APPENDIX 4 THE " LINE"—A STUDY IN WARTIM E POLITICS

N the course of an electioneering campaign in Victoria in October 1942 , I the Minister for Labour and National Service, Mr Ward, was reporte d to have stated that when the Curtin Government took office there was in existence a plan, formulated by its predecessors, for the abandonmen t of an important section of northern without firing a single shot . ' Messrs Menzies, Fadden, Hughes, McEwen and McBride, all member s of the two previous Governments, made public statements denying th e allegation. On 12th November they also expressed their serious concer n in the . Menzies referred to the special difficult y presented by the fact that the statement had been made by a responsibl e Minister and that it could be answered only by a complete expositio n of secret military plans—a disclosure that no one was in a position to make . At this meeting the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, told the Council that h e had sent a telegram to Ward, that he would see him on the subject, an d that Ward should not have made the statement.2 It can only be assumed that Curtin was unable to discipline his Minister, for Ward kept on repeating the statement with minor variations and by May 1943 his allegation had taken the form of a statement tha t a line—the ""—had been drawn north of Brisbane and that the Menzies and Fadden Governments had the "defeatist plan" o f withdrawing behind this line in the event of an invasion . During the public controversy which followed, the members of th e Opposition found a further cause for complaint in the fact that the Prim e Minister, who as a member of the Advisory War Council under th e previous administration would have been in a position to know what wa s or was not planned, still did not publicly disavow Ward's charges but , by his silence, seemed to give them credence . After repeated protests to him by the Leader of the Opposition (Fadden), Curtin did write to Fadden on 27th May saying : "On Japan coming into the war the Commander- in-Chief of the Home Forces submitted to the Minister for the Arm y proposals relating to the defence of Australia, the essence of which wa s concentration on the defence of the vital parts of Australia. This involve d holding what is known as the Brisbane Line ." Elsewhere in his letter , which was widely published in the metropolitan press of 28th May, Curtin mentioned that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces had bee n appointed by the Menzies Government, and that his submission had bee n rejected by the Curtin Government which "took steps to defend the whole of the continent" .

Argus, 27 Oct 1942 . 'Advisory War Council Minute 1102, 12 Nov 1942 .

712 THE " BRISBANE LINE " This absence of an outright disavowal of Ward's charge and the linkin g of the Menzies Government with the name of the general who had put up the plan was regarded by the Leader of the Opposition as "a cunnin g piece of evasion" . 3 During early June 1943 there was warm discussion of the subject in th e Advisory War Council and at one time it seemed as though the non - Government members might leave the Council in protest if the publi c discrediting of them by a Minister was not corrected . In response to a request made by Fadden in a letter of 28th May, and by Spender, a former Minister for the Army, at a meeting of the Council on 13th May 4 the Prime Minister produced and Advisory War Council records to a meeting of the Advisory War Council in on 3rd June . In the meantime, in the course of a broadcast from a commercial radio station on 1st June, Ward had said : "I do not withdraw one word of what I have said about the Brisbane Line", and "I lay two charges against the Menzies and Fadden Governments—first, I charge them with creatin g a position in this country which necessitated the contemplation of suc h a defeatist plan, and secondly, I charge them with becoming so pani c stricken as the threat of invasion increased, that they turned to a treacherous plan under which large portions of Australia were to be given away t o the enemy. In the course of the Council meeting on 3rd June, according to th e official minute, Curtin said that the only plan relating to the Brisban e Line of which he had knowledge was that submitted by the Commander- in-Chief of the Home Forces, Lieut-General Sir Ivcn Mackay, in Februar y 1942 ; that Ward had no access to the relevant documents ; and there had been no leakage of information from Ministers on the War Cabinet an d the Advisory War Council . Non-Government members stated that th e documents disproved Ward's allegations by showing that the plan whic h had been attributed by Ward to the Menzies and Fadden Government s was made in February 1942, four months after Curtin took office . The Prime Minister should make it clear that no such plan had existed durin g the term of office of the Menzies and Fadden Governments . During discussion in the Council reference was also made to the plans for the evacuation of the civil population and essential industr y from vulnerable areas, which had been discussed by the Advisory Wa r Council and the Premiers of the States in February 1942, and to evacuatio n plans which were consequently formulated in Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia. These plans had also been mentioned in the public controversy arising from Ward's charges, but Council member s observed, first, that the plans related to civil evacuation of potential battl e areas (not to the military abandonment of a territory) and nothing ha d emanated from them which bore any relation to the strategic conceptio n

