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Securitised Credit: What do ABS and the Ministry of Defence have in common? February 2019
“ABS, MBS, CMBS, CLO, CDO, AAAs, CCCs, IG, SUBS, MEZZ, BIG...” The Michelle Russell-Dowe Asset-Backed Securities market can appear complex, or even Head of Securitised Credit confusing. This is largely due to the proliferation of jargon, or three letter acronyms within the industry. However, the ABS industry has not cornered the market on the use of three letter acronyms (TLAs). It is actually the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that wins that crown, having published a list of TLAs totaling more than 400 pages. The proliferation of these codes has, according to The Times, resulted in “a fightback against the proliferation of TLAs, amid concerns that the practice may be hampering the ability of the military to communicate clearly with the outside world. With TLAs, we certainly see some commonality between the MoD and ABS. But the similarities don’t stop there - we also believe ABS present a critical opportunity as a defensive investment as market volatility increases. In this paper, we take a closer look at how ABS can be used as a defensive asset for those seeking stable income in today’s investment environment.
We do not predict a dull year for markets in 2019 and we believe that strong defence will become increasingly important, especially with a rise in market volatility. Our view is that select areas within ABS retain several benefits that place each at an earlier stage in their respective credit cycles, compared to more traditional credit risk. Throughout this paper we will refer to the consumer segments (ABS and MBS) as Main Street. We refer to corporate related credit as Wall Street. We believe that given the conditions today, Main Street is in better shape than Wall Street, and given our defensive bias, appears a more attractive way to play the game today.
We’d argue that it is critical to keep three key factors in mind: 1) the potential for change in policy 2) level of leverage in the different sectors, and 3) the level of outstanding debt and issuance. In doing so, we believe we can identify a defensive core allocation among more consumer-driven areas of the market and earn income while avoiding exposure to investments with imbalances, high valuations, weaker fundamentals and high sensitivity to shock as policy changes.
Policy: Reversal of QE Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) there was globally coordinated quantitative easing (QE) which has provided substantial liquidity to markets. This policy pumped more than $14 trillion of liquidity into financial markets through 2018.
Of the larger QE providers, Central Bank purchases for balance sheet allocation varied, but were substantial.
US: $4 trillion is held with $2.3 trillion of US Treasuries and $1.7 trillion of Agency MBS Bank of England (BoE): $575 billion is held with $562 billion in Gilts and $13 billion in Corporate bonds European Central Bank (ECB): $3.8 trillion is held with $2.4 trillion in Government bonds, $850 billion in Repo, $300 billion in Covered bonds, $202 billion in Corporate bonds, and $32 billion in ABS Bank of Japan (BoJ): $4.9 trillion is held with $4.2 trillion in JGBs, $468 billion in Corporate Commercial Paper, bonds and loans, and $200 billion in stocks
However, QE is coming to an end. That end is quantitative tightening (QT). With QT in mind, particularly where capital flows were increased by QE, we should expect reversion back to more normal levels of risk premium, volatility and valuations. We believe we are seeing the beginnings of that re-valuation now.
So where did QE have the most significant impact? That answer lies in two places: 1) where was it easy to deploy capital (for e.g. where regulation did not limit the capital flows by restricting lending or limiting issuance of securities), and 2) the converse; where capital was more limited. Post GFC, in the US there was a focus on de-leveraging of the financial institutions and consumers. As a result, banks, consumer lending and mortgage finance became heavily regulated. Mortgage debt and financial corporate debt outstanding have declined since 2007. The decrease has been both outright, and as a percentage of US GDP. Over the same period, US non-financial corporate debt has increased. Looking at debt outstanding over time we can see that more than $4 trillion in growth occurred in non-financial corporate debt over the period that QE has been in place. Over the same period, mortgage debt modestly declined.
Figure 1: Record high corporate debt while single family mortgages still below 2007 levels (in trillions) $ 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 Mar-05 May-06 Jul-07 Sep-08 Nov-09 Jan-11 Mar-12 May-13 Jul-14 Sep-15 Nov-16 Jan-18
Single Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding US Non-Financial Corporate debt
Source: Bloomberg, IMF, Federal Reserve as of June 2018.
The annual growth in first-lien mortgage debt (the largest of all consumer debts) has been well below pre-crisis levels, even as population and wages have increased. This is owing to the more stringent lending standards.
More tellingly, post GFC the total US consumer debt (green line) has grown at a slower rate than wages and salary (yellow line), even as wage growth has arguably been a laggard in this recovery. Non-mortgage consumer debt growth (dark blue line) has also slowed over the last two years as this credit cycle has been longer compared to historical cycles.
