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The Middle-Power Trap: a hindrance for Global South emerging powers

João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel1

Dawisson Belém Lopes2

ABSTRACT

This essay aims to depict international orders as a byproduct of leading powers’ endeavor to maintain the status quo. The literature on emerging powers usually does not take into consideration systemic-level characteristics as variables. It assumes a Western-based cannon that the international arena allows these states to achieve their status ambitions. Although the United States-led is in disarray, many mechanisms are still in vogue. We claim that these regimes and rules are traps that hinder the rise of Global South countries within the global hierarchy. We employ a qualitative case study to demonstrate, for example, how the nonproliferation regime works as a trap that locks emerging powers in the position of a minor player in the international system. Hence, we aim to fill an analytical gap in the literature on emerging powers.

Key-words: Middle-Power Trap, International Order, Non-Western International Relations Theory, Emerging Powers.

1. INTRODUCTION

Mainstream analytical strands of international relations (IR) reflect experiences and cannons from Western countries (Acharya 2014). IRs debates have tackled aspects related not only to the methodological development in the Western-based social sciences academia but also to its fundamental normative purpose of avoiding war (cf. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013; Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Tickner and Wæver 2009). The United States and Western Europe academies made efforts to produce generalizable explanations (cf. Cox 1981). It reinforced their subjective label of neutral ontological premises.

1 Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais. E-mail: [email protected]. Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/9356537757576148 2 Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte-MG, Brazil; [email protected]. ORCID iD 0000-0002-1949-1001. Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/2002314936671237 2

The rise of Non-Western countries became a topic addressed by the IR field. Many analysts delve into the foreign strategies of Brazil, India, Indonesia, or Mexico because their emergence in the international arena was considered a consolidated phenomenon during the 2000s (cf. Stuenkel 2016; Zakaria 2008). Such a debate regained momentum recently because authors attempted to provide explanations as to why many of these nations did not fulfill the expectations of becoming robust major powers. The bulk of the literature mobilizes domestic variables such as political turmoil and economic crises (Casarões 2020; Chagas-Bastos and Franzoni 2019; Lessa, Becard and Galvão 2020; Mares and Trikunas 2016; Simon 2016).

On the other hand, some scholars relied on constructivist structural reasonings such as the difficulties faced by these countries to convince peers of their subjective role of great powers (cf. Paul and Shankar 2014; Larson and Shevchenko 2014; Volgy et al. 2014). Larson, Paul and Wohlforth (2014) and Lake (2017) emphasized the social issues among states once their arguments gravitated over the dispute for subjective assets such as respect and legitimacy among international actors.

Both theoretical frameworks assumed, however, there is even a slight chance of observing an emerging power became a leading actor. Such an assumption hangs onto a Westen ontological perspective. There is a lack of discussions about the normative aims of international order. In this sense, we noticed a curious absence of a debate over the consequences of the existing world order for the rise of Global South countries. Some authors could claim such a topic is outdated once the post-World War II order has been in disarray (cf. Stuenkel 2016; Zakaria 2008). We provide a different analysis. The ultimate aim of this paper is to depict the international order as an institution composed of regimes aimed to secure the status-quo and accommodate members accordingly. Hence Global South ambitions are still regulated once the process of international socialization stigmatized them. These countries are considered revisionist actors challenging rules and regimes built to provide public benefits (cf. Schweller 1994; Zarakol 2010).

It consolidates a hierarchy claiming to preserve global peace. Countries prefer to adhere to these treaties instead of facing sanctions and stigmatizations from their peers. The ‘good citizen’ label (cf. Wohlforth et al. 2017) in the international system is what we call as “middle-power trap” because it is a hindrance to the rise of emerging powers. This article follows accordingly: (i) a systematic literature review over the concept of international order. We describe this structure as an institution employing the historical neoinstitutionalism 3 framework. (ii) There is a section to operationalize the middle-power trap. It takes into account the nonproliferation regime (cf. Singh 1998). (iii) We apply this case study because it represents a typical case (cf. George and Bennett 2005). (iv) There is a section of final considerations.