a Argus, 28 May 1943 . 4 Advisory War Council Minute 1198, 13 May 1943 . The full text of the broadcast is in the Century, 4 Jun 1943, p . 7 .

THE " BRISBANE LINE " 713 of the "Brisbane Line" to which Ward referred; second, these plans, too, belonged to the period of February 1942, and not to the term of office of the Menzies and Fadden Governments . Non-Government members referred to the difficulty they had in refutin g the charges of Ward in regard to the state of the forces during the ter m of office of the Fadden Government without revealing information o f value to the enemy. When the question was raised of tabling the papers relating to the "Brisbane Line" the Prime Minister objected that it wa s important in wartime to keep faith with the military leaders, that the secrecy of the information in the papers would preclude the tabling o f the documents and that it would be unfair to the Chiefs of Staff, as the Government's military advisers, to publish the advice they had tendered .° During a no-confidence debate in the House of Representatives on 22n d June, Fadden again called on the Prime Minister to repudiate th e "slanderous campaign" conducted by Ward, but Curtin replied with a general description of the situation that had confronted his own Govern- ment when Japan attacked . Menzies pressed the point harder : "I put this to the Prime Minister : Every record of the Department of the Army and every relative record of the Advisory War Council have been searched, and there is no such plan before February 1942 . That is a fact." Curtin answered by interjection: "I said that. I stated that the plan was put to my Government ."' Later in the debate, Ward, while "not contradicting or denying tha t the available records disclose that the first plan was dated 4th Februar y 1942", added that he was "most reliably informed that one importan t report is now missing from the official files" .8 After receiving a certificate from the departmental officers concerne d and an assurance from the Minister for the Army (Forde), the Prime Minister stated in the House on 24th June that all the records of th e War Cabinet, the Advisory War Council, Army Department and Defenc e Department were complete and no unauthorised person had ever ha d access to them . He added : "The information given to the Minister fo r Labour and National Service is therefore incorrect . The Minister for the Army and I have discussed the matter with [Mr Ward], who withdraws the statement, which he made in the belief that it was made on reliabl e information." The "withdrawal" by Ward, however, was equivocal . He said: "Last night I conferred with the Prime Minister and the Minister for the Army . In the course of the talk I received an assurance from [Mr Curtin] tha t no document is missing from the files . I unreservedly accept that assuranc e and I am satisfied that the document to which I was referring on Tuesday night is still in existence . My references to the document have been seized upon by members of the Opposition as a device for disguising the rea l

e Advisory War Council Minute 1202, 3 Jun 1943 . ',Commonwealth Debates, Vol 175, p . 38 . s Commonwealth Debates, Vol 175, pp. 574 .

