Greece External Relations Briefing: What Choices for Greek Foreign Policy? George N

ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 34, No. 4 (GR)

November 2020

Greece external relations briefing: What Choices for Greek Foreign Policy? George N. Tzogopoulos

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What Choices for Greek Foreign Policy?

Greece is currently exerting policies in response to Turkish behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean. While dialogue to arrange maritime disputes remains the optimum scenario, it is unlikely for exploratory talks to resume in the short-term. This essay analyzes Greece’s diplomatic actions, in particular at the EU level and in cooperation with its regional partners such as the UAE. While it values the importance of these initiatives, it also suggests that Athens needs to carefully act in order to have the upper hand in a potential dialogue with Turkey on delimiting maritime zones.

In an interview with Politico Magazine Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Dendias blamed Germany for ‘reluctance to use the enormous power of its economy to set a clear example to countries that they must obey international law’.1 In the last weeks Greece has appealed to its European partners to consider banning arms sales to Turkey as these arms could be used to threaten the sovereignty and sovereign rights of member states.2 It has, in particular, called on Germany to halt the delivery of six type 214 submarines ordered by Ankara.3 The possession of this type of submarines is considered – in the Greek public discourse – a critical advantage of the Hellenic Navy in comparison to Turkey.4

Although Greece’s effort in persuading its partners to accept the option of an arms embargo will hardly find some of them in accord, it is not unlikely for the EU to decide on some sanctions against Turkey. According to the conclusions of the EU Council of 1 and 2 October 2020, ‘in case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international law, the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its member

1 Nektaria Stamouli, ‘Greece Blasts Berlin for Shunning Plea for Turkey Arms Embargo’, available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-blasts-berlin-for-shunning-plea-for-turkey-arms-embargo/, 28 November 2020. 2 Prime Minister of Greece website, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Remarks to the Press after the meeting of the European Council’, available at: https://primeminister.gr/en/2020/10/16/25297, 16 October 2020. 3 Athens 9.84 website, ‘N. Dendias in Welt: Deutschlands Milder Umgang mit der Türkei ist Gescheitert’, available at: https://www.athina984.gr/de/2020/11/08/n-dendias-sti-welt-i-ipia-prosegis-tis-germanias-apenanti- stin-toyrkia-apetyche/, 8 November 2020. 4 Vassilis Nedos, ‘Navy Passes Test in Summer Standoff’, available at: https://www.ekathimerini.com/257934/article/ekathimerini/news/navy-passes-test-in-summer-standoff, 12 October 2020.

1 states’.5 Restrictive measures can target governments, entities, groups or organizations and individuals. The measures can then be divided in categories, namely: arms embargoes, travel bans, economic and financial measures.6

The EU certainly acknowledges the Turkish challenge and attempts to articulate policies which will restrain Ankara’s influence without jeopardizing its engagement with the West. The carrot and stick approach has arguably produced results.7 The EU is thus considering how to better tackle Turkish actions.8 Of course, the EU capacity to succeed is questionable as its foreign policy record remains poor. Greece, however, insists on the need of a European response to the problem and benefits by the momentum. It is not only the Turkish policy in the Eastern Mediterranean that is being scrutinized in Europe but also its actions in Cyprus. In its resolution of 26 November 2020 the European Parliament condemned Turkey’s illegal activities in Varosha, in particular its partial opening.9

As far as maritime zones are concerned, Oruc Reis vessel returned to the port of Antalya on 30 November after having completed its seismic research activities. According to the Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Ministry Oruc Reis collected 10,995 km (6,832 miles) of 2D seismic data.10 German Chancellor Angela Merkel considered the return of the Turkish vessel as ‘positive signal’.11 The question is whether this is a tactical move from Ankara or not. Ankara had made a similar decision before the EU Summit of 1-2 October 2020 but then sent Oruc Reis back to Mediterranean waters. Greece is always ready for constructive dialogue but in the context of respect for international law and the law of the sea. 12 Noting the previous