2. The missing debate about the concept of International Order

Many authors delved into the phenomenon of the rise of emerging powers. This debate hinge on a perception that regional leadership from the Global South could achieve a higher status within the international arena due to their efforts and capabilities. Wall Streat- originated acronyms to indicate emerging markets became analytical cases to IR studies. BRICS, Next-11, or MINTS were considered empirical pieces of evidence of the rise of a new era in the international arena after the 2008 economic crisis (cf. Flemes 2010; Hurrell 2009; Stuenkel 2016, 2017). Despite some relevant increase in diplomatic activism, prominent Global South countries (e.g., India and Brazil) failed to achieve greater voice within security-related institutions such as the United Nations Security Council (Pant 2013).

Some analytical imprecisions hanged onto a similar Western-based ontology about international politics. Firstly, some authors assumed emerging markets as a synonym for rising powers. Mexico, South Korea, or even Thailand were placed in the same concept inhabited by Brazil and India. It overstretched the conceptual definition (cf. Sartori 1970). Countries with significant temporal economic development (cf. Stuenkel 2016) but reduced capacities to impact the system (cf. Keohane 1969) became potential influent actors in the global arena. We operationalize the term rising power as Global South countries that wield influence over their regions and uphold significant amounts of material capabilities. However, they are not legitimated to play prominent roles in global decisions without previous great powers’ concessions (Belém Lopes, Casarões, and Gama 2020; Thies and Nieman 2017; Wohlforth et al. 2017). Indeed, there were countries which material capabilities had been increasing robustly like Brazil and India. In this sense, this concept is more restrict and less volatile than financial-related reports definitions. However, the lion’s share of the literature on the “rise of the rest” attempted to infer that the world was going through a significant transition (cf. Zakaria 2008). 4

Such a topic has been addressed by the field of foreign policy analysis, which relies on lower-level-of-abstraction observations to produce valid interpretations. The systemic level was set aside when authors took into consideration only domestic and diplomatic variables to explain, for example, the failure of Brazil to achieve greater relevance within international mechanisms (cf. Chagas-Bastos and Franzoni 2019; Milani, Pinheiro and Lima 2017). This methodological dilemma between agent or structure is still a conundrum to political scientists (Mahoney and Snyder 1999). On IR studies, however, authors that choose to assess the agent assume subjectively mainstream assumptions about the structure. These aspects are Western constructs. In this sense, this phenomenon occurs because the mainstream strands have spread their theoretical paradigms throughout the world due to political, financial, and academic structural resources (cf. Bourdieu 1989; Foucault 1990; Noda 2020).

This aspect is central for Non-Western cannons (McLeod 2007; Seth 2011). Whereas authors do not take into consideration how rigged are some existing international mechanisms and widespread narratives, the debate on rising powers will not fill a relevant gap on structural hindrances that curtail their interests. Neoliberal values on international peace and multilateral cooperation locked Global South in a dilemma (cf. Khrisna 2009): be a “good citizen” and forsake national interest considered against the rule of law or to be stigmatized as a pariah (Zarakol 2010). Western validated scientific knowledge (cf. Bhabha 1994; Souza Santos 2017) coax emerging powers to comply with rules and regimes arguably aimed to provide peace (Ikenberry 2011) and cooperative ties (Keohane 1984) among nations. However, it means unavoidably that these states have to restrain their amount of material capabilities. Hence “good citizenship” actually is a synonym for a tamed peer (cf. Casarões 2020).

The international order is not a core element for some mainstream IR’s strands. Authors usually acknowledge its existence, but they did not assume it as a relevant variable. This element is considered only a byproduct of existing interactions between states. Thus, the order and its mechanisms per se do not interfere significantly with relevant aspects of international relations (cf. Mearsheimer 2019). Likewise, Wendt’s constructivism and structural neorealist frameworks emphasize the idea of a global system wherein states interact within an anarchic structure (Waltz 1979; Wendt 1999). Thus, the authors employed these cannons to systematize foreign policy analysis related to two-level games where the international arena is composed of states as the units of analysis. Nations are differentiated 5 according to either their material capabilities (Mearsheimer 2001) or subjective ties (Wendt 1999), but the structural level has no central administration because of the principle of sovereignty.