714 THE " BRISBANE LINE " issue. The real issue is whether my charges against the former Prime Ministers are or are not true . These charges still stand." 9 During a debate on a motion for the adjournment of the House, move d by Spender, Curtin, who was clearly embarrassed, repeated that no document was missing and that the information given to the Ministe r was incorrect. The motion for the adjournment failed by 28 to 29, afte r Coles, the Independent, had been noticed to hesitate before voting wit h the Government . Fadden immediately gave notice of a motion for a Roya l Commission .' Later in the evening Coles advised Curtin of his opinion tha t an inquiry should be granted . In debate on a motion to resolve the Hous e into a Committee of Supply it also became obvious that the Oppositio n would use Ward's allegations as the grounds for a further challenge t o the Government and, late at night, Curtin announced that he was read y to constitute a of Inquiry and that Ward had bee n asked to refrain from carrying on his duties until the report of the Roya l Commission was tabled in Parliament . At a still later stage of the meetin g of the House Curtin indicated his intention to ask for an almost immediate dissolution. 2 Mr Justice Lowe of the Supreme Court of Victoria was appointed Roya l Commissioner to inquire into and report on the following matters : 1 . The statement "I am most reliably informed that one important report is now missing from the official files" made by the Minister of State for Labour and National Service in the House of Representatives on the 22nd June 1943, in the course o f the debate in that House concerning the matter known as "The Brisbane Line" . 2. The question whether that Minister was informed in the terms or to the effec t specified in the statement set out above. 3 . If that Minister was so informed (a) the particulars of the information given to that Minister and referred to in the statement set out above; and (b) the questions as to the person by whom, the circumstances under which , and the reason why, that information was given to that Minister . 4. The question whether any document concerning the matter known as "Th e Brisbane Line" is missing from the official files specified in the statement set ou t above and, if so, the particulars of the document . 3 Before the Commission had been issued, Ward had taken the stand that he was not a "squealer" and would not divulge the name of th e person who had given him his information ." "All I ask for is that the Royal Commission which is to be set up shall be given the widest terms possibl e and that I be given a fair chance to give the country all the facts that I possess." 5 After the terms of the inquiry were announced he proteste d in the House, describing the inquiry as farcical and making it plain tha t what he wanted was an opportunity to repeat his charges about th e

Commonwealth Debates, Vol 175, p . 316. 1 Commonwealth Debates, Vol 175, pp . 316-26 . v Commonwealth Debates, Vol 175, pp . 333 and 353 . =Commonwealth Gazette, No . 141, 30 Jun 1943 ; Commonwealth Debates, Vol 175, p . 572 . ' Sydney Morning Herald, 26 and 28 Jun 1943 . a Canberra Times, 28 Jun 1943 .

THE " BRISBANE LINE " 715 "Brisbane Line" and to prove "the responsibility of the Menzies-Fadden Government for the Brisbane Line strategy" .° At the outset of the Royal Commission's work, Ward's counsel, J . V. Barry,' submitted that the whole of the questions upon which Mr Justice Lowe was asked to report were beyond the power of the Commission t o deal with, on the ground that they arose out of and necessarily depende d upon a statement made by Mr Ward in Parliament . The Royal Commis- sioner, while reco g nising that parliamentary privilege debarred him from compelling Ward to attend or give evidence, ruled that it did not deba r him from investigating the truth or otherwise of any aspersion upo n persons who were not members of Parliament or officers of either Hous e of Parliament. In the absence of any evidence from Ward, however, hi s findings were limited to the conclusions that the Minister was not informe d by any officer who had the custody of the official files or by any member of the Defence Committee or by any of the Chiefs of Staff Committee ; and that no document concerning the matter known as the "Brisbane Line" was on 22nd June 1943 or was now missing from the official files . The Royal Commissioner did not investigate the contents of the files. Mr Ward continued to repeat his various statements and charges agains t the Menzies and Fadden Governments up to and throughout the general election campaign of August 1943, and when the Cabinet was forme d after the elections he was again a Minister . The main points which emerge from a thorough examination of thos e papers which were placed before the Royal Commissioner and found by him to be complete, and of other War Cabinet and Advisory Wa r Council papers, are : First, that any proposals not to reinforce the defences of outlyin g parts of the Australian mainland but to concentrate on the defence o f the vital areas were military proposals, emanating from a consideratio n of military factors and relating to the resources available and the militar y situation which was faced at a certain stage of hostilities, namely th e situation in February 1942. Second, the minutes of the War Cabinet and Advisory War Council sho w that no proposals of this kind came under the notice of these bodies until General Mackay's paper and General Sturdee's comments were pre- sented in February 1942 . Third, these proposals were rejected by a political decision on which both Government and non-Government members were a greed. Fourth, Curtin and the Labour Ministers who were members of th e War Cabinet and had previously been members of the Advisory Wa r Council under Menzies and Fadden are nowhere recorded in officia l papers as giving any support to Ward's charges or of raising any objection on the ground of fact to the categorical denial of those charges b y Menzies and Fadden .

