sylvania told of Madison's substantial victory in that state.

At this point, all states except three were solidly in either

Madison's or Clinton's column. The election would be decided by the (79)

28 returns frqm Maryland, North Carolina, ·and Ohio.

With' the election hinging on these three states, the Administration

tried to assure success by making one last attack on Clintoµ. On

the 3rd, "An Address to the Electors. of President of the United States"

appeared in the National Intelligencer. A part of it read:

what are we to think of those who would encourage the illiberal prejudices, the blind jealousies, of a few malcontents; and lend the credit of New York, a name hitherto unsullied, to sanctify their mad.ambition, which would prostrate the most valuable institution of society to attain its unhallowed object? Among states, sovereign and • equal by the compact which unites them, it is not by indulging an unholy hatred of each other, that they can hope to succeed in any object of honorable emulation. If Virginia be ambitious, is Massachusetts exempt from this· sin, and may not all the states in turn recriminate one another? Far better would it be to direct this spirit of rivalship to improvement in arts, and laws, and beneficient institutions; in a struggle which shall be foremost in exalting the glory of the American name _____ ••• 29

Additionally·, in conne.ction with the President's annual message

to Congress on November 4, Madison released diploma~ic correspondence

that became campaign documents in North Carolina and Maryland. These

documents covered Richard Russell's negotiations with Lord Castlereagh

during the summer. The papers seemed to show evidence of an American

readiness for peace. But Castlereagh refused to end the practice

of impressment during the proposed Armistice. The President announced

further that armistice negotiations were continuing between Monroe

and British Admira"l Warren, though the prospects were not promising.30

(iii)

The state with the closest race was Maryland. The political

divisions in the state were traditionally along geographical lines,

as had been the case in Virginia. The eastern shore of the Chesapeake (80)

Bay and the Potomac Valley were mostly Federalist, while the rest of the state was predominately Republican. As in Massachusetts and Vermont the Republicans had made steady gains in Maryland since 1800. By 1812 the party controlled the state's House of Assembly, the Governorship, and held~ 6-3 advantage in Representatives to Congress. Thi~ structure made victory seem certain for the Madisonians. But then disaster struck 31 at Baltimore.

In the weeks following the declaration of war, two riots occurred.

First, on June 22, the offices of the Federal Republican, the leading

Federalist newspaper of the middle Atlantic states, were demolished by a Republican mob after the paper printed an especially strong attack on the war. Five weeks of silence followed. Then, however, on July

26, a group of Federalists lodged themselves in a house in Baltimore.

This group consisted of Revolutionary War Generals Henry Lee and James M.

Lingan and other prominent figures. On the 27th they issued a denun­ ciation of the June 22 riot, and they maintained that there existed a conspiracy between national and local Republicans whose intention was to destroy the Federal Republican. These statements brought out a new mob. Both sides were heavily armed and in the ensuing exchange one

Republican was killed. Soon the militia arrived, the Federalists were taken into custody, and the mob dispersed. When the militia disbanded, however, the mob reassembled and on the night of July 28 they broke into the unprotected jail. The Federalists were severely beaten and 32 James Lingan was killed.

The result of the riots was that the public treated the slain

Federalists as martyrs. In the state election in October the Federalists (81)

won control of the House of delegates by a vote of 54-26, which would

outweigh the Republican Senate in a joint ballot. The Federalists, how­

ever, failed to make use of their advantage. Instead, the Federalists

quarreled among themselves. There had never been much support for

Clinton in Maryland. And when Alexander Hanson and Robert Goodloe

Harper supported the New Yorker, many Federalists rebelled. 33

The Presidential election saw Maryland's eleven presidential

electors being chosen by popular vote in nine electoral districts.

Madison won six and Clinton five. Madison, due to heavy majorities in

two counties, gained two electoral votes in the Federalist stronghold

of the eastern shore. The decline in Republican votes increased the

further the distance was from Baltimore and Annapolis which may have

shown the rural areas' distrust due to the summer riots. Federalist

gains came from the lower western shore, an area previously Republican,

and probably resulted from disenchantment with the war and some decrease 34 in grain markets.