On the other hand, some theoretical strands fined-grained investigated the concept of order. For example, role theory authors assume that the international system is organized by leading powers that are legitimized to solve global issues (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth 2014). Such an assumption revolves around the concept of status that is subjective social standings for states within the international arena (cf. Casarões 2020; Lake 2017; Wohlforth et al. 2017). It confers to them a national identity in the world order. In this sense, states respect wealthier and stronger peers. Hence status sparks respect and legitimacy. Once military clout and technological advances are considered manifestations of higher social status (cf. Buzan 2004), building nuclear weapons, for example, held a symbolic restricted to responsible stakeholders (Biswas 2001; Pant and Biswas 2017). This framework advanced in the operationalization of the presence of an ordering. Leading actors assume prominent roles in tackling global issues. The “great powers’ club” is a set inhabited by these countries that hold valued elements (Wohlforth et al. 2017). Role theory authors considered, in a certain way, the unequal context of structural socialization where leading countries display a myriad of instruments to sustain their status (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth 2014). However, it does not provide a comprehensive description of the core elements of international order and the reasoning behind its existence (Zarakol 2010). Such a theoretical framework is not interested in delving into the concept of international order, but it exposes significant observable implications to the topic.

Two of IR’s mainstream frameworks take into consideration the concept of international order. The liberalism, a Wilsonian-based perspective related to the paradigm of democratic peace, and the realist theory on hegemonic transition (cf. Allison 2017; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1989). Both strands acknowledge the natural absence of formalized hierarchies. But they argue that interstate dynamics are regulated by orders that reflect the political, economic, and social interests of the most powerful countries at a given period (Gilpin 1981; Kissinger 2015). Each order revolves around the ambitions and interests of leaders (Kupchan 2014; Lake 2015). These mechanisms are built by great powers to reduce the odds of global conflicts and manage international dynamics (Gilpin 1981; Ikenberry 2014; Kupchan 2014). 6

Leading countries engage in order building to preserve their positions (Ikenberry 2011; Wohlforth 2014). In this sense, international orders arise after critical junctures. Once existing dynamics are in disarray, new states assume the position to build such a structure (Gilpin 1981; Ikenberry 2011). The Cold War order, for example, was a byproduct of the geopolitical changes triggered by the end of World War II. Conferences in Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945) demonstrated that Washington, Moscow, London; and, in a minor way, Paris were delineating new dynamics to the international relations (Kissinger 2017). It is worthwhile to bear in mind that it has also occurred previously, for example, the Vienna System in 1815 (Hobsbawn 2015). The United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France attempted to set an international order after World War I aimed to consolidate liberal values and self-determination (MacMillan 2007), although exposing their colonial cannons by considering Japan a second-tier state (Shimazu 1998).

A consensus among great powers enables the arise of regulating regimes and rules committed to global stability (Gaddis 1992; Ikenberry 2011). For example, the proposes from the 1919 Paris Conferences and Wilsonian perspectives were not endorsed by the United States; therefore, such an order hanged onto feeble pillars (Ikenberry 2009; Kissinger 2017). Likewise, other polities have to accept such an institutional framework. Great powers persuade other nations to believe that the entire world will be in a better position if they comply with these regulations. Leading countries, for example, promise to refrain their geopolitical ambitions once their envisaged global mechanisms would tie them up (Keohane 1969). Such concertation seeks, in this sense, to solve collective problem actions by providing both global stability and enabling cooperative ties among nations (Gaddis 1992; Ikenberry 2011; Kissinger 2017).

The consolidation of an international order occurs when states believe it serves their purposes. During the Cold War, the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund were set to become pillars of the existing framework. The United Nations Security Council was also founded to provide stability to the system (Belém Lopes, Casarões, and Gama 2020). Such an organization crystallized the role of great powers to avoid disruptive issues, despite their geopolitical rivalries (cf. Bull 1977; Deudney 2014; Ikenberry 2011; Larson, Paul and Wohlforth 2014).