Figure 2: Consumer debt growth has lagged wage growth (year-over-year growth) 25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
Sep-04 Sep-09 Sep-14 Sep-05 Sep-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18
Mar-07 Mar-12 Mar-17 Mar-04 Mar-05 Mar-06 Mar-08 Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-18
Total Non-Mortgage Consumer Debt Total Consumer Debt Wage & Salary
Source: Bloomberg as at September 2018.
The impact of regulation on access to credit for consumers and specifically for housing, has substantially improved the fundamental position of housing and of the consumer today. Leverage, as measured by debt service ratio (DSR), has fallen sharply from pre-crisis levels, and remains low compared to longer historical averages.
In addition, US household debt as a percentage of GDP has fallen, whereas US non-financial corporate debt is at or reaching new highs, as shown in figure 3 below. The restriction in mortgage and consumer lending can be contrast with corporate lending, which has grown sharply in products like leveraged loans since the GFC, but especially over the past two years.
Figure 3: US non-financial corporate debt, % of GDP 60% 55% 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25%
20%
1980:Q1 1981:Q1 1982:Q1 1983:Q1 1984:Q1 1985:Q1 1986:Q1 1987:Q1 1988:Q1 1989:Q1 1990:Q1 1991:Q1 1992:Q1 1993:Q1 1994:Q1 1995:Q1 1996:Q1 1997:Q1 1998:Q1 1999:Q1 2000:Q1 2001:Q1 2002:Q1 2003:Q1 2004:Q1 2005:Q1 2006:Q1 2007:Q1 2008:Q1 2009:Q1 2010:Q1 2011:Q1 2012:Q1 2013:Q1 2014:Q1 2015:Q1 2016:Q1 2017:Q1
Source: Federal Reserve, MBER. Shaded areas reflect recessionary periods.
This increase in corporate debt is a function of QE:
1. Direct demand for yield spurred as investors were crowded out by QE 2. Regulation of other debt, such as financial corporate debt, bank debt and mortgage debt 3. International demand for the yields seen in the US by foreign investors 4. Ease of access to corporate debt of all kinds in daily liquid funds and ETFs
By the same token, with regulation, far fewer debt products offered exposure to consumers, and the low fixed-rates offered on most consumer and mortgage debt, the consumer debt-to-income ratio is close to 40-year lows.
Figure 4: Current consumer debt-to-income ratio (%) is close to 40-year lows 14
13
12
11
10
9
8
1980:01:00 1981:01:00 1982:01:00 1983:01:00 1984:01:00 1985:01:00 1986:01:00 1987:01:00 1988:01:00 1989:01:00 1990:01:00 1991:01:00 1992:01:00 1993:01:00 1994:01:00 1995:01:00 1996:01:00 1997:01:00 1998:01:00 1999:01:00 2000:01:00 2001:01:00 2002:01:00 2003:01:00 2004:01:00 2005:01:00 2006:01:00 2007:01:00 2008:01:00 2009:01:00 2010:01:00 2011:01:00 2012:01:00 2013:01:00 2014:01:00 2015:01:00 2016:01:00 2017:01:00 2018:01:00
Source: Federal Reserve, through Q2 2018. Current ratio level reflected by yellow line.
Regulations that impacted consumer debt / housing debt included limits to lending based on loan characteristics, restrictions on underwriting which include income standards, and requirements to offset an originate to sell model. Much of this regulation sits in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, but there are substantial other regulations that limit lenders and buyers of securitised debt, such as Basel III, Solvency II, or EU risk retention. Entities established to protect consumers such as the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), the numerous lawsuits of originators, underwriters and mortgage servicers have also had an impact. And lesser known, but no less important the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act has had a limiting effect on the offering of credit card debt. Today, more than 75% of all mortgage loans originated are guaranteed through the US Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) or Ginnie Mae (FHA/VA), with the remainder held on the lenders (bank) balance sheet. Very little of today’s mortgage origination goes through the former private label securitisation execution channel. While this is likely something that could, and should, change over time, it is noteworthy in terms of the type of supply the market sees. As we know, the GSE and FHA/VA securities are not securities which carry traditional risk as their payment (that is, their credit risk) is guaranteed by the US government.
Figure 5: Mortgage originations by channel
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated October 2018.