(iv)

With the split in Maryland, Clinton needed victories in both 35 North Carolina and Ohio to unseat Madison. The Clintonians knew that

in all probability the chances of victory in North Carolina depended upon the method used to choose its electors. Since 1803 the state had used the district system, with the result that the Federalists in 36 1808 had won three of the fourteen electoral votes. But the

Republican controlled assembly of 1811-1812 abolished the district system of choosing presidential electors and replaced· it with their election by the General Assembly. This virtually guaranteed a sweep 37 of North Carolina's electoral vote by Madison in 1812. (82)

Many-people, including Republicans, were indignant over the arbitrary action of the assembly. County grand juries across the state condemned the action. This issue combined with the Presidential contest caused the summer legislative campaign to be the most active since

1800. After the August elections, the Republicans feared that the election law had split their party.38 When the election law was passed it was not known that Madison could afford to lose some electoral votes in the state. Thinking that a few votes might make a difference the Assembly had taken what turned out to be a great risk.

In fact, there was nothing to gain and much to lose.

The Federalists planned a campaign to take advantage of their new-found popularity. And by the end of August the state's Federalists had committed themselves to support Clinton, believing perhaps they could attract dissatisfied Republican legislators to their cause. 39

It soon became obvious that Republicans who opposed the electoral law would not necessarily back Clinton. Also, the Federalist gains in the August elections were deceptive. They had gained only ten seats in the House and two in the Senate. The greatest Federalist victories centered on a group of ten central Atlantic coast counties near Newbern, and a group of eleven counties in the northern Piedmont. In these areas they elected thirty-three assemblymen, fifteen more than the previous year's figure. The Federalists •retained the loyalty of those in the South

Central Fayetteville Congressional district, but in the other half of the state the Federalists actually lost five seats in the assembly. 40 Overall, the party had only nine against the Republicans' eighty-five. (83)

Faced with this situation, the Federalists attempted to salvage some part of their position by persuading the state 0 assembly to repeal the electoral law. To accomplish this end, the Federalists hoped to induce a leading Republican to become Clinton's running-mate in the state. Governor Hawkins, ex-Governor Stone, and Nathaniel Macon were all mentioned. In particular, much effort went into attempting to persuade Governor Hawkins. Hawkins did not completely agree with

Madison's war policies, but he was a member of the "Warren Junta" and he remained loyal to the Madison Administration. And without Hawkins' assistance in calling a special session of the legislature to try to revoke the electoral law there was little chance of overcoming the 41 Madisonian position.

To compound the Federalists' problem a story circulated by

Madisonians said that two Clintonian agents had arrived in North Carolina with funds to bribe the assembly. And Clinton's ambivalent war 42 position did not set well with the staunchly pro-war state. When election returns showed that a complete sweep was needed by Clinton in North Carolina to win the election, the challenge to Madison quickly began to crumble. When the Assembly met in early November to cast their ballots for Presidential electors there was no doubt that the Clintonian plans for capturing the state's electoral support had failed. The

Republican caucus whipped its members into line and the President won by an overwhelming vote of 130-60, with even some Federalists 43 voting for Madison. (84)

(v)

Despite the crushing news of the defeat in North Carolina, some

Clintonians, even as late as the middle of December, hoped for eventual victory. This last, desperate chance was based on the fact that Ohio, which had been won by Madison, had lost one of its electoral votes because of the absence·of one elector. In addition,

Pennsylvania had four vacancies occur among its chosen electors, and the state legislature had appointed new electors after the legally set deadline for such appointments. Thus, the Clintonians considered them to be illegal, and therefore; they also felt that this caused the rest of Pennsylvania's electors to be illegal.since they had all voted together. This interpretation did not hold up.

All pf Pennsylvania's electoral votes were declared valid, and Clinton 44 ran out of time and votes. (85)

FOOTNOTES Chapter X

l Brant, President 1809-1812, p. 455 •

.2 Victor A. Sapia, "Pennsylvania: Protagonist of the War of 1812," (Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1965), p. 216. 3 Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch, pp. 259-260, 262. 4 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 5 william G: Morgan, "Presidential Nominations in the Federal Era, 1788-1828," p. 210.