In this sense, international orders are institutions because they provide formalized rules that shape interactions between states and regulate national strategies and actions (cf. 7

Ikenberry 2014; Peters 1998; Snidal 1994). These mechanisms are based upon established normative purposes to secure the status quo by incentivizing the compliance of the rules. Such values beget responses to new challenges insofar as these elements are locked in a determined range of possibilities (Peters 1998). Such institutions hang onto endogenous preferences (cf. Thelen 1999) that build regimes aimed to reproduce implicit and explicit principles (Krasner 1992). This path dependency denotes the process of adaption that each order goes through during a period of contestation. Whether a given ordering is resilient or not is tested according to its capacities to sustain principles against contestations from discontent nations (cf. Ikenberry 2010). Similar to Nozick’s definition of hidden-hand (Nozick 1994), leading powers have to defend this institutional framework through conscious interventions.

3. The Middle Power Trap

Middle-power traps are the mechanisms to preserve the status quo. They both rely on material elements and subjective aspects to sustain the international order. Regimes and rules are empirical manifestations of middle-power traps. These mechanisms require actors to comply with norms in order to regulate in given issue (Krasner 1992). States forsake some national ambitions to enable cooperative ties and to be recognized as responsible stakeholders (Belém Lopes, Casarões and Gama 2020). Such a process of socialization aims officially to set common norms throughout the world. The post-World War II order established the United Nations to congregated a network of regimes set to provide peace and fairness within the international relations (Belém Lopes and Casarões 2019). States are considered equal agents according to international law (Bull 1977).

However, we demonstrate that international orders are byproducts of leading powers’ geopolitical interests. These great powers can also be rivals but converge on some issues. In this sense, this process of socialization to spread the post-World War II order stigmatized agents who disagree with stipulated norms (Zarakol 2010). Such dynamics do not take into consideration the understandings of Non-Western countries. During the Cold War, some countries tackled this issue similarly because they claimed some rules represented a “freezing of the world power structure” (cf. Larson and Shevchenko 2014; Lima 2013; Sagan 1996; Singh 1998). Non-Western perspectives, however, were deemed revisionist behaviors from countries that could jeopardize international security. Zarakol (2010) argues that leading 8 powers created an awareness that their understandings are modern to other countries must accept them.

Global South countries came across a dilemma. If they adhere to regimes, it means to forego national ambitions to achieve responsibility assets. These countries are required to do as such minor powers. Great powers, on the other hand, are sometimes legitimized to hold some assets restricted to other nations. In this sense, such an option represents a trap that locks Global South emerging power in the status of a middle power. Renshon (2016) demonstrated that emerging powers, who accept these norms, received some diplomatic endorsement and became more respect by other nations, however, they do not achieve as robust as levels observed in leading powers such as the United States.

Rising powers sustained specific normative ambitions to acquire greater voice within the international system (cf. Gilady 2018; Miller 2016; Renshon 2016; Scheweller 1994; Thies and Nieman 2017). These actors envisage similar legitimacy and authority granted to great powers (Carranza 2016). They aim to acquire the same influence in international forums and enhance bargain positions (Asuelime and Adekoye 2016). However, convincing their peers is necessary (Carranza 2016). This process is almost impossible if these countries are stigmatized as rebel agents acting against the world’s peace.

Challenging rules is a thorny decision. Polities usually follow the norms to not only be granted the status of “good citizen” but also to avoid sanctions and diplomatic skirmishes (Casarões 2020; Wohlforth et al. 2017). A country that contests international norms is stigmatized by other nations. It could become a global pariah (Beaumont and Roren 2020; Zarakol 2010). In this sense, this option could produce a significant negative impact on the national economy and domestic political turmoil. Countries also fear members that disrespect rules, although they are Western-based ideas. The socialization makes a minor power defends great power-related rules against Global South emerging powers in instances linked to international security, for example. Perception of threat hinges on subjective dynamics whereby countries delineate their own identity and rivals. Therefore, international actors avoid closer ties with these stigmatized states. Organizations and great powers discourage the endorsement of these opponents of the global rules because the regimes set rules to pressure their partners. For example, the 2008 civil nuclear agreement between India and the United States demanded that New Delhi to not maintain nuclear commercial ties with countries that do not respect global rules (cf. Pant and Biswas 2017). 9

South Global countries are only allowed to join significant institutional decisions by invitations from consolidated global powers. The United Nations Security Council five permanent members, for example, have still sustained their veto power in security-related issues. China, despite its Non-Western backgrounds, has been benefited from previous decisions taken by the Washington that allowed it to join significant mechanisms of the international order. Beijing, however, copes with this stigmatization once national strategies unavoidably collide the interests of regimes and rules. China has been, in this sense, considered an aggressive revisionist power (cf. Huiyun 2009; Kirshner 2012; Mearsheimer 2006). The middle-power trap is, in this sense, relevant to the debate over emerging powers because it tackles a phenomenon faced by states such as Brazil and India (cf. Paul and Shankar 2014).