There are other interesting issuance dynamics in today’s market versus the pre-GFC era. In the non-agency mortgage- backed securities (non-agency MBS), there is no government guarantee, so these securities actually offer a credit risk premium, but there is very little supply and, in fact, a negative net supply situation. What exists in these markets is secondary supply driven by the $400 billion market of outstanding and seasoned vintages of 30 year mortgage securities issued before the financial crisis. In terms of new issue markets for non-agency MBS, excluding agency MBS issuance, the amount of issuance is quite a bit lower than in the past. The non-agency market outstanding beyond the older pre-crisis securities is:
1. $50 billion market in GSE credit risk transfer 2. $25 billion market in seasoned re-performing or non-performing mortgage loans 3. $20 billion market in non-Qualifying Mortgages (non-QM loans not meeting agency standards)
Considering US mortgage debt is a $10 trillion market, the $20 billion in non-QM outstanding issuance is a far cry from the peak of non-prime mortgage issuance outstanding, which reached nearly $1.5 trillion in 2007, as shown in Figure 6 overleaf.
Figure 6: ABS Net Issuance ($ billions) 1,500
1,000 Corporate Debt
Consumer ABS 500 Non-Agency CMBS
0 Non-Agency RMBS Agency CMBS
-500 Agency RMBS
-1,000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: SIFMA as of September 2018
Owing to the much more stringent underwriting, the housing finance mortgage default risk is at the lowest level, recorded by the Urban Institute.
Figure 7: Default risk well below pre-crisis levels
Source: Urban Institute, December 2018
Moving from consumer to corporate finance, we believe a very significant impact of the QE policies has been the increase in access to credit for non-financial corporations, given significant demand for assets with a credit risk premium, low levels of yields or return, and low volatility. This led to an explosion in the proportion of investment grade debt issued as BBB, as corporations leveraged up, shown in Figure 8 overleaf.
Figure 8: Value of corporate debt by rating (in $ trillions)
8 7 AAA
6 AA 5 A 4 BBB 3 BB 2 B 1 - C 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018
Source: Bloomberg as at December 2018.
Intelligence tells us consumer credit exposure offers diversification and defensive qualities. We think now is the time to consider strategic exposures that capture the consumer-driven segments of the market. Credit investors are still looking for stable income, and it is time to closely examine diversifying exposures away from trades that have become crowded in a QE fueled investment environment. The impact of the reduction in QE will be anything but predictable. It is unlikely to be coordinated globally, and it is also likely to be a longer-term proposition given that some central banks still continue to add to their balance sheet such as the Bank of Japan. As global central bank balance sheets normalise, risk premiums should return to more normal levels. Further, there will be more supply of liquid and safe assets, like US Treasury Notes, that will likely reverse the dynamic of the investment flows seen during QE.
In terms of leverage, supply and demand, or the potential for policy shocks, the consumer (Main Street), seems to be at a much earlier stage in its credit cycle versus more traditional corporate exposures (Wall Street). We think this view is supported by very favourable metrics in terms of delinquency, default rates, debt-to-income, net worth, disposable income and savings rates. In short, Main Street feels like a defensive alternative.
Figure 9: Mortgage delinquency rates move lower with unemployment 12
10
8
% 6
4
2
0 Mar-91 May-93 Jul-95 Sep-97 Nov-99 Jan-02 Mar-04 May-06 Jul-08 Sep-10 Nov-12 Jan-15 Mar-17
Delinquency Rates on all Mortgages US Unemployment Rate
Source: Federal Reserve, Bloomberg as of September 2018.
The main types of debt expanding within the consumer credit universe have been student loans and peer-to-peer lending. This type of lending is not dominated by banks and is therefore less regulated. That said, the more sizable debt within this group is student loan debt, at nearly $2 trillion outstanding. The state of the student loan market is obviously a concern from a consumer debt burden perspective, but the vast majority of this debt is held or guaranteed by the US government through the US’ Department of Education.
For auto loan finance, a $1 trillion market, 20% of that market that is non-prime lending and has gone through a tightening of lending standards over the past 2.5 years as subprime in the sector was a growing concern. We see this reconciliation as a sign of a more disciplined credit sensitive process.
Figure 10: Fed survey of auto loan underwriting standards 15
10
5
0
% -5
-10 Tightening observed
-15
-20
-25 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: Bloomberg as of October 2018.