6Independent American, 6 October 1812. 7 Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 258. 8 Ibid., pp. 258-259; Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch, pp. 261-262. In Pennsylvania: "(t)he Republica~ correspondence committee of that state, through John Binns of the Democratic Press, was furnishing campaign material to similar committees throughout the nation. On September 16 it issued an eight-column reply to the New York City Clintonian committee's address to the people. The chief Clintonian writer was Thomas Addis Emmet, noted Irish refugee, to whom Clinton had just given the office of state attorney general. Binns too was an exile from Ireland- the former tenant, said the Columbian, of twenty-one jails in succession, and deserving of the penitentiary for life." Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, pp. 107-108.

9Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch, p. 262. 10 on August 19, 1812, General William Hull surrendered more than two thousand troops and large quantities of supplies to Major General Sir Isaac Brock at Detroit. The surrender came despite a fairly strong position by ::the Americans and without battle being offered to the British. John K. Mahon, The War of _1812, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), p. 50. 11 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, pp. 104, 106. 12 Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, l October 1812, Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 187. (86)

13National Intelligencer, 10 September 1812. 14 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, pp. 104, 106. 15 Eustis and Secretary Hamilton had their resignations accepted in December 1812, after the election had been decided. 16 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 104. 17 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 17 April 1812- 29 June 1812 - 5 August 1812, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 139-140, 173, 183. In explaining his position in full on the grain shipments, Jefferson stated: "You doubt whether we ought to permit the exportation of grain to our enemies; but Great Britain, with her own agricultural support, and those she can command by her access into every sea, cannot be starved by withholding our supplies. And if she is to be fed at all events, why may we not have the benefit of it as well as others? I would not, indeed, feed her armies landed on our territory, because the difficulty of inland subsistence is what will prevent their ever penetrating far into the country, and will confine them to the sea coast. But this would be my only exception. And as to feeding her armies on the peninsula, she is fighting our sea battles there, as Bonaparte is on the Baltic. He is shutting out her manufactures from that sea, and so far assisting us in her reduction to extremity. But if she does not keep him out of the peninsula, if he gets full command of that, instead of the greatest and surest of all our markets, as that has uniformly been, we shall be excluded from it, or so much shackled by his tyranny and ignorant caprices, that it will become for us what France now is. Besides, if we could by starving the English armies, oblige them to withdraw from the peninsula, it would be to send them here; and I think we had better feed there for pay, than feed and fight them here for nothing. A truth, too, not to be lost sight of is, that no country can pay war taxes if you suppress all their resources. To keep the war popular, we must keep open the markets. As long as good prices can be had, the people will support the war cheerfully." Thomas Jefferson to James Ronaldson, 12 January 1813, Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 205-206. 18 Victor A. Sapio, "Expansion and Economic Depression as Factors in Pennsylvania's Support of the War of 1812: An Application of the Pratt and Taylor Theses to the Keystone State," Pennsylvania History 35 (October 1968); 387-388. lg Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 109. 20 rbid., pp. 108-109. (87)

21 National Intelligencer, 15 October 1812. Initially, in response to the pressure, Duane had written: "We have received some upbraidings and reproaches, and not a little of abuse for not taking a more vigorous part in the election, to our petulant censors we recommend Judge Peter's story -?nd adage -- 'Let very well alone. "' 22 Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch, p. 267.

23Ibid., pp. 265-266. 24 Ibid., p. 267. 25 sapio, "Pennsylvania: Protagonist of the War of 1812," p. 4. Congressman William Crawford of Pennsylvania, in defending the Republican Congressional caucus nomination of Madison, stated: "In their private capacities alone did they meet, nominate, and recommend the present chief magistrate again as a candidate for the public favor." National Intelligencer, 20 October 1812. 26 National Intelligencer, 24 October 1812. In 1802 Clinton had been attacked for associating with just the opposite type of group - the Jacobin related Illuminati. An accuser at that time wrote concerning this supposed connection: "They (the Columbian Illuminati) all attached themselves to the interest.of Mr. De Witt Clinton, judging, probably by a knowledge of his cousin Denniston, that he would be favorable to their cause, and Mr. Clinton, in turn, appears not to be ungrateful. He has been the means of displacing several worthy christians, to make way for them; and he bestows in bountiful measure, all his patronage to support their political paper, the American Citizen. Nothing can prove more distinctly the mutual affection and sympathy which exist between Mr. Clinton and the Columbian Illuminati, than these acts of Kindness." John Wood, A Full Exposition of the Clintonian Faction and the Society of the Columbian Illuminati; with an account of the writer of the Narrative and the Characters of his Certificate Men, as also remarks on Warren's Pamphlet, (Newark: Printed for the author, 1802), p. 48. 27 Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch, pp. 267-268; Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 267; Sapia, "Pennsylvania: Protagonist of the War of 1812," p. 221. 28 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 111. 29 National Intelligencer, 3 November 1812.

30Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 111. (88)

31 Risjord, "Election of 1812," pp. 267-268. 32 Richard Buel, Jr., Securing the Revolution Ideology in American Politics 1789-1815, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 286-287. 33 Risjord, "Election of 1812," p. 268. 34 Ibid., pp, 268-269. 35 Even before the North Carolina vote, the Madisonians were confident of victory. The National Intelligencer on November 10 commented: "The reign of anarchy will soon be at an end, and the arts of deception cease. Order and union will be re­ established; and the people will no longer be abused by falsehood, or cheated by misrepresentation. We congratulate our readers on a prospect so auspicious to· the interest of the nation, and to the ascendancy of Republican principles." National Intelligencer, 10 November 1812. 36 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, p. 148; Risjord, "Election of 1812, 11 p. 270. 37 West, "John Steele: Portrait of a Moderate Bouthern Federalist," pp. 301-302. 38 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, p. 149. 39 Risjord, "Election of 1812," p·. 271. 40 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, p. 150. 41 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, pp. 105-106; West, "John Steele: Portrait of a Moderate Southern Federalist," pp. 304, 307; Risjord, The Old Republicans, p. 148. 42 West, "John Steele: Portrait of a Moderate Southern Federalist," p. 311. "Besides the many reports circulated in conversation of missions to North Carolina, & c. a letter just received from a respectable so~rce in New York says, 'if money can buy the votes of North Carolina, De Witt Clinton will have them.' North Carolinians are not venal; Walpole's maxim, which we have of late often heard quoted, 'that every man has his price,' applies only to fools and knaves." National Intelligencer, 19 November 1812. (89)

43 Broussard, The Southern Federalists, pp. 150-151. 44 McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, 4: 201-202. THE END RESULT: AN EVALUATION

Nationally, Madison won 128 electoral votes to Clinton's eighty-nine. The election had been sectional. Every state located

east of the Delaware river (save Vermont) gave its electoral vote to

Clinton. And every state south and west of the Delaware river (save 1 Delaware) gave its electoral vote to Madison. Maryland divided.

From New Hampshire to Delaware, and including part of Maryland,

Clinton won the electoral vote of every seaboard·state. Madison carried

every other state in a contiguous but extensive grouping that spread

from Pennsylvania to Georgia, Louisiana, and Ohio, in addition to the 2 isolated Vermont. Of the original thirteen states New England gave

its forty-three votes for Clinton, the states south of the Potomac

gave fifty-nine votes for Madison, and the Middle States gave thirty­

one for Madison and forty-six for Clinton. This gave Madison ninety

and Clinton eighty-nine,.a virtual tie. But the five new states 3 gave their thirty-eight votes to Madison.

By the summer of 1812 there were three main viewpoints concerning

how American diplomacy should be oriented. Basically, the Madison

Administration believed that after the Louisiana Purchase and the

destruction of France's naval power at Trafalgar, the French were no

longer a threat to the United States' interests, but that Great 4 Britain remained a menace to those interests. . And a majority of

the Republican leaders throughout the nation, particularly in the

Republican strongholds of the South, West, and in Pennsylvania were

against making concessions to maintain peace. Therefore, any such (91)

ideas were discarded.

Federalists agreed that Britain's policies were restrictive in

regards to trading with countries on the continent, but they said that

Napoleon's decrees already closed those markets. Hence; the realistic

thing to do·was to trade under British regulations which still left the

rest of the world's marketplaces open. With the destruction of much of Europe's maritime fleet and with the promise of new markets

in the Spanish Empire, this avenue seemed even more to be the correct • 5 policy. Furthermore, they believed that war with England was mere

folly, and once it had begun they strove to end it immediately.

