Brent Spar: an Applied Exploration of Crisis Management

Brent Spar: An Applied Exploration Of Crisis Management Aminath Meena Ahmed LSE A thesis submitted to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 1 UMI Number: U205B90 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U205B90 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Library Bntisn uwaiy of Political and Economic Science THOSE 5 h \& t T - \^C, Abstract Crisis management centres on managing the risks to the reputations of corporations and other public institutions that crises are said to increase. It attests to the commercialisation of notions of risks and the expansion of risk management in an increasingly globalised environment. Arguments about the need for such work are based on a wider rhetoric of the risk-prone context in which organisations function and on the professional belief that they are judged by the way in which they are publicly represented. In particular, crisis management consultants talk about the need to continually attend to the appearance of their client. The thesis draws on theories of symbolic interactionism and risk society and the consultants’ own lay theories to explore the emergence of a new profession and a new way of depicting and managing risk. This study focuses attention on to the factors involved in the social mediation of risks, the social construction of reality, and attempts made by professionals to re-design how social reality appears. It looks at single-issue politics affecting the political agenda, the role of the mass media, as well as the imputed role of the media and single-issue politics, how corporations can and do respond, in very sophisticated ways, to threats to their political and ideological perspectives, and so advance their interests. The thesis also comments on how professional fields are created, demonstrating the work that goes into proposing, sustaining and promoting particular areas of expertise. 2 Contents Introduction pages 7-10 Chapter 1 ‘Crisis Management’ - A General Outline pages 11 - 90 The Cobra: the case of Exxon-Valdez The Python: the case of Intel’s Pentium 1 Consultants’ definitions of crisis and its management Origins and evolution of crisis management The fundamental principles of crisis management Key publics The media Delayed and defensive communications: the case of Exxon-Valdez The media’s need for a stoiy: the Braer incident Managing media representations Consultants’ communication strategy and symbolic interactionism An outline o f symbolic interactionism Affinities between the consultants ’ rationale and symbolic interactionism Why is crisis management here? The consultants ’ explanation The ‘risk society ’ perspective Zones o f convergence The promotion of crisis management A view o f society as requiring crisis management The citation o f cases Conclusions Chapter 2 Brent Spar - Setting The Stage And The ‘Emerging’ And The ‘Immediate’ Phases Of The Crisis pages 91-161 On the different conceptualisations of this case An introduction to Shell Royal Dutch/Shell Group Shell UK and Shell Exploration and Production Brent Spar Greenpeace and its campaign Claims and counter-claims: An outline of the claims made by Greenpeace and Shell Consultants’ claims about this case The emerging crisis Shell’s activities prior to the protest How Greenpeace discovered the campaign Events The immediate crisis situation: June 14-20,1995 Conclusions Chapter 3 Media Coverage And An Analysis Of The Consultants’ Interpretation Of The Case pages 162 - 268 Press and television coverage of the Brent Spar story Claims made about media coverage Shell’s claims Greenpeace’s claims Consultants ’ claims On the claims of media bias On the making of news Objectives and methods of analysing media coverage of the crisis and its aftermath The contexts of the newspapers and television news Press coverage Framing Shell Framing Greenpeace Framing risks and scientific opinion Framing protests Observations on the press coverage Television coverage BBC 4 n v Channel 4 The visual coverage of the crisis Observations on the television coverage On the consultants’ interpretation of this case Conclusions Chapter 4 Crisis Management After The Crisis pages 269 - 333 A new communications strategy An overview of events and arguments Shell’s case: Making external aspects problematic Brent Spar - A Public Relations Disaster? - An article by the Public Affairs Director of Shell UK Not Black and White but Shades o f Green -A speech by the Chairman of Shell UK Did Shell’s case gain support in the media? Television coverage BBC n v Channel 4 How could television coverage affect what Shell proposed after the crisis? Press coverage The abrupt end to the Mirror’s coverage The Guardian’s shifting allegiances A favourable depiction