5 European Council website, Special meeting of the European Council (1 and 2 October 2020) –Conclusions, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45910/021020-euco-final-conclusions.pdf, 2 October 2020. 6 Francesco Giumelli, ‘How EU Sanctions Work’, Chaillot Paper No 129, available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Chaillot_129.pdf, May 2013. 7 Robin Emmott, ‘Carrot-and-stick Approach to Turkey Failing, EU Envoys Say’, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-greece-eu-idUKKBN26Z1LU, 14 October 2020. 8 Marc Pierini, ‘How the European Union Should Tackle Turkey’s Hostility’, available at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/83126, 3 November 2020. 9 European Parliament website, ‘Escalating Tensions in Varosha Following the Illegal Actions by Turkey and the Urgent Need for the Resumption of Talks’, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9- 2020-0332_EN.html, 26 November 2020. 10 Daily Sabah website, ‘Turkey’s Oruç Reis Back in Port Ahead of EU Summit’, available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/eu-affairs/turkeys-oruc-reis-back-in-port-ahead-of-eu-summit, 30 November 2020. 11 Ayhan Simsek, ‘Merkel Sees Positive Signal from Turkey Ahead of EU Summit’, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/merkel-sees-positive-signal-from-turkey-ahead-of-eu-summit/2060808, 30 November 2011. 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece website, Online Briefing of Diplomatic Correspondents by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Alexandros Papaioannou, available at: https://www.mfa.gr/en/current- affairs/press-briefings/online-briefing-of-diplomatic-correspondents-by-ministry-of-foreign-affairs- spokesperson-alexandros-papaioannou-athens-26-november-2020.html, 27 November 2020.

2 experience, it regards a potential moratorium on exploratory activities necessary in order for de-escalation to be safeguarded.13

Greece has made important steps in arranging maritime issues with other countries. In June 2020 it reached an agreement with Italy and two months later, in August with Egypt. It has also agreed with Albania to refer the theme to the International Court of Justice. Additionally, Greece is enhancing its cooperation with other Eastern Mediterranean countries. On 12 November 2020, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis hosted President of Egypt Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and referred to the creation of the East Med Gas Forum (EMGF). The EMGF is an intergovernmental organization with the participation of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. In the press conference with El-Sisi, Mitsotakis said that every country in the Eastern Mediterranean ‘should be welcome and involved in this innovative energy partnership provided that it abstains from provocations and it respects international legality.’14 Turkey is currently absent but could arguably join the EMGF if the seven afore- mentioned players agreed.15

Greece is also enhancing its ties with the UAE. On 18 November the Greek Premier went to Abu Dhabi and met Crown Prince of the Emirate, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Among other things, the two countries signed an agreement that contains an innovative mutual defense clause for the first time since the end of World War II.16 According to official information, the cooperation agreement in the fields of foreign policy and defense stipulates, amongst other provisions, the establishment of a High Level Committee, which will oversee its implementation, as well as the strengthening of the defense collaboration. Furthermore, Athens and Abu Dhabi issued a joint statement in which they condemned Turkey’s violations of the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus, as well as its overall aggressive conduct

13 Vassilis Nedos, ‘Exploration Moratorium the Only Way’, available at: https://www.ekathimerini.com/259702/article/ekathimerini/news/exploration-moratorium-the-only-way, 30 November 2020. 14 Prime Minister of Greece website, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Statement After his Meeting with the President of Egypt Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’, available at: https://primeminister.gr/en/2020/11/11/25215, 11 November 2020. 15 George N. Tzogopoulos, ‘Athens and Jerusalem Have a Diplomatic Opportunity’, BESA Perspectives Paper No. 1,602, available at: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/greece-israel-opportunity/, 10 June 2020. 16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece website, Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Dendias, Following his Briefing of Parliamentary Group Representatives, available at: https://www.mfa.gr/en/current- affairs/top-story/statement-of-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-nikos-dendias-following-his-briefing-of- parliamentary-group-representatives-athens-26-november-2020.html, 26 November 2020.

