Lindsay Rettler: Faith, Belief, and Control
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 55, Number 1, January 2018 FAITH, BELIEF, AND CONTROL Lindsay Rettler Abstract In this paper, I solve a puzzle generated by three conflicting claims about the relationship between faith, belief, and control: according to (1) the Identity Thesis, faith is a type of belief, and accord- ing to (2) Fideistic Voluntarism, we sometimes have control over whether or not we have faith, but according to (3) Doxastic Involuntarism, we never have control over what we believe. To solve the puzzle, I argue that the Identity Thesis is true, but that either (2) or (3) is false, depending on how we understand “control.” I distinguish two notions of control: direct intention- based control and indirect reflective control. I argue that though we have direct intention- based control over neither belief nor faith, we have indirect reflective control over each of them. Moreover, indirect reflective control helps explain how we can be held accountable for each. Introduction have indirect reflective control over both faith and belief, we have direct intention-based In this paper, I solve a puzzle about the control over neither. I proceed by address- nature of faith. Here are three common views ing each thesis in turn. In § 1, I argue for the about the connections between belief, faith, Identity Thesis and defend it from objections. and control: In § 2, I provide the motivation for thinking (1) Identity Thesis: Faith is a kind of belief. that Doxastic Involuntarism is true, provided (2) Doxastic Involuntarism: We never have that we understand doxastic control as direct control over what we believe. intention- based control, which is a form of (3) Fideistic Voluntarism: We sometimes have control that we have over our actions. In § 3, control over whether or not we have faith. I provide the strongest motivation for thinking Though each is well- motivated, together that under that same interpretation of control, they form an inconsistent triad. So, we must Fideistic Voluntarism is also true. In brief, abandon at least one of them. Call this the positing this control helps explain two main Control Puzzle. practices we regularly engage in with respect I aim to solve this puzzle by arguing that (1) to faith. However, I then mount an argument is true, but either (2) or (3) is false depending against the view that we have direct intention- on how we understand “control.” I distinguish based control over whether we have faith, two notions of control: direct intention- based which leaves us with the need to explain these control and indirect reflective control. Once practices some other way. In § 4, I offer this we clarify the sort of control we have over explanation by defending the view that we faith and belief, it becomes clear that we have have indirect reflective control over whether the same kind of control over each: while we we have faith. Thus, the tension between the ©2018 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois APQ 55_1 text.indd 95 1/5/18 10:35 AM 96 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUArtERLY three theses that generate the Control Puzzle Let me offer three important clarifications is resolved when we properly disambiguate of the Identity Thesis to avoid confusion. the sort of control at issue. First, while every faith- state is a belief- state, Before I proceed, let me clarify that the it’s not the case that according to the Identity sense of faith that I’m concerned with is faith Thesis, every belief- state is a faith-state. To as an attitude or mental state rather than a illustrate via analogy, faith is to belief what set of doctrines or an ideology. In particular, dogs are to animals: while every dog is an I focus on propositional faith—faith that p. animal, it is not the case that every animal This is the sort of faith at issue when we is a dog. It’s important to recognize that the say, for example: “She has faith that her son Identity Thesis is not claiming that belief is will do the right thing.” “He has faith that sufficient for faith. It’s simply claiming that he’ll survive.” “I have faith that God exists.” any state that plays the faith role must include My discussion applies to both religious the state that plays the belief role. and nonreligious faith. Propositional faith Second, the Identity Thesis does not claim is distinct from objectual faith, which is that faith is merely a kind of belief; instead, having faith in a person or object.1 It’s also the thesis is consistent with the claim that distinct from being faithful or keeping faith faith is a kind of belief inter alia. In particular, with someone. Though these forms of faith it’s likely that propositional faith is also a type are all connected in interesting ways, I limit of pro- attitude, such as a desire.4 If I hate the discussion to propositional faith, because idea of my preferred third- party candidate such faith is plausibly a more basic unit of losing the presidential election, I can hardly faith than the other forms.2 Also, the Identity be said to have faith that she will lose, even Thesis is most plausible for propositional if I believe that she will. These types of cases faith. support the view that a person has faith that p only if she has some kind of pro- attitude 1. The Identity Thesis toward the proposition p. Additionally, one I begin with the Identity Thesis, according might hold that a person has faith that p only to which faith is a kind of belief. In what if she has some kind of intention to act as if follows, I explain the thesis in more detail, p were true. In that case, having faith that p show how it has figured in the literature on is also, inter alia, a kind of intention. For the faith and belief thus far, and defend it from purposes of this paper, I remain neutral with an objection. respect to the relationship between faith and As mentioned above, I conceive of faith, other attitudes and mental states. I focus on like belief, as a mental state. A prominent the relationship between faith and belief, as way to individuate mental states is in terms stated in the Identity Thesis.5 of their functional roles. Beliefs are different Third, the Identity Thesis is neutral with than say, desires or wishes, because beliefs respect to the specific belief that faith is. Thus function differently than desires and wishes. faith that p might be identified with belief According to this sort of analytic functional- that p, where one believes the proposition ism about mental states, to claim that faith is that one has faith in. Alternatively, faith that a type of belief is to claim that any state that p might be identified with the belief that p is plays the functional role of faith also plays likely or more likely than other competing the functional role of belief.3 For all x, if x is propositions. a faith- state, then x is a belief- state. Alterna- The Identity Thesis makes sense of claims tively, we might say that faith is a determinate that are often made about the relationship of the determinable, belief. between faith and belief in the philosophical APQ 55_1 text.indd 96 1/5/18 10:35 AM FAITH, BELIEF, AND CONTROL / 97 and theological literature on faith, as well as from God, in some extraordinary way of com- various claims made by non- philosophers. munication.”10 Insofar as the mental assent According to what Daniel Howard-Snyder referenced in these passages bears similarity calls the “Common View” of faith (2013, p. to the cognitive element of judgment involved 357), belief is a necessary condition for faith in belief, these characterizations of faith can or else faith is partly constituted by belief. But be used to articulate the view that faith is a the necessity claim and the constitution claim type of belief.11 are each mysterious in a way that the Identity In addition to various philosophers, many Thesis, as I understand it, is not. In particular, Western theologians writing on the nature of if we claim that belief is a necessary condi- religious faith also presuppose the view that tion for faith, then it seems we have to posit faith is a type of belief.12 For example, in the a necessary connection between two distinct Christian tradition, to have faith in God is, existences—a faith mental state and a belief inter alia, to believe that God exists, which mental state. But it’s unclear what a faith- state also may involve believing various proposi- and a belief- state are, not to mention exactly tions concerning the nature of God; and the how they are related.6 As for constitution, sort of faith that is necessary for human salva- we know what it is for a material entity to be tion involves believing particular propositions fully or partly constituted by another mate- about God’s plan and the person and work of rial entity. But it’s not at all clear what the Jesus.13 analogous constitution or composition rela- Another strand in both philosophical and tion would be in the case of mental states: non- philosophical literature that connects faith is not literally composed of belief like faith and belief is the idea that the essence of a statue is composed of clay.7 Fortunately, the faith is belief based on poor grounds.