Sebastian Castellio’s Doctrine of Tolerance between Theological Debate and Modernity 1

Stefania Salvadori

Scholars have long celebrated the role Sebastian Castellio2 played in the heated debate on tolerance following the execution of the Spanish heretic Michael Servetus3 in 1553,4 especially on two counts: first, for his defence of the freedom of human ; second, for his appeal to as a privileged instrument of investigation.5 Both are generally cited as proofs of the innovation and modernity of Castellio’s thought, harbingers of the century of reason and method that was to follow.6

1 This essay is dedicated to my teacher, Professor Emidio Campi, to whom I owe a spe- cial debt of gratitude: “Praeceptoribus autem eximiam debemus gratiam, quod sicut per parentis contigit ut vivamus, ita per hos contigit ut bene vivamus, et quemadmodum illis corporis vitam ferimus acceptam, ita his debemus animi vitam.” 2 Among the traditional analyses of Castellio, see Ferdinand Buisson, Sébastien Castel- lion, sa vie et son œuvre (1515–1563). Étude sur les origines du protestantisme libéral français (Paris: Hachette, 1892; reprint, Nieuwkoop: B. de Graaf, 1964); Hans Rudolf Guggisberg, Sebastian Castellio 1515–1563. Humanist und Verteidiger der religiösen Toleranz im konfes- sionellen Zeitalter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1997). 3 The literature on is extensive. A brief overview as well as references to relevant works can be found in Friedman, Michael Servetus. A Case Study in Total Heresy (: Droz, 1978); and Valentine Zuber, Les conflits de la tolérance. Michel Servet entre mémoire et histoire (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004). 4 For a historical introduction, see Uwe Plath, Calvin und in den Jahren 1552–1556 (Basel-Stuttgard: Theologischer Verlag, 1974). For an overview of both Castellio’s and Servetus’s way of thinking, see Roland Bainton, The Travail of Religious Liberty (Philadel- phia: Westminster Press, 1951); idem, Hunted Heretic: The Life and Death of Micheal Sevetus: 1511–1553 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953); and Autour de Michel Servet et Sébastien Castellion, ed. Bruno Becker (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1953). 5 Cf. Hans Rudolf Guggisberg, Sebastian Castellio im Urteil seiner Nachwelt von Späthu- manismus bis zur Aufklärung (Basel-Stuttgart: Helbing und Lichtenhahn, 1956); Roland Bainton, The Travail of Religious Liberty, 29; Charles Emile Delormeau, Sébastien Castellion. Apôtre de la Tolérance et de la Liberté de Conscience (Neuchâtel: Messeiler, 1964). 6 See, for instance, Alain Dufour, “La notion de liberté chez les Réformateurs,” in La libérté de conscience (XVIe–XVIIe siècles). Actes du Colloques du Mulhouse et Bâle (1989), ed. H. R. Guggisberg, F. Lestringant and J. C. Margolin (Geneva: Droz, 1991): 15–20; Johannes Lindelbloom, “La place de Castellion dans l’histoire de l’esprit,” in Autour de Michel Servet et Sébastien Castellion, 158–180. 196 stefania salvadori

While this assessment of Castellio’s modernity is valid from the broad perspective of the history of ideas,7 it bypasses the historiographic ques- tion as to whether the connection he posited between tolerance and freedom of conscience could be immediately translated into those terms that it acquired during the Modern Age.8 In other words, can the freedom of human conscience which we associate with modernity be seen as an achievement of sixteenth-century culture, notwithstanding that culture’s theological parameters? If the individual was not yet seen as indepen- dent of God and of his action in the world, what value could Castellio’s contemporaries attribute to his defence of the liberty of conscience? As Kaegi noted some time ago,9 Castellio’s conceptual vocabulary reflects the theological forma mentis of the environment in which he wrote. It was precisely through the traditional paradigm of concordia,10 however, that Castellio introduced a radical change in perspective that would progres- sively distance him from Reformed orthodoxy and from his main oppo- nent, . The present study seeks to shed new light on the famous debate between Calvin and Castellio by interpreting it as a discussion of the inability of human conscience to access God’s truth and thereby distinguish the dan- gerous heretic—who denies the veritas he knows—from the unorthodox believer—who interprets the veritas he knows imperfectly. In light of both authors’ understandings of the truth essential for salvation during their first debate on tolerance in 1553–1554, Castellio does not appear to oppose Calvin’s paradigm of concordia per se, but rather his interpretation of it based on the equation of “comprehensible” with “indispensable for salvation,” in which “comprehensible” does not mean “believed,” as it does

7 I refer here to that field of research in intellectual history started by Lovejoy’s work that deals with the expression and change of human ideas over time. See Bevir Mark, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 8 Hans Rudolf Guggisberg, “The Defence of Religious Toleration and Religious Liberty in Early Modern Europe: Arguments, Pressures, and Some Consequences,” History of Euro- pean Ideas 4 (1983): 37–50. 9 Werner Kaegi, “Castellio und die Anfänge der Toleranz, Gedenkrede gehalten am 19. Juli 1953,” Basler Universitätsreden, 32. Heft (1953), 18. 10 For discussion of conceptual differences between concordia and tolerance, see Mario Turchetti, Concordia o tolleranza? François Bauduin (1520–1573) e i “Moyenneurs” (Geneva: Droz, 1971); idem, “Une question mal posée: Erasme et la tolérance. L’idée de synkatabasis,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 53 (1991): 379–395; idem, “Réforme et tolérance, un binôme polysémique,” in Tolérance et Réforme. Éléments pour une généalogie du con- cept de tolérance, ed. N. Piqué and G. Waterlot (Paris-Montreal: L’Harmattan, 1999), 9–29; ­Carlos Gilly, “Sebastiano Castellione, l’idea di tolleranza e l’opposizione alla politica di Filippo II,” Rivista Storica Italiana 110 (1998): 144–165.