° Commonwealth Debates, Vol 175, pp . 572-3, 30 Jun 1943 . ? Hon Sir John Barry . Conducted inquiry into cessation of Papuan Administration in 1942 ; Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria 1947-69; senior Puisne Judge 1966-69 . Of Armadale, Vic ; b . Albury, NSW, 13 Jun 1903 . Died 8 Nov 1969 .

716 THE " BRISBANE LINE " An examination of these and other records of the War Cabinet an d Advisory War Council supports the opinion that, if there had been any discussions of this kind earlier than February 1942—and the document s do not disclose any evidence of such discussions—they would have bee n discussions at the level of military planning and would have been tentative and speculative, being directed towards an imagined contingency and not to an existing situation or to a situation that was in clear prospect . No evidence was discoverable that any such hypothetical case of the militar y abandonment of part of the continent ever reached the War Cabinet o r Advisory War Council during the terms of the Menzies and Fadde n Governments or that any political drectioni on the subject was ever give n to the military planners . Up to the time the Curtin Government too k office and for nearly two months afterwards the main subjects of politica l discussion regarding the defence of Australia in the event of war in th e Far East were the strengthening of Singapore, British naval reinforcements , the aid of the , the Malayan barrier, and the deterren t effect of the strength of the Soviet Union . The problem of the defence o f the Australian mainland was still seen as being primarily a defence against raids. It was not until Japan had crippled the Allied navies, taken Singapore and was in process of reducing the Malay barrier and the prospect o f Soviet intervention had faded, that the fears of an early large-scal e invasion became real. In this new situation, and at a time when th e expected aircraft supplies and naval and air reinforcements were lacking , the necessity of withdrawing from part of the continent was placed befor e Ministers by their military advisers . As is shown in South-West Pacific Area—First Year,' the principl e of concentrating defence on key industrial areas was one of long standin g in the discussion of Australian defence and the army leaders had studie d the application of the principle for many years. Any alert member of Parliament might well have known in general terms about such discussions . It could not be described as defence policy, however, for that policy, base d on the strength of the British Navy and Singapore, assumed consistentl y that the role of the Australian Army would be primarily one of defence against raids, not against large-scale invasion . Defence against raids was th e only role of the army mentioned in the appreciations that reached Govern- ments from their senior military advisers up to the time when the enem y advance in Malaya and the capture of Rabaul, following heavy British and American naval losses, changed the whole basis of Australia n defence policy. Whether Ward's charges were justified or whether they were, as described by the Opposition, "a wicked invention" cannot be determine d without stating them more precisely than he ever did . He created a bad impression rather than laying a definite charge . On one occasion he sai d that "during the term of the previous Federal Government a strategic plan was formed which included the sacrificing of part of northern Aus -

s By D . McCarthy, pp . 6-8, in the Army series of this history .

THE " BRISBANE LINE " 717 tralia to an invader" . In that he would have been correct if he intended to convey that at various times and at various levels of military plannin g such plans had been made in application of the principle of concentratio n in defence. They were made during the term of previous Governments bu t not by them. When, however, he charged the Menzies and Fadden Govern- ments with "responsibility" for such plans he was not justified for ther e is no record that any Government accepted such a plan or that such a plan was even considered by a Government before February 1942 . The way in which the charges were originally made and persistentl y repeated suggests that Ward was wilfully and maliciously distorting the truth in order to gain political advantage . The fact that he persisted in his charges to the embarrassment of his own party leader leaves th e historian in some doubt as to whether the only advantage he was trying to gain was the besmirching of the Opposition parties on the approac h of an election. The action of Ward in creating a false impression fo r political advantage was not novel . The novelty was in Curtin's conduct . His failure on this occasion to repudiate firmly suggestions which he must have known to be untrue fell below his customarily high standards o f honesty and courage .