o fShell A critical press attention on Greenpeace and its campaign A view o f the crisis as having displayed what the papers took to be truths about the status quo How might press coverage affect Shell’s case? Did Shell’s activities after the crisis reflect the consultants’ advice? Conclusions 5 Conclusions pages 334 - 343 Appendix A: Notes on Method pages 344 - 356 Appendix B: Images of Brent Spar pages 357 - 364 Bibliography pages 365 - 374 6 Introduction This study examines the new field of crisis management, a consultancy practice embedded within the wider public relations industry. Whereas public relations tends to focus on the construction of desired reputations, the specific task of crisis management is to preserve those reputations at times of challenge or adversity. In particular, crisis management refers quite pragmatically to perception management rather than to the other elements involved in the handling of a crisis. The manner in which crisis management consultants manage perceptions shapes their definitions o f‘crisis’ and ‘crisis management’. Crisis management is thus characterised as an issue in the regulation of adverse publicity: ‘A crisis is an event which happens to an organisation which suddenly propels it into the limelight making it the target of unfavourable information and unwanted, potentially unfavourable media coverage’ (Michael Regester, in interview: July 7, 1997). Crisis management consultants1 argue that the most appropriate way to tackle crises is by ‘getting your side of the story across’ to audiences. The service they sell to public organisations is, therefore, perception management. This thesis will focus on the 1995 controversy surrounding the disposal of the Brent Spar, an oil storage and loading facility owned by Royal Dutch/Shell, which has been portrayed by consultants as a powerful illustration of their professional argument and practice.2 They claim the controversy posed a major threat to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, a large 1 The word ‘consultants’ refers throughout the thesis to the consultants I interviewed (see Appendix A, page 344) and the literature on crisis management by its practitioners (Bland 1997; Bland 1998; Regester and Larkin 1997; Seymour and Moore 2000) maintain this argument. 2 Ibid. 7 and hitherto seemingly invulnerable organisation, and that the case of the Brent Spar exemplifies how crises can arise, reputations can be damaged, social reality can be contested, risks can be used for particular purposes, authority can be questioned and crisis management can be deployed as the cure (Regester and Larkin 1997: 63-75). In 1991, the Brent Spar came to the end of its operational life. The company conducted a series of feasibility studies and consultations to assess options for its disposal and, in 1994, came to the conclusion that the best choice would be deep sea disposal in the Atlantic Ocean. In February 1995, the UK government approved their decision and informed other governments who did not, at that stage, contest it. In April, Greenpeace, a non-governmental organisation focusing on environmental issues, initiated a protest campaign by boarding the Brent Spar and announcing to the world’s press that it contained over 100 tonnes of toxic sludge (it later claimed there were 5500 tonnes of oil on board.) Greenpeace also claimed that the sea disposal of the Brent Spar would set a precedent (an idea contested by Shell and the UK government) for disposing of400 other oil rigs and that this posed a major threat to the marine environment (Rose 1998). Greenpeace’s boarding of the Brent Spar was a secretly planned manoeuvre that surprised all the parties involved. The organisation set up recording equipment on the installation to enable it to transmit video images to the world’s television media. Amongst those images were graphic shots of Shell’s attempts to prevent Greenpeace’s boarding of the Brent Spar by using high-pressure water hoses. Greenpeace’s images were used in television news reports, and, according to the consultants, Shell was cast as a Goliath-like bully and exploiter against Greenpeace’s heroic David. Consultants remark that Greenpeace had 8 succeeded in conveying its interpretation of reality to the world, whereas Shell had not, and this failure was responsible for the company’s later defeat in managing the crisis. In the end, Shell was obliged to abandon its plan for sea disposal, although it had already spent a considerable sum of money and four years arriving at it.3 The company had been criticised. Consultants say it had been represented as aggressive and overbearing. There was a widespread perception that it had caused environmental damage and was ethically in the wrong.

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