Hence, we operationalize the middle power trap as intervening mechanisms that hamper the emerging of rising powers. Many regimes and international rules sustain the status quo by hindering the equality among nations. Leading powers crystallize their status by blocking the adherence of new Non-Western countries once they both set material rules and create awareness against their possible discontent challengers.

4. The Nonproliferation Regime: an example of middle-power trap

The Non-proliferation regime is a relevant field to observe these dynamics in international relations. Such a framework of international treaties, norms, and institutions is considered one of the most controversial international structures according to the understanding of rising powers. Once this regime involves issues related to the likelihood of producing mass-destruction weaponry, challenging the settled rules is widely accepted as a really hazardous attitude and a reprehensible act. Nuclear weapons were considered a watershed for international relations once these cutting-edge technologies enabled unprecedented massive destruction of a rival (Aron 1967; Jervis 1989; Kissinger 2017). It was the zenith of this warhead because different countries developed their scientific researches (Gaddis 2005; Hobsbawn 1994). Atomic warheads, inter alia, led these states towards a détente period. Washington and Moscow began a series of talks to diminishes the risks of skirmishes and set international rules to avoid atomic proliferation throughout the world (Kissinger 2017). Hence no great power encouraged a partner to acquire nuclear warheads. 10

Curbing their proliferation has been acknowledged as a peaceful mission. No great power encouraged a partner to go nuclear during this scrutinized period. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was in 1970. It lies at the heart of this debate. This agreement was considered the most important global mechanism to inhibit the use of atomic energy sources for military purposes. It also empowered the International Atomic Energy Agency, established in 1957, to monitor signatory countries (Lima 2013; Paul and Shankar 2014; Stuenkel 2010). In this sense, the NPT set legal and moral hurdles against atomic proliferation (Scheimman 1990). These mechanisms were deemed technical instruments built on multilateral decisions cored in the United Nations (Bull 1975).

Beyond security-minded strategies, this context also involves a matter of status in the international relations once countries develop the programs aiming to domain the use of technologies at the cutting edge or just producing missiles that very few states have (Pu and Schweller 2014; Sagan 1996). Rising powers seek status by setting space programs, soft- power diplomacy, acquisition of weapons, and commercial strategies which could serve more to ideological purposes rather than rational choices (Paul, Larson and Wohlforth 2014).

Nuclear weapons became the most dangerous military-related asset during the Cold War. In a system that these artifacts are valued as a symbol of strength and technological development, pundits claim that some countries sustain their nuclear ambitions because they strive for international recognition of their high status (Gilady, 2018; Pu and Schweller 2014; Sagan 1996). According to them, the acquisition of atomic warheads was considered, during the Cold War, a demonstration of both power and capacity of developing cutting-edge military technology (Gilady 2018; Stuenkel 2010; Oliveira 2018).

Following the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China also built their bombs, during the early years of the Cold War, without the presence of severe international constraints (Hanson 2002; Sagan 1996). These countries are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Paul and Shankar 2014). According to the Correlates of War database, only China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union scored systematically values above 0.1 in the index of material capabilities (CINC) during the Cold War. These data suggest that these countries were more powerful than others. 11

Therefore, international organizations and leaderships made efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, the nonproliferation regime would also enhance international cooperation because countries got more involved in institutionalized forms and thereby, they could share more pieces of information and data in order to mutual inspect each other (cf. Ikenberry 2009; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Nye Jr. 1992; Oye 1985; Young 1991).

