Verordnung Über Massnahmen Gegenüber Der Demokratischen Republik Kongo Vom 22

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Verordnung Über Massnahmen Gegenüber Der Demokratischen Republik Kongo Vom 22 946.231.12 Verordnung über Massnahmen gegenüber der Demokratischen Republik Kongo vom 22. Juni 2005 (Stand am 19. Dezember 2012) Der Schweizerische Bundesrat, gestützt auf Artikel 2 des Embargogesetzes vom 22. März 20021 (EmbG), in Ausführung der Resolutionen 1493 (2003), 1596 (2005) und 1807 (2008)2 des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen,3 verordnet: 1. Abschnitt: Zwangsmassnahmen Art. 1 Verbot der Lieferung von Rüstungsgütern und verwandtem Material 1 Die Lieferung, der Verkauf, die Durchfuhr und die Vermittlung von Rüstungs- gütern jeder Art, einschliesslich Waffen und Munition, Militärfahrzeuge und -aus- rüstung, paramilitärische Ausrüstung sowie Zubehör und Ersatzteile dafür, nach der Demokratischen Republik Kongo sind verboten. 2 Die Gewährung, der Verkauf und die Vermittlung von Beratung, Ausbildung oder Unterstützung, einschliesslich Finanzierung und finanzieller Unterstützung, im Zusammenhang mit der Lieferung, der Herstellung, dem Unterhalt oder der Ver- wendung von Rüstungsgütern nach Absatz 1 sowie mit militärischen Aktivitäten in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo sind verboten. 3 Von den Verboten der Absätze 1 und 2 sind ausgenommen: a. die Lieferung von Gütern und die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen für die Mission der Organisation der Vereinten Nationen in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo (MONUC); b. die Lieferung nichtletalen militärischen Geräts, das ausschliesslich für hu- manitäre oder Schutzzwecke bestimmt ist, und damit zusammenhängende technische Unterstützung und Ausbildung; c. die Lieferung von Gütern und die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen für staat- liche Organe der Demokratischen Republik Kongo; AS 2005 2551 1 SR 946.231 2 S/RES/1493 (2003), S/RES/1596 (2005) und S/RES/1807 (2008); www.un.org/en/documents/ 3 Fassung gemäss Ziff. I der V vom 25. Juni 2008, in Kraft seit 15. Juli 2008 (AS 2008 3185). 1 946.231.12 Aussenhandel d. die vorübergehende Ausfuhr von Schutzkleidung, einschliesslich kugelsiche- rer Westen und Helme, zur persönlichen Verwendung durch Personal der Vereinten Nationen und der Schweiz, Medienvertreter und humanitäres Per- sonal.4 3bis Die Lieferung von Gütern und die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen nach Ab- satz 3 Buchstaben b und c müssen dem Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO) mindestens 30 Tage im Voraus gemeldet werden.5 Art. 2 Sperrung von Geldern und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen 1 Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der Kon- trolle der natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach dem Anhang befinden, sind gesperrt. 2 Es ist verboten, den von der Sperrung betroffenen natürlichen Personen, Unter- nehmen und Organisationen Gelder zu überweisen oder Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen sonstwie direkt oder indirekt zur Verfügung zu stellen. 3 Ausnahmsweise kann das SECO nach Rücksprache mit den zuständigen Stellen des Eidgenössischen Departements des Äusseren und des Eidgenössischen Finanz- departements Zahlungen aus gesperrten Konten, Übertragungen gesperrter Vermö- genswerte sowie die Freigabe gesperrter wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen zur Wahrung schweizerischer Interessen oder zur Vermeidung von Härtefällen bewilligen. Art. 3 Begriffsbestimmungen In dieser Verordnung bedeuten: a. Gelder: finanzielle Vermögenswerte, einschliesslich Bargeld, Schecks, Geldforderungen, Wechsel, Geldanweisungen oder andere Zahlungsmittel, Guthaben, Schulden und Schuldenverpflichtungen, Wertpapiere und Schuld- titel, Wertpapierzertifikate, Obligationen, Schuldscheine, Optionsscheine, Pfandbriefe, Derivate; Zinserträge, Dividenden oder andere Einkünfte oder Wertzuwächse aus Vermögenswerten; Kredite, Rechte auf Verrechnung, Bürgschaften, Vertragserfüllungsgarantien oder andere finanzielle Zusagen; Akkreditive, Konnossemente, Sicherungsübereignungen, Dokumente zur Verbriefung von Anteilen an Fondsvermögen oder anderen Finanzressour- cen und jedes andere Finanzierungsinstrument für Exporte; b. Sperrung von Geldern: die Verhinderung jeder Handlung, welche die Ver- waltung oder die Nutzung der Gelder ermöglicht, mit Ausnahme von nor- malen Verwaltungshandlungen von Finanzinstituten; 4 Fassung gemäss Ziff. I der V vom 25. Juni 2008, in Kraft seit 15. Juli 2008 (AS 2008 3185). 5 Eingefügt durch Ziff. I der V vom 25. Juni 2008, in Kraft seit 15. Juli 2008 (AS 2008 3185). 