3 in the Middle East, Southeast Mediterranean and South Caucasus in blatant violation of international law.17

Greece’s cooperation with the UAE has flourished in the last year, especially because the UAE has criticized the Turkish-Libyan MoU on maritime zones. The May 2020 statement of Greece, Cyprus, France, Egypt, UAE had been of high significance in that regard.18 Also, both sides supported General Haftar in the Libyan civil war. The training of Greek and Emirati F-16 fighters - with Crete as their basis - last August is indicative of solidarity.19 Although specific pledges of the new defense accord are unknown, it is positive that Greece’s foreign policy is multidimensional, and draws on its opening to Israel that is being recognized by Persian Gulf countries such as the UAE and Bahrain, while it maintains good relations with Saudi Arabia. However, important as they are, these foreign policy choices cannot solve Greece’s maritime disputes with Turkey. Greece should undertake the diplomatic initiative of starting a dialogue – after the December EU council – aiming at delimiting the continental shelf. Without a solution to this problem, tensions will be continuously on the rise in the Eastern Mediterranean. The October Special EU council clarifies that the Greek-Turkish dialogue will only cover maritime zones. So, Athens need to benefit and define itself diplomatic developments.

On the whole, Greece counts on US support. Turkish collaboration with Russia – following the purchase of S400 missile system – has been an issue of concern. Ankara is well- aware of the Western criticism on this acquisition and is continuously endeavoring to play down concerns by employing a multifaceted argumentation. It argues, for instance, that other NATO member-states such as Greece and Slovakia had been supplied with S-300 missiles in the past. However, the timing of the purchase of S-400 by Turkey and the S-300 instalment on the island of Crete is completely different. The impact on American interests varies according to different junctures. The Turkish bargain with Russia took place in 2018-2019 in a period during which Washington was already considering Moscow a rival. On the contrary, the Greek-Cypriot arms swap had formally taken place in 2007, in a phase during which American-Russian relations had been better and NATO-Russian cooperation had been on the agenda. Washington is

17 Prime Minister of Greece website, Information Note on Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Visit to Abu Dhabi and the Agreements that Were Signed, available at: https://primeminister.gr/en/2020/11/18/25315, 18 November 2020. 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece website, Joint Declaration adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece and the United Arab Emirates, available at: https://www.mfa.gr/en/current- affairs/statements-speeches/joint-declaration-adopted-by-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-cyprus-egypt- france-greece-and-the-united-arab-emirates-11052020.html, 11 May 2020. 19 Vassilis Nedos, ‘Four Emirati F-16s to Arrive in Souda Air Base’, available at: https://www.ekathimerini.com/256085/article/ekathimerini/news/four-emirati-f-16s-to-arrive-in-souda-air-base, 21 August 2020.

4 currently concerned about the general motivations of Turkish foreign policy while it largely trusts Greece as a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.20 American-Turkish ties are strained whereas Greek-American relations have been elevated to the highest level of their history, including on defense collaboration. The US certainly wants to preserve Turkey as a reliable NATO partner but its effort is more complicated in relation to Greece as the latter does not cause similar problems to the Alliance.

Conclusion

Greece monitors Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterranean from a European lens. It believes that the EU needs to better manage a problem that does not only impact on the country itself and Cyprus but also on Europe. It has therefore asked its European partners to consider the possibility of an arms embargo against Ankara and hopes that potential sanctions might reserve its behavior. It additional counts on larger American support and boosts ties with regional partners such as the UAE. Greece still believes that a constructive dialogue on delimiting maritime zones could be beneficial but remains skeptical of Turkish motivations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

20 US Department of State website, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo And Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis Joint Press Statements After Their Meeting, available at: https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r- pompeo-and-greek-prime-minister-kyriakos-mitsotakis-joint-press-statements-after-their-meeting/, 29 September 2020.