Despite the announced purpose for assuring international peace, some countries raised grievances against discriminatory instances imposed on their technological development and national autonomy (Asuelime and Adekoye 2016; Larson and Shevchenko 2014; Lima 2013; Patti 2018). During the 1970s, twenty-four8 countries had been developing nuclear capabilities before the NPT set rigorous rules. Fourteen of them were placed in Latin America, Asia, or Africa (Asuelime and Adekoye 2013; Cannizzo 1982; Goldblat 1986). For the sake of the discussion, Article IX of the NPT was the most controversial aspect. It considered a nuclear state only countries that had manufactured and exploded their devices before January 1st, 1967 (Paul and Shankar 2014). Only five states (i.e., China, France, United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) therefore were allowed to hold nuclear weapons, although they were encouraged to dismantle their arsenals (Stuenkel 2010). Meanwhile, the rest of the world was completely denied to pursue this sort of armament. Also, the transference of nuclear material and technology-related became gradually more restricted.

Global South attempts to provide more equal mechanisms to secure nuclear disarmament, but leading power did not accept them (Perkovich 2001). These polities advocated that the NPT was a sort of trap to hamper their arise. This agreement was considered a global acceptance of a hierarchy among states (Paul 2000). In this sense, capitalist centers used the law to perpetuate their dominance and military superiority vis-à-vis peripheral states (Moniz-Bandeira 2017). The NPT could be grasped as a “middle-power trap”; that is, an international mechanism built to sustain the status-quo by refraining the interest of “second-tier actors” to pursue substantial assets. The emergence of these actors is regulated according to the aims of leading powers (cf. Biswas 2001; Krishna 2009).

Brazil, India, and South Africa, for example, refused to accept the nonproliferation regime during the Cold War. These three states faced strong pressure from great powers and international organizations to abdicate their ambitions of acquiring nuclear devices. Indian atomic tests in 1974 triggered the creation of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) or “London 12

Group”. Such a mechanism, which comprises states capable of exporting nuclear technologies and raw materials, was aimed to tighten the rules of this market. Likewise, Brazilian and South African nuclear policies were monitored suspiciously by global agencies. Many states hence refused to cooperate with them on atomic issues (Patti 2018).

Brazil and South Africa, for example, chose to adopt a different path: adequate, at the end of the Cold War, their nuclear policies to the international regime thereby they obtained reputational diplomatic assets since their sovereignty over this topic became subordinate to global norms so that their potential for producing weapons were suspended and their diplomatic options were restrained to their activities played within multilateral forums (Burgess 2006; Spektor 2016). Once they consolidated democratic government as a matter of demonstrating their sense of responsibility. Making this decision, these two countries became the prey of this so-called “middle-power trap”.

In this sense, India emerges as a deviant case that does not fit in this theory to provide significant insights. To assess this affirmative, it is relevant to take into account the development of New Delhi’s nuclear program. This state did not relinquish its ambitions to develop autonomous capabilities and have sustained also the military option to produce weapons, regardless of the pressures from the international community who considered this act a challenge to the non-proliferation regime (Pant and Biswas 2017). India hence chose to cope with economic sanctions and faced hardships, but did not concede the option to further its national nuclear capabilities to be considered a responsible actor within the global order (Singh 1998). Kissinger (2015); however, depicted this state as a current global actor that increased its diplomatic influence due to the enhancement of its technology investments and the stockpile of nuclear weapons. The United States recently engaged in a reset of diplomatic ties with India and legitimize its indigenous nuclear program in an unprecedented geopolitical movement (Malone 2011).

5. Final Considerations

Rising powers are coaxed by the great powers to follow international rules. Due to their lack of relative diplomatic, economic, or military influence, rising powers usually have their ambitions curbed by global regimes. They are, hence, entrapped in the status of middle- power. Whereas great powers can work more independently to achieve their goals, Global South acquiesced these rules and have to rely on multilateral organization. International order 13 issues delimitate their diplomatic strategies. Rising powers that contest norms imposed by the international community risk their reputational assets and become “troublemakers” or “rogue” states (Pu and Schweller 2014).

The international system is an environment of status contesting (Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014). Although states are juridically equal in terms of sovereignty, world politics stratify their members in hierarchical instances that restricts access to diplomatic resources and instruments for exercising an influence on relevant global issues to a very few countries considered great powers (Renshon 2016; Wohlforth et al. 2017). Disputes between those who want to obtain higher status against those who restrict new entrances into their groups. It avoids diluting their privileges are constant (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth 2014). Such context is more usual when middle powers attempt to become great powers - such as the United States.

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