2 Massnahmen gegenüber dem Kongo 946.231.12 c. wirtschaftliche Ressourcen: Vermögenswerte jeder Art, unabhängig davon, ob sie materiell oder immateriell, beweglich oder unbeweglich sind, insbe- sondere Immobilien und Luxusgüter, mit Ausnahme von Geldern nach Buchstabe a; d. Sperrung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen: die Verhinderung ihrer Verwendung zum Erwerb von Geldern, Waren oder Dienstleistungen, einschliesslich des Verkaufs, des Vermietens oder des Verpfändens solcher Ressourcen. Art. 4 Ein- und Durchreiseverbot 1 Die Einreise in die Schweiz oder die Durchreise durch die Schweiz ist den im Anhang aufgeführten natürlichen Personen verboten. 2 Das Bundesamt für Migration kann in Übereinstimmung mit den Beschlüssen des zuständigen Komitees des UNO-Sicherheitsrates oder zur Wahrung schweizerischer Interessen Ausnahmen gewähren. 2. Abschnitt: Vollzug und Strafbestimmungen Art. 5 Kontrolle und Vollzug 1 Das SECO überwacht den Vollzug der Zwangsmassnahmen nach den Artikeln 1 und 2. Entsprechend der Resolution 1807 (2008) meldet es dem zuständigen Komi- tee des UNO-Sicherheitsrates vorgängig die Lieferung von Gütern und die Erbrin- gung von Dienstleistungen nach Artikel 1 Absatz 3 Buchstaben b und c.6 2 Das Bundesamt für Migration überwacht den Vollzug des Ein- und Durchreise- verbots nach Artikel 4. 3 Die Kontrolle an der Grenze obliegt der Eidgenössischen Zollverwaltung. 4 Die zuständigen Behörden ergreifen auf Anweisung des SECO die für die Sper- rung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen notwendigen Massnahmen, zum Beispiel die Anmerkung einer Verfügungssperre im Grundbuch oder die Pfändung oder Versie- gelung von Luxusgütern. Art. 6 Meldepflichten 1 Personen und Institutionen, die Gelder halten oder verwalten oder von wirtschaft- lichen Ressourcen wissen, von denen anzunehmen ist, dass sie unter die Sperrung nach Artikel 2 Absatz 1 fallen, müssen dies dem SECO unverzüglich melden. 2 Die Meldungen müssen die Namen der Begünstigten sowie Gegenstand und Wert der gesperrten Gelder und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen enthalten. 6 Fassung gemäss Ziff. I der V vom 25. Juni 2008, in Kraft seit 15. Juli 2008 (AS 2008 3185). 3 946.231.12 Aussenhandel Art. 7 Strafbestimmungen 1 Wer gegen Artikel 1, 2 oder 4 verstösst, wird nach Artikel 9 EmbG bestraft. 2 Wer gegen Artikel 6 verstösst, wird nach Artikel 10 EmbG bestraft. 3 Verstösse nach den Artikeln 9 und 10 EmbG werden vom SECO verfolgt und beurteilt; dieses kann Beschlagnahmungen oder Einziehungen anordnen. 3. Abschnitt: Inkrafttreten Art. 8 Diese Verordnung tritt am 23. Juni 2005 in Kraft. 4 Massnahmen gegenüber dem Kongo 946.231.12 Anhang7 (Art. 2 Abs. 1 und 4 Abs. 1) Natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Massnahmen nach den Artikeln 2 und 4 richten A. Natürliche Personen NACHNAME VORNAME ALIAS GEBURTS- REISEPASS / IDENTIFIZIERUNGS- FUNKTION / BEGRÜNDUNG DATUM / -ORT INFORMATIONEN BWAMBALE Frank Kakolele Frank Kakorere Congolese Former RCD-ML leader, Frank Kakorere FARDC General, without exercising influence over Bwambale posting as of June 2011. policies and maintaining command and control over Left the CNDP in January 2008. the activities of RCD-ML As of June 2011, resides in forces, one of the armed Kinshasa. groups and militias referred Since 2010, Kakolele has ben to in paragraph 20 of Res. involved in activities apparently 1493 (2003), responsible for on behalf of the DRC govern- trafficking of arms, in vio- ment’s Programme de Stabili- lation of the arms embargo. sation et Reconstruction des Zones Sortant des Conflits Armés (STAREC), including participation in a STAREC mission to Goma and Beni in March 2011. 7 Fassung gemäss Ziff. I der V des EVD vom 4. Mai 2012 (AS 2012 2587). Bereinigt gemäss Ziff. I der V des EVD vom 22. Nov. 2012 (AS 2012 6633) und vom 17. Dez. 2012, in Kraft seit 19. Dez. 2012 (AS 2012 7447). 5 Aussenhandel 946.231.12 NACHNAME VORNAME ALIAS GEBURTS- REISEPASS / IDENTIFIZIERUNGS- FUNKTION / BEGRÜNDUNG DATUM / -ORT INFORMATIONEN IYAMUREMYE Gaston Rumuli 1948 Rwandan According to multiple sour- Byiringiro Musanze District FDLR President and 2nd Vice- ces, including the UNSC DRC Sanctions Committee’s Victor Rumuli (Northern President of FDLR-FOCA Province), Group of Experts, Gaston Victor Rumuri As of June 2011, based at Iyamuremye is the second Rwanda kalonge, North Kivu Province. Michel Byiringiro vice president of the FDLR Ruhengeri, Brigadier General and is considered a core Rwanda member of the FDLR milita- ry and political leadership. Gaston Iyamuremye also ran Ignace Murwanashyaka’s (President of the FDLR) office in Kibua, DRC until December 2009. KAINA Innocent Colonel Innocent Kaina Bunagana, Innocent Kaina is currently a «India Queen» Rutshuru terri- Sector commander in the tory, Democratic Mouvement du 23 Mars Republic of the (M23). He is responsible for Congo and has committed serious violations of international law and human rights. In July 2007 the Garrison Military Tribunal of Kinshasa found Kaina responsible for crime against humanity committed in the District of Ituri, be- tween May 2003 and Decem- ber 2005. He was released in 2009 as part of the peace agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP. Within the FARDC in 2009, he has been 6 Massnahmen gegenüber dem Kongo
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