Within this conflict of opinions between the Federalists and

the Republicans, and with the added dissension within the Republicans'

own ·ranks, De Witt Clinton saw a chance to cap·ture the Presidency, which

had so long eluded New York and particularly his family. His

viewpoint was that the war should never have been started, but once it

had begun the most efficient administration should be in control.

Moreover, he was convinced that the Madison Administration was

unreasonably biased against Britain and too easily served France's

interests. Therefore, he felt that his election would be the quickest

way to bring about peace negotiations. Though unlike the Federalists,

he was willing to continue the prosecution of the war in order to obtain

just peace terms for the United States.

Historians analyzing the Clinton candidacy have been almost

unanimous in their condemnation. Such analyses tend to be inadequate

for they blame on one man what was in fact a national malady. Though

De Witt Clinton was ambitious for himself, he was also ambitious for (92) his state and for the North in general. De Witt Clinton was the product of twenty years of New York political discontent. In 1812 he attempted to·create a new opposition party to oppose the ruling

Virginia based party. In addition, despite what many historians have stated, the New Yorker was not politically inept. His ambitions were advanced by calculated decisions in which he weighed the conflicting political forces and developed a plan of operation that came close to success.

But the events that Clinton used to challenge Madison were also the events that prompted ·the President into actions that prevented the New Yorker from achieving victory. And as a result, the defeat of the forty-three year old Clinton brought an end to his national political career.

The crux of the election came down to whether Madison would decide for war against Great Britain. The malcontents within the party were the first to bring pressure on Madison to move in the direction of a more belligerent stand: And soon it was obvious that this met the desires of many of the.leaders in the controlling sections of the Republican party, They were desirous of a belligerent approach for a number of reasons including nationalistic, economic, and political ones. Thus, Madison felt that the actions by these malcontents would split the Republican party into peace and war factions.

Believing the war faction to be the stronger of the two, the President began taking control of the move towards belligerency.

Madison, like John Adams in 1799, was faced with a demand for war from within his party. Adams chose to suppress the movement though (93) it resulted in a split Federalist party and was a major factor in his failure to be reelected. Madison, however, whatever his feelings about a war, decided to take command of the pro-war forces. The

President succumbed to political expediency. In so doing, he saved his Presidency, he prevented the Republican party from being split apart, and he led the nation into a war that was perhaps avoidable,

Indeed, long-term preconditions for war, valid and not valid, existed, but the final decision for war·was determined by realpolitiks on the domestic political level not by realpolitiks in foreign affairs.

In fact, the domestic considerations actually forced the United States into diplomatic maneuvers that were premature at best. The President failed to balance ends and means. As New York Senator Obadiah German said during the war declaration debates: "Can we look for a blessing without the use of rational means? Can we expect to reap, if we neglect to sow? If we do, the crop will surely be briars, thorns, 6 and thistles."

A delay by Madison in asking for a declaration of war would have allowed the government more time to ready its war preparedness measures, it would have given the British more time to reconsider their 7 orders-in-council, and a delay would have enabled Madison to gain a more clear idea of Britain's position in Europe following France's attempted invasion of Russia. But politically Madison was on a very

tight schedule. Since the end of the Foster talks in 1811 the President

had not considered as desirable any delay in the push for war against

the British Empire. Under such circumstances, the untimely and ill- (94) prepared crusade was launched. America's true interests were relegated to second place behind the quest for political power. (95)

FOOTNOTES Chapter XI

1 McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, 4: 202. 2 Brant, Commander-in-Chief 1812-1836, p. 112. 3 carl R. Fish, The Development of American Nationality, (New York: American Book Company, 1913), p. 117; Homer C; Hockett, Political and Social History of the United States, Vol. 1: 1492-1828 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. 313. 4 Buel, Securing the Revolution, pp. 276-277. 5 Ibid., p. 277. 6 Norman A. Graebner, ed·., Ideas and Diplomacy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 1_67 .• 7 In fact, on June 16 the new British Ministry repealed the order-in-council. The Madison Administration, however, upon learning of the repeal in late August, said that the repeal was not satisfactory because the principle underlying the orders was still asserted. In reality, to have stopped the war would have again tpreatened to disinte­ grate the Republican party since the issue had been pushed so urgently by the President, culminating in a declaration of war, and thus raising the militaristic expectations of the nation. (96)

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