The best way to access consumer credit? Much of the $13.3 trillion consumer debt is on lender balance sheets. The high deposits mean that banks have retained a substantial amount of the mortgage loans and the unsecured credit card receivables that they have originated. But, outside of owning financial corporates, the primary means of accessing exposure to the consumer is through securitised markets or through direct debt ownership. This investment exposure is directly supported by the consumer’s ability to repay the financial contract. This is a concept inherent to the ABS market. The debt is backed by repayments on financial contracts. So long as the consumer is healthy or stable, the primary exposure is to the consumer’s ability to repay the debt.
Figure 11: Underpinning the strength of the consumer are strong wage and salary numbers
3.3 9500
3.1 9000 2.9 8500 2.7 % 2.5 8000
2.3 7500
2.1 7000 1.9 6500 1.7
1.5 6000
US Average Hourly earnings (YoY %, left) Wages & Salary (SAAR, right)
Source: BEA, BLS, December 2018.
There is a secondary source of repayment, which would be the worth of any collateral that can be liquidated in the event of default. Further, a key tenet of ABS is the sale of the financial contracts to a trust, which then owns the receivables remote from the risk of the lender. In our view, aside from owning the financial contracts directly (as whole loans), ABS and MBS are the most direct way to access the consumer credit risk in the US today.
Within the US, the Agency MBS market is principally a consumer prepayment and risk mitigating consumer story, at $7.4 trillion. Another $2 trillion of consumer debt sits in the US non-agency MBS and ABS markets.1
1 We also think the US housing market is healthy and find select opportunities in less efficient, or underbuilt commercial real estate markets. These debts should be less correlated to corporate credit. Post GFC, even with QE, non-agency RMBS, ABS and CMBS did not benefit from a material expansion in demand, due in large part due to onerous capital rules put in place for banks and for European insurance companies. Additionally, given that most non-guaranteed ABS, CMBS and non-agency MBS are typically excluded from the major fixed income indices (like Bloomberg Barclays) there is little in the way of buying from passive fund mangers or ETF’s. As a result, ABS and MBS seem to us to be a defensive way to position from a technical perspective, particularly when compared to corporate credit.
TLAs aside, we believe ABS seems like a smart defensive move Based on BoAML index returns, two of the asset classes with positive returns in 2018 were ABS and MBS. Few assets classes had positive returns over this period. In non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities, investors were yet again rewarded for being long credit and spread duration. We expect a similar result in 2019 as fundamental mortgage credit performance, consumer credit performance, and underwriting remain strong.
In several asset classes like corporate debt, equity and loans, we have classic, even exaggerated, late-cycle dynamics such as high leverage, technical imbalances, potential for policy shocks, low yields/risk premiums and high valuations. In these credit sectors, it has been a while since investors have had negative returns over an annual period and this reversal alone could cause a significant momentum change, especially given the involvement of retail investors through ETF and mutual fund investments with daily liquidity.
At the end of 2018, the market for risk assets began to re-price dramatically. The conditions driving the re-pricing, and the corresponding increase in volatility, remain in place as we open the books on 2019. Under these conditions, we think focusing a bit on defense is the right call by increasing exposure to asset classes benefitting from strong fundamental support and better supply /demand dynamics. Select ABS sectors can be a great way to accomplish this, with fewer late-cycle characteristics and less exposure to the shift away from QE. In addition, ABS offers diversification to more traditional corporate credit risk given its underlying consumer-oriented fundamentals, and investors can pick up a lower volatility product with:
1. stable income potential 2. lower sensitivity to interest rates, while, 3. remaining in a good position to move offensively as opportunities unfold
Key risks of this asset class - Mortgage or asset-backed securities may not receive in full the amounts owed to them by underlying borrowers - When interest rates are very low or negative, the strategy's yield may be zero or negative, and you may not get back all of your investment - The counterparty to a derivative or other contractual agreement or synthetic financial product could become unable to honour its commitments to the strategy, potentially creating a partial or total loss for the strategy - A failure of a deposit institution or an issuer of a money market instrument could create losses - A decline in the financial health of an issuer could cause the value of its bonds to fall or become worthless - The strategy can be exposed to different currencies. Changes in foreign exchange rates could create losses - A derivative may not perform as expected, and may create losses greater than the cost of the derivative - High yield bonds (normally lower rated or unrated) generally carry greater market, credit and liquidity risk - A rise in interest rates generally causes bond prices to fall - The strategy uses derivatives for leverage, which makes it more sensitive to certain market or interest rate movements and may cause above-average volatility and risk of loss - In difficult market conditions, the strategy may not be able to sell a security for full value or at all. This could affect performance and could cause the strategy to defer or suspend redemptions of its shares - Failures at service providers could lead to disruptions of strategy operations or losses
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